< draft-ietf-ace-extend-dtls-authorize-01.txt		draft-ietf-ace-extend-dtls-authorize-02.txt >
	Network Working Group O. Bergmann		ACE Working Group O. Bergmann
	Internet-Draft TZI		Internet-Draft TZI
	Updates: draft-ietf-ace-dtls-authorize (if J. Preuß Mattsson		Updates: draft-ietf-ace-dtls-authorize (if J. Preuß Mattsson
	approved) G. Selander		approved) G. Selander
	Intended status: Standards Track Ericsson		Intended status: Standards Track Ericsson
	Expires: 8 August 2022 4 February 2022		Expires: 8 September 2022 7 March 2022
	Extension of the ACE CoAP-DTLS Profile to TLS		Extension of the CoAP-DTLS Profile for ACE to TLS
	draft-ietf-ace-extend-dtls-authorize-01		draft-ietf-ace-extend-dtls-authorize-02
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document updates the ACE CoAP-DTLS profile by specifying that		This document updates the CoAP-DTLS profile for ACE
	the profile applies to TLS as well as DTLS.		[I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize] by specifying that the profile applies
			to TLS as well as DTLS.
	Discussion Venues		Discussion Venues
	This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.		This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
	Discussion of this document takes place on the Authentication and		Discussion of this document takes place on the Authentication and
	Authorization for Constrained Environments Working Group mailing list		Authorization for Constrained Environments Working Group mailing list
	(ace@ietf.org), which is archived at		(ace@ietf.org), which is archived at
	https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ace/.		https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ace/.
	skipping to change at page 1, line 45 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 46 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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	This Internet-Draft will expire on 8 August 2022.		This Internet-Draft will expire on 8 September 2022.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
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	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	2. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		3. Connection Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	4. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	4.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	4.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
			Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
			Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	[I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize] only specifies use of DTLS		[I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize] only specifies the use of DTLS
	[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] but works equally well for TLS. For many		[RFC6347] but works equally well for TLS [RFC8446]. For many
	constrained implementations, CoAP over UDP [RFC7252] is the first		constrained implementations, CoAP over UDP [RFC7252] is the first
	choice, but when deploying ACE in networks controlled by other		choice, but when deploying ACE in networks controlled by other
	entities (such as the Internet), UDP might be blocked on the path		entities (such as the Internet), UDP might be blocked on the path
	between the client and the RS, and the client might have to fall back		between the client and the RS, and the client might have to fall back
	to CoAP over TCP [RFC8323] for NAT or firewall traversal. This		to CoAP over TCP [RFC8323] for NAT or firewall traversal. This
	feature is supported by the OSCORE profile		feature is supported by the OSCORE profile
	[I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile] but is lacking from the DTLS profile.		[I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile] but is lacking in the DTLS profile.
	This document updates [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize] by specifying		This document updates [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize] by specifying
	that the profile applies to TLS as well as DTLS. The same access		that the profile applies to TLS as well as DTLS. The same access
	rights are valid in case transport layer security is either DTLS or		rights are valid in case transport layer security is provided by
	TLS, and the same access token can be used.		either DTLS or TLS, and the same access token can be used.
			Therefore, the value coap_dtls in the ace_profile parameter of an AS-
			to-Client response or in the ace_profile claim of an access token
			indicates that either DTLS or TLS can be used for transport layer
			security.
	2. IANA Considerations		2. Terminology
	No IANA Considerations.		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
			"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
			"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
			BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
			capitals, as shown here.
	3. Security Considerations		Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts
			described in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] and
			[I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize].
			3. Connection Establishment
			Following the procedures defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize], a
			Client can retrieve an Access Token from an Authorization Server (AS)
			in order to establish a security association with a specific Resource
			Server. The ace_profile parameter in the Client-to-AS request and
			AS-to-client response is used to determine the ACE profile that the
			Client uses towards the Resource Server (RS).
			In case the ace_profile parameter indicates the use of the DTLS
			profile for ACE as defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize], the
			Client MAY try to connect to the Resource Server via TLS, or try TLS
			and DTLS in parallel to accelerate the session setup.
			As resource-constrained devices are not expected to support both
			transport layer security mechanisms, a Client that implements either
			TLS or DTLS but not both might fail in establishing a secure
			communication channel with the Resource Server altogether. This
			error SHOULD be handled by the Client in the same way as unsupported
			ACE profiles. If the Client is modified accordingly or it learns
			that the Resource Server has been, the Client may try to connect to
			the Resource Server using the transport layer security mechanism that
			was previously not mutually supported.
			Note that a communication setup with an a priori unknown Resource
			Server typically employs an initial unauthorized resource request as
			illustrated in Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize]. If this
			message exchange succeeds, the Client SHOULD first use the same
			underlying transport protocol for the establishment of the security
			association as well (i.e., DTLS for UDP, and TLS for TCP).
			As a consequence, the selection of the transport protocol used for
			the initial unauthorized resource request also depends on the
			transport layer security mechanism supported by the Client. Clients
			that support either DTLS or TLS but not both SHOULD use the transport
			protocol underlying the supported transport layer security mechanism
			also for an initial unauthorized resource request.
			4. IANA Considerations
			The following updates have been done for the "ACE Profiles" registry
			for the profile with Profile ID 1 and Profile name coap_dtls:
			Note to RFC Editor: Please replace all occurrences of "[RFC-XXXX]"
			with the RFC number of this specification and delete this paragraph.
			Description: Profile for delegating client Authentication and
			Authorization for Constrained Environments by establishing a Datagram
			Transport Layer Security (DTLS) or Transport Layer Security (TLS)
			channel between resource-constrained nodes.
			Change Controller: IESG
			Reference: [RFC-XXXX]
			5. Security Considerations
	The security consideration and requirements in TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] and		The security consideration and requirements in TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] and
	BCP 195 [RFC7525] [RFC8996] also apply to this document.		BCP 195 [RFC7525] [RFC8996] also apply to this document.
	4. References		6. References
	4.1. Normative References		6.1. Normative References
	[I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize]		[I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize]
	Gerdes, S., Bergmann, O., Bormann, C., Selander, G., and		Gerdes, S., Bergmann, O., Bormann, C., Selander, G., and
	L. Seitz, "Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)		L. Seitz, "Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
	Profile for Authentication and Authorization for		Profile for Authentication and Authorization for
	Constrained Environments (ACE)", Work in Progress,		Constrained Environments (ACE)", Work in Progress,
	Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-ace-dtls-authorize-18, 4 June		Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-ace-dtls-authorize-18, 4 June
	2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ace-		2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ace-
	dtls-authorize-18.txt>.		dtls-authorize-18.txt>.
	[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]		[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]
	Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The		Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and
	Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version		H. Tschofenig, "Authentication and Authorization for
	1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls-		Constrained Environments (ACE) using the OAuth 2.0
	dtls13-43, 30 April 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/internet-		Framework (ACE-OAuth)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
	drafts/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-43.txt>.		draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-46, 8 November 2021,
			<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ace-oauth-
			authz-46.txt>.
			[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
			Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
			[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
			Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
			January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
	[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained		[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
	Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,		Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,		DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.
			[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
			2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
			May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
	[RFC8323] Bormann, C., Lemay, S., Tschofenig, H., Hartke, K.,		[RFC8323] Bormann, C., Lemay, S., Tschofenig, H., Hartke, K.,
	Silverajan, B., and B. Raymor, Ed., "CoAP (Constrained		Silverajan, B., and B. Raymor, Ed., "CoAP (Constrained
	Application Protocol) over TCP, TLS, and WebSockets",		Application Protocol) over TCP, TLS, and WebSockets",
	RFC 8323, DOI 10.17487/RFC8323, February 2018,		RFC 8323, DOI 10.17487/RFC8323, February 2018,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8323>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8323>.
	[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol		[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
	Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,		Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
	4.2. Informative References		6.2. Informative References
	[I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile]		[I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile]
	Palombini, F., Seitz, L., Selander, G., and M. Gunnarsson,		Palombini, F., Seitz, L., Selander, G., and M. Gunnarsson,
	"OSCORE Profile of the Authentication and Authorization		"OSCORE Profile of the Authentication and Authorization
	for Constrained Environments Framework", Work in Progress,		for Constrained Environments Framework", Work in Progress,
	Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-ace-oscore-profile-19, 6 May		Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-ace-oscore-profile-19, 6 May
	2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ace-		2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ace-
	oscore-profile-19.txt>.		oscore-profile-19.txt>.
	[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,		[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
	skipping to change at page 4, line 25 ¶		skipping to change at page 6, line 17 ¶
	Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security		Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
	(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May		(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
	2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.		2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
	[RFC8996] Moriarty, K. and S. Farrell, "Deprecating TLS 1.0 and TLS		[RFC8996] Moriarty, K. and S. Farrell, "Deprecating TLS 1.0 and TLS
	1.1", BCP 195, RFC 8996, DOI 10.17487/RFC8996, March 2021,		1.1", BCP 195, RFC 8996, DOI 10.17487/RFC8996, March 2021,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8996>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8996>.
	Acknowledgments		Acknowledgments
			The authors would like to thank Marco Tiloca for reviewing this
			specification.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Olaf Bergmann		Olaf Bergmann
	Universität Bremen TZI		Universität Bremen TZI
	Bremen, D-28359		Bremen, D-28359
	Germany		Germany
	Email: bergmann@tzi.org		Email: bergmann@tzi.org
	John Preuß Mattsson		John Preuß Mattsson
	Ericsson AB		Ericsson AB
	SE-164 80 Stockholm		SE-164 80 Stockholm
	Sweden		Sweden
	Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com		Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com
	Göran Selander		Göran Selander
	Ericsson AB		Ericsson AB
	SE-164 80 Stockholm		SE-164 80 Stockholm
	Sweden		Sweden
	Email: goran.selander@ericsson.com		Email: goran.selander@ericsson.com
End of changes. 21 change blocks.
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