< draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-aggressiveuse-07.txt		draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-aggressiveuse-08.txt >
	Network Working Group K. Fujiwara		Network Working Group K. Fujiwara
	Internet-Draft JPRS		Internet-Draft JPRS
	Updates: 4035 (if approved) A. Kato		Updates: 4035 (if approved) A. Kato
	Intended status: Standards Track Keio/WIDE		Intended status: Standards Track Keio/WIDE
	Expires: June 16, 2017 W. Kumari		Expires: July 16, 2017 W. Kumari
	Google		Google
	December 13, 2016		January 12, 2017
	Aggressive use of NSEC/NSEC3		Aggressive use of DNSSEC-validated Cache
	draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-aggressiveuse-07		draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-aggressiveuse-08
	Abstract		Abstract
	The DNS relies upon caching to scale; however, the cache lookup		The DNS relies upon caching to scale; however, the cache lookup
	generally requires an exact match. This document specifies the use		generally requires an exact match. This document specifies the use
	of NSEC/NSEC3 resource records to allow DNSSEC validating resolvers		of NSEC/NSEC3 resource records to allow DNSSEC validating resolvers
	to generate negative answers within a range, and positive answers		to generate negative answers within a range, and positive answers
	from wildcards. This increases performance / decreases latency,		from wildcards. This increases performance / decreases latency,
	decreases resource utilization on both authoritative and recursive		decreases resource utilization on both authoritative and recursive
	servers, and also increases privacy. It may also help increase		servers, and also increases privacy. It may also help increase
	skipping to change at page 2, line 7 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 7 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on June 16, 2017.		This Internet-Draft will expire on July 16, 2017.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	skipping to change at page 2, line 37 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 37 ¶
	2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		3. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	4. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		4. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	5. Aggressive use of Cache . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		5. Aggressive use of Cache . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	5.1. NSEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		5.1. NSEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	5.2. NSEC3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		5.2. NSEC3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	5.3. Wildcards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		5.3. Wildcards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	5.4. Consideration on TTL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		5.4. Consideration on TTL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	6. Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		6. Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	7. Update to RFC 4035 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		7. Update to RFC 4035 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	10. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		10. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	11.1. Change History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		11.1. Change History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	11.1.1. Version draft-fujiwara-dnsop-nsec-aggressiveuse-01 . 13		11.1.1. Version draft-fujiwara-dnsop-nsec-aggressiveuse-01 . 13
	11.1.2. Version draft-fujiwara-dnsop-nsec-aggressiveuse-02 . 13		11.1.2. Version draft-fujiwara-dnsop-nsec-aggressiveuse-02 . 13
	11.1.3. Version draft-fujiwara-dnsop-nsec-aggressiveuse-03 . 13		11.1.3. Version draft-fujiwara-dnsop-nsec-aggressiveuse-03 . 13
	11.2. new section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		11.2. new section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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	of this technique, a lookup for the exact name could have come in		of this technique, a lookup for the exact name could have come in
	during this interval, and so a negative answer could already be		during this interval, and so a negative answer could already be
	cached (see [RFC2308] for more background). This means that zone		cached (see [RFC2308] for more background). This means that zone
	operators should have no expectation that an added name would work		operators should have no expectation that an added name would work
	immediately. With DNSSEC and Aggressive NSEC, the TTL of the NSEC/		immediately. With DNSSEC and Aggressive NSEC, the TTL of the NSEC/
	NSEC3 record and the SOA.MINIMUM field are the authoritative		NSEC3 record and the SOA.MINIMUM field are the authoritative
	statement of how quickly a name can start working within a zone.		statement of how quickly a name can start working within a zone.
	5. Aggressive use of Cache		5. Aggressive use of Cache
	Section 4.5 of [RFC4035] says that "In theory, a resolver could use		This document relaxes the restriction given in Section 4.5 of
	wildcards or NSEC RRs to generate positive and negative responses		[RFC4035], see Section 7 for more detail.
	(respectively) until the TTL or signatures on the records in question
	expire. However, it seems prudent for resolvers to avoid blocking
	new authoritative data or synthesizing new data on their own.
	Resolvers that follow this recommendation will have a more consistent
	view of the namespace". This document relaxes this this restriction,
	see Section 7 for more detail.
	If the negative cache of the validating resolver has sufficient		If the negative cache of the validating resolver has sufficient
	information to validate the query, the resolver SHOULD use NSEC,		information to validate the query, the resolver SHOULD use NSEC,
	NSEC3 and wildcard records aggressively. Otherwise, it MUST fall		NSEC3 and wildcard records aggressively. Otherwise, it MUST fall
	back to send the query to the authoritative DNS servers.		back to send the query to the authoritative DNS servers.
	5.1. NSEC		5.1. NSEC
	The validating resolver needs to check the existence of an NSEC RR		The validating resolver needs to check the existence of an NSEC RR
	matching/covering the source of synthesis and an NSEC RR covering the		matching/covering the source of synthesis and an NSEC RR covering the
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	o Updated pseudo code		o Updated pseudo code
	11.2. new section		11.2. new section
	12. References		12. References
	12.1. Normative References		12.1. Normative References
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC2308] Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS		[RFC2308] Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS
	NCACHE)", RFC 2308, DOI 10.17487/RFC2308, March 1998,		NCACHE)", RFC 2308, DOI 10.17487/RFC2308, March 1998,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2308>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2308>.
	[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.		[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
	Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security		Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
	Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,		Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4035>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4035>.
End of changes. 8 change blocks.
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