< draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl-02.txt		draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl-03.txt >
	dnsop P. van Dijk		dnsop P. van Dijk
	Internet-Draft PowerDNS		Internet-Draft PowerDNS
	Updates: 4034, 4035, 5155 (if approved) 29 January 2021		Updates: 4034, 4035, 5155, 8198 (if approved) 9 February 2021
	Intended status: Standards Track		Intended status: Standards Track
	Expires: 2 August 2021		Expires: 13 August 2021
	NSEC(3) TTLs and NSEC Aggressive Use		NSEC and NSEC3 TTLs and NSEC Aggressive Use
	draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl-02		draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl-03
	Abstract		Abstract
	Due to a combination of unfortunate wording in earlier documents,		Due to a combination of unfortunate wording in earlier documents,
	aggressive use of NSEC(3) records may deny names far beyond the		aggressive use of NSEC and NSEC3 records may deny names far beyond
	intended lifetime of a denial. This document changes the definition		the intended lifetime of a denial. This document changes the
	of the NSEC(3) TTL to correct that situation. This document updates		definition of the NSEC and NSEC3 TTL to correct that situation. This
	RFC 4034, RFC 4035, and RFC 5155.		document updates RFC 4034, RFC 4035, RFC 5155, and RFC 8198.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on 2 August 2021.		This Internet-Draft will expire on 13 August 2021.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
	license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.		license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
	Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights		Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
	and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components		and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
	extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text		extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
	as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are		as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
	provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.		provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3. NSEC(3) TTL changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3. NSEC and NSEC3 TTL changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3.1. Updates to RFC4034 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3.1. Updates to RFC4034 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3.2. Updates to RFC4035 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3.2. Updates to RFC4035 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3.3. Updates to RFC5155 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3.3. Updates to RFC5155 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.4. No updates to RFC8198 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3.4. Updates to RFC8198 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4. Zone Operator Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3.5. A note on incremental signers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
			4. Zone Operator Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	4.1. A Note On Wildcards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		4.1. A Note On Wildcards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	7. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		7. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	8. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		8. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	Appendix A. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		Appendix A. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	Appendix B. Document history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		Appendix B. Document history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	[RFC editor: please remove this block before publication.		[RFC editor: please remove this block before publication.
	Earlier notes on this:		Earlier notes on this:
	* https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/29/sessions/98/#20181013		* https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/29/sessions/98/#20181013
	(https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/29/sessions/98/#20181013)		(https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/29/sessions/98/#20181013)
	skipping to change at page 2, line 49 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 50 ¶
	operations/2018-March/017416.html (https://lists.dns-		operations/2018-March/017416.html (https://lists.dns-
	oarc.net/pipermail/dns-operations/2018-March/017416.html)		oarc.net/pipermail/dns-operations/2018-March/017416.html)
	This document lives on GitHub (https://github.com/PowerDNS/draft-		This document lives on GitHub (https://github.com/PowerDNS/draft-
	dnsop-nsec-ttl); proposed text and editorial changes are very much		dnsop-nsec-ttl); proposed text and editorial changes are very much
	welcomed there, but any functional changes should always first be		welcomed there, but any functional changes should always first be
	discussed on the IETF DNSOP WG mailing list.		discussed on the IETF DNSOP WG mailing list.
	]		]
	[RFC2308] defines that the SOA TTL to be used in negative answers		[RFC2308] defines the TTL of the SOA record that must be returned in
	(NXDOMAIN or NODATA) is		negative answers (NXDOMAIN or NODATA):
	| the minimum of the MINIMUM field of the SOA record and the TTL of
	| the SOA itself		| The TTL of this record is set from the minimum of the MINIMUM
			| field of the SOA record and the TTL of the SOA itself, and
			| indicates how long a resolver may cache the negative answer.
	Thus, if the TTL of the SOA in the zone is lower than the SOA MINIMUM		Thus, if the TTL of the SOA in the zone is lower than the SOA MINIMUM
	value (the last number in a SOA record), the negative TTL for that		value (the last number in the SOA record), the authoritative server
	zone is lower than the SOA MINIMUM value.		sends that lower value as the TTL of the returned SOA record. The
			resolver always uses the TTL of the returned SOA record when setting
			the negative TTL in its cache.
	However, [RFC4034] section 4 has this unfortunate text:		However, [RFC4034] section 4 has this unfortunate text:
	| The NSEC RR SHOULD have the same TTL value as the SOA minimum TTL		| The NSEC RR SHOULD have the same TTL value as the SOA minimum TTL
	| field. This is in the spirit of negative caching ([RFC2308]).		| field. This is in the spirit of negative caching ([RFC2308]).
	This text, while referring to RFC2308, can cause NSEC records to have		This text, while referring to RFC2308, can cause NSEC records to have
	much higher TTLs than the appropriate negative TTL for a zone.		much higher TTLs than the appropriate negative TTL for a zone.
	[RFC5155] contains equivalent text.		[RFC5155] contains equivalent text.
	skipping to change at page 3, line 33 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 37 ¶
	| is taken from the minimum of the SOA.MINIMUM field and SOA's TTL.		| is taken from the minimum of the SOA.MINIMUM field and SOA's TTL.
	| This can be less than the TTL of an NSEC or NSEC3 record, since		| This can be less than the TTL of an NSEC or NSEC3 record, since
	| their TTL is equal to the SOA.MINIMUM field (see [RFC4035],		| their TTL is equal to the SOA.MINIMUM field (see [RFC4035],
	| Section 2.3 and [RFC5155], Section 3).		| Section 2.3 and [RFC5155], Section 3).
	|		|
	| A resolver that supports aggressive use of NSEC and NSEC3 SHOULD		| A resolver that supports aggressive use of NSEC and NSEC3 SHOULD
	| reduce the TTL of NSEC and NSEC3 records to match the SOA.MINIMUM		| reduce the TTL of NSEC and NSEC3 records to match the SOA.MINIMUM
	| field in the authority section of a negative response, if		| field in the authority section of a negative response, if
	| SOA.MINIMUM is smaller.		| SOA.MINIMUM is smaller.
	But the NSEC(3) RRs should, per RFC4034, already be at the MINIMUM		But the NSEC and NSEC3 RRs should, according to RFC4034 and RFC5155,
	TTL, which means this advice would never actually change the TTL used		already be at the value of the MINIMUM field in the SOA. Thus, the
	for the NSEC(3) RRs.		advice from RFC8198 would not actually change the TTL used for the
			NSEC and NSEC3 RRs for authoritative servers that follow the RFCs.
	As a theoretical exercise, consider a TLD named ".example" with a SOA		As a theoretical exercise, consider a TLD named ".example" with a SOA
	record like this:		record like this:
	"example. 900 IN SOA primary.example. hostmaster.example. 1 1800 900		"example. 900 IN SOA primary.example. hostmaster.example. 1 1800 900
	604800 86400"		604800 86400"
	The SOA record has a 900 second TTL, and a 86400 MINIMUM TTL.		The SOA record has a 900 second TTL, and a 86400 MINIMUM TTL.
	Negative responses from this zone have a 900 second TTL, but the		Negative responses from this zone have a 900 second TTL, but the NSEC
	NSEC(3) records in those negative responses have a 86400 TTL. If a		or NSEC3 records in those negative responses have a 86400 TTL. If a
	resolver were to use those NSEC(3)s aggressively, they would be		resolver were to use those NSEC or NSEC3 records aggressively, they
	considered valid for a day, instead of the intended 15 minutes.		would be considered valid for a day, instead of the intended 15
			minutes.
	2. Conventions and Definitions		2. Conventions and Definitions
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
	"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP		"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
	14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all		14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
	capitals, as shown here.		capitals, as shown here.
	3. NSEC(3) TTL changes		3. NSEC and NSEC3 TTL changes
	3.1. Updates to RFC4034		3.1. Updates to RFC4034
	Where [RFC4034] says:		Where [RFC4034] says:
	| The NSEC RR SHOULD have the same TTL value as the SOA minimum TTL		| The NSEC RR SHOULD have the same TTL value as the SOA minimum TTL
	| field. This is in the spirit of negative caching ([RFC2308]).		| field. This is in the spirit of negative caching ([RFC2308]).
	This is updated to say:		This is updated to say:
	| The NSEC RR SHOULD have the same TTL value as the lesser of the		| The TTL of the NSEC RR that is returned MUST be the lesser of the
	| MINIMUM field of the SOA record and the TTL of the SOA itself.		| MINIMUM field of the SOA record and the TTL of the SOA itself.
	| This matches the definition of the TTL for negative responses in		| This matches the definition of the TTL for negative responses in
	| [RFC2308].		| [RFC2308].
	3.2. Updates to RFC4035		3.2. Updates to RFC4035
	Where [RFC4035] says:		Where [RFC4035] says:
	| The TTL value for any NSEC RR SHOULD be the same as the minimum		| The TTL value for any NSEC RR SHOULD be the same as the minimum
	| TTL value field in the zone SOA RR.		| TTL value field in the zone SOA RR.
	This is updated to say:		This is updated to say:
	| The TTL value for any NSEC RR SHOULD be the same TTL value as the		| The TTL of the NSEC RR that is returned MUST be the lesser of the
	| lesser of the MINIMUM field of the SOA record and the TTL of the		| MINIMUM field of the SOA record and the TTL of the SOA itself.
	| SOA itself. This matches the definition of the TTL for negative		| This matches the definition of the TTL for negative responses in
	| responses in [RFC2308].		| [RFC2308].
	3.3. Updates to RFC5155		3.3. Updates to RFC5155
	Where [RFC5155] says:		Where [RFC5155] says:
	| The NSEC3 RR SHOULD have the same TTL value as the SOA minimum TTL		| The NSEC3 RR SHOULD have the same TTL value as the SOA minimum TTL
	| field. This is in the spirit of negative caching [RFC2308].		| field. This is in the spirit of negative caching [RFC2308].
	This is updated to say:		This is updated to say:
	| The NSEC3 RR SHOULD have the same TTL value as the lesser of the		| The TTL of the NSEC3 RR that is returned MUST be the lesser of the
	| MINIMUM field of the SOA record and the TTL of the SOA itself.		| MINIMUM field of the SOA record and the TTL of the SOA itself.
	| This matches the definition of the TTL for negative responses in		| This matches the definition of the TTL for negative responses in
	| [RFC2308].		| [RFC2308].
	Where [RFC5155] says:		Where [RFC5155] says:
	| o The TTL value for any NSEC3 RR SHOULD be the same as the minimum		| o The TTL value for any NSEC3 RR SHOULD be the same as the minimum
	| TTL value field in the zone SOA RR.		| TTL value field in the zone SOA RR.
	This is updated to say:		This is updated to say:
	| o The TTL value for any NSEC3 RR SHOULD be the same as the lesser		| o The TTL value for each NSEC3 RR MUST be the lesser of the
	| of the MINIMUM field of the zone SOA RR and the TTL of the zone		| MINIMUM field of the zone SOA RR and the TTL of the zone SOA RR
	| SOA RR itself.		| itself.
	3.4. No updates to RFC8198		3.4. Updates to RFC8198
	Instead of updating three documents, it would have been preferable to		[RFC8198] section 5.4 (Consideration on TTL) is completely replaced
	update one. [RFC8198] says:		by the following text:
	| With DNSSEC and aggressive use of DNSSEC-validated cache, the TTL		| The TTL value of negative information is especially important,
	| of the NSEC/NSEC3 record and the SOA.MINIMUM field are the		| because newly added domain names cannot be used while the negative
	| authoritative statement of how quickly a name can start working		| information is effective.
	| within a zone.		|
			| Section 5 of [RFC2308] suggests a maximum default negative cache
			| TTL value of 3 hours (10800). It is RECOMMENDED that validating
			| resolvers limit the maximum effective TTL value of negative
			| responses (NSEC/NSEC3 RRs) to this same value.
			|
			| A resolver that supports aggressive use of NSEC and NSEC3 MAY
			| limit the TTL of NSEC and NSEC3 records to the lesser of the
			| SOA.MINIMUM field and the TTL of the SOA in a response, if
			| present. It MAY also use a previously cached SOA for a zone to
			| find these values.
	Here, the SOA.MINIMUM field cannot be changed to "the minimum/lesser		(The third paragraph of the original is removed, and the fourth
	of the SOA.MINIMUM field and the SOA TTL" because the resolver may		paragraph is updated to allow resolvers to also take the lesser of
	not have the SOA RRset in cache. Because of that, this document		the SOA TTL and SOA MINIMUM.)
	cannot get away with updating just [RFC8198]. However, if
	authoritative servers follow the updates from this document, this		3.5. A note on incremental signers
	should not make a difference, as the TTL of the NSEC/NSEC3 record is
	already set to the minimum value.		Some DNSSEC signer implementations might not (re-)sign whole zones in
			one go, instead spreading the work of updating inception/expiration
			times over some period. Such implementations would not be able to
			update all NSEC or NSEC3 records in the zone instantly either. To
			aid these implementations, we additionally specify the following:
			| If an implementation cannot update all NSEC or NSEC3 TTLs after a
			| SOA change immediately, it MUST still attempt to do so as soon as
			| possible during the signing process.
	4. Zone Operator Considerations		4. Zone Operator Considerations
	If signers & DNS servers for a zone cannot immediately be updated to		If signers & DNS servers for a zone cannot immediately be updated to
	conform to this document, zone operators are encouraged to consider		conform to this document, zone operators are encouraged to consider
	setting their SOA record TTL and the SOA MINIMUM field to the same		setting their SOA record TTL and the SOA MINIMUM field to the same
	value. That way, the TTL used for aggressive NSEC use matches the		value. That way, the TTL used for aggressive NSEC and NSEC3 use
	SOA TTL for negative responses.		matches the SOA TTL for negative responses.
	4.1. A Note On Wildcards		4.1. A Note On Wildcards
	Validating resolvers consider an expanded wildcard valid for the		Validating resolvers consider an expanded wildcard valid for the
	wildcard's TTL, capped by the TTLs of the NSEC(3) proof that shows		wildcard's TTL, capped by the TTLs of the NSEC and NSEC3 proof that
	that the wildcard expansion is legal. Thus, changing the TTL of		shows that the wildcard expansion is legal. Thus, changing the TTL
	NSEC(3) records (explicitly, or by implementation of this document,		of NSEC or NSEC3 records (explicitly, or by implementation of this
	implicitly) might affect (shorten) the lifetime of wildcards.		document, implicitly) might affect (shorten) the lifetime of
			wildcards.
	5. Security Considerations		5. Security Considerations
	An attacker can prevent future records from appearing in a cache by		An attacker can prevent future records from appearing in a cache by
	seeding the cache with queries that cause NSEC(3) responses to be		seeding the cache with queries that cause NSEC or NSEC3 responses to
	cached, for aggressive use purposes. This document reduces the		be cached, for aggressive use purposes. This document reduces the
	impact of that attack in cases where the NSEC(3) TTL is higher than		impact of that attack in cases where the NSEC or NSEC3 TTL is higher
	the zone operator intended.		than the zone operator intended.
	6. IANA Considerations		6. IANA Considerations
	IANA is requested to add a reference to this document in the		IANA is requested to add a reference to this document in the
	"Resource Record (RR) TYPEs" subregistry of the "Domain Name System		"Resource Record (RR) TYPEs" subregistry of the "Domain Name System
	(DNS) Parameters" registry, for the NSEC and NSEC3 types.		(DNS) Parameters" registry, for the NSEC and NSEC3 types.
	7. Normative References		7. Normative References
	[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
	Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
	Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4035>.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC2308] Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS		[RFC2308] Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS
	NCACHE)", RFC 2308, DOI 10.17487/RFC2308, March 1998,		NCACHE)", RFC 2308, DOI 10.17487/RFC2308, March 1998,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2308>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2308>.
	[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.		[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
	Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",		Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
	RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,		RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034>.
	[RFC5155] Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS		[RFC5155] Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
	Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of		Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
	Existence", RFC 5155, DOI 10.17487/RFC5155, March 2008,		Existence", RFC 5155, DOI 10.17487/RFC5155, March 2008,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5155>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5155>.
			[RFC8198] Fujiwara, K., Kato, A., and W. Kumari, "Aggressive Use of
			DNSSEC-Validated Cache", RFC 8198, DOI 10.17487/RFC8198,
			July 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8198>.
			[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
			Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
			Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4035>.
			[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
			Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	8. Informative References		8. Informative References
	[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC		[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
	2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,		2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
	May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.		May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
	[RFC8198] Fujiwara, K., Kato, A., and W. Kumari, "Aggressive Use of
	DNSSEC-Validated Cache", RFC 8198, DOI 10.17487/RFC8198,
	July 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8198>.
	Appendix A. Implementation Status		Appendix A. Implementation Status
	[RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication]		[RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication]
	Implemented in PowerDNS Authoritative Server 4.3.0		Implemented in PowerDNS Authoritative Server 4.3.0
	https://doc.powerdns.com/authoritative/dnssec/		https://doc.powerdns.com/authoritative/dnssec/
	operational.html?highlight=ttl#some-notes-on-ttl-usage		operational.html?highlight=ttl#some-notes-on-ttl-usage
	(https://doc.powerdns.com/authoritative/dnssec/		(https://doc.powerdns.com/authoritative/dnssec/
	operational.html?highlight=ttl#some-notes-on-ttl-usage) .		operational.html?highlight=ttl#some-notes-on-ttl-usage) .
	skipping to change at page 7, line 36 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 9 ¶
	https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/ga41J2PPUbmc21--		https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/ga41J2PPUbmc21--
	dqf3i7_IY6M (https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/		dqf3i7_IY6M (https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/
	ga41J2PPUbmc21--dqf3i7_IY6M) https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/		ga41J2PPUbmc21--dqf3i7_IY6M) https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/
	bind9/-/merge_requests/4506 (https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/		bind9/-/merge_requests/4506 (https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/
	bind9/-/merge_requests/4506) .		bind9/-/merge_requests/4506) .
	Implemented in Knot DNS 3.1, to be released in 2021		Implemented in Knot DNS 3.1, to be released in 2021
	https://gitlab.nic.cz/knot/knot-dns/-/merge_requests/1219		https://gitlab.nic.cz/knot/knot-dns/-/merge_requests/1219
	(https://gitlab.nic.cz/knot/knot-dns/-/merge_requests/1219) .		(https://gitlab.nic.cz/knot/knot-dns/-/merge_requests/1219) .
			Implemented in ldns, patch under review
			https://github.com/NLnetLabs/ldns/pull/118
			(https://github.com/NLnetLabs/ldns/pull/118)
			Implementation status is tracked at
			https://trac.ietf.org/trac/dnsop/wiki/draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl
			(https://trac.ietf.org/trac/dnsop/wiki/draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl)
	Appendix B. Document history		Appendix B. Document history
	[RFC editor: please remove this section before publication.]		[RFC editor: please remove this section before publication.]
	From draft-vandijk-dnsop-nsec-ttl-00 to draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl-00:		From draft-vandijk-dnsop-nsec-ttl-00 to draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl-00:
	* document was adopted		* document was adopted
	* various minor editorial changes		* various minor editorial changes
	skipping to change at page 8, line 4 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 34 ¶
	* various minor editorial changes		* various minor editorial changes
	* now also updates 4035		* now also updates 4035
	* use .example instead of .com for the example		* use .example instead of .com for the example
	* more words on 8198		* more words on 8198
	* a note on wildcards		* a note on wildcards
	From draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl-00 to draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl-01:		From draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl-00 to draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl-01:
	* various wording improvements		* various wording improvements
	* added Implementation note from Knot, expanded the BIND one with		* added Implementation note from Knot, expanded the BIND one with
	the GitLab MR URL		the GitLab MR URL
	* reduced requirement level from MUST to SHOULD, like the original		* reduced requirement level from MUST to SHOULD, like the original
	texts		texts
			From draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl-01 to draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl-02:
			* updated the second bit of wrong text in 5155
			From draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl-02 to draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl-03:
			* document now updates resolver behaviour in 8198
			* lots of extra text to clarify what behaviour goes where (thanks
			Paul Hoffman)
			* replace 'any' with 'each' (thanks Duane)
			* upgraded requirement level to MUST, plus a note on incremental
			signers
	Acknowledgements		Acknowledgements
	Ralph Dolmans helpfully pointed out that fixing this in RFC8198 is		This document was made possible with the help of the following
	only possible for negative (NXDOMAIN/NODATA) responses, and not for		people:
	wildcard responses. Warren Kumari gracefully acknowledged that the
	current behaviour of RFC8198, in context of the NSEC TTL defined in		* Ralph Dolmans
	RFC4034, is not the intended behaviour. Matthijs Mekking provided
	additional text explaining why this document cannot simply update		* Warren Kumari
	RFC8198. Vladimir Cunat pointed out that the effect on wildcards
	should be made explicit. Paul Hoffman, Matt Nordhoff, and Josh Soref		* Matthijs Mekking
	provided helpful corrections as native speakers.
			* Vladimir Cunat
			* Matt Nordhoff
			* Josh Soref
			* Tim Wicinski
			The author would like to explicitly thank Paul Hoffman for extensive
			reviews, text contributions, and help in navigating WG comments.
	Author's Address		Author's Address
	Peter van Dijk		Peter van Dijk
	PowerDNS		PowerDNS
	Den Haag		Den Haag
	Netherlands		Netherlands
	Email: peter.van.dijk@powerdns.com		Email: peter.van.dijk@powerdns.com
End of changes. 32 change blocks.
	87 lines changed or deleted		146 lines changed or added
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