| < draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-05.txt | draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-06.txt > | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Network Working Group M. Boucadair | Network Working Group M. Boucadair | |||
| Internet-Draft Orange | Internet-Draft Orange | |||
| Intended status: Standards Track T. Reddy | Intended status: Standards Track T. Reddy | |||
| Expires: May 27, 2021 McAfee | Expires: November 26, 2021 McAfee | |||
| W. Pan | W. Pan | |||
| Huawei Technologies | Huawei Technologies | |||
| November 23, 2020 | May 25, 2021 | |||
| Multi-homing Deployment Considerations for Distributed-Denial-of-Service | Multi-homing Deployment Considerations for Distributed-Denial-of-Service | |||
| Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) | Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) | |||
| draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-05 | draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-06 | |||
| Abstract | Abstract | |||
| This document discusses multi-homing considerations for Distributed- | This document discusses multi-homing considerations for Distributed- | |||
| Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS). The goal is to | Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS). The goal is to | |||
| provide some guidance for DOTS clients/gateways when multihomed. | provide some guidance for DOTS clients/gateways when multihomed. | |||
| Status of This Memo | Status of This Memo | |||
| This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the | This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the | |||
| skipping to change at page 1, line 36 ¶ | skipping to change at page 1, line 36 ¶ | |||
| Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering | Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering | |||
| Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute | Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute | |||
| working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- | working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- | |||
| Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. | Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. | |||
| Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months | Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months | |||
| and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any | and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any | |||
| time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference | time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference | |||
| material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." | material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." | |||
| This Internet-Draft will expire on May 27, 2021. | This Internet-Draft will expire on November 26, 2021. | |||
| Copyright Notice | Copyright Notice | |||
| Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the | Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the | |||
| document authors. All rights reserved. | document authors. All rights reserved. | |||
| This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal | This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal | |||
| Provisions Relating to IETF Documents | Provisions Relating to IETF Documents | |||
| (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of | (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of | |||
| publication of this document. Please review these documents | publication of this document. Please review these documents | |||
| carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect | carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect | |||
| to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must | to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must | |||
| include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of | include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of | |||
| the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as | the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as | |||
| skipping to change at page 2, line 24 ¶ | skipping to change at page 2, line 24 ¶ | |||
| 4.2. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Single CPE, Multiple Upstream | 4.2. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Single CPE, Multiple Upstream | |||
| ISPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 | ISPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 | |||
| 4.3. Multi-homed Enterprise: Multiple CPEs, Multiple Upstream | 4.3. Multi-homed Enterprise: Multiple CPEs, Multiple Upstream | |||
| ISPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 | ISPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 | |||
| 4.4. Multi-homed Enterprise with the Same ISP . . . . . . . . 7 | 4.4. Multi-homed Enterprise with the Same ISP . . . . . . . . 7 | |||
| 5. DOTS Multi-homing Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . 7 | 5. DOTS Multi-homing Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . 7 | |||
| 5.1. Residential CPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 | 5.1. Residential CPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 | |||
| 5.2. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Single CPE, Multiple Upstream | 5.2. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Single CPE, Multiple Upstream | |||
| ISPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 | ISPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 | |||
| 5.3. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Multiple CPEs, Multiple Upstream | 5.3. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Multiple CPEs, Multiple Upstream | |||
| ISPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 | ISPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 | |||
| 5.4. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Single ISP . . . . . . . . . . . 12 | 5.4. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Single ISP . . . . . . . . . . . 13 | |||
| 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 | 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 | |||
| 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 | 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 | |||
| 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 | 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 | |||
| 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 | 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 | |||
| 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 | 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 | |||
| 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 | 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 | |||
| Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 | Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 | |||
| 1. Introduction | 1. Introduction | |||
| In many deployments, it may not be possible for a network to | In many deployments, it may not be possible for a network to | |||
| determine the cause of a distributed Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack | determine the cause of a distributed Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack | |||
| [RFC4732]. Rather, the network may just realize that some resources | [RFC4732]. Rather, the network may just realize that some resources | |||
| seem to be under attack. To improve such situation, the IETF is | seem to be under attack. To improve such situation, the IETF is | |||
| specifying the DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) | specifying the DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) architecture | |||
| [RFC8811]architecture, where a DOTS client can inform a DOTS server | [RFC8811], where a DOTS client can inform a DOTS server that the | |||
| that the network is under a potential attack and that appropriate | network is under a potential attack and that appropriate mitigation | |||
| mitigation actions are required. Indeed, because the lack of a | actions are required. Indeed, because the lack of a common method to | |||
| common method to coordinate a real-time response among involved | coordinate a real-time response among involved actors and network | |||
| actors and network domains jeopardizes the efficiency of DDoS attack | domains jeopardizes the efficiency of DDoS attack mitigation actions, | |||
| mitigation actions, the DOTS protocol is meant to carry requests for | the DOTS protocol is meant to carry requests for DDoS attack | |||
| DDoS attack mitigation, thereby reducing the impact of an attack and | mitigation, thereby reducing the impact of an attack and leading to | |||
| leading to more efficient responsive actions. | more efficient responsive actions. [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases] | |||
| [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases] identifies a set of scenarios for DOTS; | identifies a set of scenarios for DOTS; most of these scenarios | |||
| most of these scenarios involve a Customer Premises Equipment (CPE). | involve a Customer Premises Equipment (CPE). | |||
| The high-level base DOTS architecture is illustrated in Figure 1 | The high-level base DOTS architecture is illustrated in Figure 1 | |||
| ([RFC8811]): | ([RFC8811]): | |||
| +-----------+ +-------------+ | +-----------+ +-------------+ | |||
| | Mitigator | ~~~~~~~~~~ | DOTS Server | | | Mitigator | ~~~~~~~~~~ | DOTS Server | | |||
| +-----------+ +-------------+ | +-----------+ +-------------+ | |||
| | | | | |||
| | | | | |||
| | | | | |||
| +---------------+ +-------------+ | +---------------+ +-------------+ | |||
| | Attack Target | ~~~~~~ | DOTS Client | | | Attack Target | ~~~~~~ | DOTS Client | | |||
| +---------------+ +-------------+ | +---------------+ +-------------+ | |||
| Figure 1: Basic DOTS Architecture | Figure 1: Basic DOTS Architecture | |||
| [RFC8811] specifies that the DOTS client may be provided with a list | [RFC8811] specifies that the DOTS client may be provided with a list | |||
| of DOTS servers; each of these servers is associated with one or more | of DOTS servers; each of these servers is associated with one or more | |||
| IP addresses. These addresses may or may not be of the same address | IP addresses. These addresses may or may not be of the same address | |||
| family. The DOTS client establishes one or more DOTS sessions by | family. The DOTS client establishes one or more DOTS sessions by | |||
| connecting to the provided DOTS server(s) addresses. | connecting to the provided DOTS server(s) addresses (e.g., | |||
| [RFC8973]). | ||||
| DOTS may be deployed within networks that are connected to one single | DOTS may be deployed within networks that are connected to one single | |||
| upstream provider. It can also be enabled within networks that are | upstream provider. It can also be enabled within networks that are | |||
| multi-homed. The reader may refer to [RFC3582] for an overview of | multi-homed. The reader may refer to [RFC3582] for an overview of | |||
| multi-homing goals and motivations. This document discusses DOTS | multi-homing goals and motivations. This document discusses DOTS | |||
| multi-homing considerations. Specifically, the document aims to: | multi-homing considerations. Specifically, the document aims to: | |||
| 1. Complete the base DOTS architecture with multi-homing specifics. | 1. Complete the base DOTS architecture with multi-homing specifics. | |||
| Those specifics need to be taken into account because: | Those specifics need to be taken into account because: | |||
| skipping to change at page 4, line 47 ¶ | skipping to change at page 4, line 47 ¶ | |||
| 3. Terminology | 3. Terminology | |||
| This document makes use of the terms defined in [RFC8811] and | This document makes use of the terms defined in [RFC8811] and | |||
| [RFC4116]. | [RFC4116]. | |||
| IP indifferently refers to IPv4 or IPv6. | IP indifferently refers to IPv4 or IPv6. | |||
| 4. Multi-Homing Scenarios | 4. Multi-Homing Scenarios | |||
| This section describes some multi-homing scenarios that are relevant | This section describes some multi-homing scenarios that are relevant | |||
| to DOTS. In the following sub-sections, only the connections of | to DOTS. In the following subsections, only the connections of | |||
| border routers are shown; internal network topologies are not | border routers are shown; internal network topologies are not | |||
| elaborated. | elaborated. | |||
| This section distinguishes between residential CPEs vs. enterprise | This section distinguishes between residential CPEs vs. enterprise | |||
| CPEs because PI addresses may be used for enterprises while this is | CPEs because PI addresses may be used for enterprises while this is | |||
| not the current practice for residential CPEs. | not the current practice for residential CPEs. | |||
| 4.1. Residential Single CPE | 4.1. Residential Single CPE | |||
| The scenario shown in Figure 2 is characterized as follows: | The scenario shown in Figure 2 is characterized as follows: | |||
| o The home network is connected to the Internet using one single CPE | o The home network is connected to the Internet using one single | |||
| (Customer Premises Equipment). | CPE. | |||
| o The CPE is connected to multiple provisioning domains (i.e., both | o The CPE is connected to multiple provisioning domains (i.e., both | |||
| fixed and mobile networks). Provisioning domain (PvD) is | fixed and mobile networks). Provisioning domain (PvD) is | |||
| explained in [RFC7556]. | explained in [RFC7556]. | |||
| o Each of these provisioning domains assigns IP addresses/prefixes | o Each of these provisioning domains assigns IP addresses/prefixes | |||
| to the CPE and provides additional configuration information such | to the CPE and provides additional configuration information such | |||
| as a list of DNS servers, DNS suffixes associated with the | as a list of DNS servers, DNS suffixes associated with the | |||
| network, default gateway address, and DOTS server's name | network, default gateway address, and DOTS server's name | |||
| [I-D.ietf-dots-server-discovery]. These addresses/prefixes are | [RFC8973]. These addresses/prefixes are assumed to be Provider- | |||
| assumed to be Provider-Aggregatable (PA). | Aggregatable (PA). | |||
| o Because of ingress filtering, packets forwarded by the CPE towards | o Because of ingress filtering, packets forwarded by the CPE towards | |||
| a given provisioning domain must be sent with a source IP address | a given provisioning domain must be sent with a source IP address | |||
| that was assigned by that domain [RFC8043]. | that was assigned by that domain [RFC8043]. | |||
| +-------+ +-------+ | +-------+ +-------+ | |||
| |Fixed | |Mobile | | |Fixed | |Mobile | | |||
| |Network| |Network| | |Network| |Network| | |||
| +---+---+ +---+---+ | +---+---+ +---+---+ | |||
| | | Service Providers | | | Service Providers | |||
| skipping to change at page 7, line 26 ¶ | skipping to change at page 7, line 26 ¶ | |||
| Figure 4: Multi-homed Enterprise Network (Multiple CPEs, Multiple | Figure 4: Multi-homed Enterprise Network (Multiple CPEs, Multiple | |||
| ISPs) | ISPs) | |||
| 4.4. Multi-homed Enterprise with the Same ISP | 4.4. Multi-homed Enterprise with the Same ISP | |||
| This scenario is a variant of Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 in which | This scenario is a variant of Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 in which | |||
| multi-homing is supported by the same ISP (i.e., same provisioning | multi-homing is supported by the same ISP (i.e., same provisioning | |||
| domain). | domain). | |||
| Editor's Note: The use of anycast addresses is to be consistently | ||||
| discussed. | ||||
| 5. DOTS Multi-homing Deployment Considerations | 5. DOTS Multi-homing Deployment Considerations | |||
| Table 1 provides some sample, non-exhaustive, deployment schemes to | Table 1 provides some sample, non-exhaustive, deployment schemes to | |||
| illustrate how DOTS agents may be deployed for each of the scenarios | illustrate how DOTS agents may be deployed for each of the scenarios | |||
| introduced in Section 4. | introduced in Section 4. | |||
| +---------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+ | +---------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+ | |||
| | Scenario | DOTS client | DOTS | | | Scenario | DOTS client | DOTS | | |||
| | | | gateway | | | | | gateway | | |||
| +---------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+ | +---------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+ | |||
| skipping to change at page 8, line 24 ¶ | skipping to change at page 8, line 5 ¶ | |||
| | Multiple CPEs, Multiple | internal hosts or all | CPEs (rtr1 | | | Multiple CPEs, Multiple | internal hosts or all | CPEs (rtr1 | | |||
| | provisioning domains | CPEs (rtr1 and rtr2) | and rtr2) | | | provisioning domains | CPEs (rtr1 and rtr2) | and rtr2) | | |||
| +---------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+ | +---------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+ | |||
| | Multi-homed enterprise, | internal hosts or all | CPEs (rtr1 | | | Multi-homed enterprise, | internal hosts or all | CPEs (rtr1 | | |||
| | Single provisioning | CPEs (rtr1 and rtr2) | and rtr2) | | | Single provisioning | CPEs (rtr1 and rtr2) | and rtr2) | | |||
| | domain | | | | | domain | | | | |||
| +---------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+ | +---------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+ | |||
| Table 1: Sample Deployment Cases | Table 1: Sample Deployment Cases | |||
| These deployment schemes are further discussed in the following sub- | These deployment schemes are further discussed in the following | |||
| sections. | subsections. | |||
| 5.1. Residential CPE | 5.1. Residential CPE | |||
| Figure 5 depicts DOTS sessions that need to be established between a | Figure 5 depicts DOTS sessions that need to be established between a | |||
| DOTS client (C) and two DOTS servers (S1, S2) within the context of | DOTS client (C) and two DOTS servers (S1, S2) within the context of | |||
| the scenario described in Section 4.1. | the scenario described in Section 4.1. | |||
| For each provisioning domain, the DOTS client MUST resolve the DOTS | For each provisioning domain, the DOTS client MUST resolve the DOTS | |||
| server's name provided by a provisioning domain | server's name provided by a provisioning domain ([RFC8973]) using the | |||
| ([I-D.ietf-dots-server-discovery]) using the DNS servers learned from | DNS servers learned from the respective provisioning domain. | |||
| the respective provisioning domain. IPv6-capable DOTS clients MUST | IPv6-capable DOTS clients MUST use the source address selection | |||
| use the source address selection algorithm defined in [RFC6724] to | algorithm defined in [RFC6724] to select the candidate source | |||
| select the candidate source addresses to contact each of these DOTS | addresses to contact each of these DOTS servers. DOTS sessions MUST | |||
| servers. DOTS sessions MUST be established and maintained with each | be established and maintained with each of the DOTS servers because | |||
| of the DOTS servers because the mitigation scope of these servers is | the mitigation scope of these servers is restricted. The DOTS client | |||
| restricted. The DOTS client SHOULD use the certificate provisioned | SHOULD use the certificate provisioned by a provisioning domain to | |||
| by a provisioning domain to authenticate itself to the DOTS server | authenticate itself to the DOTS server(s) provided by the same | |||
| provided by the same provisioning domain. | provisioning domain. | |||
| When conveying a mitigation request to protect the attack target(s), | When conveying a mitigation request to protect the attack target(s), | |||
| the DOTS client among the DOTS servers available MUST select a DOTS | the DOTS client among the DOTS servers available MUST select a DOTS | |||
| server whose network has assigned the prefixes from which target | server whose network has assigned the IP prefixes from which target | |||
| prefixes and target IP addresses are derived. This implies that if | IP prefixes/addresses are derived. This implies that if no | |||
| no appropriate DOTS server is found, the DOTS client MUST NOT send | appropriate DOTS server is found, the DOTS client MUST NOT send the | |||
| the mitigation request to any DOTS server. | mitigation request to any other available DOTS server. | |||
| For example, a mitigation request to protect target resources bound | For example, a mitigation request to protect target resources bound | |||
| to a PA IP address/prefix cannot be satisfied by a provisioning | to a PA IP address/prefix cannot be satisfied by a provisioning | |||
| domain another domain than the one that owns those addresses/ | domain another domain than the one that owns those addresses/ | |||
| prefixes. Consequently, if a CPE detects a DDoS attack that spreads | prefixes. Consequently, if a CPE detects a DDoS attack that spreads | |||
| over all its network attachments, it MUST contact both DOTS servers | over all its network attachments, it MUST contact both DOTS servers | |||
| for mitigation purposes. Nevertheless, if the DDoS attack is | for mitigation purposes. Nevertheless, if the DDoS attack is | |||
| received from one single network, then only the DOTS server of that | received from one single network, then only the DOTS server of that | |||
| network MUST be contacted. | network MUST be contacted. | |||
| The DOTS client MUST be able to associate a DOTS server with each | The DOTS client MUST be able to associate a DOTS server with each | |||
| provisioning domain. For example, if the DOTS client is provisioned | provisioning domain. For example, if the DOTS client is provisioned | |||
| with S1 using DHCP when attaching to a first network and with S2 | with S1 using DHCP when attaching to a first network and with S2 | |||
| using Protocol Configuration Option (PCO) when attaching to a second | using Protocol Configuration Option (PCO) when attaching to a second | |||
| network, the DOTS client must record the interface from which a DOTS | network, the DOTS client must record the interface from which a DOTS | |||
| server was provisioned. DOTS signaling session to a given DOTS | server was provisioned. DOTS signaling session to a given DOTS | |||
| server must be established using the interface from which the DOTS | server must be established using the interface from which the DOTS | |||
| server was provisioned. | server was provisioned. | |||
| +--+ | +--+ | |||
| -----------|S1| | ----------|S1| | |||
| / +--+ | / +--+ | |||
| / | / DOTS Server Domain #1 | |||
| / | / | |||
| +---+/ | +---+/ | |||
| | C | | | C | | |||
| +---+\ | +---+\ | |||
| \ | \ | |||
| \ | \ | |||
| \ +--+ | \ +--+ | |||
| -----------|S2| | ----------|S2| | |||
| +--+ | +--+ | |||
| DOTS Server Domain #2 | ||||
| Figure 5: DOTS Associations for a Multihomed Residential CPE | Figure 5: DOTS Associations for a Multihomed Residential CPE | |||
| 5.2. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Single CPE, Multiple Upstream ISPs | 5.2. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Single CPE, Multiple Upstream ISPs | |||
| Figure 6 illustrates a first set of DOTS associations that can be | Figure 6 illustrates a first set of DOTS associations that can be | |||
| established with a DOTS gateway, which is enabled within the context | established with a DOTS gateway, which is enabled within the context | |||
| of the scenario described in Section 4.2. This deployment is | of the scenario described in Section 4.2. This deployment is | |||
| characterized as follows: | characterized as follows: | |||
| skipping to change at page 10, line 15 ¶ | skipping to change at page 10, line 5 ¶ | |||
| When PA addresses/prefixes are in use, the same considerations | When PA addresses/prefixes are in use, the same considerations | |||
| discussed in Section 5.1 need to be followed by the DOTS gateway to | discussed in Section 5.1 need to be followed by the DOTS gateway to | |||
| contact its DOTS server(s). The DOTS gateways can be reachable from | contact its DOTS server(s). The DOTS gateways can be reachable from | |||
| DOTS clients by using an unicast address or an anycast address. | DOTS clients by using an unicast address or an anycast address. | |||
| Nevertheless, when PI addresses/prefixes are assigned, the DOTS | Nevertheless, when PI addresses/prefixes are assigned, the DOTS | |||
| gateway MUST send mitigation requests to all its DOTS servers. | gateway MUST send mitigation requests to all its DOTS servers. | |||
| Otherwise, the attack traffic may still be delivered via the ISP | Otherwise, the attack traffic may still be delivered via the ISP | |||
| which hasn't received the mitigation request. | which hasn't received the mitigation request. | |||
| +--+ | +--+ | |||
| -----------|S1| | ----------|S1| | |||
| +---+ / +--+ | +---+ / +--+ | |||
| | C1|----+ / | | C1|----+ / DOTS Server Domain #1 | |||
| +---+ | / | +---+ | / | |||
| +---+ +-+-+/ | +---+ +-+-+/ | |||
| | C3|------| G | | | C3|------| G | | |||
| +---+ +-+-+\ | +---+ +-+-+\ | |||
| +---+ | \ | +---+ | \ | |||
| | C2|----+ \ | | C2|----+ \ | |||
| +---+ \ +--+ | +---+ \ +--+ | |||
| -----------|S2| | ----------|S2| | |||
| +--+ | +--+ | |||
| DOTS Server Domain #2 | ||||
| Figure 6: Multiple DOTS Clients, Single DOTS Gateway, Multiple DOTS | Figure 6: Multiple DOTS Clients, Single DOTS Gateway, Multiple DOTS | |||
| Servers | Servers | |||
| An alternate deployment model is depicted in Figure 7. This | An alternate deployment model is depicted in Figure 7. This | |||
| deployment assumes that: | deployment assumes that: | |||
| o One or more DOTS clients are enabled in hosts located in the | o One or more DOTS clients are enabled in hosts located in the | |||
| internal network. These DOTS clients may use | internal network. These DOTS clients may use [RFC8973] to | |||
| [I-D.ietf-dots-server-discovery] to discover their DOTS server(s). | discover their DOTS server(s). | |||
| o These DOTS clients communicate directly with upstream DOTS | o These DOTS clients communicate directly with upstream DOTS | |||
| servers. | servers. | |||
| If PI addresses/prefixes are in use, the DOTS client MUST send a | If PI addresses/prefixes are in use, the DOTS client MUST send a | |||
| mitigation request to all the DOTS servers. The use of anycast | mitigation request to all the DOTS servers. The use of anycast | |||
| addresses to reach the DOTS servers is NOT RECOMMENDED. | addresses to reach the DOTS servers is NOT RECOMMENDED. | |||
| If PA addresses/prefixes are used, the same considerations discussed | If PA addresses/prefixes are used, the same considerations discussed | |||
| in Section 5.1 need to be followed by the DOTS clients. Because DOTS | in Section 5.1 need to be followed by the DOTS clients. Because DOTS | |||
| clients are not embedded in the CPE and multiple addreses/prefixes | clients are not embedded in the CPE and multiple addreses/prefixes | |||
| may not be assigned to the DOTS client (typically in an IPv4 | may not be assigned to the DOTS client (typically in an IPv4 | |||
| context), some issues arise to steer traffic towards the appropriate | context), some issues arise to steer traffic towards the appropriate | |||
| DOTS server by using the appropriate source IP address. These | DOTS server by using the appropriate source IP address. These | |||
| complications discussed in [RFC4116] are not specific to DOTS. | complications discussed in [RFC4116] are not specific to DOTS. | |||
| +--+ | .......... | |||
| . +--+ . | ||||
| +--------|C1|--------+ | +--------|C1|--------+ | |||
| | +--+ | | | . +--+ . | | |||
| +--+ +--+ +--+ | +--+ . +--+ . +--+ | |||
| |S2|------|C3|------|S1| | |S2|------|C3|------|S1| | |||
| +--+ +--+ +--+ | +--+ . +--+ . +--+ | |||
| | +--+ | | | . +--+ . | | |||
| +--------|C2|--------+ | +--------|C2|--------+ | |||
| +--+ | . +--+ . | |||
| .......... | ||||
| DOTS Client | ||||
| Domain | ||||
| Figure 7: Multiple DOTS Clients, Multiple DOTS Servers | Figure 7: Multiple DOTS Clients, Multiple DOTS Servers | |||
| Another deployment approach is to enable many DOTS clients; each of | Another deployment approach is to enable many DOTS clients; each of | |||
| them is responsible for handling communications with a specific DOTS | them is responsible for handling communications with a specific DOTS | |||
| server (see Figure 8). | server (see Figure 8). | |||
| +--+ | .......... | |||
| +--------|C1| | . +--+ . | |||
| | +--+ | +--------|C1| . | |||
| +--+ +--+ +--+ | | . +--+ . | |||
| |S2| |C2|------|S1| | +--+ . +--+ . +--+ | |||
| +--+ +--+ +--+ | |S2| . |C2|------|S1| | |||
| +--+ . +--+ . +--+ | ||||
| .......... | ||||
| DOTS Client | ||||
| Domain | ||||
| Figure 8: Single Homed DOTS Clients | Figure 8: Single Homed DOTS Clients | |||
| Each DOTS client SHOULD be provided with policies (e.g., a prefix | Each DOTS client SHOULD be provided with policies (e.g., a prefix | |||
| filter that will be against DDoS detection alarms) that will trigger | filter that will be against DDoS detection alarms) that will trigger | |||
| DOTS communications with the DOTS servers. Such policies will help | DOTS communications with the DOTS servers. Such policies will help | |||
| the DOTS client to select the appropriate destination DOTS server. | the DOTS client to select the appropriate destination DOTS server. | |||
| The CPE MUST select the appropriate source IP address when forwarding | The CPE MUST select the appropriate source IP address when forwarding | |||
| DOTS messages received from an internal DOTS client. If anycast | DOTS messages received from an internal DOTS client. If anycast | |||
| skipping to change at page 12, line 49 ¶ | skipping to change at page 13, line 12 ¶ | |||
| Figure 9: Multiple DOTS Clients, Multiple DOTS Gateways, Multiple | Figure 9: Multiple DOTS Clients, Multiple DOTS Gateways, Multiple | |||
| DOTS Servers | DOTS Servers | |||
| 5.4. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Single ISP | 5.4. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Single ISP | |||
| The key difference of the scenario described in Section 4.4 compared | The key difference of the scenario described in Section 4.4 compared | |||
| to the other scenarios is that multi-homing is provided by the same | to the other scenarios is that multi-homing is provided by the same | |||
| ISP. Concretely, that ISP can decide to provision the enterprise | ISP. Concretely, that ISP can decide to provision the enterprise | |||
| network with: | network with: | |||
| 1. The same DOTS server for all network attachments. | o The same DOTS server for all network attachments. | |||
| 2. Distinct DOTS servers for each network attachment. These DOTS | o Distinct DOTS servers for each network attachment. These DOTS | |||
| servers need to coordinate when a mitigation action is received | servers need to coordinate when a mitigation action is received | |||
| from the enterprise network. | from the enterprise network. | |||
| In both cases, DOTS agents enabled within the enterprise network MAY | In both cases, DOTS agents enabled within the enterprise network MAY | |||
| decide to select one or all network attachments to send DOTS | decide to select one or all network attachments to send DOTS | |||
| mitigation requests. | mitigation requests. | |||
| 6. Security Considerations | 6. Security Considerations | |||
| DOTS-related security considerations are discussed in Section 4 of | DOTS-related security considerations are discussed in Section 4 of | |||
| [RFC8811]. | [RFC8811]. | |||
| skipping to change at page 14, line 16 ¶ | skipping to change at page 14, line 27 ¶ | |||
| 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, | 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, | |||
| May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. | May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. | |||
| [RFC8811] Mortensen, A., Ed., Reddy.K, T., Ed., Andreasen, F., | [RFC8811] Mortensen, A., Ed., Reddy.K, T., Ed., Andreasen, F., | |||
| Teague, N., and R. Compton, "DDoS Open Threat Signaling | Teague, N., and R. Compton, "DDoS Open Threat Signaling | |||
| (DOTS) Architecture", RFC 8811, DOI 10.17487/RFC8811, | (DOTS) Architecture", RFC 8811, DOI 10.17487/RFC8811, | |||
| August 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8811>. | August 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8811>. | |||
| 9.2. Informative References | 9.2. Informative References | |||
| [I-D.ietf-dots-server-discovery] | ||||
| Boucadair, M. and T. Reddy.K, "Distributed-Denial-of- | ||||
| Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Agent Discovery", | ||||
| draft-ietf-dots-server-discovery-15 (work in progress), | ||||
| November 2020. | ||||
| [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases] | [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases] | |||
| Dobbins, R., Migault, D., Moskowitz, R., Teague, N., Xia, | Dobbins, R., Migault, D., Moskowitz, R., Teague, N., Xia, | |||
| L., and K. Nishizuka, "Use cases for DDoS Open Threat | L., and K. Nishizuka, "Use cases for DDoS Open Threat | |||
| Signaling", draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-25 (work in | Signaling", draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-25 (work in | |||
| progress), July 2020. | progress), July 2020. | |||
| [RFC3582] Abley, J., Black, B., and V. Gill, "Goals for IPv6 Site- | [RFC3582] Abley, J., Black, B., and V. Gill, "Goals for IPv6 Site- | |||
| Multihoming Architectures", RFC 3582, | Multihoming Architectures", RFC 3582, | |||
| DOI 10.17487/RFC3582, August 2003, | DOI 10.17487/RFC3582, August 2003, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3582>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3582>. | |||
| skipping to change at page 15, line 16 ¶ | skipping to change at page 15, line 22 ¶ | |||
| Mortensen, A., and N. Teague, "Distributed Denial-of- | Mortensen, A., and N. Teague, "Distributed Denial-of- | |||
| Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel | Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel | |||
| Specification", RFC 8782, DOI 10.17487/RFC8782, May 2020, | Specification", RFC 8782, DOI 10.17487/RFC8782, May 2020, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8782>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8782>. | |||
| [RFC8783] Boucadair, M., Ed. and T. Reddy.K, Ed., "Distributed | [RFC8783] Boucadair, M., Ed. and T. Reddy.K, Ed., "Distributed | |||
| Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data | Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data | |||
| Channel Specification", RFC 8783, DOI 10.17487/RFC8783, | Channel Specification", RFC 8783, DOI 10.17487/RFC8783, | |||
| May 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8783>. | May 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8783>. | |||
| [RFC8973] Boucadair, M. and T. Reddy.K, "DDoS Open Threat Signaling | ||||
| (DOTS) Agent Discovery", RFC 8973, DOI 10.17487/RFC8973, | ||||
| January 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8973>. | ||||
| Authors' Addresses | Authors' Addresses | |||
| Mohamed Boucadair | Mohamed Boucadair | |||
| Orange | Orange | |||
| Rennes 35000 | Rennes 35000 | |||
| France | France | |||
| Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com | Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com | |||
| Tirumaleswar Reddy | Tirumaleswar Reddy | |||
| End of changes. 28 change blocks. | ||||
| 94 lines changed or deleted | 100 lines changed or added | |||
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