< draft-ietf-dnsop-maintain-ds-02.txt		draft-ietf-dnsop-maintain-ds-03.txt >
	dnsop O. Gudmundsson		dnsop O. Gudmundsson
	Internet-Draft CloudFlare		Internet-Draft CloudFlare
	Intended status: Informational P. Wouters		Intended status: Standards Track P. Wouters
	Expires: October 6, 2016 Red Hat		Expires: December 12, 2016 Red Hat
	April 4, 2016		June 10, 2016
	Managing DS records from parent via CDS/CDNSKEY		Managing DS records from parent via CDS/CDNSKEY
	draft-ietf-dnsop-maintain-ds-02		draft-ietf-dnsop-maintain-ds-03
	Abstract		Abstract
	RFC7344 specifies how DNS trust can be partially maintained in-band		RFC7344 specifies how DNS trust can be partially maintained in-band
	between parent and child. There are two features missing in that		between parent and child. There are two features missing in that
	specification: initial trust setup and removal of trust anchor. This		specification: initial trust setup and removal of trust anchor. This
	document addresses both these omissions.		document addresses both these omissions.
	Changing a domain's DNSSEC status can be a complicated matter		Changing a domain's DNSSEC status can be a complicated matter
	involving multiple unrelated parties. Some of these parties, such as		involving multiple unrelated parties. Some of these parties, such as
	the DNS operator, might not even be known by all organizations		the DNS operator, might not even be known by all the organizations
	involved. The inability to disable DNSSEC via in-band signalling is		involved. The inability to disable DNSSEC via in-band signalling is
	seen as a problem or liability that prevents some DNSSEC adoption at		seen as a problem or liability that prevents some DNSSEC adoption at
	large scale. This document adds a method for in-band signalling of		large scale. This document adds a method for in-band signalling of
	this DNSSEC status changes.		these DNSSEC status changes.
	Initial trust is considered a much harder problem, this document will		Initial trust is considered in general to be a hard technical
	seek to clarify and simplify the initial acceptance policy.		problem, this document sets forth reasonable policies that clarify
			and simplify the initial acceptance policy.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on October 6, 2016.		This Internet-Draft will expire on December 12, 2016.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	1.1. Removing a DS Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1.1. Introducing a DS record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	1.2. Introducing a DS record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1.2. Removing a DS Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	1.3. Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		1.3. Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	1.4. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		1.4. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	2. The Three Uses of CDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2. The Three Uses of CDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	2.1. The meaning of the CDS RRset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		2.1. The meaning of the CDS RRset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3. Enabling DNSSEC via CDS/CDNSKEY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3. Enabling DNSSEC via CDS/CDNSKEY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.1. Accept policy via authenticated channel . . . . . . . . . 5		3.1. Accept policy via authenticated channel . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.2. Accept with extra checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3.2. Accept with extra checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.3. Accept after delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3.3. Accept after delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	3.4. Accept with challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3.4. Accept with challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	4. DNSSEC Delete Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		4. DNSSEC Delete Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	5. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		5. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	6. IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		6. IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
			6.1. Promoting RFC7344 to standards track . . . . . . . . . . 8
	7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	CDS/CDNSKEY [RFC7344] records are used to signal changes in trust		CDS/CDNSKEY [RFC7344] records are used to signal changes in trust
	anchors, this is one method to maintain delegations that can be used		anchors. This is one method to maintain delegations that can be used
	when the DNS operator has no other way to inform the parent that		when the DNS operator has no other way to inform the parent that
	changes are needed. [RFC7344] contains no "delete" signal for the		changes are needed.
	child to tell the parent that it wants to remove the DNSSEC security
	for its domain.
	[RFC7344] did not include a method for the Initial Trust		[RFC7344] is lacking two different options for full automated
	establishment and left it to each parent to come up with an		operation to be possible. Firstly it did not define a method for the
	acceptance policy.		Initial Trust establishment and left it to each parent to come up
			with an acceptance policy. Secondly it did not provide a "delete"
			signal for the child to tell the parent that it wants to remove the
			DNSSEC security for its domain.
	1.1. Removing a DS Record		1.1. Introducing a DS record
			The big issue is how a child domain instructs the parent that it
			wants to have a DS record added. This problem can be solved using a
			few simplifying assumptions. This document makes the assumption that
			there are reasonable policies that can be applied and will allow
			automation of trust introduction.
			Not being able to enable trust via an easily automated mechanism is
			hindering DNSSEC at scale for DNS hosters that do not have automated
			access to the "registry" of the child zone's parent.
			1.2. Removing a DS Record
	This document introduces the delete option for both CDS and CDNSKEY,		This document introduces the delete option for both CDS and CDNSKEY,
	allowing a child to signal to the parent to turn off DNSSEC. When a		allowing a child to signal to the parent to turn off DNSSEC. When a
	domain is moved from one DNS operator to another one, sometimes it is		domain is moved from one DNS operator to another one, sometimes it is
	necessary to turn off DNSSEC to facilitate the change of DNS		necessary to turn off DNSSEC to facilitate the change of DNS
	operator. Common scenarios include:		operator. Common scenarios include:
	1 alternative to doing a proper DNSSEC algorithm rollover due to		1 alternative to doing a proper DNSSEC algorithm rollover due to
	operational limitations such as software limitations.		operational limitations such as software limitations.
	skipping to change at page 3, line 36 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 48 ¶
	algorithms to sign the zone, thus an algorithm rollover can not be		algorithms to sign the zone, thus an algorithm rollover can not be
	performed.		performed.
	5 the domain holder no longer wants DNSSEC enabled.		5 the domain holder no longer wants DNSSEC enabled.
	The lack of a "remove my DNSSEC" option is cited as a reason why some		The lack of a "remove my DNSSEC" option is cited as a reason why some
	operators cannot deploy DNSSEC, as this is seen as an operational		operators cannot deploy DNSSEC, as this is seen as an operational
	risk.		risk.
	Turning off DNSSEC reduces the security of the domain and thus should		Turning off DNSSEC reduces the security of the domain and thus should
	only be done carefully, and that decision should be fully under the		only be done carefully, and that decision SHOULD be fully under the
	child domain's control.		child domain's control.
	1.2. Introducing a DS record
	The converse issue is how a child domain instructs the parent that it
	wants to have a DS record added. This problem can be solved using a
	few simplifying assumptions. This document makes the assumption that
	there are reasonable policies that can be applied and will allow
	automation of trust introduction.
	Not being able to enable trust via an easily automated mechanism is
	hindering DNSSEC at scale for DNS hosters that do not have automated
	access to the "registry" of the child zone's parent.
	1.3. Notation		1.3. Notation
	When this document uses the word CDS it implies that the same applies		When this document uses the word CDS it implies that the same applies
	to CDNSKEY and vice versa. The only difference between the two		to CDNSKEY and vice verse. The only differences between the two
	records is how information is represented.		records is how information is represented, and who calculates the DS
			digiest.
	We use RRR to mean Registry Registrar Registrant in the context of		We use RRR to mean Registry Registrar Registrant in the context of
	DNS domain markets.		DNS domain markets.
	When the document uses the word "parent" it implies an entity that is		When the document uses the word "parent" it implies an entity that is
	authorized to insert DS records into the parent zone on behalf of the		authorized to insert DS records into the parent zone on behalf of the
	child domain. Which entity this exactly is does not matter. It		child domain. Which entity this exactly is does not matter. It
	could be the Registrar or Reseller that the child domain was		could be the Registrar or Reseller that the child domain was
	purchased from. It could be the Registry that the domain is		purchased from. It could be the Registry that the domain is
	registered in when allowed. It could be some other entity when the		registered in when allowed. It could be some other entity when the
	skipping to change at page 4, line 33 ¶		skipping to change at page 4, line 34 ¶
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
	document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].		document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
	2. The Three Uses of CDS		2. The Three Uses of CDS
	In general there are three operations that a domain wants to		In general there are three operations that a domain wants to
	influence on its parent:		influence on its parent:
	1 Roll over KSK, this means updating the DS records in the parent to		1 Enable DNSSEC validation, i.e. place an initial DS RRset in the
			parent.
			2 Roll over KSK, this means updating the DS records in the parent to
	reflect the new set of KSK's at the child. This could be an ADD		reflect the new set of KSK's at the child. This could be an ADD
	operation, a DELETE operation on one or more records while keeping		operation, a DELETE operation on one or more records while keeping
	at least one DS RR, or a full REPLACE operation.		at least one DS RR, or a full REPLACE operation.
	2 Turn off DNSSEC validation, i.e. delete all the DS records.		3 Turn off DNSSEC validation, i.e. delete all the DS records.
	3 Enable DNSSEC validation, i.e. place an initial DS RRset in the
	parent.
	Operation 1 is covered in [RFC7344], operations 2 and 3 are defined		Operation 2 is covered in [RFC7344], operations 1 and 3 are defined
	in this document. In many people's minds, those two later operations		in this document. In many people's minds, those two operations carry
	carry more risk than the first one. This document argues that 2 is		more risk than the first one. This document argues that 3 is
	identical to 1 and the third one is different (but not that		identical to 2 and the first one is different (but not that
	different).		different).
	2.1. The meaning of the CDS RRset		2.1. The meaning of the CDS RRset
	The semantic meaning of publishing a CDS RRset is interpreted to		The semantic meaning of publishing a CDS RRset is interpreted to
	mean:		mean:
	"Publishing a CDS or CDNSKEY record signals to the parent that the		"Publishing a CDS or CDNSKEY record signals to the parent that the
	child desires that the corresponding DS records be synchronized.		child desires that the corresponding DS records be synchronized.
	Every parent or parental agent should have an acceptance policy of		Every parent or parental agent should have an acceptance policy of
	these records for the three different use cases involved: Initial DS		these records for the three different use cases involved: Initial DS
	publication, Key rollover, and Returning to Insecure."		publication, Key rollover, and Returning to Insecure."
	In short, the CDS RRset is an instruction to the parent to modify the		In short, the CDS RRset is an instruction to the parent to modify the
	DS RRset if the CDS and DS RRsets differ. The acceptance policy for		DS RRset if the CDS and DS Reset's differ. The acceptance policy for
	CDS in the rollover case is "seeing" according to [RFC7344]. The		CDS in the rollover case is "seeing" according to [RFC7344]. The
	acceptance policy in the Delete case is seeing a (validly signed) CDS		acceptance policy in the Delete case is seeing a (validly signed) CDS
	RRset with the delete operation specified in this document.		RRset with the delete operation specified in this document.
	3. Enabling DNSSEC via CDS/CDNSKEY		3. Enabling DNSSEC via CDS/CDNSKEY
	There are number of different models for managing initial trust, but		There are number of different models for managing initial trust, but
	in the general case, the child wants to enable global validation for		in the general case, the child wants to enable global validation for
	the future. Thus during the period from the time the child publishes		the future. Thus during the period from the time the child publishes
	the CDS until the corresponding DS is published at the parent is the		the CDS until the corresponding DS is published at the parent is the
	skipping to change at page 5, line 42 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 42 ¶
	DNSSEC information to the parent, so the parent can publish a DS		DNSSEC information to the parent, so the parent can publish a DS
	record for the child. In this case there is a possibility of setting		record for the child. In this case there is a possibility of setting
	up some kind of authentication mechanism and submission mechanism		up some kind of authentication mechanism and submission mechanism
	that is outside the scope of this document.		that is outside the scope of this document.
	Below are some policies that parents can use. These policies assume		Below are some policies that parents can use. These policies assume
	that the notifications can be verified or authenticated.		that the notifications can be verified or authenticated.
	3.1. Accept policy via authenticated channel		3.1. Accept policy via authenticated channel
	In this case the parent is notified via UI/API that a CDS RRset		In this case the parent is notified via authenticated channel UI/API
	exists. The parent retrieves the CDS and inserts the corresponding		that a CDS/CDNSKEY RRset exists. In the case of a CDS RRset the
	DS RRset as requested, provided that the request comes over an		parent retrieves the CDS and inserts the corresponding DS RRset as
	authenticated channel.		requested. In the case of CDNSKEY the parent retrieves the CDNSKEY
			RRset and calculates the DS record(s).
	3.2. Accept with extra checks		3.2. Accept with extra checks
	In this case the parent checks that the source of the notification is		In this case the parent checks that the source of the notification is
	allowed to request the DS insertion. The checks could include		allowed to request the DS insertion. The checks could include
	whether this is a trusted entity, whether the nameservers correspond		whether this is a trusted entity, whether the nameservers correspond
	to the requestor, whether there have been any changes in registration		to the requester, whether there have been any changes in registration
	in the last few days, etc. The parent can also send a notification		in the last few days, etc. The parent can also send a notification
	requesting a confirmation.		requesting a confirmation, for example by sending email to the
			registrant requesting a confirmation. The end result is that the CDS
	The end result is that the CDS RRset is accepted at the end of the		RRset is accepted at the end of the checks or when the out-of-band
	checks or when the out-of-band confirmation is received.		confirmation is received.
	3.3. Accept after delay		3.3. Accept after delay
	In this case, if the parent deems the request valid, it starts		In this case, if the parent deems the request valid, it starts
	monitoring the CDS RRset at the child nameservers over period of time		monitoring the CDS RRset at the child nameservers over period of time
	to make sure nothing changes. After some time or after a number of		to make sure nothing changes. After some time or after a number of
	checks, preferably from different vantage points in the network, the		checks, preferably from different vantage points in the network, the
	parent accepts the CDS RRset as a valid signal to update its DS RRset		parent accepts the CDS RRset as a valid signal to update its DS RRset
	for this child.		for this child.
	3.4. Accept with challenge		3.4. Accept with challenge
	In this case the parent instructs the requestor to insert some record		In this case the parent instructs the requester to insert some record
	into the child domain to prove it has the ability to do so (i.e., it		into the child domain to prove it has the ability to do so (i.e., it
	is the operator of the zone).		is the operator of the zone).
	4. DNSSEC Delete Algorithm		4. DNSSEC Delete Algorithm
	The DNSKEY algorithm registry contains two reserved values: 0 and		The DNSKEY algorithm registry contains two reserved values: 0 and
	255[RFC4034]. The CERT record [RFC4398] defines the value 0 to mean		255[RFC4034]. The CERT record [RFC4398] defines the value 0 to mean
	the algorithm in the CERT record is not defined in DNSSEC.		the algorithm in the CERT record is not defined in DNSSEC.
	[rfc-editor remove before publication] For this reason, using the		For this reason, using the value 0 in CDS/CDNSKEY delete operations
	value 0 in CDS/CDNSKEY delete operations is potentially problematic,		is potentially problematic, but we propose it here anyway as the risk
	but we propose it here anyway as the risk is minimal. The		is minimal. The alternative is to reserve a DNSSEC algorithm number
	alternative is to reserve a DNSSEC algorithm number for this purpose.		for this purpose.
	[rfc-editor end remove]
	Right now, no DNSSEC validator understands algorithm 0 as a valid		Right now, no DNSSEC validator understands algorithm 0 as a valid
	signature algorithm. If a validator sees a DNSKEY or DS record with		signature algorithm. If a validator sees a DNSKEY or DS record with
	this algorithm value, it MUST treat it as unknown. Accordingly, the		this algorithm value, it MUST treat it as unknown. Accordingly, the
	zone is treated as unsigned unless there are other algorithms		zone is treated as unsigned unless there are other algorithms
	present.		present. In general the value 0 should never be used in the context
			of DNSKEY and DS records.
	In the context of CDS and CDNSKEY records, DNSSEC algorithm 0 is		In the context of CDS and CDNSKEY records, DNSSEC algorithm 0 is
	defined to mean that the entire DS RRset MUST be removed. The		defined to mean that the entire DS RRset MUST be removed. The
	contents of the CDS or CDNSKEY RRset MUST contain one RR and only		contents of the CDS or CDNSKEY RRset MUST contain one RR and only
	contain the fixed fields as shown below.		contain the exactly the fields as shown below.
	1 CDS 0 0 0		1 CDS 0 0 0
	2 CDNSKEY 0 3 0		2 CDNSKEY 0 3 0
	The keying material payload is represented by a single 0. This		The keying material payload is represented by a single 0. This
	record is signed in the same way as regular CDS/CDNSKEY RRsets are		record is signed in the same way as regular CDS/CDNSKEY RRset's are
	signed.		signed. This is a change in format from strict interpretation of
			[RFC7344] and may cause problems with some deployed software.
	Strictly speaking the CDS record could be "CDS X 0 X" as only the		Strictly speaking the CDS record could be "CDS X 0 X" as only the
	DNSKEY algorithm is what signals the DELETE operation, but for		DNSKEY algorithm is what signals the DELETE operation, but for
	clarity the "0 0 0" notation is mandated - this is not a definition		clarity the "0 0 0" notation is mandated - this is not a definition
	of DS Digest algorithm 0. The same argument applies to "CDNSKEY 0 3		of DS Digest algorithm 0. The same argument applies to "CDNSKEY 0 3
	0", the value 3 in second field is mandated by RFC4034 section 2.1.2.		0", the value 3 in second field is mandated by RFC4034 section 2.1.2.
	Once the parent has verified the CDS/CDNSKEY RRset and it has passed		Once the parent has verified the CDS/CDNSKEY RRset and it has passed
	other acceptance tests, the parent MUST remove the DS RRset. After		other acceptance tests, the parent MUST remove the DS RRset. After
	waiting a sufficient amount of time - depending on the parental TTLs		waiting a sufficient amount of time - depending on the parental TTL's
	- the child can start the process of turning off DNSSEC.		- the child can start the process of turning off DNSSEC.
	5. Security considerations		5. Security considerations
	This document's main goal is to avoid validation failures when a		This document's main goal is to avoid validation failures when a
	domain moves from one DNS operator to another. Turning off DNSSEC		domain moves from one DNS operator to another. Turning off DNSSEC
	reduces the security of the domain and thus should only be done as a		reduces the security of the domain and thus should only be done as a
	last resort.		last resort.
	In most cases it is preferable that operators collaborate on the		In most cases it is preferable that operators collaborate on the
	skipping to change at page 7, line 42 ¶		skipping to change at page 7, line 43 ¶
	can be hard and takes a long time. Before deciding to complete the		can be hard and takes a long time. Before deciding to complete the
	rollover via an unsigned state, all options SHOULD be considered.		rollover via an unsigned state, all options SHOULD be considered.
	A parent SHOULD ensure that when it is allowing a child to become		A parent SHOULD ensure that when it is allowing a child to become
	securely delegated, that it has a reasonable assurance that the CDS/		securely delegated, that it has a reasonable assurance that the CDS/
	CDNSKEY RRset that is used to bootstrap the security is visible from		CDNSKEY RRset that is used to bootstrap the security is visible from
	a geographically and topologically diverse view. It SHOULD also		a geographically and topologically diverse view. It SHOULD also
	ensure that the zone validates correctly if the parent publishes the		ensure that the zone validates correctly if the parent publishes the
	DS record. A parent zone might also consider sending an email to its		DS record. A parent zone might also consider sending an email to its
	contact addresses to give the child zone a warning that security will		contact addresses to give the child zone a warning that security will
	be enabled after a certain about of wait time - thus allowing a child		be enabled after a certain amount of wait time - thus allowing a
	administrator to cancel the request.		child administrator to cancel the request.
	6. IANA considerations		6. IANA considerations
	This document updates the following IANA registries: "DNS Security		This document updates the following IANA registries: "DNS Security
	Algorithm Numbers"		Algorithm Numbers"
	Algorithm 0 adds a reference to this document.		Algorithm 0 adds a reference to this document.
			6.1. Promoting RFC7344 to standards track
			Experience has shown that CDS/CDNSKEY are useful in the deployment of
			DNSSEC. [RFC7344] was published as Informational, this document
			elevates RFC7344 to standards track.
	7. References		7. References
	7.1. Normative References		7.1. Normative References
	[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.		[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
	Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",		Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
	RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,		RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034>.
	[RFC7344] Kumari, W., Gudmundsson, O., and G. Barwood, "Automating		[RFC7344] Kumari, W., Gudmundsson, O., and G. Barwood, "Automating
	skipping to change at page 8, line 33 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 39 ¶
	RFC2119, March 1997,		RFC2119, March 1997,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC4398] Josefsson, S., "Storing Certificates in the Domain Name		[RFC4398] Josefsson, S., "Storing Certificates in the Domain Name
	System (DNS)", RFC 4398, DOI 10.17487/RFC4398, March 2006,		System (DNS)", RFC 4398, DOI 10.17487/RFC4398, March 2006,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4398>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4398>.
	Appendix A. Acknowledgements		Appendix A. Acknowledgements
	This document is generated using the mmark tool that Miek Gieben has		This document is generated using the mmark tool that Miek Gieben has
	developed.		developed. We thank number of people that have provided feedback and
			useful comments including Bob Harold, John Levine, Matthijs Mekking,
			Dan York, Shane Kerr, Jacques Latour.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Olafur Gudmundsson		Olafur Gudmundsson
	CloudFlare		CloudFlare
	Email: olafur+ietf@cloudflare.com		Email: olafur+ietf@cloudflare.com
	Paul Wouters		Paul Wouters
	Red Hat		Red Hat
	Email: pwouters@redhat.com		Email: pwouters@redhat.com
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