< draft-ietf-dkim-mailinglists-10.txt   draft-ietf-dkim-mailinglists-11.txt >
DKIM Working Group M. Kucherawy DKIM Working Group M. Kucherawy
Internet-Draft Cloudmark Internet-Draft Cloudmark
Intended status: BCP May 10, 2011 Intended status: BCP June 3, 2011
Expires: November 11, 2011 Expires: December 5, 2011
DKIM And Mailing Lists DKIM And Mailing Lists
draft-ietf-dkim-mailinglists-10 draft-ietf-dkim-mailinglists-11
Abstract Abstract
DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) allows an administrative mail DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) allows an administrative mail
domain (ADMD) to assume some responsibility for a message. Based on domain (ADMD) to assume some responsibility for a message. Based on
deployment experience with DKIM, this Best Current Practices document deployment experience with DKIM, this document provides guidance for
provides guidance for the use of DKIM with scenarios that include the use of DKIM with scenarios that include Mailing List Managers
Mailing List Managers (MLMs). (MLMs).
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 11, 2011. This Internet-Draft will expire on December 5, 2011.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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A "message stream" identifies a group of messages originating from A "message stream" identifies a group of messages originating from
within an ADMD that are distinct in intent, origin and/or use, and within an ADMD that are distinct in intent, origin and/or use, and
partitions them somehow (i.e., via changing the value in the "d=" tag partitions them somehow (i.e., via changing the value in the "d=" tag
value in the context of DKIM) so as to keep them associated to users value in the context of DKIM) so as to keep them associated to users
yet distinct in terms of their evaluation and handling by verifiers yet distinct in terms of their evaluation and handling by verifiers
or receivers. or receivers.
A good example might be user mail generated by a company's employees, A good example might be user mail generated by a company's employees,
versus operational or transactional mail that comes from automated versus operational or transactional mail that comes from automated
sources, versus marketing or sales campaigns. Each of these could sources, versus marketing or sales campaigns. Each of these could
have different security policies imposed against them, or there might have different sending policies imposed against them, or there might
be a desire to insulate one from the other (e.g., a marketing be a desire to insulate one from the other (e.g., a marketing
campaign that gets reported by many spam filters could cause the campaign that gets reported by many spam filters could cause the
marketing stream's reputation to degrade without automatically marketing stream's reputation to degrade without automatically
punishing the transactional or user streams). punishing the transactional or user streams).
3. Mailing Lists and DKIM 3. Mailing Lists and DKIM
It is important to make some distinctions among different styles of It is important to make some distinctions among different styles of
intermediaries, their typical implementations, and the effects they intermediaries, their typical implementations, and the effects they
have in a DKIM-aware environment. have in a DKIM-aware environment.
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3.1. Roles and Realities 3.1. Roles and Realities
Across DKIM activities, there are several key roles in the transit of Across DKIM activities, there are several key roles in the transit of
a message. Most of these are defined in [EMAIL-ARCH], but are a message. Most of these are defined in [EMAIL-ARCH], but are
reviewed here for quick reference. reviewed here for quick reference.
author: The agent that provided the content of the message being author: The agent that provided the content of the message being
sent through the system. The author delivers that content to the sent through the system. The author delivers that content to the
originator in order to begin a message's journey to its intended originator in order to begin a message's journey to its intended
final recipients. The author can be a human using an MUA (Mail final recipients. The author can be a human using an MUA (Mail
User Agent) or a common system utility such as "cron", etc. User Agent) or an automated process that may send mail (for
example, the "cron" Unix system utility).
originator: The agent that accepts a message from the author, originator: The agent that accepts a message from the author,
ensures it conforms to the relevant standards such as [MAIL], and ensures it conforms to the relevant standards such as [MAIL], and
then sends it toward its destination(s). This is often referred then sends it toward its destination(s). This is often referred
to as the Mail Submission Agent (MSA). to as the Mail Submission Agent (MSA).
signer: Any agent that affixes one or more DKIM signature(s) to a signer: Any agent that affixes one or more DKIM signature(s) to a
message on its way toward its ultimate destination. There is message on its way toward its ultimate destination. There is
typically a signer running at the MTA that sits between the typically a signer running at the MTA that sits between the
author's ADMD and the general Internet. The originator and/or author's ADMD and the general Internet. The originator and/or
author might also be a signer. author might also be a signer.
verifier: Any agent that conducts DKIM signature analysis. One is verifier: Any agent that conducts DKIM signature validation. One is
typically running at the MTA that sits between the public Internet typically running at the MTA that sits between the public Internet
and the receiver's ADMD. Note that any agent that handles a and the receiver's ADMD. Note that any agent that handles a
signed message can conduct verification; this document only signed message can conduct verification; this document only
considers that action and its outcomes either at an MLM or at the considers that action and its outcomes either at an MLM or at the
receiver. Filtering decisions could be made by this agent based receiver. Filtering decisions could be made by this agent based
on verification results. on verification results.
receiver: The agent that is the final transit relay for the message receiver: The agent that is the final transit relay for the message
and performs final delivery to the recipient(s) of the message. and performs final delivery to the recipient(s) of the message.
Filtering decisions based on results made by the verifier could be Filtering decisions based on results made by the verifier could be
applied by the receiver. The verifier and the receiver could be applied by the receiver. The verifier and the receiver could be
the same agent. the same agent. This is sometimes the same as or coupled with the
Mail Delivery Agent (MDA).
In the case of simple user-to-user mail, these roles are fairly In the case of simple user-to-user mail, these roles are fairly
straightforward. However, when one is sending mail to a list, which straightforward. However, when one is sending mail to a list, which
then gets relayed to all of that list's subscribers, the roles are then gets relayed to all of that list's subscribers, the roles are
often less clear to the general user as particular agents may hold often less clear to the general user as particular agents may hold
multiple important but separable roles. The above definitions are multiple important but separable roles. The above definitions are
intended to enable more precise discussion of the mechanisms intended to enable more precise discussion of the mechanisms
involved. involved.
3.2. Types Of Mailing Lists 3.2. Types Of Mailing Lists
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This section contains a discussion of issues regarding sending DKIM- This section contains a discussion of issues regarding sending DKIM-
signed mail to or through an MLM that is not DKIM-aware. signed mail to or through an MLM that is not DKIM-aware.
Specifically, the header fields introduced by [DKIM] and Specifically, the header fields introduced by [DKIM] and
[AUTH-RESULTS] carry no special meaning to such an MLM. [AUTH-RESULTS] carry no special meaning to such an MLM.
4.1. Author-Related Signing 4.1. Author-Related Signing
In an idealized world, if an author knows that the MLM to which a In an idealized world, if an author knows that the MLM to which a
message is being sent is a non-participating resending MLM, the message is being sent is a non-participating resending MLM, the
author SHOULD be cautious when deciding whether or not to send a author needs to be cautious when deciding whether or not to send a
signed message to the list. The MLM could make a change that would signed message to the list. The MLM could make a change that would
invalidate the author's signature but not remove it prior to re- invalidate the author's signature but not remove it prior to re-
distribution. Hence, list recipients would receive a message distribution. Hence, list recipients would receive a message
purportedly from the author but bearing a DKIM signature that would purportedly from the author but bearing a DKIM signature that would
not verify. Some mail filtering software incorrectly penalizes a not verify. Some mail filtering software incorrectly penalizes a
message containing a DKIM signature that fails verification. This message containing a DKIM signature that fails verification. This
may have detrimental effects outside of the author's control. may have detrimental effects outside of the author's control.
(Additional discussion of this is below.) This problem can be (Additional discussion of this is below.) This problem can be
compounded if there are receivers that apply signing policies (e.g., compounded if there are receivers that apply signing policies (e.g.,
[ADSP]) and the author publishes any kind of strict policy, i.e., a [ADSP]) and the author publishes any kind of strict policy, i.e., a
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influence over the management of an MLM. Specifically, the behavior influence over the management of an MLM. Specifically, the behavior
of an intermediary (e.g., an MLM that is not careful about filtering of an intermediary (e.g., an MLM that is not careful about filtering
out junk mail or being diligent about unsubscription requests) can out junk mail or being diligent about unsubscription requests) can
trigger recipient complaints that reflect back on those agents that trigger recipient complaints that reflect back on those agents that
appear to be responsible for the message, in this case an author via appear to be responsible for the message, in this case an author via
the address found in the RFC5322.From field. In the future, as DKIM the address found in the RFC5322.From field. In the future, as DKIM
signature outputs (i.e., the signing domain) are used as inputs to signature outputs (i.e., the signing domain) are used as inputs to
reputation modules, there may be a desire to insulate one's reputation modules, there may be a desire to insulate one's
reputation from influence by the unknown results of sending mail reputation from influence by the unknown results of sending mail
through an MLM. In that case, authors SHOULD create a mail stream through an MLM. In that case, authors SHOULD create a mail stream
specifically used for generating signatures when sending traffic to specifically used for generating DKIM signatures when sending traffic
MLMs. to MLMs.
This suggestion can be made more general. Mail that is of a This suggestion can be made more general. Mail that is of a
transactional or generally end-to-end nature, and not likely to be transactional or generally end-to-end nature, and not likely to be
forwarded around either by MLMs or users, SHOULD be signed with a forwarded around either by MLMs or users, SHOULD be signed with a
different mail stream identifier from a stream that serves more different mail stream identifier from a stream that serves more
varied uses. varied uses.
5.6. Verification Outcomes at MLMs 5.6. Verification Outcomes at MLMs
MLMs typically attempt to authenticate messages posted through them. MLMs typically attempt to authenticate messages posted through them.
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by the MLM. This is not required, however; it is believed the by the MLM. This is not required, however; it is believed the
reputation of the signer will be a more critical data point rather reputation of the signer will be a more critical data point rather
than this suggested binding. Furthermore, this is not a binding than this suggested binding. Furthermore, this is not a binding
recognized by any current specification document. recognized by any current specification document.
A DKIM-aware resending MLM SHOULD sign the entire message after the A DKIM-aware resending MLM SHOULD sign the entire message after the
message is prepared for distribution (i.e. the "MLM Output" from message is prepared for distribution (i.e. the "MLM Output" from
Section 3.2). Any other configuration might generate signatures that Section 3.2). Any other configuration might generate signatures that
will not validate. will not validate.
DKIM-aware authoring MLMs MUST sign the mail they send according to DKIM-aware authoring MLMs sign the mail they send according to the
the regular signing guidelines given in [DKIM]. regular signing guidelines given in [DKIM].
One concern is that having an MLM apply its signature to unsigned One concern is that having an MLM apply its signature to unsigned
mail might cause some verifiers or receivers to interpret the mail might cause some verifiers or receivers to interpret the
signature as conferring more authority or authenticity to the message signature as conferring more authority or authenticity to the message
content than is defined by [DKIM]. This is an issue beyond MLMs and content than is defined by [DKIM]. This is an issue beyond MLMs and
primarily entails receive-side processing outside of the scope of primarily entails receive-side processing outside of the scope of
[DKIM]. It is nevertheless worth noting here. [DKIM]. It is nevertheless worth noting here.
5.9. Verification Outcomes at Final Receiving Sites 5.9. Verification Outcomes at Final Receiving Sites
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This includes possibly processing the message as per ADSP This includes possibly processing the message as per ADSP
requirements. requirements.
Receivers SHOULD ignore or remove all unsigned externally-applied Receivers SHOULD ignore or remove all unsigned externally-applied
Authentication-Results header fields, and those not signed by an ADMD Authentication-Results header fields, and those not signed by an ADMD
that can be trusted by the receiver. See Section 5 and Section 7 of that can be trusted by the receiver. See Section 5 and Section 7 of
[AUTH-RESULTS] for further discussion. [AUTH-RESULTS] for further discussion.
Upon DKIM and ADSP evaluation during an SMTP session (a common Upon DKIM and ADSP evaluation during an SMTP session (a common
implementation), an agent MAY decide to reject a message during an implementation), an agent MAY decide to reject a message during an
SMTP session. If this is done, use of an [SMTP] failure code not SMTP session. If this is done, [SMTP] stipulates that 550 is the
normally used for "user unknown" (550) is preferred; therefore, 554 correct response code. However, if the SMTP server supports
SHOULD be used. If the rejecting SMTP server supports [ENHANCED] [ENHANCED] status codes, a status code not normally used for "user
status codes, it SHOULD make a distinction between messages rejected unknown" (5.1.1) is preferred; therefore, a 5.7.0 code SHOULD be
deliberately due to policy decisions rather than those rejected used. If the rejecting SMTP server supports this, it thus makes a
because of other delivery issues. In particular, a policy rejection distinction between messages rejected deliberately due to policy
SHOULD be relayed using a 5.7.1 enhanced status code and some decisions rather than those rejected because of other delivery
appropriate wording in the text part of the reply, in contrast to a issues. In particular, a policy rejection SHOULD be relayed using
code of 5.1.1 indicating the user does not exist. Those MLMs that the above enhanced status code and some appropriate wording in the
automatically attempt to remove users with prolonged delivery text part of the reply. Those MLMs that automatically attempt to
problems (such as account deletion) SHOULD thus detect the difference remove users with prolonged delivery problems (such as account
between policy rejection and other delivery failures, and act deletion) SHOULD thus detect the difference between policy rejection
accordingly. SMTP servers doing so SHOULD also use appropriate and other delivery failures, and act accordingly. It would be
wording in the text portion of the reply, perhaps explicitly using beneficial for SMTP servers doing so to also use appropriate wording
the string "ADSP" to facilitate searching of relevant data in logs. in the text portion of the reply, perhaps explicitly using the string
"ADSP" to facilitate searching for relevant data in logs.
The preceding paragraph does not apply to an [ADSP] policy of The preceding paragraph does not apply to an [ADSP] policy of
"discardable". In such cases where the submission fails that test, "discardable". In such cases where the submission fails that test,
the receiver or verifier SHOULD discard the message but return an the receiver or verifier SHOULD discard the message but return an
SMTP success code, i.e. accept the message but drop it without SMTP success code, i.e. accept the message but drop it without
delivery. An SMTP rejection of such mail instead of the requested delivery. An SMTP rejection of such mail instead of the requested
discard action causes more harm than good. discard action causes more harm than good.
6. DKIM Reporting 6. DKIM Reporting
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