< draft-ietf-dnsind-clarify-06.txt   draft-ietf-dnsind-clarify-07.txt >
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Network Working Group Robert Elz Network Working Group Robert Elz
Internet Draft University of Melbourne Internet Draft University of Melbourne
Expiration Date: September 1997 Expiration Date: September 1997
Randy Bush Randy Bush
RGnet, Inc. RGnet, Inc.
March 1997 March 1997
Clarifications to the DNS Specification Clarifications to the DNS Specification
draft-ietf-dnsind-clarify-06.txt draft-ietf-dnsind-clarify-07.txt
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working
documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. working documents as Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the
"1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow
Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), nic.nordu.net (Europe), Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), nic.nordu.net (Europe),
munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ds.internic.net (US East Coast), or munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ds.internic.net (US East Coast), or
ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast). ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast).
1. Abstract 1. Abstract
This draft considers some areas that have been identified as problems This draft considers some areas that have been identified as problems
with the specification of the Domain Name System, and proposes with the specification of the Domain Name System, and proposes
remedies for the defects identified. Six separate issues are remedies for the defects identified. Eight separate issues are
considered: considered:
+ IP packet header address usage from multi-homed servers, + IP packet header address usage from multi-homed servers,
+ TTLs in sets of records with the same name, class, and type, + TTLs in sets of records with the same name, class, and type,
+ correct handling of zone cuts, + correct handling of zone cuts,
+ two minor issues concerning SOA records and their use, + two minor issues concerning SOA records and their use,
+ the precise definition of the Time to Live (TTL)
+ Use of the TC (truncated) header bit
+ the issue of what is an authoritative, or canonical, name, + the issue of what is an authoritative, or canonical, name,
+ and the issue of what makes a valid DNS label. + and the issue of what makes a valid DNS label.
The first four of these are areas where the correct behaviour has The first six of these are areas where the correct behaviour has been
been somewhat unclear, we seek to rectify that. The other two are somewhat unclear, we seek to rectify that. The other two are already
already adequately specified, however the specifications seem to be adequately specified, however the specifications seem to be sometimes
sometimes ignored. We seek to reinforce the existing specifications. ignored. We seek to reinforce the existing specifications.
This version tightens the procedures to be followed when a server This versions ads two new minor clarifications, to the definition of
receives an RRSet with varying TTLs on the RRs comprising the RRSet. a TTL, and to use of the TC bit. This paragraph will be deleted from
This is an attempt to limit the spread of bogus data. This paragraph the final version of this document.
will be deleted from the final version of this document.
Contents Contents
1 Abstract ................................................... 1 1 Abstract ................................................... 1
2 Introduction ............................................... 2 2 Introduction ............................................... 2
3 Terminology ................................................ 3 3 Terminology ................................................ 3
4 Server Reply Source Address Selection ...................... 3 4 Server Reply Source Address Selection ...................... 3
5 Resource Record Sets ....................................... 4 5 Resource Record Sets ....................................... 4
6 Zone Cuts .................................................. 8 6 Zone Cuts .................................................. 8
7 SOA RRs .................................................... 10 7 SOA RRs .................................................... 10
8 Naming issues .............................................. 10 8 Time to Live (TTL) ......................................... 10
9 Name syntax ................................................ 12 9 The TC (truncated) header bit .............................. 11
10 Security Considerations .................................... 13 10 Naming issues .............................................. 11
11 References ................................................. 13 11 Name syntax ................................................ 13
12 Acknowledgements ........................................... 14 12 Security Considerations .................................... 14
13 Authors' addresses ......................................... 14 13 References ................................................. 14
14 Acknowledgements ........................................... 14
15 Authors' addresses ......................................... 15
2. Introduction 2. Introduction
Several problem areas in the Domain Name System specification Several problem areas in the Domain Name System specification
[RFC1034, RFC1035] have been noted through the years [RFC1123]. This [RFC1034, RFC1035] have been noted through the years [RFC1123]. This
draft addresses several additional problem areas. The issues here draft addresses several additional problem areas. The issues here
are independent. Those issues are the question of which source are independent. Those issues are the question of which source
address a multi-homed DNS server should use when replying to a query, address a multi-homed DNS server should use when replying to a query,
the issue of differing TTLs for DNS records with the same label, the issue of differing TTLs for DNS records with the same label,
class and type, and the issue of canonical names, what they are, how class and type, and the issue of canonical names, what they are, how
CNAME records relate, what names are legal in what parts of the DNS, CNAME records relate, what names are legal in what parts of the DNS,
and what is the valid syntax of a DNS name. and what is the valid syntax of a DNS name.
Clarifications to the DNS specification to avoid these problems are Clarifications to the DNS specification to avoid these problems are
made in this memo. A minor ambiguity in RFC1034 concerned with SOA made in this memo. A minor ambiguity in RFC1034 concerned with SOA
records is also corrected. records is also corrected, as is one in the definition of the TTL
(Time To Live) and some possible confusion in use of the TC bit.
3. Terminology 3. Terminology
This memo does not use the oft used expressions MUST, SHOULD, MAY, or This memo does not use the oft used expressions MUST, SHOULD, MAY, or
their negative forms. In some sections it may seem that a their negative forms. In some sections it may seem that a
specification is worded mildly, and hence some may infer that the specification is worded mildly, and hence some may infer that the
specification is optional. That is not correct. Anywhere that this specification is optional. That is not correct. Anywhere that this
memo suggests that some action should be carried out, or must be memo suggests that some action should be carried out, or must be
carried out, or that some behaviour is acceptable, or not, that is to carried out, or that some behaviour is acceptable, or not, that is to
be considered as a fundamental aspect of this specification, be considered as a fundamental aspect of this specification,
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7.2. TTLs on SOA RRs 7.2. TTLs on SOA RRs
It may be observed that in section 3.2.1 of RFC1035, which defines It may be observed that in section 3.2.1 of RFC1035, which defines
the format of a Resource Record, that the definition of the TTL field the format of a Resource Record, that the definition of the TTL field
contains a throw away line which states that the TTL of an SOA record contains a throw away line which states that the TTL of an SOA record
should always be sent as zero to prevent caching. This is mentioned should always be sent as zero to prevent caching. This is mentioned
nowhere else, and has not generally been implemented. nowhere else, and has not generally been implemented.
Implementations should not assume that SOA records will have a TTL of Implementations should not assume that SOA records will have a TTL of
zero, nor are they required to send SOA records with a TTL of zero. zero, nor are they required to send SOA records with a TTL of zero.
8. Naming issues 8. Time to Live (TTL)
The definition of values appropriate to the TTL field in STD 13 is
not as clear as it could be, with respect to how many significant
bits exist, and whether the value is signed or unsigned. It is
hereby specified that a TTL value is an unsigned number, with a
minimum value of 0, and a maximum value of 2147483647. That is, a
maximum of 2^31 - 1. When transmitted, this value shall be encoded
in the less significant 31 bits of the 32 bit TTL field, with the
most significant, or sign, bit set to zero.
Implementations should treat TTL values received with the most
significant bit set as if the entire value received was zero.
Implementations are always free to place an upper bound on any TTL
received, and treat any larger values as if they were that upper
bound. The TTL specifies a maximum time to live, not a mandatory
time to live.
9. The TC (truncated) header bit
The TC bit should be set in responses only when an RRSet is required
as a part of the response, but could not be included in its entirety.
The TC bit should not be set merely because some extra information
could have been included, but there was insufficient room. This
includes the results of additional section processing. In such cases
the entire RRSet that will not fit in the response should be omitted,
and the reply sent as is, with the TC bit clear. If the recipient of
the reply needs the omitted data, it can construct a query for that
data and send that separately.
Where TC is set, the partial RRSet that would not completely fit may
be left in the response. When a DNS client receives a reply with TC
set, it should ignore that response, and query again, using a
mechanism, such as a TCP connection, that will permit larger replies.
10. Naming issues
It has sometimes been inferred from some sections of the DNS It has sometimes been inferred from some sections of the DNS
specification [RFC1034, RFC1035] that a host, or perhaps an interface specification [RFC1034, RFC1035] that a host, or perhaps an interface
of a host, is permitted exactly one authoritative, or official, name, of a host, is permitted exactly one authoritative, or official, name,
called the canonical name. There is no such requirement in the DNS. called the canonical name. There is no such requirement in the DNS.
8.1. CNAME records 10.1. CNAME records
The DNS CNAME ("canonical name") record exists to provide the The DNS CNAME ("canonical name") record exists to provide the
canonical name associated with an alias name. There may be only one canonical name associated with an alias name. There may be only one
such canonical name for any one alias. That name should generally be such canonical name for any one alias. That name should generally be
a name that exists elsewhere in the DNS, though some applications for a name that exists elsewhere in the DNS, though some applications for
aliases with no accompanying canonical name exist. An alias name aliases with no accompanying canonical name exist. An alias name
(label of a CNAME record) may, if DNSSEC is in use, have SIG, NXT, (label of a CNAME record) may, if DNSSEC is in use, have SIG, NXT,
and KEY RRs, but may have no other data. That is, for any label in and KEY RRs, but may have no other data. That is, for any label in
the DNS (any domain name) exactly one of the following is true: the DNS (any domain name) exactly one of the following is true:
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canonical name associated with an alias name. There may be only one canonical name associated with an alias name. There may be only one
such canonical name for any one alias. That name should generally be such canonical name for any one alias. That name should generally be
a name that exists elsewhere in the DNS, though some applications for a name that exists elsewhere in the DNS, though some applications for
aliases with no accompanying canonical name exist. An alias name aliases with no accompanying canonical name exist. An alias name
(label of a CNAME record) may, if DNSSEC is in use, have SIG, NXT, (label of a CNAME record) may, if DNSSEC is in use, have SIG, NXT,
and KEY RRs, but may have no other data. That is, for any label in and KEY RRs, but may have no other data. That is, for any label in
the DNS (any domain name) exactly one of the following is true: the DNS (any domain name) exactly one of the following is true:
+ one CNAME record exists, optionally accompanied by SIG, NXT, and + one CNAME record exists, optionally accompanied by SIG, NXT, and
KEY RRs, KEY RRs,
+ one or more records exist, none being CNAME records, + one or more records exist, none being CNAME records,
+ the name exists, but has no associated RRs of any type, + the name exists, but has no associated RRs of any type,
+ the name does not exist at all. + the name does not exist at all.
8.1.1. CNAME terminology 10.1.1. CNAME terminology
It has been traditional to refer to the label of a CNAME record as "a It has been traditional to refer to the label of a CNAME record as "a
CNAME". This is unfortunate, as "CNAME" is an abbreviation of CNAME". This is unfortunate, as "CNAME" is an abbreviation of
"canonical name", and the label of a CNAME record is most certainly "canonical name", and the label of a CNAME record is most certainly
not a canonical name. It is, however, an entrenched usage. Care not a canonical name. It is, however, an entrenched usage. Care
must therefore be taken to be very clear whether the label, or the must therefore be taken to be very clear whether the label, or the
value (the canonical name) of a CNAME resource record is intended. value (the canonical name) of a CNAME resource record is intended.
In this document, the label of a CNAME resource record will always be In this document, the label of a CNAME resource record will always be
referred to as an alias. referred to as an alias.
8.2. PTR records 10.2. PTR records
Confusion about canonical names has lead to a belief that a PTR Confusion about canonical names has lead to a belief that a PTR
record should have exactly one RR in its RRSet. This is incorrect, record should have exactly one RR in its RRSet. This is incorrect,
the relevant section of RFC1034 (section 3.6.2) indicates that the the relevant section of RFC1034 (section 3.6.2) indicates that the
value of a PTR record should be a canonical name. That is, it should value of a PTR record should be a canonical name. That is, it should
not be an alias. There is no implication in that section that only not be an alias. There is no implication in that section that only
one PTR record is permitted for a name. No such restriction should one PTR record is permitted for a name. No such restriction should
be inferred. be inferred.
Note that while the value of a PTR record must not be an alias, there Note that while the value of a PTR record must not be an alias, there
is no requirement that the process of resolving a PTR record not is no requirement that the process of resolving a PTR record not
encounter any aliases. The label that is being looked up for a PTR encounter any aliases. The label that is being looked up for a PTR
value might have a CNAME record. That is, it might be an alias. The value might have a CNAME record. That is, it might be an alias. The
value of that CNAME RR, if not another alias, which it should not be, value of that CNAME RR, if not another alias, which it should not be,
will give the location where the PTR record is found. That record will give the location where the PTR record is found. That record
gives the result of the PTR type lookup. This final result, the gives the result of the PTR type lookup. This final result, the
value of the PTR RR, is the label which must not be an alias. value of the PTR RR, is the label which must not be an alias.
8.3. MX and NS records 10.3. MX and NS records
The domain name used as the value of a NS resource record, or part of The domain name used as the value of a NS resource record, or part of
the value of a MX resource record must not be an alias. Not only is the value of a MX resource record must not be an alias. Not only is
the specification clear on this point, but using an alias in either the specification clear on this point, but using an alias in either
of these positions neither works as well as might be hoped, nor well of these positions neither works as well as might be hoped, nor well
fulfills the ambition that may have led to this approach. This fulfills the ambition that may have led to this approach. This
domain name must have as its value one or more address records. domain name must have as its value one or more address records.
Currently those will be A records, however in the future other record Currently those will be A records, however in the future other record
types giving addressing information may be acceptable. It can also types giving addressing information may be acceptable. It can also
have other RRs, but never a CNAME RR. have other RRs, but never a CNAME RR.
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alone the address records that may be associated with the canonical alone the address records that may be associated with the canonical
name derived from the alias. Thus, if an alias is used as the value name derived from the alias. Thus, if an alias is used as the value
of an NS or MX record, no address will be returned with the NS or MX of an NS or MX record, no address will be returned with the NS or MX
value. This can cause extra queries, and extra network burden, on value. This can cause extra queries, and extra network burden, on
every query. It is trivial to avoid this by resolving the alias and every query. It is trivial to avoid this by resolving the alias and
placing the canonical name directly in the affected record just once placing the canonical name directly in the affected record just once
when it is updated or installed. In some particular hard cases the when it is updated or installed. In some particular hard cases the
lack of the additional section address records in the results of a NS lack of the additional section address records in the results of a NS
lookup can cause the request to fail. lookup can cause the request to fail.
9. Name syntax 11. Name syntax
Occasionally it is assumed that the Domain Name System serves only Occasionally it is assumed that the Domain Name System serves only
the purpose of mapping Internet host names to data, and mapping the purpose of mapping Internet host names to data, and mapping
Internet addresses to host names. This is not correct, the DNS is a Internet addresses to host names. This is not correct, the DNS is a
general (if somewhat limited) hierarchical database, and can store general (if somewhat limited) hierarchical database, and can store
almost any kind of data, for almost any purpose. almost any kind of data, for almost any purpose.
The DNS itself places only one restriction on the particular labels The DNS itself places only one restriction on the particular labels
that can be used to identify resource records. That one restriction that can be used to identify resource records. That one restriction
relates to the length of the label and the full name. The length of relates to the length of the label and the full name. The length of
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can have an MX record does not imply that any binary name can be used can have an MX record does not imply that any binary name can be used
as the host part of an e-mail address. Clients of the DNS can impose as the host part of an e-mail address. Clients of the DNS can impose
whatever restrictions are appropriate to their circumstances on the whatever restrictions are appropriate to their circumstances on the
values they use as keys for DNS lookup requests, and on the values values they use as keys for DNS lookup requests, and on the values
returned by the DNS. If the client has such restrictions, it is returned by the DNS. If the client has such restrictions, it is
solely responsible for validating the data from the DNS to ensure solely responsible for validating the data from the DNS to ensure
that it conforms before it makes any use of that data. that it conforms before it makes any use of that data.
See also [RFC1123] section 6.1.3.5. See also [RFC1123] section 6.1.3.5.
10. Security Considerations 12. Security Considerations
This document does not consider security. This document does not consider security.
In particular, nothing in section 4 is any way related to, or useful In particular, nothing in section 4 is any way related to, or useful
for, any security related purposes. for, any security related purposes.
Section 5.4.1 is also not related to security. Security of DNS data Section 5.4.1 is also not related to security. Security of DNS data
will be obtained by the Secure DNS [RFC2065], which is mostly will be obtained by the Secure DNS [RFC2065], which is mostly
orthogonal to this memo. orthogonal to this memo.
It is not believed that anything in this document adds to any It is not believed that anything in this document adds to any
security issues that may exist with the DNS, nor does it do anything security issues that may exist with the DNS, nor does it do anything
to that will necessarily lessen them. Correct implementation of the to that will necessarily lessen them. Correct implementation of the
clarifications in this document might play some small part in clarifications in this document might play some small part in
limiting the spread of non-malicious bad data in the DNS, but only limiting the spread of non-malicious bad data in the DNS, but only
DNSSEC can help with deliberate attempts to subvert DNS data. DNSSEC can help with deliberate attempts to subvert DNS data.
11. References 13. References
[RFC1034] Domain Names - Concepts and Facilities, (STD 13) [RFC1034] Domain Names - Concepts and Facilities, (STD 13)
P. Mockapetris, ISI, November 1987. P. Mockapetris, ISI, November 1987.
[RFC1035] Domain Names - Implementation and Specification (STD 13) [RFC1035] Domain Names - Implementation and Specification (STD 13)
P. Mockapetris, ISI, November 1987. P. Mockapetris, ISI, November 1987.
[RFC1123] Requirements for Internet hosts - application and support, [RFC1123] Requirements for Internet hosts - application and support,
(STD 3) R. Braden, January 1989. (STD 3) R. Braden, January 1989.
[RFC1700] Assigned Numbers (STD 2) [RFC1700] Assigned Numbers (STD 2)
J. Reynolds, J. Postel, October 1994. J. Reynolds, J. Postel, October 1994.
[RFC2065] Domain Name System Security Extensions, [RFC2065] Domain Name System Security Extensions,
D. E. Eastlake, 3rd, C. W. Kaufman, January 1997. D. E. Eastlake, 3rd, C. W. Kaufman, January 1997.
12. Acknowledgements 14. Acknowledgements
This memo arose from discussions in the DNSIND working group of the This memo arose from discussions in the DNSIND working group of the
IETF in 1995 and 1996, the members of that working group are largely IETF in 1995 and 1996, the members of that working group are largely
responsible for the ideas captured herein. Particular thanks to responsible for the ideas captured herein. Particular thanks to
Donald E. Eastlake, 3rd, and Olafur Gudmundsson, for help with the Donald E. Eastlake, 3rd, and Olafur Gudmundsson, for help with the
DNSSEC issues in this document, and to John Gilmore for pointing out DNSSEC issues in this document, and to John Gilmore for pointing out
where the clarifications were not necessarily clarifying. Bob Halley where the clarifications were not necessarily clarifying. Bob Halley
suggested clarifying the placement of SOA records in authoritative suggested clarifying the placement of SOA records in authoritative
answers, and provided the references. Michael Patton, as usual, Mark answers, and provided the references. Michael Patton, as usual, Mark
Andrews, and Alan Barrett provided much assistance with many details. Andrews, and Alan Barrett provided much assistance with many details.
13. Authors' addresses 15. Authors' addresses
Robert Elz Robert Elz
Computer Science Computer Science
University of Melbourne University of Melbourne
Parkville, Victoria, 3052 Parkville, Victoria, 3052
Australia. Australia.
EMail: kre@munnari.OZ.AU EMail: kre@munnari.OZ.AU
Randy Bush Randy Bush
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