< draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel-04.txt   draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel-05.txt >
DOTS T. Reddy DOTS T. Reddy
Internet-Draft McAfee Internet-Draft McAfee
Intended status: Standards Track M. Boucadair Intended status: Standards Track M. Boucadair
Expires: April 5, 2018 Orange Expires: April 15, 2018 Orange
P. Patil P. Patil
Cisco Cisco
A. Mortensen A. Mortensen
Arbor Networks, Inc. Arbor Networks, Inc.
N. Teague N. Teague
Verisign, Inc. Verisign, Inc.
October 2, 2017 October 12, 2017
Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal
Channel Channel
draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel-04 draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel-05
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies the DOTS signal channel, a protocol for This document specifies the DOTS signal channel, a protocol for
signaling the need for protection against Distributed Denial-of- signaling the need for protection against Distributed Denial-of-
Service (DDoS) attacks to a server capable of enabling network Service (DDoS) attacks to a server capable of enabling network
traffic mitigation on behalf of the requesting client. A companion traffic mitigation on behalf of the requesting client. A companion
document defines the DOTS data channel, a separate reliable document defines the DOTS data channel, a separate reliable
communication layer for DOTS management and configuration. communication layer for DOTS management and configuration.
skipping to change at page 1, line 43 skipping to change at page 1, line 43
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 5, 2018. This Internet-Draft will expire on April 15, 2018.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 26 skipping to change at page 2, line 26
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Notational Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Notational Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Solution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Solution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Happy Eyeballs for DOTS Signal Channel . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Happy Eyeballs for DOTS Signal Channel . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. DOTS Signal Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. DOTS Signal Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2. DOTS Signal YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.2. DOTS Signal YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2.1. Mitigation Request YANG Module Tree Structure . . . . 8 5.2.1. Mitigation Request YANG Module Tree Structure . . . . 8
5.2.2. Mitigation Request YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.2.2. Mitigation Request YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2.3. Session Configuration YANG Module Tree Structure . . 10 5.2.3. Session Configuration YANG Module Tree Structure . . 11
5.2.4. Session Configuration YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.2.4. Session Configuration YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.3. Mitigation Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.3. Mitigation Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.3.1. Requesting mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5.3.1. Requesting mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.3.2. Withdraw a DOTS Signal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 5.3.2. Withdraw a DOTS Signal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.3.3. Retrieving a DOTS Signal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 5.3.3. Retrieving a DOTS Signal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.3.4. Efficacy Update from DOTS Client . . . . . . . . . . 25 5.3.4. Efficacy Update from DOTS Client . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.4. DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration . . . . . . . . 27 5.4. DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration . . . . . . . . 30
5.4.1. Discover Configuration Parameters . . . . . . . . . . 28 5.4.1. Discover Configuration Parameters . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.4.2. Convey DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration . . 30 5.4.2. Convey DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration . . 33
5.4.3. Delete DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration . . 33 5.4.3. Delete DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration . . 37
5.4.4. Retrieving DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration 34 5.4.4. Retrieving DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration 38
5.5. Redirected Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 5.5. Redirected Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.6. Heartbeat Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 5.6. Heartbeat Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6. Mapping parameters to CBOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 6. Mapping parameters to CBOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7. (D)TLS Protocol Profile and Performance considerations . . . 37 7. (D)TLS Protocol Profile and Performance considerations . . . 41
7.1. MTU and Fragmentation Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 7.1. MTU and Fragmentation Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
8. (D)TLS 1.3 considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 8. (D)TLS 1.3 considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
9. Mutual Authentication of DOTS Agents & Authorization of DOTS 9. Mutual Authentication of DOTS Agents & Authorization of DOTS
Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
10.1. CoAP Response Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 10.1. CoAP Response Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
10.2. DOTS signal channel CBOR Mappings Registry . . . . . . . 42 10.2. DOTS signal channel CBOR Mappings Registry . . . . . . . 46
10.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 10.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
10.2.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 10.2.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
11. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 11. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
11.1. nttdots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 11.1. nttdots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
13. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 13. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
14. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 14. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
15.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 15.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
15.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 15.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack is an attempt to make A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack is an attempt to make
machines or network resources unavailable to their intended users. machines or network resources unavailable to their intended users.
In most cases, sufficient scale can be achieved by compromising In most cases, sufficient scale can be achieved by compromising
enough end-hosts and using those infected hosts to perpetrate and enough end-hosts and using those infected hosts to perpetrate and
amplify the attack. The victim in this attack can be an application amplify the attack. The victim in this attack can be an application
server, a host, a router, a firewall, or an entire network. server, a host, a router, a firewall, or an entire network.
skipping to change at page 7, line 20 skipping to change at page 7, line 20
Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252], a lightweight protocol Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252], a lightweight protocol
originally designed for constrained devices and networks. CoAP's originally designed for constrained devices and networks. CoAP's
expectation of packet loss, support for asynchronous non-confirmable expectation of packet loss, support for asynchronous non-confirmable
messaging, congestion control, small message overhead limiting the messaging, congestion control, small message overhead limiting the
need for fragmentation, use of minimal resources, and support for need for fragmentation, use of minimal resources, and support for
(D)TLS make it a good foundation on which to build the DOTS signaling (D)TLS make it a good foundation on which to build the DOTS signaling
mechanism. mechanism.
The DOTS signal channel is layered on existing standards (Figure 4). The DOTS signal channel is layered on existing standards (Figure 4).
TBD: The default port number for DOTS signal channel is 5684 TBD: The default port number for DOTS signal channel is 5684
(Section 12.7 of [RFC7252] and Section 10.4 of (Section 12.7 of [RFC7252] and Section 10.4 of
[I-D.ietf-core-coap-tcp-tls]), for both UDP and TCP. [I-D.ietf-core-coap-tcp-tls]), for both UDP and TCP.
+--------------+ +--------------+
| DOTS | | DOTS |
+--------------+ +--------------+
| CoAP | | CoAP |
+--------------+ +--------------+
| TLS | DTLS | | TLS | DTLS |
+--------------+ +--------------+
| TCP | UDP | | TCP | UDP |
+--------------+ +--------------+
skipping to change at page 8, line 29 skipping to change at page 8, line 29
This document defines a YANG [RFC6020] module for mitigation scope This document defines a YANG [RFC6020] module for mitigation scope
and DOTS signal channel session configuration data. and DOTS signal channel session configuration data.
5.2.1. Mitigation Request YANG Module Tree Structure 5.2.1. Mitigation Request YANG Module Tree Structure
This document defines the YANG module "ietf-dots-signal", which has This document defines the YANG module "ietf-dots-signal", which has
the following tree structure: the following tree structure:
module: ietf-dots-signal module: ietf-dots-signal
+--rw mitigation-scope +--rw mitigation-scope
+--rw client-identifier* binary
+--rw scope* [mitigation-id] +--rw scope* [mitigation-id]
+--rw mitigation-id int32 +--rw mitigation-id int32
+--rw target-ip* inet:ip-address +--rw target-ip* inet:ip-address
+--rw target-prefix* inet:ip-prefix +--rw target-prefix* inet:ip-prefix
+--rw target-port-range* [lower-port upper-port] +--rw target-port-range* [lower-port upper-port]
| +--rw lower-port inet:port-number | +--rw lower-port inet:port-number
| +--rw upper-port inet:port-number | +--rw upper-port inet:port-number
+--rw target-protocol* uint8 +--rw target-protocol* uint8
+--rw fqdn* inet:domain-name +--rw fqdn* inet:domain-name
+--rw uri* inet:uri +--rw uri* inet:uri
+--rw alias-name* string +--rw alias-name* string
+--rw lifetime? int32 +--rw lifetime? int32
5.2.2. Mitigation Request YANG Module 5.2.2. Mitigation Request YANG Module
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-dots-signal@2017-08-03.yang" <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-dots-signal@2017-10-04.yang"
module ietf-dots-signal { module ietf-dots-signal {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal"; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal";
prefix "signal"; prefix "signal";
import ietf-inet-types { import ietf-inet-types {
prefix "inet"; prefix "inet";
} }
organization "McAfee, Inc."; organization "IETF DOTS Working Group";
contact "Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy <TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>";
contact
"Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy <TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>
Mohamed Boucadair <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
Prashanth Patil <praspati@cisco.com>
Andrew Mortensen <amortensen@arbor.net>
Nik Teague <nteague@verisign.com>";
description description
"This module contains YANG definition for DOTS "This module contains YANG definition for DOTS
signal sent by the DOTS client to the DOTS server."; signal sent by the DOTS client to the DOTS server.
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision 2017-10-04 {
description
"Add units and fix some nits.";
reference
"-05";
}
revision 2017-08-03 { revision 2017-08-03 {
reference reference
"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-reddy-dots-signal-channel"; "https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-reddy-dots-signal-channel";
} }
container mitigation-scope { container mitigation-scope {
description description
"Top level container for a mitigation request."; "Top level container for a mitigation request.";
leaf-list client-identifier {
type binary;
description
"A client identifier conveyed by a DOTS gateway
to a remote DOTS server.";
}
list scope { list scope {
key mitigation-id; key mitigation-id;
description "Identifier for the mitigation request."; description "Identifier for the mitigation request.";
leaf mitigation-id { leaf mitigation-id {
type int32; type int32;
description "Mitigation request identifier."; description "Mitigation request identifier.";
} }
leaf-list target-ip { leaf-list target-ip {
type inet:ip-address; type inet:ip-address;
description description
"IPv4 or IPv6 address identifyting the target."; "IPv4 or IPv6 address identifying the target.";
} }
leaf-list target-prefix { leaf-list target-prefix {
type inet:ip-prefix; type inet:ip-prefix;
description description
"IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifyting the target."; "IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the target.";
} }
list target-port-range { list target-port-range {
key "lower-port upper-port"; key "lower-port upper-port";
description "Port range. When only lower-port is present, description "Port range. When only lower-port is present,
it represents a single port."; it represents a single port.";
leaf lower-port { leaf lower-port {
type inet:port-number; type inet:port-number;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description "Lower port number."; description "Lower port number.";
} }
leaf upper-port { leaf upper-port {
skipping to change at page 10, line 35 skipping to change at page 11, line 26
description "URI"; description "URI";
} }
leaf-list alias-name { leaf-list alias-name {
type string; type string;
description "alias name"; description "alias name";
} }
leaf lifetime { leaf lifetime {
type int32; type int32;
units "seconds";
default 3600;
description description
"Indicates the lifetime of the mitigation request."; "Indicates the lifetime of the mitigation request.";
} }
} }
} }
} }
<CODE ENDS> <CODE ENDS>
5.2.3. Session Configuration YANG Module Tree Structure 5.2.3. Session Configuration YANG Module Tree Structure
skipping to change at page 11, line 17 skipping to change at page 12, line 7
+--rw session-id? int32 +--rw session-id? int32
+--rw heartbeat-interval? int16 +--rw heartbeat-interval? int16
+--rw missing-hb-allowed? int16 +--rw missing-hb-allowed? int16
+--rw max-retransmit? int16 +--rw max-retransmit? int16
+--rw ack-timeout? int16 +--rw ack-timeout? int16
+--rw ack-random-factor? decimal64 +--rw ack-random-factor? decimal64
+--rw trigger-mitigation? boolean +--rw trigger-mitigation? boolean
5.2.4. Session Configuration YANG Module 5.2.4. Session Configuration YANG Module
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-dots-signal-config@2016-11-28.yang" <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-dots-signal-config@2017-10-04.yang"
module ietf-dots-signal-config { module ietf-dots-signal-config {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal-config"; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal-config";
prefix "config"; prefix "config";
organization "McAfee, Inc."; organization "IETF DOTS Working Group";
contact "Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy <TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>";
contact
"Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy <TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>
Mohamed Boucadair <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
Prashanth Patil <praspati@cisco.com>
Andrew Mortensen <amortensen@arbor.net>
Nik Teague <nteague@verisign.com>";
description description
"This module contains YANG definition for DOTS "This module contains YANG definition for DOTS
signal channel session configuration."; signal channel session configuration.
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision 2017-10-04 {
description
"Add units/defaults and fix some nits.";
reference
"-05";
}
revision 2016-11-28 { revision 2016-11-28 {
reference reference
"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-reddy-dots-signal-channel"; "https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-reddy-dots-signal-channel";
} }
container signal-config { container signal-config {
description "Top level container for DOTS signal channel session description "Top level container for DOTS signal channel session
configuration."; configuration.";
leaf session-id { leaf session-id {
type int32; type int32;
description "An identifier for the DOTS signal channel description "An identifier for the DOTS signal channel
session configuration data."; session configuration data.";
} }
leaf heartbeat-interval { leaf heartbeat-interval {
type int16; type int16;
units "seconds";
default 30;
description description
"DOTS agents regularly send heartbeats to each other "DOTS agents regularly send heartbeats to each other
after mutual authentication in order to keep after mutual authentication in order to keep
the DOTS signal channel open."; the DOTS signal channel open.";
} }
leaf missing-hb-allowed { leaf missing-hb-allowed {
type int16; type int16;
default 5;
description description
"Maximum number of missing heartbeats allowed"; "Maximum number of missing heartbeats allowed.";
} }
leaf max-retransmit { leaf max-retransmit {
type int16; type int16;
default 3;
description description
"Maximum number of retransmissions of a "Maximum number of retransmissions of a
Confirmable message."; Confirmable message.";
} }
leaf ack-timeout { leaf ack-timeout {
type int16; type int16;
units "seconds";
default 2;
description description
"Initial retransmission timeout value."; "Initial retransmission timeout value.";
} }
leaf ack-random-factor { leaf ack-random-factor {
type decimal64 { type decimal64 {
fraction-digits 2; fraction-digits 2;
} }
default 1.5;
description description
"Random factor used to influence the timing of "Random factor used to influence the timing of
retransmissions"; retransmissions";
} }
leaf trigger-mitigation { leaf trigger-mitigation {
type boolean; type boolean;
default true; default true;
description description
"If false, then mitigation is triggered "If false, then mitigation is triggered
only when the DOTS server channel session is lost"; only when the DOTS server channel session is lost";
} }
} }
} }
<CODE ENDS> <CODE ENDS>
5.3. Mitigation Request 5.3. Mitigation Request
The following methods are used to request or withdraw mitigation The following methods are used to request or withdraw mitigation
requests: requests:
PUT: DOTS clients use the PUT method to request mitigation PUT: DOTS clients use the PUT method to request mitigation
(Section 5.3.1). During active mitigation, DOTS clients may use (Section 5.3.1). During active mitigation, DOTS clients may use
PUT requests to convey mitigation efficacy updates to the DOTS PUT requests to convey mitigation efficacy updates to the DOTS
server (Section 5.3.4). server (Section 5.3.4).
DELETE: DOTS clients use the DELETE method to withdraw a request for DELETE: DOTS clients use the DELETE method to withdraw a request for
mitigation from the DOTS server (Section 5.3.2). mitigation from the DOTS server (Section 5.3.2).
GET: DOTS clients may use the GET method to subscribe to DOTS server GET: DOTS clients may use the GET method to subscribe to DOTS server
status messages, or to retrieve the list of existing mitigations status messages, or to retrieve the list of existing mitigations
(Section 5.3.3). (Section 5.3.3).
Mitigation request and response messages are marked as Non- Mitigation request and response messages are marked as Non-
confirmable messages. DOTS agents should follow the data confirmable messages. DOTS agents SHOULD follow the data
transmission guidelines discussed in Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085] and transmission guidelines discussed in Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085] and
control transmission behavior by not sending on average more than one control transmission behavior by not sending on average more than one
UDP datagram per RTT to the peer DOTS agent. Requests marked by the UDP datagram per RTT to the peer DOTS agent.
DOTS client as Non-confirmable messages are sent at regular intervals
until a response is received from the DOTS server and if the DOTS Requests marked by the DOTS client as Non-confirmable messages are
client cannot maintain a RTT estimate then it SHOULD NOT send more sent at regular intervals until a response is received from the DOTS
than one Non-confirmable request every 3 seconds, and SHOULD use an server and if the DOTS client cannot maintain a RTT estimate then it
even less aggressive rate when possible (case 2 in Section 3.1.3 of SHOULD NOT send more than one Non-confirmable request every 3
[RFC8085]). seconds, and SHOULD use an even less aggressive rate when possible
(case 2 in Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085]).
5.3.1. Requesting mitigation 5.3.1. Requesting mitigation
When a DOTS client requires mitigation for any reason, the DOTS When a DOTS client requires mitigation for any reason, the DOTS
client uses CoAP PUT method to send a mitigation request to the DOTS client uses CoAP PUT method to send a mitigation request to the DOTS
server (Figure 5, illustrated in JSON diagnostic notation). The DOTS server (Figure 5, illustrated in JSON diagnostic notation). The DOTS
server can enable mitigation on behalf of the DOTS client by server can enable mitigation on behalf of the DOTS client by
communicating the DOTS client's request to the mitigator and relaying communicating the DOTS client's request to the mitigator and relaying
selected mitigator feedback to the requesting DOTS client. selected mitigator feedback to the requesting DOTS client.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03) Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Host: "host" Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: "version" Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "dots-signal" Uri-Path: "dots-signal"
Uri-Path: "signal" Uri-Path: "signal"
Content-Type: "application/cbor" Content-Type: "application/cbor"
{ {
"mitigation-scope": { "mitigation-scope": {
"client-identifer": "string",
"scope": [ "scope": [
{ {
"mitigation-id": integer, "mitigation-id": integer,
"target-ip": [ "target-ip": [
"string" "string"
], ],
"target-prefix": [ "target-prefix": [
"string" "string"
], ],
"target-port-range": [ "target-port-range": [
skipping to change at page 14, line 50 skipping to change at page 16, line 51
"lifetime": integer "lifetime": integer
} }
] ]
} }
} }
Figure 5: PUT to convey DOTS signals Figure 5: PUT to convey DOTS signals
The parameters are described below. The parameters are described below.
client-identifer: The client identifer MAY be conveyed by the DOTS
gateway to propagate the DOTS client identity to the DOTS server.
The'client-identifier' value MUST be assigned by the DOTS gateway
in a manner that ensures that there is no probability that the
same value will be accidentally assigned to a different DOTS
client. The client-identifier attribute SHOULD NOT to be
advertised by the DOTS client.
mitigation-id: Identifier for the mitigation request represented mitigation-id: Identifier for the mitigation request represented
using an integer. This identifier MUST be unique for each using an integer. This identifier MUST be unique for each
mitigation request bound to the DOTS client, i.e., the mitigation- mitigation request bound to the DOTS client, i.e., the mitigation-
id parameter value in the mitigation request needs to be unique id parameter value in the mitigation request needs to be unique
relative to the mitigation-id parameter values of active relative to the mitigation-id parameter values of active
mitigation requests conveyed from the DOTS client to the DOTS mitigation requests conveyed from the DOTS client to the DOTS
server. This identifier MUST be generated by the DOTS client. server. This identifier MUST be generated by the DOTS client.
This document does not make any assumption about how this This document does not make any assumption about how this
identifier is generated. This is a mandatory attribute. identifier is generated. This is a mandatory attribute.
skipping to change at page 16, line 8 skipping to change at page 18, line 18
sending the same request again. The default lifetime of the sending the same request again. The default lifetime of the
mitigation request is 3600 seconds (60 minutes) -- this value was mitigation request is 3600 seconds (60 minutes) -- this value was
chosen to be long enough so that refreshing is not typically a chosen to be long enough so that refreshing is not typically a
burden on the DOTS client, while expiring the request where the burden on the DOTS client, while expiring the request where the
client has unexpectedly quit in a timely manner. A lifetime of client has unexpectedly quit in a timely manner. A lifetime of
negative one (-1) indicates indefinite lifetime for the mitigation negative one (-1) indicates indefinite lifetime for the mitigation
request. The server MUST always indicate the actual lifetime in request. The server MUST always indicate the actual lifetime in
the response and the remaining lifetime in status messages sent to the response and the remaining lifetime in status messages sent to
the client. This is an optional attribute in the request. the client. This is an optional attribute in the request.
The CBOR key values for the parameters are defined in Section 6. The The CBOR key values for the parameters are defined in Section 6.
IANA Considerations section defines how the CBOR key values can be Section 10 defines how the CBOR key values can be allocated to
allocated to standards bodies and vendors. FQDN and URI mitigation standards bodies and vendors.
scopes may be thought of as a form of scope alias, in which the
addresses to which the domain name or URI resolve represent the full FQDN and URI mitigation scopes may be thought of as a form of scope
scope of the mitigation. In the PUT request at least one of the alias, in which the addresses to which the domain name or URI resolve
attributes target-ip or target-prefix or fqdn or uri or alias-name represent the full scope of the mitigation.
MUST be present. DOTS agents can safely ignore Vendor-Specific
parameters they don't understand. The relative order of two In the PUT request at least one of the attributes target-ip or
mitigation requests from a DOTS client is determined by comparing target-prefix or fqdn or uri or alias-name MUST be present. DOTS
their respective mitigation-id values. If two mitigation requests agents can safely ignore Vendor-Specific parameters they don't
have overlapping mitigation scopes the mitigation request with higher understand.
numeric mitigation-id value will override the mitigation request with
a lower numeric mitigation-id value. Two mitigation-ids are The relative order of two mitigation requests from a DOTS client is
overlapping if there is a common IP, IP Prefix, FQDN, URI or alias- determined by comparing their respective 'mitigation-id' values. If
name. The overlapped lower numeric mitigation-id is automatically two mitigation requests have overlapping mitigation scopes, the
deleted and no longer available at the DOTS server. The Uri-Path mitigation request with higher numeric 'mitigation-id' value will
option carries a major and minor version nomenclature to manage override the mitigation request with a lower numeric 'mitigation-id'
versioning and DOTS signal channel in this specification uses v1 value. Two mitigation-ids are overlapping if there is a common IP
major version. address, IP prefix, FQDN, URI, or alias-name. The overlapped lower
numeric 'mitigation-id' MUST be automatically deleted and no longer
available at the DOTS server.
The Uri-Path option carries a major and minor version nomenclature to
manage versioning and DOTS signal channel in this specification uses
v1 major version.
If the DOTS client is using the certificate provisioned by the EST
server in the DOTS gateway-domain to authenticate itself to the DOTS
gateway, then the 'client-identifier' value will be the output of a
cryptographic hash algorithm whose input is the DER-encoded ASN.1
representation of the Subject Public Key Info (SPKI) of an X.509
certificate. The output of the cryptographic hash algorithm is
base64url encoded. In this version of the specification, the
cryptographic hash algorithm used is SHA-256 [RFC6234]. If the
'client-identifier' value is already present in the mitigation
request received from the DOTS client, the DOTS gateway computes the
'client-identifier' value, as discussed above, and adds the computed
'client-identifier' value to the end of the 'client-identifier' list.
In both DOTS signal and data channel sessions, the DOTS client MUST In both DOTS signal and data channel sessions, the DOTS client MUST
authenticate itself to the DOTS server (Section 9). The DOTS server authenticate itself to the DOTS server (Section 9). If the 'client-
can use the algorithm discussed in Section 7 of [RFC7589] to derive identifier' value is not present in the mitigation request, the DOTS
the DOTS client identity or username from the client certificate. server may use the algorithm in Section 7 of [RFC7589] to derive the
The DOTS server couples the DOTS signal and data channel sessions DOTS client identity or username from the client certificate. The
using the DOTS client identity, so the DOTS server can validate DOTS server couples the DOTS signal and data channel sessions using
whether the aliases conveyed in the mitigation request were indeed the DOTS client identity, so the DOTS server can validate whether the
created by the same DOTS client using the DOTS data channel session. aliases conveyed in the mitigation request were indeed created by the
If the aliases were not created by the DOTS client then the DOTS same DOTS client using the DOTS data channel session. If the aliases
server returns 4.00 (Bad Request) in the response. The DOTS server were not created by the DOTS client, the DOTS server returns 4.00
couples the DOTS signal channel sessions using the DOTS client (Bad Request) in the response.
identity, and the DOTS server uses mitigation-id parameter value to
detect duplicate mitigation requests. If the mitigation request
contains both alias-name and other parameters identifying the target
resources (such as, target-ip, target-prefix, target-port-range,
fqdn, or uri) then the DOTS server appends the parameter values in
alias-name with the corresponding parameter values in target-ip,
target-prefix, target-port-range, fqdn, or uri.
Figure 6 shows an PUT request example to signal that ports 80, 8080, The DOTS server couples the DOTS signal channel sessions using the
DOTS client identity, and the DOTS server uses 'mitigation-id'
parameter value to detect duplicate mitigation requests. If the
mitigation request contains both alias-name and other parameters
identifying the target resources (such as, target-ip, target-prefix,
target-port-range, fqdn, or uri), then the DOTS server appends the
parameter values in alias-name with the corresponding parameter
values in target-ip, target-prefix, target-port-range, fqdn, or uri.
Figure 6 shows a PUT request example to signal that ports 80, 8080,
and 443 on the servers 2001:db8:6401::1 and 2001:db8:6401::2 are and 443 on the servers 2001:db8:6401::1 and 2001:db8:6401::2 are
being attacked (illustrated in JSON diagnostic notation). being attacked (illustrated in JSON diagnostic notation).
Header: PUT (Code=0.03) Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Host: "www.example.com" Uri-Host: "www.example.com"
Uri-Path: "v1" Uri-Path: "v1"
Uri-Path: "dots-signal" Uri-Path: "dots-signal"
Uri-Path: "signal" Uri-Path: "signal"
Content-Format: "application/cbor" Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{ {
"mitigation-scope": { "mitigation-scope": {
"scope": [ "client-identifier": "E9CZ9INDbd+2eRQozYqqbQ2yXLVKB9+xcprMF+44U1g=",
{ "scope": [
"mitigation-id": 12332, {
"target-ip": [ "mitigation-id": 12332,
"2001:db8:6401::1", "target-ip": [
"2001:db8:6401::2" "2001:db8:6401::1",
], "2001:db8:6401::2"
"target-port-range": [ ],
{ "target-port-range": [
"lower-port": 80 {
}, "lower-port": 80
{ },
"lower-port": 443 {
}, "lower-port": 443
{ },
"lower-port": 8080 {
} "lower-port": 8080
], }
"target-protocol": [ ],
6 "target-protocol": [
] 6
} ]
] }
} ]
} }
}
The CBOR encoding format is shown below: The CBOR encoding format is shown below:
a1 # map(1) A1 # map(1)
01 # unsigned(1) 01 # unsigned(1)
a1 # map(1) A2 # map(2)
02 # unsigned(2) 18 20 # unsigned(32)
81 # array(1) 78 2C # text(44)
a4 # map(4) 4539435A39494E4462642B326552516F7A59717162513279584C564B42392B786370724D462B34345531673D
03 # unsigned(3) # "E9CZ9INDbd+2eRQozYqqbQ2yXLVKB9+xcprMF+44U1g="
19 302c # unsigned(12332) 02 # unsigned(2)
04 # unsigned(4) 81 # array(1)
82 # array(2) A4 # map(4)
70 # text(16) 03 # unsigned(3)
323030313A6462383A363430313A3A31 # "2001:db8:6401::1" 19 302C # unsigned(12332)
04 # unsigned(4)
82 # array(2)
70 # text(16)
323030313A6462383A363430313A3A31 # "2001:db8:6401::1"
70 # text(16)
323030313A6462383A363430313A3A32 # "2001:db8:6401::2"
05 # unsigned(5)
83 # array(3)
A1 # map(1)
06 # unsigned(6)
18 50 # unsigned(80)
A1 # map(1)
06 # unsigned(6)
19 01BB # unsigned(443)
A1 # map(1)
06 # unsigned(6)
19 1F90 # unsigned(8080)
70 # text(16) 08 # unsigned(8)
323030313A6462383A363430313A3A32 # "2001:db8:6401::2" 81 # array(1)
05 # unsigned(5) 06 # unsigned(6)
83 # array(3)
a1 # map(1)
06 # unsigned(6)
18 50 # unsigned(80)
a1 # map(1)
06 # unsigned(6)
19 01bb # unsigned(443)
a1 # map(1)
06 # unsigned(6)
19 1f90 # unsigned(8080)
08 # unsigned(8)
81 # array(1)
06 # unsigned(6)
Figure 6: PUT for DOTS signal Figure 6: PUT for DOTS signal
The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the PUT request The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the PUT request
using CoAP response codes. CoAP 2.xx codes are success. CoAP 4.xx using CoAP response codes. CoAP 2.xx codes are success. CoAP 4.xx
codes are some sort of invalid requests. Figure 7 shows an PUT codes are some sort of invalid requests. Figure 7 shows a PUT
response for CoAP 2.xx response codes. response for CoAP 2.xx response codes.
{ {
"mitigation-scope": { "mitigation-scope": {
"client-identifer": "string",
"scope": [ "scope": [
{ {
"mitigation-id": integer, "mitigation-id": integer,
"lifetime": integer "lifetime": integer
} }
] ]
} }
} }
Figure 7: 2.xx response body Figure 7: 2.xx response body
COAP 5.xx codes are returned if the DOTS server has erred or is COAP 5.xx codes are returned if the DOTS server has erred or is
currently unavailable to provide mitigation in response to the currently unavailable to provide mitigation in response to the
mitigation request from the DOTS client. If the DOTS server does not mitigation request from the DOTS client.
find the mitigation-id parameter value conveyed in the PUT request in
its configuration data then the server MAY accept the mitigation If the DOTS server does not find the 'mitigation-id' parameter value
request, and a 2.01 (Created) response is returned to the DOTS conveyed in the PUT request in its configuration data, then the
client, and the DOTS server will try to mitigate the attack. If the server MAY accept the mitigation request by sending back a 2.01
DOTS server finds the mitigation-id parameter value conveyed in the (Created) response to the DOTS client; the DOTS server will
PUT request in its configuration data then the server MAY update the consequently try to mitigate the attack.
mitigation request, and a 2.04 (Changed) response is returned to
indicate a successful update of the mitigation request. If the If the DOTS server finds the 'mitigation-id' parameter value conveyed
request is missing one or more mandatory attributes, then 4.00 (Bad in the PUT request in its configuration data, then the server MAY
Request) will be returned in the response or if the request contains update the mitigation request, and a 2.04 (Changed) response is
invalid or unknown parameters then 4.02 (Invalid query) will be returned to indicate a successful update of the mitigation request.
If the request is missing one or more mandatory attributes, then 4.00
(Bad Request) will be returned in the response or if the request
contains invalid or unknown parameters then 4.02 (Invalid query) is
returned in the response. returned in the response.
For the mitigation request to continue beyond the initial negotiated For a mitigation request to continue beyond the initial negotiated
lifetime, the DOTS client will need to refresh the current mitigation lifetime, the DOTS client need to refresh the current mitigation
request by sending a new PUT request. The PUT request MUST use the request by sending a new PUT request. The PUT request MUST use the
same mitigation-id value, and MUST repeat all the other parameters as same 'mitigation-id' value, and MUST repeat all the other parameters
sent in the original mitigation request apart from a possible change as sent in the original mitigation request apart from a possible
to the lifetime parameter value. change to the lifetime parameter value.
5.3.2. Withdraw a DOTS Signal 5.3.2. Withdraw a DOTS Signal
A DELETE request is used to withdraw a DOTS signal from a DOTS server A DELETE request is used to withdraw a DOTS signal from a DOTS server
(Figure 8). (Figure 8).
Header: DELETE (Code=0.04) Header: DELETE (Code=0.04)
Uri-Host: "host" Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: "version" Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "dots-signal" Uri-Path: "dots-signal"
Uri-Path: "signal" Uri-Path: "signal"
Content-Format: "application/cbor" Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{ {
"mitigation-scope": { "mitigation-scope": {
"client-identifer": "string",
"scope": [ "scope": [
{ {
"mitigation-id": integer "mitigation-id": integer
} }
] ]
} }
} }
Figure 8: Withdraw DOTS signal Figure 8: Withdraw DOTS signal
The DOTS server immediately acknowledges a DOTS client's request to The DOTS server immediately acknowledges a DOTS client's request to
withdraw the DOTS signal using 2.02 (Deleted) response code with no withdraw the DOTS signal using 2.02 (Deleted) response code with no
response payload. A 2.02 (Deleted) Response Code is returned even if response payload. A 2.02 (Deleted) Response Code is returned even if
the mitigation-id parameter value conveyed in the DELETE request does the 'mitigation-id' parameter value conveyed in the DELETE request
not exist in its configuration data before the request. If the DOTS does not exist in its configuration data before the request.
server finds the mitigation-id parameter value conveyed in the DELETE
request in its configuration data, then to protect against route or If the DOTS server finds the 'mitigation-id' parameter value conveyed
DNS flapping caused by a client rapidly toggling mitigation, and to in the DELETE request in its configuration data, then to protect
dampen the effect of oscillating attacks, DOTS servers MAY allow against route or DNS flapping caused by a client rapidly toggling
mitigation to continue for a limited period after acknowledging a mitigation, and to dampen the effect of oscillating attacks, DOTS
DOTS client's withdrawal of a mitigation request. During this servers MAY allow mitigation to continue for a limited period after
period, DOTS server status messages SHOULD indicate that mitigation acknowledging a DOTS client's withdrawal of a mitigation request.
is active but terminating. The active-but-terminating period is During this period, the DOTS server status messages SHOULD indicate
initially 30 seconds. If the client requests mitigation again before that mitigation is active but terminating. The active-but-
that 30 second window elapses, the DOTS server MAY exponentially terminating period MUST be set by default to 30 seconds. If the DOTS
increase the active- but-terminating period up to a maximum of 240 client requests mitigation again before that 30 second expires, the
seconds (4 minutes). After the active-but-terminating period DOTS server MAY exponentially increase the active-but-terminating
elapses, the DOTS server MUST treat the mitigation as terminated, as timeout up to a maximum of 240 seconds (4 minutes). After the
the DOTS client is no longer responsible for the mitigation. For active-but-terminating period expires, the DOTS server MUST treat the
example, if there is a financial relationship between the DOTS client mitigation as terminated. That is, the DOTS client is no longer
and server domains, the DOTS client ceases incurring cost at this responsible for the mitigation. For example, if there is a financial
point. relationship between the DOTS client and server domains, the DOTS
client ceases incurring cost at this point.
5.3.3. Retrieving a DOTS Signal 5.3.3. Retrieving a DOTS Signal
A GET request is used to retrieve information and status of a DOTS A GET request is used to retrieve information (inclduding status) of
signal from a DOTS server (Figure 9). If the DOTS server does not a DOTS signal from a DOTS server (Figure 9). If the DOTS server does
find the mitigation-id parameter value conveyed in the GET request in not find the 'mitigation-id' parameter value conveyed in the GET
its configuration data, then it responds with a 4.04 (Not Found) request in its configuration data, then it responds with a 4.04 (Not
error response code. The 'c' (content) parameter and its permitted Found) error response code. The 'c' (content) parameter and its
values defined in [I-D.ietf-core-comi] can be used to retrieve non- permitted values defined in [I-D.ietf-core-comi] can be used to
configuration data or configuration data or both. retrieve non-configuration data or configuration data or both.
1) To retrieve all DOTS signals signaled by the DOTS client. 1) To retrieve all DOTS signals signaled by the DOTS client.
Header: GET (Code=0.01) Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Host: "host" Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: "version" Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "dots-signal" Uri-Path: "dots-signal"
Uri-Path: "signal" Uri-Path: "signal"
Observe : 0 Observe : 0
{
"mitigation-scope": {
"client-identifer": "string",
}
}
2) To retrieve a specific DOTS signal signaled by the DOTS client. 2) To retrieve a specific DOTS signal signaled by the DOTS client.
The configuration data in the response will be formatted in the The configuration data in the response will be formatted in the
same order it was processed at the DOTS server. same order it was processed at the DOTS server.
Header: GET (Code=0.01) Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Host: "host" Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: "version" Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "dots-signal" Uri-Path: "dots-signal"
Uri-Path: "signal" Uri-Path: "signal"
Observe : 0 Observe : 0
Content-Format: "application/cbor" Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{ {
"mitigation-scope": { "mitigation-scope": {
"client-identifer": "string",
"scope": [ "scope": [
{ {
"mitigation-id": integer "mitigation-id": integer
} }
] ]
} }
} }
Figure 9: GET to retrieve the rules Figure 9: GET to retrieve the rules
Figure 10 shows a response example of all the active mitigation Figure 10 shows a response example of all the active mitigation
requests associated with the DOTS client on the DOTS server and the requests associated with the DOTS client on the DOTS server and the
mitigation status of each mitigation request. mitigation status of each mitigation request.
{ {
"mitigation-scope": { "mitigation-scope": {
"scope": [ "scope": [
{ {
"mitigation-id": 12332, "mitigation-id": 12332,
"mitigation-start": 1507818434.00,
"target-protocol": [ "target-protocol": [
17 17
], ],
"lifetime":1800, "lifetime":1800,
"status":2, "status":2,
"bytes-dropped": 134334555, "bytes-dropped": 134334555,
"bps-dropped": 43344, "bps-dropped": 43344,
"pkts-dropped": 333334444, "pkts-dropped": 333334444,
"pps-dropped": 432432 "pps-dropped": 432432
}, },
{ {
"mitigation-id": 12333, "mitigation-id": 12333,
"mitigation-start": 1507818393.00,
"target-protocol": [ "target-protocol": [
6 6
], ],
"lifetime":1800, "lifetime":1800,
"status":3 "status":3
"bytes-dropped": 0, "bytes-dropped": 0,
"bps-dropped": 0, "bps-dropped": 0,
"pkts-dropped": 0, "pkts-dropped": 0,
"pps-dropped": 0 "pps-dropped": 0
} }
skipping to change at page 22, line 45 skipping to change at page 25, line 47
Figure 10: Response body Figure 10: Response body
The mitigation status parameters are described below. The mitigation status parameters are described below.
lifetime: The remaining lifetime of the mitigation request in lifetime: The remaining lifetime of the mitigation request in
seconds. seconds.
mitigation-start: Mitigation start time is represented in seconds mitigation-start: Mitigation start time is represented in seconds
relative to 1970-01-01T00:00Z in UTC time (Section 2.4.1 of relative to 1970-01-01T00:00Z in UTC time (Section 2.4.1 of
[RFC7049]). [RFC7049]). The encoding is modified so that the leading tag 1
(epoch-based date/time) MUST be omitted.
bytes-dropped: The total dropped byte count for the mitigation bytes-dropped: The total dropped byte count for the mitigation
request since the attack mitigation is triggered. The count wraps request since the attack mitigation is triggered. The count wraps
around when it reaches the maximum value of unsigned integer. around when it reaches the maximum value of unsigned integer.
This is an optional attribute. This is an optional attribute.
bps-dropped: The average dropped bytes per second for the mitigation bps-dropped: The average dropped bytes per second for the mitigation
request since the attack mitigation is triggered. This is an request since the attack mitigation is triggered. This is an
optional attribute. optional attribute.
skipping to change at page 23, line 24 skipping to change at page 26, line 26
mitigation request since the attack mitigation is triggered. This mitigation request since the attack mitigation is triggered. This
is an optional attribute. is an optional attribute.
status: Status of attack mitigation. The 'status' parameter is a status: Status of attack mitigation. The 'status' parameter is a
mandatory attribute. mandatory attribute.
The various possible values of 'status' parameter are explained The various possible values of 'status' parameter are explained
below: below:
/--------------------+---------------------------------------------------\ /--------------------+---------------------------------------------------\
| Parameter value | Description | | Parameter value | Description |
|--------------------+---------------------------------------------------| +--------------------+---------------------------------------------------+
| 1 | Attack mitigation is in progress | | 1 | Attack mitigation is in progress |
| | (e.g., changing the network path to re-route the | | | (e.g., changing the network path to re-route the |
| | inbound traffic to DOTS mitigator). | | | inbound traffic to DOTS mitigator). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +--------------------+---------------------------------------------------+
| 2 | Attack is successfully mitigated | | 2 | Attack is successfully mitigated |
| | (e.g., traffic is redirected to a DDOS mitigator | | | (e.g., traffic is redirected to a DDOS mitigator |
| | and attack traffic is dropped). | | | and attack traffic is dropped). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +--------------------+---------------------------------------------------+
| 3 | Attack has stopped and the DOTS client | | 3 | Attack has stopped and the DOTS client |
| | can withdraw the mitigation request. | | | can withdraw the mitigation request. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +--------------------+---------------------------------------------------+
| 4 | Attack has exceeded the mitigation provider | | 4 | Attack has exceeded the mitigation provider |
| | capability. | | | capability. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +--------------------+---------------------------------------------------+
| 5 | DOTS client has withdrawn the mitigation request | | 5 | DOTS client has withdrawn the mitigation request |
and the mitigation is active but terminating. | | | and the mitigation is active but terminating. |
| | |
\--------------------+---------------------------------------------------/ \--------------------+---------------------------------------------------/
The observe option defined in [RFC7641] extends the CoAP core The observe option defined in [RFC7641] extends the CoAP core
protocol with a mechanism for a CoAP client to "observe" a resource protocol with a mechanism for a CoAP client to "observe" a resource
on a CoAP server: the client retrieves a representation of the on a CoAP server: the client retrieves a representation of the
resource and requests this representation be updated by the server as resource and requests this representation be updated by the server as
long as the client is interested in the resource. A DOTS client long as the client is interested in the resource. A DOTS client
conveys the observe option set to 0 in the GET request to receive conveys the observe option set to 0 in the GET request to receive
unsolicited notifications of attack mitigation status from the DOTS unsolicited notifications of attack mitigation status from the DOTS
server. Unidirectional notifications within the bidirectional signal server. Unidirectional notifications within the bidirectional signal
skipping to change at page 25, line 20 skipping to change at page 28, line 22
that the attack has been mitigated. This ensures that the DOTS that the attack has been mitigated. This ensures that the DOTS
client does not recall a mitigation request in a premature fashion client does not recall a mitigation request in a premature fashion
because it is possible that the DOTS client does not sense the DDOS because it is possible that the DOTS client does not sense the DDOS
attack on its resources but the DOTS server could be actively attack on its resources but the DOTS server could be actively
mitigating the attack and the attack is not completely averted. mitigating the attack and the attack is not completely averted.
5.3.4. Efficacy Update from DOTS Client 5.3.4. Efficacy Update from DOTS Client
While DDoS mitigation is active, a DOTS client MAY frequently While DDoS mitigation is active, a DOTS client MAY frequently
transmit DOTS mitigation efficacy updates to the relevant DOTS transmit DOTS mitigation efficacy updates to the relevant DOTS
server. An PUT request (Figure 12) is used to convey the mitigation server. A PUT request (Figure 12) is used to convey the mitigation
efficacy update to the DOTS server. The PUT request MUST include all efficacy update to the DOTS server.
the parameters used in the PUT request to convey the DOTS signal
(Section 5.3.1) unchanged apart from the lifetime parameter value. The PUT request MUST include all the parameters used in the PUT
If this is not the case, the DOTS server MUST reject the request with request to convey the DOTS signal (Section 5.3.1) unchanged apart
a 4.02 error response code. The If-Match Option (Section 5.10.8.1 of from the lifetime parameter value. If this is not the case, the DOTS
[RFC7252]) with an empty value is used to make the PUT request server MUST reject the request with a 4.02 error response code.
conditional on the current existence of the mitigation request. If
UDP is used as transport, CoAP requests may arrive out-of-order. For The If-Match Option (Section 5.10.8.1 of [RFC7252]) with an empty
example, the DOTS client may send a PUT request to convey efficacy value is used to make the PUT request conditional on the current
update to the DOTS server followed by a DELETE request to withdraw existence of the mitigation request. If UDP is used as transport,
the mitigation request, but DELETE request arrives at the DOTS server CoAP requests may arrive out-of-order. For example, the DOTS client
before the PUT request. To handle out-of-order delivery of requests, may send a PUT request to convey an efficacy update to the DOTS
if an If-Match option is present in the PUT request and the server followed by a DELETE request to withdraw the mitigation
mitigation-id in the request matches a mitigation request from the request, but the DELETE request arrives at the DOTS server before the
DOTS client then the request is processed, and if no match is found PUT request. To handle out-of-order delivery of requests, if an If-
then the PUT request is silently ignored. Match option is present in the PUT request and the 'mitigation-id' in
the request matches a mitigation request from that DOTS client, then
the request is processed. If no match is found, the PUT request is
silently ignored.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03) Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Host: "host" Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: "version" Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "dots-signal" Uri-Path: "dots-signal"
Uri-Path: "signal" Uri-Path: "signal"
Content-Format: "application/cbor" Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{ {
"mitigation-scope": { "mitigation-scope": {
"client-identifer": "string",
"scope": [ "scope": [
{ {
"mitigation-id": integer, "mitigation-id": integer,
"target-ip": [ "target-ip": [
"string" "string"
], ],
"target-port-range": [ "target-port-range": [
{ {
"lower-port": integer, "lower-port": integer,
"upper-port": integer "upper-port": integer
skipping to change at page 26, line 48 skipping to change at page 29, line 49
"attack-status": integer "attack-status": integer
} }
] ]
} }
} }
Figure 12: Efficacy Update Figure 12: Efficacy Update
The 'attack-status' parameter is a mandatory attribute. The various The 'attack-status' parameter is a mandatory attribute. The various
possible values contained in the 'attack-status' parameter are possible values contained in the 'attack-status' parameter are
explained below: described below:
/--------------------+------------------------------------------------------\ /--------------------+------------------------------------------------------\
| Parameter value | Description | | Parameter value | Description |
|--------------------+------------------------------------------------------| +--------------------+------------------------------------------------------+
| 1 | DOTS client determines that it is still under attack.| | 1 | DOTS client determines that it is still under attack.|
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +--------------------+------------------------------------------------------+
| 2 | DOTS client determines that the attack is | | 2 | DOTS client determines that the attack is |
| | successfully mitigated | | | successfully mitigated |
| | (e.g., attack traffic is not seen). | | | (e.g., attack traffic is not seen). |
\--------------------+------------------------------------------------------/ \--------------------+------------------------------------------------------/
The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the PUT request The DOTS server indicates the result of processing a PUT request
using CoAP response codes. The response code 2.04 (Changed) will be using CoAP response codes. The response code 2.04 (Changed) is
returned in the response if the DOTS server has accepted the returned if the DOTS server has accepted the mitigation efficacy
mitigation efficacy update. The error response code 5.03 (Service update. The error response code 5.03 (Service Unavailable) is
Unavailable) is returned if the DOTS server has erred or is incapable returned if the DOTS server has erred or is incapable of performing
of performing the mitigation. the mitigation.
5.4. DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration 5.4. DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration
The DOTS client can negotiate, configure and retrieve the DOTS signal The DOTS client can negotiate, configure, and retrieve the DOTS
channel session behavior. The DOTS signal channel can be used, for signal channel session behavior. The DOTS signal channel can be
example, to configure the following: used, for example, to configure the following:
a. Heartbeat interval: DOTS agents regularly send heartbeats (Ping/ a. Heartbeat interval: DOTS agents regularly send heartbeats (Ping/
Pong) to each other after mutual authentication in order to keep Pong) to each other after mutual authentication in order to keep
the DOTS signal channel open, heartbeat messages are exchanged the DOTS signal channel open, heartbeat messages are exchanged
between the DOTS agents every heartbeat-interval seconds to between the DOTS agents every heartbeat-interval seconds to
detect the current status of the DOTS signal channel session. detect the current status of the DOTS signal channel session.
b. Missing heartbeats allowed: This variable indicates the maximum b. Missing heartbeats allowed: This variable indicates the maximum
number of consecutive heartbeat messages for which a DOTS agent number of consecutive heartbeat messages for which a DOTS agent
did not receive a response before concluding that the session is did not receive a response before concluding that the session is
skipping to change at page 30, line 8 skipping to change at page 33, line 8
Figure 14: GET response body Figure 14: GET response body
Figure 15 shows an example of acceptable and current configuration Figure 15 shows an example of acceptable and current configuration
parameters on the DOTS server for DOTS signal channel session parameters on the DOTS server for DOTS signal channel session
configuration. configuration.
Content-Format: "application/cbor" Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{ {
"heartbeat-interval": { "heartbeat-interval": {
"CurrentValue": 91, "CurrentValue": 30,
"MinValue": 60, "MinValue": 15,
"MaxValue" : 240, "MaxValue" : 240,
}, },
"missing-hb-allowed": { "missing-hb-allowed": {
"CurrentValue": 3, "CurrentValue": 5,
"MinValue": 1, "MinValue": 3,
"MaxValue" : 7, "MaxValue" : 9,
}, },
"max-retransmit": { "max-retransmit": {
"CurrentValue": 4, "CurrentValue": 3,
"MinValue": 3, "MinValue": 2,
"MaxValue" : 15, "MaxValue" : 15,
}, },
"ack-timeout": { "ack-timeout": {
"CurrentValue": 2, "CurrentValue": 2,
"MinValue": 1, "MinValue": 1,
"MaxValue" : 30, "MaxValue" : 30,
}, },
"ack-random-factor": { "ack-random-factor": {
"CurrentValue": 1.5, "CurrentValue": 1.5,
"MinValue": 1.0, "MinValue": 1.1,
"MaxValue" : 4.0, "MaxValue" : 4.0,
} }
} }
Figure 15: configuration response body Figure 15: configuration response body
5.4.2. Convey DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration 5.4.2. Convey DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration
A PUT request is used to convey the configuration parameters for the A PUT request is used to convey the configuration parameters for the
signaling channel (e.g., heartbeat interval, maximum retransmissions signaling channel (e.g., heartbeat interval, maximum
etc). Message transmission parameters for CoAP are defined in retransmissions). Message transmission parameters for CoAP are
Section 4.8 of [RFC7252]. The RECOMMENDED values of transmission defined in Section 4.8 of [RFC7252]. The RECOMMENDED values of
parameter values are ack_timeout (2 seconds), max-retransmit (4), transmission parameter values are ack_timeout (2 seconds), max-
ack-random-factor (1.5), heartbeat-interval (93 seconds) and missing- retransmit (3), ack-random-factor (1.5). In addition to those
hb-allowed (3). The heartbeat-interval value is equal to the parameters, the RECOMMENDED specific DOTS transmission parameter
MAX_TRANSMIT_WAIT counter (Section 4.8.2 of [RFC7252]) whose value is values are heartbeat-interval (30 seconds) and missing-hb-allowed
derived from transmission parameters. For the default transmission (5).
parameters, if the DOTS agent does not receive any response from the
peer DOTS agent for three (missing-hb-allowed) consecutive "CoAP Note: heartbeat-interval should be tweaked to also assist DOTS
ping" confirmable messages then it concludes that the DOTS signal messages for NAT traversal (SIG-010 of
channel session is disconnected, and a "CoAP ping" confirmable [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]). According to [RFC8085], keepalive
message is retransmitted four (max-retransmit) times using a initial messages must not be sent more frequently than once every 15
timeout set to random duration between 2 (ack_timeout) and 3 seconds seconds and should use longer intervals when possible.
(ack-timeout*ack-random-factor) and exponential back-off between
retransmissions. Furthermore, [RFC4787] recommends NATs to use a state timeout of 2
minutes or longer, but experience shows that sending packets every
15 to 30 seconds is necessary to prevent the majority of
middleboxes from losing state for UDP flows. From that
standpoint, this specification recommends a minimum heartbeat-
interval of 15 seconds and a maximum heartbeat-interval of 240
seconds. The recommended value of 30 seconds is selected to
anticipate the expiry of NAT state.
A heartbeat-interval of 30 second may be seen as too chatty in
some deployments. For such deployments, DOTS agents may negotiate
longer heartbeat-interval values to avoid overloading the network
with too frequent keepalives.
For the recommended transmission parameters, if the DOTS agent does
not receive any response from the peer DOTS agent for five (missing-
hb-allowed) consecutive "CoAP ping" confirmable messages, then it
concludes that the DOTS signal channel session is disconnected, and a
"CoAP ping" confirmable message is retransmitted three (max-
retransmit) times using an initial timeout set to a random duration
between 2 (ack_timeout) and 3 seconds (ack-timeout*ack-random-factor)
and exponential back-off between retransmissions.
If the DOTS agent wishes to change the default values of message If the DOTS agent wishes to change the default values of message
transmission parameters then it should follow the guidance given in transmission parameters, then it should follow the guidance given in
Section 4.8.1 of [RFC7252]. The DOTS agents MUST use the negotiated Section 4.8.1 of [RFC7252]. The DOTS agents MUST use the negotiated
values for message transmission parameters and default values for values for message transmission parameters and default values for
non-negotiated message transmission parameters. The signaling non-negotiated message transmission parameters.
channel session configuration is applicable to a single DOTS signal
channel session between the DOTS agents. The signaling channel session configuration is applicable to a single
DOTS signal channel session between the DOTS agents.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03) Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Host: "host" Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: "version" Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "dots-signal" Uri-Path: "dots-signal"
Uri-Path: "config" Uri-Path: "config"
Content-Format: "application/cbor" Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{ {
"signal-config": { "signal-config": {
"session-id": integer, "session-id": integer,
skipping to change at page 32, line 32 skipping to change at page 36, line 20
DOTS server can detect that the DOTS session is lost. The default DOTS server can detect that the DOTS session is lost. The default
value of the parameter is 'true'. This is an optional attribute. value of the parameter is 'true'. This is an optional attribute.
In the PUT request at least one of the attributes heartbeat-interval, In the PUT request at least one of the attributes heartbeat-interval,
missing-hb-allowed, max-retransmit, ack-timeout, ack-random-factor, missing-hb-allowed, max-retransmit, ack-timeout, ack-random-factor,
and trigger-mitigation MUST be present. The PUT request with higher and trigger-mitigation MUST be present. The PUT request with higher
numeric session-id value over-rides the DOTS signal channel session numeric session-id value over-rides the DOTS signal channel session
configuration data installed by a PUT request with a lower numeric configuration data installed by a PUT request with a lower numeric
session-id value. session-id value.
Figure 17 shows an PUT request example to convey the configuration Figure 17 shows a PUT request example to convey the configuration
parameters for the DOTS signal channel. parameters for the DOTS signal channel.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03) Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Host: "www.example.com" Uri-Host: "www.example.com"
Uri-Path: "v1" Uri-Path: "v1"
Uri-Path: "dots-signal" Uri-Path: "dots-signal"
Uri-Path: "config" Uri-Path: "config"
Content-Format: "application/cbor" Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{ {
"signal-config": { "signal-config": {
skipping to change at page 33, line 26 skipping to change at page 36, line 44
"max-retransmit": 7, "max-retransmit": 7,
"ack-timeout": 5, "ack-timeout": 5,
"ack-random-factor": 1.5, "ack-random-factor": 1.5,
"trigger-mitigation": false "trigger-mitigation": false
} }
} }
Figure 17: PUT to convey the configuration parameters Figure 17: PUT to convey the configuration parameters
The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the PUT request The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the PUT request
using CoAP response codes. If the DOTS server finds the session-id using CoAP response codes:
parameter value conveyed in the PUT request in its configuration data
and if the DOTS server has accepted the updated configuration o If the DOTS server finds the 'session-id' parameter value conveyed
parameters then the a 2.04 (Changed) response will be returned in the in the PUT request in its configuration data and if the DOTS
response. If the DOTS server does not find the session-id parameter server has accepted the updated configuration parameters, then
value conveyed in the PUT request in its configuration data and if 2.04 (Changed) code is returned in the response.
the DOTS server has accepted the configuration parameters then a
response code 2.01 (Created) will be returned in the response. If o If the DOTS server does not find the 'session-id' parameter value
the request is missing one or more mandatory attributes then 4.00 conveyed in the PUT request in its configuration data and if the
(Bad Request) will be returned in the response or if the request DOTS server has accepted the configuration parameters, then a
contains invalid or unknown parameters then 4.02 (Invalid query) will response code 2.01 (Created) is returned in the response.
be returned in the response. Response code 4.22 (Unprocessable
Entity) will be returned in the response if any of the heartbeat- o If the request is missing one or more mandatory attributes, then
interval, missing-hb-allowed, max-retransmit, target-protocol, ack- 4.00 (Bad Request) is returned in the response.
timeout and ack-random-factor attribute values are not acceptable to
the DOTS server. On receipt of the 4.22 error response code, the o If the request contains one or more invalid or unknown parameters,
DOTS client should request the maximum and minumum attribute values then 4.02 (Invalid query) code is returned in the response.
acceptable to the DOTS server (Section 5.4.1). The DOTS client can
re-try and send the PUT request with updated attribute values o Response code 4.22 (Unprocessable Entity) is returned in the
acceptable to the DOTS server. response, if any of the heartbeat-interval, missing-hb-allowed,
max-retransmit, target-protocol, ack-timeout, and ack-random-
factor attribute values are not acceptable to the DOTS server.
Upon receipt of the 4.22 error response code, the DOTS client
should request the maximum and minumum attribute values acceptable
to the DOTS server (Section 5.4.1). The DOTS client may re-try
and send the PUT request with updated attribute values acceptable
to the DOTS server.
5.4.3. Delete DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration 5.4.3. Delete DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration
A DELETE request is used to delete the installed DOTS signal channel A DELETE request is used to delete the installed DOTS signal channel
session configuration data (Figure 18). session configuration data (Figure 18).
Header: DELETE (Code=0.04) Header: DELETE (Code=0.04)
Uri-Host: "host" Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: "version" Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "dots-signal" Uri-Path: "dots-signal"
skipping to change at page 36, line 43 skipping to change at page 40, line 21
[RFC7252]. Concretely, the DOTS agent sends an Empty Confirmable [RFC7252]. Concretely, the DOTS agent sends an Empty Confirmable
message and the peer DOTS agent will respond by sending an Reset message and the peer DOTS agent will respond by sending an Reset
message. message.
In DOTS over TCP, heartbeat messages can be exchanged between the In DOTS over TCP, heartbeat messages can be exchanged between the
DOTS agents using the Ping and Pong messages specified in Section 4.4 DOTS agents using the Ping and Pong messages specified in Section 4.4
of [I-D.ietf-core-coap-tcp-tls]. That is, the DOTS agent sends a of [I-D.ietf-core-coap-tcp-tls]. That is, the DOTS agent sends a
Ping message and the peer DOTS agent would respond by sending a Ping message and the peer DOTS agent would respond by sending a
single Pong message. single Pong message.
A DOTS client MUST NOT transmit a heartbeat message while a previous
heartbeat message has not been responded by the remote DOTS server.
6. Mapping parameters to CBOR 6. Mapping parameters to CBOR
All parameters in the payload in the DOTS signal channel MUST be All parameters in the payload in the DOTS signal channel MUST be
mapped to CBOR types as follows and are given an integer key to save mapped to CBOR types as follows and are given an integer key to save
space. The recipient of the payload MAY reject the information if it space. The recipient of the payload MAY reject the information if it
is not suitably mapped. is not suitably mapped.
/--------------------+------------------------+--------------------------\ /--------------------+------------------------+--------------------------\
| Parameter name | CBOR key | CBOR major type of value | | Parameter name | CBOR key | CBOR major type of value |
|--------------------+------------------------+--------------------------| +--------------------+------------------------+--------------------------+
| mitigation-scope | 1 | 5 (map) | | mitigation-scope | 1 | 5 (map) |
| scope | 2 | 5 (map) | | scope | 2 | 5 (map) |
| mitigation-id | 3 | 0 (unsigned) | | mitigation-id | 3 | 0 (unsigned) |
| target-ip | 4 | 4 (array) | | target-ip | 4 | 4 (array) |
| target-port-range | 5 | 4 | | target-port-range | 5 | 4 |
| lower-port | 6 | 0 | | lower-port | 6 | 0 |
| upper-port | 7 | 0 | | upper-port | 7 | 0 |
| target-protocol | 8 | 4 | | target-protocol | 8 | 4 |
| fqdn | 9 | 4 | | fqdn | 9 | 4 |
| uri | 10 | 4 | | uri | 10 | 4 |
skipping to change at page 37, line 38 skipping to change at page 41, line 38
| status | 21 | 0 | | status | 21 | 0 |
| bytes-dropped | 22 | 0 | | bytes-dropped | 22 | 0 |
| bps-dropped | 23 | 0 | | bps-dropped | 23 | 0 |
| pkts-dropped | 24 | 0 | | pkts-dropped | 24 | 0 |
| pps-dropped | 25 | 0 | | pps-dropped | 25 | 0 |
| session-id | 26 | 0 | | session-id | 26 | 0 |
| trigger-mitigation | 27 | 7 (simple types) | | trigger-mitigation | 27 | 7 (simple types) |
| missing-hb-allowed | 28 | 0 | | missing-hb-allowed | 28 | 0 |
| CurrentValue | 29 | 0 | | CurrentValue | 29 | 0 |
| mitigation-start | 30 | 7 (floating-point) | | mitigation-start | 30 | 7 (floating-point) |
| target-prefix | 31 | 4 (array) |
| client-identifier | 32 | 2 (byte string) |
\--------------------+------------------------+--------------------------/ \--------------------+------------------------+--------------------------/
Figure 22: CBOR mappings used in DOTS signal channel message Figure 22: CBOR mappings used in DOTS signal channel message
7. (D)TLS Protocol Profile and Performance considerations 7. (D)TLS Protocol Profile and Performance considerations
This section defines the (D)TLS protocol profile of DOTS signal This section defines the (D)TLS protocol profile of DOTS signal
channel over (D)TLS and DOTS data channel over TLS. channel over (D)TLS and DOTS data channel over TLS.
There are known attacks on (D)TLS, such as machine-in-the-middle and There are known attacks on (D)TLS, such as machine-in-the-middle and
skipping to change at page 41, line 43 skipping to change at page 45, line 43
each other. After the DOTS gateway validates the identity of a DOTS each other. After the DOTS gateway validates the identity of a DOTS
client, it communicates with the AAA server in the 'example.com' client, it communicates with the AAA server in the 'example.com'
domain to determine if the DOTS client is authorized to request DDOS domain to determine if the DOTS client is authorized to request DDOS
mitigation. If the DOTS client is not authorized, a 4.01 mitigation. If the DOTS client is not authorized, a 4.01
(Unauthorized) is returned in the response to the DOTS client. In (Unauthorized) is returned in the response to the DOTS client. In
this example, the DOTS gateway only allows the application server and this example, the DOTS gateway only allows the application server and
DDOS detector to request DDOS mitigation, but does not permit the DDOS detector to request DDOS mitigation, but does not permit the
user of type 'guest' to request DDOS mitigation. user of type 'guest' to request DDOS mitigation.
Also, DOTS gateway and DOTS server located in different domains MUST Also, DOTS gateway and DOTS server located in different domains MUST
perform mutual authentication using certificates. A DOTS server will perform mutual authentication (e.g., using certificates). A DOTS
only allow a DOTS gateway with a certificate for a particular domain server will only allow a DOTS gateway with a certificate for a
to request mitigation for that domain. In reference to Figure 24, particular domain to request mitigation for that domain. In
the DOTS server only allows the DOTS gateway to request mitigation reference to Figure 24, the DOTS server only allows the DOTS gateway
for 'example.com' domain and not for other domains. to request mitigation for 'example.com' domain and not for other
domains.
10. IANA Considerations 10. IANA Considerations
This specification registers new CoAP response code, new parameters This specification registers new CoAP response code, new parameters
for DOTS signal channel and establishes registries for mappings to for DOTS signal channel and establishes registries for mappings to
CBOR. CBOR.
10.1. CoAP Response Code 10.1. CoAP Response Code
The following entry is added to the "CoAP Response Codes" sub- The following entry is added to the "CoAP Response Codes" sub-
skipping to change at page 46, line 40 skipping to change at page 50, line 40
o CBOR Major Type: 0 o CBOR Major Type: 0
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document o Specification Document(s): this document
o Parameter Name: CurrentValue o Parameter Name: CurrentValue
o CBOR Key Value: 29 o CBOR Key Value: 29
o CBOR Major Type: 0 o CBOR Major Type: 0
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document o Specification Document(s): this document
o Parameter Name:mitigation-start
o CBOR Key Value: 30
o CBOR Major Type: 7
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document
o Parameter Name:target-prefix
o CBOR Key Value: 31
o CBOR Major Type: 4
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document
o Parameter Name:client-identifier
o CBOR Key Value: 32
o CBOR Major Type: 2
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document
11. Implementation Status 11. Implementation Status
[Note to RFC Editor: Please remove this section and reference to [Note to RFC Editor: Please remove this section and reference to
[RFC7942] prior to publication.] [RFC7942] prior to publication.]
This section records the status of known implementations of the This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942]. Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942].
The description of implementations in this section is intended to The description of implementations in this section is intended to
assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
skipping to change at page 48, line 18 skipping to change at page 52, line 35
If TCP is used between DOTS agents, an attacker may be able to inject If TCP is used between DOTS agents, an attacker may be able to inject
RST packets, bogus application segments, etc., regardless of whether RST packets, bogus application segments, etc., regardless of whether
TLS authentication is used. Because the application data is TLS TLS authentication is used. Because the application data is TLS
protected, this will not result in the application receiving bogus protected, this will not result in the application receiving bogus
data, but it will constitute a DoS on the connection. This attack data, but it will constitute a DoS on the connection. This attack
can be countered by using TCP-AO [RFC5925]. If TCP-AO is used, then can be countered by using TCP-AO [RFC5925]. If TCP-AO is used, then
any bogus packets injected by an attacker will be rejected by the any bogus packets injected by an attacker will be rejected by the
TCP-AO integrity check and therefore will never reach the TLS layer. TCP-AO integrity check and therefore will never reach the TLS layer.
In order to prevent leaking internal information outside a client-
domain, DOTS gateways located in the client-domain SHOULD NOT reveal
the identity of internal DOTS clients (client-identifier) unless
explicitly configured to do so.
Special care should be taken in order to ensure that the activation Special care should be taken in order to ensure that the activation
of the proposed mechanism won't have an impact on the stability of of the proposed mechanism won't have an impact on the stability of
the network (including connectivity and services delivered over that the network (including connectivity and services delivered over that
network). network).
Involved functional elements in the cooperation system must establish Involved functional elements in the cooperation system must establish
exchange instructions and notification over a secure and exchange instructions and notification over a secure and
authenticated channel. Adequate filters can be enforced to avoid authenticated channel. Adequate filters can be enforced to avoid
that nodes outside a trusted domain can inject request such as that nodes outside a trusted domain can inject request such as
deleting filtering rules. Nevertheless, attacks can be initiated deleting filtering rules. Nevertheless, attacks can be initiated
skipping to change at page 48, line 45 skipping to change at page 53, line 19
Mike Geller Cisco Systems, Inc. 3250 Florida 33309 USA Email: Mike Geller Cisco Systems, Inc. 3250 Florida 33309 USA Email:
mgeller@cisco.com mgeller@cisco.com
Robert Moskowitz HTT Consulting Oak Park, MI 42837 United States Robert Moskowitz HTT Consulting Oak Park, MI 42837 United States
Email: rgm@htt-consult.com Email: rgm@htt-consult.com
Dan Wing Email: dwing-ietf@fuggles.com Dan Wing Email: dwing-ietf@fuggles.com
14. Acknowledgements 14. Acknowledgements
Thanks to Christian Jacquenet, Roland Dobbins, Andrew Mortensen, Thanks to Christian Jacquenet, Roland Dobbins, Roman D. Danyliw,
Roman D. Danyliw, Michael Richardson, Ehud Doron, Kaname Nishizuka, Michael Richardson, Ehud Doron, Kaname Nishizuka, Dave Dolson, Liang
Dave Dolson, Liang Xia, Jon Shallow, and Gilbert Clark for the Xia, Jon Shallow, and Gilbert Clark for the discussion and comments.
discussion and comments.
15. References 15. References
15.1. Normative References 15.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-core-coap-tcp-tls] [I-D.ietf-core-coap-tcp-tls]
Bormann, C., Lemay, S., Tschofenig, H., Hartke, K., Bormann, C., Lemay, S., Tschofenig, H., Hartke, K.,
Silverajan, B., and B. Raymor, "CoAP (Constrained Silverajan, B., and B. Raymor, "CoAP (Constrained
Application Protocol) over TCP, TLS, and WebSockets", Application Protocol) over TCP, TLS, and WebSockets",
draft-ietf-core-coap-tcp-tls-09 (work in progress), May draft-ietf-core-coap-tcp-tls-09 (work in progress), May
skipping to change at page 49, line 30 skipping to change at page 53, line 48
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5925] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP [RFC5925] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
Authentication Option", RFC 5925, DOI 10.17487/RFC5925, Authentication Option", RFC 5925, DOI 10.17487/RFC5925,
June 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5925>. June 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5925>.
[RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234>.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer [RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347, Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>. January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
[RFC7250] Wouters, P., Ed., Tschofenig, H., Ed., Gilmore, J., [RFC7250] Wouters, P., Ed., Tschofenig, H., Ed., Gilmore, J.,
Weiler, S., and T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in Weiler, S., and T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 7250, DOI 10.17487/RFC7250, Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 7250, DOI 10.17487/RFC7250,
June 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7250>. June 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7250>.
skipping to change at page 50, line 34 skipping to change at page 55, line 9
Mortensen, A., Andreasen, F., Reddy, T., Mortensen, A., Andreasen, F., Reddy, T.,
christopher_gray3@cable.comcast.com, c., Compton, R., and christopher_gray3@cable.comcast.com, c., Compton, R., and
N. Teague, "Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat N. Teague, "Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat
Signaling (DOTS) Architecture", draft-ietf-dots- Signaling (DOTS) Architecture", draft-ietf-dots-
architecture-04 (work in progress), July 2017. architecture-04 (work in progress), July 2017.
[I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel] [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel]
Reddy, T., Boucadair, M., Nishizuka, K., Xia, L., Patil, Reddy, T., Boucadair, M., Nishizuka, K., Xia, L., Patil,
P., Mortensen, A., and N. Teague, "Distributed Denial-of- P., Mortensen, A., and N. Teague, "Distributed Denial-of-
Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel", draft- Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel", draft-
ietf-dots-data-channel-03 (work in progress), August 2017. ietf-dots-data-channel-04 (work in progress), October
2017.
[I-D.ietf-dots-requirements] [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]
Mortensen, A., Moskowitz, R., and T. Reddy, "Distributed Mortensen, A., Moskowitz, R., and T. Reddy, "Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling
Requirements", draft-ietf-dots-requirements-06 (work in Requirements", draft-ietf-dots-requirements-06 (work in
progress), July 2017. progress), July 2017.
[I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases] [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases]
Dobbins, R., Migault, D., Fouant, S., Moskowitz, R., Dobbins, R., Migault, D., Fouant, S., Moskowitz, R.,
Teague, N., Xia, L., and K. Nishizuka, "Use cases for DDoS Teague, N., Xia, L., and K. Nishizuka, "Use cases for DDoS
skipping to change at page 51, line 29 skipping to change at page 56, line 5
[RFC4632] Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing [RFC4632] Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing
(CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation (CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation
Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, DOI 10.17487/RFC4632, August Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, DOI 10.17487/RFC4632, August
2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4632>. 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4632>.
[RFC4732] Handley, M., Ed., Rescorla, E., Ed., and IAB, "Internet [RFC4732] Handley, M., Ed., Rescorla, E., Ed., and IAB, "Internet
Denial-of-Service Considerations", RFC 4732, Denial-of-Service Considerations", RFC 4732,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4732, December 2006, DOI 10.17487/RFC4732, December 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4732>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4732>.
[RFC4787] Audet, F., Ed. and C. Jennings, "Network Address
Translation (NAT) Behavioral Requirements for Unicast
UDP", BCP 127, RFC 4787, DOI 10.17487/RFC4787, January
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4787>.
[RFC4987] Eddy, W., "TCP SYN Flooding Attacks and Common [RFC4987] Eddy, W., "TCP SYN Flooding Attacks and Common
Mitigations", RFC 4987, DOI 10.17487/RFC4987, August 2007, Mitigations", RFC 4987, DOI 10.17487/RFC4987, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4987>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4987>.
[RFC5077] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig, [RFC5077] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without
Server-Side State", RFC 5077, DOI 10.17487/RFC5077, Server-Side State", RFC 5077, DOI 10.17487/RFC5077,
January 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5077>. January 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5077>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for [RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
 End of changes. 90 change blocks. 
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