< draft-ietf-dnsop-kskroll-sentinel-14.txt   draft-ietf-dnsop-kskroll-sentinel-15.txt >
DNSOP G. Huston DNSOP G. Huston
Internet-Draft J. Damas Internet-Draft J. Damas
Intended status: Standards Track APNIC Intended status: Standards Track APNIC
Expires: December 13, 2018 W. Kumari Expires: January 3, 2019 W. Kumari
Google Google
June 11, 2018 July 02, 2018
A Root Key Trust Anchor Sentinel for DNSSEC A Root Key Trust Anchor Sentinel for DNSSEC
draft-ietf-dnsop-kskroll-sentinel-14 draft-ietf-dnsop-kskroll-sentinel-15
Abstract Abstract
The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) were developed to provide origin The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) were developed to provide origin
authentication and integrity protection for DNS data by using digital authentication and integrity protection for DNS data by using digital
signatures. These digital signatures can be verified by building a signatures. These digital signatures can be verified by building a
chain of trust starting from a trust anchor and proceeding down to a chain of trust starting from a trust anchor and proceeding down to a
particular node in the DNS. This document specifies a mechanism that particular node in the DNS. This document specifies a mechanism that
will allow an end user and third parties to determine the trusted key will allow an end user and third parties to determine the trusted key
state for the root key of the resolvers that handle that user's DNS state for the root key of the resolvers that handle that user's DNS
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 13, 2018. This Internet-Draft will expire on January 3, 2019.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Sentinel Mechanism in Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Sentinel Mechanism in Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Preconditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.1. Preconditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Special Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2. Special Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Sentinel Tests for a Single DNS Resolver . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Sentinel Tests for a Single DNS Resolver . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Forwarders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1. Forwarders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Sentinel Tests for a Set of Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4. Sentinel Tests from Hosts with More than One Configured
Resolve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1. Test Scenario and Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.1. Test Scenario and Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2. Test Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.2. Test Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3. Test Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.3. Test Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Implementation Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7. Implementation Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 10. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix A. Protocol Walkthrough Example . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Appendix A. Protocol Walkthrough Example . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [RFC4033], [RFC4034] and The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [RFC4033], [RFC4034] and
[RFC4035] were developed to provide origin authentication and [RFC4035] were developed to provide origin authentication and
integrity protection for DNS data by using digital signatures. integrity protection for DNS data by using digital signatures.
DNSSEC uses Key Tags to efficiently match signatures to the keys from DNSSEC uses Key Tags to efficiently match signatures to the keys from
which they are generated. The Key Tag is a 16-bit value computed which they are generated. The Key Tag is a 16-bit value computed
from the RDATA portion of a DNSKEY RR using a formula found in "Key from the RDATA of a DNSKEY RR as described in Appendix B of
Tag Calculation" (Appendix B of "Resource Records for the DNS [RFC4034]. RRSIG RRs contain a Key Tag field whose value is equal to
Security Extensions" [RFC4034]), a formula similar to a ones- the Key Tag of the DNSKEY RR that was used to generate the
complement checksum. RRSIG RRs contain a Key Tag field whose value corresponding signature.
is equal to the Key Tag of the DNSKEY RR that validates the
signature.
This document specifies how security-aware DNS resolvers that perform This document specifies how security-aware DNS resolvers that perform
validation of their responses can respond to certain queries in a validation of their responses can respond to certain queries in a
manner that allows an agent performing the queries to deduce whether manner that allows an agent performing the queries to deduce whether
a particular key for the root has been loaded into that resolver's a particular key for the root has been loaded into that resolver's
trusted key store. This document also describes a procedure where a trusted key store. This document also describes a procedure where a
collection of resolvers can be tested to determine if at least one of collection of resolvers can be tested to determine if at least one of
these resolvers has loaded a given key into its trusted key store. these resolvers has loaded a given key into its trusted key store.
These tests can be used to determine whether a certain root zone KSK These tests can be used to determine whether a certain root zone Key
is ready to be used as a trusted key, within the context of a planned Signing Key (KSK) is ready to be used as a trusted key, within the
root zone KSK key roll. context of a planned root zone KSK key roll.
There are two primary use cases for this mechanism: There are two primary use cases for this mechanism:
o Users may wish to ascertain whether their DNS resolution o Users may wish to ascertain whether their DNS resolution
environment resolvers is ready for an upcoming root KSK rollover. environment resolvers is ready for an upcoming root KSK rollover.
o Researchers want to perform Internet-wide studies about the o Researchers want to perform Internet-wide studies about the
proportion of users who will be negatively impacted an upcoming proportion of users who will be negatively impacted an upcoming
root KSK rollover. root KSK rollover.
The mechanism described in this document meets both of these use The mechanism described in this document satisfy the requirements of
cases. This new mechanism is OPTIONAL to implement and use, although both these use-cases. This mechanism is OPTIONAL to implement and
for reasons of supporting broad-based measurement techniques, it is use. If implemented, this mechanism SHOULD be enabled by default to
strongly preferred that configurations of DNSSEC-validating resolvers facilitate Internet-wide measurement. Configuration options MAY be
enabled this mechanism by default, allowing for local configuration provided to disable the mechanism for reasons of local policy.
directives to disable this mechanism if desired.
The KSK sentinel tests described in this document use a test The KSK sentinel tests described in this document use a test
comprising of a set of DNS queries to domain names that have special comprising of a set of DNS queries to domain names that have special
values for the left-most label. The test relies on recursive values for the left-most label. The test relies on recursive
resolvers supporting a mechanism that recognises this special name resolvers supporting a mechanism that recognises this special name
pattern in queries, and under certain defined circumstances will pattern in queries, and under certain defined circumstances will
return a DNS SERVFAIL response code (RCODE 2), mimicking the response return a DNS SERVFAIL response code (RCODE 2), mimicking the response
code that is returned by security-aware resolvers when DNSSEC code that is returned by security-aware resolvers when DNSSEC
validation fails. validation fails.
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sentinel test described in this document can still be used, but it sentinel test described in this document can still be used, but it
makes a number of assumptions about DNS resolution behaviour that may makes a number of assumptions about DNS resolution behaviour that may
not necessarily hold in all environments. If these assumptions do not necessarily hold in all environments. If these assumptions do
not hold (such as, for example, requiring the stub resolver to query not hold (such as, for example, requiring the stub resolver to query
the next recursive resolver in the locally configured set upon the next recursive resolver in the locally configured set upon
receipt of a SERVFAIL response code) then this test may produce receipt of a SERVFAIL response code) then this test may produce
indeterminate or inconsistent results. In some cases where these indeterminate or inconsistent results. In some cases where these
assumptions do not hold, repeating the same test query set may assumptions do not hold, repeating the same test query set may
generate different results. generate different results.
Note that the sentinel mechanism described here measures a very Note that the measurements facilitated by the mechanism described in
different (and likely more useful) metric than [RFC8145]. RFC 8145 this document are different from those of [RFC8145]. RFC 8145 relies
relies on resolvers reporting towards the root servers a list of on resolvers reporting towards the root servers a list of locally
locally cached trust anchors for the root zone. Those reports can be cached trust anchors for the root zone. Those reports can be used to
used to infer how many resolvers may be impacted by a KSK roll, but infer how many resolvers may be impacted by a KSK roll, but not what
not what the user impact of the KSK roll will be. the user impact of the KSK roll will be.
1.1. Terminology 1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
2. Sentinel Mechanism in Resolvers 2. Sentinel Mechanism in Resolvers
DNSSEC-Validating resolvers that implement this mechanism MUST DNSSEC-Validating resolvers that implement this mechanism MUST
perform validation of responses in accordance with the DNSSEC perform validation of responses in accordance with the DNSSEC
response validation specification [RFC4035]. response validation specification [RFC4035].
This sentinel mechanism makes use of two special labels: This sentinel mechanism makes use of two special labels:
o root-key-sentinel-is-ta-<key-tag> o root-key-sentinel-is-ta-<key-tag>
o root-key-sentinel-not-ta-<key-tag> o root-key-sentinel-not-ta-<key-tag>
Note that the <key-tag> is specified in the DNS label as unsigned
decimal integer (as described in [RFC4034], section 5.3), but zero-
padded to five digits (for example, a Key Tag value of 42 would be
represented in the label as 00042).
These labels trigger special processing in the validating DNS These labels trigger special processing in the validating DNS
resolver when responses from authoritative servers are received. resolver when responses from authoritative servers are received.
Labels containing "root-key-sentinel-is-ta-<key-tag>" is used to Labels containing "root-key-sentinel-is-ta-<key-tag>" is used to
answer the question "Is this the Key Tag of a key which the answer the question "Is this the Key Tag of a key which the
validating DNS resolver is currently trusting as a trust anchor?" validating DNS resolver is currently trusting as a trust anchor?"
Labels containing "root-key-sentinel-not-ta-<key-tag>" is used to Labels containing "root-key-sentinel-not-ta-<key-tag>" is used to
answer the question "Is this the Key Tag of a key which the answer the question "Is this the Key Tag of a key which the
validating DNS resolver is *not* currently trusting as a trust validating DNS resolver is *not* currently trusting as a trust
anchor?" anchor?"
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o The OPCODE is QUERY. o The OPCODE is QUERY.
o The leftmost label of the original QNAME (the name sent in the o The leftmost label of the original QNAME (the name sent in the
Question Section in the original query) is either "root-key- Question Section in the original query) is either "root-key-
sentinel-is-ta-<key-tag>" or "root-key-sentinel-not-ta-<key-tag>". sentinel-is-ta-<key-tag>" or "root-key-sentinel-not-ta-<key-tag>".
If any one of the preconditions is not met, the resolver MUST NOT If any one of the preconditions is not met, the resolver MUST NOT
alter the DNS response based on the mechanism in this document. alter the DNS response based on the mechanism in this document.
Note that the <key-tag> is specified in the DNS label as unsigned
decimal integer (as described in [RFC4034], section 5.3), but zero-
padded to five digits (for example, a Key Tag value of 42 would be
represented in the label as 00042). The precise specification of the
special labels above should be followed exactly. For example, a
label that does not include a Key Tag zero-padded to five digits does
not match this specification, and should not be processed as if they
did -- in other words, such queries should be handled as any other
label and not according to Section 2.2.
2.2. Special Processing 2.2. Special Processing
Responses which fulfil all of the preconditions in Section 2.1 Responses which fulfil all of the preconditions in Section 2.1
require special processing, depending on leftmost label in the QNAME. require special processing, depending on leftmost label in the QNAME.
First, the resolver determines if the numerical value of <key-tag> is First, the resolver determines if the numerical value of <key-tag> is
equal to any of the Key Tag values of an active root zone KSK which equal to any of the Key Tag values of an active root zone KSK which
is currently trusted by the local resolver and is stored in its store is currently trusted by the local resolver and is stored in its store
of trusted keys. An active root zone KSK is one which could of trusted keys. An active root zone KSK is one which could
currently be used for validation (that is, a key that is not in currently be used for validation (that is, a key that is not in
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Label | Key is trusted | Key is not trusted Label | Key is trusted | Key is not trusted
------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------
is-ta | return original answer | return SERVFAIL is-ta | return original answer | return SERVFAIL
not-ta | return SERVFAIL | return original answer not-ta | return SERVFAIL | return original answer
Instruction "return SERVFAIL" means that the resolver MUST set Instruction "return SERVFAIL" means that the resolver MUST set
RCODE=SERVFAIL (value 2) and the ANSWER section of the DNS response RCODE=SERVFAIL (value 2) and the ANSWER section of the DNS response
MUST be empty, ignoring all other documents which specify content of MUST be empty, ignoring all other documents which specify content of
the ANSWER section. the ANSWER section.
Instruction "return original answer" means that the resolver MUST
process the query without any further special processing; that is,
exactly as if the mechanism described in this document was not
implemented or disabled.
3. Sentinel Tests for a Single DNS Resolver 3. Sentinel Tests for a Single DNS Resolver
This section describes the use of the sentinel detection mechanism This section describes the use of the sentinel detection mechanism
against a single DNS recursive resolver in order to determine whether against a single DNS recursive resolver in order to determine whether
this resolver is using a particular trust anchor to validate DNSSEC- this resolver is using a particular trust anchor to validate DNSSEC-
signed responses. signed responses.
Note that the test in this section applies to a single DNS resolver. Note that the test in this section applies to a single DNS resolver.
The test described in Section 4 applies instead to a collection of The test described in Section 4 applies instead to a collection of
DNS resolvers, as might be found in the DNS configuration of an end- DNS resolvers, as might be found in the DNS configuration of an end-
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Vind: There is no information about the trust anchors of the Vind: There is no information about the trust anchors of the
resolver. resolver.
nonV: The resolver does not perform DNSSEC validation. nonV: The resolver does not perform DNSSEC validation.
other: The properties of the resolver cannot be analyzed by this other: The properties of the resolver cannot be analyzed by this
protocol. protocol.
3.1. Forwarders 3.1. Forwarders
There is also the common case of a recursive resolver using a Some resolvers are configured not to answer queries using the
forwarder. recursive algorithm first described in [RFC1034] section 4.3.2, but
instead relay queries to one or more other resolvers. Resolvers
configured in this manner are referred to in this document as
"forwarders".
If the resolver is non-validating, and it has a single forwarder, If the resolver is non-validating, and it has a single forwarder,
then the resolver will presumably mirror the capabilities of the then the resolver will presumably mirror the capabilities of the
forwarder target resolver. forwarder target resolver.
If the validating resolver has a forwarding configuration, and uses If the validating resolver has a forwarding configuration, and uses
the CD bit on all forwarded queries, then this resolver is acting in the CD bit on all forwarded queries, then this resolver is acting in
a manner that is identical to a standalone resolver. a manner that is identical to a standalone resolver.
A more complex case is where all of the following conditions hold: A more complex case is where all of the following conditions hold:
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If the validating resolver has a forwarding configuration, and uses If the validating resolver has a forwarding configuration, and uses
the CD bit on all forwarded queries, then this resolver is acting in the CD bit on all forwarded queries, then this resolver is acting in
a manner that is identical to a standalone resolver. a manner that is identical to a standalone resolver.
A more complex case is where all of the following conditions hold: A more complex case is where all of the following conditions hold:
o Both the validating resolver and the forwarder target resolver o Both the validating resolver and the forwarder target resolver
support this trusted key sentinel mechanism support this trusted key sentinel mechanism
o The local resolver's queries do not have the CD bit set o The local resolver's queries do not have the CD bit set
o The trusted key state differs between the forwarding resolver and o The trusted key state differs between the forwarding resolver and
the forwarder target resolver the forwarder target resolver
In such a case, either the outcome is indeterminate validating In such a case, either the outcome is indeterminate validating
("Vind"), or a case of mixed signals such as SERVFAIL in all three ("Vind"), or a case of mixed signals such as SERVFAIL in all three
responses, ("other") which is similarly an indeterminate response responses, ("other") which is similarly an indeterminate response
with respect to the trusted key state. with respect to the trusted key state.
4. Sentinel Tests for a Set of Resolvers 4. Sentinel Tests from Hosts with More than One Configured Resolve
The description in Section 3 describes a trust anchor test that can The description in Section 3 describes a trust anchor test that can
be used in the simple situation where the test queries were being be used in the simple situation where the test queries were being
passed to a single recursive resolver that directly queries passed to a single recursive resolver that directly queries
authoritative name servers. authoritative name servers.
However, the common end user scenario is where a user's local DNS However, the common end-user scenario is where a user's local DNS
resolution environment is configured to use a set of recursive resolution environment is configured to use more than one recursive
resolvers. The single resolver test technique will not function resolver. The single resolver test technique will not function
reliably in such cases, as a a SERVFAIL response from one resolver reliably in such cases, as a a SERVFAIL response from one resolver
may cause the local stub resolver to repeat the query against one of may cause the local stub resolver to repeat the query against one of
the other configured resolvers and the results may be inconclusive. the other configured resolvers and the results may be inconclusive.
In describing a test procedure that can be used in this environment In describing a test procedure that can be used in this environment
of a set of DNS resolvers there are some necessary changes to the of a set of DNS resolvers there are some necessary changes to the
nature of the question that this test can answer, the assumptions nature of the question that this test can answer, the assumptions
about the behaviour of the DNS resolution environment, and some about the behaviour of the DNS resolution environment, and some
further observations about potential variability in the test further observations about potential variability in the test
outcomes. outcomes.
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http://www.ksk-test.net An Javascript implementation of the client http://www.ksk-test.net An Javascript implementation of the client
side of this protocol is available at: http://www.ksk-test.net side of this protocol is available at: http://www.ksk-test.net
http://test.kskroll.dnssec.lab.nic.cl/ Hugo Salgado-Hernandez has http://test.kskroll.dnssec.lab.nic.cl/ Hugo Salgado-Hernandez has
created an implementation at created an implementation at
http://test.kskroll.dnssec.lab.nic.cl/ http://test.kskroll.dnssec.lab.nic.cl/
http://sentinel.research.icann.org/ The code for this implementation http://sentinel.research.icann.org/ The code for this implementation
is published at https://github.com/paulehoffman/sentinel-testbed is published at https://github.com/paulehoffman/sentinel-testbed
http://www.bellis.me.uk/sentinel/ Ray Bellis client implementation -
http://www.bellis.me.uk/sentinel/
8. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
[Note to IANA, to be removed prior to publication: there are no IANA This document has no IANA actions.
considerations stated in this version of the document.]
9. Acknowledgements 9. Acknowledgements
This document has borrowed extensively from [RFC8145] for the This document has borrowed extensively from [RFC8145] for the
introductory text, and the authors would like to acknowledge and introductory text, and the authors would like to acknowledge and
thank the authors of that document both for some text excerpts and thank the authors of that document both for some text excerpts and
for the more general stimulation of thoughts about monitoring the for the more general stimulation of thoughts about monitoring the
progress of a roll of the KSK of the root zone of the DNS. progress of a roll of the KSK of the root zone of the DNS.
The authors would like to thank Joe Abley, Mehmet Akcin, Mark The authors would like to thank Joe Abley, Mehmet Akcin, Mark
Andrews, Richard Barnes, Ray Bellis, Stephane Bortzmeyer, David Andrews, Richard Barnes, Ray Bellis, Stephane Bortzmeyer, David
Conrad, Ralph Dolmans, John Dickinson, Steinar Haug, Bob Harold, Wes Conrad, Ralph Dolmans, John Dickinson, Steinar Haug, Bob Harold, Wes
Hardaker, Paul Hoffman, Matt Larson, Jinmei Tatuya, Edward Lewis, Hardaker, Paul Hoffman, Matt Larson, Jinmei Tatuya, Edward Lewis,
George Michaelson, Benno Overeinder, Matthew Pounsett, Hugo Salgado- George Michaelson, Benno Overeinder, Matthew Pounsett, Hugo Salgado-
Hernandez, Andreas Schulze, Mukund Sivaraman, Petr Spacek, Job Hernandez, Andreas Schulze, Mukund Sivaraman, Petr Spacek, Job
Snijders, Andrew Sullivan, Ondrej Sury, Paul Vixie, Duane Wessels and Snijders, Andrew Sullivan, Ondrej Sury, Paul Vixie, Duane Wessels and
Paul Wouters for their helpful feedback. Paul Wouters for their helpful feedback.
The authors would like to especially call out Paul Hoffman and Duane The authors would like to especially call out Paul Hoffman and Duane
Wessels for providing comments in the form of a pull request. Wessels for providing comments in the form of pull requests. Joe
Abley also helpfully provided extensive review and OLD / NEW text.
Petr Spacek wrote some very early implmentations, and provided
significant feedback (including pointing out when the test bed didn't
match the document!)
10. Change Log 10. Change Log
RFC Editor: Please remove this section! RFC Editor: Please remove this section!
Note that this document is being worked on in GitHub - see Abstract. Note that this document is being worked on in GitHub - see Abstract.
The below is mainly large changes, and is not authoritative. The below is mainly large changes, and is not authoritative.
From -14 to -15:
o Addressed Joe Abley's thorough review, at:
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/8ZnN1xj55Yimet2cg-
LrdoJafEA
From -13 to -14: From -13 to -14:
o Addressed nits from Bob Harold - o Addressed nits from Bob Harold -
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/ https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/
j4Serw0z24o470AnlD8ISo8o9k4 j4Serw0z24o470AnlD8ISo8o9k4
o Formatting changes (and a bit more text) in the implementation o Formatting changes (and a bit more text) in the implementation
section. section.
o Closes PR #21: Clarify indeterminate and resolution systems, o Closes PR #21: Clarify indeterminate and resolution systems,
skipping to change at page 17, line 32 skipping to change at page 18, line 4
o Clarification that this is for the root. o Clarification that this is for the root.
o Changed the label template from _is-ta-<key-tag> to kskroll- o Changed the label template from _is-ta-<key-tag> to kskroll-
sentinel-is-ta-<key-tag>. This is because BIND (at least) will sentinel-is-ta-<key-tag>. This is because BIND (at least) will
not allow records which start with an underscore to have address not allow records which start with an underscore to have address
records (CNAMEs, yes, A/AAAA no). Some browsers / operating records (CNAMEs, yes, A/AAAA no). Some browsers / operating
systems also will not fetch resources from names which start with systems also will not fetch resources from names which start with
an underscore. an underscore.
11. References 11. References
11.1. Normative References 11.1. Normative References
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.
[RFC2308] Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS [RFC2308] Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS
NCACHE)", RFC 2308, DOI 10.17487/RFC2308, March 1998, NCACHE)", RFC 2308, DOI 10.17487/RFC2308, March 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2308>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2308>.
[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. [RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005, RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033>.
[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. [RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
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