< draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-experiments-03.txt		draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-experiments-04.txt >
	DNSEXT D. Blacka		DNSEXT D. Blacka
	Internet-Draft VeriSign, Inc.		Internet-Draft VeriSign, Inc.
	Intended status: Standards Track April 7, 2006		Intended status: Best Current March 20, 2007
	Expires: October 9, 2006		Practice
			Expires: September 21, 2007
	DNSSEC Experiments		DNSSEC Experiments
	draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-experiments-03		draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-experiments-04
	Status of this Memo		Status of this Memo
	By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any		By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
	applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware		applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
	have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes		have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
	aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.		aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
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	skipping to change at page 1, line 34 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 35 ¶
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	This Internet-Draft will expire on October 9, 2006.		This Internet-Draft will expire on September 21, 2007.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).		Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document describes a methodology for deploying alternate, non-		This document describes a methodology for deploying alternate, non-
	backwards-compatible, DNSSEC methodologies in an experimental fashion		backwards-compatible, DNSSEC methodologies in an experimental fashion
	without disrupting the deployment of standard DNSSEC.		without disrupting the deployment of standard DNSSEC.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Definitions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Definitions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	skipping to change at page 3, line 8 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 8 ¶
	9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 15		Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 15
	1. Definitions and Terminology		1. Definitions and Terminology
	Throughout this document, familiarity with the DNS system (RFC 1035		Throughout this document, familiarity with the DNS system (RFC 1035
	[5]) and the DNS security extensions ([2], [3], and [4] is assumed.		[5]) and the DNS security extensions (RFC 4033 [2], RFC 4034 [3], and
			RFC 4035 [4]) is assumed.
	The key words "MUST, "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY, and "OPTIONAL" in this		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
	document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1].		document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1].
	2. Overview		2. Overview
	Historically, experimentation with DNSSEC alternatives has been a		Historically, experimentation with DNSSEC alternatives has been a
	problematic endeavor. There has typically been a desire to both		problematic endeavor. There has typically been a desire to both
	introduce non-backwards-compatible changes to DNSSEC and to try these		introduce non-backwards-compatible changes to DNSSEC and to try these
	changes on real zones in the public DNS. This creates a problem when		changes on real zones in the public DNS. This creates a problem when
	the change to DNSSEC would make all or part of the zone using those		the change to DNSSEC would make all or part of the zone using those
	changes appear bogus (bad) or otherwise broken to existing security-		changes appear bogus (bad) or otherwise broken to existing security-
	skipping to change at page 6, line 14 ¶		skipping to change at page 6, line 14 ¶
	4. Method		4. Method
	The core of the methodology is the use of strictly unknown algorithm		The core of the methodology is the use of strictly unknown algorithm
	identifiers when signing the experimental zone, and more importantly,		identifiers when signing the experimental zone, and more importantly,
	having only unknown algorithm identifiers in the DS records for the		having only unknown algorithm identifiers in the DS records for the
	delegation to the zone at the parent.		delegation to the zone at the parent.
	This technique works because of the way DNSSEC-compliant validators		This technique works because of the way DNSSEC-compliant validators
	are expected to work in the presence of a DS set with only unknown		are expected to work in the presence of a DS set with only unknown
	algorithm identifiers. From [4], Section 5.2:		algorithm identifiers. From RFC 4035 [4], Section 5.2:
	If the validator does not support any of the algorithms listed in		If the validator does not support any of the algorithms listed in
	an authenticated DS RRset, then the resolver has no supported		an authenticated DS RRset, then the resolver has no supported
	authentication path leading from the parent to the child. The		authentication path leading from the parent to the child. The
	resolver should treat this case as it would the case of an		resolver should treat this case as it would the case of an
	authenticated NSEC RRset proving that no DS RRset exists, as		authenticated NSEC RRset proving that no DS RRset exists, as
	described above.		described above.
	And further:		And further:
	If the resolver does not support any of the algorithms listed in		If the resolver does not support any of the algorithms listed in
	an authenticated DS RRset, then the resolver will not be able to		an authenticated DS RRset, then the resolver will not be able to
	verify the authentication path to the child zone. In this case,		verify the authentication path to the child zone. In this case,
	the resolver SHOULD treat the child zone as if it were unsigned.		the resolver SHOULD treat the child zone as if it were unsigned.
	While this behavior isn't strictly mandatory (as marked by MUST), it		Although this behavior isn't strictly mandatory (as marked by MUST),
	is likely that a validator would implement this behavior, or, more to		it is unlikely for a validator to implement a substantially different
	the point, it would handle this situation in a safe way (see below		behavior. Essentially, if the validator does not have a usable chain
	(Section 6).)		of trust to a child zone, then it can only do one of two things:
			treat responses from the zone as insecure (the recommended behavior),
			or treat the responses as bogus. If the validator chooses the
			latter, this will both violate the expectation of the zone owner and
			defeat the purpose of the above rule. However, with local policy, it
			is within the right of a validator to refuse to trust certain zones
			based on any criteria, including the use of unknown signing
			algorithms.
	Because we are talking about experiments, it is RECOMMENDED that		Because we are talking about experiments, it is RECOMMENDED that
	private algorithm numbers be used (see [3], appendix A.1.1. Note		private algorithm numbers be used (see RFC 4034 [3], appendix A.1.1.
	that secure handling of private algorithms requires special handing		Note that secure handling of private algorithms requires special
	by the validator logic. See [6] for further details.) Normally,		handing by the validator logic. See draft-ietf-dnssec-bis-updates
	instead of actually inventing new signing algorithms, the recommended		[6] for further details.) Normally, instead of actually inventing
	path is to create alternate algorithm identifiers that are aliases		new signing algorithms, the recommended path is to create alternate
	for the existing, known algorithms. While, strictly speaking, it is		algorithm identifiers that are aliases for the existing, known
	only necessary to create an alternate identifier for the mandatory		algorithms. While, strictly speaking, it is only necessary to create
	algorithms, it is suggested that all optional defined algorithms be		an alternate identifier for the mandatory algorithms, it is suggested
	aliased as well.		that all optional defined algorithms be aliased as well.
	It is RECOMMENDED that for a particular DNSSEC experiment, a		It is RECOMMENDED that for a particular DNSSEC experiment, a
	particular domain name base is chosen for all new algorithms, then		particular domain name base is chosen for all new algorithms, then
	the algorithm number (or name) is prepended to it. For example, for		the algorithm number (or name) is prepended to it. For example, for
	experiment A, the base name of "dnssec-experiment-a.example.com" is		experiment A, the base name of "dnssec-experiment-a.example.com" is
	chosen. Then, aliases for algorithms 3 (DSA) and 5 (RSASHA1) are		chosen. Then, aliases for algorithms 3 (DSA) and 5 (RSASHA1) are
	defined to be "3.dnssec-experiment-a.example.com" and		defined to be "3.dnssec-experiment-a.example.com" and
	"5.dnssec-experiment-a.example.com". However, any unique identifier		"5.dnssec-experiment-a.example.com". However, any unique identifier
	will suffice.		will suffice.
	skipping to change at page 7, line 19 ¶		skipping to change at page 7, line 27 ¶
	identifiers signify.		identifiers signify.
	This method creates two classes of security-aware servers and		This method creates two classes of security-aware servers and
	resolvers: servers and resolvers that are aware of the experiment		resolvers: servers and resolvers that are aware of the experiment
	(and thus recognize the experiment's algorithm identifiers and		(and thus recognize the experiment's algorithm identifiers and
	experimental semantics), and servers and resolvers that are unaware		experimental semantics), and servers and resolvers that are unaware
	of the experiment.		of the experiment.
	This method also precludes any zone from being both in an experiment		This method also precludes any zone from being both in an experiment
	and in a classic DNSSEC island of security. That is, a zone is		and in a classic DNSSEC island of security. That is, a zone is
	either in an experiment and only experimentally validatable, or it is		either in an experiment and only possible to validate experimentally,
	not.		or it is not.
	5. Defining an Experiment		5. Defining an Experiment
	The DNSSEC experiment MUST define the particular set of (previously		The DNSSEC experiment MUST define the particular set of (previously
	unknown) algorithm identifiers that identify the experiment, and		unknown) algorithm identifiers that identify the experiment, and
	define what each unknown algorithm identifier means. Typically,		define what each unknown algorithm identifier means. Typically,
	unless the experiment is actually experimenting with a new DNSSEC		unless the experiment is actually experimenting with a new DNSSEC
	algorithm, this will be a mapping of private algorithm identifiers to		algorithm, this will be a mapping of private algorithm identifiers to
	existing, known algorithms.		existing, known algorithms.
	skipping to change at page 9, line 9 ¶		skipping to change at page 9, line 9 ¶
	others that the resolver might understand.		others that the resolver might understand.
	In general, resolvers involved in the experiment are expected to		In general, resolvers involved in the experiment are expected to
	understand both standard DNSSEC and the defined experimental DNSSEC		understand both standard DNSSEC and the defined experimental DNSSEC
	protocol, although this isn't required.		protocol, although this isn't required.
	6. Considerations		6. Considerations
	There are a number of considerations with using this methodology.		There are a number of considerations with using this methodology.
	1. Under some circumstances, it may be that the experiment will not		1. If an unaware validator does not correctly follow the rules laid
	be sufficiently masked by this technique and may cause resolution		out in RFC 4035 (e.g., the validator interprets a DNSSEC record
	problem for resolvers not aware of the experiment. For instance,		prior to validating it), or if the experiment is broader in scope
	the resolver may look at a non-validatable response and conclude		that just modifying the DNSSEC semantics, the experiment may not
	that the response is bogus, either due to local policy or		be sufficiently masked by this technique. This may cause
	implementation details. This is not expected to be a common		unintended resolution failures.
	case, however.
	2. It will not be possible for security-aware resolvers unaware of		2. It will not be possible for security-aware resolvers unaware of
	the experiment to build a chain of trust through an experimental		the experiment to build a chain of trust through an experimental
	zone.		zone.
	7. Use in Non-Experiments		7. Use in Non-Experiments
	This general methodology MAY be used for non-backwards compatible		This general methodology MAY be used for non-backwards compatible
	DNSSEC protocol changes that start out as or become standards. In		DNSSEC protocol changes that start out as or become standards. In
	this case:		this case:
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	o Resolvers MAY recognize the protocol change in zones not signed		o Resolvers MAY recognize the protocol change in zones not signed
	(or not solely signed) using the new algorithm identifiers.		(or not solely signed) using the new algorithm identifiers.
	8. Security Considerations		8. Security Considerations
	Zones using this methodology will be considered insecure by all		Zones using this methodology will be considered insecure by all
	resolvers except those aware of the experiment. It is not generally		resolvers except those aware of the experiment. It is not generally
	possible to create a secure delegation from an experimental zone that		possible to create a secure delegation from an experimental zone that
	will be followed by resolvers unaware of the experiment.		will be followed by resolvers unaware of the experiment.
			Implementers should take into account any security issues that may
			result from environments being configured to trust both experimental
			and non-experimental zones. If the experimental zone is more
			vulnerable to attacks, it could, for example, be used promote trust
			in zones not part of the experiment, possibly under the control of an
			attacker.
	9. IANA Considerations		9. IANA Considerations
	This document has no IANA actions.		This document has no IANA actions.
	10. References		10. References
	10.1. Normative References		10.1. Normative References
	[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement		[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
	Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
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	Email: davidb@verisign.com		Email: davidb@verisign.com
	URI: http://www.verisignlabs.com		URI: http://www.verisignlabs.com
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