< draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-04.txt   draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-05.txt >
Network Working Group J. Peterson Network Working Group J. Peterson
Internet-Draft Neustar Internet-Draft Neustar
Intended status: Informational M. Barnes Intended status: Informational M. Barnes
Expires: May 7, 2020 Independent Expires: September 10, 2020 Independent
D. Hancock D. Hancock
C. Wendt C. Wendt
Comcast Comcast
November 4, 2019 March 9, 2020
ACME Challenges Using an Authority Token ACME Challenges Using an Authority Token
draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-04.txt draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-05
Abstract Abstract
Some proposed extensions to the Automated Certificate Management Some proposed extensions to the Automated Certificate Management
Environment (ACME) rely on proving eligibility for certificates Environment (ACME) rely on proving eligibility for certificates
through consulting an external authority that issues a token through consulting an external authority that issues a token
according to a particular policy. This document specifies a generic according to a particular policy. This document specifies a generic
Authority Token challenge for ACME which supports subtype claims for Authority Token challenge for ACME which supports subtype claims for
different identifiers or namespaces that can be defined separately different identifiers or namespaces that can be defined separately
for specific applications. for specific applications.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 7, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 10, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
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5.1. Basic REST Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.1. Basic REST Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Using an Authority Token in a Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. Using an Authority Token in a Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 10. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
ACME [I-D.ietf-acme-acme] is a mechanism for automating certificate ACME [RFC8555] is a mechanism for automating certificate management
management on the Internet. It enables administrative entities to on the Internet. It enables administrative entities to prove
prove effective control over resources like domain names, and effective control over resources like domain names, and automates the
automates the process of generating and issuing certificates. process of generating and issuing certificates.
In some cases, proving effective control over an identifier requires In some cases, proving effective control over an identifier requires
an attestation from a third party who has authority over the an attestation from a third party who has authority over the
resource, for example, an external policy administrator for a resource, for example, an external policy administrator for a
namespace other than the DNS application ACME was originally designed namespace other than the DNS application ACME was originally designed
to support. In order to automate the process of issuing certificates to support. In order to automate the process of issuing certificates
for those resources, this specification defines a generic Authority for those resources, this specification defines a generic Authority
Token challenge that ACME servers can issue in order to require Token challenge that ACME servers can issue in order to require
clients to return such a token. The challenge contains a type clients to return such a token. The challenge contains a type
indication that tells the client what sort of token it needs to indication that tells the client what sort of token it needs to
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(CSPs) can delegate authority over numbers to their customers, and (CSPs) can delegate authority over numbers to their customers, and
those CSPs who support ACME can then help customers to acquire those CSPs who support ACME can then help customers to acquire
certificates for those numbering resources with ACME. This can certificates for those numbering resources with ACME. This can
permit number acquisition flows compatible with those shown in permit number acquisition flows compatible with those shown in
[RFC8396]. Another, similar example would a mechanism that permits [RFC8396]. Another, similar example would a mechanism that permits
CSPs to delegate authority for particular telephone numbers to CSPs to delegate authority for particular telephone numbers to
customers, as described in [I-D.ietf-acme-telephone]. customers, as described in [I-D.ietf-acme-telephone].
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
described in [RFC2119]. 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Challenges for an Authority Token 3. Challenges for an Authority Token
Proving that a device on the Internet has effective control over a Proving that a device on the Internet has effective control over a
non-Internet resource is not as straightforward as proving control non-Internet resource is not as straightforward as proving control
over an Internet resources like a DNS zone or a web page. Provided over an Internet resources like a DNS zone or a web page. Provided
that the issuer of identifiers in a namespace, or someone acting on that the issuer of identifiers in a namespace, or someone acting on
the issuer's behalf, can implement a service that grants Authority the issuer's behalf, can implement a service that grants Authority
Tokens to the people to whom it has issued identifiers, a generic Tokens to the people to whom it has issued identifiers, a generic
token could be used as a response to an ACME challenge. This token could be used as a response to an ACME challenge. This
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The "atc" field in this response contains the Authority Token. The "atc" field in this response contains the Authority Token.
7. Acknowledgements 7. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank you for your contributions to this problem We would like to thank you for your contributions to this problem
statement and framework. statement and framework.
8. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
This document requests that the IANA registers a new ACME identifier This document requests that the IANA registers a new ACME identifier
type (per [I-D.ietf-acme-acme]) for the label "atc", for which the type (per [RFC8555]) for the label "atc", for which the reference is
reference is [RFCThis]. [RFCThis].
This document further requests that the IANA create a registry for This document further requests that the IANA create a registry for
"token types" as used in these challenges, following the requirements "token types" as used in these challenges, following the requirements
in Section 3.1, pre-populated with the label of "atc" per Section 4 in Section 3.1, pre-populated with the label of "atc" per Section 4
with a value of [RFCThis]. with a value of [RFCThis].
9. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
Per the guidance in [I-D.ietf-acme-acme], ACME transactions MUST use Per the guidance in [RFC8555], ACME transactions MUST use TLS, and
TLS, and similarly the HTTPS REST transactions used to request and similarly the HTTPS REST transactions used to request and acquire
acquire authority tokens MUST use TLS. These measures are intended authority tokens MUST use TLS. These measures are intended to
to prevent the capture of Authority Tokens by eavesdroppers. prevent the capture of Authority Tokens by eavesdroppers. The
security considerations of [RFC8555] apply to the use of the
mechanism in this specification.
The capture of Authority Tokens by an adversary could enable an The capture of Authority Tokens by an adversary could enable an
attacker to acquire a certificate from a CA. Therefore, all attacker to acquire a certificate from a CA. Therefore, all
Authority Tokens MUST contain a field that identifies to the CA which Authority Tokens MUST contain a field that identifies to the CA which
ACME client requested the token from the authority; here that is the ACME client requested the token from the authority; here that is the
fingerprint specified in Section 4). All Authority Tokens must fingerprint specified in Section 4). All Authority Tokens must
specify an expiry (of the token itself as proof for a CA, as opposed specify an expiry (of the token itself as proof for a CA, as opposed
to the expiry of the name), and for some application, it may make to the expiry of the name), and for some application, it may make
sense of that expiry to be quite short. Any protocol used to sense of that expiry to be quite short. Any protocol used to
retrieve Authority Tokens from an authority MUST use confidentiality retrieve Authority Tokens from an authority MUST use confidentiality
to prevent eavesdroppers from acquiring an Authority Token. to prevent eavesdroppers from acquiring an Authority Token.
10. Normative References 10. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-acme-acme]
Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J.
Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
(ACME)", draft-ietf-acme-acme-18 (work in progress),
December 2018.
[I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist] [I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist]
Wendt, C., Hancock, D., Barnes, M., and J. Peterson, Wendt, C., Hancock, D., Barnes, M., and J. Peterson,
"TNAuthList profile of ACME Authority Token", draft-ietf- "TNAuthList profile of ACME Authority Token", draft-ietf-
acme-authority-token-tnauthlist-04 (work in progress), acme-authority-token-tnauthlist-05 (work in progress),
September 2019. November 2019.
[I-D.ietf-acme-service-provider] [I-D.ietf-acme-service-provider]
Barnes, M. and C. Wendt, "ACME Identifiers and Challenges Barnes, M. and C. Wendt, "ACME Identifiers and Challenges
for VoIP Service Providers", draft-ietf-acme-service- for VoIP Service Providers", draft-ietf-acme-service-
provider-02 (work in progress), October 2017. provider-02 (work in progress), October 2017.
[I-D.ietf-acme-star] [I-D.ietf-acme-star]
Sheffer, Y., Lopez, D., Dios, O., Pastor, A., and T. Sheffer, Y., Lopez, D., Dios, O., Pastor, A., and T.
Fossati, "Support for Short-Term, Automatically-Renewed Fossati, "Support for Short-Term, Automatically-Renewed
(STAR) Certificates in Automated Certificate Management (STAR) Certificates in Automated Certificate Management
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<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>. 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8224] Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt, [RFC8224] Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt,
"Authenticated Identity Management in the Session "Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 8224, Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 8224,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8224, February 2018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8224, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8224>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8224>.
[RFC8225] Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "PASSporT: Personal Assertion [RFC8225] Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "PASSporT: Personal Assertion
Token", RFC 8225, DOI 10.17487/RFC8225, February 2018, Token", RFC 8225, DOI 10.17487/RFC8225, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8225>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8225>.
skipping to change at page 12, line 16 skipping to change at page 12, line 11
Credentials: Certificates", RFC 8226, Credentials: Certificates", RFC 8226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8226, February 2018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8226, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8226>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8226>.
[RFC8396] Peterson, J. and T. McGarry, "Managing, Ordering, [RFC8396] Peterson, J. and T. McGarry, "Managing, Ordering,
Distributing, Exposing, and Registering Telephone Numbers Distributing, Exposing, and Registering Telephone Numbers
(MODERN): Problem Statement, Use Cases, and Framework", (MODERN): Problem Statement, Use Cases, and Framework",
RFC 8396, DOI 10.17487/RFC8396, July 2018, RFC 8396, DOI 10.17487/RFC8396, July 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8396>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8396>.
[RFC8555] Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J.
Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
(ACME)", RFC 8555, DOI 10.17487/RFC8555, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8555>.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Jon Peterson Jon Peterson
Neustar, Inc. Neustar, Inc.
1800 Sutter St Suite 570 1800 Sutter St Suite 570
Concord, CA 94520 Concord, CA 94520
US US
Email: jon.peterson@team.neustar Email: jon.peterson@team.neustar
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