< draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-01.txt		draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-02.txt >
	DIME H. Tschofenig, Ed.		DIME H. Tschofenig
	Internet-Draft Nokia Solutions and Networks		Internet-Draft
	Intended status: Informational J. Korhonen		Intended status: Informational J. Korhonen
	Expires: April 24, 2014 Broadcom		Expires: July 30, 2015 Broadcom
	G. Zorn		G. Zorn
	Network Zen		Network Zen
	K. Pillay		K. Pillay
	Oracle Communications		Oracle Communications
	October 21, 2013		January 26, 2015
	Diameter AVP Level Security: Scenarios and Requirements		Diameter AVP Level Security End-to-End Security: Scenarios and
	draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-01.txt		Requirements
			draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-02.txt
	Abstract		Abstract
	This specification discusses requirements for providing Diameter		This specification discusses requirements for providing Diameter
	security at the level of individual Attribute Value Pairs.		security at the level of individual Attribute Value Pairs.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	skipping to change at page 1, line 36 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 37 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on April 24, 2014.		This Internet-Draft will expire on July 30, 2015.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3. Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		3. Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	4. Scenarios for Diameter AVP-Level Protection . . . . . . . . . 4		4. Scenarios for Diameter AVP-Level Protection . . . . . . . . . 5
	5. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		5. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	6. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	The Diameter Base specification [2] offers security protection		The Diameter Base specification [2] offers security protection
	between neighboring Diameter peers and mandates that either TLS (for		between neighboring Diameter peers and mandates that either TLS (for
	TCP), DTLS (for SCTP), or IPsec is used. These security protocols		TCP), DTLS (for SCTP), or IPsec is used. These security protocols
	offer a wide range of security properties, including entity		offer a wide range of security properties, including entity
	authentication, data-origin authentication, integrity,		authentication, data-origin authentication, integrity,
	confidentiality protection and replay protection. They also support		confidentiality protection and replay protection. They also support
	skipping to change at page 7, line 37 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 16 ¶
	provide different security services. Asymmetric algorithms,		provide different security services. Asymmetric algorithms,
	for example, allow non-repudiation services to be offered.		for example, allow non-repudiation services to be offered.
	Requirement #8: A solution for dynamic key management MUST be		Requirement #8: A solution for dynamic key management MUST be
	included in the overall solution framework. However, it is		included in the overall solution framework. However, it is
	assumed that no "new" key management protocol needs to be		assumed that no "new" key management protocol needs to be
	developed; instead existing ones are re-used, if at all possible.		developed; instead existing ones are re-used, if at all possible.
	Rekeying could be triggered by (a) management actions and (b)		Rekeying could be triggered by (a) management actions and (b)
	expiring keying material.		expiring keying material.
	Requirement #9: The ability to statically provisioned keys		6. Security Considerations
	(symmetric as well as asymmetric keys) has to be supported to
	simplify management for small-scale deployments that typically do
	not have a back-end network management infrastructure.
	6. Open Issues
	Open Issue #1: Capability/Policy Discovery: This document talks
	about selectively protecting Diameter AVPs between different
	Diameter nodes. A Diameter node has to be configured such that it
	applies security protection to a certain number of AVPs. A number
	of policy related questions arise: What keying material should be
	used so that the intended recipient is also able to verify it?
	What AVPs shall be protected so that the result is not rejected by
	the recipient? In case of confidentiality protection the Diameter
	node encrypting AVPs needs to know ahead of time what other node
	is intended to decrypt them. Should the list of integrity
	protected AVP be indicated in the protected payload itself (or is
	it known based on out-of-band information)? Is this policy /
	capability information assumed to be established out-of-band
	(manually) or is there a protocol mechanism to distribute this
	information?
	Open Issue #2: Command-Line Support: Should solutions allow the
	provisioning of long-term shared symmetric credentials via a
	command-line interface / text file? This allows easier management
	for small-scale deployments.
	7. Security Considerations
	This entire document focused on the discussion of new functionality		This entire document focused on the discussion of new functionality
	for securing Diameter AVPs selectively between non-neighboring nodes.		for securing Diameter AVPs selectively between non-neighboring nodes.
	8. IANA Considerations		7. IANA Considerations
	This document does not require actions by IANA.		This document does not require actions by IANA.
	9. Acknowledgments		8. Acknowledgments
	We would like to thank Guenther Horn, Martin Dolly, for his review		We would like to thank Guenther Horn, Martin Dolly, for his review
	comments.		comments.
	10. References		9. References
	10.1. Normative References		9.1. Normative References
	[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
	[2] Fajardo, V., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn,		[2] Fajardo, V., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn,
	"Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 6733, October 2012.		"Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 6733, October 2012.
	10.2. Informative References		9.2. Informative References
	[3] Calhoun, P., Farrell, S., and W. Bulley, "Diameter CMS		[3] Calhoun, P., Farrell, S., and W. Bulley, "Diameter CMS
	Security Application", draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-cms-sec-04		Security Application", draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-cms-sec-04
	(work in progress), March 2002.		(work in progress), March 2002.
	[4] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible		[4] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible
	Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072,		Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072,
	August 2005.		August 2005.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Hannes Tschofenig (editor)		Hannes Tschofenig
	Nokia Solutions and Networks		Hall in Tirol 6060
	Linnoitustie 6		Austria
	Espoo 02600
	Finland
	Phone: +358 (50) 4871445		Email: Hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net
	Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
	URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at		URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at
	Jouni Korhonen		Jouni Korhonen
	Broadcom		Broadcom
	Porkkalankatu 24		Porkkalankatu 24
	Helsinki 00180		Helsinki 00180
	Finland		Finland
	Email: jouni.nospam@gmail.com		Email: jouni.nospam@gmail.com
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