< draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-20.txt		draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-21.txt >
	INTERNET-DRAFT Brian Tung		INTERNET-DRAFT Brian Tung
	draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-20.txt Clifford Neuman		draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-21.txt Clifford Neuman
	Updates: CLARIFICATIONS USC/ISI		expires April 25, 2005 USC/ISI
	expires January 25, 2005 Matthew Hur
	Ari Medvinsky
	Microsoft Corporation
	Sasha Medvinsky		Sasha Medvinsky
	Motorola, Inc.		Motorola, Inc.
	John Wray
	Iris Associates, Inc.
	Jonathan Trostle
	Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos		Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos
	0. Status Of This Memo		0. Status Of This Memo
	By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable		By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable
	patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed,		patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed,
	or will be disclosed, and any of which I become aware will be		or will be disclosed, and any of which I become aware will be
	disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668.		disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668.
	This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	all provision of Section 10 of RFC 2026. Internet-Drafts are		Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
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	The distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as		The distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as
	draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-20.txt and expires January 25, 2005.		draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-21.txt and expires April 25, 2005.
	Please send comments to the authors.		Please send comments to the authors.
	1. Abstract		1. Abstract
	This document describes protocol extensions (hereafter called		This document describes protocol extensions (hereafter called
	PKINIT) to the Kerberos protocol specification ([1], hereafter		PKINIT) to the Kerberos protocol specification [1]. These
	called CLARIFICATIONS). These extensions provide a method for		extensions provide a method for integrating public key cryptography
	integrating public key cryptography into the initial authentication		into the initial authentication exchange, by passing digital
	exchange, by passing digital certificates and associated		certificates and associated authenticators in preauthentication data
	authenticators in preauthentication data fields.		fields.
	2. Introduction		2. Introduction
	A client typically authenticates itself to a service in Kerberos		A client typically authenticates itself to a service in Kerberos
	using three distinct though related exchanges. First, the client		using three distinct though related exchanges. First, the client
	requests a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) from the Kerberos		requests a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) from the Kerberos
	authentication server (AS). Then, it uses the TGT to request a		authentication server (AS). Then, it uses the TGT to request a
	service ticket from the Kerberos ticket-granting server (TGS).		service ticket from the Kerberos ticket-granting server (TGS).
	Usually, the AS and TGS are integrated in a single device known as		Usually, the AS and TGS are integrated in a single device known as
	a Kerberos Key Distribution Center, or KDC. (In this document, we		a Kerberos Key Distribution Center, or KDC. (In this document, we
	skipping to change at line 95 ¶		skipping to change at line 88 ¶
	no inherent security benefit.		no inherent security benefit.
	As noted above, a convenient and efficient place to introduce		As noted above, a convenient and efficient place to introduce
	public-key cryptography into Kerberos is in the initial		public-key cryptography into Kerberos is in the initial
	authentication exchange. This document describes the methods and		authentication exchange. This document describes the methods and
	data formats for integrating public-key cryptography into Kerberos		data formats for integrating public-key cryptography into Kerberos
	initial authentication.		initial authentication.
	3. Extensions		3. Extensions
	This section describes extensions to CLARIFICATIONS for supporting		This section describes extensions to [1] for supporting the use of
	the use of public-key cryptography in the initial request for a		public-key cryptography in the initial request for a ticket.
	ticket.
	Briefly, this document defines the following extensions to		Briefly, this document defines the following extensions to [1]:
	CLARIFICATIONS:
	1. The client indicates the use of public-key authentication by		1. The client indicates the use of public-key authentication by
	including a special preauthenticator in the initial request.		including a special preauthenticator in the initial request.
	This preauthenticator contains the client's public-key data		This preauthenticator contains the client's public-key data
	and a signature.		and a signature.
	2. The KDC tests the client's request against its policy and		2. The KDC tests the client's request against its policy and
	trusted Certification Authorities (CAs).		trusted Certification Authorities (CAs).
	3. If the request passes the verification tests, the KDC		3. If the request passes the verification tests, the KDC
	skipping to change at line 130 ¶		skipping to change at line 121 ¶
	Any keying material required by the client to obtain the		Any keying material required by the client to obtain the
	Encryption key is returned in a preauthentication field		Encryption key is returned in a preauthentication field
	accompanying the usual reply.		accompanying the usual reply.
	4. The client obtains the encryption key, decrypts the reply,		4. The client obtains the encryption key, decrypts the reply,
	and then proceeds as usual.		and then proceeds as usual.
	Section 3.1 of this document defines the necessary message formats.		Section 3.1 of this document defines the necessary message formats.
	Section 3.2 describes their syntax and use in greater detail.		Section 3.2 describes their syntax and use in greater detail.
	3.1. Definitions		3.1. Definitions, Requirements, and Constants
			The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
			"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
			document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [12].
	3.1.1. Required Algorithms		3.1.1. Required Algorithms
	All PKINIT implementations MUST support the following algorithms:		All PKINIT implementations MUST support the following algorithms:
	- Reply key (or DH-derived key): AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 etype.		- Reply key (or DH-derived key): AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 etype.
	- Signature algorithm: SHA-1 digest and RSA.		- Signature algorithm: SHA-1 digest and RSA.
	- Reply key delivery method: ephemeral-ephemeral Diffie-Hellman		- Reply key delivery method: ephemeral-ephemeral Diffie-Hellman
	with a non-zero nonce.		with a non-zero nonce.
	- Unkeyed checksum type for the paChecksum member of		- Unkeyed checksum type for the paChecksum member of
	PKAuthenticator: SHA1 (unkeyed).		PKAuthenticator: SHA1 (unkeyed), Kerberos checksum type 14
			[11].
	3.1.2. Defined Message and Encryption Types		3.1.2. Defined Message and Encryption Types
	PKINIT makes use of the following new preauthentication types:		PKINIT makes use of the following new preauthentication types:
	PA-PK-AS-REQ TBD		PA-PK-AS-REQ TBD
	PA-PK-AS-REP TBD		PA-PK-AS-REP TBD
	PKINIT also makes use of the following new authorization data type:		PKINIT also makes use of the following new authorization data type:
	skipping to change at line 175 ¶		skipping to change at line 171 ¶
	KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE 71		KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE 71
	KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE 72		KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE 72
	KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN 73		KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN 73
	KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH 75		KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH 75
	PKINIT uses the following typed data types for errors:		PKINIT uses the following typed data types for errors:
	TD-DH-PARAMETERS TBD		TD-DH-PARAMETERS TBD
	TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS 104		TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS 104
	TD-CERTIFICATE-INDEX 105		TD-CERTIFICATE-INDEX 105
			TD-UNKEYED-CHECKSUM-INFO 109
	PKINIT defines the following encryption types, for use in the AS-REQ		PKINIT defines the following encryption types, for use in the AS-REQ
	message (to indicate acceptance of the corresponding encryption OIDs		message (to indicate acceptance of the corresponding encryption OIDs
	in PKINIT):		in PKINIT):
	dsaWithSHA1-CmsOID 9		dsaWithSHA1-CmsOID 9
	md5WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 10		md5WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 10
	sha1WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 11		sha1WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 11
	rc2CBC-EnvOID 12		rc2CBC-EnvOID 12
	rsaEncryption-EnvOID (PKCS1 v1.5) 13		rsaEncryption-EnvOID (PKCS1 v1.5) 13
	rsaES-OAEP-EnvOID (PKCS1 v2.0) 14		rsaES-OAEP-EnvOID (PKCS1 v2.0) 14
	des-ede3-cbc-EnvOID 15		des-ede3-cbc-EnvOID 15
	The above encryption types are used by the client only within the		The above encryption types are used by the client only within the
	KDC-REQ-BODY to indicate which CMS [2] algorithms it supports. Their		KDC-REQ-BODY to indicate which CMS [2] algorithms it supports. Their
	use within Kerberos EncryptedData structures is not specified by this		use within Kerberos EncryptedData structures is not specified by this
	document.		document.
	The ASN.1 module for all structures defined in this document (plus		The ASN.1 module for all structures defined in this document (plus
	IMPORT statements for all imported structures) are given in Appendix		IMPORT statements for all imported structures) are given in Appendix
	A. All structures MUST be encoded using Distinguished Encoding		A. In the event of a discrepancy between Appendix A and the portions
	Rules (DER).		of ASN.1 in the main text, the appendix is normative.
			All structures defined in this document MUST be encoded using
			Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER). All imported data structures
			must be encoded according to the rules specified in Kerberos [1] or
			CMS [2] as appropriate.
			Interoperability note: Some implementations may not be able to
			decode CMS objects encoded with BER but not DER; specifically, they
			may not be able to decode infinite length encodings. To maximize
			interoperability, implementers SHOULD encode CMS objects used in
			PKINIT with DER.
	3.1.3. Algorithm Identifiers		3.1.3. Algorithm Identifiers
	PKINIT does not define, but does make use of, the following		PKINIT does not define, but does make use of, the following
	algorithm identifiers.		algorithm identifiers.
	PKINIT uses the following algorithm identifier for Diffie-Hellman		PKINIT uses the following algorithm identifier for Diffie-Hellman
	key agreement [9]:		key agreement [9]:
	dhpublicnumber		dhpublicnumber
	skipping to change at line 225 ¶		skipping to change at line 233 ¶
	encrypting the temporary key with a public key:		encrypting the temporary key with a public key:
	rsaEncryption (PKCS1 v1.5)		rsaEncryption (PKCS1 v1.5)
	id-RSAES-OAEP (PKCS1 v2.0)		id-RSAES-OAEP (PKCS1 v2.0)
	PKINIT uses the following algorithm identifiers [2] for encrypting		PKINIT uses the following algorithm identifiers [2] for encrypting
	the reply key with the temporary key:		the reply key with the temporary key:
	des-ede3-cbc (three-key 3DES, CBC mode)		des-ede3-cbc (three-key 3DES, CBC mode)
	rc2-cbc (RC2, CBC mode)		rc2-cbc (RC2, CBC mode)
			aes256_CBC (AES-256, CBC mode)
	Kerberos data structures require the use of integer etypes, while CMS
	objects use OIDs. Therefore, each cryptographic algorithm supported
	by PKINIT is identified both by a CMS OID and by an equivalent
	Kerberos etype (defined in section 3.1.2).
	3.2. PKINIT Preauthentication Syntax and Use		3.2. PKINIT Preauthentication Syntax and Use
	This section defines the syntax and use of the various		This section defines the syntax and use of the various
	preauthentication fields employed by PKINIT.		preauthentication fields employed by PKINIT.
	3.2.1. Client Request		3.2.1. Client Request
	The initial authentication request (AS-REQ) is sent as per RFC		The initial authentication request (AS-REQ) is sent as per [1]; in
	1510bis; in addition, a preauthentication field contains data signed		addition, a preauthentication field contains data signed by the
	by the client's private signature key, as follows:		client's private signature key, as follows:
			WrapContentInfo ::= OCTET STRING (CONSTRAINED BY {
			-- Contains a BER encoding of
			-- ContentInfo
			})
			WrapIssuerAndSerial ::= OCTET STRING (CONSTRAINED BY {
			-- Contains a BER encoding of
			-- IssuerAndSerialNumber
			})
	PA-PK-AS-REQ ::= SEQUENCE {		PA-PK-AS-REQ ::= SEQUENCE {
	signedAuthPack [0] ContentInfo,		signedAuthPack [0] IMPLICIT WrapContentInfo,
	-- Defined in CMS [2].
	-- Type is SignedData.		-- Type is SignedData.
	-- Content is AuthPack		-- Content is AuthPack
	-- (defined below).		-- (defined below).
	trustedCertifiers [1] SEQUENCE OF TrustedCA OPTIONAL,		trustedCertifiers [1] SEQUENCE OF TrustedCA OPTIONAL,
	-- A list of CAs, trusted by		-- A list of CAs, trusted by
	-- the client, used to certify		-- the client, used to certify
	-- KDCs.		-- KDCs.
	kdcCert [2] IssuerAndSerialNumber OPTIONAL,		kdcCert [2] IMPLICIT WrapIssuerAndSerial
	-- Defined in CMS [2].		OPTIONAL,
	-- Identifies a particular KDC		-- Identifies a particular KDC
	-- certificate, if the client		-- certificate, if the client
	-- already has it.		-- already has it.
	...		...
	}		}
	TrustedCA ::= CHOICE {		TrustedCA ::= CHOICE {
	caName [0] Name,		caName [1] Name,
	-- Fully qualified X.500 name		-- Fully qualified X.500 name
	-- as defined in RFC 3280 [4].		-- as defined in RFC 3280 [4].
	issuerAndSerial [2] IssuerAndSerialNumber,		issuerAndSerial [2] IMPLICIT WrapIssuerAndSerial,
	-- Identifies a specific CA		-- Identifies a specific CA
	-- certificate.		-- certificate.
	...		...
	}		}
	AuthPack ::= SEQUENCE {		AuthPack ::= SEQUENCE {
	pkAuthenticator [0] PKAuthenticator,		pkAuthenticator [0] PKAuthenticator,
	clientPublicValue [1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL,		clientPublicValue [1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL,
	-- Defined in RFC 3280 [4].		-- Defined in RFC 3280 [4].
	-- Present only if the client		-- Present only if the client
	skipping to change at line 286 ¶		skipping to change at line 299 ¶
	-- Diffie-Hellman.		-- Diffie-Hellman.
	supportedCMSTypes [2] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier		supportedCMSTypes [2] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
	OPTIONAL,		OPTIONAL,
	-- List of CMS encryption types		-- List of CMS encryption types
	-- supported by client in order		-- supported by client in order
	-- of (decreasing) preference.		-- of (decreasing) preference.
	...		...
	}		}
	PKAuthenticator ::= SEQUENCE {		PKAuthenticator ::= SEQUENCE {
	cusec [0] INTEGER,		cusec [0] INTEGER (0..999999),
	ctime [1] KerberosTime,		ctime [1] KerberosTime,
	-- cusec and ctime are used as		-- cusec and ctime are used as
	-- in CLARIFICATIONS, for replay		-- in [1], for replay
	-- prevention.		-- prevention.
	nonce [2] INTEGER (0..4294967295),		nonce [2] INTEGER (0..4294967295),
	-- Binds reply to request,		-- Binds reply to request,
	-- MUST be zero when client		-- MUST be zero when client
	-- will accept cached		-- will accept cached
	-- Diffie-Hellman parameters		-- Diffie-Hellman parameters
	-- from KDC. MUST NOT be		-- from KDC. MUST NOT be
	-- zero otherwise.		-- zero otherwise.
	paChecksum [3] Checksum,		paChecksum [3] Checksum,
	-- Defined in CLARIFICATIONS.		-- Defined in [1].
	-- Performed over KDC-REQ-BODY,		-- Performed over KDC-REQ-BODY,
	-- MUST be unkeyed.		-- MUST be unkeyed.
	...		...
	}		}
	The ContentInfo in the signedAuthPack is filled out as follows:		The ContentInfo in the signedAuthPack is filled out as follows:
	1. The eContent field contains data of type AuthPack. It MUST		1. The eContent field contains data of type AuthPack. It MUST
	contain the pkAuthenticator, and MAY also contain the		contain the pkAuthenticator, and MAY also contain the
	client's Diffie-Hellman public value (clientPublicValue).		client's Diffie-Hellman public value (clientPublicValue).
	2. The eContentType field MUST contain the OID value for		2. The eContentType field MUST contain the OID value for
	id-pkauthdata: { iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1)		id-pkauthdata: { iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) kerberosv5(2) pkinit(3) pkauthdata(1)}		security(5) kerberosv5(2) pkinit(3) pkauthdata(1)}
	3. The signerInfos field MUST contain the signature over the		3. The signerInfos field MUST contain the signature over the
	AuthPack.		AuthPack.
	4. The certificates field MUST contain at least a signature		4. The certificates field MUST contain at least a signature
	verification certificate chain that the KDC can use to		verification certificate chain that the KDC can use to
	verify the signature over the AuthPack. Additionally, the		verify the signature over the AuthPack. The certificate
	client MAY insert an encryption certificate chain, if		chain(s) MUST NOT contain the root CA certificate.
	(for example) the client is not using ephemeral-ephemeral
	Diffie-Hellman.
	5. If a Diffie-Hellman key is being used, the parameters SHOULD		5. If a Diffie-Hellman key is being used, the parameters MUST
	be chosen from the First or Second defined Oakley Groups.		be chosen from Oakley Group 2 or 14. Implementations MUST
			support Group 2; they are RECOMMENDED to support Group 14.
	(See RFC 2409 [10].)		(See RFC 2409 [10].)
	6. The KDC may wish to use cached Diffie-Hellman parameters.		6. The KDC may wish to use cached Diffie-Hellman parameters.
	To indicate acceptance of caching, the client sends zero in		To indicate acceptance of caching, the client sends zero in
	the nonce field of the pkAuthenticator. Zero is not a valid		the nonce field of the pkAuthenticator. Zero is not a valid
	value for this field under any other circumstances. Since		value for this field under any other circumstances. Since
	zero is used to indicate acceptance of cached parameters,		zero is used to indicate acceptance of cached parameters,
	message binding in this case is performed using only the		message binding in this case is performed using only the
	nonce in the main request.		nonce in the main request.
	3.2.2. Validation of Client Request		3.2.2. Validation of Client Request
	Upon receiving the client's request, the KDC validates it. This		Upon receiving the client's request, the KDC validates it. This
	section describes the steps that the KDC MUST (unless otherwise		section describes the steps that the KDC MUST (unless otherwise
	noted) take in validating the request.		noted) take in validating the request.
	The KDC must look for a client certificate in the signedAuthPack.		The KDC must look for a client certificate in the signedAuthPack.
	If it cannot find one signed by a CA it trusts, it sends back an		If it cannot find one signed by a CA it trusts, it sends back an
	error of type KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE. The accompanying		error of type KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE. The accompanying
	e-data for this error is a SEQUENCE OF TYPED-DATA (as defined in RFC		e-data for this error is a TYPED-DATA (as defined in [1]). For this
	1510bis). For this error, the data-type is TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS,		error, the data-type is TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS, and the data-value is
	and the data-value is an OCTET STRING containing the DER encoding of		the DER encoding of
	TrustedCertifiers ::= SEQUENCE OF Name		TrustedCertifiers ::= SEQUENCE OF Name
	If, while verifying the certificate chain, the KDC determines that		If, while verifying the certificate chain, the KDC determines that
	the signature on one of the certificates in the signedAuthPack is		the signature on one of the certificates in the signedAuthPack is
	invalid, it returns an error of type KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE.		invalid, it returns an error of type KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE.
	The accompanying e-data for this error is a SEQUENCE OF TYPED-DATA,		The accompanying e-data for this error is a TYPED-DATA, whose
	whose data-type is TD-CERTIFICATE-INDEX, and whose data-value is an		data-type is TD-CERTIFICATE-INDEX, and whose data-value is the DER
	OCTET STRING containing the DER encoding of the index into the		encoding of the index into the CertificateSet field, ordered as sent
	CertificateSet field, ordered as sent by the client:		by the client:
	CertificateIndex ::= IssuerAndSerialNumber		CertificateIndex ::= IssuerAndSerialNumber
	-- IssuerAndSerialNumber of		-- IssuerAndSerialNumber of
	-- certificate with invalid signature		-- certificate with invalid signature
	If more than one certificate signature is invalid, the KDC MAY send		If more than one certificate signature is invalid, the KDC MAY send
	one TYPED-DATA per invalid signature.		one TYPED-DATA per invalid signature.
	The KDC MAY also check whether any certificates in the client's		The KDC MAY also check whether any certificates in the client's
	chain have been revoked. If any of them have been revoked, the KDC		chain have been revoked. If any of them have been revoked, the KDC
	skipping to change at line 409 ¶		skipping to change at line 421 ¶
	If the KDC does not have its own mapping and there is no Kerberos		If the KDC does not have its own mapping and there is no Kerberos
	name present in the certificate, or if the name in the request does		name present in the certificate, or if the name in the request does
	not match the name in the certificate (including the realm name), or		not match the name in the certificate (including the realm name), or
	if there is no name in the request, the KDC MUST return error code		if there is no name in the request, the KDC MUST return error code
	KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH. There is no accompanying e-data		KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH. There is no accompanying e-data
	for this error.		for this error.
	Even if the chain is validated, and the names in the certificate and		Even if the chain is validated, and the names in the certificate and
	the request match, the KDC may decide not to trust the client. For		the request match, the KDC may decide not to trust the client. For
	example, the certificate may include an Enxtended Key Usage (EKU) OID		example, the certificate may include an Extended Key Usage (EKU) OID
	in the extensions field. As a matter of local policy, the KDC may		in the extensions field. As a matter of local policy, the KDC may
	decide to reject requests on the basis of the absence or presence of		decide to reject requests on the basis of the absence or presence of
	specific EKU OIDs. In this case, the KDC MUST return error code		specific EKU OIDs. In this case, the KDC MUST return error code
	KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED. The PKINIT EKU OID is defined as:		KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED. The PKINIT EKU OID is defined as:
	{ iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosv5(2)		{ iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosv5(2)
	pkinit(3) pkekuoid(4) }		pkinit(3) pkekuoid(4) }
	If the client's signature on the signedAuthPack fails to verify, the KDC		If the client's signature on the signedAuthPack fails to verify, the KDC
	MUST return error KDC_ERR_INVALID_SIG. There is no accompanying		MUST return error KDC_ERR_INVALID_SIG. There is no accompanying
	e-data for this error.		e-data for this error.
	The KDC MUST check the timestamp to ensure that the request is not		The KDC MUST check the timestamp to ensure that the request is not
	a replay, and that the time skew falls within acceptable limits.		a replay, and that the time skew falls within acceptable limits.
	The recommendations clock skew times in CLARIFICATIONS apply here.		The recommendations clock skew times in [1] apply here. If the
	If the check fails, the KDC MUSTreturn error code KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT		check fails, the KDC MUSTreturn error code KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT or
	or KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW, respectively.		KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW, respectively.
	If the clientPublicValue is filled in, indicating that the client		If the clientPublicValue is filled in, indicating that the client
	wishes to use ephemeral-ephemeral Diffie-Hellman, the KDC checks to		wishes to use ephemeral-ephemeral Diffie-Hellman, the KDC checks to
	see if the parameters satisfy its policy. If they do not, it MUST		see if the parameters satisfy its policy. If they do not, it MUST
	return error code KDC_ERR_KEY_SIZE. The accompanying e-data is a		return error code KDC_ERR_KEY_SIZE. The accompanying e-data is a
	SEQUENCE OF TYPED-DATA, whose data-type is TD-DH-PARAMETERS, and		TYPED-DATA, whose data-type is TD-DH-PARAMETERS, and whose
	whose data-value is an OCTET STRING containing the DER encoding of a		data-value is the DER encoding of a DomainParameters (see [3]),
	DomainParameters (see [3]), including appropriate Diffie-Hellman		including appropriate Diffie-Hellman parameters with which to retry
	parameters with which to retry the request.		the request.
	The KDC MUST return error code KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH if the		The KDC MUST return error code KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH if the
	client included a kdcCert field in the PA-PK-AS-REQ and the KDC does		client included a kdcCert field in the PA-PK-AS-REQ and the KDC does
	not have the corresponding certificate.		not have the corresponding certificate.
	The KDC MUST return error code KDC_ERR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED if the client		The KDC MUST return error code KDC_ERR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED if the client
	did not include a kdcCert field, but did include a trustedCertifiers		did not include a kdcCert field, but did include a trustedCertifiers
	field, and the KDC does not possesses a certificate issued by one of		field, and the KDC does not possesses a certificate issued by one of
	the listed certifiers.		the listed certifiers.
	If there is a supportedCMSTypes field in the AuthPack, the KDC must		If there is a supportedCMSTypes field in the AuthPack, the KDC must
	check to see if it supports any of the listed types. If it supports		check to see if it supports any of the listed types. If it supports
	more than one of the types, the KDC SHOULD use the one listed first.		more than one of the types, the KDC SHOULD use the one listed first.
	If it does not support any of them, it MUST return an error of type		If it does not support any of them, it MUST return an error of type
	KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP.		KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP.
	3.2.3. KDC Reply		3.2.3. KDC Reply
	Assuming that the client's request has been properly validated, the		Assuming that the client's request has been properly validated, the
	KDC proceeds as per CLARIFICATIONS, except as follows.		KDC proceeds as per [1], except as follows.
	The KDC MUST set the initial flag and include an authorization data		The KDC MUST set the initial flag and include an authorization data
	of type AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS in the issued ticket. The value is		of type AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS in the issued ticket. The value is
	an OCTET STRING containing the DER encoding of InitialVerifiedCAs:		an OCTET STRING containing the DER encoding of InitialVerifiedCAs:
	InitialVerifiedCAs ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {		InitialVerifiedCAs ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
	ca [0] Name,		ca [0] Name,
	Validated [1] BOOLEAN,		Validated [1] BOOLEAN,
	...		...
	}		}
	skipping to change at line 483 ¶		skipping to change at line 495 ¶
	Application servers that understand this authorization data type		Application servers that understand this authorization data type
	SHOULD apply local policy to determine whether a given ticket		SHOULD apply local policy to determine whether a given ticket
	bearing such a type *not* contained within an AD-IF-RELEVANT		bearing such a type *not* contained within an AD-IF-RELEVANT
	container is acceptable. (This corresponds to the AP server		container is acceptable. (This corresponds to the AP server
	checking the transited field when the TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED flag		checking the transited field when the TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED flag
	has not been set.) If such a data type is contained within an		has not been set.) If such a data type is contained within an
	AD-IF-RELEVANT container, AP servers MAY apply local policy to		AD-IF-RELEVANT container, AP servers MAY apply local policy to
	determine whether the authorization data is acceptable.		determine whether the authorization data is acceptable.
	The AS-REP is otherwise unchanged from CLARIFICATIONS. The KDC		The AS-REP is otherwise unchanged from [1]. The KDC encrypts the
	encrypts the reply as usual, but not with the client's long-term		reply as usual, but not with the client's long-term key. Instead,
	key. Instead, it encrypts it with either a generated encryption		it encrypts it with either a generated encryption key, or a key
	key, or a key derived from a Diffie-Hellman exchange. The contents		derived from a Diffie-Hellman exchange. The contents of the
	of the PA-PK-AS-REP indicate the type of encryption key that was		PA-PK-AS-REP indicate the type of encryption key that was used:
	used:
	PA-PK-AS-REP ::= CHOICE {		PA-PK-AS-REP ::= CHOICE {
	dhSignedData [0] ContentInfo,		dhSignedData [0] IMPLICIT WrapContentInfo,
	-- Type is SignedData.		-- Type is SignedData.
	-- Content is KDCDHKeyInfo		-- Content is KDCDHKeyInfo
	-- (defined below).		-- (defined below).
	encKeyPack [1] ContentInfo,		encKeyPack [1] IMPLICIT WrapContentInfo,
	-- Type is EnvelopedData.		-- Type is EnvelopedData.
	-- Content is SignedData over		-- Content is SignedData over
	-- ReplyKeyPack (defined below).		-- ReplyKeyPack (defined below).
	...		...
	}		}
	KDCDHKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {		KDCDHKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
	subjectPublicKey [0] BIT STRING,		subjectPublicKey [0] BIT STRING,
	-- Equals public exponent		-- Equals public exponent
	-- (g^a mod p).		-- (g^a mod p).
	-- INTEGER encoded as payload		-- INTEGER encoded as payload
	-- of BIT STRING.		-- of BIT STRING.
	nonce [1] INTEGER,		nonce [1] INTEGER (0..4294967295),
	-- Binds reply to request.		-- Binds reply to request.
	-- Exception: A value of zero		-- Exception: A value of zero
	-- indicates that the KDC is		-- indicates that the KDC is
	-- using cached values.		-- using cached values.
	dhKeyExpiration [2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,		dhKeyExpiration [2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
	-- Expiration time for KDC's		-- Expiration time for KDC's
	-- cached values.		-- cached values.
	...		...
	}		}
	skipping to change at line 536 ¶		skipping to change at line 547 ¶
	security(5) kerberosv5(2) pkinit(3) pkdhkeydata(2) }		security(5) kerberosv5(2) pkinit(3) pkdhkeydata(2) }
	3. The signerInfos field contains a single signerInfo, which is		3. The signerInfos field contains a single signerInfo, which is
	the signature of the KDCDHKeyInfo.		the signature of the KDCDHKeyInfo.
	4. The certificates field contains a signature verification		4. The certificates field contains a signature verification
	certificate chain that the client will use to verify the		certificate chain that the client will use to verify the
	KDC's signature over the KDCDHKeyInfo. This field may only		KDC's signature over the KDCDHKeyInfo. This field may only
	be left empty if the client did include a kdcCert field in		be left empty if the client did include a kdcCert field in
	the PA-PK-AS-REQ, indicating that it has the KDC's		the PA-PK-AS-REQ, indicating that it has the KDC's
	certificate.		certificate. The certificate chain MUST NOT contain the
			root CA certificate.
	5. If the client and KDC agree to use cached parameters, the		5. If the client and KDC agree to use cached parameters, the
	KDC MUST return a zero in the nonce field and include the		KDC MUST return a zero in the nonce field and include the
	expiration time of the cached values in the dhKeyExpiration		expiration time of the cached values in the dhKeyExpiration
	field. If this time is exceeded, the client MUST NOT use		field. If this time is exceeded, the client MUST NOT use
	the reply. If the time is absent, the client MUST NOT use		the reply. If the time is absent, the client MUST NOT use
	the reply and MAY resubmit a request with a non-zero nonce,		the reply and MAY resubmit a request with a non-zero nonce,
	thus indicating non-acceptance of the cached parameters.		thus indicating non-acceptance of the cached parameters.
	The key is derived as follows: Both the KDC and the client calculate		The KDC reply key is derived as follows:
			1. Both the KDC and the client calculate the shared secret
			value
			DHKey = g^(ab) mod p
			where a and b are the client's and KDC's private exponents,
			respectively. DHKey, padded first with leading zeros as
			needed to make it as long as the modulus p, is represented
			as a string of octets in big-endian order (such that the
			size of DHKey in octets is the size of the modulus p).
			2. Let K be the key-generation seed length [6] of the reply key
			whose enctype is selected according to [1].
			3. Define the function octetstring2key() as follows:
			octetstring2key(h, x) == random-to-key(K-truncate(
			h(0x00 | x) |
			h(0x01 | x) |
			h(0x02 | x) |
			...
			))
			where x is an octet string; h:octet string -> octet string
			is a cryptographically strong hash function; | is the
			concatenation operator; 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, etc. are each
			represented as a single octet; random-to-key() is an
			operation that generates a protocolkey from a bitstring of
			length K; and K-truncate truncates its input to K bits.
			Both K and random-to-key() are defined in the kcrypto
			profile [6] for the enctype of the reply key.
			A good example of h() is SHA1.
			4. Define H to be a hash function based on operations of a
			given checksum type [6], as follows:
			H(x) = get_mic(dummy-key, x)
			where x is an octet string.
			H() MUST be a cryptographically strong hash, in order to be
			suitable for use in the octetstring2key() operation above.
			5. The client specifies a checksum type to use in the
			paChecksum of the PKAuthenticator. If the H() operation
			based on this checksum is not suitable for use in
			octetstring2key(), or this checksum type is too weak or not
			supported by the KDC, the KDC MUST return an error of type
			KDC_ERR_PA_CKSUMTYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED. The accompanying e-data
			for this error is a TYPED-DATA: the data-type is
			TD-UNKEYED-CHECKSUM-INFO, and the data-value is the DER
			encoding of
			UNKEYED-CHECKSUM-INFO ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
			cksumtype [0] Int32,
			...
			}
			This list is in the preference order (best choice first) of
			the KDC, and the client SHOULD retry with the first
			available checksum type.
			6. When cached DH parameters are used, let n_c be the
			clientDHNonce, and n_k be the serverDHNonce; otherwise, let
			both n_c and n_k be empty octet strings. The reply key k is
			k = octetstring2key(H, DHKey | n_c | n_k)
			where H() is the hash function based on the checksum type
			used in the paChecksum of the PKAuthenticator (as defined in
			step 4).
			Both the KDC and the client calculate
	the value g^(ab) mod p, where a and b are the client's and KDC's		the value g^(ab) mod p, where a and b are the client's and KDC's
	private exponents, respectively. They both take the first k bits of		private exponents, respectively. They both take the first k bits of
	this secret value as a key generation seed, where the parameter k		this secret value as a key generation seed, where the parameter k
	(the size of the seed) is dependent on the selected key type, as		(the size of the seed) is dependent on the selected key type, as
	specified in [6]. The seed is then converted into a protocol key by		specified in [6]. The seed is then converted into a protocol key by
	applying to it a random-to-key function, which is also dependent on		applying to it a random-to-key function, which is also dependent on
	key type.		key type.
	If the KDC and client are not using Diffie-Hellman, the KDC encrypts		If the KDC and client are not using Diffie-Hellman, the KDC encrypts
	the reply with an encryption key, packed in the encKeyPack, which		the reply with an encryption key, packed in the encKeyPack, which
	contains data of type ReplyKeyPack:		contains data of type ReplyKeyPack:
	ReplyKeyPack ::= SEQUENCE {		ReplyKeyPack ::= SEQUENCE {
	replyKey [0] EncryptionKey,		replyKey [0] EncryptionKey,
	-- Defined in CLARIFICATIONS.		-- Defined in [1].
	-- Used to encrypt main reply.		-- Used to encrypt main reply.
	-- MUST be at least as strong		-- MUST be at least as strong
	-- as session key. (Using the		-- as session key. (Using the
	-- same enctype and a strong		-- same enctype and a strong
	-- prng should suffice, if no		-- prng should suffice, if no
	-- stronger encryption system		-- stronger encryption system
	-- is available.)		-- is available.)
	nonce [1] INTEGER (0..4294967295),		nonce [1] INTEGER (0..4294967295),
	-- Binds reply to request.		-- Binds reply to request.
	...		...
	skipping to change at line 592 ¶		skipping to change at line 679 ¶
	security(5) kerberosv5(2) pkinit(3) pkrkeydata(3) }		security(5) kerberosv5(2) pkinit(3) pkrkeydata(3) }
	3. The signerInfos field contains a single signerInfo, which is		3. The signerInfos field contains a single signerInfo, which is
	the signature of the ReplyKeyPack.		the signature of the ReplyKeyPack.
	4. The certificates field contains a signature verification		4. The certificates field contains a signature verification
	certificate chain that the client will use to verify the		certificate chain that the client will use to verify the
	KDC's signature over the ReplyKeyPack. This field may only		KDC's signature over the ReplyKeyPack. This field may only
	be left empty if the client included a kdcCert field in the		be left empty if the client included a kdcCert field in the
	PA-PK-AS-REQ, indicating that it has the KDC's certificate.		PA-PK-AS-REQ, indicating that it has the KDC's certificate.
			The certificate chain MUST NOT contain the root CA
			certificate.
	5. The contentType for the EnvelopedData contains the OID value		5. The contentType for the EnvelopedData contains the OID value
	for id-signedData: { iso (1) member-body (2) us (840) rsadsi		for id-signedData: { iso (1) member-body (2) us (840) rsadsi
	(113549) pkcs (1) pkcs7 (7) signedData (2) }		(113549) pkcs (1) pkcs7 (7) signedData (2) }
	6. The recipientInfos field is a SET which MUST contain exactly		6. The recipientInfos field is a SET which MUST contain exactly
	one member of type KeyTransRecipientInfo. The encryptedKey		one member of type KeyTransRecipientInfo. The encryptedKey
	for this member contains the temporary key which is		for this member contains the temporary key which is
	encrypted using the client's public key.		encrypted using the client's public key.
	skipping to change at line 629 ¶		skipping to change at line 718 ¶
	as to the identity of the KDC, this check MAY be omitted.		as to the identity of the KDC, this check MAY be omitted.
	The client also MUST check that the KDC's certificate contains an		The client also MUST check that the KDC's certificate contains an
	extendedKeyUsage OID of id-pkkdcekuoid:		extendedKeyUsage OID of id-pkkdcekuoid:
	{ iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosv5(2)		{ iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosv5(2)
	pkinit(3) pkkdcekuoid(5) }		pkinit(3) pkkdcekuoid(5) }
	If all applicable checks are satisfied, the client then decrypts the		If all applicable checks are satisfied, the client then decrypts the
	main reply with the resulting key, and then proceeds as described in		main reply with the resulting key, and then proceeds as described in
	CLARIFICATIONS.		[1].
	4. Security Considerations		4. Security Considerations
	PKINIT raises certain security considerations beyond those that can		PKINIT raises certain security considerations beyond those that can
	be regulated strictly in protocol definitions. We will address them		be regulated strictly in protocol definitions. We will address them
	in this section.		in this section.
	PKINIT extends the cross-realm model to the public-key		PKINIT extends the cross-realm model to the public-key
	infrastructure. Users of PKINIT must understand security policies		infrastructure. Users of PKINIT must understand security policies
	and procedures appropriate to the use of Public Key Infrastructures.		and procedures appropriate to the use of Public Key Infrastructures.
	Standard Kerberos allows the possibility of interactions between		Standard Kerberos allows the possibility of interactions between
	cryptosystems of varying strengths; this document adds interactions		cryptosystems of varying strengths; this document adds interactions
	with public-key cryptosystems to Kerberos. Some administrative		with public-key cryptosystems to Kerberos. Some administrative
	policies may allow the use of relatively weak public keys. Using		policies may allow the use of relatively weak public keys. Using
	such keys to wrap data encrypted under stronger conventional		such keys to wrap data encrypted under stronger conventional
	cryptosystems may be inappropriate.		cryptosystems may be inappropriate.
	PKINIT requires keys for symmetric cryptosystems to be generated.		PKINIT requires keys for symmetric cryptosystems to be generated.
	Some such systems contain "weak" keys. For recommendations regarding		Some such systems contain "weak" keys. For recommendations regarding
	these weak keys, see CLARIFICATIONS.		these weak keys, see [1].
	PKINIT allows the use of a zero nonce in the PKAuthenticator when		PKINIT allows the use of a zero nonce in the PKAuthenticator when
	cached Diffie-Hellman keys are used. In this case, message binding		cached Diffie-Hellman keys are used. In this case, message binding
	is performed using the nonce in the main request in the same way as		is performed using the nonce in the main request in the same way as
	it is done for ordinary AS-REQs (without the PKINIT		it is done for ordinary AS-REQs (without the PKINIT
	pre-authenticator). The nonce field in the KDC request body is		pre-authenticator). The nonce field in the KDC request body is
	signed through the checksum in the PKAuthenticator, which		signed through the checksum in the PKAuthenticator, which
	cryptographically binds the PKINIT pre-authenticator to the main		cryptographically binds the PKINIT pre-authenticator to the main
	body of the AS Request and also provides message integrity for the		body of the AS Request and also provides message integrity for the
	full AS Request.		full AS Request.
	skipping to change at line 701 ¶		skipping to change at line 790 ¶
	Kerberos, although the potential cost is not as great, because		Kerberos, although the potential cost is not as great, because
	standard Kerberos does not make use of public-key cryptography.		standard Kerberos does not make use of public-key cryptography.
	The syntax for the AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS authorization data does		The syntax for the AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS authorization data does
	permit empty SEQUENCEs to be encoded. Such empty sequences may only		permit empty SEQUENCEs to be encoded. Such empty sequences may only
	be used if the KDC itself vouches for the user's certificate. [This		be used if the KDC itself vouches for the user's certificate. [This
	seems to reflect the consensus of the Kerberos working group.]		seems to reflect the consensus of the Kerberos working group.]
	5. Acknowledgements		5. Acknowledgements
			The following people have made significant contributions to this
			draft: Ari Medvinsky, Matt Hur, John Wray, Jonathan Trostle, Nicolas
			Williams, Tom Yu, Sam Hartman, and Jeff Hutzelman.
	Some of the ideas on which this document is based arose during		Some of the ideas on which this document is based arose during
	discussions over several years between members of the SAAG, the IETF		discussions over several years between members of the SAAG, the IETF
	CAT working group, and the PSRG, regarding integration of Kerberos		CAT working group, and the PSRG, regarding integration of Kerberos
	and SPX. Some ideas have also been drawn from the DASS system.		and SPX. Some ideas have also been drawn from the DASS system.
	These changes are by no means endorsed by these groups. This is an		These changes are by no means endorsed by these groups. This is an
	attempt to revive some of the goals of those groups, and this		attempt to revive some of the goals of those groups, and this
	document approaches those goals primarily from the Kerberos		document approaches those goals primarily from the Kerberos
	perspective. Lastly, comments from groups working on similar ideas		perspective. Lastly, comments from groups working on similar ideas
	in DCE have been invaluable.		in DCE have been invaluable.
	6. Expiration Date		6. Expiration Date
	This draft expires January 25, 2004.		This draft expires January 25, 2004.
	7. Bibliography		7. Bibliography
	[1] RFC-Editor: To be replaced by RFC number for		[1] RFC-Editor: To be replaced by RFC number for
	draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications.		draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications.
	[2] R. Housley. Cryptographic Message Syntax., April 1999.		[2] R. Housley. Cryptographic Message Syntax. April 1999. Request
	Request For Comments 2630.		For Comments 2630.
	[3] W. Polk, R. Housley, and L. Bassham. Algorithms and Identifiers		[3] W. Polk, R. Housley, and L. Bassham. Algorithms and Identifiers
	for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and		for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
	Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile, April 2002. Request For		Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile, April 2002. Request For
	Comments 3279.		Comments 3279.
	[4] R. Housley, W. Polk, W. Ford, D. Solo. Internet X.509 Public		[4] R. Housley, W. Polk, W. Ford, D. Solo. Internet X.509 Public
	Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List		Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
	(CRL) Profile, April 2002. Request for Comments 3280.		(CRL) Profile, April 2002. Request for Comments 3280.
	skipping to change at line 752 ¶		skipping to change at line 845 ¶
	[8] M. Myers, R. Ankney, A. Malpani, S. Galperin, and C. Adams.		[8] M. Myers, R. Ankney, A. Malpani, S. Galperin, and C. Adams.
	Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Online Certificate Status		Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Online Certificate Status
	Protocol - OCSP, June 1999. Request for Comments 2560.		Protocol - OCSP, June 1999. Request for Comments 2560.
	[9] NIST, Guidelines for Implementing and Using the NBS Encryption		[9] NIST, Guidelines for Implementing and Using the NBS Encryption
	Standard, April 1981. FIPS PUB 74.		Standard, April 1981. FIPS PUB 74.
	[10] D. Harkins and D. Carrel. The Internet Key Exchange (IKE),		[10] D. Harkins and D. Carrel. The Internet Key Exchange (IKE),
	November 1998. Request for Comments 2409.		November 1998. Request for Comments 2409.
			[11] K. Raeburn. Unkeyed SHA-1 Checksum Specification for Kerberos
			5. Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-krb-wg-sha1-00.txt.
			[12] S. Bradner. Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
			Levels. March 1997. Request for Comments 2119 (BCP 14).
	8. Authors		8. Authors
	Brian Tung		Brian Tung
	Clifford Neuman		Clifford Neuman
	USC Information Sciences Institute		USC Information Sciences Institute
	4676 Admiralty Way Suite 1001		4676 Admiralty Way Suite 1001
	Marina del Rey CA 90292-6695		Marina del Rey CA 90292-6695
	Phone: +1 310 822 1511		Phone: +1 310 822 1511
	E-mail: {brian,bcn}@isi.edu		E-mail: {brian,bcn}@isi.edu
	skipping to change at line 830 ¶		skipping to change at line 929 ¶
	pa-pk-as-rep INTEGER ::= TBD		pa-pk-as-rep INTEGER ::= TBD
	pa-pk-ocsp-req INTEGER ::= TBD		pa-pk-ocsp-req INTEGER ::= TBD
	pa-pk-ocsp-rep INTEGER ::= TBD		pa-pk-ocsp-rep INTEGER ::= TBD
	ad-initial-verified-cas INTEGER ::= TBD		ad-initial-verified-cas INTEGER ::= TBD
	td-dh-parameters INTEGER ::= TBD		td-dh-parameters INTEGER ::= TBD
	td-trusted-certifiers INTEGER ::= 104		td-trusted-certifiers INTEGER ::= 104
	td-certificate-index INTEGER ::= 105		td-certificate-index INTEGER ::= 105
			WrapContentInfo ::= OCTET STRING (CONSTRAINED BY {
			-- Contains a BER encoding of
			-- ContentInfo
			})
			WrapIssuerAndSerial ::= OCTET STRING (CONSTRAINED BY {
			-- Contains a BER encoding of
			-- IssuerAndSerialNumber
			})
	PA-PK-AS-REQ ::= SEQUENCE {		PA-PK-AS-REQ ::= SEQUENCE {
	signedAuthPack [0] ContentInfo,		signedAuthPack [0] IMPLICIT WrapContentInfo,
	trustedCertifiers [1] SEQUENCE OF TrustedCA OPTIONAL,		trustedCertifiers [1] SEQUENCE OF TrustedCA OPTIONAL,
	kdcCert [2] IssuerAndSerialNumber OPTIONAL,		kdcCert [2] IMPLICIT WrapIssuerAndSerial
			OPTIONAL,
	...		...
	}		}
	TrustedCA ::= CHOICE {		TrustedCA ::= CHOICE {
	caName [0] Name,		caName [1] Name,
	issuerAndSerial [2] IssuerAndSerialNumber,		issuerAndSerial [2] IMPLICIT WrapIssuerAndSerial,
	...		...
	}		}
	AuthPack ::= SEQUENCE {		AuthPack ::= SEQUENCE {
	pkAuthenticator [0] PKAuthenticator,		pkAuthenticator [0] PKAuthenticator,
	clientPublicValue [1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL,		clientPublicValue [1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL,
	supportedCMSTypes [2] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier		supportedCMSTypes [2] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
	OPTIONAL,		OPTIONAL,
	...		...
	}		}
	PKAuthenticator ::= SEQUENCE {		PKAuthenticator ::= SEQUENCE {
	cusec [0] INTEGER,		cusec [0] INTEGER (0..999999),
	ctime [1] KerberosTime,		ctime [1] KerberosTime,
	nonce [2] INTEGER (0..4294967295),		nonce [2] INTEGER (0..4294967295),
	paChecksum [3] Checksum,		paChecksum [3] Checksum,
	...		...
	}		}
	TrustedCertifiers ::= SEQUENCE OF Name		TrustedCertifiers ::= SEQUENCE OF Name
	CertificateIndex ::= IssuerAndSerialNumber		CertificateIndex ::= IssuerAndSerialNumber
	skipping to change at line 875 ¶		skipping to change at line 985 ¶
	principalName [1] PrincipalName		principalName [1] PrincipalName
	}		}
	InitialVerifiedCAs ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {		InitialVerifiedCAs ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
	ca [0] Name,		ca [0] Name,
	validated [1] BOOLEAN,		validated [1] BOOLEAN,
	...		...
	}		}
	PA-PK-AS-REP ::= CHOICE {		PA-PK-AS-REP ::= CHOICE {
	dhSignedData [0] ContentInfo,		dhSignedData [0] IMPLICIT WrapContentInfo,
	encKeyPack [1] ContentInfo,		encKeyPack [1] IMPLICIT WrapContentInfo,
	...		...
	}		}
	KDCDHKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {		KDCDHKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
	subjectPublicKey [0] BIT STRING,		subjectPublicKey [0] BIT STRING,
	nonce [1] INTEGER,		nonce [1] INTEGER (0..4294967295),
	dhKeyExpiration [2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,		dhKeyExpiration [2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
	...		...
	}		}
	ReplyKeyPack ::= SEQUENCE {		ReplyKeyPack ::= SEQUENCE {
	replyKey [0] EncryptionKey,		replyKey [0] EncryptionKey,
	nonce [1] INTEGER (0..4294967295),		nonce [1] INTEGER (0..4294967295),
	...		...
	}		}
	END		END
	Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is subject		Copyright (C) The Internet Society 2004. This document is subject
	to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and		to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
	except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.		except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
	This document and the information contained herein are provided on an		This document and the information contained herein are provided on
	"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS		an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE
	OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET		REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE
	ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,		INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR
	INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE		IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
	INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED		THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
	WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.		WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
End of changes. 51 change blocks.
	99 lines changed or deleted		209 lines changed or added
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