< draft-ietf-dime-erp-14.txt		draft-ietf-dime-erp-15.txt >
	Network Working Group J. Bournelle		Network Working Group J. Bournelle
	Internet-Draft L. Morand		Internet-Draft L. Morand
	Intended status: Standards Track Orange Labs		Intended status: Standards Track Orange Labs
	Expires: April 25, 2013 S. Decugis		Expires: June 13, 2013 S. Decugis
	INSIDE Secure		INSIDE Secure
	Q. Wu		Q. Wu
	Huawei		Huawei
	G. Zorn		G. Zorn
	Network Zen		Network Zen
	October 22, 2012		December 10, 2012
	Diameter Support for the EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP)		Diameter Support for the EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP)
	draft-ietf-dime-erp-14.txt		draft-ietf-dime-erp-15.txt
	Abstract		Abstract
	The EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP) defines extensions to the		The EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP) defines extensions to the
	Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) to support efficient re-		Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) to support efficient re-
	authentication between the peer and an EAP Re-authentication (ER)		authentication between the peer and an EAP Re-authentication (ER)
	server through a compatible authenticator. This document specifies		server through a compatible authenticator. This document specifies
	Diameter support for ERP. It defines a new Diameter ERP application		Diameter support for ERP. It defines a new Diameter ERP application
	to transport ERP messages between an ER authenticator and the ER		to transport ERP messages between an ER authenticator and the ER
	server, and a set of new AVPs that can be used to transport the		server, and a set of new AVPs that can be used to transport the
	skipping to change at page 1, line 43 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 43 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on April 25, 2013.		This Internet-Draft will expire on June 13, 2013.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 2, line 44 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 44 ¶
	8.3.4. Key-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		8.3.4. Key-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	9. Result-Code AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		9. Result-Code AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	9.1. Permanent Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		9.1. Permanent Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	10. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		10. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	12.1. Diameter Application Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		12.1. Diameter Application Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	12.2. New AVPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		12.2. New AVPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	12.3. New Permanent Failures Result-Code AVP Values . . . . . . 14		12.3. New Permanent Failures Result-Code AVP Values . . . . . . 14
	13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	14. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
			14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
			14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	Cao, et al. [RFC6696] defines the EAP Re-authentication Protocol		Cao, et al. [RFC6696] defines the EAP Re-authentication Protocol
	(ERP). It consists of the following steps:		(ERP). It consists of the following steps:
	Bootstrapping		Bootstrapping
	A root key for re-authentication is derived from the Extended		A root key for re-authentication is derived from the Extended
	Master Session Key (EMSK) created during EAP authentication		Master Session Key (EMSK) created during EAP authentication
	skipping to change at page 4, line 18 ¶		skipping to change at page 4, line 18 ¶
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
	document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].		document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
	3. Assumptions		3. Assumptions
	This document assumes the existence of at most one logical ER server		This document assumes the existence of at most one logical ER server
	entity in a domain. If several physical servers are deployed for		entity in a domain. If several physical servers are deployed for
	robustness, a replication mechanism must be deployed to synchronize		robustness, a replication mechanism must be deployed to synchronize
	the ERP state (e.g., root keys) between these servers. This		the ERP state (e.g., root keys) between these servers. Any such
	replication mechanism is out of the scope of this document. If		replication mechanism is outside the scope of this document. If
	multiple ER servers are deployed in the domain, we assume that they		multiple ER servers are deployed in the domain, we assume that they
	can be used interchangeably. If multiple ER servers are deployed		can be used interchangeably. If multiple ER servers are deployed
	across the domains, we assume only one ER server that is near to the		across the domains, we assume only one ER server that is near the
	peer is getting involved in the ERP.		peer is involved in ERP.
	Also this document assumes the existence of at most one EAP server		This document also assumes the existence of at most one EAP server
	entity in the home domain. In case of multiple physical home EAP		entity in the home domain. In case of multiple physical home EAP
	servers in the same domain, if the ER server wants to reach the same		servers in the same domain, if the ER server wants to reach the same
	home EAP server, the ER server may cache the Destination-Host AVP		home EAP server, the ER server may cache the Destination-Host AVP
	corresponding to the home EAP server it requests.		corresponding to the home EAP server it requests.
	4. Protocol Overview		4. Protocol Overview
	The following figure shows the components involved in ERP, and their		The following figure illustrates the components involved in ERP and
	interactions.		their interactions.
	Diameter +--------+		Diameter +--------+
	+-------------+ ERP +-----------+ (*) | Home |		+-------------+ ERP +-----------+ (*) | Home |
	Peer <->|Authenticator|<=======>| ER server | <---> | EAP |		Peer <->|Authenticator|<=======>| ER server | <---> | EAP |
	+-------------+ +-----------+ | server |		+-------------+ +-----------+ | server |
	+--------+		+--------+
	(*) Diameter EAP application, explicit bootstrapping scenario only.		(*) Diameter EAP application, explicit bootstrapping scenario only.
	Figure 1: Diameter ERP Overview.		Figure 1: Diameter ERP Overview.
	skipping to change at page 5, line 21 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 21 ¶
	If there is no local ER server, the message is routed according to		If there is no local ER server, the message is routed according to
	its Destination-Realm AVP content, extracted from the realm component		its Destination-Realm AVP content, extracted from the realm component
	of the keyName-NAI attribute. As specified in RFC 6696, this realm		of the keyName-NAI attribute. As specified in RFC 6696, this realm
	is the home domain of the peer in the case of bootstrapping exchange		is the home domain of the peer in the case of bootstrapping exchange
	('B' flag is set in ERP message) or the domain of the bootstrapped ER		('B' flag is set in ERP message) or the domain of the bootstrapped ER
	server otherwise .		server otherwise .
	If no ER server is available in the home domain either, the ERP/DER		If no ER server is available in the home domain either, the ERP/DER
	message cannot be delivered, and an error DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER		message cannot be delivered, and an error DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER
	MUST be generated as specified in [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] and		MUST be generated as specified in [RFC6733] and returned to the
	returned to the authenticator. The authenticator MAY cache this		authenticator. The authenticator MAY cache this information (with
	information (with limited duration) to avoid further attempts to		limited duration) to avoid further attempts to execute ERP with this
	execute ERP with this realm. It MAY also fallback to full EAP		realm. It MAY also fallback to full EAP authentication to
	authentication to authenticate the peer.		authenticate the peer.
	When an ER server receives the ERP/DER message, it searches its local		When an ER server receives the ERP/DER message, it searches its local
	database for a valid, unexpired root key matching the keyName part of		database for a valid, unexpired root key matching the keyName part of
	the User-Name AVP. If such key is found, the ER server processes the		the User-Name AVP. If such key is found, the ER server processes the
	ERP message as described in RFC 6696, then creates the ERP/DEA answer		ERP message as described in RFC 6696, then creates the ERP/DEA answer
	as described in Section 6. The rMSK is included in this answer.		as described in Section 6. The rMSK is included in this answer.
	Finally, the authenticator extracts the rMSK from the ERP/DEA as		Finally, the authenticator extracts the rMSK from the ERP/DEA as
	described in RFC 6696, and forwards the content of the EAP-Payload		described in RFC 6696, and forwards the content of the EAP-Payload
	AVP, the EAP-Finish/Re-Auth message, to the peer.		AVP, the EAP-Finish/Re-Auth message, to the peer.
	skipping to change at page 8, line 30 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 30 ¶
	5.2. Bootstrapping During the First Re-authentication		5.2. Bootstrapping During the First Re-authentication
	Bootstrapping the ER server during the first re-authentication (also		Bootstrapping the ER server during the first re-authentication (also
	known as explicit bootstrapping) is only needed when there is no		known as explicit bootstrapping) is only needed when there is no
	local ER server in the visited domain and there is an ER server in		local ER server in the visited domain and there is an ER server in
	the home domain. It is less resource-intensive, since the EMSK		the home domain. It is less resource-intensive, since the EMSK
	generated during initial EAP authentication is reused to derive root		generated during initial EAP authentication is reused to derive root
	keys. On the other hand, the first re-authentication requires a one-		keys. On the other hand, the first re-authentication requires a one-
	round-trip exchange with the home EAP server, since the EMSK is		round-trip exchange with the home EAP server, since the EMSK is
	generated during the initial EAP authentication and never leaves the		generated during the initial EAP authentication and never leaves the
	home EAP server, which is less efficient than the implicit		home EAP server, which is less efficient than implicit bootstrapping.
	bootstrapping scenario.
	The EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message is sent to the home ER server. The		The EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message is sent to the home ER server. The
	home ER server receives the ERP/DER message containing the EAP-		home ER server receives the ERP/DER message containing the EAP-
	Initiate/Re-Auth message with the 'B' flag set. It creates the new		Initiate/Re-Auth message with the 'B' flag set. It creates the new
	EAP/DER message using the received DRP/DER message and performs the		EAP/DER message using the received DRP/DER message and performs the
	following processing:		following processing:
	Set the Application Id in the header of the message to <Diameter		Set the Application Id in the header of the message to <Diameter
	EAP Application> [RFC4072]		EAP Application> [RFC4072]
	skipping to change at page 9, line 19 ¶		skipping to change at page 9, line 18 ¶
	the Domain- Name TLV attribute with the content from the ERP-Realm		the Domain- Name TLV attribute with the content from the ERP-Realm
	AVP. The server creates the EAP/DEA reply message [RFC4072]		AVP. The server creates the EAP/DEA reply message [RFC4072]
	including an instance of the Key AVP (Section 8.3) with Key-Type AVP		including an instance of the Key AVP (Section 8.3) with Key-Type AVP
	set to rRK and an instance of the Domain-Name TLV attribute with the		set to rRK and an instance of the Domain-Name TLV attribute with the
	content from the ERP-Realm AVP.		content from the ERP-Realm AVP.
	The ER server receives this EAP/DEA and proxies it as follows, in		The ER server receives this EAP/DEA and proxies it as follows, in
	addition to standard proxy operations:		addition to standard proxy operations:
	Set the Application Id back to Diameter ERP Application Id		Set the Application Id back to Diameter ERP Application Id
	(Section 12.1 )		(Section 12.1)
	Extract and cache the content of the Key AVP with Key-Type set to		Extract and cache the content of the Key AVP with Key-Type set to
	rRK, as described in the implicit scenario (Section 5.1).		rRK, as described in Section 5.1).
	The ERP/DEA message is then forwarded to the authenticator, that can		The ERP/DEA message is then forwarded to the authenticator, that can
	use the rMSK as described in RFC 6696.		use the rMSK as described in RFC 6696.
	The figure below captures this proxy behavior:		The figure below captures this proxy behavior:
	Authenticator ER server Home Diameter server		Authenticator ER server Home Diameter server
	============= ========= ====================		============= ========= ====================
	----------------------->		----------------------->
	Diameter ERP/DER		Diameter ERP/DER
	skipping to change at page 10, line 51 ¶		skipping to change at page 10, line 51 ¶
	specific code (EAP-Initiate). The peer should fallback to full EAP		specific code (EAP-Initiate). The peer should fallback to full EAP
	authentication in this case.		authentication in this case.
	When the authenticator receives an EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message from		When the authenticator receives an EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message from
	the peer, the message is processed as described in RFC 6696 with		the peer, the message is processed as described in RFC 6696 with
	regard to the EAP state machine. It creates a Diameter ERP/DER		regard to the EAP state machine. It creates a Diameter ERP/DER
	message following the general process of Diameter EAP [RFC4072], with		message following the general process of Diameter EAP [RFC4072], with
	the following differences:		the following differences:
	The Application Id in the header is set to <Diameter ERP> (code		The Application Id in the header is set to <Diameter ERP> (code
	TBD1 ).		TBD1).
	The value in Auth-Application-Id AVP is also set to <Diameter		The value in Auth-Application-Id AVP is also set to <Diameter
	ERP>.		ERP>.
	The keyName-NAI attribute from the ERP message is used to create		The keyName-NAI attribute from the ERP message is used to create
	the content of the User-Name and Destination-Realm AVPs.		the content of the User-Name and Destination-Realm AVPs.
	The Auth-Request-Type AVP content is set to the appropriate value.		The Auth-Request-Type AVP content is set to the appropriate value.
	The EAP-Payload AVP contains the EAP-Initiate/Re-Auth meassge.		The EAP-Payload AVP contains the EAP-Initiate/Re-Auth message.
	Then this ERP/DER message is sent as described in Section 4.		Then this ERP/DER message is sent as described in Section 4.
	The ER server receives and processes this request as described in		The ER server receives and processes this request as described in
	Section 4. It then creates an ERP/DEA message following the general		Section 4. It then creates an ERP/DEA message following the general
	process described in RFC4072 [RFC4072], with the following		process described in RFC4072 [RFC4072], with the following
	differences:		differences:
	The Application Id in the header is set to <Diameter ERP> (code		The Application Id in the header is set to <Diameter ERP> (code
	TBD1).		TBD1).
	skipping to change at page 11, line 37 ¶		skipping to change at page 11, line 37 ¶
	The EAP-Payload AVP contains the EAP-Finish/Re-auth message.		The EAP-Payload AVP contains the EAP-Finish/Re-auth message.
	If authentication is successful, an instance of the Key AVP		If authentication is successful, an instance of the Key AVP
	containing the Re-authentication Master Session Key (rMSK) derived		containing the Re-authentication Master Session Key (rMSK) derived
	by ERP is included.		by ERP is included.
	When the authenticator receives this ERP/DEA answer, it processes it		When the authenticator receives this ERP/DEA answer, it processes it
	as described in the Diameter EAP Application specification [RFC4072]		as described in the Diameter EAP Application specification [RFC4072]
	and RFC 6696: the content of the EAP-Payload AVP is forwarded to the		and RFC 6696: the content of the EAP-Payload AVP is forwarded to the
	peer, and the contents of the Keying-Material AVP		peer, and the contents of the Keying-Material AVP [RFC6734] is used
	[I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran] is used as a shared secret for a secure		as a shared secret for a secure association protocol specific to the
	association protocol specific to the lower-layer in use.		lower-layer in use.
	7. Application Id		7. Application Id
	We define a new Diameter application in this document, Diameter ERP		We define a new Diameter application in this document, Diameter ERP
	Application, with an Application Id value of TBD1. Diameter nodes		Application, with an Application Id value of TBD1. Diameter nodes
	conforming to this specification in the role of ER server MUST		conforming to this specification in the role of ER server MUST
	advertise support by including an Auth-Application-Id AVP with a		advertise support by including an Auth-Application-Id AVP with a
	value of Diameter ERP in the Capabilities-Exchange-Request and		value of Diameter ERP in the Capabilities-Exchange-Request and
	Capabilities-Exchange-Answer commands [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis].		Capabilities-Exchange-Answer commands [RFC6733].
	The primary use of the Diameter ERP Application Id is to ensure		The primary use of the Diameter ERP Application Id is to ensure
	proper routing of the messages, and that the nodes that advertise the		proper routing of the messages, and that the nodes that advertise the
	support for this application do understand the new AVPs defined in		support for this application do understand the new AVPs defined in
	Section 8, although these AVP have the 'M' flag cleared.		Section 8, although these AVP have the 'M' flag cleared.
	8. AVPs		8. AVPs
	The following sub-sections discuss the AVPs used by the Diameter ERP		The following sub-sections discuss the AVPs used by the Diameter ERP
	application.		application.
	skipping to change at page 12, line 34 ¶		skipping to change at page 12, line 34 ¶
	8.2. ERP-Realm AVP		8.2. ERP-Realm AVP
	The ERP-Realm AVP (AVP Code TBD3) is of type DiameterIdentity. It		The ERP-Realm AVP (AVP Code TBD3) is of type DiameterIdentity. It
	contains the name of the realm in which the ER server is located.		contains the name of the realm in which the ER server is located.
	This AVP has the M and V bits cleared.		This AVP has the M and V bits cleared.
	8.3. Key AVP		8.3. Key AVP
	The Key AVP [I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran] is of type "Grouped" and is		The Key AVP [RFC6734] is of type "Grouped" and is used to carry the
	used to carry the rRK or rMSK and associated attributes. The usage		rRK or rMSK and associated attributes. The usage of the Key AVP and
	of the Key AVP and its constituent AVPs in this application is		its constituent AVPs in this application is specified in the
	specified in the following sub-sections.		following sub-sections.
	8.3.1. Key-Type AVP		8.3.1. Key-Type AVP
	The value of the Key-Type AVP MUST be set to 2 for rRK or 3 for rMSK.		The value of the Key-Type AVP MUST be set to 2 for rRK or 3 for rMSK.
	8.3.2. Keying-Material AVP		8.3.2. Keying-Material AVP
	The Keying-Material AVP contains the rRK sent by the home EAP server		The Keying-Material AVP contains the rRK sent by the home EAP server
	to the ER server, in answer to a request containing an ERP-RK-Request		to the ER server, in answer to a request containing an ERP-RK-Request
	AVP, or the rMSK sent by the ER server to the authenticator. How		AVP, or the rMSK sent by the ER server to the authenticator. How
	skipping to change at page 13, line 18 ¶		skipping to change at page 13, line 18 ¶
	The derivation of this name is specified in RFC 6696.		The derivation of this name is specified in RFC 6696.
	8.3.4. Key-Lifetime AVP		8.3.4. Key-Lifetime AVP
	The Key-Lifetime AVP contains the lifetime of the keying material in		The Key-Lifetime AVP contains the lifetime of the keying material in
	seconds. It MUST NOT be greater than the remaining lifetime of the		seconds. It MUST NOT be greater than the remaining lifetime of the
	EMSK from which the material was derived.		EMSK from which the material was derived.
	9. Result-Code AVP Values		9. Result-Code AVP Values
	This section defines new Result-Code [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis]		This section defines new Result-Code [RFC6733] values that MUST be
	values that MUST be supported by all Diameter implementations that		supported by all Diameter implementations that conform to this
	conform to this specification.		specification.
	9.1. Permanent Failures		9.1. Permanent Failures
	Errors that fall within the Permanent Failures category are used to		Errors that fall within the Permanent Failures category are used to
	inform the peer that the request failed and SHOULD NOT be attempted		inform the peer that the request failed and SHOULD NOT be attempted
	again.		again.
	DIAMETER_ERROR_ EAP_CODE_UNKNOWN (TBD4)		DIAMETER_ERROR_ EAP_CODE_UNKNOWN (TBD4)
	This error code is used by the Diameter server to inform the		This error code is used by the Diameter server to inform the
	skipping to change at page 13, line 43 ¶		skipping to change at page 13, line 43 ¶
	10. Contributors		10. Contributors
	Hannes Tschofenig wrote the initial draft of this document.		Hannes Tschofenig wrote the initial draft of this document.
	Lakshminath Dondeti contributed to the early versions of the		Lakshminath Dondeti contributed to the early versions of the
	document.		document.
	11. Acknowledgements		11. Acknowledgements
	Hannes Tschofenig, Zhen Cao, Benoit Claise, Elwyn Davies and Jouni		Hannes Tschofenig, Zhen Cao, Benoit Claise, Elwyn Davies, Menachem
	Korhonen provided useful reviews.		Dodge, Vincent Roca and Jouni Korhonen provided useful reviews.
	Vidya Narayanan reviewed a rough draft version of the document and		Vidya Narayanan reviewed a rough draft version of the document and
	found some errors.		found some errors.
	Many thanks to these people!		Many thanks to these people!
	12. IANA Considerations		12. IANA Considerations
	This document requires IANA registration of the following new		This document requires IANA registration of the following new
	elements in the Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA)		elements in the Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA)
	Parameters [1] registries.		Parameters registries [AAAPARAMS].
	12.1. Diameter Application Identifier		12.1. Diameter Application Identifier
	This specification requires IANA to allocate a new value "Diameter		This specification requires IANA to allocate a new value "Diameter
	ERP" in the "Application IDs" registry using the policy specified in		ERP" (code: TBD1) in the "Application IDs" registry using the policy
	Section 11.3 of RFC 3588 [RFC3588].		specified in Section 11.3 of RFC 3588 [RFC3588].
	12.2. New AVPs		12.2. New AVPs
	This specification requires IANA to allocate new values from the "AVP		This specification requires IANA to allocate new values from the "AVP
	Codes" registry according to the policy specified in Section 11.1 of		Codes" registry according to the policy specified in Section 11.1 of
	Fajardo, et al. [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] for the following AVPs:		Fajardo, et al. [RFC6733] for the following AVPs:
	ERP-RK-Request		ERP-RK-Request (code: TBD2)
	ERP-Realm		ERP-Realm (code: TBD3)
	These AVPs are defined in Section 8.		These AVPs are defined in Section 8.
	12.3. New Permanent Failures Result-Code AVP Values		12.3. New Permanent Failures Result-Code AVP Values
	This specification requires IANA to allocate a new value from the		This specification requires IANA to allocate a new value from the
	"Result-Code AVP Values (code 268) - Permanent Failure" registry		"Result-Code AVP Values (code 268) - Permanent Failure" registry
	according to the policy specified in Section 11.3.2 of Fajardo, et		according to the policy specified in Section 11.3.2 of Fajardo, et
	al. [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] for the following Result-Code:		al. [RFC6733] for the following Result-Code:
	DIAMETER_ERROR_EAP_CODE_UNKNOWN TBD4		DIAMETER_ERROR_EAP_CODE_UNKNOWN (code: TBD4)
	This result-code value is defined in Section 9.		This result-code value is defined in Section 9.
	13. Security Considerations		13. Security Considerations
	The security considerations from the following documents apply here:		The security considerations from the following documents apply here:
	o Fajardo, et al. [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis]		o Fajardo, et al. [RFC6733]
	o RFC 4072 [RFC4072]		o RFC 4072 [RFC4072]
	o RFC 6696 [RFC6696]		o RFC 6696 [RFC6696]
	o Zorn, Wu and Cakulev [I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran]		o Zorn, Wu and Cakulev [RFC6734]
	14. Normative References		14. References
	[I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran] Zorn, G., Wu, W., and V. Cakulev,		14.1. Normative References
	"Diameter Attribute-Value Pairs for
	Cryptographic Key Transport",
	draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran-14 (work
	in progress), August 2011.
	[I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] Fajardo, V., Arkko, J., Loughney, J.,		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	and G. Zorn, "Diameter Base Protocol",		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
	draft-ietf-dime-rfc3588bis-34 (work in
	progress), June 2012.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in		[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J.
	RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels",		Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588,
	BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		September 2003.
	[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman,		[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and
	E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, "Diameter		H. Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol
	Base Protocol", RFC 3588,		(EAP)", RFC 3748, June 2004.
	September 2003.
	[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J.,		[RFC4072] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter
	Carlson, J., and H. Levkowetz,		Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application",
	"Extensible Authentication Protocol		RFC 4072, August 2005.
	(EAP)", RFC 3748, June 2004.
	[RFC4072] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn,		[RFC5295] Salowey, J., Dondeti, L., Narayanan, V., and M.
	"Diameter Extensible Authentication		Nakhjiri, "Specification for the Derivation of Root Keys
	Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072,		from an Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)", RFC 5295,
	August 2005.		August 2008.
	[RFC5295] Salowey, J., Dondeti, L., Narayanan,		[RFC6696] Cao, Z., He, B., Shi, Y., Wu, Q., and G. Zorn, "EAP
	V., and M. Nakhjiri, "Specification		Extensions for the EAP Re-authentication Protocol
	for the Derivation of Root Keys from		(ERP)", RFC 6696, July 2012.
	an Extended Master Session Key
	(EMSK)", RFC 5295, August 2008.
	[RFC6696] Cao, Z., He, B., Shi, Y., Wu, Q., and		[RFC6733] Fajardo, V., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn,
	G. Zorn, "EAP Extensions for the EAP		"Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 6733, October 2012.
	Re-authentication Protocol (ERP)",
	RFC 6696, July 2012.
	[1] <http://www.iana.org/assignments/aaa-parameters/>		[RFC6734] Zorn, G., Wu, Q., and V. Cakulev, "Diameter Attribute-
			Value Pairs for Cryptographic Key Transport", RFC 6734,
			October 2012.
			14.2. Informative References
			[AAAPARAMS] Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, "Authentication,
			Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) Parameters",
			http://www.iana.org/assignments/aaa-parameters/.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Julien Bournelle		Julien Bournelle
	Orange Labs		Orange Labs
	38-40 rue du general Leclerc		38-40 rue du general Leclerc
	Issy-Les-Moulineaux 92794		Issy-Les-Moulineaux 92794
	France		France
	EMail: julien.bournelle@orange-ftgroup.com		EMail: julien.bournelle@orange-ftgroup.com
End of changes. 39 change blocks.
	81 lines changed or deleted		78 lines changed or added
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