< draft-ietf-curdle-cms-eddsa-signatures-06.txt   draft-ietf-curdle-cms-eddsa-signatures-07.txt >
Internet-Draft R. Housley Internet-Draft R. Housley
Intended status: Standards Track Vigil Security Intended status: Standards Track Vigil Security
Expires: 2 December 2017 2 June 2017 Expires: 4 February 2018 4 August 2017
Use of EdDSA Signatures in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Use of EdDSA Signatures in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
<draft-ietf-curdle-cms-eddsa-signatures-06.txt> <draft-ietf-curdle-cms-eddsa-signatures-07.txt>
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies the conventions for using Edwards-curve This document specifies the conventions for using Edwards-curve
Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) for curve25519 and curve448 in Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) for curve25519 and curve448 in
the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). For each curve, EdDSA the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). For each curve, EdDSA
defines the PureEdDSA and HashEdDSA modes. However, the HashEdDSA defines the PureEdDSA and HashEdDSA modes. However, the HashEdDSA
mode is not used with the CMS. In addition, no context string is mode is not used with the CMS. In addition, no context string is
used with the CMS. used with the CMS.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 2 December 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on 4 February 2018.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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these values can result in little or no security. An attacker may these values can result in little or no security. An attacker may
find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced
the keys, searching the resulting small set of possibilities, rather the keys, searching the resulting small set of possibilities, rather
than brute force searching the whole key space. The generation of than brute force searching the whole key space. The generation of
quality random numbers is difficult. RFC 4086 [RANDOM] offers quality random numbers is difficult. RFC 4086 [RANDOM] offers
important guidance in this area. important guidance in this area.
Unlike DSA and ECDSA, EdDSA does not require the generation of a Unlike DSA and ECDSA, EdDSA does not require the generation of a
random value for each signature operation. random value for each signature operation.
Using the same private key for different algorithms has the potential Using the same private key with different algorithms has the
of allowing an attacker to get extra information about the private potential to leak extra information about the private key to an
key. For this reason, the same private key SHOULD NOT be used with attacker. For this reason, the same private key SHOULD NOT be used
more than one EdDSA set of parameters. For example, do not use the with more than one set of EdDSA parameters, although it appears that
same private key with PureEdDSA and HashEdDSA. there are no security concerns when using the same private key with
PureEdDSA and HashEdDSA [EDDSA].
When computing signatures, the same hash function should be used for When computing signatures, the same hash function SHOULD be used for
all operations. This reduces the number of failure points in the all operations. This reduces the number of failure points in the
signature process. signature process.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
This document requires no actions by IANA. This document requires no actions by IANA.
7. Acknowledgements 7. Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Jim Schaad and Daniel Migault for the careful review Many thanks to Jim Schaad and Daniel Migault for the careful review
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