< draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-05.txt   draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-06.txt >
Network Working Group M. Boucadair Network Working Group M. Boucadair
Internet-Draft Orange Internet-Draft Orange
Intended status: Standards Track T. Reddy Intended status: Standards Track T. Reddy
Expires: May 27, 2021 McAfee Expires: November 26, 2021 McAfee
W. Pan W. Pan
Huawei Technologies Huawei Technologies
November 23, 2020 May 25, 2021
Multi-homing Deployment Considerations for Distributed-Denial-of-Service Multi-homing Deployment Considerations for Distributed-Denial-of-Service
Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Open Threat Signaling (DOTS)
draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-05 draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-06
Abstract Abstract
This document discusses multi-homing considerations for Distributed- This document discusses multi-homing considerations for Distributed-
Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS). The goal is to Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS). The goal is to
provide some guidance for DOTS clients/gateways when multihomed. provide some guidance for DOTS clients/gateways when multihomed.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
skipping to change at page 1, line 36 skipping to change at page 1, line 36
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 27, 2021. This Internet-Draft will expire on November 26, 2021.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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4.2. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Single CPE, Multiple Upstream 4.2. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Single CPE, Multiple Upstream
ISPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 ISPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.3. Multi-homed Enterprise: Multiple CPEs, Multiple Upstream 4.3. Multi-homed Enterprise: Multiple CPEs, Multiple Upstream
ISPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 ISPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.4. Multi-homed Enterprise with the Same ISP . . . . . . . . 7 4.4. Multi-homed Enterprise with the Same ISP . . . . . . . . 7
5. DOTS Multi-homing Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . 7 5. DOTS Multi-homing Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Residential CPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.1. Residential CPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Single CPE, Multiple Upstream 5.2. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Single CPE, Multiple Upstream
ISPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 ISPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.3. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Multiple CPEs, Multiple Upstream 5.3. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Multiple CPEs, Multiple Upstream
ISPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 ISPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.4. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Single ISP . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.4. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Single ISP . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
In many deployments, it may not be possible for a network to In many deployments, it may not be possible for a network to
determine the cause of a distributed Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack determine the cause of a distributed Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack
[RFC4732]. Rather, the network may just realize that some resources [RFC4732]. Rather, the network may just realize that some resources
seem to be under attack. To improve such situation, the IETF is seem to be under attack. To improve such situation, the IETF is
specifying the DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) specifying the DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) architecture
[RFC8811]architecture, where a DOTS client can inform a DOTS server [RFC8811], where a DOTS client can inform a DOTS server that the
that the network is under a potential attack and that appropriate network is under a potential attack and that appropriate mitigation
mitigation actions are required. Indeed, because the lack of a actions are required. Indeed, because the lack of a common method to
common method to coordinate a real-time response among involved coordinate a real-time response among involved actors and network
actors and network domains jeopardizes the efficiency of DDoS attack domains jeopardizes the efficiency of DDoS attack mitigation actions,
mitigation actions, the DOTS protocol is meant to carry requests for the DOTS protocol is meant to carry requests for DDoS attack
DDoS attack mitigation, thereby reducing the impact of an attack and mitigation, thereby reducing the impact of an attack and leading to
leading to more efficient responsive actions. more efficient responsive actions. [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases]
[I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases] identifies a set of scenarios for DOTS; identifies a set of scenarios for DOTS; most of these scenarios
most of these scenarios involve a Customer Premises Equipment (CPE). involve a Customer Premises Equipment (CPE).
The high-level base DOTS architecture is illustrated in Figure 1 The high-level base DOTS architecture is illustrated in Figure 1
([RFC8811]): ([RFC8811]):
+-----------+ +-------------+ +-----------+ +-------------+
| Mitigator | ~~~~~~~~~~ | DOTS Server | | Mitigator | ~~~~~~~~~~ | DOTS Server |
+-----------+ +-------------+ +-----------+ +-------------+
| |
| |
| |
+---------------+ +-------------+ +---------------+ +-------------+
| Attack Target | ~~~~~~ | DOTS Client | | Attack Target | ~~~~~~ | DOTS Client |
+---------------+ +-------------+ +---------------+ +-------------+
Figure 1: Basic DOTS Architecture Figure 1: Basic DOTS Architecture
[RFC8811] specifies that the DOTS client may be provided with a list [RFC8811] specifies that the DOTS client may be provided with a list
of DOTS servers; each of these servers is associated with one or more of DOTS servers; each of these servers is associated with one or more
IP addresses. These addresses may or may not be of the same address IP addresses. These addresses may or may not be of the same address
family. The DOTS client establishes one or more DOTS sessions by family. The DOTS client establishes one or more DOTS sessions by
connecting to the provided DOTS server(s) addresses. connecting to the provided DOTS server(s) addresses (e.g.,
[RFC8973]).
DOTS may be deployed within networks that are connected to one single DOTS may be deployed within networks that are connected to one single
upstream provider. It can also be enabled within networks that are upstream provider. It can also be enabled within networks that are
multi-homed. The reader may refer to [RFC3582] for an overview of multi-homed. The reader may refer to [RFC3582] for an overview of
multi-homing goals and motivations. This document discusses DOTS multi-homing goals and motivations. This document discusses DOTS
multi-homing considerations. Specifically, the document aims to: multi-homing considerations. Specifically, the document aims to:
1. Complete the base DOTS architecture with multi-homing specifics. 1. Complete the base DOTS architecture with multi-homing specifics.
Those specifics need to be taken into account because: Those specifics need to be taken into account because:
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3. Terminology 3. Terminology
This document makes use of the terms defined in [RFC8811] and This document makes use of the terms defined in [RFC8811] and
[RFC4116]. [RFC4116].
IP indifferently refers to IPv4 or IPv6. IP indifferently refers to IPv4 or IPv6.
4. Multi-Homing Scenarios 4. Multi-Homing Scenarios
This section describes some multi-homing scenarios that are relevant This section describes some multi-homing scenarios that are relevant
to DOTS. In the following sub-sections, only the connections of to DOTS. In the following subsections, only the connections of
border routers are shown; internal network topologies are not border routers are shown; internal network topologies are not
elaborated. elaborated.
This section distinguishes between residential CPEs vs. enterprise This section distinguishes between residential CPEs vs. enterprise
CPEs because PI addresses may be used for enterprises while this is CPEs because PI addresses may be used for enterprises while this is
not the current practice for residential CPEs. not the current practice for residential CPEs.
4.1. Residential Single CPE 4.1. Residential Single CPE
The scenario shown in Figure 2 is characterized as follows: The scenario shown in Figure 2 is characterized as follows:
o The home network is connected to the Internet using one single CPE o The home network is connected to the Internet using one single
(Customer Premises Equipment). CPE.
o The CPE is connected to multiple provisioning domains (i.e., both o The CPE is connected to multiple provisioning domains (i.e., both
fixed and mobile networks). Provisioning domain (PvD) is fixed and mobile networks). Provisioning domain (PvD) is
explained in [RFC7556]. explained in [RFC7556].
o Each of these provisioning domains assigns IP addresses/prefixes o Each of these provisioning domains assigns IP addresses/prefixes
to the CPE and provides additional configuration information such to the CPE and provides additional configuration information such
as a list of DNS servers, DNS suffixes associated with the as a list of DNS servers, DNS suffixes associated with the
network, default gateway address, and DOTS server's name network, default gateway address, and DOTS server's name
[I-D.ietf-dots-server-discovery]. These addresses/prefixes are [RFC8973]. These addresses/prefixes are assumed to be Provider-
assumed to be Provider-Aggregatable (PA). Aggregatable (PA).
o Because of ingress filtering, packets forwarded by the CPE towards o Because of ingress filtering, packets forwarded by the CPE towards
a given provisioning domain must be sent with a source IP address a given provisioning domain must be sent with a source IP address
that was assigned by that domain [RFC8043]. that was assigned by that domain [RFC8043].
+-------+ +-------+ +-------+ +-------+
|Fixed | |Mobile | |Fixed | |Mobile |
|Network| |Network| |Network| |Network|
+---+---+ +---+---+ +---+---+ +---+---+
| | Service Providers | | Service Providers
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Figure 4: Multi-homed Enterprise Network (Multiple CPEs, Multiple Figure 4: Multi-homed Enterprise Network (Multiple CPEs, Multiple
ISPs) ISPs)
4.4. Multi-homed Enterprise with the Same ISP 4.4. Multi-homed Enterprise with the Same ISP
This scenario is a variant of Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 in which This scenario is a variant of Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 in which
multi-homing is supported by the same ISP (i.e., same provisioning multi-homing is supported by the same ISP (i.e., same provisioning
domain). domain).
Editor's Note: The use of anycast addresses is to be consistently
discussed.
5. DOTS Multi-homing Deployment Considerations 5. DOTS Multi-homing Deployment Considerations
Table 1 provides some sample, non-exhaustive, deployment schemes to Table 1 provides some sample, non-exhaustive, deployment schemes to
illustrate how DOTS agents may be deployed for each of the scenarios illustrate how DOTS agents may be deployed for each of the scenarios
introduced in Section 4. introduced in Section 4.
+---------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+ +---------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+
| Scenario | DOTS client | DOTS | | Scenario | DOTS client | DOTS |
| | | gateway | | | | gateway |
+---------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+ +---------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+
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| Multiple CPEs, Multiple | internal hosts or all | CPEs (rtr1 | | Multiple CPEs, Multiple | internal hosts or all | CPEs (rtr1 |
| provisioning domains | CPEs (rtr1 and rtr2) | and rtr2) | | provisioning domains | CPEs (rtr1 and rtr2) | and rtr2) |
+---------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+ +---------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+
| Multi-homed enterprise, | internal hosts or all | CPEs (rtr1 | | Multi-homed enterprise, | internal hosts or all | CPEs (rtr1 |
| Single provisioning | CPEs (rtr1 and rtr2) | and rtr2) | | Single provisioning | CPEs (rtr1 and rtr2) | and rtr2) |
| domain | | | | domain | | |
+---------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+ +---------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+
Table 1: Sample Deployment Cases Table 1: Sample Deployment Cases
These deployment schemes are further discussed in the following sub- These deployment schemes are further discussed in the following
sections. subsections.
5.1. Residential CPE 5.1. Residential CPE
Figure 5 depicts DOTS sessions that need to be established between a Figure 5 depicts DOTS sessions that need to be established between a
DOTS client (C) and two DOTS servers (S1, S2) within the context of DOTS client (C) and two DOTS servers (S1, S2) within the context of
the scenario described in Section 4.1. the scenario described in Section 4.1.
For each provisioning domain, the DOTS client MUST resolve the DOTS For each provisioning domain, the DOTS client MUST resolve the DOTS
server's name provided by a provisioning domain server's name provided by a provisioning domain ([RFC8973]) using the
([I-D.ietf-dots-server-discovery]) using the DNS servers learned from DNS servers learned from the respective provisioning domain.
the respective provisioning domain. IPv6-capable DOTS clients MUST IPv6-capable DOTS clients MUST use the source address selection
use the source address selection algorithm defined in [RFC6724] to algorithm defined in [RFC6724] to select the candidate source
select the candidate source addresses to contact each of these DOTS addresses to contact each of these DOTS servers. DOTS sessions MUST
servers. DOTS sessions MUST be established and maintained with each be established and maintained with each of the DOTS servers because
of the DOTS servers because the mitigation scope of these servers is the mitigation scope of these servers is restricted. The DOTS client
restricted. The DOTS client SHOULD use the certificate provisioned SHOULD use the certificate provisioned by a provisioning domain to
by a provisioning domain to authenticate itself to the DOTS server authenticate itself to the DOTS server(s) provided by the same
provided by the same provisioning domain. provisioning domain.
When conveying a mitigation request to protect the attack target(s), When conveying a mitigation request to protect the attack target(s),
the DOTS client among the DOTS servers available MUST select a DOTS the DOTS client among the DOTS servers available MUST select a DOTS
server whose network has assigned the prefixes from which target server whose network has assigned the IP prefixes from which target
prefixes and target IP addresses are derived. This implies that if IP prefixes/addresses are derived. This implies that if no
no appropriate DOTS server is found, the DOTS client MUST NOT send appropriate DOTS server is found, the DOTS client MUST NOT send the
the mitigation request to any DOTS server. mitigation request to any other available DOTS server.
For example, a mitigation request to protect target resources bound For example, a mitigation request to protect target resources bound
to a PA IP address/prefix cannot be satisfied by a provisioning to a PA IP address/prefix cannot be satisfied by a provisioning
domain another domain than the one that owns those addresses/ domain another domain than the one that owns those addresses/
prefixes. Consequently, if a CPE detects a DDoS attack that spreads prefixes. Consequently, if a CPE detects a DDoS attack that spreads
over all its network attachments, it MUST contact both DOTS servers over all its network attachments, it MUST contact both DOTS servers
for mitigation purposes. Nevertheless, if the DDoS attack is for mitigation purposes. Nevertheless, if the DDoS attack is
received from one single network, then only the DOTS server of that received from one single network, then only the DOTS server of that
network MUST be contacted. network MUST be contacted.
The DOTS client MUST be able to associate a DOTS server with each The DOTS client MUST be able to associate a DOTS server with each
provisioning domain. For example, if the DOTS client is provisioned provisioning domain. For example, if the DOTS client is provisioned
with S1 using DHCP when attaching to a first network and with S2 with S1 using DHCP when attaching to a first network and with S2
using Protocol Configuration Option (PCO) when attaching to a second using Protocol Configuration Option (PCO) when attaching to a second
network, the DOTS client must record the interface from which a DOTS network, the DOTS client must record the interface from which a DOTS
server was provisioned. DOTS signaling session to a given DOTS server was provisioned. DOTS signaling session to a given DOTS
server must be established using the interface from which the DOTS server must be established using the interface from which the DOTS
server was provisioned. server was provisioned.
+--+ +--+
-----------|S1| ----------|S1|
/ +--+ / +--+
/ / DOTS Server Domain #1
/ /
+---+/ +---+/
| C | | C |
+---+\ +---+\
\ \
\ \
\ +--+ \ +--+
-----------|S2| ----------|S2|
+--+ +--+
DOTS Server Domain #2
Figure 5: DOTS Associations for a Multihomed Residential CPE Figure 5: DOTS Associations for a Multihomed Residential CPE
5.2. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Single CPE, Multiple Upstream ISPs 5.2. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Single CPE, Multiple Upstream ISPs
Figure 6 illustrates a first set of DOTS associations that can be Figure 6 illustrates a first set of DOTS associations that can be
established with a DOTS gateway, which is enabled within the context established with a DOTS gateway, which is enabled within the context
of the scenario described in Section 4.2. This deployment is of the scenario described in Section 4.2. This deployment is
characterized as follows: characterized as follows:
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When PA addresses/prefixes are in use, the same considerations When PA addresses/prefixes are in use, the same considerations
discussed in Section 5.1 need to be followed by the DOTS gateway to discussed in Section 5.1 need to be followed by the DOTS gateway to
contact its DOTS server(s). The DOTS gateways can be reachable from contact its DOTS server(s). The DOTS gateways can be reachable from
DOTS clients by using an unicast address or an anycast address. DOTS clients by using an unicast address or an anycast address.
Nevertheless, when PI addresses/prefixes are assigned, the DOTS Nevertheless, when PI addresses/prefixes are assigned, the DOTS
gateway MUST send mitigation requests to all its DOTS servers. gateway MUST send mitigation requests to all its DOTS servers.
Otherwise, the attack traffic may still be delivered via the ISP Otherwise, the attack traffic may still be delivered via the ISP
which hasn't received the mitigation request. which hasn't received the mitigation request.
+--+ +--+
-----------|S1| ----------|S1|
+---+ / +--+ +---+ / +--+
| C1|----+ / | C1|----+ / DOTS Server Domain #1
+---+ | / +---+ | /
+---+ +-+-+/ +---+ +-+-+/
| C3|------| G | | C3|------| G |
+---+ +-+-+\ +---+ +-+-+\
+---+ | \ +---+ | \
| C2|----+ \ | C2|----+ \
+---+ \ +--+ +---+ \ +--+
-----------|S2| ----------|S2|
+--+ +--+
DOTS Server Domain #2
Figure 6: Multiple DOTS Clients, Single DOTS Gateway, Multiple DOTS Figure 6: Multiple DOTS Clients, Single DOTS Gateway, Multiple DOTS
Servers Servers
An alternate deployment model is depicted in Figure 7. This An alternate deployment model is depicted in Figure 7. This
deployment assumes that: deployment assumes that:
o One or more DOTS clients are enabled in hosts located in the o One or more DOTS clients are enabled in hosts located in the
internal network. These DOTS clients may use internal network. These DOTS clients may use [RFC8973] to
[I-D.ietf-dots-server-discovery] to discover their DOTS server(s). discover their DOTS server(s).
o These DOTS clients communicate directly with upstream DOTS o These DOTS clients communicate directly with upstream DOTS
servers. servers.
If PI addresses/prefixes are in use, the DOTS client MUST send a If PI addresses/prefixes are in use, the DOTS client MUST send a
mitigation request to all the DOTS servers. The use of anycast mitigation request to all the DOTS servers. The use of anycast
addresses to reach the DOTS servers is NOT RECOMMENDED. addresses to reach the DOTS servers is NOT RECOMMENDED.
If PA addresses/prefixes are used, the same considerations discussed If PA addresses/prefixes are used, the same considerations discussed
in Section 5.1 need to be followed by the DOTS clients. Because DOTS in Section 5.1 need to be followed by the DOTS clients. Because DOTS
clients are not embedded in the CPE and multiple addreses/prefixes clients are not embedded in the CPE and multiple addreses/prefixes
may not be assigned to the DOTS client (typically in an IPv4 may not be assigned to the DOTS client (typically in an IPv4
context), some issues arise to steer traffic towards the appropriate context), some issues arise to steer traffic towards the appropriate
DOTS server by using the appropriate source IP address. These DOTS server by using the appropriate source IP address. These
complications discussed in [RFC4116] are not specific to DOTS. complications discussed in [RFC4116] are not specific to DOTS.
+--+ ..........
. +--+ .
+--------|C1|--------+ +--------|C1|--------+
| +--+ | | . +--+ . |
+--+ +--+ +--+ +--+ . +--+ . +--+
|S2|------|C3|------|S1| |S2|------|C3|------|S1|
+--+ +--+ +--+ +--+ . +--+ . +--+
| +--+ | | . +--+ . |
+--------|C2|--------+ +--------|C2|--------+
+--+ . +--+ .
..........
DOTS Client
Domain
Figure 7: Multiple DOTS Clients, Multiple DOTS Servers Figure 7: Multiple DOTS Clients, Multiple DOTS Servers
Another deployment approach is to enable many DOTS clients; each of Another deployment approach is to enable many DOTS clients; each of
them is responsible for handling communications with a specific DOTS them is responsible for handling communications with a specific DOTS
server (see Figure 8). server (see Figure 8).
+--+ ..........
+--------|C1| . +--+ .
| +--+ +--------|C1| .
+--+ +--+ +--+ | . +--+ .
|S2| |C2|------|S1| +--+ . +--+ . +--+
+--+ +--+ +--+ |S2| . |C2|------|S1|
+--+ . +--+ . +--+
..........
DOTS Client
Domain
Figure 8: Single Homed DOTS Clients Figure 8: Single Homed DOTS Clients
Each DOTS client SHOULD be provided with policies (e.g., a prefix Each DOTS client SHOULD be provided with policies (e.g., a prefix
filter that will be against DDoS detection alarms) that will trigger filter that will be against DDoS detection alarms) that will trigger
DOTS communications with the DOTS servers. Such policies will help DOTS communications with the DOTS servers. Such policies will help
the DOTS client to select the appropriate destination DOTS server. the DOTS client to select the appropriate destination DOTS server.
The CPE MUST select the appropriate source IP address when forwarding The CPE MUST select the appropriate source IP address when forwarding
DOTS messages received from an internal DOTS client. If anycast DOTS messages received from an internal DOTS client. If anycast
skipping to change at page 12, line 49 skipping to change at page 13, line 12
Figure 9: Multiple DOTS Clients, Multiple DOTS Gateways, Multiple Figure 9: Multiple DOTS Clients, Multiple DOTS Gateways, Multiple
DOTS Servers DOTS Servers
5.4. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Single ISP 5.4. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Single ISP
The key difference of the scenario described in Section 4.4 compared The key difference of the scenario described in Section 4.4 compared
to the other scenarios is that multi-homing is provided by the same to the other scenarios is that multi-homing is provided by the same
ISP. Concretely, that ISP can decide to provision the enterprise ISP. Concretely, that ISP can decide to provision the enterprise
network with: network with:
1. The same DOTS server for all network attachments. o The same DOTS server for all network attachments.
2. Distinct DOTS servers for each network attachment. These DOTS o Distinct DOTS servers for each network attachment. These DOTS
servers need to coordinate when a mitigation action is received servers need to coordinate when a mitigation action is received
from the enterprise network. from the enterprise network.
In both cases, DOTS agents enabled within the enterprise network MAY In both cases, DOTS agents enabled within the enterprise network MAY
decide to select one or all network attachments to send DOTS decide to select one or all network attachments to send DOTS
mitigation requests. mitigation requests.
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
DOTS-related security considerations are discussed in Section 4 of DOTS-related security considerations are discussed in Section 4 of
[RFC8811]. [RFC8811].
skipping to change at page 14, line 16 skipping to change at page 14, line 27
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8811] Mortensen, A., Ed., Reddy.K, T., Ed., Andreasen, F., [RFC8811] Mortensen, A., Ed., Reddy.K, T., Ed., Andreasen, F.,
Teague, N., and R. Compton, "DDoS Open Threat Signaling Teague, N., and R. Compton, "DDoS Open Threat Signaling
(DOTS) Architecture", RFC 8811, DOI 10.17487/RFC8811, (DOTS) Architecture", RFC 8811, DOI 10.17487/RFC8811,
August 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8811>. August 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8811>.
9.2. Informative References 9.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-dots-server-discovery]
Boucadair, M. and T. Reddy.K, "Distributed-Denial-of-
Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Agent Discovery",
draft-ietf-dots-server-discovery-15 (work in progress),
November 2020.
[I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases] [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases]
Dobbins, R., Migault, D., Moskowitz, R., Teague, N., Xia, Dobbins, R., Migault, D., Moskowitz, R., Teague, N., Xia,
L., and K. Nishizuka, "Use cases for DDoS Open Threat L., and K. Nishizuka, "Use cases for DDoS Open Threat
Signaling", draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-25 (work in Signaling", draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-25 (work in
progress), July 2020. progress), July 2020.
[RFC3582] Abley, J., Black, B., and V. Gill, "Goals for IPv6 Site- [RFC3582] Abley, J., Black, B., and V. Gill, "Goals for IPv6 Site-
Multihoming Architectures", RFC 3582, Multihoming Architectures", RFC 3582,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3582, August 2003, DOI 10.17487/RFC3582, August 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3582>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3582>.
skipping to change at page 15, line 16 skipping to change at page 15, line 22
Mortensen, A., and N. Teague, "Distributed Denial-of- Mortensen, A., and N. Teague, "Distributed Denial-of-
Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel
Specification", RFC 8782, DOI 10.17487/RFC8782, May 2020, Specification", RFC 8782, DOI 10.17487/RFC8782, May 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8782>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8782>.
[RFC8783] Boucadair, M., Ed. and T. Reddy.K, Ed., "Distributed [RFC8783] Boucadair, M., Ed. and T. Reddy.K, Ed., "Distributed
Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data
Channel Specification", RFC 8783, DOI 10.17487/RFC8783, Channel Specification", RFC 8783, DOI 10.17487/RFC8783,
May 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8783>. May 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8783>.
[RFC8973] Boucadair, M. and T. Reddy.K, "DDoS Open Threat Signaling
(DOTS) Agent Discovery", RFC 8973, DOI 10.17487/RFC8973,
January 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8973>.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Mohamed Boucadair Mohamed Boucadair
Orange Orange
Rennes 35000 Rennes 35000
France France
Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
Tirumaleswar Reddy Tirumaleswar Reddy
 End of changes. 28 change blocks. 
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