< draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-25.txt		draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-26.txt >
	NETWORK WORKING GROUP B. Tung		NETWORK WORKING GROUP B. Tung
	Internet-Draft USC Information Sciences Institute		Internet-Draft USC Information Sciences Institute
	Expires: August 22, 2005 L. Zhu		Expires: November 24, 2005 L. Zhu
	Microsoft Corporation		Microsoft Corporation
	February 18, 2005		May 23, 2005
	Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos		Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos
	draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-25		draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-26
	Status of this Memo		Status of this Memo
	This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions		This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions
	of Section 3 of RFC 3667. By submitting this Internet-Draft, each		of Section 3 of RFC 3667.
	author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of
	which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of		By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
	which he or she become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with		applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
	RFC 3668.		have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
			aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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	This Internet-Draft will expire on August 22, 2005.		This Internet-Draft will expire on November 24, 2005.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).		Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document describes protocol extensions (hereafter called PKINIT)		This document describes protocol extensions (hereafter called PKINIT)
	to the Kerberos protocol specification. These extensions provide a		to the Kerberos protocol specification. These extensions provide a
	method for integrating public key cryptography into the initial		method for integrating public key cryptography into the initial
	skipping to change at page 2, line 14 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 14 ¶
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3. Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3. Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3.1 Definitions, Requirements, and Constants . . . . . . . . . 4		3.1 Definitions, Requirements, and Constants . . . . . . . . . 4
	3.1.1 Required Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3.1.1 Required Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3.1.2 Defined Message and Encryption Types . . . . . . . . . 5		3.1.2 Defined Message and Encryption Types . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.1.3 Algorithm Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3.1.3 Algorithm Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	3.2 PKINIT Pre-authentication Syntax and Use . . . . . . . . . 6		3.2 PKINIT Pre-authentication Syntax and Use . . . . . . . . . 7
	3.2.1 Generation of Client Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3.2.1 Generation of Client Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	3.2.2 Receipt of Client Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		3.2.2 Receipt of Client Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	3.2.3 Generation of KDC Reply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		3.2.3 Generation of KDC Reply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	3.2.4 Receipt of KDC Reply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		3.2.4 Receipt of KDC Reply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	3.3 Interoperability Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		3.3 Interoperability Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
	3.4 KDC Indication of PKINIT Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		3.4 KDC Indication of PKINIT Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
	4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21		4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
	5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22		5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
	6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22		6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
	7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23		7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
	7.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23		7.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
	7.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24		7.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
	A. PKINIT ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25		A. PKINIT ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
	Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 30		Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 30
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	A client typically authenticates itself to a service in Kerberos		A client typically authenticates itself to a service in Kerberos
	using three distinct though related exchanges. First, the client		using three distinct though related exchanges. First, the client
	requests a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) from the Kerberos		requests a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) from the Kerberos
	authentication server (AS). Then, it uses the TGT to request a		authentication server (AS). Then, it uses the TGT to request a
	service ticket from the Kerberos ticket-granting server (TGS).		service ticket from the Kerberos ticket-granting server (TGS).
	Usually, the AS and TGS are integrated in a single device known as a		Usually, the AS and TGS are integrated in a single device known as a
	Kerberos Key Distribution Center, or KDC. (In this document, both		Kerberos Key Distribution Center, or KDC. Finally, the client uses
	the AS and the TGS are referred to as the KDC.) Finally, the client		the service ticket to authenticate itself to the service.
	uses the service ticket to authenticate itself to the service.
	The advantage afforded by the TGT is that the client exposes his		The advantage afforded by the TGT is that the client exposes his
	long-term secrets only once. The TGT and its associated session key		long-term secrets only once. The TGT and its associated session key
	can then be used for any subsequent service ticket requests. One		can then be used for any subsequent service ticket requests. One
	result of this is that all further authentication is independent of		result of this is that all further authentication is independent of
	the method by which the initial authentication was performed.		the method by which the initial authentication was performed.
	Consequently, initial authentication provides a convenient place to		Consequently, initial authentication provides a convenient place to
	integrate public-key cryptography into Kerberos authentication.		integrate public-key cryptography into Kerberos authentication.
	As defined in [CLAR], Kerberos authentication exchanges use		As defined in [CLAR], Kerberos authentication exchanges use
	skipping to change at page 3, line 38 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 37 ¶
	must be shared, so that before a client can authenticate itself, he		must be shared, so that before a client can authenticate itself, he
	must already be registered with the KDC.		must already be registered with the KDC.
	Conversely, public-key cryptography (in conjunction with an		Conversely, public-key cryptography (in conjunction with an
	established Public Key Infrastructure) permits authentication without		established Public Key Infrastructure) permits authentication without
	prior registration with a KDC. Adding it to Kerberos allows the		prior registration with a KDC. Adding it to Kerberos allows the
	widespread use of Kerberized applications by clients without		widespread use of Kerberized applications by clients without
	requiring them to register first with a KDC--a requirement that has		requiring them to register first with a KDC--a requirement that has
	no inherent security benefit.		no inherent security benefit.
	As noted above, a convenient and efficient place to introduce		As noted above, a convenient and efficient place to introduce public-
	public-key cryptography into Kerberos is in the initial		key cryptography into Kerberos is in the initial authentication
	authentication exchange. This document describes the methods and		exchange. This document describes the methods and data formats for
	data formats for integrating public-key cryptography into Kerberos		integrating public-key cryptography into Kerberos initial
	initial authentication.		authentication.
	2. Conventions Used in This Document		2. Conventions Used in This Document
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
	document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].		document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
			Both the AS and the TGS are referred to as the KDC.
	In this document, the encryption key used to encrypt the enc-part		In this document, the encryption key used to encrypt the enc-part
	field of the KDC-REP in the AS-REP [CLAR] is referred to as the KDC		field of the KDC-REP in the AS-REP [CLAR] is referred to as the AS
	AS reply key.		reply key.
	3. Extensions		3. Extensions
	This section describes extensions to [CLAR] for supporting the use of		This section describes extensions to [CLAR] for supporting the use of
	public-key cryptography in the initial request for a ticket.		public-key cryptography in the initial request for a ticket.
	Briefly, this document defines the following extensions to [CLAR]:		Briefly, this document defines the following extensions to [CLAR]:
	1. The client indicates the use of public-key authentication by		1. The client indicates the use of public-key authentication by
	including a special preauthenticator in the initial request. This		including a special preauthenticator in the initial request. This
	preauthenticator contains the client's public-key data and a		preauthenticator contains the client's public-key data and a
	signature.		signature.
	2. The KDC tests the client's request against its authentication		2. The KDC tests the client's request against its authentication
	policy and trusted Certification Authorities (CAs).		policy and trusted Certification Authorities (CAs).
	3. If the request passes the verification tests, the KDC replies as		3. If the request passes the verification tests, the KDC replies as
	usual, but the reply is encrypted using either:		usual, but the reply is encrypted using either:
	a. a key generated through a Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange		a. a key generated through a Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange
	[RFC2631][IEEE1363] with the client, signed using the KDC's		[RFC2631] [IEEE1363] with the client, signed using the KDC's
	signature key; or		signature key; or
	b. a symmetric encryption key, signed using the KDC's signature		b. a symmetric encryption key, signed using the KDC's signature
	key and encrypted using the client's public key.		key and encrypted using the client's public key.
	Any keying material required by the client to obtain the		Any keying material required by the client to obtain the
	encryption key for decrypting the KDC reply is returned in a		encryption key for decrypting the KDC reply is returned in a pre-
	pre-authentication field accompanying the usual reply.		authentication field accompanying the usual reply.
	4. The client validates the KDC's signature, obtains the encryption		4. The client validates the KDC's signature, obtains the encryption
	key, decrypts the reply, and then proceeds as usual.		key, decrypts the reply, and then proceeds as usual.
	Section 3.1 of this document enumerates the required algorithms and		Section 3.1 of this document enumerates the required algorithms and
	necessary extension message types. Section 3.2 describes the		necessary extension message types. Section 3.2 describes the
	extension messages in greater detail.		extension messages in greater detail.
	3.1 Definitions, Requirements, and Constants		3.1 Definitions, Requirements, and Constants
	3.1.1 Required Algorithms		3.1.1 Required Algorithms
	All PKINIT implementations MUST support the following algorithms:		All PKINIT implementations MUST support the following algorithms:
	o KDC AS reply key enctype: AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 etype [RFC3961].		o AS reply key enctype: AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 etype [RFC3962].
	o Signature algorithm: sha-1WithRSAEncryption [RFC3279].		o Signature algorithm: sha-1WithRSAEncryption [RFC3279].
	o KDC AS reply key delivery method: Diffie-Hellman key exchange		o AS reply key delivery method: Diffie-Hellman key exchange
	[RFC2631].		[RFC2631].
	3.1.2 Defined Message and Encryption Types		3.1.2 Defined Message and Encryption Types
	PKINIT makes use of the following new pre-authentication types:		PKINIT makes use of the following new pre-authentication types:
	PA_PK_AS_REQ 16		PA_PK_AS_REQ 16
	PA_PK_AS_REP 17		PA_PK_AS_REP 17
	PKINIT also makes use of the following new authorization data type:		PKINIT also makes use of the following new authorization data type:
	skipping to change at page 5, line 31 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 36 ¶
	KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE 70		KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE 70
	KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE 71		KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE 71
	KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE 72		KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE 72
	KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN 73		KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN 73
	KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH 75		KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH 75
	KDC_ERR_INCONSISTENT_KEY_PURPOSE 76		KDC_ERR_INCONSISTENT_KEY_PURPOSE 76
	PKINIT uses the following typed data types for errors:		PKINIT uses the following typed data types for errors:
	TD_TRUSTED_CERTIFIERS 104		TD_TRUSTED_CERTIFIERS 104
	TD_INVLID_CERTIFICATES 105		TD_INVALID_CERTIFICATES 105
	TD_DH_PARAMETERS 109		TD_DH_PARAMETERS 109
	PKINIT defines the following encryption types, for use in the AS-REQ		PKINIT defines the following encryption types, for use in the AS-REQ
	message to indicate acceptance of the corresponding algorithms that		message to indicate acceptance of the corresponding algorithms that
	can used by Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC3852] messages in		can used by Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC3852] messages in
	the reply:		the reply:
	dsaWithSHA1-CmsOID 9		dsaWithSHA1-CmsOID 9
	md5WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 10		md5WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 10
	sha1WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 11		sha1WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 11
	skipping to change at page 6, line 21 ¶		skipping to change at page 6, line 29 ¶
	PKINIT with DER.		PKINIT with DER.
	3.1.3 Algorithm Identifiers		3.1.3 Algorithm Identifiers
	PKINIT does not define, but does make use of, the following algorithm		PKINIT does not define, but does make use of, the following algorithm
	identifiers.		identifiers.
	PKINIT uses the following algorithm identifiers for Diffie-Hellman		PKINIT uses the following algorithm identifiers for Diffie-Hellman
	key agreement [RFC3279]:		key agreement [RFC3279]:
	dhpublicnumber (Diffie-Hellman modulo a prime p [RFC2631])		dhpublicnumber (Modular Exponential Diffie-Hellman [RFC2631])
	id-ecPublicKey (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman [IEEE1363])		id-ecPublicKey (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman [IEEE1363])
	PKINIT uses the following signature algorithm identifiers [RFC3279]:		PKINIT uses the following signature algorithm identifiers [RFC3279]:
	sha-1WithRSAEncryption (RSA with SHA1)		sha-1WithRSAEncryption (RSA with SHA1)
	md5WithRSAEncryption (RSA with MD5)		md5WithRSAEncryption (RSA with MD5)
	id-dsa-with-sha1 (DSA with SHA1)		id-dsa-with-sha1 (DSA with SHA1)
	PKINIT uses the following encryption algorithm identifiers [RFC3447]		PKINIT uses the following encryption algorithm identifiers [RFC3447]
	for encrypting the temporary key with a public key:		for encrypting the temporary key with a public key:
	rsaEncryption (PKCS1 v1.5)		rsaEncryption (PKCS1 v1.5)
	id-RSAES-OAEP (PKCS1 v2.0)		id-RSAES-OAEP (PKCS1 v2.0)
	PKINIT uses the following algorithm identifiers [RFC3370][RFC3565]		PKINIT uses the following algorithm identifiers [RFC3370] [RFC3565]
	for encrypting the KDC AS reply key with the temporary key:		for encrypting the AS reply key with the temporary key:
	des-ede3-cbc (three-key 3DES, CBC mode)		des-ede3-cbc (three-key 3DES, CBC mode)
	rc2-cbc (RC2, CBC mode)		rc2-cbc (RC2, CBC mode)
	id-aes256-CBC (AES-256, CBC mode)		id-aes256-CBC (AES-256, CBC mode)
	3.2 PKINIT Pre-authentication Syntax and Use		3.2 PKINIT Pre-authentication Syntax and Use
	This section defines the syntax and use of the various		This section defines the syntax and use of the various pre-
	pre-authentication fields employed by PKINIT.		authentication fields employed by PKINIT.
	3.2.1 Generation of Client Request		3.2.1 Generation of Client Request
	The initial authentication request (AS-REQ) is sent as per [CLAR]; in		The initial authentication request (AS-REQ) is sent as per [CLAR]; in
	addition, a pre-authentication data element, whose padata-type is		addition, a pre-authentication data element, whose padata-type is
	PA_PK_AS_REQ and whose padata-value contains the DER encoding of the		PA_PK_AS_REQ and whose padata-value contains the DER encoding of the
	type PA-PK-AS-REQ, is included.		type PA-PK-AS-REQ, is included.
	PA-PK-AS-REQ ::= SEQUENCE {		PA-PK-AS-REQ ::= SEQUENCE {
	signedAuthPack [0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING,		signedAuthPack [0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING,
	skipping to change at page 7, line 22 ¶		skipping to change at page 7, line 31 ¶
	-- The contentType field of the type ContentInfo		-- The contentType field of the type ContentInfo
	-- is id-signedData (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2),		-- is id-signedData (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2),
	-- and the content field is a SignedData.		-- and the content field is a SignedData.
	-- The eContentType field for the type SignedData is		-- The eContentType field for the type SignedData is
	-- id-pkauthdata (1.3.6.1.5.2.3.1), and the		-- id-pkauthdata (1.3.6.1.5.2.3.1), and the
	-- eContent field contains the DER encoding of the		-- eContent field contains the DER encoding of the
	-- type AuthPack.		-- type AuthPack.
	-- AuthPack is defined below.		-- AuthPack is defined below.
	trustedCertifiers [1] SEQUENCE OF TrustedCA OPTIONAL,		trustedCertifiers [1] SEQUENCE OF TrustedCA OPTIONAL,
	-- A list of CAs, trusted by the client, that can		-- A list of CAs, trusted by the client, that can
	-- be used as the trust anchor to validate the KDC's		-- be used to certify the KDC.
	-- signature.
	-- Each TrustedCA identifies a CA or a CA		-- Each TrustedCA identifies a CA or a CA
	-- certificate (thereby its public key).		-- certificate (thereby its public key).
			-- The information contained in the
			-- trustedCertifiers SHOULD be used by the KDC as
			-- hints to guide its selection of an appropriate
			-- certificate chain to return to the client.
	kdcPkId [2] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING		kdcPkId [2] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING
	OPTIONAL,		OPTIONAL,
	-- Contains a CMS type SignerIdentifier encoded		-- Contains a CMS type SignerIdentifier encoded
	-- according to [RFC3852].		-- according to [RFC3852].
	-- Identifies, if present, a particular KDC		-- Identifies, if present, a particular KDC
	-- public key that the client already has.		-- public key that the client already has.
	...		...
	}		}
	DHNonce ::= OCTET STRING		DHNonce ::= OCTET STRING
	skipping to change at page 8, line 19 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 31 ¶
	...		...
	}		}
	AuthPack ::= SEQUENCE {		AuthPack ::= SEQUENCE {
	pkAuthenticator [0] PKAuthenticator,		pkAuthenticator [0] PKAuthenticator,
	clientPublicValue [1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL,		clientPublicValue [1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL,
	-- Type SubjectPublicKeyInfo is defined in		-- Type SubjectPublicKeyInfo is defined in
	-- [RFC3280].		-- [RFC3280].
	-- Specifies Diffie-Hellman domain parameters		-- Specifies Diffie-Hellman domain parameters
	-- and the client's public key value [IEEE1363].		-- and the client's public key value [IEEE1363].
	-- The public key value (the subjectPublicKey field		-- The DH public key value is encoded as a BIT
	-- of the type SubjectPublicKeyInfo) MUST be encoded		-- STRING, as specified in Section 2.3.3 of
	-- according to [RFC3279].		-- [RFC3279].
	-- Present only if the client wishes to use the		-- This field is present only if the client wishes
	-- Diffie-Hellman key agreement method.		-- to use the Diffie-Hellman key agreement method.
	supportedCMSTypes [2] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier		supportedCMSTypes [2] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
	OPTIONAL,		OPTIONAL,
	-- Type AlgorithmIdentifier is defined in		-- Type AlgorithmIdentifier is defined in
	-- [RFC3280].		-- [RFC3280].
	-- List of CMS encryption types supported by the		-- List of CMS encryption types supported by the
	-- client in order of (decreasing) preference.		-- client in order of (decreasing) preference.
	clientDHNonce [3] DHNonce OPTIONAL,		clientDHNonce [3] DHNonce OPTIONAL,
	-- Present only if the client indicates that it		-- Present only if the client indicates that it
	-- wishes to reuse DH keys or to allow the KDC to		-- wishes to reuse DH keys or to allow the KDC to
	-- do so (see Section 3.2.3.1).		-- do so (see Section 3.2.3.1).
	skipping to change at page 9, line 26 ¶		skipping to change at page 9, line 37 ¶
	4. The signerInfos field of the type SignedData contains a single		4. The signerInfos field of the type SignedData contains a single
	signerInfo, which contains the signature over the type AuthPack.		signerInfo, which contains the signature over the type AuthPack.
	5. The certificates field of the type SignedData contains		5. The certificates field of the type SignedData contains
	certificates intended to facilitate certification path		certificates intended to facilitate certification path
	construction, so that the KDC can verify the signature over the		construction, so that the KDC can verify the signature over the
	type AuthPack. For path validation, these certificates SHOULD be		type AuthPack. For path validation, these certificates SHOULD be
	sufficient to construct at least one certification path from the		sufficient to construct at least one certification path from the
	client certificate to one trust anchor acceptable by the KDC		client certificate to one trust anchor acceptable by the KDC
	[CAPATH]. The certificates field MUST NOT contain "root" CA		[CAPATH]. The client MUST be capable of including such a set of
	certificates.		certificates if configured to do so. The certificates field MUST
			NOT contain "root" CA certificates.
	6. The client's Diffie-Hellman public value (clientPublicValue) is		6. The client's Diffie-Hellman public value (clientPublicValue) is
	included if and only if the client wishes to use the		included if and only if the client wishes to use the Diffie-
	Diffie-Hellman key agreement method. The Diffie-Hellman domain		Hellman key agreement method. The Diffie-Hellman domain
	parameters for the client's public key are specified in the		parameters [IEEE1363] for the client's public key are specified
	algorithm field of the type SubjectPublicKeyInfo		in the algorithm field of the type SubjectPublicKeyInfo [RFC3279]
	[IEEE1363][RFC3279] and the client's Diffie-Hellman public key		and the client's Diffie-Hellman public key value is mapped to a
	value is mapped to a subjectPublicKey (a BIT STRING) according to		subjectPublicKey (a BIT STRING) according to [RFC3279]. When
	[RFC3279]. When using the Diffie-Hellman key agreement method,		using the Diffie-Hellman key agreement method, implementations
	implementations MUST support Oakley 1024-bit MODP well-known		MUST support Oakley 1024-bit Modular Exponential (MODP) well-
	group 2 [RFC2412] and SHOULD support Oakley 2048-bit MODP		known group 2 [RFC2412] and SHOULD support Oakley 2048-bit MODP
	well-known group 14 and Oakley 4096-bit MODP well-known group 16		well-known group 14 and Oakley 4096-bit MODP well-known group 16
	[RFC3526].		[RFC3526].
	The Diffie-Hellman field size should be chosen so as to provide		The Diffie-Hellman field size should be chosen so as to provide
	sufficient cryptographic security. The following table, based on		sufficient cryptographic security [RFC3766].
	[LENSTRA], gives approximate comparable key sizes for symmetric-
	and asymmetric-key cryptosystems based on the best-known
	algorithms for attacking them.
	Symmetric | ECC | DH/DSA/RSA
	-------------+---------+------------
	80 | 163 | 1024
	112 | 233 | 2048
	128 | 283 | 3072
	192 | 409 | 7680
	256 | 571 | 15360
	Table 1: Comparable key sizes (in bits)
	When Diffie-Hellma modulo a prime p is used, the exponents should		When MODP Diffie-Hellman is used, the exponents should have at
	have at least twice as many bits as the symmetric keys that will		least twice as many bits as the symmetric keys that will be
	be derived from them [ODL99].		derived from them [ODL99].
	7. The client may wish to reuse DH keys or to allow the KDC to do so		7. The client may wish to reuse DH keys or to allow the KDC to do so
	(see Section 3.2.3.1). If so, then the client includes the		(see Section 3.2.3.1). If so, then the client includes the
	clientDHNonce field. This nonce string needs to be as long as		clientDHNonce field. This nonce string needs to be as long as
	the longest key length of the symmetric key types that the client		the longest key length of the symmetric key types that the client
	supports. This nonce MUST be chosen randomly.		supports. This nonce MUST be chosen randomly.
	3.2.2 Receipt of Client Request		3.2.2 Receipt of Client Request
	Upon receiving the client's request, the KDC validates it. This		Upon receiving the client's request, the KDC validates it. This
	skipping to change at page 10, line 39 ¶		skipping to change at page 10, line 34 ¶
	noted) take in validating the request.		noted) take in validating the request.
	The KDC verifies the client's signature in the signedAuthPack field		The KDC verifies the client's signature in the signedAuthPack field
	according to [RFC3852].		according to [RFC3852].
	If, while validating the client's X.509 certificate [RFC3280], the		If, while validating the client's X.509 certificate [RFC3280], the
	KDC cannot build a certification path to validate the client's		KDC cannot build a certification path to validate the client's
	certificate, it sends back a KRB-ERROR [CLAR] message with the code		certificate, it sends back a KRB-ERROR [CLAR] message with the code
	KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE. The accompanying e-data for this		KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE. The accompanying e-data for this
	error message is a TYPED-DATA (as defined in [CLAR]) that contains an		error message is a TYPED-DATA (as defined in [CLAR]) that contains an
	element whose data-type is TD_TRUSTED_CERTIFIERS, and whose		element whose data-type is TD_TRUSTED_CERTIFIERS, and whose data-
	data-value contains the DER encoding of the type		value contains the DER encoding of the type TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS:
	TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS:
	TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS ::= SEQUENCE OF TrustedCA		TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS ::= SEQUENCE OF TrustedCA
	-- Identifies a list of CAs trusted by the KDC.		-- Identifies a list of CAs trusted by the KDC.
	-- Each TrustedCA identifies a CA or a CA		-- Each TrustedCA identifies a CA or a CA
	-- certificate (thereby its public key).		-- certificate (thereby its public key).
	Upon receiving this error message, the client SHOULD retry only if it		Upon receiving this error message, the client SHOULD retry only if it
	has a different set of certificates (from those of the previous		has a different set of certificates (from those of the previous
	requests) that form a certification path (or a partial path) from one		requests) that form a certification path (or a partial path) from one
	of the trust anchors selected by the KDC to its own certificate.		of the trust anchors acceptable by the KDC to its own certificate.
	If, while processing the certification path, the KDC determines that		If, while processing the certification path, the KDC determines that
	the signature on one of the certificates in the signedAuthPack field		the signature on one of the certificates in the signedAuthPack field
	is invalid, it returns a KRB-ERROR [CLAR] message with the code		is invalid, it returns a KRB-ERROR [CLAR] message with the code
	KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE. The accompanying e-data for this error		KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE. The accompanying e-data for this error
	message is a TYPED-DATA that contains an element whose data-type is		message is a TYPED-DATA that contains an element whose data-type is
	TD_INVALID_CERTIFICATES, and whose data-value contains the DER		TD_INVALID_CERTIFICATES, and whose data-value contains the DER
	encoding of the type TD-INVALID-CERTIFICATES:		encoding of the type TD-INVALID-CERTIFICATES:
	TD-INVALID-CERTIFICATES ::= SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING		TD-INVALID-CERTIFICATES ::= SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING
	-- Each OCTET STRING contains a CMS type		-- Each OCTET STRING contains a CMS type
	-- IssuerAndSerialNumber encoded according to		-- IssuerAndSerialNumber encoded according to
	-- [RFC3852].		-- [RFC3852].
	-- Each IssuerAndSerialNumber indentifies a		-- Each IssuerAndSerialNumber identifies a
	-- certificate (sent by the client) with an invalid		-- certificate (sent by the client) with an invalid
	-- signature.		-- signature.
	If more than one X.509 certificate signature is invalid, the KDC MAY		If more than one X.509 certificate signature is invalid, the KDC MAY
	send one TYPED-DATA element per invalid signature.		include one IssuerAndSerialNumber per invalid signature within the
			TD-INVALID-CERTIFICATES.
			The client's X.509 certificate is validated according to [RFC3280].
	Based on local policy, the KDC may also check whether any X.509		Based on local policy, the KDC may also check whether any X.509
	certificates in the certification path validating the client's		certificates in the certification path validating the client's
	certificate have been revoked. If any of them have been revoked, the		certificate have been revoked. If any of them have been revoked, the
	KDC MUST return an error message with the code		KDC MUST return an error message with the code
	KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE; if the KDC attempts to determine the		KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE; if the KDC attempts to determine the
	revocation status but is unable to do so, it SHOULD return an error		revocation status but is unable to do so, it SHOULD return an error
	message with the code KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN. The		message with the code KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN. The
	certificate or certificates affected are identified exactly as for		certificate or certificates affected are identified exactly as for
	the error code KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE (see above).		the error code KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE (see above).
			Note that the TD_INVALID_CERTIFICATES error data is only used to
			identify invalid certificates sent by the client in the request.
	The client's public key is then used to verify the signature. If the		The client's public key is then used to verify the signature. If the
	signature fails to verify, the KDC MUST return an error message with		signature fails to verify, the KDC MUST return an error message with
	the code KDC_ERR_INVALID_SIG. There is no accompanying e-data for		the code KDC_ERR_INVALID_SIG. There is no accompanying e-data for
	this error message.		this error message.
	In addition to validating the client's signature, the KDC MUST also		In addition to validating the client's signature, the KDC MUST also
	check that the client's public key used to verify the client's		check that the client's public key used to verify the client's
	signature is bound to the client's principal name as specified in the		signature is bound to the client's principal name as specified in the
	AS-REQ as follows:		AS-REQ as follows:
	1. If the KDC has its own binding between either the client's		1. If the KDC has its own binding between either the client's
	signature-verification public key or the client's certificate and		signature-verification public key or the client's certificate and
	the client's Kerberos principal name, it uses that binding.		the client's Kerberos principal name, it uses that binding.
	2. Otherwise, if the client's X.509 certificate contains a Subject		2. Otherwise, if the client's X.509 certificate contains a Subject
	Alternative Name (SAN) extension [RFC3280] with a		Alternative Name (SAN) extension carrying a KRB5PrincipalName
	KRB5PrincipalName (defined below) in the otherName field, it binds		(defined below) in the otherName field of the type GeneralName
	the client's X.509 certificate to that name.		[RFC3280], it binds the client's X.509 certificate to that name.
	The otherName field (of type AnotherName) in the SAN extension
	MUST contain KRB5PrincipalName as defined below.
	The type-id field of the type AnotherName is id-pksan:		The type of the otherName field is AnotherName. The type-id field
			of the type AnotherName is id-pksan:
	id-pksan OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=		id-pksan OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
	{ iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosv5(2)		{ iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosv5(2)
	x509-sanan (2) }		x509-sanan (2) }
	The value field of the type AnotherName is the DER encoding of the		And the value field of the type AnotherName is a
	following ASN.1 type:		KRB5PrincipalName.
	KRB5PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE {		KRB5PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE {
	realm [0] Realm,		realm [0] Realm,
	principalName [1] PrincipalName		principalName [1] PrincipalName
	}		}
	If the KDC does not have its own binding and there is no		If the KDC does not have its own binding and there is no
	KRB5PrincipalName name present in the client's X.509 certificate, and		KRB5PrincipalName name present in the client's X.509 certificate, or
	if the Kerberos name in the request does not match the		if the Kerberos name in the request does not match the
	KRB5PrincipalName in the client's X.509 certificate (including the		KRB5PrincipalName in the client's X.509 certificate (including the
	realm name), the KDC MUST return an error message with the code		realm name), the KDC MUST return an error message with the code
	KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH. There is no accompanying e-data for		KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH. There is no accompanying e-data for
	this error message.		this error message.
	The KDC MAY require the presence of an Extended Key Usage (EKU)		The KDC MAY require the presence of an Extended Key Usage (EKU)
	KeyPurposeId [RFC3280] id-pkekuoid in the extensions field of the		KeyPurposeId [RFC3280] id-pkekuoid in the extensions field of the
	client's X.509 certificate:		client's X.509 certificate:
	id-pkekuoid OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=		id-pkekuoid OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
	{ iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosv5(2)		{ iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosv5(2)
	pkinit(3) pkekuoid(4) }		pkinit(3) pkekuoid(4) }
	-- PKINIT client authentication.		-- PKINIT client authentication.
	-- Key usage bits that MUST be consistent:		-- Key usage bits that MUST be consistent:
	-- digitalSignature;		-- digitalSignature.
	-- Key usage bits that MAY be consistent:
	-- nonRepudiation, and (keyEncipherment or keyAgreement).
	If this EKU is required but is missing, the KDC MUST return an error		If this EKU KeyPurposeId is required but it is not present or if the
	message of the code KDC_ERR_INCONSISTENT_KEY_PURPOSE. There is no		client certificate is restricted not to be used for PKINIT client
	accompanying e-data for this error message. KDCs implementing this		authentication per Section 4.2.1.13 of [RFC3280], the KDC MUST return
	requirement SHOULD also accept the EKU KeyPurposeId id-ms-sc-logon		an error message of the code KDC_ERR_INCONSISTENT_KEY_PURPOSE. There
	(1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2) as meeting the requirement, as there are a		is no accompanying e-data for this error message. KDCs implementing
	large number of X.509 client certificates deployed for use with		this requirement SHOULD also accept the EKU KeyPurposeId id-ms-sc-
			logon (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2) as meeting the requirement, as there
			are a large number of X.509 client certificates deployed for use with
	PKINIT which have this EKU.		PKINIT which have this EKU.
	If for any other reasons, the client's public key is not accepted,		If for any other reasons, the client's public key is not accepted,
	the KDC MUST return an error message with the code		the KDC MUST return an error message with the code
	KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED.		KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED.
	The KDC MUST check the timestamp to ensure that the request is not a		The KDC MUST check the timestamp to ensure that the request is not a
	replay, and that the time skew falls within acceptable limits. The		replay, and that the time skew falls within acceptable limits. The
	recommendations for clock skew times in [CLAR] apply here. If the		recommendations for clock skew times in [CLAR] apply here. If the
	check fails, the KDC MUST return error code KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT or		check fails, the KDC MUST return error code KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT or
	skipping to change at page 13, line 34 ¶		skipping to change at page 13, line 37 ¶
	-- This list is in decreasing preference order.		-- This list is in decreasing preference order.
	TD-DH-PARAMETERS contains a list of Diffie-Hellman domain parameters		TD-DH-PARAMETERS contains a list of Diffie-Hellman domain parameters
	that the KDC supports in decreasing preference order, from which the		that the KDC supports in decreasing preference order, from which the
	client SHOULD pick one to retry the request.		client SHOULD pick one to retry the request.
	If the client included a kdcPkId field in the PA-PK-AS-REQ and the		If the client included a kdcPkId field in the PA-PK-AS-REQ and the
	KDC does not possess the corresponding key, the KDC MUST ignore the		KDC does not possess the corresponding key, the KDC MUST ignore the
	kdcPkId field as if the client did not include one.		kdcPkId field as if the client did not include one.
	If the client included a trustedCertifiers field, and the KDC does
	not possesses the private key for any one of the listed certifiers,
	the KDC MUST ignore the trustedCertifiers field as if the client did
	not include any.
	If there is a supportedCMSTypes field in the AuthPack, the KDC must		If there is a supportedCMSTypes field in the AuthPack, the KDC must
	check to see if it supports any of the listed types. If it supports		check to see if it supports any of the listed types. If it supports
	more than one of the types, the KDC SHOULD use the one listed first.		more than one of the types, the KDC SHOULD use the one listed first.
	If it does not support any of them, it MUST return an error message		If it does not support any of them, it MUST return an error message
	with the code KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP [CLAR].		with the code KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP [CLAR].
	3.2.3 Generation of KDC Reply		3.2.3 Generation of KDC Reply
	Assuming that the client's request has been properly validated, the		Assuming that the client's request has been properly validated, the
	KDC proceeds as per [CLAR], except as follows.		KDC proceeds as per [CLAR], except as follows.
	skipping to change at page 14, line 17 ¶		skipping to change at page 14, line 15 ¶
	AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS ::= SEQUENCE OF TrustedCA		AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS ::= SEQUENCE OF TrustedCA
	-- Identifies the certification path based on which		-- Identifies the certification path based on which
	-- the client certificate was validated.		-- the client certificate was validated.
	-- Each TrustedCA identifies a CA or a CA		-- Each TrustedCA identifies a CA or a CA
	-- certificate (thereby its public key).		-- certificate (thereby its public key).
	The AS wraps any AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS data in AD-IF-RELEVANT		The AS wraps any AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS data in AD-IF-RELEVANT
	containers if the list of CAs satisfies the AS' realm's local policy		containers if the list of CAs satisfies the AS' realm's local policy
	(this corresponds to the TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED ticket flag		(this corresponds to the TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED ticket flag
	[CLAR]). Furthermore, any TGS MUST copy such authorization data from		[CLAR]). Furthermore, any TGS MUST copy such authorization data from
	tickets used in a PA-TGS-REQ [CLAR] of the TGS-REQ to the resulting		tickets used within a PA-TGS-REQ of the TGS-REQ into the resulting
	ticket, and it can wrap or unwrap the data into or out-of the		ticket. If the list of CAs satisfies the local KDC's realm's policy,
	AD-IF-RELEVANT container, depends on if the list of CAs satisfies the		the TGS MAY wrap the data into the AD-IF-RELEVANT container,
	TGS' realm's local policy.		otherwise it MAY unwrap the authorization data out of the AD-IF-
			RELEVANT container.
	Application servers that understand this authorization data type		Application servers that understand this authorization data type
	SHOULD apply local policy to determine whether a given ticket bearing		SHOULD apply local policy to determine whether a given ticket bearing
	such a type *not* contained within an AD-IF-RELEVANT container is		such a type *not* contained within an AD-IF-RELEVANT container is
	acceptable. (This corresponds to the AP server checking the		acceptable. (This corresponds to the AP server checking the
	transited field when the TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED flag has not been		transited field when the TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED flag has not been
	set [CLAR].) If such a data type is contained within an		set [CLAR].) If such a data type is contained within an AD-IF-
	AD-IF-RELEVANT container, AP servers MAY apply local policy to		RELEVANT container, AP servers MAY apply local policy to determine
	determine whether the authorization data is acceptable.		whether the authorization data is acceptable.
	The content of the AS-REP is otherwise unchanged from [CLAR]. The		The content of the AS-REP is otherwise unchanged from [CLAR]. The
	KDC encrypts the reply as usual, but not with the client's long-term		KDC encrypts the reply as usual, but not with the client's long-term
	key. Instead, it encrypts it with either a shared key derived from a		key. Instead, it encrypts it with either a shared key derived from a
	Diffie-Hellman exchange, or a generated encryption key. The contents		Diffie-Hellman exchange, or a generated encryption key. The contents
	of the PA-PK-AS-REP indicate which key delivery method is used:		of the PA-PK-AS-REP indicate which key delivery method is used:
	PA-PK-AS-REP ::= CHOICE {		PA-PK-AS-REP ::= CHOICE {
	dhInfo [0] DHRepInfo,		dhInfo [0] DHRepInfo,
	-- Selected when Diffie-Hellman key exchange is		-- Selected when Diffie-Hellman key exchange is
	skipping to change at page 15, line 31 ¶		skipping to change at page 15, line 29 ¶
	-- type KDCDHKeyInfo.		-- type KDCDHKeyInfo.
	-- KDCDHKeyInfo is defined below.		-- KDCDHKeyInfo is defined below.
	serverDHNonce [1] DHNonce OPTIONAL		serverDHNonce [1] DHNonce OPTIONAL
	-- Present if and only if dhKeyExpiration is		-- Present if and only if dhKeyExpiration is
	-- present in the KDCDHKeyInfo.		-- present in the KDCDHKeyInfo.
	}		}
	KDCDHKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {		KDCDHKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
	subjectPublicKey [0] BIT STRING,		subjectPublicKey [0] BIT STRING,
	-- KDC's DH public key.		-- KDC's DH public key.
	-- The DH pubic key value is mapped to a BIT STRING		-- The DH public key value is encoded as a BIT
	-- according to [RFC3279].		-- STRING, as specified in Section 2.3.3 of
			-- [RFC3279].
	nonce [1] INTEGER (0..4294967295),		nonce [1] INTEGER (0..4294967295),
	-- Contains the nonce in the PKAuthenticator of the		-- Contains the nonce in the PKAuthenticator of the
	-- request if DH keys are NOT reused,		-- request if DH keys are NOT reused,
	-- 0 otherwise.		-- 0 otherwise.
	dhKeyExpiration [2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,		dhKeyExpiration [2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
	-- Expiration time for KDC's key pair,		-- Expiration time for KDC's key pair,
	-- present if and only if DH keys are reused. If		-- present if and only if DH keys are reused. If
	-- this field is omitted then the serverDHNonce		-- this field is omitted then the serverDHNonce
	-- field MUST also be omitted. See Section 3.2.3.1.		-- field MUST also be omitted. See Section 3.2.3.1.
	...		...
	skipping to change at page 16, line 23 ¶		skipping to change at page 16, line 23 ¶
	3. The eContent field for the type SignedData contains the DER		3. The eContent field for the type SignedData contains the DER
	encoding of the type KDCDHKeyInfo.		encoding of the type KDCDHKeyInfo.
	4. The signerInfos field of the type SignedData contains a single		4. The signerInfos field of the type SignedData contains a single
	signerInfo, which contains the signature over the type		signerInfo, which contains the signature over the type
	KDCDHKeyInfo.		KDCDHKeyInfo.
	5. The certificates field of the type SignedData contains		5. The certificates field of the type SignedData contains
	certificates intended to facilitate certification path		certificates intended to facilitate certification path
	construction, so that the client can verify the KDC's signature		construction, so that the client can verify the KDC's signature
	over the type KDCDHKeyInfo. This field may only be left empty if		over the type KDCDHKeyInfo. The information contained in the
	the KDC public key specified by the kdcPkId field in the		trustedCertifiers in the request SHOULD be used by the KDC as
	PA-PK-AS-REQ was used for signing. Otherwise, for path		hints to guide its selection of an appropriate certificate chain
	validation, these certificates SHOULD be sufficient to construct		to return to the client. This field may only. be left empty if
	at least one certification path from the KDC certificate to one		the KDC public key specified by the kdcPkId field in the PA-PK-
	trust anchor acceptable by the client [CAPATH]. The certificates		AS-REQ was used for signing. Otherwise, for path validation,
	field MUST NOT contain "root" CA certificates.		these certificates SHOULD be sufficient to construct at least one
			certification path from the KDC certificate to one trust anchor
			acceptable by the client [CAPATH]. The KDC MUST be capable of
			including such a set of certificates if configured to do so. The
			certificates field MUST NOT contain "root" CA certificates.
	6. If the client included the clientDHNonce field, then the KDC may		6. If the client included the clientDHNonce field, then the KDC may
	choose to reuse its DH keys (see Section 3.2.3.1). If the server		choose to reuse its DH keys (see Section 3.2.3.1). If the server
	reuses DH keys then it MUST include an expiration time in the		reuses DH keys then it MUST include an expiration time in the
	dhKeyExperiation field. Past the point of the expiration time,		dhKeyExpiration field. Past the point of the expiration time,
	the signature over the type DHRepInfo is considered		the signature over the type DHRepInfo is considered expired/
	expired/invalid. When the server reuses DH keys then it MUST		invalid. When the server reuses DH keys then it MUST include a
	include a serverDHNonce at least as long as the length of keys		serverDHNonce at least as long as the length of keys for the
	for the symmetric encryption system used to encrypt the AS reply.		symmetric encryption system used to encrypt the AS reply. Note
	Note that including the serverDHNonce changes how the client and		that including the serverDHNonce changes how the client and
	server calculate the key to use to encrypt the reply; see below		server calculate the key to use to encrypt the reply; see below
	for details. The KDC SHOULD NOT reuse DH keys unless the		for details. The KDC SHOULD NOT reuse DH keys unless the
	clientDHNonce field is present in the request.		clientDHNonce field is present in the request.
	The KDC AS reply key is derived as follows:		The AS reply key is derived as follows:
	1. Both the KDC and the client calculate the shared secret value as		1. Both the KDC and the client calculate the shared secret value as
	follows:		follows:
	a) When Diffie-Hellman modulo a prime p ([RFC2631]) is used, let		a) When MODP Diffie-Hellman is used, let DHSharedSecret be the
	DHSharedSecret be the shared secret value.		shared secret value. DHSharedSecret is the value ZZ as
			described in Section 2.1.1 of [RFC2631].
	b) When Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) (with each party		b) When Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) (with each party
	contributing one key pair) [IEEE1363] is used, let		contributing one key pair) is used, let DHSharedSecret be the
	DHSharedSecret be the x-coordinate of the shared secret value		x-coordinate of the shared secret value (an elliptic curve
	(an elliptic curve point).		point). DHSharedSecret is the output of operation ECSVDP-DH as
			described in Section 7.2.1 of [IEEE1363].
	DHSharedSecret is first padded with leading zeros such that the		DHSharedSecret is first padded with leading zeros such that the
	size of DHSharedSecret in octets is the same as that of the		size of DHSharedSecret in octets is the same as that of the
	modulus, then represented as a string of octets in big-endian		modulus, then represented as a string of octets in big-endian
	order.		order.
	Implementation note: Both the client and the KDC can cache the		Implementation note: Both the client and the KDC can cache the
	triple (ya, yb, DHSharedSecret), where ya is the client's public		triple (ya, yb, DHSharedSecret), where ya is the client's public
	key and yb is the KDC's public key. If both ya and yb are the		key and yb is the KDC's public key. If both ya and yb are the
	same in a later exchange, the cached DHSharedSecret can be used.		same in a later exchange, the cached DHSharedSecret can be used.
	2. Let K be the key-generation seed length [RFC3961] of the KDC AS		2. Let K be the key-generation seed length [RFC3961] of the AS reply
	reply key whose enctype is selected according to [CLAR].		key whose enctype is selected according to [CLAR].
	3. Define the function octetstring2key() as follows:		3. Define the function octetstring2key() as follows:
	octetstring2key(x) == random-to-key(K-truncate(		octetstring2key(x) == random-to-key(K-truncate(
	SHA1(0x00 | x) |		SHA1(0x00 | x) |
	SHA1(0x01 | x) |		SHA1(0x01 | x) |
	SHA1(0x02 | x) |		SHA1(0x02 | x) |
	...		...
	))		))
	where x is an octet string; | is the concatenation operator; 0x00,		where x is an octet string; | is the concatenation operator; 0x00,
	0x01, 0x02, etc., are each represented as a single octet;		0x01, 0x02, etc., are each represented as a single octet; random-
	random-to-key() is an operation that generates a protocol key from		to-key() is an operation that generates a protocol key from a
	a bitstring of length K; and K-truncate truncates its input to the		bitstring of length K; and K-truncate truncates its input to the
	first K bits. Both K and random-to-key() are as defined in the		first K bits. Both K and random-to-key() are as defined in the
	kcrypto profile [RFC3961] for the enctype of the KDC AS reply key.		kcrypto profile [RFC3961] for the enctype of the AS reply key.
	4. When DH keys are reused, let n_c be the clientDHNonce, and n_k be		4. When DH keys are reused, let n_c be the clientDHNonce, and n_k be
	the serverDHNonce; otherwise, let both n_c and n_k be empty octet		the serverDHNonce; otherwise, let both n_c and n_k be empty octet
	strings.		strings.
	5. The KDC AS reply key k is:		5. The AS reply key k is:
	k = octetstring2key(DHSharedSecret | n_c | n_k)		k = octetstring2key(DHSharedSecret | n_c | n_k)
	3.2.3.2 Using Public Key Encryption		3.2.3.2 Using Public Key Encryption
	In this case, the PA-PK-AS-REP contains a ContentInfo structure		In this case, the PA-PK-AS-REP contains a ContentInfo structure
	wrapped in an OCTET STRING. The KDC AS reply key is encrypted in the		wrapped in an OCTET STRING. The AS reply key is encrypted in the
	encKeyPack field, which contains data of type ReplyKeyPack:		encKeyPack field, which contains data of type ReplyKeyPack:
	ReplyKeyPack ::= SEQUENCE {		ReplyKeyPack ::= SEQUENCE {
	replyKey [0] EncryptionKey,		replyKey [0] EncryptionKey,
	-- Contains the session key used to encrypt the		-- Contains the session key used to encrypt the
	-- enc-part field in the AS-REP.		-- enc-part field in the AS-REP.
	nonce [1] INTEGER (0..4294967295),		nonce [1] INTEGER (0..4294967295),
	-- Contains the nonce in the PKAuthenticator of the		-- Contains the nonce in the PKAuthenticator of the
	-- request.		-- request.
	...		...
	}		}
	The ContentInfo [RFC3852] structure for the encKeyPack field is		The ContentInfo [RFC3852] structure for the encKeyPack field is
	filled in as follows:		filled in as follows:
	1. The contentType field of the type ContentInfo is id-envelopedData		1. The contentType field of the type ContentInfo is id-envelopedData
	(as defined in [RFC3852]), and the content field is an		(as defined in [RFC3852]), and the content field is an
	EnvelopedData (as defined in [RFC3852]).		EnvelopedData (as defined in [RFC3852]).
	2. The contentType field for the type EnvelopedData is		2. The contentType field for the type EnvelopedData is id-
	id-signedData: { iso (1) member-body (2) us (840) rsadsi (113549)		signedData: { iso (1) member-body (2) us (840) rsadsi (113549)
	pkcs (1) pkcs7 (7) signedData (2) }.		pkcs (1) pkcs7 (7) signedData (2) }.
	3. The eContentType field for the inner type SignedData (when		3. The eContentType field for the inner type SignedData (when
	decrypted from the encryptedContent field for the type		decrypted from the encryptedContent field for the type
	EnvelopedData) is id-pkrkeydata: { iso(1) org(3) dod(6)		EnvelopedData) is id-pkrkeydata: { iso(1) org(3) dod(6)
	internet(1) security(5) kerberosv5(2) pkinit(3) pkrkeydata(3) }.		internet(1) security(5) kerberosv5(2) pkinit(3) pkrkeydata(3) }.
	4. The eContent field for the inner type SignedData contains the DER		4. The eContent field for the inner type SignedData contains the DER
	encoding of the type ReplyKeyPack.		encoding of the type ReplyKeyPack.
	5. The signerInfos field of the inner type SignedData contains a		5. The signerInfos field of the inner type SignedData contains a
	single signerInfo, which contains the signature over the type		single signerInfo, which contains the signature over the type
	ReplyKeyPack.		ReplyKeyPack.
	6. The certificates field of the inner type SignedData contains		6. The certificates field of the inner type SignedData contains
	certificates intended to facilitate certification path		certificates intended to facilitate certification path
	construction, so that the client can verify the KDC's signature		construction, so that the client can verify the KDC's signature
	over the type ReplyKeyPack. This field may only be left empty if		over the type ReplyKeyPack. The information contained in the
	the KDC public key specified by the kdcPkId field in the		trustedCertifiers in the request SHOULD be used by the KDC as
	PA-PK-AS-REQ was used for signing. Otherwise, for path		hints to guide its selection of an appropriate certificate chain
	validation, these certificates SHOULD be sufficient to construct		to return to the client. This field may only be left empty if
	at least one certification path from the KDC certificate to one		the KDC public key specified by the kdcPkId field in the PA-PK-
	trust anchor acceptable by the client [CAPATH]. The certificates		AS-REQ was used for signing. Otherwise, for path validation,
	field MUST NOT contain "root" CA certificates.		these certificates SHOULD be sufficient to construct at least one
			certification path from the KDC certificate to one trust anchor
			acceptable by the client [CAPATH]. The KDC MUST be capable of
			including such a set of certificates if configured to do so. The
			certificates field MUST NOT contain "root" CA certificates.
	7. The recipientInfos field of the type EnvelopedData is a SET which		7. The recipientInfos field of the type EnvelopedData is a SET which
	MUST contain exactly one member of type KeyTransRecipientInfo.		MUST contain exactly one member of type KeyTransRecipientInfo.
	The encryptedKey of this member contains the temporary key which		The encryptedKey of this member contains the temporary key which
	is encrypted using the client's public key.		is encrypted using the client's public key.
	8. The unprotectedAttrs or originatorInfo fields of the type		8. The unprotectedAttrs or originatorInfo fields of the type
	EnvelopedData MAY be present.		EnvelopedData MAY be present.
	3.2.4 Receipt of KDC Reply		3.2.4 Receipt of KDC Reply
	Upon receipt of the KDC's reply, the client proceeds as follows. If		Upon receipt of the KDC's reply, the client proceeds as follows. If
	the PA-PK-AS-REP contains the dhSignedData field, the client derives		the PA-PK-AS-REP contains the dhSignedData field, the client derives
	the KDC AS reply key using the same procedure used by the KDC as		the AS reply key using the same procedure used by the KDC as defined
	defined in Section 3.2.3.1. Otherwise, the message contains the		in Section 3.2.3.1. Otherwise, the message contains the encKeyPack
	encKeyPack field, and the client decrypts and extracts the temporary		field, and the client decrypts and extracts the temporary key in the
	key in the encryptedKey field of the member KeyTransRecipientInfo,		encryptedKey field of the member KeyTransRecipientInfo, and then uses
	and then uses that as the KDC AS reply key.		that as the AS reply key.
	In either case, the client MUST verify the signature in the		In either case, the client MUST verify the signature in the
	SignedData according to [RFC3852]. Unless the client can otherwise		SignedData according to [RFC3852]. The KDC's X.509 certificate MUST
	prove that the public key used to verify the KDC's signature is bound		be validated according to [RFC3280]. In addition, unless the client
	to the target KDC, the KDC's X.509 certificate MUST satisfy at least		can otherwise verify that the public key used to verify the KDC's
	one of the following two requirements:		signature is bound to the KDC of the target realm, the KDC's X.509
			certificate MUST contain a Subject Alternative Name extension
	1. The certificate contains a Subject Alternative Name (SAN)		[RFC3280] carrying an AnotherName whose type-id is id-pksan (as
	extension [RFC3280] carrying a dNSName and that name value		defined in Section 3.2.2) and whose value is a KRB5PrincipalName that
	matches the following name format:		matches the name of the TGS of the target realm (as defined in
			Section 7.3 of [CLAR]).
	_Service._Proto.Realm
	Where the Service name is the string literal "kerberos", the
	Proto can be "udp" or "tcp", and the Realm is the domain style
	Kerberos realm name [CLAR] of the target KDC. This name format
	is identical to the owner label format used in the DNS SRV
	records for specifying the KDC location as described in [CLAR].
	For example, the X.509 certificate for the KDC of the Kerberos
	realm "EXAMPLE.COM" would contain a dNSName value of
	"_kerberos._tcp.EXAMPLE.COM" or "_kerberos._udp.EXAMPLE.COM".
	2. The certificate contains the EKU KeyPurposeId [RFC3280]		Based on local policy, the client MAY require that the KDC
	id-pkkdcekuoid (defined below) and an SAN extension [RFC3280]		certificate contains the EKU KeyPurposeId [RFC3280] id-pkkdcekuoid:
	carrying an AnotherName whose type-id is id-pksan (as defined in
	Section 3.2.2) and whose value contains a KRB5PrincipalName name,
	and the realm name of that KRB5PrincipalName matches the realm
	name of the target KDC.
	id-pkkdcekuoid OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=		id-pkkdcekuoid OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
	{ iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosv5(2)		{ iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosv5(2)
	pkinit(3) pkkdcekuoid(5) }		pkinit(3) pkkdcekuoid(5) }
	-- Signing KDC responses.		-- Signing KDC responses.
	-- Key usage bits that MUST be consistent:		-- Key usage bits that MUST be consistent:
	-- digitalSignature.
	If no SAN id-pksan extension is present (but the id-pkkdcekuoid		-- digitalSignature.
	EKU is) in the KDC's X.509 certificate, and the client has a
	priori knowledge of the KDC's hostname (or IP address), the
	client SHOULD accept the KDC's X.509 certificate if that
	certificate contains an SAN extension carrying a dNSName and the
	dNSName value matches the hostname (or the IP address) of the KDC
	with which the client believes it is communicating.
	Matching rules used for the dNSName value are specified in [RFC3280].
	If all applicable checks are satisfied, the client then decrypts the		If all applicable checks are satisfied, the client then decrypts the
	enc-part field of the KDC-REP in the AS-REP using the KDC AS reply		enc-part field of the KDC-REP in the AS-REP using the AS reply key,
	key, and then proceeds as described in [CLAR].		and then proceeds as described in [CLAR].
	Implementation note: CAs issuing KDC certificates SHOULD place all		Implementation note: CAs issuing KDC certificates SHOULD place all
	"short" and "fully-qualified" Kerberos realm names of the KDC (one		"short" and "fully-qualified" Kerberos realm names of the KDC (one
	per SAN extension) into the KDC certificate to allow maximum		per GeneralName [RFC3280]) into the KDC certificate to allow maximum
	flexibility.		flexibility.
	3.3 Interoperability Requirements		3.3 Interoperability Requirements
	The client MUST be capable of sending a set of certificates		The client MUST be capable of sending a set of certificates
	sufficient to allow the KDC to construct a certification path for the		sufficient to allow the KDC to construct a certification path for the
	client's certificate, if the correct set of certificates is provided		client's certificate, if the correct set of certificates is provided
	through configuration or policy.		through configuration or policy.
	If the client sends all the X.509 certificates on a certification		If the client sends all the X.509 certificates on a certification
	skipping to change at page 22, line 24 ¶		skipping to change at page 22, line 18 ¶
	The syntax for the AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS authorization data does		The syntax for the AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS authorization data does
	permit empty SEQUENCEs to be encoded. Such empty sequences may only		permit empty SEQUENCEs to be encoded. Such empty sequences may only
	be used if the KDC itself vouches for the user's certificate.		be used if the KDC itself vouches for the user's certificate.
	5. Acknowledgements		5. Acknowledgements
	The following people have made significant contributions to this		The following people have made significant contributions to this
	draft: Paul Leach, Kristin Lauter, Sam Hartman, Love Hornquist		draft: Paul Leach, Kristin Lauter, Sam Hartman, Love Hornquist
	Astrand, Ken Raeburn, Nicolas Williams, John Wray, Jonathan Trostle,		Astrand, Ken Raeburn, Nicolas Williams, John Wray, Jonathan Trostle,
	Tom Yu, Jeffrey Hutzelman, David Cross, Dan Simon, Karthik Jaganathan		Tom Yu, Jeffrey Hutzelman, David Cross, Dan Simon, Karthik
	and Chaskiel M Grundman.		Jaganathan, Chaskiel M Grundman and Stefan Santesson.
	Special thanks to Clifford Neuman, Matthew Hur and Sasha Medvinsky		Special thanks to Clifford Neuman, Matthew Hur, Sasha Medvinsky and
	who wrote earlier versions of this document.		Jonathan Trostle who wrote earlier versions of this document.
	The authors are indebt to the Kerberos working group chair Jeffrey		The authors are indebted to the Kerberos working group chair Jeffrey
	Hutzelman who kept track of various issues and was enormously helpful		Hutzelman who kept track of various issues and was enormously helpful
	during the creation of this document.		during the creation of this document.
	Some of the ideas on which this document is based arose during		Some of the ideas on which this document is based arose during
	discussions over several years between members of the SAAG, the IETF		discussions over several years between members of the SAAG, the IETF
	CAT working group, and the PSRG, regarding integration of Kerberos		CAT working group, and the PSRG, regarding integration of Kerberos
	and SPX. Some ideas have also been drawn from the DASS system.		and SPX. Some ideas have also been drawn from the DASS system.
	These changes are by no means endorsed by these groups. This is an		These changes are by no means endorsed by these groups. This is an
	attempt to revive some of the goals of those groups, and this		attempt to revive some of the goals of those groups, and this
	document approaches those goals primarily from the Kerberos		document approaches those goals primarily from the Kerberos
	skipping to change at page 23, line 25 ¶		skipping to change at page 23, line 18 ¶
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
	[RFC2412] Orman, H., "The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol",		[RFC2412] Orman, H., "The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol",
	RFC 2412, November 1998.		RFC 2412, November 1998.
	[RFC2631] Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method",		[RFC2631] Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method",
	RFC 2631, June 1999.		RFC 2631, June 1999.
	[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W. and R. Housley, "Algorithms and		[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
	Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key		Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
	Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List		Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
	(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, April 2002.		(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, April 2002.
	[RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W. and D. Solo, "Internet		[RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
	X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and		X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
	Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,		Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
	April 2002.		April 2002.
	[RFC3370] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)		[RFC3370] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
	Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002.		Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002.
	[RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography		[RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
	Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications		Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
	Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.		Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.
	[RFC3526] Kivinen, T. and M. Kojo, "More Modular Exponential (MODP)		[RFC3526] Kivinen, T. and M. Kojo, "More Modular Exponential (MODP)
	Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)",		Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)",
	RFC 3526, May 2003.		RFC 3526, May 2003.
	[RFC3565] Schaad, J., "Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)		[RFC3565] Schaad, J., "Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
	Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic Message Syntax		Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic Message Syntax
	(CMS)", RFC 3565, July 2003.		(CMS)", RFC 3565, July 2003.
			[RFC3766] Orman, H. and P. Hoffman, "Determining Strengths For
			Public Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric Keys", BCP 86,
			RFC 3766, April 2004.
	[RFC3852] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",		[RFC3852] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
	RFC 3852, July 2004.		RFC 3852, July 2004.
	[RFC3961] Raeburn, K., "Encryption and Checksum Specifications for		[RFC3961] Raeburn, K., "Encryption and Checksum Specifications for
	Kerberos 5", RFC 3961, February 2005.		Kerberos 5", RFC 3961, February 2005.
			[RFC3962] Raeburn, K., "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
			Encryption for Kerberos 5", RFC 3962, February 2005.
	[X.509-97] ITU-T. Recommendation X.509: The Directory - Authentication		[X.509-97] ITU-T. Recommendation X.509: The Directory - Authentication
	Framework. 1997.		Framework. 1997.
	[X690] ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding		[X690] ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding
	Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and		Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and
	Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER), ITU-T Recommendation		Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER), ITU-T Recommendation
	X.690 (1997) | ISO/IEC International Standard		X.690 (1997) | ISO/IEC International Standard
	8825-1:1998.		8825-1:1998.
	7.2 Informative References		7.2 Informative References
	skipping to change at page 26, line 15 ¶		skipping to change at page 26, line 15 ¶
	-- The contentType field of the type ContentInfo		-- The contentType field of the type ContentInfo
	-- is id-signedData (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2),		-- is id-signedData (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2),
	-- and the content field is a SignedData.		-- and the content field is a SignedData.
	-- The eContentType field for the type SignedData is		-- The eContentType field for the type SignedData is
	-- id-pkauthdata (1.3.6.1.5.2.3.1), and the		-- id-pkauthdata (1.3.6.1.5.2.3.1), and the
	-- eContent field contains the DER encoding of the		-- eContent field contains the DER encoding of the
	-- type AuthPack.		-- type AuthPack.
	-- AuthPack is defined below.		-- AuthPack is defined below.
	trustedCertifiers [1] SEQUENCE OF TrustedCA OPTIONAL,		trustedCertifiers [1] SEQUENCE OF TrustedCA OPTIONAL,
	-- A list of CAs, trusted by the client, that can		-- A list of CAs, trusted by the client, that can
	-- be used as the trust anchor to validate the KDC's		-- be used to certify the KDC.
	-- signature.
	-- Each TrustedCA identifies a CA or a CA		-- Each TrustedCA identifies a CA or a CA
	-- certificate (thereby its public key).		-- certificate (thereby its public key).
			-- The information contained in the
			-- trustedCertifiers SHOULD be used by the KDC as
			-- hints to guide its selection of an appropriate
			-- certificate chain to return to the client.
	kdcPkId [2] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING		kdcPkId [2] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING
	OPTIONAL,		OPTIONAL,
	-- Contains a CMS type SignerIdentifier encoded		-- Contains a CMS type SignerIdentifier encoded
	-- according to [RFC3852].		-- according to [RFC3852].
	-- Identifies, if present, a particular KDC		-- Identifies, if present, a particular KDC
	-- public key that the client already has.		-- public key that the client already has.
	...		...
	}		}
	DHNonce ::= OCTET STRING		DHNonce ::= OCTET STRING
	skipping to change at page 26, line 50 ¶		skipping to change at page 27, line 4 ¶
	subjectKeyIdentifier [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,		subjectKeyIdentifier [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
	-- Identifies the CA's public key by a key		-- Identifies the CA's public key by a key
	-- identifier. When an X.509 certificate is		-- identifier. When an X.509 certificate is
	-- referenced, this key identifier matches the X.509		-- referenced, this key identifier matches the X.509
	-- subjectKeyIdentifier extension value. When other		-- subjectKeyIdentifier extension value. When other
	-- certificate formats are referenced, the documents		-- certificate formats are referenced, the documents
	-- that specify the certificate format and their use		-- that specify the certificate format and their use
	-- with the CMS must include details on matching the		-- with the CMS must include details on matching the
	-- key identifier to the appropriate certificate		-- key identifier to the appropriate certificate
	-- field.		-- field.
	...		...
	}		}
	AuthPack ::= SEQUENCE {		AuthPack ::= SEQUENCE {
	pkAuthenticator [0] PKAuthenticator,		pkAuthenticator [0] PKAuthenticator,
	clientPublicValue [1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL,		clientPublicValue [1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL,
	-- Type SubjectPublicKeyInfo is defined in		-- Type SubjectPublicKeyInfo is defined in
	-- [RFC3280].		-- [RFC3280].
	-- Specifies Diffie-Hellman domain parameters		-- Specifies Diffie-Hellman domain parameters
	-- and the client's public key value [IEEE1363].		-- and the client's public key value [IEEE1363].
	-- The public key value (the subjectPublicKey field		-- The DH public key value is encoded as a BIT
	-- of the type SubjectPublicKeyInfo) MUST be encoded		-- STRING, as specified in Section 2.3.3 of
	-- according to [RFC3279].		-- [RFC3279].
	-- Present only if the client wishes to use the		-- This field is present only if the client wishes
	-- Diffie-Hellman key agreement method.		-- to use the Diffie-Hellman key agreement method.
	supportedCMSTypes [2] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier		supportedCMSTypes [2] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
	OPTIONAL,		OPTIONAL,
	-- Type AlgorithmIdentifier is defined in		-- Type AlgorithmIdentifier is defined in
	-- [RFC3280].		-- [RFC3280].
	-- List of CMS encryption types supported by the		-- List of CMS encryption types supported by the
	-- client in order of (decreasing) preference.		-- client in order of (decreasing) preference.
	clientDHNonce [3] DHNonce OPTIONAL,		clientDHNonce [3] DHNonce OPTIONAL,
	-- Present only if the client indicates that it		-- Present only if the client indicates that it
	-- wishes to reuse DH keys or to allow the KDC to		-- wishes to reuse DH keys or to allow the KDC to
	-- do so.		-- do so.
	skipping to change at page 28, line 4 ¶		skipping to change at page 28, line 9 ¶
	TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS ::= SEQUENCE OF TrustedCA		TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS ::= SEQUENCE OF TrustedCA
	-- Identifies a list of CAs trusted by the KDC.		-- Identifies a list of CAs trusted by the KDC.
	-- Each TrustedCA identifies a CA or a CA		-- Each TrustedCA identifies a CA or a CA
	-- certificate (thereby its public key).		-- certificate (thereby its public key).
	TD-INVALID-CERTIFICATES ::= SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING		TD-INVALID-CERTIFICATES ::= SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING
	-- Each OCTET STRING contains a CMS type		-- Each OCTET STRING contains a CMS type
	-- IssuerAndSerialNumber encoded according to		-- IssuerAndSerialNumber encoded according to
	-- [RFC3852].		-- [RFC3852].
			-- Each IssuerAndSerialNumber identifies a
	-- Each IssuerAndSerialNumber indentifies a
	-- certificate (sent by the client) with an invalid		-- certificate (sent by the client) with an invalid
	-- signature.		-- signature.
	KRB5PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE {		KRB5PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE {
	realm [0] Realm,		realm [0] Realm,
	principalName [1] PrincipalName		principalName [1] PrincipalName
	}		}
	AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS ::= SEQUENCE OF TrustedCA		AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS ::= SEQUENCE OF TrustedCA
	-- Identifies the certification path based on which		-- Identifies the certification path based on which
	skipping to change at page 28, line 49 ¶		skipping to change at page 29, line 4 ¶
	...		...
	}		}
	DHRepInfo ::= SEQUENCE {		DHRepInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
	dhSignedData [0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING,		dhSignedData [0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING,
	-- Contains a CMS type ContentInfo encoded according		-- Contains a CMS type ContentInfo encoded according
	-- to [RFC3852].		-- to [RFC3852].
	-- The contentType field of the type ContentInfo is		-- The contentType field of the type ContentInfo is
	-- id-signedData (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2), and the		-- id-signedData (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2), and the
	-- content field is a SignedData.		-- content field is a SignedData.
	-- The eContentType field for the type SignedData is		-- The eContentType field for the type SignedData is
	-- id-pkdhkeydata (1.3.6.1.5.2.3.2), and the		-- id-pkdhkeydata (1.3.6.1.5.2.3.2), and the
	-- eContent field contains the DER encoding of the		-- eContent field contains the DER encoding of the
	-- type KDCDHKeyInfo.		-- type KDCDHKeyInfo.
	-- KDCDHKeyInfo is defined below.		-- KDCDHKeyInfo is defined below.
	serverDHNonce [1] DHNonce OPTIONAL		serverDHNonce [1] DHNonce OPTIONAL
	-- Present if and only if dhKeyExpiration is		-- Present if and only if dhKeyExpiration is
	-- present.		-- present.
	}		}
	KDCDHKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {		KDCDHKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
	subjectPublicKey [0] BIT STRING,		subjectPublicKey [0] BIT STRING,
	-- KDC's DH public key.		-- KDC's DH public key.
	-- The DH pubic key value is mapped to a BIT STRING		-- The DH public key value is encoded as a BIT
	-- according to [RFC3279].		-- STRING, as specified in Section 2.3.3 of
			-- [RFC3279].
	nonce [1] INTEGER (0..4294967295),		nonce [1] INTEGER (0..4294967295),
	-- Contains the nonce in the PKAuthenticator of the		-- Contains the nonce in the PKAuthenticator of the
	-- request if DH keys are NOT reused,		-- request if DH keys are NOT reused,
	-- 0 otherwise.		-- 0 otherwise.
	dhKeyExpiration [2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,		dhKeyExpiration [2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
	-- Expiration time for KDC's key pair,		-- Expiration time for KDC's key pair,
	-- present if and only if DH keys are reused. If		-- present if and only if DH keys are reused. If
	-- this field is omitted then the serverDHNonce		-- this field is omitted then the serverDHNonce
	-- field MUST also be omitted.		-- field MUST also be omitted.
	...		...
End of changes. 87 change blocks.
	219 lines changed or deleted		212 lines changed or added
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