< draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel-06.txt   draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel-07.txt >
DOTS T. Reddy DOTS T. Reddy
Internet-Draft McAfee Internet-Draft McAfee
Intended status: Standards Track M. Boucadair Intended status: Standards Track M. Boucadair
Expires: April 30, 2018 Orange Expires: May 16, 2018 Orange
P. Patil P. Patil
Cisco Cisco
A. Mortensen A. Mortensen
Arbor Networks, Inc. Arbor Networks, Inc.
N. Teague N. Teague
Verisign, Inc. Verisign, Inc.
October 27, 2017 November 12, 2017
Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal
Channel Channel
draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel-06 draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel-07
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies the DOTS signal channel, a protocol for This document specifies the DOTS signal channel, a protocol for
signaling the need for protection against Distributed Denial-of- signaling the need for protection against Distributed Denial-of-
Service (DDoS) attacks to a server capable of enabling network Service (DDoS) attacks to a server capable of enabling network
traffic mitigation on behalf of the requesting client. A companion traffic mitigation on behalf of the requesting client. A companion
document defines the DOTS data channel, a separate reliable document defines the DOTS data channel, a separate reliable
communication layer for DOTS management and configuration. communication layer for DOTS management and configuration.
skipping to change at page 1, line 43 skipping to change at page 1, line 43
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 30, 2018. This Internet-Draft will expire on May 16, 2018.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 25 skipping to change at page 2, line 25
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Notational Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Notational Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Solution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Solution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Happy Eyeballs for DOTS Signal Channel . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Happy Eyeballs for DOTS Signal Channel . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. DOTS Signal Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. DOTS Signal Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2. DOTS Signal YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.2. DOTS Signal YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2.1. Mitigation Request YANG Module Tree Structure . . . . 8 5.2.1. Mitigation Request YANG Module Tree Structure . . . . 8
5.2.2. Mitigation Request YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.2.2. Mitigation Request YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2.3. Session Configuration YANG Module Tree Structure . . 11 5.2.3. Session Configuration YANG Module Tree Structure . . 11
5.2.4. Session Configuration YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.2.4. Session Configuration YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.3. Mitigation Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.3. CoAP URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.3.1. Requesting mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.4. Mitigation Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.3.2. Withdraw a DOTS Signal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5.4.1. Requesting mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.3.3. Retrieving a DOTS Signal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 5.4.2. Withdraw a DOTS Signal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.3.4. Efficacy Update from DOTS Client . . . . . . . . . . 29 5.4.3. Retrieving a DOTS Signal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.4. DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration . . . . . . . . 31 5.4.4. Efficacy Update from DOTS Client . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.4.1. Discover Configuration Parameters . . . . . . . . . . 32 5.5. DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration . . . . . . . . 32
5.4.2. Convey DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration . . 34 5.5.1. Discover Configuration Parameters . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.4.3. Delete DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration . . 38 5.5.2. Convey DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration . . 35
5.5. Redirected Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 5.5.3. Delete DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration . . 39
5.6. Heartbeat Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 5.6. Redirected Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6. Mapping parameters to CBOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 5.7. Heartbeat Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7. (D)TLS Protocol Profile and Performance considerations . . . 41 6. Mapping parameters to CBOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.1. MTU and Fragmentation Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 7. (D)TLS Protocol Profile and Performance considerations . . . 43
8. (D)TLS 1.3 considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 7.1. MTU and Fragmentation Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
8. (D)TLS 1.3 considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
9. Mutual Authentication of DOTS Agents & Authorization of DOTS 9. Mutual Authentication of DOTS Agents & Authorization of DOTS
Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
10.1. CoAP Response Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 10.1. DOTS Signal Channel UDP and TCP Port Number . . . . . . 48
10.2. DOTS signal channel CBOR Mappings Registry . . . . . . . 46 10.2. Well-Known 'dots' URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
10.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 10.3. CoAP Response Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
10.2.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 10.4. DOTS signal channel CBOR Mappings Registry . . . . . . . 48
11. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 10.4.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
11.1. nttdots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 10.4.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
13. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 11. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
14. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 11.1. nttdots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
15.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 13. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
15.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 14. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
15.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
15.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack is an attempt to make A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack is an attempt to make
machines or network resources unavailable to their intended users. machines or network resources unavailable to their intended users.
In most cases, sufficient scale can be achieved by compromising In most cases, sufficient scale can be achieved by compromising
enough end-hosts and using those infected hosts to perpetrate and enough end-hosts and using those infected hosts to perpetrate and
amplify the attack. The victim in this attack can be an application amplify the attack. The victim in this attack can be an application
server, a host, a router, a firewall, or an entire network. server, a host, a router, a firewall, or an entire network.
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Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252], a lightweight protocol Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252], a lightweight protocol
originally designed for constrained devices and networks. CoAP's originally designed for constrained devices and networks. CoAP's
expectation of packet loss, support for asynchronous non-confirmable expectation of packet loss, support for asynchronous non-confirmable
messaging, congestion control, small message overhead limiting the messaging, congestion control, small message overhead limiting the
need for fragmentation, use of minimal resources, and support for need for fragmentation, use of minimal resources, and support for
(D)TLS make it a good foundation on which to build the DOTS signaling (D)TLS make it a good foundation on which to build the DOTS signaling
mechanism. mechanism.
The DOTS signal channel is layered on existing standards (Figure 4). The DOTS signal channel is layered on existing standards (Figure 4).
TBD: The default port number for DOTS signal channel is 5684 By default, DOTS signal channel MUST run over port number TBD as
(Section 12.7 of [RFC7252] and Section 10.4 of defined in Section 10.1, for both UDP and TCP, unless the DOTS server
[I-D.ietf-core-coap-tcp-tls]), for both UDP and TCP. has mutual agreement with its DOTS clients to use a port other than
TBD for DOTS signal channel, or DOTS clients supports means to
dynamically discover the ports used by their DOTS servers. In order
to use a distinct port number (vs. TBD), DOTS clients and servers
should support a configurable parameter to supply the port number to
use.
+--------------+ +--------------+
| DOTS | | DOTS |
+--------------+ +--------------+
| CoAP | | CoAP |
+--------------+ +--------------+
| TLS | DTLS | | TLS | DTLS |
+--------------+ +--------------+
| TCP | UDP | | TCP | UDP |
+--------------+ +--------------+
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default true; default true;
description description
"If false, then mitigation is triggered "If false, then mitigation is triggered
only when the DOTS server channel session is lost"; only when the DOTS server channel session is lost";
} }
} }
} }
<CODE ENDS> <CODE ENDS>
5.3. Mitigation Request 5.3. CoAP URIs
The DOTS server MUST support the use of the path-prefix of "/.well-
known/" as defined in [RFC5785] and the registered name of "dots".
Each DOTS operation is indicated by a path-suffix that indicates the
intended operation.
+------------------------+-----------------+-------------------+
| Operation |Operation path | Details |
+========================+=================+===================+
| Mitigation | /v1/mitigate | Section 5.4 |
| | | |
+------------------------+-----------------+-------------------+
| Session configuration | /v1/config | Section 5.5 |
| | | |
+------------------------+-----------------+-------------------+
Figure 5: Operations and their corresponding URIs:
5.4. Mitigation Request
The following methods are used to request or withdraw mitigation The following methods are used to request or withdraw mitigation
requests: requests:
PUT: DOTS clients use the PUT method to request mitigation PUT: DOTS clients use the PUT method to request mitigation
(Section 5.3.1). During active mitigation, DOTS clients may use (Section 5.4.1). During active mitigation, DOTS clients may use
PUT requests to convey mitigation efficacy updates to the DOTS PUT requests to convey mitigation efficacy updates to the DOTS
server (Section 5.3.4). server (Section 5.4.4).
DELETE: DOTS clients use the DELETE method to withdraw a request for DELETE: DOTS clients use the DELETE method to withdraw a request for
mitigation from the DOTS server (Section 5.3.2). mitigation from the DOTS server (Section 5.4.2).
GET: DOTS clients may use the GET method to subscribe to DOTS server GET: DOTS clients may use the GET method to subscribe to DOTS server
status messages, or to retrieve the list of existing mitigations status messages, or to retrieve the list of existing mitigations
(Section 5.3.3). (Section 5.4.3).
Mitigation request and response messages are marked as Non- Mitigation request and response messages are marked as Non-
confirmable messages. DOTS agents SHOULD follow the data confirmable messages. DOTS agents SHOULD follow the data
transmission guidelines discussed in Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085] and transmission guidelines discussed in Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085] and
control transmission behavior by not sending on average more than one control transmission behavior by not sending on average more than one
UDP datagram per RTT to the peer DOTS agent. UDP datagram per RTT to the peer DOTS agent.
Requests marked by the DOTS client as Non-confirmable messages are Requests marked by the DOTS client as Non-confirmable messages are
sent at regular intervals until a response is received from the DOTS sent at regular intervals until a response is received from the DOTS
server and if the DOTS client cannot maintain a RTT estimate then it server and if the DOTS client cannot maintain a RTT estimate then it
SHOULD NOT send more than one Non-confirmable request every 3 SHOULD NOT send more than one Non-confirmable request every 3
seconds, and SHOULD use an even less aggressive rate when possible seconds, and SHOULD use an even less aggressive rate when possible
(case 2 in Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085]). (case 2 in Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085]).
5.3.1. Requesting mitigation 5.4.1. Requesting mitigation
When a DOTS client requires mitigation for any reason, the DOTS When a DOTS client requires mitigation for any reason, the DOTS
client uses CoAP PUT method to send a mitigation request to the DOTS client uses CoAP PUT method to send a mitigation request to the DOTS
server (Figure 5, illustrated in JSON diagnostic notation). The DOTS server (Figure 6, illustrated in JSON diagnostic notation). The DOTS
server can enable mitigation on behalf of the DOTS client by server can enable mitigation on behalf of the DOTS client by
communicating the DOTS client's request to the mitigator and relaying communicating the DOTS client's request to the mitigator and relaying
selected mitigator feedback to the requesting DOTS client. selected mitigator feedback to the requesting DOTS client.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03) Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Host: "host" Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "version" Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "dots-signal" Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "signal"
Content-Type: "application/cbor" Content-Type: "application/cbor"
{ {
"mitigation-scope": { "mitigation-scope": {
"client-identifier": [ "client-identifier": [
"string" "string"
], ],
"scope": [ "scope": [
{ {
"mitigation-id": integer, "mitigation-id": integer,
"target-ip": [ "target-ip": [
skipping to change at page 16, line 49 skipping to change at page 17, line 50
], ],
"alias-name": [ "alias-name": [
"string" "string"
], ],
"lifetime": integer "lifetime": integer
} }
] ]
} }
} }
Figure 5: PUT to convey DOTS signals Figure 6: PUT to convey DOTS signals
The parameters are described below. The parameters are described below.
client-identifier: The client identifier MAY be conveyed by the DOTS client-identifier: The client identifier MAY be conveyed by the DOTS
gateway to propagate the DOTS client identity from the gateway's gateway to propagate the DOTS client identity from the gateway's
client-side to the gateway's server-side, and from the gateway's client-side to the gateway's server-side, and from the gateway's
server-side to the DOTS server. This allows the final DOTS server server-side to the DOTS server. This allows the final DOTS server
to accept mitigation requests with scopes which the DOTS client is to accept mitigation requests with scopes which the DOTS client is
authorized to manage. authorized to manage.
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A lifetime of negative one (-1) indicates indefinite lifetime for A lifetime of negative one (-1) indicates indefinite lifetime for
the mitigation request. the mitigation request.
DOTS clients SHOULD include this parameter in their mitigation DOTS clients SHOULD include this parameter in their mitigation
requests. If no lifetime is supplied by a DOTS client, the DOTS requests. If no lifetime is supplied by a DOTS client, the DOTS
server uses the default lifetime value (3600 seconds). Upon the server uses the default lifetime value (3600 seconds). Upon the
expiry of this lifetime, and if the request is not refreshed, the expiry of this lifetime, and if the request is not refreshed, the
mitigation request is removed. The request can be refreshed by mitigation request is removed. The request can be refreshed by
sending the same request again. The server MAY refuse indefinite sending the same request again. The server MAY refuse indefinite
lifetime; the granted lifetime value is returned in the response. lifetime, for policy reasons; the granted lifetime value is
The server MUST always indicate the actual lifetime in the returned in the response. DOTS clients MUST be prepared to not be
response and the remaining lifetime in status messages sent to the granted mitigations with indefinite lifetimes. The server MUST
client. This is a mandatory parameter for responses. always indicate the actual lifetime in the response and the
remaining lifetime in status messages sent to the client. This is
a mandatory parameter for responses.
The CBOR key values for the parameters are defined in Section 6. The CBOR key values for the parameters are defined in Section 6.
Section 10 defines how the CBOR key values can be allocated to Section 10 defines how the CBOR key values can be allocated to
standards bodies and vendors. standards bodies and vendors.
FQDN and URI mitigation scopes may be thought of as a form of scope FQDN and URI mitigation scopes may be thought of as a form of scope
alias, in which the addresses to which the domain name or URI resolve alias, in which the addresses to which the domain name or URI resolve
represent the full scope of the mitigation. represent the full scope of the mitigation.
In the PUT request at least one of the attributes 'target-ip' or In the PUT request at least one of the attributes 'target-ip' or
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numeric 'mitigation-id' MUST be automatically deleted and no longer numeric 'mitigation-id' MUST be automatically deleted and no longer
available at the DOTS server. available at the DOTS server.
The Uri-Path option carries a major and minor version nomenclature to The Uri-Path option carries a major and minor version nomenclature to
manage versioning and DOTS signal channel in this specification uses manage versioning and DOTS signal channel in this specification uses
v1 major version. v1 major version.
If the DOTS client is using the certificate provisioned by the If the DOTS client is using the certificate provisioned by the
Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) server [RFC6234] in the DOTS Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) server [RFC6234] in the DOTS
gateway-domain to authenticate itself to the DOTS gateway, then the gateway-domain to authenticate itself to the DOTS gateway, then the
'client-identifier' value will be the output of a cryptographic hash 'client-identifier' value can be the output of a cryptographic hash
algorithm whose input is the DER-encoded ASN.1 representation of the algorithm whose input is the DER-encoded ASN.1 representation of the
Subject Public Key Info (SPKI) of an X.509 certificate. The output Subject Public Key Info (SPKI) of an X.509 certificate. In this
of the cryptographic hash algorithm is base64url encoded. In this
version of the specification, the cryptographic hash algorithm used version of the specification, the cryptographic hash algorithm used
is SHA-256 [RFC6234]. If the 'client-identifier' value is already is SHA-256 [RFC6234]. The output of the cryptographic hash algorithm
present in the mitigation request received from the DOTS client, the is truncated to 16 bytes; truncation is done by stripping off the
DOTS gateway computes the 'client-identifier' value, as discussed final 16 bytes. The truncated output is base64url encoded. If the
above, and adds the computed 'client-identifier' value to the end of 'client-identifier' value is already present in the mitigation
the 'client-identifier' list. The DOTS server MUST NOT use the request received from the DOTS client, the DOTS gateway MAY compute
'client-identifier' for the DOTS client authentication process. the 'client-identifier' value, as discussed above, and add the
computed 'client-identifier' value to the end of the 'client-
identifier' list. The DOTS server MUST NOT use the 'client-
identifier' for the DOTS client authentication process.
In both DOTS signal and data channel sessions, the DOTS client MUST In both DOTS signal and data channel sessions, the DOTS client MUST
authenticate itself to the DOTS server (Section 9). The DOTS server authenticate itself to the DOTS server (Section 9). The DOTS server
may use the algorithm in Section 7 of [RFC7589] to derive the DOTS may use the algorithm in Section 7 of [RFC7589] to derive the DOTS
client identity or username from the client certificate. The DOTS client identity or username from the client certificate. The DOTS
client identity allows the DOTS server to accept mitigation requests client identity allows the DOTS server to accept mitigation requests
with scopes which the DOTS client is authorized to manage. The DOTS with scopes which the DOTS client is authorized to manage. The DOTS
server couples the DOTS signal and data channel sessions using the server couples the DOTS signal and data channel sessions using the
DOTS client identity and the 'client-identifier' parameter value, so DOTS client identity and the 'client-identifier' parameter value, so
the DOTS server can validate whether the aliases conveyed in the the DOTS server can validate whether the aliases conveyed in the
skipping to change at page 20, line 7 skipping to change at page 21, line 11
The DOTS server couples the DOTS signal channel sessions using the The DOTS server couples the DOTS signal channel sessions using the
DOTS client identity and the 'client-identifier' parameter value, and DOTS client identity and the 'client-identifier' parameter value, and
the DOTS server uses 'mitigation-id' parameter value to detect the DOTS server uses 'mitigation-id' parameter value to detect
duplicate mitigation requests. If the mitigation request contains duplicate mitigation requests. If the mitigation request contains
both alias-name and other parameters identifying the target resources both alias-name and other parameters identifying the target resources
(such as, 'target-ip', 'target-prefix', 'target-port-range', 'fqdn', (such as, 'target-ip', 'target-prefix', 'target-port-range', 'fqdn',
or 'uri'), then the DOTS server appends the parameter values in or 'uri'), then the DOTS server appends the parameter values in
'alias-name' with the corresponding parameter values in 'target-ip', 'alias-name' with the corresponding parameter values in 'target-ip',
'target-prefix', 'target-port-range', 'fqdn', or 'uri'. 'target-prefix', 'target-port-range', 'fqdn', or 'uri'.
Figure 6 shows a PUT request example to signal that ports 80, 8080, Figure 7 shows a PUT request example to signal that ports 80, 8080,
and 443 on the servers 2001:db8:6401::1 and 2001:db8:6401::2 are and 443 on the servers 2001:db8:6401::1 and 2001:db8:6401::2 are
being attacked (illustrated in JSON diagnostic notation). being attacked (illustrated in JSON diagnostic notation).
Header: PUT (Code=0.03) Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Host: "www.example.com" Uri-Host: "www.example.com"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "v1" Uri-Path: "v1"
Uri-Path: "dots-signal" Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "signal"
Content-Format: "application/cbor" Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{ {
"mitigation-scope": { "mitigation-scope": {
"client-identifier": [ "client-identifier": [
"E9CZ9INDbd+2eRQozYqqbQ2yXLVKB9+xcprMF+44U1g=" "dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
], ],
"scope": [ "scope": [
{ {
"mitigation-id": 12332, "mitigation-id": 12332,
"target-ip": [ "target-ip": [
"2001:db8:6401::1", "2001:db8:6401::1",
"2001:db8:6401::2" "2001:db8:6401::2"
], ],
"target-port-range": [ "target-port-range": [
{ {
skipping to change at page 21, line 7 skipping to change at page 22, line 12
} }
} }
The CBOR encoding format is shown below: The CBOR encoding format is shown below:
A1 # map(1) A1 # map(1)
01 # unsigned(1) 01 # unsigned(1)
A2 # map(2) A2 # map(2)
18 20 # unsigned(32) 18 20 # unsigned(32)
81 # array(1) 81 # array(1)
78 2C # text(44) 76 # text(22)
4539435A39494E4462642B326552516F7A59717162513279584C564B42392B786370724D462B34345531673D 647A3670486A6141446B614654626A72304A47427077 # "dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
# "E9CZ9INDbd+2eRQozYqqbQ2yXLVKB9+xcprMF+44U1g="
02 # unsigned(2) 02 # unsigned(2)
81 # array(1) 81 # array(1)
A4 # map(4) A4 # map(4)
03 # unsigned(3) 03 # unsigned(3)
19 302C # unsigned(12332) 19 302C # unsigned(12332)
04 # unsigned(4) 04 # unsigned(4)
82 # array(2) 82 # array(2)
70 # text(16) 70 # text(16)
323030313A6462383A363430313A3A31 # "2001:db8:6401::1" 323030313A6462383A363430313A3A31 # "2001:db8:6401::1"
70 # text(16) 70 # text(16)
skipping to change at page 21, line 36 skipping to change at page 22, line 40
A1 # map(1) A1 # map(1)
06 # unsigned(6) 06 # unsigned(6)
19 01BB # unsigned(443) 19 01BB # unsigned(443)
A1 # map(1) A1 # map(1)
06 # unsigned(6) 06 # unsigned(6)
19 1F90 # unsigned(8080) 19 1F90 # unsigned(8080)
08 # unsigned(8) 08 # unsigned(8)
81 # array(1) 81 # array(1)
06 # unsigned(6) 06 # unsigned(6)
Figure 6: PUT for DOTS signal Figure 7: PUT for DOTS signal
The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the PUT request The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the PUT request
using CoAP response codes. CoAP 2.xx codes are success. CoAP 4.xx using CoAP response codes. CoAP 2.xx codes are success. CoAP 4.xx
codes are some sort of invalid requests. Figure 7 shows a PUT codes are some sort of invalid requests. Figure 8 shows a PUT
response for CoAP 2.xx response codes. response for CoAP 2.xx response codes.
{ {
"mitigation-scope": { "mitigation-scope": {
"client-identifier": [ "client-identifier": [
"string" "string"
], ],
"scope": [ "scope": [
{ {
"mitigation-id": integer, "mitigation-id": integer,
"lifetime": integer "lifetime": integer
} }
] ]
} }
} }
Figure 7: 2.xx response body Figure 8: 2.xx response body
COAP 5.xx codes are returned if the DOTS server has erred or is COAP 5.xx codes are returned if the DOTS server has erred or is
currently unavailable to provide mitigation in response to the currently unavailable to provide mitigation in response to the
mitigation request from the DOTS client. mitigation request from the DOTS client.
If the DOTS server does not find the 'mitigation-id' parameter value If the DOTS server does not find the 'mitigation-id' parameter value
conveyed in the PUT request in its configuration data, then the conveyed in the PUT request in its configuration data, then the
server MAY accept the mitigation request by sending back a 2.01 server MAY accept the mitigation request by sending back a 2.01
(Created) response to the DOTS client; the DOTS server will (Created) response to the DOTS client; the DOTS server will
consequently try to mitigate the attack. consequently try to mitigate the attack.
skipping to change at page 23, line 5 skipping to change at page 24, line 5
request by sending a new PUT request. The PUT request MUST use the request by sending a new PUT request. The PUT request MUST use the
same 'mitigation-id' value, and MUST repeat all the other parameters same 'mitigation-id' value, and MUST repeat all the other parameters
as sent in the original mitigation request apart from a possible as sent in the original mitigation request apart from a possible
change to the lifetime parameter value. change to the lifetime parameter value.
A DOTS gateway MUST update the 'client-identifier' list in the A DOTS gateway MUST update the 'client-identifier' list in the
response to remove the 'client-identifier' value it had added in the response to remove the 'client-identifier' value it had added in the
corresponding request before forwarding the response to the DOTS corresponding request before forwarding the response to the DOTS
client. client.
5.3.2. Withdraw a DOTS Signal 5.4.2. Withdraw a DOTS Signal
A DELETE request is used to withdraw a DOTS signal from a DOTS server A DELETE request is used to withdraw a DOTS signal from a DOTS server
(Figure 8). (Figure 9).
Header: DELETE (Code=0.04) Header: DELETE (Code=0.04)
Uri-Host: "host" Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "version" Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "dots-signal" Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "signal"
Content-Format: "application/cbor" Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{ {
"mitigation-scope": { "mitigation-scope": {
"client-identifier": [ "client-identifier": [
"string" "string"
], ],
"scope": [ "scope": [
{ {
"mitigation-id": integer "mitigation-id": integer
} }
] ]
} }
} }
Figure 8: Withdraw DOTS signal Figure 9: Withdraw DOTS signal
The DOTS server immediately acknowledges a DOTS client's request to The DOTS server immediately acknowledges a DOTS client's request to
withdraw the DOTS signal using 2.02 (Deleted) response code with no withdraw the DOTS signal using 2.02 (Deleted) response code with no
response payload. A 2.02 (Deleted) Response Code is returned even if response payload. A 2.02 (Deleted) Response Code is returned even if
the 'mitigation-id' parameter value conveyed in the DELETE request the 'mitigation-id' parameter value conveyed in the DELETE request
does not exist in its configuration data before the request. does not exist in its configuration data before the request.
If the DOTS server finds the 'mitigation-id' parameter value conveyed If the DOTS server finds the 'mitigation-id' parameter value conveyed
in the DELETE request in its configuration data, then to protect in the DELETE request in its configuration data, then to protect
against route or DNS flapping caused by a client rapidly toggling against route or DNS flapping caused by a client rapidly toggling
mitigation, and to dampen the effect of oscillating attacks, DOTS mitigation, and to dampen the effect of oscillating attacks, DOTS
servers MAY allow mitigation to continue for a limited period after servers MAY allow mitigation to continue for a limited period after
acknowledging a DOTS client's withdrawal of a mitigation request. acknowledging a DOTS client's withdrawal of a mitigation request.
During this period, the DOTS server status messages SHOULD indicate During this period, the DOTS server status messages SHOULD indicate
that mitigation is active but terminating. The active-but- that mitigation is active but terminating. The initial active-but-
terminating period MUST be set by default to 30 seconds. If the DOTS terminating period SHOULD be sufficiently long to absorb latency
client requests mitigation again before that 30 second expires, the incurred by route propagation. The active-but-terminating period
DOTS server MAY exponentially increase the active-but-terminating SHOULD be set by default to 120 seconds. If the client requests
timeout up to a maximum of 240 seconds (4 minutes). After the mitigation again before the initial active-but-terminating period
active-but-terminating period expires, the DOTS server MUST treat the elapses, the DOTS server MAY exponentially increase the active-but-
mitigation as terminated. That is, the DOTS client is no longer terminating period up to a maximum of 300 seconds (5 minutes). After
the active-but-terminating period elapses, the DOTS server MUST treat
the mitigation as terminated, as the DOTS client is no longer
responsible for the mitigation. For example, if there is a financial responsible for the mitigation. For example, if there is a financial
relationship between the DOTS client and server domains, the DOTS relationship between the DOTS client and server domains, the DOTS
client ceases incurring cost at this point. client ceases incurring cost at this point.
5.3.3. Retrieving a DOTS Signal 5.4.3. Retrieving a DOTS Signal
A GET request is used to retrieve information (including status) of a A GET request is used to retrieve information (including status) of a
DOTS signal from a DOTS server (Figure 9). If the DOTS server does DOTS signal from a DOTS server (Figure 10). If the DOTS server does
not find the 'mitigation-id' parameter value conveyed in the GET not find the 'mitigation-id' parameter value conveyed in the GET
request in its configuration data, then it responds with a 4.04 (Not request in its configuration data, then it responds with a 4.04 (Not
Found) error response code. The 'c' (content) parameter and its Found) error response code. The 'c' (content) parameter and its
permitted values defined in [I-D.ietf-core-comi] can be used to permitted values defined in [I-D.ietf-core-comi] can be used to
retrieve non-configuration data (attack mitigation status) or retrieve non-configuration data (attack mitigation status) or
configuration data or both. configuration data or both. The DOTS server SHOULD support this
optional filtering capability but can safely ignore it if not
supported.
The examples below assume the default of "c=a".
1) To retrieve all DOTS signals signaled by the DOTS client. 1) To retrieve all DOTS signals signaled by the DOTS client.
Header: GET (Code=0.01) Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Host: "host" Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "version" Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "dots-signal" Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "signal"
Observe : 0 Observe : 0
{ {
"mitigation-scope": { "mitigation-scope": {
"client-identifier": [ "client-identifier": [
"string" "string"
] ]
} }
} }
2) To retrieve a specific DOTS signal signaled by the DOTS client. 2) To retrieve a specific DOTS signal signaled by the DOTS client.
The configuration data in the response will be formatted in the The configuration data in the response will be formatted in the
same order it was processed at the DOTS server. same order it was processed at the DOTS server.
Header: GET (Code=0.01) Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Host: "host" Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "version" Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "dots-signal" Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "signal"
Observe : 0 Observe : 0
Content-Format: "application/cbor" Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{ {
"mitigation-scope": { "mitigation-scope": {
"client-identifier": [ "client-identifier": [
"string" "string"
], ],
"scope": [ "scope": [
{ {
"mitigation-id": integer "mitigation-id": integer
} }
] ]
} }
} }
Figure 9: GET to retrieve the rules Figure 10: GET to retrieve the rules
Figure 10 shows a response example of all the active mitigation Figure 11 shows a response example of all the active mitigation
requests associated with the DOTS client on the DOTS server and the requests associated with the DOTS client on the DOTS server and the
mitigation status of each mitigation request. mitigation status of each mitigation request.
{ {
"mitigation-scope": { "mitigation-scope": {
"scope": [ "scope": [
{ {
"mitigation-id": 12332, "mitigation-id": 12332,
"mitigation-start": 1507818434.00, "mitigation-start": 1507818434.00,
"target-protocol": [ "target-protocol": [
skipping to change at page 26, line 38 skipping to change at page 27, line 38
"status":3 "status":3
"bytes-dropped": 0, "bytes-dropped": 0,
"bps-dropped": 0, "bps-dropped": 0,
"pkts-dropped": 0, "pkts-dropped": 0,
"pps-dropped": 0 "pps-dropped": 0
} }
] ]
} }
} }
Figure 10: Response body Figure 11: Response body
The mitigation status parameters are described below. The mitigation status parameters are described below.
lifetime: The remaining lifetime of the mitigation request in lifetime: The remaining lifetime of the mitigation request in
seconds. seconds.
mitigation-start: Mitigation start time is represented in seconds mitigation-start: Mitigation start time is represented in seconds
relative to 1970-01-01T00:00Z in UTC time (Section 2.4.1 of relative to 1970-01-01T00:00Z in UTC time (Section 2.4.1 of
[RFC7049]). The encoding is modified so that the leading tag 1 [RFC7049]). The encoding is modified so that the leading tag 1
(epoch-based date/time) MUST be omitted. (epoch-based date/time) MUST be omitted.
skipping to change at page 28, line 51 skipping to change at page 29, line 51
| status: "mitigation | | status: "mitigation |
| complete" | | complete" |
|<------------------------------+ |<------------------------------+
| 2.05 Content | | 2.05 Content |
| Token: 0x4a | Notification upon | Token: 0x4a | Notification upon
| Observe: 60 | a state change | Observe: 60 | a state change
| status: "attack stopped" | | status: "attack stopped" |
|<------------------------------+ |<------------------------------+
| | | |
Figure 11: Notifications of attack mitigation status Figure 12: Notifications of attack mitigation status
5.3.3.1. Mitigation Status 5.4.3.1. Mitigation Status
The DOTS client can send the GET request at frequent intervals The DOTS client can send the GET request at frequent intervals
without the Observe option to retrieve the configuration data of the without the Observe option to retrieve the configuration data of the
mitigation request and non-configuration data (i.e., the attack mitigation request and non-configuration data (i.e., the attack
status). The frequency of polling the DOTS server to get the status). The frequency of polling the DOTS server to get the
mitigation status should follow the transmission guidelines given in mitigation status should follow the transmission guidelines given in
Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085]. If the DOTS server has been able to Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085]. If the DOTS server has been able to
mitigate the attack and the attack has stopped, the DOTS server mitigate the attack and the attack has stopped, the DOTS server
indicates as such in the status, and the DOTS client recalls the indicates as such in the status, and the DOTS client recalls the
mitigation request by issuing a DELETE for the mitigation-id. mitigation request by issuing a DELETE for the mitigation-id.
A DOTS client should react to the status of the attack from the DOTS A DOTS client should react to the status of the attack from the DOTS
server and not the fact that it has recognized, using its own means, server and not the fact that it has recognized, using its own means,
that the attack has been mitigated. This ensures that the DOTS that the attack has been mitigated. This ensures that the DOTS
client does not recall a mitigation request in a premature fashion client does not recall a mitigation request in a premature fashion
because it is possible that the DOTS client does not sense the DDOS because it is possible that the DOTS client does not sense the DDOS
attack on its resources but the DOTS server could be actively attack on its resources but the DOTS server could be actively
mitigating the attack and the attack is not completely averted. mitigating the attack and the attack is not completely averted.
5.3.4. Efficacy Update from DOTS Client 5.4.4. Efficacy Update from DOTS Client
While DDoS mitigation is active, due to the likelihood of packet While DDoS mitigation is active, due to the likelihood of packet
loss, a DOTS client MAY periodically transmit DOTS mitigation loss, a DOTS client MAY periodically transmit DOTS mitigation
efficacy updates to the relevant DOTS server. A PUT request efficacy updates to the relevant DOTS server. A PUT request
(Figure 12) is used to convey the mitigation efficacy update to the (Figure 13) is used to convey the mitigation efficacy update to the
DOTS server. DOTS server.
The PUT request MUST include all the parameters used in the PUT The PUT request MUST include all the parameters used in the PUT
request to convey the DOTS signal (Section 5.3.1) unchanged apart request to convey the DOTS signal (Section 5.4.1) unchanged apart
from the lifetime parameter value. If this is not the case, the DOTS from the lifetime parameter value. If this is not the case, the DOTS
server MUST reject the request with a 4.02 error response code. server MUST reject the request with a 4.02 error response code.
The If-Match Option (Section 5.10.8.1 of [RFC7252]) with an empty The If-Match Option (Section 5.10.8.1 of [RFC7252]) with an empty
value is used to make the PUT request conditional on the current value is used to make the PUT request conditional on the current
existence of the mitigation request. If UDP is used as transport, existence of the mitigation request. If UDP is used as transport,
CoAP requests may arrive out-of-order. For example, the DOTS client CoAP requests may arrive out-of-order. For example, the DOTS client
may send a PUT request to convey an efficacy update to the DOTS may send a PUT request to convey an efficacy update to the DOTS
server followed by a DELETE request to withdraw the mitigation server followed by a DELETE request to withdraw the mitigation
request, but the DELETE request arrives at the DOTS server before the request, but the DELETE request arrives at the DOTS server before the
PUT request. To handle out-of-order delivery of requests, if an If- PUT request. To handle out-of-order delivery of requests, if an If-
Match option is present in the PUT request and the 'mitigation-id' in Match option is present in the PUT request and the 'mitigation-id' in
the request matches a mitigation request from that DOTS client, then the request matches a mitigation request from that DOTS client, then
the request is processed. If no match is found, the PUT request is the request is processed. If no match is found, the PUT request is
silently ignored. silently ignored.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03) Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Host: "host" Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "version" Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "dots-signal" Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "signal"
Content-Format: "application/cbor" Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{ {
"mitigation-scope": { "mitigation-scope": {
"client-identifier": [ "client-identifier": [
"string" "string"
], ],
"scope": [ "scope": [
{ {
"mitigation-id": integer, "mitigation-id": integer,
"target-ip": [ "target-ip": [
skipping to change at page 30, line 47 skipping to change at page 31, line 48
"alias-name": [ "alias-name": [
"string" "string"
], ],
"lifetime": integer, "lifetime": integer,
"attack-status": integer "attack-status": integer
} }
] ]
} }
} }
Figure 12: Efficacy Update Figure 13: Efficacy Update
The 'attack-status' parameter is a mandatory attribute when doing a The 'attack-status' parameter is a mandatory attribute when doing a
efficacy update. The various possible values contained in the efficacy update. The various possible values contained in the
'attack-status' parameter are described below: 'attack-status' parameter are described below:
/--------------------+------------------------------------------------------\ /--------------------+------------------------------------------------------\
| Parameter value | Description | | Parameter value | Description |
+--------------------+------------------------------------------------------+ +--------------------+------------------------------------------------------+
| 1 | DOTS client determines that it is still under attack.| | 1 | DOTS client determines that it is still under attack.|
+--------------------+------------------------------------------------------+ +--------------------+------------------------------------------------------+
skipping to change at page 31, line 22 skipping to change at page 32, line 22
| | (e.g., attack traffic is not seen). | | | (e.g., attack traffic is not seen). |
\--------------------+------------------------------------------------------/ \--------------------+------------------------------------------------------/
The DOTS server indicates the result of processing a PUT request The DOTS server indicates the result of processing a PUT request
using CoAP response codes. The response code 2.04 (Changed) is using CoAP response codes. The response code 2.04 (Changed) is
returned if the DOTS server has accepted the mitigation efficacy returned if the DOTS server has accepted the mitigation efficacy
update. The error response code 5.03 (Service Unavailable) is update. The error response code 5.03 (Service Unavailable) is
returned if the DOTS server has erred or is incapable of performing returned if the DOTS server has erred or is incapable of performing
the mitigation. the mitigation.
5.4. DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration 5.5. DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration
The DOTS client can negotiate, configure, and retrieve the DOTS The DOTS client can negotiate, configure, and retrieve the DOTS
signal channel session behavior. The DOTS signal channel can be signal channel session behavior. The DOTS signal channel can be
used, for example, to configure the following: used, for example, to configure the following:
a. Heartbeat interval: DOTS agents regularly send heartbeats (CoAP a. Heartbeat interval: DOTS agents regularly send heartbeats (CoAP
Ping/Pong) to each other after mutual authentication in order to Ping/Pong) to each other after mutual authentication in order to
keep the DOTS signal channel open, heartbeat messages are keep the DOTS signal channel open, heartbeat messages are
exchanged between the DOTS agents every heartbeat-interval exchanged between the DOTS agents every heartbeat-interval
seconds to detect the current status of the DOTS signal channel seconds to detect the current status of the DOTS signal channel
skipping to change at page 32, line 28 skipping to change at page 33, line 28
Implementation Note: A DOTS client that receives a response in a CON Implementation Note: A DOTS client that receives a response in a CON
message may want to clean up the message state right after sending message may want to clean up the message state right after sending
the ACK. If that ACK is lost and the DOTS server retransmits the the ACK. If that ACK is lost and the DOTS server retransmits the
CON, the DOTS client may no longer have any state to which to CON, the DOTS client may no longer have any state to which to
correlate this response, making the retransmission an unexpected correlate this response, making the retransmission an unexpected
message; the DOTS client will send a Reset message so it does not message; the DOTS client will send a Reset message so it does not
receive any more retransmissions. This behavior is normal and not an receive any more retransmissions. This behavior is normal and not an
indication of an error (see Section 5.3.2 of [RFC7252] for more indication of an error (see Section 5.3.2 of [RFC7252] for more
details). details).
5.4.1. Discover Configuration Parameters 5.5.1. Discover Configuration Parameters
A GET request is used to obtain acceptable and current configuration A GET request is used to obtain acceptable and current configuration
parameters on the DOTS server for DOTS signal channel session parameters on the DOTS server for DOTS signal channel session
configuration. Figure 13 shows how to obtain acceptable configuration. Figure 14 shows how to obtain acceptable
configuration parameters for the server. configuration parameters for the server.
Header: GET (Code=0.01) Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Host: "host" Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "version" Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "dots-signal"
Uri-Path: "config" Uri-Path: "config"
Figure 13: GET to retrieve configuration Figure 14: GET to retrieve configuration
The DOTS server in the 2.05 (Content) response conveys the current, The DOTS server in the 2.05 (Content) response conveys the current,
minimum and maximum attribute values acceptable by the DOTS server. minimum and maximum attribute values acceptable by the DOTS server.
Content-Format: "application/cbor" Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{ {
"heartbeat-interval": { "heartbeat-interval": {
"CurrentValue": integer, "CurrentValue": integer,
"MinValue": integer, "MinValue": integer,
"MaxValue" : integer, "MaxValue" : integer,
skipping to change at page 33, line 37 skipping to change at page 34, line 37
"ack-random-factor": { "ack-random-factor": {
"CurrentValue": number, "CurrentValue": number,
"MinValue": number, "MinValue": number,
"MaxValue" : number, "MaxValue" : number,
}, },
"trigger-mitigation": { "trigger-mitigation": {
"CurrentValue": boolean, "CurrentValue": boolean,
} }
} }
Figure 14: GET response body Figure 15: GET response body
Figure 15 shows an example of acceptable and current configuration Figure 16 shows an example of acceptable and current configuration
parameters on the DOTS server for DOTS signal channel session parameters on the DOTS server for DOTS signal channel session
configuration. configuration.
Content-Format: "application/cbor" Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{ {
"heartbeat-interval": { "heartbeat-interval": {
"CurrentValue": 30, "CurrentValue": 30,
"MinValue": 15, "MinValue": 15,
"MaxValue" : 240, "MaxValue" : 240,
}, },
skipping to change at page 34, line 37 skipping to change at page 35, line 37
"ack-random-factor": { "ack-random-factor": {
"CurrentValue": 1.5, "CurrentValue": 1.5,
"MinValue": 1.1, "MinValue": 1.1,
"MaxValue" : 4.0, "MaxValue" : 4.0,
}, },
"trigger-mitigation": { "trigger-mitigation": {
"CurrentValue": true, "CurrentValue": true,
} }
} }
Figure 15: configuration response body Figure 16: configuration response body
5.4.2. Convey DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration 5.5.2. Convey DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration
A PUT request is used to convey the configuration parameters for the A PUT request is used to convey the configuration parameters for the
signaling channel (e.g., heartbeat interval, maximum signaling channel (e.g., heartbeat interval, maximum
retransmissions). Message transmission parameters for CoAP are retransmissions). Message transmission parameters for CoAP are
defined in Section 4.8 of [RFC7252]. The RECOMMENDED values of defined in Section 4.8 of [RFC7252]. The RECOMMENDED values of
transmission parameter values are ack_timeout (2 seconds), max- transmission parameter values are ack_timeout (2 seconds), max-
retransmit (3), ack-random-factor (1.5). In addition to those retransmit (3), ack-random-factor (1.5). In addition to those
parameters, the RECOMMENDED specific DOTS transmission parameter parameters, the RECOMMENDED specific DOTS transmission parameter
values are heartbeat-interval (30 seconds) and missing-hb-allowed values are heartbeat-interval (30 seconds) and missing-hb-allowed
(5). (5).
skipping to change at page 36, line 7 skipping to change at page 37, line 7
transmission parameters, then it should follow the guidance given in transmission parameters, then it should follow the guidance given in
Section 4.8.1 of [RFC7252]. The DOTS agents MUST use the negotiated Section 4.8.1 of [RFC7252]. The DOTS agents MUST use the negotiated
values for message transmission parameters and default values for values for message transmission parameters and default values for
non-negotiated message transmission parameters. non-negotiated message transmission parameters.
The signaling channel session configuration is applicable to a single The signaling channel session configuration is applicable to a single
DOTS signal channel session between the DOTS agents. DOTS signal channel session between the DOTS agents.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03) Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Host: "host" Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "version" Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "dots-signal"
Uri-Path: "config" Uri-Path: "config"
Content-Format: "application/cbor" Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{ {
"signal-config": { "signal-config": {
"session-id": integer, "session-id": integer,
"heartbeat-interval": integer, "heartbeat-interval": integer,
"missing-hb-allowed": integer, "missing-hb-allowed": integer,
"max-retransmit": integer, "max-retransmit": integer,
"ack-timeout": integer, "ack-timeout": integer,
"ack-random-factor": number "ack-random-factor": number
"trigger-mitigation": boolean "trigger-mitigation": boolean
} }
} }
Figure 16: PUT to convey the DOTS signal channel session Figure 17: PUT to convey the DOTS signal channel session
configuration data. configuration data.
The parameters are described below: The parameters are described below:
session-id: Identifier for the DOTS signal channel session session-id: Identifier for the DOTS signal channel session
configuration data represented as an integer. This identifier configuration data represented as an integer. This identifier
MUST be generated by the DOTS client. This document does not make MUST be generated by the DOTS client. This document does not make
any assumption about how this identifier is generated. This is a any assumption about how this identifier is generated. This is a
mandatory attribute. mandatory attribute.
skipping to change at page 37, line 20 skipping to change at page 38, line 24
DOTS server can detect that the DOTS session is lost. The default DOTS server can detect that the DOTS session is lost. The default
value of the parameter is 'true'. This is an optional attribute. value of the parameter is 'true'. This is an optional attribute.
In the PUT request at least one of the attributes heartbeat-interval, In the PUT request at least one of the attributes heartbeat-interval,
missing-hb-allowed, max-retransmit, ack-timeout, ack-random-factor, missing-hb-allowed, max-retransmit, ack-timeout, ack-random-factor,
and trigger-mitigation MUST be present. The PUT request with higher and trigger-mitigation MUST be present. The PUT request with higher
numeric session-id value over-rides the DOTS signal channel session numeric session-id value over-rides the DOTS signal channel session
configuration data installed by a PUT request with a lower numeric configuration data installed by a PUT request with a lower numeric
session-id value. session-id value.
Figure 17 shows a PUT request example to convey the configuration Figure 18 shows a PUT request example to convey the configuration
parameters for the DOTS signal channel. parameters for the DOTS signal channel.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03) Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Host: "www.example.com" Uri-Host: "www.example.com"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "v1" Uri-Path: "v1"
Uri-Path: "dots-signal"
Uri-Path: "config" Uri-Path: "config"
Content-Format: "application/cbor" Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{ {
"signal-config": { "signal-config": {
"session-id": 1234534333242, "session-id": 1234534333242,
"heartbeat-interval": 91, "heartbeat-interval": 91,
"missing-hb-allowed": 3, "missing-hb-allowed": 3,
"max-retransmit": 7, "max-retransmit": 7,
"ack-timeout": 5, "ack-timeout": 5,
"ack-random-factor": 1.5, "ack-random-factor": 1.5,
"trigger-mitigation": false "trigger-mitigation": false
} }
} }
Figure 17: PUT to convey the configuration parameters Figure 18: PUT to convey the configuration parameters
The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the PUT request The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the PUT request
using CoAP response codes: using CoAP response codes:
o If the DOTS server finds the 'session-id' parameter value conveyed o If the DOTS server finds the 'session-id' parameter value conveyed
in the PUT request in its configuration data and if the DOTS in the PUT request in its configuration data and if the DOTS
server has accepted the updated configuration parameters, then server has accepted the updated configuration parameters, then
2.04 (Changed) code is returned in the response. 2.04 (Changed) code is returned in the response.
o If the DOTS server does not find the 'session-id' parameter value o If the DOTS server does not find the 'session-id' parameter value
skipping to change at page 38, line 19 skipping to change at page 39, line 24
o If the request contains one or more invalid or unknown parameters, o If the request contains one or more invalid or unknown parameters,
then 4.02 (Invalid query) code is returned in the response. then 4.02 (Invalid query) code is returned in the response.
o Response code 4.22 (Unprocessable Entity) is returned in the o Response code 4.22 (Unprocessable Entity) is returned in the
response, if any of the heartbeat-interval, missing-hb-allowed, response, if any of the heartbeat-interval, missing-hb-allowed,
max-retransmit, target-protocol, ack-timeout, and ack-random- max-retransmit, target-protocol, ack-timeout, and ack-random-
factor attribute values are not acceptable to the DOTS server. factor attribute values are not acceptable to the DOTS server.
Upon receipt of the 4.22 error response code, the DOTS client Upon receipt of the 4.22 error response code, the DOTS client
should request the maximum and minimum attribute values acceptable should request the maximum and minimum attribute values acceptable
to the DOTS server (Section 5.4.1). The DOTS client may re-try to the DOTS server (Section 5.5.1). The DOTS client may re-try
and send the PUT request with updated attribute values acceptable and send the PUT request with updated attribute values acceptable
to the DOTS server. to the DOTS server.
5.4.3. Delete DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration 5.5.3. Delete DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration
A DELETE request is used to delete the installed DOTS signal channel A DELETE request is used to delete the installed DOTS signal channel
session configuration data (Figure 18). session configuration data (Figure 19).
Header: DELETE (Code=0.04) Header: DELETE (Code=0.04)
Uri-Host: "host" Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "version" Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "dots-signal"
Uri-Path: "config" Uri-Path: "config"
Content-Format: "application/cbor" Content-Format: "application/cbor"
Figure 18: DELETE configuration Figure 19: DELETE configuration
The DOTS server resets the DOTS signal channel session configuration The DOTS server resets the DOTS signal channel session configuration
back to the default values and acknowledges a DOTS client's request back to the default values and acknowledges a DOTS client's request
to remove the DOTS signal channel session configuration using 2.02 to remove the DOTS signal channel session configuration using 2.02
(Deleted) response code. (Deleted) response code.
5.5. Redirected Signaling 5.6. Redirected Signaling
Redirected Signaling is discussed in detail in Section 3.2.2 of Redirected Signaling is discussed in detail in Section 3.2.2 of
[I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]. If the DOTS server wants to redirect [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]. If the DOTS server wants to redirect
the DOTS client to an alternative DOTS server for a signaling session the DOTS client to an alternative DOTS server for a signaling session
then the response code 3.00 (alternate server) will be returned in then the response code 3.00 (alternate server) will be returned in
the response to the client. The DOTS server can return the error the response to the client. The DOTS server can return the error
response code 3.00 in response to a PUT request from the DOTS client response code 3.00 in response to a PUT request from the DOTS client
or convey the error response code 3.00 in a unidirectional or convey the error response code 3.00 in a unidirectional
notification response from the DOTS server. notification response from the DOTS server.
skipping to change at page 39, line 19 skipping to change at page 40, line 30
{ {
"alt-server": "string", "alt-server": "string",
"alt-server-record": [ "alt-server-record": [
{ {
"addr": "string", "addr": "string",
"ttl" : integer, "ttl" : integer,
} }
] ]
} }
Figure 19: Error response body Figure 20: Error response body
The parameters are described below: The parameters are described below:
alt-server: FQDN of an alternate DOTS server. alt-server: FQDN of an alternate DOTS server.
addr: IP address of an alternate DOTS server. addr: IP address of an alternate DOTS server.
ttl: Time to live (TTL) represented as an integer number of seconds. ttl: Time to live (TTL) represented as an integer number of seconds.
Figure 20 shows a 3.00 response example to convey the DOTS alternate Figure 21 shows a 3.00 response example to convey the DOTS alternate
server www.example-alt.com, its IP addresses 2001:db8:6401::1 and server www.example-alt.com, its IP addresses 2001:db8:6401::1 and
2001:db8:6401::2, and TTL values 3600 and 1800. 2001:db8:6401::2, and TTL values 3600 and 1800.
{ {
"alt-server": "www.example-alt.com", "alt-server": "www.example-alt.com",
"alt-server-record": [ "alt-server-record": [
{ {
"ttl" : 3600, "ttl" : 3600,
"addr": "2001:db8:6401::1" "addr": "2001:db8:6401::1"
}, },
{ {
"ttl" : 1800, "ttl" : 1800,
"addr": "2001:db8:6401::2" "addr": "2001:db8:6401::2"
} }
] ]
} }
Figure 20: Example of error response body Figure 21: Example of error response body
When the DOTS client receives 3.00 response, it considers the current When the DOTS client receives 3.00 response, it considers the current
request as having failed, but SHOULD try the request with the request as having failed, but SHOULD try the request with the
alternate DOTS server. During a DDOS attack, the DNS server may be alternate DOTS server. During a DDOS attack, the DNS server may be
subjected to DDOS attack, alternate DOTS server IP addresses conveyed subjected to DDOS attack, alternate DOTS server IP addresses conveyed
in the 3.00 response help the DOTS client to skip DNS lookup of the in the 3.00 response help the DOTS client to skip DNS lookup of the
alternate DOTS server and can try to establish UDP or TCP session alternate DOTS server and can try to establish UDP or TCP session
with the alternate DOTS server IP addresses. The DOTS client SHOULD with the alternate DOTS server IP addresses. The DOTS client SHOULD
implement DNS64 function to handle the scenario where IPv6-only DOTS implement DNS64 function to handle the scenario where IPv6-only DOTS
client communicates with IPv4-only alternate DOTS server. client communicates with IPv4-only alternate DOTS server.
5.6. Heartbeat Mechanism 5.7. Heartbeat Mechanism
To provide a metric of signal health and distinguish an 'idle' signal To provide a metric of signal health and distinguish an 'idle' signal
channel from a 'disconnected' or 'defunct' session, the DOTS agent channel from a 'disconnected' or 'defunct' session, the DOTS agent
sends a heartbeat over the signal channel to maintain its half of the sends a heartbeat over the signal channel to maintain its half of the
channel. The DOTS agent similarly expects a heartbeat from its peer channel. The DOTS agent similarly expects a heartbeat from its peer
DOTS agent, and may consider a session terminated in the extended DOTS agent, and may consider a session terminated in the extended
absence of a peer agent heartbeat. absence of a peer agent heartbeat.
While the communication between the DOTS agents is quiescent, the While the communication between the DOTS agents is quiescent, the
DOTS client will probe the DOTS server to ensure it has maintained DOTS client will probe the DOTS server to ensure it has maintained
cryptographic state and vice versa. Such probes can also keep alive cryptographic state and vice versa. Such probes can also keep alive
firewall and/or NAT bindings. This probing reduces the frequency of firewall and/or NAT bindings. This probing reduces the frequency of
establishing a new handshake when a DOTS signal needs to be conveyed establishing a new handshake when a DOTS signal needs to be conveyed
to the DOTS server. to the DOTS server.
In case of a volumetric DDoS attack saturating the incoming link to
the DOTS client, all traffic from the DOTS server to the DOTS client
will likely be dropped, although the DOTS server receives heartbeat
requests and DOTS messages from the DOTS client. In this scenario,
the DOTS agents MUST behave differently to handle message
transmission and DOTS session liveliness during link saturation:
o The DOTS client MUST NOT consider the DOTS session terminated even
after maximum "missing-hb-allowed" threshold is reached. The DOTS
client SHOULD continue to use the current DOTS session, and send
heartbeat requests over the current DOTS session, so the DOTS
server knows the DOTS client has not disconnected the DOTS
session. After the maximum "missing-hb-allowed" threshold is
reached, the DOTS client SHOULD try (D)TLS session resumption.
The DOTS client SHOULD send mitigation requests over the current
DOTS session, and in parallel, try (D)TLS session resumption or
0-RTT mode in DTLS 1.3 to piggyback the mitigation request in the
ClientHello message. Once the link is no longer statured, if
traffic from the DOTS server reaches the DOTS client over the
current DOTS session, the DOTS client can stop (D)TLS session
resumption or if (D)TLS session resumption is successful then
disconnect the current DOTS session.
o If the DOTS server does not receive any traffic from the peer DOTS
client, then the DOTS server sends heartbeat requests to the DOTS
client and after maximum "missing-hb-allowed" threshold is
reached, the DOTS server concludes the session is disconnected.
In DOTS over UDP, heartbeat messages may be exchanged between the In DOTS over UDP, heartbeat messages may be exchanged between the
DOTS agents using the "COAP ping" mechanism defined in Section 4.2 of DOTS agents using the "COAP ping" mechanism defined in Section 4.2 of
[RFC7252]. Concretely, the DOTS agent sends an Empty Confirmable [RFC7252]. Concretely, the DOTS agent sends an Empty Confirmable
message and the peer DOTS agent will respond by sending an Reset message and the peer DOTS agent will respond by sending an Reset
message. message.
In DOTS over TCP, heartbeat messages can be exchanged between the In DOTS over TCP, heartbeat messages can be exchanged between the
DOTS agents using the Ping and Pong messages specified in Section 4.4 DOTS agents using the Ping and Pong messages specified in Section 4.4
of [I-D.ietf-core-coap-tcp-tls]. That is, the DOTS agent sends a of [I-D.ietf-core-coap-tcp-tls]. That is, the DOTS agent sends a
Ping message and the peer DOTS agent would respond by sending a Ping message and the peer DOTS agent would respond by sending a
skipping to change at page 41, line 40 skipping to change at page 43, line 40
| bps-dropped | 23 | 0 | | bps-dropped | 23 | 0 |
| pkts-dropped | 24 | 0 | | pkts-dropped | 24 | 0 |
| pps-dropped | 25 | 0 | | pps-dropped | 25 | 0 |
| session-id | 26 | 0 | | session-id | 26 | 0 |
| trigger-mitigation | 27 | 7 (simple types) | | trigger-mitigation | 27 | 7 (simple types) |
| missing-hb-allowed | 28 | 0 | | missing-hb-allowed | 28 | 0 |
| CurrentValue | 29 | 0 | | CurrentValue | 29 | 0 |
| mitigation-start | 30 | 7 (floating-point) | | mitigation-start | 30 | 7 (floating-point) |
| target-prefix | 31 | 4 (array) | | target-prefix | 31 | 4 (array) |
| client-identifier | 32 | 2 (byte string) | | client-identifier | 32 | 2 (byte string) |
| alt-server | 33 | 2 |
| alt-server-record | 34 | 4 |
| addr | 35 | 2 |
| ttl | 36 | 0 |
\--------------------+------------------------+--------------------------/ \--------------------+------------------------+--------------------------/
Figure 21: CBOR mappings used in DOTS signal channel message Figure 22: CBOR mappings used in DOTS signal channel message
7. (D)TLS Protocol Profile and Performance considerations 7. (D)TLS Protocol Profile and Performance considerations
This section defines the (D)TLS protocol profile of DOTS signal This section defines the (D)TLS protocol profile of DOTS signal
channel over (D)TLS and DOTS data channel over TLS. channel over (D)TLS and DOTS data channel over TLS.
There are known attacks on (D)TLS, such as machine-in-the-middle and There are known attacks on (D)TLS, such as machine-in-the-middle and
protocol downgrade. These are general attacks on (D)TLS and not protocol downgrade. These are general attacks on (D)TLS and not
specific to DOTS over (D)TLS; please refer to the (D)TLS RFCs for specific to DOTS over (D)TLS; please refer to the (D)TLS RFCs for
discussion of these security issues. DOTS agents MUST adhere to the discussion of these security issues. DOTS agents MUST adhere to the
skipping to change at page 43, line 42 skipping to change at page 45, line 46
send DOTS signal message on its first flight, thus reducing send DOTS signal message on its first flight, thus reducing
handshake latency. 0-RTT only works if the DOTS client has handshake latency. 0-RTT only works if the DOTS client has
previously communicated with that DOTS server, which is very previously communicated with that DOTS server, which is very
likely with the DOTS signal channel. The DOTS client SHOULD likely with the DOTS signal channel. The DOTS client SHOULD
establish a (D)TLS session with the DOTS server during peacetime establish a (D)TLS session with the DOTS server during peacetime
and share a PSK. During DDOS attack, the DOTS client can use the and share a PSK. During DDOS attack, the DOTS client can use the
(D)TLS session to convey the DOTS signal message and if there is (D)TLS session to convey the DOTS signal message and if there is
no response from the server after multiple re-tries then the DOTS no response from the server after multiple re-tries then the DOTS
client can resume the (D)TLS session in 0-RTT mode using PSK. A client can resume the (D)TLS session in 0-RTT mode using PSK. A
simplified TLS 1.3 handshake with 0-RTT DOTS signal message simplified TLS 1.3 handshake with 0-RTT DOTS signal message
exchange is shown in Figure 22. exchange is shown in Figure 23.
DOTS Client DOTS Server DOTS Client DOTS Server
ClientHello ClientHello
(Finished) (Finished)
(0-RTT DOTS signal message) (0-RTT DOTS signal message)
(end_of_early_data) --------> (end_of_early_data) -------->
ServerHello ServerHello
{EncryptedExtensions} {EncryptedExtensions}
{ServerConfiguration} {ServerConfiguration}
{Certificate} {Certificate}
{CertificateVerify} {CertificateVerify}
{Finished} {Finished}
<-------- [DOTS signal message] <-------- [DOTS signal message]
{Finished} --------> {Finished} -------->
[DOTS signal message] <-------> [DOTS signal message] [DOTS signal message] <-------> [DOTS signal message]
Figure 22: TLS 1.3 handshake with 0-RTT Figure 23: TLS 1.3 handshake with 0-RTT
9. Mutual Authentication of DOTS Agents & Authorization of DOTS Clients 9. Mutual Authentication of DOTS Agents & Authorization of DOTS Clients
(D)TLS based on client certificate can be used for mutual (D)TLS based on client certificate can be used for mutual
authentication between DOTS agents. If a DOTS gateway is involved, authentication between DOTS agents. If a DOTS gateway is involved,
DOTS clients and DOTS gateway MUST perform mutual authentication; DOTS clients and DOTS gateway MUST perform mutual authentication;
only authorized DOTS clients are allowed to send DOTS signals to a only authorized DOTS clients are allowed to send DOTS signals to a
DOTS gateway. DOTS gateway and DOTS server MUST perform mutual DOTS gateway. DOTS gateway and DOTS server MUST perform mutual
authentication; DOTS server only allows DOTS signals from authorized authentication; DOTS server only allows DOTS signals from authorized
DOTS gateway, creating a two-link chain of transitive authentication DOTS gateway, creating a two-link chain of transitive authentication
skipping to change at page 45, line 29 skipping to change at page 47, line 29
| +----+--------+ | +---------------+ | +----+--------+ | +---------------+
| ^ | | ^ |
| | | | | |
| +----------------+ | | | +----------------+ | |
| | DDOS detector | | | | | DDOS detector | | |
| | (DOTS client) +<--------------+ | | | (DOTS client) +<--------------+ |
| +----------------+ | | +----------------+ |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------------+
Figure 23: Example of Authentication and Authorization of DOTS Agents Figure 24: Example of Authentication and Authorization of DOTS Agents
In the example depicted in Figure 23, the DOTS gateway and DOTS In the example depicted in Figure 24, the DOTS gateway and DOTS
clients within the 'example.com' domain mutually authenticate with clients within the 'example.com' domain mutually authenticate with
each other. After the DOTS gateway validates the identity of a DOTS each other. After the DOTS gateway validates the identity of a DOTS
client, it communicates with the AAA server in the 'example.com' client, it communicates with the AAA server in the 'example.com'
domain to determine if the DOTS client is authorized to request DDOS domain to determine if the DOTS client is authorized to request DDOS
mitigation. If the DOTS client is not authorized, a 4.01 mitigation. If the DOTS client is not authorized, a 4.01
(Unauthorized) is returned in the response to the DOTS client. In (Unauthorized) is returned in the response to the DOTS client. In
this example, the DOTS gateway only allows the application server and this example, the DOTS gateway only allows the application server and
DDOS detector to request DDOS mitigation, but does not permit the DDOS detector to request DDOS mitigation, but does not permit the
user of type 'guest' to request DDOS mitigation. user of type 'guest' to request DDOS mitigation.
Also, DOTS gateway and DOTS server located in different domains MUST Also, DOTS gateway and DOTS server located in different domains MUST
perform mutual authentication (e.g., using certificates). A DOTS perform mutual authentication (e.g., using certificates). A DOTS
server will only allow a DOTS gateway with a certificate for a server will only allow a DOTS gateway with a certificate for a
particular domain to request mitigation for that domain. In particular domain to request mitigation for that domain. In
reference to Figure 23, the DOTS server only allows the DOTS gateway reference to Figure 24, the DOTS server only allows the DOTS gateway
to request mitigation for 'example.com' domain and not for other to request mitigation for 'example.com' domain and not for other
domains. domains.
10. IANA Considerations 10. IANA Considerations
This specification registers new CoAP response code, new parameters This specification registers a default port, new URI suffix in the
for DOTS signal channel and establishes registries for mappings to Well-Known URIs registry, new CoAP response code, new parameters for
CBOR. DOTS signal channel and establishes registries for mappings to CBOR.
10.1. CoAP Response Code 10.1. DOTS Signal Channel UDP and TCP Port Number
IANA has assigned the port number TBD to the DOTS signal channel
protocol, for both UDP and TCP.
10.2. Well-Known 'dots' URI
This memo registers the 'dots' well-known URI in the Well-Known URIs
registry as defined by [RFC5785].
URI suffix: dots
Change controller: IETF
Specification document(s): This RFC
Related information: None
10.3. CoAP Response Code
The following entry is added to the "CoAP Response Codes" sub- The following entry is added to the "CoAP Response Codes" sub-
registry: registry:
+------+------------------------------+-----------+ +------+------------------------------+-----------+
| Code | Description | Reference | | Code | Description | Reference |
+------+------------------------------+-----------+ +------+------------------------------+-----------+
| 3.00 | Alternate server | [RFCXXXX] | | 3.00 | Alternate server | [RFCXXXX] |
+------+------------------------------+-----------+ +------+------------------------------+-----------+
Figure 24: CoAP Response Code Figure 25: CoAP Response Code
[Note to RFC Editor: Please replace XXXX with the RFC number of this [Note to RFC Editor: Please replace XXXX with the RFC number of this
specification.] specification.]
10.2. DOTS signal channel CBOR Mappings Registry 10.4. DOTS signal channel CBOR Mappings Registry
A new registry will be requested from IANA, entitled "DOTS signal A new registry will be requested from IANA, entitled "DOTS signal
channel CBOR Mappings Registry". The registry is to be created as channel CBOR Mappings Registry". The registry is to be created as
Expert Review Required. Expert Review Required.
10.2.1. Registration Template 10.4.1. Registration Template
Parameter name: Parameter name:
Parameter names (e.g., "target_ip") in the DOTS signal channel. Parameter names (e.g., "target_ip") in the DOTS signal channel.
CBOR Key Value: CBOR Key Value:
Key value for the parameter. The key value MUST be an integer in Key value for the parameter. The key value MUST be an integer in
the range of 1 to 65536. The key values in the range of 32768 to the range of 1 to 65536. The key values in the range of 32768 to
65536 are assigned for Vendor-Specific parameters. 65536 are assigned for Vendor-Specific parameters.
CBOR Major Type: CBOR Major Type:
skipping to change at page 47, line 4 skipping to change at page 49, line 24
CBOR Major Type: CBOR Major Type:
CBOR Major type and optional tag for the claim. CBOR Major type and optional tag for the claim.
Change Controller: Change Controller:
For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the
name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal
address, email address, home page URI) may also be included. address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.
Specification Document(s): Specification Document(s):
Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter, Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter,
preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of
the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be
included but is not required. included but is not required.
10.2.2. Initial Registry Contents 10.4.2. Initial Registry Contents
o Parameter Name: "mitigation-scope" o Parameter Name: "mitigation-scope"
o CBOR Key Value: 1 o CBOR Key Value: 1
o CBOR Major Type: 5 o CBOR Major Type: 5
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document o Specification Document(s): this document
o Parameter Name: "scope" o Parameter Name: "scope"
o CBOR Key Value: 2 o CBOR Key Value: 2
o CBOR Major Type: 5 o CBOR Major Type: 5
skipping to change at page 51, line 4 skipping to change at page 53, line 23
o CBOR Key Value: 30 o CBOR Key Value: 30
o CBOR Major Type: 7 o CBOR Major Type: 7
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document o Specification Document(s): this document
o Parameter Name:target-prefix o Parameter Name:target-prefix
o CBOR Key Value: 31 o CBOR Key Value: 31
o CBOR Major Type: 4 o CBOR Major Type: 4
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document o Specification Document(s): this document
o Parameter Name:client-identifier o Parameter Name:client-identifier
o CBOR Key Value: 32 o CBOR Key Value: 32
o CBOR Major Type: 2 o CBOR Major Type: 2
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document o Specification Document(s): this document
o Parameter Name:alt-server
o CBOR Key Value: 33
o CBOR Major Type: 2
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document
o Parameter Name:alt-server-record
o CBOR Key Value: 34
o CBOR Major Type: 4
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document
o Parameter Name:addr
o CBOR Key Value: 35
o CBOR Major Type: 2
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document
o Parameter Name:ttl
o CBOR Key Value: 36
o CBOR Major Type: 0
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document
11. Implementation Status 11. Implementation Status
[Note to RFC Editor: Please remove this section and reference to [Note to RFC Editor: Please remove this section and reference to
[RFC7942] prior to publication.] [RFC7942] prior to publication.]
This section records the status of known implementations of the This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942]. Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942].
The description of implementations in this section is intended to The description of implementations in this section is intended to
assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
skipping to change at page 53, line 31 skipping to change at page 56, line 31
Xia, Jon Shallow, and Gilbert Clark for the discussion and comments. Xia, Jon Shallow, and Gilbert Clark for the discussion and comments.
15. References 15. References
15.1. Normative References 15.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-core-coap-tcp-tls] [I-D.ietf-core-coap-tcp-tls]
Bormann, C., Lemay, S., Tschofenig, H., Hartke, K., Bormann, C., Lemay, S., Tschofenig, H., Hartke, K.,
Silverajan, B., and B. Raymor, "CoAP (Constrained Silverajan, B., and B. Raymor, "CoAP (Constrained
Application Protocol) over TCP, TLS, and WebSockets", Application Protocol) over TCP, TLS, and WebSockets",
draft-ietf-core-coap-tcp-tls-09 (work in progress), May draft-ietf-core-coap-tcp-tls-10 (work in progress),
2017. October 2017.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5785] Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-Known
Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 5785,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5785, April 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5785>.
[RFC5925] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP [RFC5925] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
Authentication Option", RFC 5925, DOI 10.17487/RFC5925, Authentication Option", RFC 5925, DOI 10.17487/RFC5925,
June 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5925>. June 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5925>.
[RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms [RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234, (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011, DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234>.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer [RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
skipping to change at page 55, line 9 skipping to change at page 58, line 16
Mortensen, A., Andreasen, F., Reddy, T., Mortensen, A., Andreasen, F., Reddy, T.,
christopher_gray3@cable.comcast.com, c., Compton, R., and christopher_gray3@cable.comcast.com, c., Compton, R., and
N. Teague, "Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat N. Teague, "Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat
Signaling (DOTS) Architecture", draft-ietf-dots- Signaling (DOTS) Architecture", draft-ietf-dots-
architecture-05 (work in progress), October 2017. architecture-05 (work in progress), October 2017.
[I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel] [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel]
Reddy, T., Boucadair, M., Nishizuka, K., Xia, L., Patil, Reddy, T., Boucadair, M., Nishizuka, K., Xia, L., Patil,
P., Mortensen, A., and N. Teague, "Distributed Denial-of- P., Mortensen, A., and N. Teague, "Distributed Denial-of-
Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel", draft- Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel", draft-
ietf-dots-data-channel-05 (work in progress), October ietf-dots-data-channel-06 (work in progress), October
2017. 2017.
[I-D.ietf-dots-requirements] [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]
Mortensen, A., Moskowitz, R., and T. Reddy, "Distributed Mortensen, A., Moskowitz, R., and T. Reddy, "Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling
Requirements", draft-ietf-dots-requirements-06 (work in Requirements", draft-ietf-dots-requirements-07 (work in
progress), July 2017. progress), October 2017.
[I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases] [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases]
Dobbins, R., Migault, D., Fouant, S., Moskowitz, R., Dobbins, R., Migault, D., Fouant, S., Moskowitz, R.,
Teague, N., Xia, L., and K. Nishizuka, "Use cases for DDoS Teague, N., Xia, L., and K. Nishizuka, "Use cases for DDoS
Open Threat Signaling", draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-08 (work Open Threat Signaling", draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-09 (work
in progress), October 2017. in progress), November 2017.
[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-21 (work in progress), Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-21 (work in progress),
July 2017. July 2017.
[I-D.rescorla-tls-dtls13] [I-D.rescorla-tls-dtls13]
Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
1.3", draft-rescorla-tls-dtls13-01 (work in progress), 1.3", draft-rescorla-tls-dtls13-01 (work in progress),
 End of changes. 104 change blocks. 
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