< draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-26.txt   draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-27.txt >
ACE Working Group L. Seitz ACE Working Group L. Seitz
Internet-Draft RISE Internet-Draft RISE
Intended status: Standards Track G. Selander Intended status: Standards Track G. Selander
Expires: May 22, 2020 Ericsson Expires: May 24, 2020 Ericsson
E. Wahlstroem E. Wahlstroem
S. Erdtman S. Erdtman
Spotify AB Spotify AB
H. Tschofenig H. Tschofenig
Arm Ltd. Arm Ltd.
November 19, 2019 November 21, 2019
Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE)
using the OAuth 2.0 Framework (ACE-OAuth) using the OAuth 2.0 Framework (ACE-OAuth)
draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-26 draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-27
Abstract Abstract
This specification defines a framework for authentication and This specification defines a framework for authentication and
authorization in Internet of Things (IoT) environments called ACE- authorization in Internet of Things (IoT) environments called ACE-
OAuth. The framework is based on a set of building blocks including OAuth. The framework is based on a set of building blocks including
OAuth 2.0 and CoAP, thus transforming a well-known and widely used OAuth 2.0 and CoAP, thus transforming a well-known and widely used
authorization solution into a form suitable for IoT devices. authorization solution into a form suitable for IoT devices.
Existing specifications are used where possible, but extensions are Existing specifications are used where possible, but extensions are
added and profiles are defined to better serve the IoT use cases. added and profiles are defined to better serve the IoT use cases.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 22, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on May 24, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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5.8.1. The Authorization Information Endpoint . . . . . . . 36 5.8.1. The Authorization Information Endpoint . . . . . . . 36
5.8.1.1. Verifying an Access Token . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 5.8.1.1. Verifying an Access Token . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.8.1.2. Protecting the Authorization Information 5.8.1.2. Protecting the Authorization Information
Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.8.2. Client Requests to the RS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 5.8.2. Client Requests to the RS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.8.3. Token Expiration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 5.8.3. Token Expiration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.8.4. Key Expiration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 5.8.4. Key Expiration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.1. Protecting Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 6.1. Protecting Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.2. Communication Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 6.2. Communication Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6.3. Long-Term Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 6.3. Long-Term Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6.4. Unprotected AS Request Creation Hints . . . . . . . . . . 44 6.4. Unprotected AS Request Creation Hints . . . . . . . . . . 44
6.5. Minimal security requirements for communication . 45 6.5. Minimal security requirements for communication . 45
6.6. Token Freshness and Expiration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 6.6. Token Freshness and Expiration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
6.7. Combining profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 6.7. Combining profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
6.8. Unprotected Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 6.8. Unprotected Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
6.9. Identifying audiences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 6.9. Identifying audiences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
6.10. Denial of service against or with Introspection . . 48 6.10. Denial of service against or with Introspection . . 48
7. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 7. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
8.1. ACE Authorization Server Request Creation Hints . . . . . 50 8.1. ACE Authorization Server Request Creation Hints . . . . . 50
8.2. OAuth Extensions Error Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 51 8.2. OAuth Extensions Error Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 50
8.3. OAuth Error Code CBOR Mappings Registry . . . . . . . . . 51 8.3. OAuth Error Code CBOR Mappings Registry . . . . . . . . . 51
8.4. OAuth Grant Type CBOR Mappings . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 8.4. OAuth Grant Type CBOR Mappings . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
8.5. OAuth Access Token Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 8.5. OAuth Access Token Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
8.6. OAuth Access Token Type CBOR Mappings . . . . . . . . . . 52 8.6. OAuth Access Token Type CBOR Mappings . . . . . . . . . . 52
8.6.1. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 8.6.1. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
8.7. ACE Profile Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 8.7. ACE Profile Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
8.8. OAuth Parameter Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 8.8. OAuth Parameter Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
8.9. OAuth Parameters CBOR Mappings Registry . . . . . . . . . 53 8.9. OAuth Parameters CBOR Mappings Registry . . . . . . . . . 53
8.10. OAuth Introspection Response Parameter Registration . . . 54 8.10. OAuth Introspection Response Parameter Registration . . . 54
8.11. OAuth Token Introspection Response CBOR Mappings Registry 54 8.11. OAuth Token Introspection Response CBOR Mappings Registry 54
8.12. JSON Web Token Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 8.12. JSON Web Token Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
8.13. CBOR Web Token Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 8.13. CBOR Web Token Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
8.14. Media Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 8.14. Media Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
8.15. CoAP Content-Format Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 8.15. CoAP Content-Format Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
8.16. Expert Review Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 8.16. Expert Review Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Appendix A. Design Justification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Appendix A. Design Justification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Appendix B. Roles and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Appendix B. Roles and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Appendix C. Requirements on Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 Appendix C. Requirements on Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Appendix D. Assumptions on AS knowledge about C and RS . . . . . 71 Appendix D. Assumptions on AS knowledge about C and RS . . . . . 70
Appendix E. Deployment Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Appendix E. Deployment Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
E.1. Local Token Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 E.1. Local Token Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
E.2. Introspection Aided Token Validation . . . . . . . . . . 76 E.2. Introspection Aided Token Validation . . . . . . . . . . 75
Appendix F. Document Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 Appendix F. Document Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
F.1. Version -21 to 22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 F.1. Version -21 to 22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
F.2. Version -20 to 21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 F.2. Version -20 to 21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
F.3. Version -19 to 20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 F.3. Version -19 to 20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
F.4. Version -18 to -19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 F.4. Version -18 to -19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
F.5. Version -17 to -18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 F.5. Version -17 to -18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
F.6. Version -16 to -17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 F.6. Version -16 to -17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
F.7. Version -15 to -16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 F.7. Version -15 to -16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
F.8. Version -14 to -15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 F.8. Version -14 to -15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
F.9. Version -13 to -14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 F.9. Version -13 to -14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
F.10. Version -12 to -13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 F.10. Version -12 to -13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
F.11. Version -11 to -12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 F.11. Version -11 to -12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
F.12. Version -10 to -11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 F.12. Version -10 to -11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
F.13. Version -09 to -10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 F.13. Version -09 to -10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
F.14. Version -08 to -09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 F.14. Version -08 to -09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
F.15. Version -07 to -08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 F.15. Version -07 to -08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
F.16. Version -06 to -07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 F.16. Version -06 to -07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
F.17. Version -05 to -06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 F.17. Version -05 to -06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
F.18. Version -04 to -05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 F.18. Version -04 to -05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
F.19. Version -03 to -04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 F.19. Version -03 to -04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
F.20. Version -02 to -03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 F.20. Version -02 to -03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
F.21. Version -01 to -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 F.21. Version -01 to -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
F.22. Version -00 to -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 F.22. Version -00 to -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Authorization is the process for granting approval to an entity to Authorization is the process for granting approval to an entity to
access a generic resource [RFC4949]. The authorization task itself access a generic resource [RFC4949]. The authorization task itself
can best be described as granting access to a requesting client, for can best be described as granting access to a requesting client, for
a resource hosted on a device, the resource server (RS). This a resource hosted on a device, the resource server (RS). This
exchange is mediated by one or multiple authorization servers (AS). exchange is mediated by one or multiple authorization servers (AS).
Managing authorization for a large number of devices and users can be Managing authorization for a large number of devices and users can be
a complex task. a complex task.
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If a token that authorizes a long running request such as a CoAP If a token that authorizes a long running request such as a CoAP
Observe [RFC7641] expires, the RS MUST send an error response with Observe [RFC7641] expires, the RS MUST send an error response with
the response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.01 (Unauthorized) to the response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.01 (Unauthorized) to
the client and then terminate processing the long running request. the client and then terminate processing the long running request.
5.8.4. Key Expiration 5.8.4. Key Expiration
The AS provides the client with key material that the RS uses. This The AS provides the client with key material that the RS uses. This
can either be a common symmetric PoP-key, or an asymmetric key used can either be a common symmetric PoP-key, or an asymmetric key used
by the RS to authenticate towards the client. Since there is no by the RS to authenticate towards the client. Since there is
metadata associated to those keys, the client has no way of knowing currently no expiration metadata associated to those keys, the client
if these keys are still valid. This may lead to situations where the has no way of knowing if these keys are still valid. This may lead
client sends requests containing sensitive information to the RS to situations where the client sends requests containing sensitive
using a key that is expired and possibly in the hands of an attacker, information to the RS using a key that is expired and possibly in the
or accepts responses from the RS that are not properly protected and hands of an attacker, or accepts responses from the RS that are not
could possibly have been forged by an attacker. properly protected and could possibly have been forged by an
attacker.
In order to prevent this, the client must assume that those keys are In order to prevent this, the client must assume that those keys are
only valid as long as the related access token is. Since the access only valid as long as the related access token is. Since the access
token is opaque to the client, one of the following methods MUST be token is opaque to the client, one of the following methods MUST be
used to inform the client about the validity of an access token: used to inform the client about the validity of an access token:
o The client knows a default validity time for all tokens it is o The client knows a default validity time for all tokens it is
using (i.e. how long a token is valid after being issued). This using (i.e. how long a token is valid after being issued). This
information could be provisioned to the client when it is information could be provisioned to the client when it is
registered at the AS, or published by the AS in a way that the registered at the AS, or published by the AS in a way that the
client can query. client can query.
o The AS informs the client about the token validity using the o The AS informs the client about the token validity using the
"expires_in" parameter in the Access Information. "expires_in" parameter in the Access Information.
o The client performs an introspection of the token. Although this
is not explicitly forbidden, how exactly a client does
introspection is not currently specified for OAuth.
A client that is not able to obtain information about the expiration A client that is not able to obtain information about the expiration
of a token MUST NOT use this token. of a token MUST NOT use this token.
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
Security considerations applicable to authentication and Security considerations applicable to authentication and
authorization in RESTful environments provided in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] authorization in RESTful environments provided in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]
apply to this work. Furthermore [RFC6819] provides additional apply to this work. Furthermore [RFC6819] provides additional
security considerations for OAuth which apply to IoT deployments as security considerations for OAuth which apply to IoT deployments as
well. If the introspection endpoint is used, the security well. If the introspection endpoint is used, the security
skipping to change at page 59, line 20 skipping to change at page 59, line 18
[I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession] [I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession]
Jones, M., Seitz, L., Selander, G., Erdtman, S., and H. Jones, M., Seitz, L., Selander, G., Erdtman, S., and H.
Tschofenig, "Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Tschofenig, "Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR
Web Tokens (CWTs)", draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of- Web Tokens (CWTs)", draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-
possession-11 (work in progress), October 2019. possession-11 (work in progress), October 2019.
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-params] [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-params]
Seitz, L., "Additional OAuth Parameters for Authorization Seitz, L., "Additional OAuth Parameters for Authorization
in Constrained Environments (ACE)", draft-ietf-ace-oauth- in Constrained Environments (ACE)", draft-ietf-ace-oauth-
params-05 (work in progress), March 2019. params-06 (work in progress), November 2019.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-token-exchange] [I-D.ietf-oauth-token-exchange]
Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., and C. Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., and C.
Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", draft-ietf-oauth- Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", draft-ietf-oauth-
token-exchange-19 (work in progress), July 2019. token-exchange-19 (work in progress), July 2019.
[IANA.CborWebTokenClaims] [IANA.CborWebTokenClaims]
IANA, "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims", IANA, "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt/ <https://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt/
cwt.xhtml#claims-registry>. cwt.xhtml#claims-registry>.
skipping to change at page 61, line 49 skipping to change at page 61, line 44
<https://www.bluetooth.com/specifications/ <https://www.bluetooth.com/specifications/
bluetooth-core-specification/>. bluetooth-core-specification/>.
[I-D.erdtman-ace-rpcc] [I-D.erdtman-ace-rpcc]
Seitz, L. and S. Erdtman, "Raw-Public-Key and Pre-Shared- Seitz, L. and S. Erdtman, "Raw-Public-Key and Pre-Shared-
Key as OAuth client credentials", draft-erdtman-ace- Key as OAuth client credentials", draft-erdtman-ace-
rpcc-02 (work in progress), October 2017. rpcc-02 (work in progress), October 2017.
[I-D.ietf-quic-transport] [I-D.ietf-quic-transport]
Iyengar, J. and M. Thomson, "QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed Iyengar, J. and M. Thomson, "QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed
and Secure Transport", draft-ietf-quic-transport-23 (work and Secure Transport", draft-ietf-quic-transport-24 (work
in progress), September 2019. in progress), November 2019.
[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]
Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
1.3", draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-33 (work in progress), October 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-34 (work in progress), November
2019. 2019.
[Margi10impact] [Margi10impact]
Margi, C., de Oliveira, B., de Sousa, G., Simplicio Jr, Margi, C., de Oliveira, B., de Sousa, G., Simplicio Jr,
M., Barreto, P., Carvalho, T., Naeslund, M., and R. Gold, M., Barreto, P., Carvalho, T., Naeslund, M., and R. Gold,
"Impact of Operating Systems on Wireless Sensor Networks "Impact of Operating Systems on Wireless Sensor Networks
(Security) Applications and Testbeds", Proceedings of (Security) Applications and Testbeds", Proceedings of
the 19th International Conference on Computer the 19th International Conference on Computer
Communications and Networks (ICCCN), August 2010. Communications and Networks (ICCCN), August 2010.
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