< draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel-16.txt		draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel-17.txt >
	DOTS T. Reddy, Ed.		DOTS T. Reddy, Ed.
	Internet-Draft McAfee		Internet-Draft McAfee
	Intended status: Standards Track M. Boucadair, Ed.		Intended status: Standards Track M. Boucadair, Ed.
	Expires: July 15, 2018 Orange		Expires: July 26, 2018 Orange
	P. Patil		P. Patil
	Cisco		Cisco
	A. Mortensen		A. Mortensen
	Arbor Networks, Inc.		Arbor Networks, Inc.
	N. Teague		N. Teague
	Verisign, Inc.		Verisign, Inc.
	January 11, 2018		January 22, 2018
	Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal		Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal
	Channel		Channel Specification
	draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel-16		draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel-17
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document specifies the DOTS signal channel, a protocol for		This document specifies the DOTS signal channel, a protocol for
	signaling the need for protection against Distributed Denial-of-		signaling the need for protection against Distributed Denial-of-
	Service (DDoS) attacks to a server capable of enabling network		Service (DDoS) attacks to a server capable of enabling network
	traffic mitigation on behalf of the requesting client.		traffic mitigation on behalf of the requesting client.
	A companion document defines the DOTS data channel, a separate		A companion document defines the DOTS data channel, a separate
	reliable communication layer for DOTS management and configuration		reliable communication layer for DOTS management and configuration
	skipping to change at page 1, line 44 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 44 ¶
	o "This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX;"		o "This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX;"
	o "RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling		o "RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling
	(DOTS) Signal Channel";		(DOTS) Signal Channel";
	o "| 3.00 | Alternate server | [RFCXXXX] |"		o "| 3.00 | Alternate server | [RFCXXXX] |"
	o reference: RFC XXXX		o reference: RFC XXXX
	o This RFC
	Please update TBD statements with the port number to be assigned to		Please update TBD statements with the port number to be assigned to
	DOTS Signal Channel Protocol.		DOTS Signal Channel Protocol.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on July 15, 2018.		This Internet-Draft will expire on July 26, 2018.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 3, line 4 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 4 ¶
	4.1. DOTS Server(s) Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		4.1. DOTS Server(s) Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	4.2. CoAP URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		4.2. CoAP URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	4.3. Happy Eyeballs for DOTS Signal Channel . . . . . . . . . 9		4.3. Happy Eyeballs for DOTS Signal Channel . . . . . . . . . 9
	4.4. DOTS Mitigation Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		4.4. DOTS Mitigation Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	4.4.1. Request Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		4.4.1. Request Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	4.4.2. Retrieve Information Related to a Mitigation . . . . 24		4.4.2. Retrieve Information Related to a Mitigation . . . . 24
	4.4.3. Efficacy Update from DOTS Clients . . . . . . . . . . 31		4.4.3. Efficacy Update from DOTS Clients . . . . . . . . . . 31
	4.4.4. Withdraw a Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33		4.4.4. Withdraw a Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
	4.5. DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration . . . . . . . . 34		4.5. DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration . . . . . . . . 34
	4.5.1. Discover Configuration Parameters . . . . . . . . . . 36		4.5.1. Discover Configuration Parameters . . . . . . . . . . 36
	4.5.2. Convey DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration . . 39		4.5.2. Convey DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration . . 41
	4.5.3. Delete DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration . . 45		4.5.3. Delete DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration . . 45
	4.6. Redirected Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46		4.6. Redirected Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
	4.7. Heartbeat Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47		4.7. Heartbeat Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
	5. DOTS Signal Channel YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49		5. DOTS Signal Channel YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
	5.1. Tree Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49		5.1. Tree Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
	5.2. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51		5.2. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
	6. Mapping Parameters to CBOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66		6. Mapping Parameters to CBOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
	7. (D)TLS Protocol Profile and Performance Considerations . . . 67		7. (D)TLS Protocol Profile and Performance Considerations . . . 67
	7.1. (D)TLS Protocol Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67		7.1. (D)TLS Protocol Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
	7.2. (D)TLS 1.3 Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69		7.2. (D)TLS 1.3 Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
	7.3. MTU and Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70		7.3. MTU and Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
	8. Mutual Authentication of DOTS Agents & Authorization of DOTS		8. Mutual Authentication of DOTS Agents & Authorization of DOTS
	Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71		Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
	9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72		9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
	9.1. DOTS Signal Channel UDP and TCP Port Number . . . . . . . 72		9.1. DOTS Signal Channel UDP and TCP Port Number . . . . . . . 72
	9.2. Well-Known 'dots' URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72		9.2. Well-Known 'dots' URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
	9.3. CoAP Response Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73		9.3. CoAP Response Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
	9.4. DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Mappings Registry . . . . . . . 73		9.4. DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Mappings Registry . . . . . . . 73
	9.4.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73		9.4.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
	9.4.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74		9.4.2. Initial Registry Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
	9.5. DOTS Signal Channel YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80		9.5. DOTS Signal Channel YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
	10. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80		10. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
	10.1. nttdots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81		10.1. nttdots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
	11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81		11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
	12. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82		12. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
	13. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82		13. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
	14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82		14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
	14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82		14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
	14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85		14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack is an attempt to make		A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack is an attempt to make
	machines or network resources unavailable to their intended users.		machines or network resources unavailable to their intended users.
	In most cases, sufficient scale can be achieved by compromising		In most cases, sufficient scale can be achieved by compromising
	enough end-hosts and using those infected hosts to perpetrate and		enough end-hosts and using those infected hosts to perpetrate and
	amplify the attack. The victim in this attack can be an application		amplify the attack. The victim in this attack can be an application
	server, a host, a router, a firewall, or an entire network.		server, a host, a router, a firewall, or an entire network.
	skipping to change at page 7, line 25 ¶		skipping to change at page 7, line 25 ¶
	or IPv6 transfer capabilities. A Happy Eyeballs procedure for DOTS		or IPv6 transfer capabilities. A Happy Eyeballs procedure for DOTS
	signal channel is specified in Section 4.3.		signal channel is specified in Section 4.3.
	Messages exchanged between DOTS agents are serialized using Concise		Messages exchanged between DOTS agents are serialized using Concise
	Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC7049], CBOR is a binary		Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC7049], CBOR is a binary
	encoding scheme designed for small code and message size. CBOR-		encoding scheme designed for small code and message size. CBOR-
	encoded payloads are used to carry signal channel-specific payload		encoded payloads are used to carry signal channel-specific payload
	messages which convey request parameters and response information		messages which convey request parameters and response information
	such as errors. In order to allow the use of the same data models,		such as errors. In order to allow the use of the same data models,
	[RFC7951] specifies the JSON encoding of YANG-modeled data. A		[RFC7951] specifies the JSON encoding of YANG-modeled data. A
	similar effort for CBOR is defined in [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor]. All		similar effort for CBOR is defined in [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor].
	parameters in the payload of the DOTS signal channel are mapped to
	CBOR types as specified in Section 6.
	From that standpoint, this document specifies a YANG data model for		From that standpoint, this document specifies a YANG module for
	representing mitigation scopes and DOTS signal channel session		representing mitigation scopes and DOTS signal channel session
	configuration data (Section 5). Representing these data as CBOR data		configuration data (Section 5). Representing these data as CBOR data
	is assumed to follow the rules in [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor] or those		is assumed to follow the rules in [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor] or those
	in [RFC7951] combined with JSON/CBOR conversion rules in [RFC7049].		in [RFC7951] combined with JSON/CBOR conversion rules in [RFC7049].
			All parameters in the payload of the DOTS signal channel are mapped
			to CBOR types as specified in Section 6.
	In order to prevent fragmentation, DOTS agents must follow the		In order to prevent fragmentation, DOTS agents must follow the
	recommendations documented in Section 4.6 of [RFC7252]. Refer to		recommendations documented in Section 4.6 of [RFC7252]. Refer to
	Section 7.3 for more details.		Section 7.3 for more details.
	DOTS agents MUST support GET, PUT, and DELETE CoAP methods. The		DOTS agents MUST support GET, PUT, and DELETE CoAP methods. The
	payload included in CoAP responses with 2.xx and 3.xx Response Codes		payload included in CoAP responses with 2.xx and 3.xx Response Codes
	MUST be of content type "application/cbor" (Section 5.5.1 of		MUST be of content type "application/cbor" (Section 5.5.1 of
	[RFC7252]). CoAP responses with 4.xx and 5.xx error Response Codes		[RFC7252]). CoAP responses with 4.xx and 5.xx error Response Codes
	MUST include a diagnostic payload (Section 5.5.2 of [RFC7252]). The		MUST include a diagnostic payload (Section 5.5.2 of [RFC7252]). The
	skipping to change at page 9, line 8 ¶		skipping to change at page 9, line 8 ¶
	4.2. CoAP URIs		4.2. CoAP URIs
	The DOTS server MUST support the use of the path-prefix of "/.well-		The DOTS server MUST support the use of the path-prefix of "/.well-
	known/" as defined in [RFC5785] and the registered name of "dots".		known/" as defined in [RFC5785] and the registered name of "dots".
	Each DOTS operation is indicated by a path-suffix that indicates the		Each DOTS operation is indicated by a path-suffix that indicates the
	intended operation. The operation path (Table 1) is appended to the		intended operation. The operation path (Table 1) is appended to the
	path-prefix to form the URI used with a CoAP request to perform the		path-prefix to form the URI used with a CoAP request to perform the
	desired DOTS operation.		desired DOTS operation.
	+-----------------------+----------------+-------------+		+-----------------------+----------------+-------------+
	| Operation | Operation path | Details |		| Operation | Operation Path | Details |
	+-----------------------+----------------+-------------+		+-----------------------+----------------+-------------+
	| Mitigation | /v1/mitigate | Section 4.4 |		| Mitigation | /v1/mitigate | Section 4.4 |
	+-----------------------+----------------+-------------+		+-----------------------+----------------+-------------+
	| Session configuration | /v1/config | Section 4.5 |		| Session configuration | /v1/config | Section 4.5 |
	+-----------------------+----------------+-------------+		+-----------------------+----------------+-------------+
	Table 1: Operations and their Corresponding URIs		Table 1: Operations and their Corresponding URIs
	4.3. Happy Eyeballs for DOTS Signal Channel		4.3. Happy Eyeballs for DOTS Signal Channel
	skipping to change at page 9, line 41 ¶		skipping to change at page 9, line 41 ¶
	DOTS client may experience a significant connection delay compared to		DOTS client may experience a significant connection delay compared to
	an IPv4-only DOTS client. The other problem is that if a middlebox		an IPv4-only DOTS client. The other problem is that if a middlebox
	between the DOTS client and DOTS server is configured to block UDP		between the DOTS client and DOTS server is configured to block UDP
	traffic, the DOTS client will fail to establish a DTLS session with		traffic, the DOTS client will fail to establish a DTLS session with
	the DOTS server and, as a consequence, will have to fall back to TLS		the DOTS server and, as a consequence, will have to fall back to TLS
	over TCP, thereby incurring significant connection delays.		over TCP, thereby incurring significant connection delays.
	To overcome these connection setup problems, the DOTS client attempts		To overcome these connection setup problems, the DOTS client attempts
	to connect to its DOTS server(s) using both IPv6 and IPv4, and tries		to connect to its DOTS server(s) using both IPv6 and IPv4, and tries
	both DTLS over UDP and TLS over TCP in a manner similar to the Happy		both DTLS over UDP and TLS over TCP in a manner similar to the Happy
	Eyeballs mechanism [RFC6555]. These connection attempts are		Eyeballs mechanism [RFC8305]. These connection attempts are
	performed by the DOTS client when it initializes. The results of the		performed by the DOTS client when it initializes. The results of the
	Happy Eyeballs procedure are used by the DOTS client for sending its		Happy Eyeballs procedure are used by the DOTS client for sending its
	subsequent messages to the DOTS server.		subsequent messages to the DOTS server.
	The order of preference of DOTS signal channel address family and		The order of preference of DOTS signal channel address family and
	transport protocol (most preferred first) is: UDP over IPv6, UDP over		transport protocol (most preferred first) is: UDP over IPv6, UDP over
	IPv4, TCP over IPv6, and finally TCP over IPv4. This order adheres		IPv4, TCP over IPv6, and finally TCP over IPv4. This order adheres
	to the address preference order specified in [RFC6724] and the DOTS		to the address preference order specified in [RFC6724] and the DOTS
	signal channel preference which privileges the use of UDP over TCP		signal channel preference which privileges the use of UDP over TCP
	(to avoid TCP's head of line blocking).		(to avoid TCP's head of line blocking).
	skipping to change at page 12, line 11 ¶		skipping to change at page 12, line 11 ¶
	server can enable mitigation on behalf of the DOTS client by		server can enable mitigation on behalf of the DOTS client by
	communicating the DOTS client's request to the mitigator and relaying		communicating the DOTS client's request to the mitigator and relaying
	selected mitigator feedback to the requesting DOTS client.		selected mitigator feedback to the requesting DOTS client.
	Header: PUT (Code=0.03)		Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
	Uri-Host: "host"		Uri-Host: "host"
	Uri-Path: ".well-known"		Uri-Path: ".well-known"
	Uri-Path: "dots"		Uri-Path: "dots"
	Uri-Path: "version"		Uri-Path: "version"
	Uri-Path: "mitigate"		Uri-Path: "mitigate"
	Uri-Path: "cuid=7dec-11d0-a765-00a0c91e6bf6@foo.bar.example"		Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
	Uri-Path: "mitigation-id=123"		Uri-Path: "mid=123"
	Content-Type: "application/cbor"		Content-Type: "application/cbor"
	{		{
	"ietf-dots-signal:mitigation-scope": {		"ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
	"scope": [		"scope": [
	{		{
	"target-prefix": [		"target-prefix": [
	"string"		"string"
	],		],
	"target-port-range": [		"target-port-range": [
	{		{
	"lower-port": integer,		"lower-port": integer,
	"upper-port": integer		"upper-port": integer
	}		}
	skipping to change at page 12, line 47 ¶		skipping to change at page 12, line 47 ¶
	"string"		"string"
	],		],
	"lifetime": integer		"lifetime": integer
	}		}
	]		]
	}		}
	}		}
	Figure 5: PUT to Convey DOTS Mitigation Requests		Figure 5: PUT to Convey DOTS Mitigation Requests
	The parameters are described below:		The Uri-Path option carries a major and minor version nomenclature to
			manage versioning; DOTS signal channel in this specification uses
			'v1' major version.
	cuid: Stands for Client Unique Identifier. A unique identifier that		The order of the Uri-Path options is important as it defines the CoAP
	is meant to prevent collisions among DOTS clients from the same		resource. In particular, 'mid' MUST follow 'cuid'.
	domain. It MUST be generated by DOTS clients. A variety of
	methods can be used to generate such identifier, e.g.,
	cryptographic means [RFC4086], mimic the algorithm in [RFC4941],
	prepend a timestamp to a randomly generated identifier, etc.
	Implementations MAY use the form "identifier@host", for example
	"7dec-11d0-a765-00a0c91e6bf6@foo.bar.example".
	The CUID is intended to be stable when communicating with a given		The additional Uri-Path parameters to those defined in Section 4.2
	DOTS server, i.e., the CUID used by a DOTS client SHOULD NOT		are as follows:
	change over time. Distinct CUIDs MAY be used per DOTS server.
	DOTS servers MUST treat CUIDs as opaque values and MUST only		cuid: Stands for Client Unique Identifier. A globally unique
	compare CUIDs for equality. That is, DOTS servers must not		identifier that is meant to prevent collisions among DOTS clients,
	interpret CUIDs. DOTS servers MUST return 4.09 (Conflict) error		especially those from the same domain. It MUST be generated by
	code to a DOTS peer to notify that the CUID is already in-use by		DOTS clients.
	another DOTS client of the same domain. Upon receipt of that
	error code, a new CUID MUST be generated by the DOTS peer.
	Client-domain DOTS gateways MUST handle CUID collision directly		Implementations SHOULD use the output of a cryptographic hash
	and it is RECOMMENDED that CUID collision is handled directly by		algorithm whose input is the DER-encoded ASN.1 representation of
			the Subject Public Key Info (SPKI) of the DOTS client X.509
			certificate [RFC5280], the DOTS client raw public key [RFC7250],
			or the "PSK identity" used by the DOTS client in the TLS
			ClientKeyExchange message to set 'cuid'. In this version of the
			specification, the cryptographic hash algorithm used is SHA-256
			[RFC6234]. The output of the cryptographic hash algorithm is
			truncated to 16 bytes; truncation is done by stripping off the
			final 16 bytes. The truncated output is base64url encoded.
			The 'cuid' is intended to be stable when communicating with a
			given DOTS server, i.e., the 'cuid' used by a DOTS client SHOULD
			NOT change over time. Distinct 'cuid' values MAY be used per DOTS
			server.
			DOTS servers MUST return 4.09 (Conflict) error code to a DOTS peer
			to notify that the 'cuid' is already in-use by another DOTS
			client. Upon receipt of that error code, a new 'cuid' MUST be
			generated by the DOTS peer.
			Client-domain DOTS gateways MUST handle 'cuid' collision directly
			and it is RECOMMENDED that 'cuid' collision is handled directly by
	server-domain DOTS gateways.		server-domain DOTS gateways.
	Client-domain DOTS gateways MAY rewrite the CUIDs used by internal		DOTS gateways MAY rewrite the 'cuid' used by peer DOTS clients.
	DOTS clients. Triggers for such rewriting are out of scope.		Triggers for such rewriting are out of scope.
	This is a mandatory attribute.		This is a mandatory Uri-Path.
	mitigation-id: Identifier for the mitigation request represented		mid: Identifier for the mitigation request represented with an
	with an integer. This identifier MUST be unique for each		integer. This identifier MUST be unique for each mitigation
	mitigation request bound to the DOTS client, i.e., the		request bound to the DOTS client, i.e., the 'mid' parameter value
	'mitigation-id' parameter value in the mitigation request needs to		in the mitigation request needs to be unique relative to the 'mid'
	be unique relative to the 'mitigation-id' parameter values of		parameter values of active mitigation requests conveyed from the
	active mitigation requests conveyed from the DOTS client to the		DOTS client to the DOTS server.
	DOTS server. This identifier MUST be generated by the DOTS
	client. This document does not make any assumption about how this
	identifier is generated.
	This is a mandatory attribute.		This identifier MUST be generated by the DOTS client. This
			document does not make any assumption about how this identifier is
			generated.
			This is a mandatory Uri-Path parameter.
			The parameters in the CBOR body of the PUT request are described
			below:
	target-prefix: A list of prefixes identifying resources under		target-prefix: A list of prefixes identifying resources under
	attack. Prefixes are represented using Classless Inter-Domain		attack. Prefixes are represented using Classless Inter-Domain
	Routing (CIDR) notation [RFC4632].		Routing (CIDR) notation [RFC4632].
	As a reminder, the prefix length must be less than or equal to 32		As a reminder, the prefix length must be less than or equal to 32
	(resp. 128) for IPv4 (resp. IPv6).		(resp. 128) for IPv4 (resp. IPv6).
	This is an optional attribute.		This is an optional attribute.
	target-port-range: A list of port numbers bound to resources under		target-port-range: A list of port numbers bound to resources under
	attack.		attack.
	The port range is defined by two bounds, a lower port number		A port range is defined by two bounds, a lower port number (lower-
	(lower-port) and an upper port number (upper-port). When only		port) and an upper port number (upper-port). When only 'lower-
	'lower-port' is present, it represents a single port number. For		port' is present, it represents a single port number.
	TCP, UDP, Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) [RFC4960],
	or Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) [RFC4340], the		For TCP, UDP, Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP)
	range of ports can be, for example, 1024-65535.		[RFC4960], or Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)
			[RFC4340], a range of ports can be, for example, 0-1023,
			1024-65535, or 1024-49151.
	This is an optional attribute.		This is an optional attribute.
	target-protocol: A list of protocols involved in an attack. Values		target-protocol: A list of protocols involved in an attack. Values
	are taken from the IANA protocol registry [proto_numbers].		are taken from the IANA protocol registry [proto_numbers].
	The value '0' has a special meaning for 'all protocols'.		The value '0' has a special meaning for 'all protocols'.
	This is an optional attribute.		This is an optional attribute.
	target-fqdn: A list of Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs)		target-fqdn: A list of Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs)
	identifying resources under attack. An FQDN is the full name of a		identifying resources under attack. An FQDN is the full name of a
	resource, rather than just its hostname. For example, "venera" is		resource, rather than just its hostname. For example, "venera" is
	a hostname, and "venera.isi.edu" is an FQDN.		a hostname, and "venera.isi.edu" is an FQDN [RFC1983].
	This is an optional attribute.		This is an optional attribute.
	target-uri: A list of Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) [RFC3986]		target-uri: A list of Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) [RFC3986]
	identifying resources under attack.		identifying resources under attack.
	This is an optional attribute.		This is an optional attribute.
	alias-name: A list of aliases of resources for which the mitigation		alias-name: A list of aliases of resources for which the mitigation
	is requested. Aliases can be created using the DOTS data channel		is requested. Aliases can be created using the DOTS data channel
	(Section 6.1 of [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel]), direct		(Section 6.1 of [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel]), direct
	configuration, or other means. An alias is used in subsequent		configuration, or other means.
	signal channel exchanges to refer more efficiently to the
	resources under attack.		An alias is used in subsequent signal channel exchanges to refer
			more efficiently to the resources under attack.
	This is an optional attribute.		This is an optional attribute.
	lifetime: Lifetime of the mitigation request in seconds. The		lifetime: Lifetime of the mitigation request in seconds. The
	RECOMMENDED lifetime of a mitigation request is 3600 seconds (60		RECOMMENDED lifetime of a mitigation request is 3600 seconds (60
	minutes) -- this value was chosen to be long enough so that		minutes) -- this value was chosen to be long enough so that
	refreshing is not typically a burden on the DOTS client, while		refreshing is not typically a burden on the DOTS client, while
	expiring the request where the client has unexpectedly quit in a		expiring the request where the client has unexpectedly quit in a
	timely manner. DOTS clients MUST include this parameter in their		timely manner. DOTS clients MUST include this parameter in their
	mitigation requests. Upon the expiry of this lifetime, and if the		mitigation requests. Upon the expiry of this lifetime, and if the
	skipping to change at page 15, line 18 ¶		skipping to change at page 15, line 37 ¶
	returned in the response. DOTS clients MUST be prepared to not be		returned in the response. DOTS clients MUST be prepared to not be
	granted mitigations with indefinite lifetimes.		granted mitigations with indefinite lifetimes.
	The DOTS server MUST always indicate the actual lifetime in the		The DOTS server MUST always indicate the actual lifetime in the
	response and the remaining lifetime in status messages sent to the		response and the remaining lifetime in status messages sent to the
	DOTS client.		DOTS client.
	This is a mandatory attribute.		This is a mandatory attribute.
	In deployments where server-domain DOTS gateways are enabled,		In deployments where server-domain DOTS gateways are enabled,
	identity information about the origin source client domain has to be		identity information about the origin source client domain SHOULD be
	supplied to the DOTS server. That information is meant to assist the		supplied to the DOTS server. That information is meant to assist the
	DOTS server to enforce some policies. Figure 6 shows an example of a		DOTS server to enforce some policies. These policies can be enforced
	request relayed by a server-domain DOTS gateway.		per-client, per-client domain, or both. Figure 6 shows an example of
			a request relayed by a server-domain DOTS gateway.
	Header: PUT (Code=0.03)		Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
	Uri-Host: "host"		Uri-Host: "host"
	Uri-Path: ".well-known"		Uri-Path: ".well-known"
	Uri-Path: "dots"		Uri-Path: "dots"
	Uri-Path: "version"		Uri-Path: "v1"
	Uri-Path: "mitigate"		Uri-Path: "mitigate"
	Uri-Path: "cuid=7dec-11d0-a765-00a0c91e6bf6@foo.bar.example"		Uri-Path: "cdid=7eeaf349529eb55ed50113"
	Uri-Path: "mitigation-id=123"		Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
			Uri-Path: "mid=123"
	Content-Type: "application/cbor"		Content-Type: "application/cbor"
	{		{
	"ietf-dots-signal:mitigation-scope": {		"ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
	"client-domain-hash": "string",
	"scope": [		"scope": [
	{		{
	"target-prefix": [		"target-prefix": [
	"string"		"string"
	],		],
	"target-port-range": [		"target-port-range": [
	{		{
	"lower-port": integer,		"lower-port": integer,
	"upper-port": integer		"upper-port": integer
	}		}
	skipping to change at page 16, line 49 ¶		skipping to change at page 16, line 49 ¶
	],		],
	"lifetime": integer		"lifetime": integer
	}		}
	]		]
	}		}
	}		}
	Figure 6: PUT to Convey DOTS Mitigation Request as relayed by a		Figure 6: PUT to Convey DOTS Mitigation Request as relayed by a
	Server-Domain DOTS Gateway		Server-Domain DOTS Gateway
	The DOTS gateway may add the following parameter:		A server-domain DOTS gateway SHOULD add the following Uri-Path
			parameter:
	client-domain-hash: The client identifier MAY be conveyed by a		cdid: Stands for Client Domain IDentifier. The 'cdid' is conveyed
	server-domain DOTS gateway to propagate the source domain identity		by a server-domain DOTS gateway to propagate the source domain
	from the gateway's client-side to the gateway's server-side, and		identity from the gateway's client-facing-side to the gateway's
	from the gateway's server-side to the DOTS server. 'client-domain-		server-facing-side, and from the gateway's server-facing-side to
	hash' MAY be used by the final DOTS server for policy enforcement		the DOTS server. 'cdid' may be used by the final DOTS server for
	purposes (e.g., enforce a quota on filtering rules).		policy enforcement purposes (e.g., enforce a quota on filtering
			rules). These policies are deployment-specific.
	The 'client-domain-hash' value MUST be assigned by the server-		Server-domain DOTS gateways SHOULD support a configuration option
	domain DOTS gateway in a manner that ensures that there is zero		to instruct whether 'cdid' parameter is to be inserted.
	probability that the same value will be assigned to a different
	client domain.
	If the DOTS client is using the certificate provisioned by the		In order to accommodate deployments that require enforcing per-
	Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) server [RFC7030] in the		client policies, per-client domain policies, or a combination
	DOTS gateway-domain to authenticate itself to the DOTS gateway,		thereof, server-domain DOTS gateways MUST supply the SPKI hash of
	the 'client-domain-hash' value may be the output of a		the DOTS client X.509 certificate, the DOTS client raw public key,
	cryptographic hash algorithm whose input is the DER-encoded ASN.1		or the hash of the "PSK identity" in the 'cdid', following the
	representation of the Subject Public Key Info (SPKI) of an X.509		same rules for generating the hash conveyed in 'cuid', which is
	certificate. In this version of the specification, the		then used by the ultimate DOTS server to determine the
	cryptographic hash algorithm used is SHA-256 [RFC6234]. The		corresponding client's domain.
	output of the cryptographic hash algorithm is truncated to 16
	bytes; truncation is done by stripping off the final 16 bytes.
	The truncated output is base64url encoded.
	The 'client-domain-hash' attribute MUST NOT be generated and		If a DOTS client is provisioned, for example, with distinct
	included by DOTS clients.		certificates as a function of the peer server-domain DOTS gateway,
			distinct 'cdid' values may be supplied by a server-domain DOTS
			gateway. The ultimate DOTS server MUST treat those 'cdid' values
			as equivalent.
	DOTS servers MUST ignore 'client-domain-hash' attributes that are		The 'cdid' attribute MUST NOT be generated and included by DOTS
	directly supplied by source DOTS clients or client-domain DOTS		clients.
	gateways. This implies that first server-domain DOTS gateways
	MUST strip 'client-domain-hash' attributes supplied by DOTS
	clients. DOTS servers MAY support a configuration parameter to
	identify DOTS gateways that are trusted to supply 'client-domain-
	hash' attributes.
	Only singe-valued 'client-domain-hash' are defined in this		DOTS servers MUST ignore 'cdid' attributes that are directly
	document.		supplied by source DOTS clients or client-domain DOTS gateways.
			This implies that first server-domain DOTS gateways MUST strip
			'cdid' attributes supplied by DOTS clients. DOTS servers SHOULD
			support a configuration parameter to identify DOTS gateways that
			are trusted to supply 'cdid' attributes.
	This is an optional attribute.		Only single-valued 'cdid' are defined in this document.
			This is an optional Uri-Path.
			The CBOR key values for the parameters are defined in Section 6.
			Section 9 defines how the CBOR key values can be allocated for future
			uses.
	Because of the complexity to handle partial failure cases, this		Because of the complexity to handle partial failure cases, this
	specification does not allow for including multiple mitigation		specification does not allow for including multiple mitigation
	requests in the same PUT request. Concretely, a DOTS client MUST NOT		requests in the same PUT request. Concretely, a DOTS client MUST NOT
	include multiple 'scope' parameters in the same PUT request.		include multiple 'scope' parameters in the same PUT request.
	The CBOR key values for the parameters are defined in Section 6.
	Section 9 defines how the CBOR key values can be allocated to
	standard bodies and vendors.
	FQDN and URI mitigation scopes may be thought of as a form of scope		FQDN and URI mitigation scopes may be thought of as a form of scope
	alias, in which the addresses to which the domain name or URI resolve		alias, in which the addresses to which the domain name or URI resolve
	represent the full scope of the mitigation.		represent the full scope of the mitigation.
	In the PUT request at least one of the attributes 'target-prefix' or		In the PUT request at least one of the attributes 'target-prefix',
	'target-fqdn' or 'target-uri 'or 'alias-name' MUST be present.		'target-fqdn','target-uri', or 'alias-name' MUST be present.
	Attributes with empty values MUST NOT be present in a request.
	The relative order of two mitigation requests from a DOTS client is		Attributes and Uri-Path parameters with empty values MUST NOT be
	determined by comparing their respective 'mitigation-id' values. If		present in a request.
	two mitigation requests have overlapping mitigation scopes, the
	mitigation request with the highest numeric 'mitigation-id' value
	will override the other mitigation request. Two mitigation-ids from
	a DOTS client are overlapping if there is a common IP address, IP
	prefix, FQDN, URI, or alias-name. To avoid maintaining a long list
	of overlapping mitigation requests from a DOTS client and avoid
	error-prone provisioning of mitigation requests from a DOTS client,
	the overlapped lower numeric 'mitigation-id' MUST be automatically
	deleted and no longer available at the DOTS server.
	The Uri-Path option carries a major and minor version nomenclature to		The relative order of two mitigation requests from a DOTS client is
	manage versioning and DOTS signal channel in this specification uses		determined by comparing their respective 'mid' values. If two
	v1 major version.		mitigation requests have overlapping mitigation scopes, the
			mitigation request with the highest numeric 'mid' value will override
			the other mitigation request. Two mitigation requests from a DOTS
			client are overlapping if there is a common IP address, IP prefix,
			FQDN, URI, or alias-name. To avoid maintaining a long list of
			overlapping mitigation requests from a DOTS client and avoid error-
			prone provisioning of mitigation requests from a DOTS client, the
			overlapped lower numeric 'mid' MUST be automatically deleted and no
			longer available at the DOTS server.
	Figure 7 shows a PUT request example to signal that ports 80, 8080,		Figure 7 shows a PUT request example to signal that ports 80, 8080,
	and 443 used by 2001:db8:6401::1 and 2001:db8:6401::2 servers are		and 443 used by 2001:db8:6401::1 and 2001:db8:6401::2 servers are
	under attack (illustrated in JSON diagnostic notation). The presence		under attack (illustrated in JSON diagnostic notation). The presence
	of 'client-domain-hash' indicates that a server-domain DOTS gateway		of 'cdid' indicates that a server-domain DOTS gateway has modified
	has modified the initial PUT request sent by the DOTS client.		the initial PUT request sent by the DOTS client.
	Header: PUT (Code=0.03)		Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
	Uri-Host: "www.example.com"		Uri-Host: "www.example.com"
	Uri-Path: ".well-known"		Uri-Path: ".well-known"
	Uri-Path: "dots"		Uri-Path: "dots"
	Uri-Path: "v1"		Uri-Path: "v1"
	Uri-Path: "mitigate"		Uri-Path: "mitigate"
	Uri-Path: "cuid=7dec-11d0-a765-00a0c91e6bf6@foo.bar.example"		Uri-Path: "cdid=7eeaf349529eb55ed50113"
	Uri-Path: "mitigation-id=123"		Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
			Uri-Path: "mid=123"
	Content-Format: "application/cbor"		Content-Format: "application/cbor"
	{		{
	"ietf-dots-signal:mitigation-scope": {		"ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
	"client-domain-hash": "dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw",
	"scope": [		"scope": [
	{		{
	"target-prefix": [		"target-prefix": [
	"2001:db8:6401::1/128",		"2001:db8:6401::1/128",
	"2001:db8:6401::2/128"		"2001:db8:6401::2/128"
	],		],
	"target-port-range": [		"target-port-range": [
	{		{
	"lower-port": 80		"lower-port": 80
	},		},
	skipping to change at page 20, line 7 ¶		skipping to change at page 20, line 7 ¶
	]		]
	}		}
	}		}
	Figure 7: PUT for DOTS Mitigation Request		Figure 7: PUT for DOTS Mitigation Request
	The corresponding CBOR encoding format is shown in Figure 8.		The corresponding CBOR encoding format is shown in Figure 8.
	A1 # map(1)		A1 # map(1)
	01 # unsigned(1)		01 # unsigned(1)
	A2 # map(2)		A1 # map(1)
	18 24 # unsigned(36)
	76 # text(22)
	647A3670486A6141446B614654626A72304A47427077 # "dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
	02 # unsigned(2)		02 # unsigned(2)
	81 # array(1)		81 # array(1)
	A3 # map(3)		A3 # map(3)
	18 23 # unsigned(35)		18 23 # unsigned(35)
	82 # array(2)		82 # array(2)
	74 # text(20)		74 # text(20)
	323030313A6462383A363430313A3A312F313238 # "2001:db8:6401::1/128"		323030313A6462383A363430313A3A312F313238 # "2001:db8:6401::1/128"
	74 # text(20)		74 # text(20)
	323030313A6462383A363430313A3A322F313238 # "2001:db8:6401::2/128"		323030313A6462383A363430313A3A322F313238 # "2001:db8:6401::2/128"
	05 # unsigned(5)		05 # unsigned(5)
	skipping to change at page 20, line 43 ¶		skipping to change at page 20, line 40 ¶
	06 # unsigned(6)		06 # unsigned(6)
	Figure 8: PUT for DOTS Mitigation Request (CBOR)		Figure 8: PUT for DOTS Mitigation Request (CBOR)
	In both DOTS signal and data channel sessions, the DOTS client MUST		In both DOTS signal and data channel sessions, the DOTS client MUST
	authenticate itself to the DOTS server (Section 8). The DOTS server		authenticate itself to the DOTS server (Section 8). The DOTS server
	may use the algorithm presented in Section 7 of [RFC7589] to derive		may use the algorithm presented in Section 7 of [RFC7589] to derive
	the DOTS client identity or username from the client certificate.		the DOTS client identity or username from the client certificate.
	The DOTS client identity allows the DOTS server to accept mitigation		The DOTS client identity allows the DOTS server to accept mitigation
	requests with scopes that the DOTS client is authorized to manage.		requests with scopes that the DOTS client is authorized to manage.
	The DOTS server couples the DOTS signal and data channel sessions		The DOTS server couples the DOTS signal and data channel sessions
	using the DOTS client identity or the 'client-domain-hash' parameter		using the DOTS client identity (e.g., client certificate, 'cuid') and
	value, so the DOTS server can validate whether the aliases conveyed		optionally the 'cdid' parameter value, so the DOTS server can
	in the mitigation request were indeed created by the same DOTS client		validate whether the aliases conveyed in the mitigation request were
	using the DOTS data channel session. If the aliases were not created		indeed created by the same DOTS client using the DOTS data channel
	by the DOTS client, the DOTS server MUST return 4.00 (Bad Request) in		session. If the aliases were not created by the DOTS client, the
	the response.		DOTS server MUST return 4.00 (Bad Request) in the response.
	The DOTS server couples the DOTS signal channel sessions using the		The DOTS server couples the DOTS signal channel sessions using the
	DOTS client identity or the 'client-domain-hash' parameter value, and		DOTS client identity and optionally the 'cdid' parameter value, and
	the DOTS server uses 'mitigation-id' and 'cuid' parameter values to		the DOTS server uses 'mid' and 'cuid' Uri-Path parameter values to
	detect duplicate mitigation requests. If the mitigation request		detect duplicate mitigation requests. If the mitigation request
	contains the alias-name and other parameters identifying the target		contains the 'alias-name' and other parameters identifying the target
	resources (such as, 'target-prefix', 'target-port-range', 'target-		resources (such as 'target-prefix', 'target-port-range', 'target-
	fqdn', or 'target-uri'), the DOTS server appends the parameter values		fqdn', or 'target-uri'), the DOTS server appends the parameter values
	in 'alias-name' with the corresponding parameter values in 'target-		in 'alias-name' with the corresponding parameter values in 'target-
	prefix', 'target-port-range', 'target-fqdn', or 'target-uri'.		prefix', 'target-port-range', 'target-fqdn', or 'target-uri'.
	The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the PUT request		The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the PUT request
	using CoAP response codes. CoAP 2.xx codes are success. CoAP 4.xx		using CoAP response codes. CoAP 2.xx codes are success. CoAP 4.xx
	codes are some sort of invalid requests (client errors). COAP 5.xx		codes are some sort of invalid requests (client errors). COAP 5.xx
	codes are returned if the DOTS server has erred or is currently		codes are returned if the DOTS server has erred or is currently
	unavailable to provide mitigation in response to the mitigation		unavailable to provide mitigation in response to the mitigation
	request from the DOTS client.		request from the DOTS client.
	Figure 9 shows an example of a PUT request that is successfully		Figure 9 shows an example response to a PUT request that is
	processed by a DOTS server (i.e., CoAP 2.xx response codes).		successfully processed by a DOTS server (i.e., CoAP 2.xx response
			codes). This PUT request is assumed to be relayed by a server-domain
			DOTS gateway.
	{		{
	"ietf-dots-signal:mitigation-scope": {		"ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
	"client-domain-hash": "dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw",		"cdid": "7eeaf349529eb55ed50113",
	"scope": [		"scope": [
	{		{
	"mitigation-id": 12332,		"mid": 12332,
	"lifetime": 3600		"lifetime": 3600
	}		}
	]		]
	}		}
	}		}
	Figure 9: 2.xx Response Body		Figure 9: 2.xx Response Body
	If the request is missing one or more mandatory attributes, or		If the request is missing a mandatory attribute, does not include
	includes multiple 'scope' parameters, or contains invalid or unknown		'cuid' or 'mid' Uri-Path options, includes multiple 'scope'
	parameters, the DOTS server MUST reply with 4.00 (Bad Request). DOTS		parameters, or contains invalid or unknown parameters, the DOTS
	agents can safely ignore Vendor-Specific parameters they don't		server MUST reply with 4.00 (Bad Request). DOTS agents can safely
	understand.		ignore Vendor-Specific parameters they don't understand.
	A DOTS server that receives a mitigation request with a lifetime set		A DOTS server that receives a mitigation request with a lifetime set
	to '0' MUST reply with a 4.00 (Bad Request).		to '0' MUST reply with a 4.00 (Bad Request).
	If the DOTS server does not find the 'mitigation-id' parameter value		If the DOTS server does not find the 'mid' parameter value conveyed
	conveyed in the PUT request in its configuration data, it MAY accept		in the PUT request in its configuration data, it MAY accept the
	the mitigation request by sending back a 2.01 (Created) response to		mitigation request by sending back a 2.01 (Created) response to the
	the DOTS client; the DOTS server will consequently try to mitigate		DOTS client; the DOTS server will consequently try to mitigate the
	the attack.		attack.
	If the DOTS server finds the 'mitigation-id' parameter value conveyed		If the DOTS server finds the 'mid' parameter value conveyed in the
	in the PUT request in its configuration data bound to that DOTS		PUT request in its configuration data bound to that DOTS client, it
	client, it MAY update the mitigation request, and a 2.04 (Changed)		MAY update the mitigation request, and a 2.04 (Changed) response is
	response is returned to indicate a successful update of the		returned to indicate a successful update of the mitigation request.
	mitigation request.
	If the request is conflicting with an existing mitigation request		If the request is conflicting with an existing mitigation request
	from a different DOTS client, and the DOTS server decides to maintain		from a different DOTS client, and the DOTS server decides to maintain
	the conflicting mitigation request, the DOTS server returns 4.09		the conflicting mitigation request, the DOTS server returns 4.09
	(Conflict) [RFC8132] to the requesting DOTS client. The response		(Conflict) [RFC8132] to the requesting DOTS client. The response
	includes enough information for a DOTS client to recognize the source		includes enough information for a DOTS client to recognize the source
	of the conflict as described below:		of the conflict as described below:
	conflict-information: Indicates that a mitigation request is		conflict-information: Indicates that a mitigation request is
	conflicting with another mitigation request(s) from other DOTS		conflicting with another mitigation request(s) from other DOTS
	skipping to change at page 22, line 49 ¶		skipping to change at page 22, line 48 ¶
	following values are defined:		following values are defined:
	1: Overlapping targets. 'conflict-scope' provides more details		1: Overlapping targets. 'conflict-scope' provides more details
	about the conflicting target clauses.		about the conflicting target clauses.
	2: Conflicts with an existing white list. This code is		2: Conflicts with an existing white list. This code is
	returned when the DDoS mitigation detects source addresses/		returned when the DDoS mitigation detects source addresses/
	prefixes in the white-listed ACLs are attacking the target.		prefixes in the white-listed ACLs are attacking the target.
	3: CUID Collision. This code is returned when a DOTS client		3: CUID Collision. This code is returned when a DOTS client
	uses a CUID that is already used by another DOTS client of		uses a 'cuid' that is already used by another DOTS client.
	the same domain. This code is an indication that the		This code is an indication that the request has been
	request has been rejected and a new request with a new CUID		rejected and a new request with a new 'cuid' is to be re-
	is to be re-sent by the DOTS client. Note that 'conflict-		sent by the DOTS client. Note that 'conflict-status',
	status', 'conflict-scope', and 'retry-timer' are not		'conflict-scope', and 'retry-timer' are not returned in the
	returned in the error response.		error response.
	conflict-scope: Indicates the conflict scope. It may include a		conflict-scope: Indicates the conflict scope. It may include a
	list of IP addresses, a list of prefixes, a list of port		list of IP addresses, a list of prefixes, a list of port
	numbers, a list of target protocols, a list of FQDNs, a list of		numbers, a list of target protocols, a list of FQDNs, a list of
	URIs, a list of alias-names, or references to conflicting ACLs.		URIs, a list of alias-names, or references to conflicting ACLs.
	retry-timer: Indicates, in seconds, the time after which the DOTS		retry-timer: Indicates, in seconds, the time after which the DOTS
	client may re-issue the same request. The DOTS server returns		client may re-issue the same request. The DOTS server returns
	'retry-timer' only to DOTS client(s) for which a mitigation		'retry-timer' only to DOTS client(s) for which a mitigation
	request is deactivated. Any retransmission of the same		request is deactivated. Any retransmission of the same
	skipping to change at page 23, line 30 ¶		skipping to change at page 23, line 30 ¶
	mitigation request resulting in the deactivation of the		mitigation request resulting in the deactivation of the
	conflicting mitigation request. The lifetime of the		conflicting mitigation request. The lifetime of the
	deactivated mitigation request will be updated to (retry-timer		deactivated mitigation request will be updated to (retry-timer
	+ 45 seconds), so the DOTS client can refresh the deactivated		+ 45 seconds), so the DOTS client can refresh the deactivated
	mitigation request after retry-timer seconds before expiry of		mitigation request after retry-timer seconds before expiry of
	lifetime and check if the conflict is resolved.		lifetime and check if the conflict is resolved.
	For a mitigation request to continue beyond the initial negotiated		For a mitigation request to continue beyond the initial negotiated
	lifetime, the DOTS client has to refresh the current mitigation		lifetime, the DOTS client has to refresh the current mitigation
	request by sending a new PUT request. This PUT request MUST use the		request by sending a new PUT request. This PUT request MUST use the
	same 'mitigation-id' value, and MUST repeat all the other parameters		same 'mid' value, and MUST repeat all the other parameters as sent in
	as sent in the original mitigation request apart from a possible		the original mitigation request apart from a possible change to the
	change to the lifetime parameter value.		lifetime parameter value.
	The DOTS gateway, which inserted a 'client-domain-hash' attribute in		The DOTS gateway that inserted a 'cdid' in a request, MUST strip the
	a request, MUST strip the 'client-domain-hash' parameter in the		'cdid' parameter in the corresponding response before forwarding the
	corresponding response before forwarding the response to the DOTS		response to the DOTS client. If we consider the example depicted in
	client. If we consider the example depicted in Figure 9, the message		Figure 9, the message that will be relayed by the DOTS gateway is
	that will be relayed by the DOTS gateway is shown in Figure 10.		shown in Figure 10.
	{		{
	"ietf-dots-signal:mitigation-scope": {		"ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
	"scope": [		"scope": [
	{		{
	"mitigation-id": 12332,		"mid": 12332,
	"lifetime": 3600		"lifetime": 3600
	}		}
	]		]
	}		}
	}		}
	Figure 10: 2.xx Response Body Relayed by a DOTS Gateway		Figure 10: 2.xx Response Body Relayed by a DOTS Gateway
	4.4.2. Retrieve Information Related to a Mitigation		4.4.2. Retrieve Information Related to a Mitigation
	A GET request is used by a DOTS client to retrieve information		A GET request is used by a DOTS client to retrieve information
	(including status) of DOTS mitigations from a DOTS server.		(including status) of DOTS mitigations from a DOTS server.
	The same considerations for manipulating 'client-domain-hash'		'cuid' is a mandatory Uri-Query parameter for GET requests.
	parameter by server-domain DOTS gateways specified in Section 4.4.1
	MUST be followed for GET requests.
	If the DOTS server does not find the 'mitigation-id' parameter value		Uri-Query parameters with empty values MUST NOT be present in a
	conveyed in the GET request in its configuration data for the		request.
	requesting DOTS client or the one identified by 'client-domain-hash',
	it MUST respond with a 4.04 (Not Found) error response code.		The same considerations for manipulating 'cdid' parameter by server-
			domain DOTS gateways specified in Section 4.4.1 MUST be followed for
			GET requests.
			If the DOTS server does not find the 'mid' Uri-Query value conveyed
			in the GET request in its configuration data for the requesting DOTS
			client, it MUST respond with a 4.04 (Not Found) error response code.
	Likewise, the same error MUST be returned as a response to a request		Likewise, the same error MUST be returned as a response to a request
	to retrieve all mitigation records of a given DOTS client if the DOTS		to retrieve all mitigation records (i.e., 'mid' Uri-Query is not
	server does not find any mitigation record for that DOTS client or		defined) of a given DOTS client if the DOTS server does not find any
	the one identified by 'client-domain-hash'.		mitigation record for that DOTS client. As a reminder, a DOTS client
			is identified by its identity (e.g., client certificate, 'cuid') and
			optionally the 'cdid'.
	The 'c' (content) parameter and its permitted values defined in		The 'c' (content) parameter and its permitted values defined in
	[I-D.ietf-core-comi] can be used to retrieve non-configuration data		[I-D.ietf-core-comi] can be used to retrieve non-configuration data
	(attack mitigation status) or configuration data or both. The DOTS		(attack mitigation status), configuration data, or both. The DOTS
	server may support this optional filtering capability. It can safely		server may support this optional filtering capability. It can safely
	ignore it if not supported.		ignore it if not supported.
	The following examples illustrate how a DOTS client retrieves active		The following examples illustrate how a DOTS client retrieves active
	mitigation requests from a DOTS server. In particular:		mitigation requests from a DOTS server. In particular:
	o Figure 11 shows the example of a GET request to retrieve all DOTS		o Figure 11 shows the example of a GET request to retrieve all DOTS
	mitigation requests signaled by a DOTS client.		mitigation requests signaled by a DOTS client.
	o Figure 12 shows the example of a GET request to retrieve a		o Figure 12 shows the example of a GET request to retrieve a
	specific DOTS mitigation request signaled by a DOTS client. The		specific DOTS mitigation request signaled by a DOTS client. The
	configuration data to be reported in the response is formatted in		configuration data to be reported in the response is formatted in
	the same order it was processed by the DOTS server.		the same order as was processed by the DOTS server in the original
			mitigation request.
	These two examples assume the default of "c=a"; that is, the DOTS		These two examples assume the default of "c=a"; that is, the DOTS
	client asks for all data to be reported by the DOTS server.		client asks for all data to be reported by the DOTS server.
	Header: GET (Code=0.01)		Header: GET (Code=0.01)
	Uri-Host: "host"		Uri-Host: "host"
	Uri-Path: ".well-known"		Uri-Path: ".well-known"
	Uri-Path: "dots"		Uri-Path: "dots"
	Uri-Path: "version"		Uri-Path: "v1"
	Uri-Path: "mitigate"		Uri-Path: "mitigate"
	Uri-Query: "cuid=7dec-11d0-a765-00a0c91e6bf6@foo.bar.example"		Uri-Query: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
	Observe : 0		Observe: 0
	Figure 11: GET to Retrieve all DOTS Mitigation Requests		Figure 11: GET to Retrieve all DOTS Mitigation Requests
	Header: GET (Code=0.01)		Header: GET (Code=0.01)
	Uri-Host: "host"		Uri-Host: "host"
	Uri-Path: ".well-known"		Uri-Path: ".well-known"
	Uri-Path: "dots"		Uri-Path: "dots"
	Uri-Path: "version"		Uri-Path: "v1"
	Uri-Path: "mitigate"		Uri-Path: "mitigate"
	Uri-Query: "cuid=7dec-11d0-a765-00a0c91e6bf6@foo.bar.example"		Uri-Query: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
	Uri-Query: "mitigation-id=12332"		Uri-Query: "mid=12332"
	Observe : 0		Observe: 0
	Figure 12: GET to Retrieve a Specific DOTS Mitigation Request		Figure 12: GET to Retrieve a Specific DOTS Mitigation Request
	Figure 13 shows a response example of all active mitigation requests		Figure 13 shows a response example of all active mitigation requests
	associated with the DOTS client on the DOTS server and the mitigation		associated with the DOTS client as maintained by the DOTS server.
	status of each mitigation request.		The response indicates the mitigation status of each mitigation
			request.
	{		{
	"ietf-dots-signal:mitigation-scope": {		"ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
	"scope": [		"scope": [
	{		{
	"mitigation-id": 12332,		"mid": 12332,
	"mitigation-start": 1507818434.00,		"mitigation-start": 1507818434,
	"target-prefix": [		"target-prefix": [
	"2001:db8:6401::1/128",		"2001:db8:6401::1/128",
	"2001:db8:6401::2/128"		"2001:db8:6401::2/128"
	],		],
	"target-protocol": [		"target-protocol": [
	17		17
	],		],
	"lifetime": 1800,		"lifetime": 1800,
	"status": 2,		"status": 2,
	"bytes-dropped": 134334555,		"bytes-dropped": 134334555,
	"bps-dropped": 43344,		"bps-dropped": 43344,
	"pkts-dropped": 333334444,		"pkts-dropped": 333334444,
	"pps-dropped": 432432		"pps-dropped": 432432
	},		},
	{		{
	"mitigation-id": 12333,		"mid": 12333,
	"mitigation-start": 1507818393.00,		"mitigation-start": 1507818393,
	"target-prefix": [		"target-prefix": [
	"2001:db8:6401::1/128",		"2001:db8:6401::1/128",
	"2001:db8:6401::2/128"		"2001:db8:6401::2/128"
	],		],
	"target-protocol": [		"target-protocol": [
	6		6
	],		],
	"lifetime": 1800,		"lifetime": 1800,
	"status": 3,		"status": 3,
	"bytes-dropped": 0,		"bytes-dropped": 0,
	skipping to change at page 27, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 27, line 5 ¶
	}		}
	}		}
	Figure 13: Response Body to a Get Request		Figure 13: Response Body to a Get Request
	The mitigation status parameters are described below:		The mitigation status parameters are described below:
	mitigation-start: Mitigation start time is expressed in seconds		mitigation-start: Mitigation start time is expressed in seconds
	relative to 1970-01-01T00:00Z in UTC time (Section 2.4.1 of		relative to 1970-01-01T00:00Z in UTC time (Section 2.4.1 of
	[RFC7049]). The encoding is modified so that the leading tag 1		[RFC7049]). The CBOR encoding is modified so that the leading tag
	(epoch-based date/time) MUST be omitted.		1 (epoch-based date/time) MUST be omitted.
	This is a mandatory attribute.		This is a mandatory attribute.
	lifetime: The remaining lifetime of the mitigation request, in		lifetime: The remaining lifetime of the mitigation request, in
	seconds.		seconds.
	This is a mandatory attribute.		This is a mandatory attribute.
	status: Status of attack mitigation. The various possible values of		status: Status of attack mitigation. The various possible values of
	'status' parameter are explained in Table 2.		'status' parameter are explained in Table 2.
	This is a mandatory attribute.		This is a mandatory attribute.
	bytes-dropped: The total dropped byte count for the mitigation		bytes-dropped: The total dropped byte count for the mitigation
	request since the attack mitigation is triggered. The count wraps		request since the attack mitigation is triggered. The count wraps
	around when it reaches the maximum value of unsigned integer.		around when it reaches the maximum value of unsigned integer64.
	This is an optional attribute.		This is an optional attribute.
	bps-dropped: The average number of dropped bytes per second for the		bps-dropped: The average number of dropped bytes per second for the
	mitigation request since the attack mitigation is triggered. This		mitigation request since the attack mitigation is triggered. This
	SHOULD be a five-minute average.		SHOULD be a five-minute average.
	This is an optional attribute.		This is an optional attribute.
	pkts-dropped: The total number of dropped packet count for the		pkts-dropped: The total number of dropped packet count for the
	mitigation request since the attack mitigation is triggered.		mitigation request since the attack mitigation is triggered. The
			count wraps around when it reaches the maximum value of unsigned
			integer64.
	This is an optional attribute.		This is an optional attribute.
	pps-dropped: The average number of dropped packets per second for		pps-dropped: The average number of dropped packets per second for
	the mitigation request since the attack mitigation is triggered.		the mitigation request since the attack mitigation is triggered.
	This SHOULD be a five-minute average.		This SHOULD be a five-minute average.
	This is an optional attribute.		This is an optional attribute.
	+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+		+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
	| Parameter | Description |		| Parameter | Description |
	| value | |		| Value | |
	+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+		+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
	| 1 | Attack mitigation is in progress (e.g., changing the |		| 1 | Attack mitigation is in progress (e.g., changing the |
	| | network path to re-route the inbound traffic to DOTS |		| | network path to re-route the inbound traffic to DOTS |
	| | mitigator). |		| | mitigator). |
	+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+		+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
	| 2 | Attack is successfully mitigated (e.g., traffic is |		| 2 | Attack is successfully mitigated (e.g., traffic is |
	| | redirected to a DDoS mitigator and attack traffic is |		| | redirected to a DDoS mitigator and attack traffic is |
	| | dropped). |		| | dropped). |
	+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+		+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
	| 3 | Attack has stopped and the DOTS client can withdraw |		| 3 | Attack has stopped and the DOTS client can withdraw |
	skipping to change at page 28, line 35 ¶		skipping to change at page 28, line 35 ¶
	+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+		+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
	| 6 | Attack mitigation is now terminated. |		| 6 | Attack mitigation is now terminated. |
	+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+		+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
	| 7 | Attack mitigation is withdrawn. |		| 7 | Attack mitigation is withdrawn. |
	+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+		+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
	| 8 | Attack mitigation is rejected. |		| 8 | Attack mitigation is rejected. |
	+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+		+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
	Table 2: Values of 'status' Parameter		Table 2: Values of 'status' Parameter
	The observe option defined in [RFC7641] extends the CoAP core		The Observe Option defined in [RFC7641] extends the CoAP core
	protocol with a mechanism for a CoAP client to "observe" a resource		protocol with a mechanism for a CoAP client to "observe" a resource
	on a CoAP server: The client retrieves a representation of the		on a CoAP server: The client retrieves a representation of the
	resource and requests this representation be updated by the server as		resource and requests this representation be updated by the server as
	long as the client is interested in the resource. A DOTS client		long as the client is interested in the resource. A DOTS client
	conveys the observe option set to '0' in the GET request to receive		conveys the Observe Option set to '0' in the GET request to receive
	unsolicited notifications of attack mitigation status from the DOTS		unsolicited notifications of attack mitigation status from the DOTS
	server.		server.
	Unidirectional notifications within the bidirectional signal channel		Unidirectional notifications within the bidirectional signal channel
	allows unsolicited message delivery, enabling asynchronous		allows unsolicited message delivery, enabling asynchronous
	notifications between the agents. Due to the higher likelihood of		notifications between the agents. Due to the higher likelihood of
	packet loss during a DDoS attack, the DOTS server periodically sends		packet loss during a DDoS attack, the DOTS server periodically sends
	attack mitigation status to the DOTS client and also notifies the		attack mitigation status to the DOTS client and also notifies the
	DOTS client whenever the status of the attack mitigation changes. If		DOTS client whenever the status of the attack mitigation changes. If
	the DOTS server cannot maintain a RTT estimate, it SHOULD NOT send		the DOTS server cannot maintain an RTT estimate, it SHOULD NOT send
	more than one unsolicited notification every 3 seconds, and SHOULD		more than one unsolicited notification every 3 seconds, and SHOULD
	use an even less aggressive rate whenever possible (case 2 in		use an even less aggressive rate whenever possible (case 2 in
	Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085]). The DOTS server MUST use the same CUID		Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085]).
	as the one used by the DOTS client to observe a mitigation request.
	When conflicting requests are detected, the DOTS server enforces the		When conflicting requests are detected, the DOTS server enforces the
	corresponding policy (e.g., accept all requests, reject all requests,		corresponding policy (e.g., accept all requests, reject all requests,
	accept only one request but reject all the others, ...). It is		accept only one request but reject all the others, ...). It is
	assumed that this policy is supplied by the DOTS server administrator		assumed that this policy is supplied by the DOTS server administrator
	or it is a default behavior of the DOTS server implementation. Then,		or it is a default behavior of the DOTS server implementation. Then,
	the DOTS server sends notification message(s) to the DOTS client(s)		the DOTS server sends notification message(s) to the DOTS client(s)
	at the origin of the conflict. A conflict notification message		at the origin of the conflict (refer to the conflict parameters
	includes information about the conflict cause, scope, and the status		defined in Section 4.4.1). A conflict notification message includes
	of the mitigation request(s). For example,		information about the conflict cause, scope, and the status of the
			mitigation request(s). For example,
	o A notification message with status code set to '8 (Attack		o A notification message with 'status' code set to '8 (Attack
	mitigation is rejected)' and 'conflict-status' set to '1' is sent		mitigation is rejected)' and 'conflict-status' set to '1' is sent
	to a DOTS client to indicate that this mitigation request is		to a DOTS client to indicate that this mitigation request is
	rejected because a conflict is detected.		rejected because a conflict is detected.
	o A notification message with status code set to '7 (Attack		o A notification message with 'status' code set to '7 (Attack
	mitigation is withdrawn)' and 'conflict-status' set to '1' is sent		mitigation is withdrawn)' and 'conflict-status' set to '1' is sent
	to a DOTS client to indicate that an active mitigation request is		to a DOTS client to indicate that an active mitigation request is
	deactivated because a conflict is detected.		deactivated because a conflict is detected.
	o A notification message with status code set to '1 (Attack		o A notification message with 'status' code set to '1 (Attack
	mitigation is in progress)' and 'conflict-status' set to '2' is		mitigation is in progress)' and 'conflict-status' set to '2' is
	sent to a DOTS client to indicate that this mitigation request is		sent to a DOTS client to indicate that this mitigation request is
	in progress, but a conflict is detected.		in progress, but a conflict is detected.
	Upon receipt of a conflict notification message indicating that a		Upon receipt of a conflict notification message indicating that a
	mitigation request is deactivated because of a conflict, a DOTS		mitigation request is deactivated because of a conflict, a DOTS
	client MUST NOT resend the same mitigation request before the expiry		client MUST NOT resend the same mitigation request before the expiry
	of 'retry-timer'. It is also recommended that DOTS clients support		of 'retry-timer'. It is also recommended that DOTS clients support
	means to alert administrators about mitigation conflicts.		means to alert administrators about mitigation conflicts.
	skipping to change at page 30, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 30, line 5 ¶
	recognize the token in the message and thus will return a Reset		recognize the token in the message and thus will return a Reset
	message. This causes the DOTS server to remove the associated entry.		message. This causes the DOTS server to remove the associated entry.
	Alternatively, the DOTS client can explicitly deregister itself by		Alternatively, the DOTS client can explicitly deregister itself by
	issuing a GET request that has the Token field set to the token of		issuing a GET request that has the Token field set to the token of
	the observation to be cancelled and includes an Observe Option with		the observation to be cancelled and includes an Observe Option with
	the value set to '1' (deregister).		the value set to '1' (deregister).
	Figure 14 shows an example of a DOTS client requesting a DOTS server		Figure 14 shows an example of a DOTS client requesting a DOTS server
	to send notifications related to a given mitigation request.		to send notifications related to a given mitigation request.
	+-----------+ +-----------+		+-----------+ +-----------+
	|DOTS client| |DOTS server|		|DOTS client| |DOTS server|
	+-----------+ +-----------+		+-----------+ +-----------+
	| |		| |
	| GET /<mitigation-id number> |		| GET /<mid> |
	| Token: 0x4a | Registration		| Token: 0x4a | Registration
	| Observe: 0 |		| Observe: 0 |
	+------------------------------>|		+---------------------------------->|
	| |		| |
	| 2.05 Content |		| 2.05 Content |
	| Token: 0x4a | Notification of		| Token: 0x4a | Notification of
	| Observe: 12 | the current state		| Observe: 12 | the current state
	| status: "mitigation |		| status: "mitigation in progress" |
	| in progress" |		| |
	|<------------------------------+		|<----------------------------------+
	| 2.05 Content |		| 2.05 Content |
	| Token: 0x4a | Notification upon		| Token: 0x4a | Notification upon
	| Observe: 44 | a state change		| Observe: 44 | a state change
	| status: "mitigation |		| status: "mitigation complete" |
	| complete" |		| |
	|<------------------------------+		|<----------------------------------+
	| 2.05 Content |		| 2.05 Content |
	| Token: 0x4a | Notification upon		| Token: 0x4a | Notification upon
	| Observe: 60 | a state change		| Observe: 60 | a state change
	| status: "attack stopped" |		| status: "attack stopped" |
	|<------------------------------+		|<----------------------------------+
	| |		| |
	Figure 14: Notifications of Attack Mitigation Status		Figure 14: Notifications of Attack Mitigation Status
	4.4.2.1. Mitigation Status		4.4.2.1. DOTS Clients Polling for Mitigation Status
	The DOTS client can send the GET request at frequent intervals		The DOTS client can send the GET request at frequent intervals
	without the Observe option to retrieve the configuration data of the		without the Observe Option to retrieve the configuration data of the
	mitigation request and non-configuration data (i.e., the attack		mitigation request and non-configuration data (i.e., the attack
	status). The frequency of polling the DOTS server to get the		status). The frequency of polling the DOTS server to get the
	mitigation status should follow the transmission guidelines given in		mitigation status SHOULD follow the transmission guidelines in
	Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085]. If the DOTS server has been able to		Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085].
	mitigate the attack and the attack has stopped, the DOTS server
	indicates as such in the status, and the DOTS client recalls the		If the DOTS server has been able to mitigate the attack and the
	mitigation request by issuing a DELETE request for the 'mitigation-		attack has stopped, the DOTS server indicates as such in the status.
	id'.		In such case, the DOTS client recalls the mitigation request by
			issuing a DELETE request for this mitigation request (Section 4.4.4).
	A DOTS client SHOULD react to the status of the attack as per the		A DOTS client SHOULD react to the status of the attack as per the
	information sent by the DOTS server rather than acknowledging by		information sent by the DOTS server rather than acknowledging by
	itself, using its own means, that the attack has been mitigated.		itself, using its own means, that the attack has been mitigated.
	This ensures that the DOTS client does not recall a mitigation		This ensures that the DOTS client does not recall a mitigation
	request prematurely because it is possible that the DOTS client does		request prematurely because it is possible that the DOTS client does
	not sense the DDoS attack on its resources but the DOTS server could		not sense the DDoS attack on its resources, but the DOTS server could
	be actively mitigating the attack and the attack is not completely		be actively mitigating the attack because the attack is not
	averted.		completely averted.
	4.4.3. Efficacy Update from DOTS Clients		4.4.3. Efficacy Update from DOTS Clients
	While DDoS mitigation is active, due to the likelihood of packet		While DDoS mitigation is active, due to the likelihood of packet
	loss, a DOTS client MAY periodically transmit DOTS mitigation		loss, a DOTS client MAY periodically transmit DOTS mitigation
	efficacy updates to the relevant DOTS server. A PUT request is used		efficacy updates to the relevant DOTS server. A PUT request is used
	to convey the mitigation efficacy update to the DOTS server.		to convey the mitigation efficacy update to the DOTS server.
	The PUT request MUST include all the parameters used in the PUT		The PUT request used for efficacy update MUST include all the
	request to carry the DOTS mitigation request (Section 4.4.1)		parameters used in the PUT request to carry the DOTS mitigation
	unchanged apart from the lifetime parameter value. If this is not		request (Section 4.4.1) unchanged apart from the 'lifetime' parameter
	the case, the DOTS server MUST reject the request with a 4.00 (Bad		value. If this is not the case, the DOTS server MUST reject the
	Request).		request with a 4.00 (Bad Request).
	The If-Match Option (Section 5.10.8.1 of [RFC7252]) with an empty		The If-Match Option (Section 5.10.8.1 of [RFC7252]) with an empty
	value is used to make the PUT request conditional on the current		value is used to make the PUT request conditional on the current
	existence of the mitigation request. If UDP is used as transport,		existence of the mitigation request. If UDP is used as transport,
	CoAP requests may arrive out-of-order. For example, the DOTS client		CoAP requests may arrive out-of-order. For example, the DOTS client
	may send a PUT request to convey an efficacy update to the DOTS		may send a PUT request to convey an efficacy update to the DOTS
	server followed by a DELETE request to withdraw the mitigation		server followed by a DELETE request to withdraw the mitigation
	request, but the DELETE request arrives at the DOTS server before the		request, but the DELETE request arrives at the DOTS server before the
	PUT request. To handle out-of-order delivery of requests, if an If-		PUT request. To handle out-of-order delivery of requests, if an If-
	Match option is present in the PUT request and the 'mitigation-id' in		Match Option is present in the PUT request and the 'mid' in the
	the request matches a mitigation request from that DOTS client, then		request matches a mitigation request from that DOTS client, the
	the request is processed. If no match is found, the PUT request is		request is processed by the DOTS server. If no match is found, the
	silently ignored.		PUT request is silently ignored by the DOTS server.
	An example of an efficacy update message, which includes an If-Match		An example of an efficacy update message, which includes an If-Match
	option with an empty value, is depicted in Figure 15.		Option with an empty value, is depicted in Figure 15.
	Header: PUT (Code=0.03)		Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
	Uri-Host: "host"		Uri-Host: "host"
	Uri-Path: ".well-known"		Uri-Path: ".well-known"
	Uri-Path: "dots"		Uri-Path: "dots"
	Uri-Path: "version"		Uri-Path: "v1"
	Uri-Path: "mitigate"		Uri-Path: "mitigate"
	Uri-Path: "cuid=7dec-11d0-a765-00a0c91e6bf6@foo.bar.example"		Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
	Uri-Path: "mitigation-id=123"		Uri-Path: "mid=123"
	Content-Format: "application/cbor"		Content-Format: "application/cbor"
	If-Match:		If-Match:
	{		{
	"ietf-dots-signal:mitigation-scope": {		"ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
	"scope": [		"scope": [
	{		{
	"target-prefix": [		"target-prefix": [
	"string"		"string"
	],		],
	"target-port-range": [		"target-port-range": [
	{		{
	"lower-port": integer,		"lower-port": integer,
	"upper-port": integer		"upper-port": integer
	}		}
	skipping to change at page 33, line 28 ¶		skipping to change at page 33, line 28 ¶
	The DOTS server indicates the result of processing a PUT request		The DOTS server indicates the result of processing a PUT request
	using CoAP response codes. The response code 2.04 (Changed) is		using CoAP response codes. The response code 2.04 (Changed) is
	returned if the DOTS server has accepted the mitigation efficacy		returned if the DOTS server has accepted the mitigation efficacy
	update. The error response code 5.03 (Service Unavailable) is		update. The error response code 5.03 (Service Unavailable) is
	returned if the DOTS server has erred or is incapable of performing		returned if the DOTS server has erred or is incapable of performing
	the mitigation.		the mitigation.
	4.4.4. Withdraw a Mitigation		4.4.4. Withdraw a Mitigation
	A DELETE request is used to withdraw a DOTS mitigation request from a		DELETE requests are used to withdraw DOTS mitigation requests from
	DOTS server (Figure 16).		DOTS servers (Figure 16).
	The same considerations for manipulating 'client-domain-hash'		'cuid' and 'mid' are mandatory Uri-Query parameters for DELETE
	parameter by DOTS gateways, as specified in Section 4.4.1, MUST be		requests.
	followed for DELETE requests.
			The same considerations for manipulating 'cdid' parameter by DOTS
			gateways, as specified in Section 4.4.1, MUST be followed for DELETE
			requests. Uri-Query parameters with empty values MUST NOT be present
			in a request.
	Header: DELETE (Code=0.04)		Header: DELETE (Code=0.04)
	Uri-Host: "host"		Uri-Host: "host"
	Uri-Path: ".well-known"		Uri-Path: ".well-known"
	Uri-Path: "dots"		Uri-Path: "dots"
	Uri-Path: "version"		Uri-Path: "v1"
	Uri-Path: "mitigate"		Uri-Path: "mitigate"
	Uri-Query: "cuid=7dec-11d0-a765-00a0c91e6bf6@foo.bar.example"		Uri-Query: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
	Uri-Query: "mitigation-id=123"		Uri-Query: "mid=123"
	Figure 16: Withdraw a DOTS Mitigation		Figure 16: Withdraw a DOTS Mitigation
	If the request does not include a 'mitigation-id' parameter, the DOTS		If the DELETE request does not include 'cuid' and 'mid' parameters,
	server MUST reply with a 4.00 (Bad Request).		the DOTS server MUST reply with a 4.00 (Bad Request).
	Once the request is validated, the DOTS server immediately		Once the request is validated, the DOTS server immediately
	acknowledges a DOTS client's request to withdraw the DOTS signal		acknowledges a DOTS client's request to withdraw the DOTS signal
	using 2.02 (Deleted) response code with no response payload. A 2.02		using 2.02 (Deleted) response code with no response payload. A 2.02
	(Deleted) Response Code is returned even if the 'mitigation-id'		(Deleted) Response Code is returned even if the 'mid' parameter value
	parameter value conveyed in the DELETE request does not exist in its		conveyed in the DELETE request does not exist in its configuration
	configuration data before the request.		data before the request.
	If the DOTS server finds the 'mitigation-id' parameter value conveyed		If the DOTS server finds the 'mid' parameter value conveyed in the
	in the DELETE request in its configuration data for the DOTS client,		DELETE request in its configuration data for the DOTS client, then to
	then to protect against route or DNS flapping caused by a DOTS client		protect against route or DNS flapping caused by a DOTS client rapidly
	rapidly removing a mitigation, and to dampen the effect of		removing a mitigation, and to dampen the effect of oscillating
	oscillating attacks, the DOTS server MAY allow mitigation to continue		attacks, the DOTS server MAY allow mitigation to continue for a
	for a limited period after acknowledging a DOTS client's withdrawal		limited period after acknowledging a DOTS client's withdrawal of a
	of a mitigation request. During this period, the DOTS server status		mitigation request. During this period, the DOTS server status
	messages SHOULD indicate that mitigation is active but terminating		messages SHOULD indicate that mitigation is active but terminating
	(Section 4.4.2).		(Section 4.4.2).
	The initial active-but-terminating period SHOULD be sufficiently long		The initial active-but-terminating period SHOULD be sufficiently long
	to absorb latency incurred by route propagation. The active-but-		to absorb latency incurred by route propagation. The active-but-
	terminating period SHOULD be set by default to 120 seconds. If the		terminating period SHOULD be set by default to 120 seconds. If the
	client requests mitigation again before the initial active-but-		client requests mitigation again before the initial active-but-
	terminating period elapses, the DOTS server MAY exponentially		terminating period elapses, the DOTS server MAY exponentially
	increase the active-but- terminating period up to a maximum of 300		increase the active-but-terminating period up to a maximum of 300
	seconds (5 minutes).		seconds (5 minutes).
	After the active-but-terminating period elapses, the DOTS server MUST		After the active-but-terminating period elapses, the DOTS server MUST
	treat the mitigation as terminated, as the DOTS client is no longer		treat the mitigation as terminated, as the DOTS client is no longer
	responsible for the mitigation. For example, if there is a financial		responsible for the mitigation. For example, if there is a financial
	relationship between the DOTS client and server domains, the DOTS		relationship between the DOTS client and server domains, the DOTS
	client stops incurring cost at this point.		client stops incurring cost at this point.
	4.5. DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration		4.5. DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration
	A DOTS client can negotiate, configure, and retrieve the DOTS signal		A DOTS client can negotiate, configure, and retrieve the DOTS signal
	channel session behavior. The DOTS signal channel can be used, for		channel session behavior with its DOTS peers. The DOTS signal
	example, to configure the following:		channel can be used, for example, to configure the following:
	a. Heartbeat interval (heartbeat-interval): DOTS agents regularly		a. Heartbeat interval (heartbeat-interval): DOTS agents regularly
	send heartbeats (CoAP Ping/Pong) to each other after mutual		send heartbeats (CoAP Ping/Pong) to each other after mutual
	authentication is successfully completed in order to keep the		authentication is successfully completed in order to keep the
	DOTS signal channel open. Heartbeat messages are exchanged		DOTS signal channel open. Heartbeat messages are exchanged
	between DOTS agents every 'heartbeat-interval' seconds to detect		between DOTS agents every 'heartbeat-interval' seconds to detect
	the current status of the DOTS signal channel session.		the current status of the DOTS signal channel session.
	b. Missing heartbeats allowed (missing-hb-allowed): This variable		b. Missing heartbeats allowed (missing-hb-allowed): This variable
	indicates the maximum number of consecutive heartbeat messages		indicates the maximum number of consecutive heartbeat messages
	skipping to change at page 36, line 20 ¶		skipping to change at page 36, line 20 ¶
	between a DOTS client and its immediate peer DOTS server. As such,		between a DOTS client and its immediate peer DOTS server. As such,
	this GET request MUST NOT be relayed by an on-path DOTS gateway.		this GET request MUST NOT be relayed by an on-path DOTS gateway.
	Figure 17 shows how to obtain acceptable configuration parameters for		Figure 17 shows how to obtain acceptable configuration parameters for
	the DOTS server.		the DOTS server.
	Header: GET (Code=0.01)		Header: GET (Code=0.01)
	Uri-Host: "host"		Uri-Host: "host"
	Uri-Path: ".well-known"		Uri-Path: ".well-known"
	Uri-Path: "dots"		Uri-Path: "dots"
	Uri-Path: "version"		Uri-Path: "v1"
	Uri-Path: "config"		Uri-Path: "config"
	Figure 17: GET to Retrieve Configuration		Figure 17: GET to Retrieve Configuration
	The DOTS server in the 2.05 (Content) response conveys the current,		The DOTS server in the 2.05 (Content) response conveys the current,
	minimum, and maximum attribute values acceptable by the DOTS server		minimum, and maximum attribute values acceptable by the DOTS server
	(Figure 18).		(Figure 18).
	Content-Format: "application/cbor"		Content-Format: "application/cbor"
	{		{
	"ietf-dots-signal:signal-config": {		"ietf-dots-signal-channel:signal-config": {
	"mitigating-config": {		"mitigating-config": {
	"heartbeat-interval": {		"heartbeat-interval": {
	"current-value": integer,		"max-value": integer,
	"min-value": integer,		"min-value": integer,
	"max-value": integer		"current-value": integer
	},		},
	"missing-hb-allowed": {		"missing-hb-allowed": {
	"current-value": integer,		"max-value": integer,
	"min-value": integer,		"min-value": integer,
	"max-value": integer		"current-value": integer
	},		},
	"max-retransmit": {		"max-retransmit": {
	"current-value": integer,		"max-value": integer,
	"min-value": integer,		"min-value": integer,
	"max-value": integer		"current-value": integer
	},		},
	"ack-timeout": {		"ack-timeout": {
	"current-value": integer,		"max-value": integer,
	"min-value": integer,		"min-value": integer,
	"max-value": integer		"current-value": integer
	},		},
	"ack-random-factor": {		"ack-random-factor": {
	"current-value-decimal": number,		"max-value-decimal": number,
	"min-value-decimal": number,		"min-value-decimal": number,
	"max-value-decimal": number		"current-value-decimal": number
	}		}
	},		},
	"idle-config": {		"idle-config": {
	"heartbeat-interval": {		"heartbeat-interval": {
	"current-value": integer,		"max-value": integer,
	"min-value": integer,		"min-value": integer,
	"max-value": integer		"current-value": integer
	},		},
	"missing-hb-allowed": {		"missing-hb-allowed": {
	"current-value": integer,		"max-value": integer,
	"min-value": integer,		"min-value": integer,
	"max-value": integer		"current-value": integer
	},		},
	"max-retransmit": {		"max-retransmit": {
	"current-value": integer,		"max-value": integer,
	"min-value": integer,		"min-value": integer,
	"max-value": integer		"current-value": integer
	},		},
	"ack-timeout": {		"ack-timeout": {
	"current-value": integer,		"max-value": integer,
	"min-value": integer,		"min-value": integer,
	"max-value": integer		"current-value": integer
	},		},
	"ack-random-factor": {		"ack-random-factor": {
	"current-value-decimal": number,		"max-value-decimal": number,
	"min-value-decimal": number,		"min-value-decimal": number,
	"max-value-decimal": number		"current-value-decimal": number
	}		}
	},		},
	"trigger-mitigation": {		"trigger-mitigation": boolean,
	"current-value": boolean		"config-interval": integer
	}
	}		}
	}		}
	Figure 18: GET Configuration Response Body		Figure 18: GET Configuration Response Body
			The parameters in Figure 18 are described below:
			mitigation-config: Set of configuration parameters to use when a
			mitigation is active. The following parameters may be included:
			heartbeat-interval: Time interval in seconds between two
			consecutive heartbeat messages.
			'0' is used to disable the heartbeat mechanism.
			This is an optional attribute.
			missing-hb-allowed: Maximum number of consecutive heartbeat
			messages for which the DOTS agent did not receive a response
			before concluding that the session is disconnected.
			This is an optional attribute.
			max-retransmit: Maximum number of retransmissions for a message
			(referred to as MAX_RETRANSMIT parameter in CoAP).
			This is an optional attribute.
			ack-timeout: Timeout value in seconds used to calculate the
			initial retransmission timeout value (referred to as
			ACK_TIMEOUT parameter in CoAP).
			This is an optional attribute.
			ack-random-factor: Random factor used to influence the timing of
			retransmissions (referred to as ACK_RANDOM_FACTOR parameter in
			CoAP).
			This is an optional attribute.
			idle-config: Set of configuration parameters to use when no
			mitigation is active. This attribute has the same structure as
			'mitigating-config'.
			trigger-mitigation: If the parameter value is set to 'false', then
			DDoS mitigation is triggered only when the DOTS signal channel
			session is lost. Automated mitigation on loss of signal is
			discussed in Section 3.3.3 of [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture].
			If the DOTS client ceases to respond to heartbeat messages, the
			DOTS server can detect that the DOTS session is lost.
			The default value of the parameter is 'true'.
			This is an optional attribute.
			config-interval: This parameter is returned to indicate the time
			interval expressed in seconds, which a DOTS agent must wait for
			before re-contacting its peer in order to retrieve the signal
			channel configuration data. This parameter is only valid for a
			GET response. It MUST NOT be used in a PUT request.
			'0' is used to disable this configuration refresh mechanism.
			If a non-zero value of 'config-interval' is received by a DOTS
			client, it has to issue a PUT request to refresh the configuration
			parameters for the signal channel before the expiry of 'config-
			interval'. When a DDoS attack is active, refresh requests MUST
			NOT be sent by DOTS clients and the DOTS server MUST NOT terminate
			the (D)TLS session after the expiry of 'config-interval'.
			This mechanism allows updating the configuration data if a change
			occurs at the DOTS server side. For example, the new
			configuration may instruct a DOTS client to cease heartbeats or
			reduce heartbeat frequency.
			If this parameter is not returned, this is equivalent to receiving
			a 'config-interval' value set to '0'.
			If a DOTS server detects that a misbehaving DOTS client does not
			contact the DOTS server after the expiry of 'config-interval', in
			order to retrieve the signal channel configuration data, it MAY
			terminate the (D)TLS session. A (D)TLS session is terminated by
			the receipt of an authenticated message that closes the connection
			(e.g., a fatal alert (Section 7.2 of [RFC5246])).
			This is an optional attribute.
	Figure 19 shows an example of acceptable and current configuration		Figure 19 shows an example of acceptable and current configuration
	parameters on a DOTS server for DOTS signal channel session		parameters on a DOTS server for DOTS signal channel session
	configuration. The same acceptable configuration is used during		configuration. The same acceptable configuration is used during
	attack and peace times.		attack and peace times.
	Content-Format: "application/cbor"		Content-Format: "application/cbor"
	{		{
	"ietf-dots-signal:signal-config": {		"ietf-dots-signal-channel:signal-config": {
	"mitigating-config": {		"mitigating-config": {
	"heartbeat-interval": {		"heartbeat-interval": {
	"current-value": 30,		"max-value": 240,
	"min-value": 15,		"min-value": 15,
	"max-value": 240		"current-value": 30
	},		},
	"missing-hb-allowed": {		"missing-hb-allowed": {
	"current-value": 5,		"max-value": 9,
	"min-value": 3,		"min-value": 3,
	"max-value": 9		"current-value": 5
	},		},
	"max-retransmit": {		"max-retransmit": {
	"current-value": 3,		"max-value": 15,
	"min-value": 2,		"min-value": 2,
	"max-value": 15		"current-value": 3
	},		},
	"ack-timeout": {		"ack-timeout": {
	"current-value": 2,		"max-value": 30,
	"min-value": 1,		"min-value": 1,
	"max-value": 30		"current-value": 2
	},		},
	"ack-random-factor": {		"ack-random-factor": {
	"current-value-decimal": 1.5,		"max-value-decimal": 4.0,
	"min-value-decimal": 1.1,		"min-value-decimal": 1.1,
	"max-value-decimal": 4.0		"current-value-decimal": 1.5
	}		}
	},		},
	"idle-config": {		"idle-config": {
	"heartbeat-interval": {		"heartbeat-interval": {
	"current-value": 30,		"max-value": 240,
	"min-value": 15,		"min-value": 15,
	"max-value": 240		"current-value": 30
	},		},
	"missing-hb-allowed": {		"missing-hb-allowed": {
	"current-value": 5,		"max-value": 9,
	"min-value": 3,		"min-value": 3,
	"max-value": 9		"current-value": 5
	},		},
	"max-retransmit": {		"max-retransmit": {
	"current-value": 3,		"max-value": 15,
	"min-value": 2,		"min-value": 2,
	"max-value": 15		"current-value": 3
	},		},
	"ack-timeout": {		"ack-timeout": {
	"current-value": 2,		"max-value": 30,
	"min-value": 1,		"min-value": 1,
	"max-value": 30		"current-value": 2
	},		},
	"ack-random-factor": {		"ack-random-factor": {
	"current-value-decimal": 1.5,		"max-value-decimal": 4.0,
	"min-value-decimal": 1.1,		"min-value-decimal": 1.1,
	"max-value-decimal": 4.0		"current-value-decimal": 1.5
	}		}
	},		},
	"trigger-mitigation": {		"trigger-mitigation": true,
	"current-value": true		"config-interval": 3600
	}
	}		}
	}		}
	Figure 19: Example of a Configuration Response Body		Figure 19: Example of a Configuration Response Body
	4.5.2. Convey DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration		4.5.2. Convey DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration
	A PUT request is used to convey the configuration parameters for the		A PUT request is used to convey the configuration parameters for the
	signal channel (e.g., heartbeat interval, maximum retransmissions).		signal channel (e.g., heartbeat interval, maximum retransmissions).
	Message transmission parameters for CoAP are defined in Section 4.8		Message transmission parameters for CoAP are defined in Section 4.8
	skipping to change at page 40, line 26 ¶		skipping to change at page 42, line 11 ¶
	exponential back-off between retransmissions. By choosing the		exponential back-off between retransmissions. By choosing the
	recommended transmission parameters, the "CoAP Ping" will timeout		recommended transmission parameters, the "CoAP Ping" will timeout
	after 45 seconds. If the DOTS agent does not receive any response		after 45 seconds. If the DOTS agent does not receive any response
	from the peer DOTS agent for 'missing-hb-allowed' number of		from the peer DOTS agent for 'missing-hb-allowed' number of
	consecutive "CoAP Ping" confirmable messages, it concludes that the		consecutive "CoAP Ping" confirmable messages, it concludes that the
	DOTS signal channel session is disconnected. A DOTS client MUST NOT		DOTS signal channel session is disconnected. A DOTS client MUST NOT
	transmit a "CoAP Ping" while waiting for the previous "CoAP Ping"		transmit a "CoAP Ping" while waiting for the previous "CoAP Ping"
	response from the same DOTS server.		response from the same DOTS server.
	If the DOTS agent wishes to change the default values of message		If the DOTS agent wishes to change the default values of message
	transmission parameters, then it should follow the guidance given in		transmission parameters, it should follow the guidance given in
	Section 4.8.1 of [RFC7252]. The DOTS agents MUST use the negotiated		Section 4.8.1 of [RFC7252]. The DOTS agents MUST use the negotiated
	values for message transmission parameters and default values for		values for message transmission parameters and default values for
	non-negotiated message transmission parameters.		non-negotiated message transmission parameters.
	The signal channel session configuration is applicable to a single		The signal channel session configuration is applicable to a single
	DOTS signal channel session between the DOTS agents.		DOTS signal channel session between DOTS agents, so the 'cuid' Uri-
			Path MUST NOT be used.
	Header: PUT (Code=0.03)		Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
	Uri-Host: "host"		Uri-Host: "host"
	Uri-Path: ".well-known"		Uri-Path: ".well-known"
	Uri-Path: "dots"		Uri-Path: "dots"
	Uri-Path: "version"		Uri-Path: "v1"
	Uri-Path: "config"		Uri-Path: "config"
	Uri-Path: "session-id=123"		Uri-Path: "sid=123"
	Content-Format: "application/cbor"		Content-Format: "application/cbor"
	{		{
	"ietf-dots-signal:signal-config": {		"ietf-dots-signal-channel:signal-config": {
	"mitigating-config": {		"mitigating-config": {
	"heartbeat-interval": {		"heartbeat-interval": {
	"current-value": integer		"current-value": integer
	},		},
	"missing-hb-allowed": {		"missing-hb-allowed": {
	"current-value": integer		"current-value": integer
	},		},
	"max-retransmit": {		"max-retransmit": {
	"current-value": integer		"current-value": integer
	},		},
	skipping to change at page 41, line 30 ¶		skipping to change at page 43, line 16 ¶
	"max-retransmit": {		"max-retransmit": {
	"current-value": integer		"current-value": integer
	},		},
	"ack-timeout": {		"ack-timeout": {
	"current-value": integer		"current-value": integer
	},		},
	"ack-random-factor": {		"ack-random-factor": {
	"current-value-decimal": number		"current-value-decimal": number
	}		}
	},		},
	"trigger-mitigation": boolean,		"trigger-mitigation": boolean
	"config-interval": integer
	}		}
	}		}
	Figure 20: PUT to Convey the DOTS Signal Channel Session		Figure 20: PUT to Convey the DOTS Signal Channel Session
	Configuration Data		Configuration Data
	The parameters in Figure 20 are described below:		The additional Uri-Path parameter to those defined in Table 1 is as
			follows:
	session-id: Identifier for the DOTS signal channel session		sid: Session Identifier is an identifier for the DOTS signal channel
	configuration data represented as an integer. This identifier		session configuration data represented as an integer. This
	MUST be generated by the DOTS client. This document does not make		identifier MUST be generated by DOTS clients. This document does
	any assumption about how this identifier is generated.		not make any assumption about how this identifier is generated.
	This is a mandatory attribute.		This is a mandatory attribute.
	mitigation-config: Set of configuration parameters to use when a		The meaning of the parameters in the CBOR body is defined in
	mitigation is active. The following parameters may be included:		Section 4.5.1.
	heartbeat-interval: Time interval in seconds between two
	consecutive heartbeat messages.
	'0' is used to disable the heartbeat mechanism.
	This is an optional attribute.
	missing-hb-allowed: Maximum number of consecutive heartbeat
	messages for which the DOTS agent did not receive a response
	before concluding that the session is disconnected.
	This is an optional attribute.
	max-retransmit: Maximum number of retransmissions for a message
	(referred to as MAX_RETRANSMIT parameter in CoAP).
	This is an optional attribute.
	ack-timeout: Timeout value in seconds used to calculate the
	initial retransmission timeout value (referred to as
	ACK_TIMEOUT parameter in CoAP).
	This is an optional attribute.
	ack-random-factor: Random factor used to influence the timing of
	retransmissions (referred to as ACK_RANDOM_FACTOR parameter in
	CoAP).
	This is an optional attribute.
	idle-config: Set of configuration parameters to use when no
	mitigation is active. This attribute has the same structure as
	'mitigating-config'.
	trigger-mitigation: If the parameter value is set to 'false', then
	DDoS mitigation is triggered only when the DOTS signal channel
	session is lost. Automated mitigation on loss of signal is
	discussed in Section 3.3.3 of [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture].
	If the DOTS client ceases to respond to heartbeat messages, the
	DOTS server can detect that the DOTS session is lost.
	The default value of the parameter is 'true'.
	This is an optional attribute.
	config-interval: This parameter is returned to indicate the time
	interval expressed in seconds, which a DOTS agent must wait for
	before re-contacting its peer in order to retrieve the signal
	channel configuration data.
	'0' is used to disable this refresh mechanism.
	If a non-zero value of 'config-interval' is received by a DOTS
	client, it has to issue a PUT request to refresh the configuration
	parameters for the signal channel before the expiry of 'config-
	interval'. When a DDoS attack is active, refresh requests MUST
	NOT be sent by DOTS clients and the DOTS server MUST NOT terminate
	the (D)TLS session after the expiry of 'config-interval'.
	This mechanism allows to update the configuration data if a change
	occurs at the DOTS server side. For example, the new
	configuration may instruct a DOTS client to cease heartbeats or
	reduce heartbeat frequency.
	If this parameter is not returned, this is equivalent to receiving
	a 'config-interval' value set to '0'.
	If a DOTS server detects that a misbehaving DOTS client does not
	contact the DOTS server after the expiry of 'config-interval', in
	order to retrieve the signal channel configuration data, it MAY
	terminate the (D)TLS session. A (D)TLS session is terminated by
	the receipt of an authenticated message that closes the connection
	(e.g., a fatal alert (Section 7.2 of [RFC5246])).
	This is an optional attribute.
	At least one of the attributes 'heartbeat-interval', 'missing-hb-		At least one of the attributes 'heartbeat-interval', 'missing-hb-
	allowed', 'max-retransmit', 'ack-timeout', 'ack-random-factor', and		allowed', 'max-retransmit', 'ack-timeout', 'ack-random-factor', and
	'trigger-mitigation' MUST be present in the PUT request. The PUT		'trigger-mitigation' MUST be present in the PUT request.
	request with a higher numeric 'session-id' value overrides the DOTS
			The PUT request with a higher numeric 'sid' value overrides the DOTS
	signal channel session configuration data installed by a PUT request		signal channel session configuration data installed by a PUT request
	with a lower numeric 'session-id' value.		with a lower numeric 'sid' value. To avoid maintaining a long list
			of 'sid' requests from a DOTS client, the lower numeric 'sid' MUST be
			automatically deleted and no longer available at the DOTS server.
	Figure 21 shows a PUT request example to convey the configuration		Figure 21 shows a PUT request example to convey the configuration
	parameters for the DOTS signal channel. In this example, heartbeat		parameters for the DOTS signal channel. In this example, heartbeat
	mechanism is disabled when no mitigation is active, while the		mechanism is disabled when no mitigation is active, while the
	heartbeat interval is set to '91' when a mitigation is active.		heartbeat interval is set to '91' when a mitigation is active.
	Header: PUT (Code=0.03)		Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
	Uri-Host: "www.example.com"		Uri-Host: "www.example.com"
	Uri-Path: ".well-known"		Uri-Path: ".well-known"
	Uri-Path: "dots"		Uri-Path: "dots"
	Uri-Path: "v1"		Uri-Path: "v1"
	Uri-Path: "config"		Uri-Path: "config"
	Uri-Path: "session-id=123"		Uri-Path: "sid=123"
	Content-Format: "application/cbor"		Content-Format: "application/cbor"
	{		{
	"ietf-dots-signal:signal-config": {		"ietf-dots-signal-channel:signal-config": {
	"mitigating-config": {		"mitigating-config": {
	"heartbeat-interval": {		"heartbeat-interval": {
	"current-value": 91		"current-value": 91
	},		},
	"missing-hb-allowed": {		"missing-hb-allowed": {
	"current-value": 3		"current-value": 3
	},		},
	"max-retransmit": {		"max-retransmit": {
	"current-value": 7		"current-value": 7
	},		},
	skipping to change at page 45, line 8 ¶		skipping to change at page 45, line 8 ¶
	},		},
	"trigger-mitigation": false		"trigger-mitigation": false
	}		}
	}		}
	Figure 21: PUT to Convey the Configuration Parameters		Figure 21: PUT to Convey the Configuration Parameters
	The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the PUT request		The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the PUT request
	using CoAP response codes:		using CoAP response codes:
	o If the DOTS server finds the 'session-id' parameter value conveyed		o If the request is missing a mandatory attribute, does not include
	in the PUT request in its configuration data and if the DOTS		a 'sid' Uri-Path, or contains one or more invalid or unknown
	server has accepted the updated configuration parameters, then		parameters, 4.00 (Bad Request) MUST be returned in the response.
	2.04 (Changed) code is returned in the response.
	o If the DOTS server does not find the 'session-id' parameter value		o If the DOTS server does not find the 'sid' parameter value
	conveyed in the PUT request in its configuration data and if the		conveyed in the PUT request in its configuration data and if the
	DOTS server has accepted the configuration parameters, then a		DOTS server has accepted the configuration parameters, then a
	response code 2.01 (Created) is returned in the response.		response code 2.01 (Created) is returned in the response.
	o If the request is missing one or more mandatory attributes or it		o If the DOTS server finds the 'sid' parameter value conveyed in the
	contains one or more invalid or unknown parameters, 4.00 (Bad		PUT request in its configuration data and if the DOTS server has
	Request) is returned in the response.		accepted the updated configuration parameters, 2.04 (Changed) MUST
			be returned in the response.
	o Response code 4.22 (Unprocessable Entity) is returned in the		o If any of the 'heartbeat-interval', 'missing-hb-allowed', 'max-
	response, if any of the 'heartbeat-interval', 'missing-hb-		retransmit', 'target-protocol', 'ack-timeout', and 'ack-random-
	allowed', 'max-retransmit', 'target-protocol', 'ack-timeout', and		factor' attribute values are not acceptable to the DOTS server,
	'ack-random-factor' attribute values are not acceptable to the		4.22 (Unprocessable Entity) MUST be returned in the response.
	DOTS server. Upon receipt of the 4.22 error response code, the		Upon receipt of this error code, the DOTS client SHOULD request
	DOTS client should request the maximum and minimum attribute		the maximum and minimum attribute values acceptable to the DOTS
	values acceptable to the DOTS server (Section 4.5.1).		server (Section 4.5.1).
	The DOTS client may re-try and send the PUT request with updated		The DOTS client may re-try and send the PUT request with updated
	attribute values acceptable to the DOTS server.		attribute values acceptable to the DOTS server.
	4.5.3. Delete DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration		4.5.3. Delete DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration
	A DELETE request is used to delete the installed DOTS signal channel		A DELETE request is used to delete the installed DOTS signal channel
	session configuration data (Figure 22).		session configuration data (Figure 22).
	Header: DELETE (Code=0.04)		Header: DELETE (Code=0.04)
	Uri-Host: "host"		Uri-Host: "host"
	Uri-Path: ".well-known"		Uri-Path: ".well-known"
	Uri-Path: "dots"		Uri-Path: "dots"
	Uri-Path: "version"		Uri-Path: "v1"
	Uri-Path: "config"		Uri-Path: "config"
	Uri-Query: "session-id=123"		Uri-Query: "sid=123"
	Figure 22: DELETE Configuration		Figure 22: DELETE Configuration
	The DOTS server resets the DOTS signal channel session configuration		The DOTS server resets the DOTS signal channel session configuration
	back to the default values and acknowledges a DOTS client's request		back to the default values and acknowledges a DOTS client's request
	to remove the DOTS signal channel session configuration using 2.02		to remove the DOTS signal channel session configuration using 2.02
	(Deleted) response code.		(Deleted) response code.
			Upon bootsrapping or reboot, a DOTS client MAY send a DELETE request
			to set the configuration parameters to default values. Such a
			request does not include any 'sid'.
	4.6. Redirected Signaling		4.6. Redirected Signaling
	Redirected DOTS signaling is discussed in detail in Section 3.2.2 of		Redirected DOTS signaling is discussed in detail in Section 3.2.2 of
	[I-D.ietf-dots-architecture].		[I-D.ietf-dots-architecture].
	If a DOTS server wants to redirect a DOTS client to an alternative		If a DOTS server wants to redirect a DOTS client to an alternative
	DOTS server for a signal session, then the response code 3.00		DOTS server for a signal session, then the response code 3.00
	(alternate server) will be returned in the response to the DOTS		(alternate server) will be returned in the response to the DOTS
	client.		client.
	The DOTS server can return the error response code 3.00 in response		The DOTS server can return the error response code 3.00 in response
	to a PUT request from the DOTS client or convey the error response		to a PUT request from the DOTS client or convey the error response
	code 3.00 in a unidirectional notification response from the DOTS		code 3.00 in a unidirectional notification response from the DOTS
	server.		server.
	The DOTS server in the error response conveys the alternate DOTS		The DOTS server in the error response conveys the alternate DOTS
	server's FQDN, and the alternate DOTS server's IP address(es) and		server's FQDN, and the alternate DOTS server's IP address(es) and
	time to live values in the CBOR body (Figure 23).		time to live values in the CBOR body (Figure 23).
	{		{
	"ietf-dots-signal:redirected-signal": {		"ietf-dots-signal-channel:redirected-signal": {
	"alt-server": "string",		"alt-server": "string",
	"alt-server-record": [		"alt-server-record": [
	{		{
	"addr": "string",		"addr": "string",
	"ttl" : integer		"ttl" : integer
	}		}
	]		]
	}		}
	}		}
	skipping to change at page 47, line 6 ¶		skipping to change at page 47, line 6 ¶
	addr: IP address of an alternate DOTS server.		addr: IP address of an alternate DOTS server.
	ttl: Time to live (TTL) represented as an integer number of seconds.		ttl: Time to live (TTL) represented as an integer number of seconds.
	Figure 24 shows a 3.00 response example to convey the DOTS alternate		Figure 24 shows a 3.00 response example to convey the DOTS alternate
	server 'alt-server.example', its IP addresses 2001:db8:6401::1 and		server 'alt-server.example', its IP addresses 2001:db8:6401::1 and
	2001:db8:6401::2, and TTL values 3600 and 1800.		2001:db8:6401::2, and TTL values 3600 and 1800.
	{		{
	"ietf-dots-signal:redirected-signal": {		"ietf-dots-signal-channel:redirected-signal": {
	"alt-server": "alt-server.example",		"alt-server": "alt-server.example",
	"alt-server-record": [		"alt-server-record": [
	{		{
	"ttl" : 3600,		"ttl" : 3600,
	"addr": "2001:db8:6401::1"		"addr": "2001:db8:6401::1"
	},		},
	{		{
	"ttl" : 1800,		"ttl" : 1800,
	"addr": "2001:db8:6401::2"		"addr": "2001:db8:6401::2"
	}		}
	skipping to change at page 49, line 10 ¶		skipping to change at page 49, line 10 ¶
	DOTS agents using the Ping and Pong messages specified in Section 4.4		DOTS agents using the Ping and Pong messages specified in Section 4.4
	of [I-D.ietf-core-coap-tcp-tls]. That is, the DOTS agent sends a		of [I-D.ietf-core-coap-tcp-tls]. That is, the DOTS agent sends a
	Ping message and the peer DOTS agent would respond by sending a		Ping message and the peer DOTS agent would respond by sending a
	single Pong message.		single Pong message.
	5. DOTS Signal Channel YANG Module		5. DOTS Signal Channel YANG Module
	This document defines a YANG [RFC7950] module for mitigation scope		This document defines a YANG [RFC7950] module for mitigation scope
	and DOTS signal channel session configuration data.		and DOTS signal channel session configuration data.
			This YANG module defines the DOTS client interaction with the DOTS
			server as seen by the DOTS client. A DOTS server is allowed to
			update the non-configurable 'ro' entities in the responses. This
			YANG module is not intended to be used for DOTS servers management
			purposes. Such module is out of the scope of this document.
	5.1. Tree Structure		5.1. Tree Structure
	This document defines the YANG module "ietf-dots-signal"		This document defines the YANG module "ietf-dots-signal-channel"
	(Section 5.2), which has the following tree structure. A DOTS signal		(Section 5.2), which has the following tree structure. A DOTS signal
	message can either be a mitigation or a configuration message.		message can either be a mitigation or a configuration message.
	module: ietf-dots-signal		module: ietf-dots-signal-channel
	+--rw dots-signal		+--rw dots-signal
	+--rw (message-type)?		+--rw (message-type)?
	+--:(mitigation-scope)		+--:(mitigation-scope)
	| +--rw client-domain-hash? string		| +--rw cdid? string
	| +--rw scope* [cuid mitigation-id]		| +--rw scope* [cuid mid]
	| +--rw cuid string		| +--rw cuid string
	| +--rw mitigation-id int32		| +--rw mid uint32
	| +--rw target-prefix* inet:ip-prefix		| +--rw target-prefix* inet:ip-prefix
	| +--rw target-port-range* [lower-port upper-port]		| +--rw target-port-range* [lower-port upper-port]
	| | +--rw lower-port inet:port-number		| | +--rw lower-port inet:port-number
	| | +--rw upper-port inet:port-number		| | +--rw upper-port inet:port-number
	| +--rw target-protocol* uint8		| +--rw target-protocol* uint8
	| +--rw target-fqdn* inet:domain-name		| +--rw target-fqdn* inet:domain-name
	| +--rw target-uri* inet:uri		| +--rw target-uri* inet:uri
	| +--rw alias-name* string		| +--rw alias-name* string
	| +--rw lifetime? int32		| +--rw lifetime? int32
	| +--rw mitigation-start? int64		| +--ro mitigation-start? uint64
	| +--ro status? enumeration		| +--ro status? enumeration
	| +--ro conflict-information		| +--ro conflict-information
	| | +--ro conflict-status? enumeration		| | +--ro conflict-status? enumeration
	| | +--ro conflict-cause? enumeration		| | +--ro conflict-cause? enumeration
	| | +--ro retry-timer? int32		| | +--ro retry-timer? uint32
	| | +--ro conflict-scope		| | +--ro conflict-scope
	| | +--ro target-prefix* inet:ip-prefix		| | +--ro target-prefix* inet:ip-prefix
	| | +--ro target-port-range* [lower-port upper-port]		| | +--ro target-port-range* [lower-port upper-port]
	| | | +--ro lower-port inet:port-number		| | | +--ro lower-port inet:port-number
	| | | +--ro upper-port inet:port-number		| | | +--ro upper-port inet:port-number
	| | +--ro target-protocol* uint8		| | +--ro target-protocol* uint8
	| | +--ro target-fqdn* inet:domain-name		| | +--ro target-fqdn* inet:domain-name
	| | +--ro target-uri* inet:uri		| | +--ro target-uri* inet:uri
	| | +--ro alias-name* string		| | +--ro alias-name* string
	| | +--ro acl-list* [acl-name acl-type]		| | +--ro acl-list* [acl-name]
	| | +--ro acl-name -> /ietf-acl:access-lists/acl/acl-name		| | +--ro acl-name
	| | +--ro acl-type -> /ietf-acl:access-lists/acl/acl-type		| | | -> /ietf-acl:access-lists/acl/name
	| +--ro pkts-dropped? yang:zero-based-counter64		| | +--ro acl-type?
	| +--ro bps-dropped? yang:zero-based-counter64		| | -> /ietf-acl:access-lists/acl/type
	| +--ro bytes-dropped? yang:zero-based-counter64		| +--ro bytes-dropped? yang:zero-based-counter64
	| +--ro pps-dropped? yang:zero-based-counter64		| +--ro bps-dropped? yang:zero-based-counter64
	| +--rw attack-status? enumeration		| +--ro pkts-dropped? yang:zero-based-counter64
	+--:(signal-config)		| +--ro pps-dropped? yang:zero-based-counter64
	| +--rw session-id int32		| +--rw attack-status? enumeration
	| +--rw mitigating-config		+--:(signal-config)
	| | +--rw heartbeat-interval		| +--rw sid uint32
	| | | +--rw max-value? int16		| +--rw mitigating-config
	| | | +--rw min-value? int16		| | +--rw heartbeat-interval
	| | | +--rw current-value? int16		| | | +--ro max-value? uint16
	| | +--rw missing-hb-allowed		| | | +--ro min-value? uint16
	| | | +--rw max-value? int16		| | | +--rw current-value? uint16
	| | | +--rw min-value? int16		| | +--rw missing-hb-allowed
	| | | +--rw current-value? int16		| | | +--ro max-value? uint16
	| | +--rw max-retransmit		| | | +--ro min-value? uint16
	| | | +--rw max-value? int16		| | | +--rw current-value? uint16
	| | | +--rw min-value? int16		| | +--rw max-retransmit
	| | | +--rw current-value? int16		| | | +--ro max-value? uint16
	| | +--rw ack-timeout		| | | +--ro min-value? uint16
	| | | +--rw max-value? int16		| | | +--rw current-value? uint16
	| | | +--rw min-value? int16		| | +--rw ack-timeout
	| | | +--rw current-value? int16		| | | +--ro max-value? uint16
	| | +--rw ack-random-factor		| | | +--ro min-value? uint16
	| | +--rw max-value-decimal? decimal64		| | | +--rw current-value? uint16
	| | +--rw min-value-decimal? decimal64		| | +--rw ack-random-factor
	| | +--rw current-value-decimal? decimal64		| | +--ro max-value-decimal? decimal64
	| +--rw idle-config		| | +--ro min-value-decimal? decimal64
	| | +--rw heartbeat-interval		| | +--rw current-value-decimal? decimal64
	| | | +--rw max-value? int16		| +--rw idle-config
	| | | +--rw min-value? int16		| | +--rw heartbeat-interval
	| | | +--rw current-value? int16		| | | +--ro max-value? uint16
	| | +--rw missing-hb-allowed		| | | +--ro min-value? uint16
	| | | +--rw max-value? int16		| | | +--rw current-value? uint16
	| | | +--rw min-value? int16		| | +--rw missing-hb-allowed
	| | | +--rw current-value? int16		| | | +--ro max-value? uint16
	| | +--rw max-retransmit		| | | +--ro min-value? uint16
	| | | +--rw max-value? int16		| | | +--rw current-value? uint16
	| | | +--rw min-value? int16		| | +--rw max-retransmit
	| | | +--rw current-value? int16		| | | +--ro max-value? uint16
	| | +--rw ack-timeout		| | | +--ro min-value? uint16
	| | | +--rw max-value? int16		| | | +--rw current-value? uint16
	| | | +--rw min-value? int16		| | +--rw ack-timeout
	| | | +--rw current-value? int16		| | | +--ro max-value? uint16
	| | +--rw ack-random-factor		| | | +--ro min-value? uint16
	| | +--rw max-value-decimal? decimal64		| | | +--rw current-value? uint16
	| | +--rw min-value-decimal? decimal64		| | +--rw ack-random-factor
	| | +--rw current-value-decimal? decimal64		| | +--ro max-value-decimal? decimal64
	| +--rw trigger-mitigation? boolean		| | +--ro min-value-decimal? decimal64
	| +--rw config-interval? int32		| | +--rw current-value-decimal? decimal64
	+--:(redirected-signal)		| +--rw trigger-mitigation? boolean
	+--rw alt-server string		| +--ro config-interval? uint32
	+--rw alt-server-record* [addr]		+--:(redirected-signal)
	+--rw addr inet:ip-address		+--ro alt-server string
	+--rw ttl? int32		+--ro alt-server-record* [addr]
			+--ro addr inet:ip-address
			+--ro ttl? uint32
	5.2. YANG Module		5.2. YANG Module
	<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-dots-signal@2018-01-09.yang"		<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-dots-signal-channel@2018-01-23.yang"
	module ietf-dots-signal {
	yang-version 1.1;
	namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal";
	prefix "signal";
	import ietf-inet-types {prefix "inet";}
	import ietf-yang-types {prefix yang;}
	import ietf-access-control-list {prefix "ietf-acl";}
	organization "IETF DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Working Group";
	contact
	"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dots/>
	WG List: <mailto:dots@ietf.org>
	Editor: Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy		module ietf-dots-signal-channel {
	<mailto:TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>		yang-version 1.1;
			namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal-channel";
			prefix signal;
	Editor: Mohamed Boucadair		import ietf-inet-types {
	<mailto:mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>		prefix inet;
			}
			import ietf-yang-types {
			prefix yang;
			}
			import ietf-access-control-list {
			prefix ietf-acl;
			}
	Author: Prashanth Patil		organization
	<mailto:praspati@cisco.com>		"IETF DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Working Group";
			contact
			"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dots/>
			WG List: <mailto:dots@ietf.org>
	Author: Andrew Mortensen		Editor: Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy
	<mailto:amortensen@arbor.net>		<mailto:TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>
	Author: Nik Teague		Editor: Mohamed Boucadair
	<mailto:nteague@verisign.com>";		<mailto:mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
	description		Author: Prashanth Patil
	"This module contains YANG definition for the signaling		<mailto:praspati@cisco.com>
	messages exchanged between a DOTS client and a DOTS server.
	Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as		Author: Andrew Mortensen
	authors of the code. All rights reserved.		<mailto:amortensen@arbor.net>
	Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or		Author: Nik Teague
	without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject		<mailto:nteague@verisign.com>";
	to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License		description
	set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions		"This module contains YANG definition for the signaling
	Relating to IETF Documents		messages exchanged between a DOTS client and a DOTS server.
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
	This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see		Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
	the RFC itself for full legal notices.";		authors of the code. All rights reserved.
	revision 2018-01-09 {		Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
	description		without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
	"Initial revision.";		to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
	reference		set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
	"RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat		Relating to IETF Documents
	Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel";		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
	}
	grouping target {		This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
	description		the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
	"Specifies the targets of the mitigation request.";
	leaf-list target-prefix {		revision 2018-01-23 {
	type inet:ip-prefix;
	description		description
	"IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the target.";		"Initial revision.";
			reference
			"RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
			Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel";
	}		}
	list target-port-range {		/*
	key "lower-port upper-port";		* Groupings
			*/
			grouping target {
	description		description
	"Port range. When only lower-port is		"Specifies the targets of the mitigation request.";
	present, it represents a single port.";		leaf-list target-prefix {
			type inet:ip-prefix;
	leaf lower-port {
	type inet:port-number;
	mandatory true;
	description		description
	"Lower port number of the port range.";		"IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the target.";
	}		}
			list target-port-range {
	leaf upper-port {		key "lower-port upper-port";
	type inet:port-number;
	must ". >= ../lower-port" {
	error-message
	"The upper port number must be greater than
	or equal to lower port number.";
	}
	description		description
	"Upper port number of the port range.";		"Port range. When only lower-port is
			present, it represents a single port number.";
			leaf lower-port {
			type inet:port-number;
			mandatory true;
			description
			"Lower port number of the port range.";
			}
			leaf upper-port {
			type inet:port-number;
			must ". >= ../lower-port" {
			error-message
			"The upper port number must be greater than
			or equal to lower port number.";
			}
			description
			"Upper port number of the port range.";
			}
	}		}
	}		leaf-list target-protocol {
			type uint8;
	leaf-list target-protocol {		description
	type uint8;		"Identifies the target protocol number.
	description
	"Identifies the target protocol number.
	The value '0' means 'all protocols'.
	Values are taken from the IANA protocol registry:
	https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/
	protocol-numbers.xhtml
	For example, 6 for TCP or 17 for UDP.";
	}
	leaf-list target-fqdn {
	type inet:domain-name;
	description "FQDN identifying the target.";
	}
	leaf-list target-uri {
	type inet:uri;
	description "URI identifying the target.";
	}
	leaf-list alias-name {
	type string;
	description
	"An alias name that points to a resoucre.";
	}
	}
	grouping mitigation-scope {
	description
	"Specifies the scope of the mitigation request.";
	leaf client-domain-hash {
	type string;
	description
	"The client domain hash may be conveyed by
	the server-domain DOTS gateway to propagate the
	client domain identification information from the
	gateway's client-side to the gateway's server-side,
	and from the gateway's server-side to the DOTS
	server.
	It may be used by the final DOTS server		The value '0' means 'all protocols'.
	for policy enforcement purposes.";
	}
	list scope {		Values are taken from the IANA protocol registry:
	key "cuid mitigation-id";		https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/
	description		protocol-numbers.xhtml
	"The scope of the request.";
	leaf cuid {		For example, 6 for TCP or 17 for UDP.";
	type string;
	description
	"A unique identifier that is randomly
	generated by a DOTS client to prevent
	request collisions.";
	}		}
			leaf-list target-fqdn {
	leaf mitigation-id {		type inet:domain-name;
	type int32;
	description		description
	"Mitigation request identifier.		"FQDN identifying the target.";
	This identifier must be unique for each mitigation
	request bound to the DOTS client.";
	}		}
			leaf-list target-uri {
	uses target;		type inet:uri;
	leaf lifetime {
	type int32;
	units "seconds";
	default 3600;
	description		description
	"Indicates the lifetime of the mitigation request.";		"URI identifying the target.";
	reference
	"RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
	Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel";
	}		}
			}
	leaf mitigation-start {		grouping mitigation-scope {
	type int64;		description
	units "seconds";		"Specifies the scope of the mitigation request.";
			leaf cdid {
			type string;
	description		description
	"Mitigation start time is represented in seconds		"The cdid should be included by a server-domain
	relative to 1970-01-01T00:00Z in UTC time.";		DOTS gateway to propagate the client domain
			identification information from the
			gateway's client-facing-side to the gateway's
			server-facing-side, and from the gateway's
			server-facing-side to the DOTS server.
			It may be used by the final DOTS server
			for policy enforcement purposes.";
	}		}
			list scope {
			key "cuid mid";
			description
			"The scope of the request.";
			leaf cuid {
			type string;
			description
			"A unique identifier that is randomly
			generated by a DOTS client to prevent
			request collisions. It is expected that the
			cuid will remain consistent throughout the
			lifetime of the DOTS client.";
			}
			leaf mid {
			type uint32;
			description
			"Mitigation request identifier.
	leaf status {		This identifier must be unique for each mitigation
	type enumeration {		request bound to the DOTS client.";
	enum "attack-mitigation-in-progress" {		}
	value 1;		uses target;
	description		leaf-list alias-name {
	"Attack mitigation is in progress (e.g., changing		type string;
	the network path to re-route the inbound traffic		description
	to DOTS mitigator).";		"An alias name that points to a resource.";
	}		}
			leaf lifetime {
	enum "attack-successfully-mitigated" {		type int32;
	value 2;		units "seconds";
	description		default "3600";
	"Attack is successfully mitigated (e.g., traffic		description
	is redirected to a DDoS mitigator and attack		"Indicates the lifetime of the mitigation request.
	traffic is dropped or blackholed).";
	}
	enum "attack-stopped" {
	value 3;
	description
	"Attack has stopped and the DOTS client can
	withdraw the mitigation request.";
	}
	enum "attack-exceeded-capability" {
	value 4;
	description
	"Attack has exceeded the mitigation provider
	capability.";
	}
	enum "dots-client-withdrawn-mitigation" {		A lifetime of '0' in a mitigation request is an
	value 5;		invalid value.
	description
	"DOTS client has withdrawn the mitigation
	request and the mitigation is active but
	terminating.";
	}
	enum "attack-mitigation-terminated" {		A lifetime of negative one (-1) indicates indefinite
	value 6;		lifetime for the mitigation request.";
	description
	"Attack mitigation is now terminated.";
	}
	enum "attack-mitigation-withdrawn" {
	value 7;
	description
	"Attack mitigation is withdrawn.";
	}
	enum "attack-mitigation-rejected" {
	value 8;
	description
	"Attack mitigation is rejected.";
	}
	}		}
	config false;		leaf mitigation-start {
	description		type uint64;
	"Indicates the status of a mitigation request.		config false;
	It must be included in responses only.";		description
			"Mitigation start time is represented in seconds
			relative to 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z in UTC time.";
			}
			leaf status {
			type enumeration {
			enum "attack-mitigation-in-progress" {
			value 1;
			description
			"Attack mitigation is in progress (e.g., changing
			the network path to re-route the inbound traffic
			to DOTS mitigator).";
			}
			enum "attack-successfully-mitigated" {
			value 2;
			description
			"Attack is successfully mitigated (e.g., traffic
			is redirected to a DDoS mitigator and attack
			traffic is dropped or blackholed).";
			}
			enum "attack-stopped" {
			value 3;
			description
			"Attack has stopped and the DOTS client can
			withdraw the mitigation request.";
			}
			enum "attack-exceeded-capability" {
			value 4;
			description
			"Attack has exceeded the mitigation provider
			capability.";
			}
			enum "dots-client-withdrawn-mitigation" {
			value 5;
			description
			"DOTS client has withdrawn the mitigation
			request and the mitigation is active but
			terminating.";
			}
			enum "attack-mitigation-terminated" {
			value 6;
			description
			"Attack mitigation is now terminated.";
			}
			enum "attack-mitigation-withdrawn" {
			value 7;
			description
			"Attack mitigation is withdrawn.";
			}
			enum "attack-mitigation-rejected" {
			value 8;
			description
			"Attack mitigation is rejected.";
			}
			}
			config false;
			description
			"Indicates the status of a mitigation request.
			It must be included in responses only.";
	}		}
	container conflict-information {		container conflict-information {
	config false;		config false;
	description		description
	"Indicates that a conflict is detected.		"Indicates that a conflict is detected.
	Must only be used for responses.";		Must only be used for responses.";
	leaf conflict-status {		leaf conflict-status {
	type enumeration {		type enumeration {
	enum "request-inactive-other-active" {		enum "request-inactive-other-active" {
	value 1;		value 1;
	description		description
	"DOTS Server has detected conflicting mitigation		"DOTS Server has detected conflicting mitigation
	requests from different DOTS clients.		requests from different DOTS clients.
	This mitigation request is currently inactive		This mitigation request is currently inactive
	until the conflicts are resolved. Another		until the conflicts are resolved. Another
	mitigation request is active.";		mitigation request is active.";
	}		}
	enum "request-active" {		enum "request-active" {
	value 2;		value 2;
	description		description
	"DOTS Server has detected conflicting mitigation		"DOTS Server has detected conflicting mitigation
	requests from different DOTS clients.		requests from different DOTS clients.
	This mitigation request is currently active.";		This mitigation request is currently active.";
	}		}
	enum "all-requests-inactive" {		enum "all-requests-inactive" {
	value 3;		value 3;
	description		description
	"DOTS Server has detected conflicting mitigation		"DOTS Server has detected conflicting mitigation
	requests from different DOTS clients. All		requests from different DOTS clients. All
	conflicting mitigation requests are inactive.";		conflicting mitigation requests are inactive.";
	}		}
	}		}
	description		description
	"Indicates the conflict status.		"Indicates the conflict status.";
	It must be included in responses only.";
	}		}
	leaf conflict-cause {		leaf conflict-cause {
	type enumeration {		type enumeration {
	enum "overlapping-targets" {		enum "overlapping-targets" {
	value 1;		value 1;
	description		description
	"Overlapping targets. conflict-scope provides		"Overlapping targets. conflict-scope provides
	more details about the exact conflict.";		more details about the exact conflict.";
	}		}
			enum "conflict-with-whitelist" {
	enum "conflict-with-whitelist" {		value 2;
	value 2;		description
	description		"Conflicts with an existing white list.
	"Conflicts with an existing white list.
	This code is returned when the DDoS mitigation
	detects that some of the source addresses/prefixes
	listed in the white list ACLs are actually
	attacking the target.";
	}
	enum "cuid-collision" {		This code is returned when the DDoS mitigation
	value 3;		detects that some of the source addresses/prefixes
	description		listed in the white list ACLs are actually
	"Conflicts with the CUID used by another		attacking the target.";
	DOTS client of the same domain.";		}
	}		enum "cuid-collision" {
			value 3;
			description
			"Conflicts with the cuid used by another
			DOTS client.";
			}
	}		}
	description		description
	"Indicates the cause of the conflict.		"Indicates the cause of the conflict.";
	It must be included in responses only.";
	}		}
	leaf retry-timer {		leaf retry-timer {
	type int32;		type uint32;
	units "seconds";		units "seconds";
	description		description
	"The DOTS client must not re-send the		"The DOTS client must not re-send the
	same request before the expiry of this timer.		same request that has a conflict before the expiry of
	It must be included in responses, only.";		this timer.";
	}		}
	container conflict-scope {		container conflict-scope {
	description		description
	"Provides more information about the conflict scope.";		"Provides more information about the conflict scope.";
	uses target {		uses target {
	when "../conflict-cause = 'overlapping-targets'";		when "../conflict-cause = 'overlapping-targets'";
	}		}
			leaf-list alias-name {
			when "../../conflict-cause = 'overlapping-targets'";
			type string;
			description
			"Conflicting alias-name.";
			}
	list acl-list {		list acl-list {
	when "../../conflict-cause = 'conflict-with-whitelist'";		when "../../conflict-cause = 'conflict-with-whitelist'";
	key "acl-name acl-type";		key "acl-name";
	description		description
	"List of conflicting ACLs";		"List of conflicting ACLs as defined in the DOTS data
			channel. These ACLs are uniquely defined by
			cuid and acl-name.";
	leaf acl-name {		leaf acl-name {
	type leafref {		type leafref {
	path "/ietf-acl:access-lists/ietf-acl:acl" +		path "/ietf-acl:access-lists/ietf-acl:acl/" +
	"/ietf-acl:acl-name";		"ietf-acl:name";
	}		}
	description		description
	"Reference to the conflicting ACL name bound to		"Reference to the conflicting ACL name bound to
	a DOTS client.";		a DOTS client.";
	}		}
	leaf acl-type {		leaf acl-type {
	type leafref {		type leafref {
	path "/ietf-acl:access-lists/ietf-acl:acl" +		path "/ietf-acl:access-lists/ietf-acl:acl/" +
	"/ietf-acl:acl-type";		"ietf-acl:type";
	}		}
	description		description
	"Reference to the conflicting ACL type bound to		"Reference to the conflicting ACL type bound to
	a DOTS client.";		a DOTS client.";
	}		}
	}		}
	}		}
	}		}
			leaf bytes-dropped {
	leaf pkts-dropped {
	type yang:zero-based-counter64;		type yang:zero-based-counter64;
			units "bytes";
	config false;		config false;
	description		description
	"Number of dropped packets.";		"The total dropped byte count for the mitigation
			request since the attack mitigation is triggered.
			The count wraps around when it reaches the maximum value
			of counter64 for dropped bytes.";
	}		}
	leaf bps-dropped {		leaf bps-dropped {
	type yang:zero-based-counter64;		type yang:zero-based-counter64;
	config false;		config false;
	description		description
	"The average number of dropped bytes per second for		"The average number of dropped bits per second for
	the mitigation request since the attack		the mitigation request since the attack
	mitigation is triggered.";		mitigation is triggered. This should be a
	}		five-minute average.";
	leaf bytes-dropped {		}
			leaf pkts-dropped {
	type yang:zero-based-counter64;		type yang:zero-based-counter64;
	units 'bytes';
	config false;		config false;
	description		description
	"Counter for dropped packets; in bytes.";		"The total number of dropped packet count for the
			mitigation request since the attack mitigation is
			triggered. The count wraps around when it reaches
			the maximum value of counter64 for dropped packets.";
	}		}
	leaf pps-dropped {		leaf pps-dropped {
	type yang:zero-based-counter64;		type yang:zero-based-counter64;
	config false;		config false;
	description		description
	"The average number of dropped packets per second		"The average number of dropped packets per second
	for the mitigation request since the attack		for the mitigation request since the attack
	mitigation is triggered.";		mitigation is triggered. This should be a
	}		five-minute average.";
	leaf attack-status {
	type enumeration {
	enum "under-attack" {
	value 1;
	description
	"The DOTS client determines that it is still under
	attack.";
	}
	enum "attack-successfully-mitigated" {
	value 2;
	description
	"The DOTS client determines that the attack is
	successfully mitigated.";
	}
	}		}
	description		leaf attack-status {
	"Indicates the status of an attack as seen by the		type enumeration {
	DOTS client.";		enum "under-attack" {
			value 1;
			description
			"The DOTS client determines that it is still under
			attack.";
			}
			enum "attack-successfully-mitigated" {
			value 2;
			description
			"The DOTS client determines that the attack is
			successfully mitigated.";
			}
			}
			description
			"Indicates the status of an attack as seen by the
			DOTS client.";
	}		}
			}
	}		}
	}
	grouping config-parameters {
	description
	"Subset of DOTS signal channel session configuration.";
	container heartbeat-interval {		grouping config-parameters {
	description		description
	"DOTS agents regularly send heartbeats to each other		"Subset of DOTS signal channel session configuration.";
	after mutual authentication is successfully		container heartbeat-interval {
	completed in order to keep the DOTS signal channel
	open.";
	leaf max-value {
	type int16;
	units "seconds";
	description		description
	"Maximum acceptable heartbeat-interval value.";		"DOTS agents regularly send heartbeats to each other
	reference		after mutual authentication is successfully
	"RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat		completed in order to keep the DOTS signal channel
	Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel";		open.";
	}		leaf max-value {
			type uint16;
			units "seconds";
			config false;
			description
			"Maximum acceptable heartbeat-interval value.";
			}
			leaf min-value {
			type uint16;
			units "seconds";
			config false;
			description
			"Minimum acceptable heartbeat-interval value.";
			}
			leaf current-value {
			type uint16;
			units "seconds";
			default "30";
			description
			"Current heartbeat-interval value.
	leaf min-value {		'0' means that heartbeat mechanism is deactivated.";
	type int16;		}
	units "seconds";
	description
	"Minimum acceptable heartbeat-interval value.";
	reference
	"RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
	Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel";
	}		}
	leaf current-value {		container missing-hb-allowed {
	type int16;
	units "seconds";
	default 30;
	description		description
	"Current heartbeat-interval value.		"Maximum number of missing heartbeats allowed.";
			leaf max-value {
	'0' means that heartbeat mechanism is deactivated.";		type uint16;
	reference		config false;
	"RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat		description
	Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel";		"Maximum acceptable missing-hb-allowed value.";
			}
			leaf min-value {
			type uint16;
			config false;
			description
			"Minimum acceptable missing-hb-allowed value.";
			}
			leaf current-value {
			type uint16;
			default "5";
			description
			"Current missing-hb-allowed value.";
			}
	}		}
	}		container max-retransmit {
	container missing-hb-allowed {
	description
	"Maximum number of missing heartbeats allowed.";
	leaf max-value {
	type int16;
	description		description
	"Maximum acceptable value.";		"Maximum number of retransmissions of a Confirmable
	reference		message.";
	"RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat		leaf max-value {
	Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel";		type uint16;
			config false;
			description
			"Maximum acceptable max-retransmit value.";
			}
			leaf min-value {
			type uint16;
			config false;
			description
			"Minimum acceptable max-retransmit value.";
			}
			leaf current-value {
			type uint16;
			default "3";
			description
			"Current max-retransmit value.";
			}
	}		}
			container ack-timeout {
	leaf min-value {
	type int16;
	description		description
	"Minimum acceptable value.";		"Initial retransmission timeout value.";
	reference		leaf max-value {
	"RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat		type uint16;
	Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel";		units "seconds";
			config false;
			description
			"Maximum ack-timeout value.";
			}
			leaf min-value {
			type uint16;
			units "seconds";
			config false;
			description
			"Minimum ack-timeout value.";
			}
			leaf current-value {
			type uint16;
			units "seconds";
			default "2";
			description
			"Current ack-timeout value.";
			}
	}		}
	leaf current-value {		container ack-random-factor {
	type int16;
	default 5;
	description		description
	"Current value.";		"Random factor used to influence the timing of
	reference		retransmissions.";
	"RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat		leaf max-value-decimal {
	Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel";		type decimal64 {
			fraction-digits 2;
			}
			config false;
			description
			"Maximum acceptable ack-random-factor value.";
			}
			leaf min-value-decimal {
			type decimal64 {
			fraction-digits 2;
			}
			config false;
			description
			"Minimum acceptable ack-random-factor value.";
			}
			leaf current-value-decimal {
			type decimal64 {
			fraction-digits 2;
			}
			default "1.5";
			description
			"Current ack-random-factor value.";
			}
	}		}
	}		}
	container max-retransmit {		grouping signal-config {
	description		description
	"Maximum number of retransmissions of a Confirmable		"DOTS signal channel session configuration.";
	message.";		leaf sid {
			type uint32;
	leaf max-value {		mandatory true;
	type int16;
	description
	"Maximum acceptable value.";
	reference
	"Section 4.8 of RFC 7552.";
	}
	leaf min-value {
	type int16;
	description		description
	"Minimum acceptable value.";		"An identifier for the DOTS signal channel
	reference		session configuration data.";
	"Section 4.8 of RFC 7552.";
	}		}
	leaf current-value {		container mitigating-config {
	type int16;
	default 3;
	description		description
	"Current value.";		"Configuration parameters to use when a mitigation
	reference		is active.";
	"RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat		uses config-parameters;
	Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel";
	}		}
	}		container idle-config {
	container ack-timeout {
	description
	"Initial retransmission timeout value.";
	leaf max-value {
	type int16;
	units "seconds";
	description		description
	"Maximum value.";		"Configuration parameters to use when no mitigation
	reference		is active.";
	"Section 4.8 of RFC 7552.";		uses config-parameters;
	}		}
			leaf trigger-mitigation {
	leaf min-value {		type boolean;
	type int16;		default "true";
	units "seconds";
	description		description
	"Minimum value.";		"If false, then mitigation is triggered
	reference		only when the DOTS server channel session is lost.";
	"Section 4.8 of RFC 7552.";
	}		}
	leaf current-value {		leaf config-interval {
	type int16;		type uint32;
	units "seconds";		units "seconds";
	default 2;		default "3600";
			config false;
	description		description
	"Current value.";		"This parameter is returned by a DOTS server to
	reference		a requesting DOTS client to indicate the time interval
	"Section 4.8 of RFC 7552.";		after which the DOTS client must contact the DOTS
	}		server in order to retrieve the signal channel
	}		configuration data.
	container ack-random-factor {		This mechanism allows the update of the configuration
	description		data if a change occurs.
	"Random factor used to influence the timing of
	retransmissions.";
	leaf max-value-decimal {		For example, the new configuration may instruct
	type decimal64 {		a DOTS client to cease heartbeats or reduce
	fraction-digits 2;		heartbeat frequency.
	}
	description
	"Maximum acceptable value.";
	reference
	"Section 4.8 of RFC 7552.";
	}
	leaf min-value-decimal {		'0' is used to disable this refresh mechanism.";
	type decimal64 {
	fraction-digits 2;
	}
	description
	"Minimum acceptable value.";
	reference
	"Section 4.8 of RFC 7552.";
	}
	leaf current-value-decimal {
	type decimal64 {
	fraction-digits 2;
	}
	default 1.5;
	description
	"Current value.";
	reference
	"Section 4.8 of RFC 7552.";
	}		}
	}		}
	}
	grouping signal-config {
	description
	"DOTS signal channel session configuration.";
	leaf session-id {
	type int32;
	mandatory true;
	description
	"An identifier for the DOTS signal channel
	session configuration data.";
	}
	container mitigating-config {
	description
	"Configuration parameters to use when a mitigation is active.";
	uses config-parameters;
	}
	container idle-config {
	description
	"Configuration parameters to use when no mitigation is
	active.";
	uses config-parameters;
	}
	leaf trigger-mitigation {
	type boolean;
	default true;
	description
	"If false, then mitigation is triggered
	only when the DOTS server channel session is lost";
	reference
	"RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
	Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel";
	}
	leaf config-interval {
	type int32;
	units "seconds";
	description
	"This parameter is returned by a DOTS server to
	a requesting DOTS client to indicate the time interval
	after which the DOTS client must contact the DOTS
	server in order to retrieve the signal channel
	configuration data.
	This mechanism allows the update of the configuration
	data if a change occurs.
	For example, the new configuration may instruct
	a DOTS client to cease heartbeats or reduce
	heartbeat frequency.
	'0' is used to disable this refresh mechanism.";
	}
	}
	grouping redirected-signal {
	description
	"Grouping for the redirected signaling.";
	leaf alt-server {
	type string;
	mandatory true;
	description
	"Alias of an alternate server.";
	}
	list alt-server-record {		grouping redirected-signal {
	key "addr";
	description		description
	"List of records for the alternate server.";		"Grouping for the redirected signaling.";
			leaf alt-server {
	leaf addr {		type string;
	type inet:ip-address;		config false;
			mandatory true;
	description		description
	"IPv4 or IPv6 address identifying the server.";		"FQDN of an alternate server.";
	}		}
			list alt-server-record {
	leaf ttl {		key "addr";
	type int32;		config false;
	description		description
	"TTL associated with this record.";		"List of records for the alternate server.";
			leaf addr {
			type inet:ip-address;
			description
			"An IPv4 or IPv6 address identifying the server.";
			}
			leaf ttl {
			type uint32;
			description
			"TTL associated with this record.";
			}
	}		}
	}		}
	}
	container dots-signal {		/*
	description		* Main Container for DOTS Signal Channel
	"Main container for DOTS signal message.		*/
	A DOTS signal message can be a mitigation message or
	a configuration message.";
	choice message-type {		container dots-signal {
	description		description
	"Can be a mitigation, a configuration, or a redirect		"Main container for DOTS signal message.
	message.";
	case mitigation-scope {
	description
	"Mitigation scope of a mitigation message.";
	uses mitigation-scope;
	}
	case signal-config {
	description
	"Configuration message.";
	uses signal-config;
	}
	case redirected-signal {		A DOTS signal message can be a mitigation, a configuration,
			or a redirected signal message.";
			choice message-type {
	description		description
	"Redirected signaling.";		"Can be a mitigation, a configuration, or a redirect
	uses redirected-signal;		message.";
			case mitigation-scope {
			description
			"Mitigation scope of a mitigation message.";
			uses mitigation-scope;
			}
			case signal-config {
			description
			"Configuration message.";
			uses signal-config;
			}
			case redirected-signal {
			description
			"Redirected signaling.";
			uses redirected-signal;
			}
	}		}
	}		}
	}		}
	}		<CODE ENDS>
	<CODE ENDS>
	6. Mapping Parameters to CBOR		6. Mapping Parameters to CBOR
	All parameters in the payload of the DOTS signal channel MUST be		All parameters in the payload of the DOTS signal channel MUST be
	mapped to CBOR types as shown in Table 4 and are assigned an integer		mapped to CBOR types as shown in Table 4 and are assigned an integer
	key to save space. The recipient of the payload MAY reject the		key to save space. The recipient of the payload MAY reject the
	information if it is not suitably mapped.		information if it is not suitably mapped.
	+-----------------------+---------+--------------------+------------+		+----------------------+-------------+-----+---------------+--------+
	| Parameter Name | CBOR | CBOR Major Type | JSON Type |		| Parameter Name | YANG | CBOR| CBOR Major | JSON |
	| | Key | | |		| | Type | Key | Type & | Type |
	+-----------------------+---------+--------------------+------------+		| | | | Information | |
	| mitigation-scope | 1 | 5 (map) | Object |		+----------------------+-------------+-----+---------------+--------+
	| scope | 2 | 4 (array) | Array |		| ietf-dots-signal-cha | | | | |
	| mitigation-id | 3 | 0 (unsigned) | Number |		| nnel:mitigation-scope| container | 1 | 5 map | Object |
	| acl-list | 4 | 4 (array) | Array |		| cdid | string | 2 | 3 text string | String |
	| target-port-range | 5 | 4 (array) | Array |		| scope | list | 3 | 4 array | Array |
	| lower-port | 6 | 0 (unsigned) | Number |		| cuid | string | 4 | 3 text string | String |
	| upper-port | 7 | 0 (unsigned) | Number |		| mid | uint32 | 5 | 0 unsigned | Number |
	| target-protocol | 8 | 4 (array) | Array |		| target-prefix | leaf-list | 6 | 4 array | Array |
	| | | 0 (unsigned) | Number |		| | inet: | | | |
	| target-fqdn | 9 | 4 (array) | Array |		| | ip-prefix | | 3 text string | String |
	| | | 3 (text string) | String |		| target-port-range | list | 7 | 4 array | Array |
	| target-uri | 10 | 4 (array) | Array |		| lower-port | inet: | | | |
	| | | 3 (text string) | String |		| | port-number| 8 | 0 unsigned | Number |
	| alias-name | 11 | 4 (array) | Array |		| upper-port | inet: | | | |
	| | | 3 (text string) | String |		| | port-number| 9 | 0 unsigned | Number |
	| lifetime | 12 | 0 (unsigned) | Number |		| target-protocol | leaf-list | 10 | 4 array | Array |
	| attack-status | 13 | 0 (unsigned) | Number |		| | uint8 | | 0 unsigned | Number |
	| signal-config | 14 | 5 (map) | Object |		| target-fqdn | leaf-list | 11 | 4 array | Array |
	| heartbeat-interval | 15 | 5 (map) | Object |		| | inet: | | | |
	| max-retransmit | 16 | 5 (map) | Object |		| | domain-name| | 3 text string | String |
	| ack-timeout | 17 | 5 (map) | Object |		| target-uri | leaf-list | 12 | 4 array | Array |
	| ack-random-factor | 18 | 5 (map) | Object |		| | inet:uri | | 3 text string | String |
	| min-value | 19 | 0 (unsigned) | Number |		| alias-name | leaf-list | 13 | 4 array | Array |
	| max-value | 20 | 0 (unsigned) | Number |		| | string | | 3 text string | String |
	| status | 21 | 0 (unsigned) | Number |		| lifetime | int32 | 14 | 0 unsigned | Number |
	| conflict-information | 22 | 5 (map) | Object |		| | | | 1 negative | Number |
	| conflict-status | 23 | 0 (unsigned) | Number |		| mitigation-start | uint64 | 15 | 0 unsigned | String |
	| conflict-cause | 24 | 0 (unsigned) | Number |		| status | enumeration | 16 | 0 unsigned | String |
	| retry-timer | 25 | 0 (unsigned) | Number |		| conflict-information | container | 17 | 5 map | Object |
	| bytes-dropped | 26 | 0 (unsigned) | String |		| conflict-status | enumeration | 18 | 0 unsigned | String |
	| bps-dropped | 27 | 0 (unsigned) | String |		| conflict-cause | enumeration | 19 | 0 unsigned | String |
	| pkts-dropped | 28 | 0 (unsigned) | String |		| retry-timer | uint32 | 20 | 0 unsigned | Number |
	| pps-dropped | 29 | 0 (unsigned) | String |		| conflict-scope | container | 21 | 5 map | Object |
	| session-id | 30 | 0 (unsigned) | Number |		| acl-list | list | 22 | 4 array | Array |
	| trigger-mitigation | 31 | 7 (simple type) | true/false |		| acl-name | leafref | 23 | 3 text string | String |
	| missing-hb-allowed | 32 | 5 (map) | Object |		| acl-type | leafref | 24 | 3 text string | String |
	| current-value | 33 | 0 (unsigned) | Number |		| bytes-dropped | yang:zero- | | | |
	| mitigation-start | 34 | 7 (floating-point) | Number |		| | based- | | | |
	| target-prefix | 35 | 4 (array) | Array |		| | counter64 | 25 | 0 unsigned | String |
	| | | 3 (text string) | String |		| bps-dropped | yang:zero- | | | |
	| client-domain-hash | 36 | 3 (text string) | String |		| | based- | | | |
	| alt-server | 37 | 3 (text string) | String |		| | counter64 | 26 | 0 unsigned | String |
	| alt-server-record | 38 | 4 (array) | Array |		| pkts-dropped | yang:zero- | | | |
	| addr | 39 | 3 (text string) | String |		| | based- | | | |
	| ttl | 40 | 0 (unsigned) | Number |		| | counter64 | 27 | 0 unsigned | String |
	| conflict-scope | 41 | 5 (map) | Object |		| pps-dropped | yang:zero- | | | |
	| acl-name | 42 | 3 (text string) | String |		| | based- | | | |
	| acl-type | 43 | 3 (text string) | String |		| | counter64 | 28 | 0 unsigned | String |
	| config-interval | 44 | 0 (unsigned) | Number |		| attack-status | enumeration | 29 | 0 unsigned | String |
	| mitigating-config | 45 | 5 (map) | Object |		| ietf-dots-signal- | | | | |
	| idle-config | 46 | 5 (map) | Object |		| channel:signal-config| container | 30 | 5 map | Object |
	| cuid | 47 | 3 (text string) | String |		| sid | uint32 | 31 | 0 unsigned | Number |
	| min-value-decimal | 48 | 7 (floating-point) | Number |		| mitigating-config | container | 32 | 5 map | Object |
	| max-value-decimal | 49 | 7 (floating-point) | Number |		| heartbeat-interval | container | 33 | 5 map | Object |
	| current-value-decimal | 50 | 7 (floating-point) | Number |		| max-value | uint16 | 34 | 0 unsigned | Number |
	+-----------------------+---------+--------------------+------------+		| min-value | uint16 | 35 | 0 unsigned | Number |
			| current-value | uint16 | 36 | 0 unsigned | Number |
			| missing-hb-allowed | container | 37 | 5 map | Object |
			| max-retransmit | container | 38 | 5 map | Object |
			| ack-timeout | container | 39 | 5 map | Object |
			| ack-random-factor | container | 40 | 5 map | Object |
			| max-value-decimal | decimal64 | 41 | 6 tag 4 | |
			| | | | [-2, integer]| String |
			| min-value-decimal | decimal64 | 42 | 6 tag 4 | |
			| | | | [-2, integer]| String |
			| current-value-decimal| decimal64 | 43 | 6 tag 4 | |
			| | | | [-2, integer]| String |
			| idle-config | container | 44 | 5 map | Object |
			| trigger-mitigation | boolean | 45 | 7 bits 20 | False |
			| | | | 7 bits 21 | True |
			| config-interval | uint32 | 46 | 0 unsigned | Number |
			| ietf-dots-signal-cha | | | | |
			|nnel:redirected-signal| container | 47 | 5 map | Object |
			| alt-server | string | 48 | 3 text string | String |
			| alt-server-record | list | 49 | 4 array | Array |
			| addr | inet: | | | |
			| | ip-address | 50 | 3 text string | String |
			| ttl | uint32 | 51 | 0 unsigned | Number |
			+----------------------+-------------+-----+---------------+--------+
	Table 4: CBOR Mappings Used in DOTS Signal Channel Messages		Table 4: CBOR Mappings Used in DOTS Signal Channel Messages
	7. (D)TLS Protocol Profile and Performance Considerations		7. (D)TLS Protocol Profile and Performance Considerations
	7.1. (D)TLS Protocol Profile		7.1. (D)TLS Protocol Profile
	This section defines the (D)TLS protocol profile of DOTS signal		This section defines the (D)TLS protocol profile of DOTS signal
	channel over (D)TLS and DOTS data channel over TLS.		channel over (D)TLS and DOTS data channel over TLS.
	There are known attacks on (D)TLS, such as man-in-the-middle and		There are known attacks on (D)TLS, such as man-in-the-middle and
	protocol downgrade attacks. These are general attacks on (D)TLS and,		protocol downgrade attacks. These are general attacks on (D)TLS and,
	skipping to change at page 70, line 30 ¶		skipping to change at page 69, line 43 ¶
	[DOTS signal message] <-------> [DOTS signal message]		[DOTS signal message] <-------> [DOTS signal message]
	Figure 25: TLS 1.3 handshake with 0-RTT		Figure 25: TLS 1.3 handshake with 0-RTT
	7.3. MTU and Fragmentation		7.3. MTU and Fragmentation
	To avoid DOTS signal message fragmentation and the subsequent		To avoid DOTS signal message fragmentation and the subsequent
	decreased probability of message delivery, DOTS agents MUST ensure		decreased probability of message delivery, DOTS agents MUST ensure
	that the DTLS record MUST fit within a single datagram. If the path		that the DTLS record MUST fit within a single datagram. If the path
	MTU is not known to the DOTS server, an IP MTU of 1280 bytes SHOULD		MTU is not known to the DOTS server, an IP MTU of 1280 bytes SHOULD
	be assumed. The length of the URL MUST NOT exceed 256 bytes. If UDP		be assumed. If UDP is used to convey the DOTS signal messages then
	is used to convey the DOTS signal messages then the DOTS client must		the DOTS client must consider the amount of record expansion expected
	consider the amount of record expansion expected by the DTLS		by the DTLS processing when calculating the size of CoAP message that
	processing when calculating the size of CoAP message that fits within		fits within the path MTU. Path MTU MUST be greater than or equal to
	the path MTU. Path MTU MUST be greater than or equal to [CoAP		[CoAP message size + DTLS overhead of 13 octets + authentication
	message size + DTLS overhead of 13 octets + authentication overhead		overhead of the negotiated DTLS cipher suite + block padding
	of the negotiated DTLS cipher suite + block padding (Section 4.1.1.1		(Section 4.1.1.1 of [RFC6347]). If the request size exceeds the path
	of [RFC6347]). If the request size exceeds the path MTU then the		MTU then the DOTS client MUST split the DOTS signal into separate
	DOTS client MUST split the DOTS signal into separate messages, for		messages, for example the list of addresses in the 'target-prefix'
	example the list of addresses in the 'target-prefix' parameter could		parameter could be split into multiple lists and each list conveyed
	be split into multiple lists and each list conveyed in a new PUT		in a new PUT request.
	request.
	Implementation Note: DOTS choice of message size parameters works		Implementation Note: DOTS choice of message size parameters works
	well with IPv6 and with most of today's IPv4 paths. However, with		well with IPv6 and with most of today's IPv4 paths. However, with
	IPv4, it is harder to reliably ensure that there is no IP		IPv4, it is harder to reliably ensure that there is no IP
	fragmentation. If IPv4 path MTU is unknown, implementations may want		fragmentation. If IPv4 path MTU is unknown, implementations may want
	to limit themselves to more conservative IPv4 datagram sizes such as		to limit themselves to more conservative IPv4 datagram sizes such as
	576 bytes, as per [RFC0791]. IP packets whose size does not exceed		576 bytes, as per [RFC0791]. IP packets whose size does not exceed
	576 bytes should never need to be fragmented: therefore, sending a		576 bytes should never need to be fragmented: therefore, sending a
	maximum of 500 bytes of DOTS signal over a UDP datagram will		maximum of 500 bytes of DOTS signal over a UDP datagram will
	generally avoid IP fragmentation.		generally avoid IP fragmentation.
	skipping to change at page 72, line 23 ¶		skipping to change at page 72, line 7 ¶
	Also, DOTS gateways and servers located in different domains MUST		Also, DOTS gateways and servers located in different domains MUST
	perform mutual authentication (e.g., using certificates). A DOTS		perform mutual authentication (e.g., using certificates). A DOTS
	server will only allow a DOTS gateway with a certificate for a		server will only allow a DOTS gateway with a certificate for a
	particular domain to request mitigation for that domain. In		particular domain to request mitigation for that domain. In
	reference to Figure 26, the DOTS server only allows the DOTS gateway		reference to Figure 26, the DOTS server only allows the DOTS gateway
	to request mitigation for 'example.com' domain and not for other		to request mitigation for 'example.com' domain and not for other
	domains.		domains.
	9. IANA Considerations		9. IANA Considerations
	This specification registers a service port (Section 9.1), an URI		This specification registers a service port (Section 9.1), a URI
	suffix in the Well-Known URIs registry (Section 9.2), a CoAP response		suffix in the Well-Known URIs registry (Section 9.2), a CoAP response
	code (Section 9.3), a YANG module (Section 9.5). It also creates a		code (Section 9.3), a YANG module (Section 9.5). It also creates a
	registry for mappings to CBOR (Section 9.4).		registry for mappings to CBOR (Section 9.4).
	9.1. DOTS Signal Channel UDP and TCP Port Number		9.1. DOTS Signal Channel UDP and TCP Port Number
	IANA is requested to assign the port number TBD to the DOTS signal		IANA is requested to assign the port number TBD to the DOTS signal
	channel protocol for both UDP and TCP from the "Service Name and		channel protocol for both UDP and TCP from the "Service Name and
	Transport Protocol Port Number Registry" available at		Transport Protocol Port Number Registry" available at
	https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-numbers/service-		https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-numbers/service-
	names-port-numbers.xhtml.		names-port-numbers.xhtml.
	The assignment of port number 4646 is strongly suggested, as 4646 is		The assignment of port number 4646 is strongly suggested, as 4646 is
	the ASCII decimal value for ".." (DOTS).		the ASCII decimal value for ".." (DOTS).
	9.2. Well-Known 'dots' URI		9.2. Well-Known 'dots' URI
	This document requests IANA to register the 'dots' well-known URI in		This document requests IANA to register the 'dots' well-known URI in
	the Well-Known URIs registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-		the Well-Known URIs registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-
	known-uris/well-known-uris.xhtml) as defined by [RFC5785].		known-uris/well-known-uris.xhtml) as defined by [RFC5785]:
	URI suffix: dots
	Change controller: IETF
	Specification document(s): This RFC		+----------+----------------+---------------------+-----------------+
			| URI | Change | Specification | Related |
			| suffix | controller | document(s) | information |
			+----------+----------------+---------------------+-----------------+
			| dots | IETF | [RFCXXXX] | None |
			+----------+----------------+---------------------+-----------------+
	Related information: None		Table 5: 'dots' well-known URI
	9.3. CoAP Response Code		9.3. CoAP Response Code
	IANA is requested to add the following entry to the "CoAP Response		IANA is requested to add the following entry to the "CoAP Response
	Codes" sub-registry available at https://www.iana.org/assignments/		Codes" sub-registry available at https://www.iana.org/assignments/
	core-parameters/core-parameters.xhtml#response-codes:		core-parameters/core-parameters.xhtml#response-codes:
	+------+------------------+-----------+		+------+------------------+-----------+
	| Code | Description | Reference |		| Code | Description | Reference |
	+------+------------------+-----------+		+------+------------------+-----------+
	| 3.00 | Alternate Server | [RFCXXXX] |		| 3.00 | Alternate Server | [RFCXXXX] |
	+------+------------------+-----------+		+------+------------------+-----------+
	Table 5: CoAP Response Code		Table 6: CoAP Response Code
	9.4. DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Mappings Registry		9.4. DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Mappings Registry
	The document requests IANA to create a new registry, entitled "DOTS		The document requests IANA to create a new registry, entitled "DOTS
	Signal Channel CBOR Mappings Registry". The structure of this		Signal Channel CBOR Mappings Registry". The structure of this
	registry is provided in Section 9.4.1.		registry is provided in Section 9.4.1.
	The registry is initially populated with the values in Section 9.4.2.		The registry is initially populated with the values in Section 9.4.2.
	Values from that registry MUST be assigned via Expert Review		Values from that registry MUST be assigned via Expert Review
	skipping to change at page 74, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 73, line 40 ¶
	For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the		For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the
	name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal		name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal
	address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.		address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.
	Specification Document(s):		Specification Document(s):
	Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter,		Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter,
	preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of		preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of
	the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be		the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be
	included but is not required.		included but is not required.
	9.4.2. Initial Registry Contents		9.4.2. Initial Registry Content
	o Parameter Name: mitigation-scope
	o CBOR Key Value: 1
	o CBOR Major Type: 5
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: scope
	o CBOR Key Value: 2
	o CBOR Major Type: 4
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: mitigation-id
	o CBOR Key Value: 3
	o CBOR Major Type: 0
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: acl-list
	o CBOR Key Value: 4
	o CBOR Major Type: 4
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: target-port-range
	o CBOR Key Value: 5
	o CBOR Major Type: 4
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: lower-port
	o CBOR Key Value: 6
	o CBOR Major Type: 0
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: upper-port
	o CBOR Key Value: 7
	o CBOR Major Type: 0
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: target-protocol
	o CBOR Key Value: 8
	o CBOR Major Type: 4
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: target-fqdn
	o CBOR Key Value: 9
	o CBOR Major Type: 4
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: target-uri
	o CBOR Key Value: 10
	o CBOR Major Type: 4
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: alias-name
	o CBOR Key Value: 11
	o CBOR Major Type: 4
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: lifetime
	o CBOR Key Value: 12
	o CBOR Major Type: 0
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: attack-status
	o CBOR Key Value: 13
	o CBOR Major Type: 0
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: signal-config
	o CBOR Key Value: 14
	o CBOR Major Type: 5
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: heartbeat-interval
	o CBOR Key Value: 15
	o CBOR Major Type: 5
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: max-retransmit
	o CBOR Key Value: 16
	o CBOR Major Type: 5
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: ack-timeout
	o CBOR Key Value: 17
	o CBOR Major Type: 5
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: ack-random-factor
	o CBOR Key Value: 18
	o CBOR Major Type: 5
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: min-value
	o CBOR Key Value: 19
	o CBOR Major Type: 0
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: max-value
	o CBOR Key Value: 20
	o CBOR Major Type: 0
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: status
	o CBOR Key Value: 21
	o CBOR Major Type: 0
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: conflict-information
	o CBOR Key Value: 22
	o CBOR Major Type: 5
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: conflict-status
	o CBOR Key Value: 23
	o CBOR Major Type: 0
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: conflict-cause
	o CBOR Key Value: 24
	o CBOR Major Type: 0
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: retry-timer
	o CBOR Key Value: 25
	o CBOR Major Type: 0
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: bytes-dropped
	o CBOR Key Value: 26
	o CBOR Major Type: 0
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: bps-dropped
	o CBOR Key Value: 27
	o CBOR Major Type: 0
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: pkts-dropped
	o CBOR Key Value: 28
	o CBOR Major Type: 0
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: pps-dropped
	o CBOR Key Value: 29
	o CBOR Major Type: 0
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: session-id
	o CBOR Key Value: 30
	o CBOR Major Type: 0
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: trigger-mitigation
	o CBOR Key Value: 31
	o CBOR Major Type: 7
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: missing-hb-allowed
	o CBOR Key Value: 32
	o CBOR Major Type: 5
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: current-value
	o CBOR Key Value: 33
	o CBOR Major Type: 0
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: mitigation-start
	o CBOR Key Value: 34
	o CBOR Major Type: 7
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: target-prefix
	o CBOR Key Value: 35
	o CBOR Major Type: 4
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: client-domain-hash
	o CBOR Key Value: 36
	o CBOR Major Type: 3
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: alt-server
	o CBOR Key Value: 37
	o CBOR Major Type: 3
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: alt-server-record
	o CBOR Key Value: 38
	o CBOR Major Type: 4
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: addr
	o CBOR Key Value: 39
	o CBOR Major Type: 3
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: ttl
	o CBOR Key Value: 40
	o CBOR Major Type: 0
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: conflict-scope
	o CBOR Key Value: 41
	o CBOR Major Type: 5
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: acl-name
	o CBOR Key Value: 42
	o CBOR Major Type: 3
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: acl-type
	o CBOR Key Value: 43
	o CBOR Major Type: 3
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: config-interval
	o CBOR Key Value: 44
	o CBOR Major Type: 0
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: mitigating-config
	o CBOR Key Value: 45
	o CBOR Major Type: 5
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: idle-config
	o CBOR Key Value: 46
	o CBOR Major Type: 5
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: cuid
	o CBOR Key Value: 47
	o CBOR Major Type: 3
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: min-value-decimal
	o CBOR Key Value: 48
	o CBOR Major Type: 7
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter Name: max-value-decimal		+----------------------+-------+-------+------------+---------------+
	o CBOR Key Value: 49		| Parameter Name | CBOR | CBOR | Change | Specification |
	o CBOR Major Type: 7		| | Key | Major | Controller | Document(s) |
	o Change Controller: IESG		| | Value | Type | | |
	o Specification Document(s): this document		+----------------------+-------+-------+------------+---------------+
			| ietf-dots-signal-chan| 1 | 5 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| nel:mitigation-scope | | | | |
			| cdid | 2 | 3 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| scope | 3 | 4 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| cuid | 4 | 3 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| mid | 5 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| target-prefix | 6 | 4 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| target-port-range | 7 | 4 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| lower-port | 8 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| upper-port | 9 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| target-protocol | 10 | 4 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| target-fqdn | 11 | 4 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| target-uri | 12 | 4 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| alias-name | 13 | 4 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| lifetime | 14 | 0/1 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| mitigation-start | 15 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| status | 16 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| conflict-information | 17 | 5 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| conflict-status | 18 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| conflict-cause | 19 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| retry-timer | 20 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| conflict-scope | 21 | 5 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| acl-list | 22 | 4 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| acl-name | 23 | 3 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| acl-type | 24 | 3 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| bytes-dropped | 25 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| bps-dropped | 26 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| pkts-dropped | 27 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| pps-dropped | 28 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| attack-status | 29 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| ietf-dots-signal- | 30 | 5 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| channel:signal-config| | | | |
			| sid | 31 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| mitigating-config | 32 | 5 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| heartbeat-interval | 33 | 5 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| min-value | 34 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| max-value | 35 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| current-value | 36 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| missing-hb-allowed | 37 | 5 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| max-retransmit | 38 | 5 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| ack-timeout | 39 | 5 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| ack-random-factor | 40 | 5 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| min-value-decimal | 41 | 6tag4 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| max-value-decimal | 42 | 6tag4 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| current-value- | 43 | 6tag4 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| decimal | | | | |
			| idle-config | 44 | 5 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| trigger-mitigation | 45 | 7 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| config-interval | 46 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| ietf-dots-signal-chan| 47 | 5 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| nel:redirected-signal| | | | |
			| alt-server | 48 | 3 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| alt-server-record | 49 | 4 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| addr | 50 | 3 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			| ttl | 51 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
			+----------------------+-------+-------+------------+---------------+
	o Parameter Name: current-value-decimal		Table 7: Initial DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Mappings Registry
	o CBOR Key Value: 50
	o CBOR Major Type: 7
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	9.5. DOTS Signal Channel YANG Module		9.5. DOTS Signal Channel YANG Module
	This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the		This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the
	"IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:		"IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:
	URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal		URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal-channel
	Registrant Contact: The IESG.		Registrant Contact: The IESG.
	XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.		XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.
	This document requests IANA to register the following YANG module in		This document requests IANA to register the following YANG module in
	the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC7950].		the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC7950].
	name: ietf-signal		name: ietf-signal
	namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal		namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal-channel
	prefix: signal		prefix: signal
	reference: RFC XXXX		reference: RFC XXXX
	10. Implementation Status		10. Implementation Status
	[Note to RFC Editor: Please remove this section and reference to		[Note to RFC Editor: Please remove this section and reference to
	[RFC7942] prior to publication.]		[RFC7942] prior to publication.]
	This section records the status of known implementations of the		This section records the status of known implementations of the
	protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting this		protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting this
	Internet-Draft, and is based upon a proposal described in [RFC7942].		Internet-Draft, and is based upon a proposal described in [RFC7942].
	The description of implementations in this section is intended to		The description of implementations in this section is intended to
	skipping to change at page 82, line 10 ¶		skipping to change at page 77, line 10 ¶
	If TCP is used between DOTS agents, an attacker may be able to inject		If TCP is used between DOTS agents, an attacker may be able to inject
	RST packets, bogus application segments, etc., regardless of whether		RST packets, bogus application segments, etc., regardless of whether
	TLS authentication is used. Because the application data is TLS		TLS authentication is used. Because the application data is TLS
	protected, this will not result in the application receiving bogus		protected, this will not result in the application receiving bogus
	data, but it will constitute a DoS on the connection. This attack		data, but it will constitute a DoS on the connection. This attack
	can be countered by using TCP-AO [RFC5925]. If TCP-AO is used, then		can be countered by using TCP-AO [RFC5925]. If TCP-AO is used, then
	any bogus packets injected by an attacker will be rejected by the		any bogus packets injected by an attacker will be rejected by the
	TCP-AO integrity check and therefore will never reach the TLS layer.		TCP-AO integrity check and therefore will never reach the TLS layer.
			Rate-limiting DOTS requests, including those with new 'cuid' values,
			from the same DOTS client defends against DoS attacks that would
			result in varying the 'cuid' to exhaust DOTS server resources. Rate-
			limit policies SHOULD be enforced on DOTS gateways (if deployed) and
			DOTS servers.
	In order to prevent leaking internal information outside a client-		In order to prevent leaking internal information outside a client-
	domain, DOTS gateways located in the client-domain SHOULD NOT reveal		domain, DOTS gateways located in the client-domain SHOULD NOT reveal
	the identification information that pertains to internal DOTS clients		the identification information that pertains to internal DOTS clients
	(e.g., source IP address, client's hostname) unless explicitly		(e.g., source IP address, client's hostname) unless explicitly
	configured to do so.		configured to do so.
	Special care should be taken in order to ensure that the activation		Special care should be taken in order to ensure that the activation
	of the proposed mechanism will not impact the stability of the		of the proposed mechanism will not impact the stability of the
	network (including connectivity and services delivered over that		network (including connectivity and services delivered over that
	network).		network).
	12. Contributors		12. Contributors
	The following individuals have contributed to this document:		The following individuals have contributed to this document:
	Mike Geller Cisco Systems, Inc. 3250 Florida 33309 USA Email:		o Mike Geller, Cisco Systems, Inc. 3250 Florida 33309 USA, Email:
	mgeller@cisco.com		mgeller@cisco.com
	Robert Moskowitz HTT Consulting Oak Park, MI 42837 United States		o Robert Moskowitz, HTT Consulting Oak Park, MI 42837 United States,
	Email: rgm@htt-consult.com		Email: rgm@htt-consult.com
	Dan Wing Email: dwing-ietf@fuggles.com		o Dan Wing, Email: dwing-ietf@fuggles.com
			o Jon Shallow, NCC Group, Email: jon.shallow@nccgroup.trust
	13. Acknowledgements		13. Acknowledgements
	Thanks to Christian Jacquenet, Roland Dobbins, Roman D. Danyliw,		Thanks to Christian Jacquenet, Roland Dobbins, Roman D. Danyliw,
	Michael Richardson, Ehud Doron, Kaname Nishizuka, Dave Dolson, Liang		Michael Richardson, Ehud Doron, Kaname Nishizuka, Dave Dolson, Liang
	Xia, Gilbert Clark, and Nesredien Suleiman for the discussion and		Xia, Gilbert Clark, and Nesredien Suleiman for the discussion and
	comments.		comments.
	Special thanks to Jon Shallow for the careful reviews and inputs that		Special thanks to Jon Shallow for the careful reviews and inputs that
	enhanced this specification.		enhanced this specification.
	skipping to change at page 86, line 13 ¶		skipping to change at page 81, line 18 ¶
	December 2017.		December 2017.
	[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]		[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]
	Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The		Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
	Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version		Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
	1.3", draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-22 (work in progress),		1.3", draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-22 (work in progress),
	November 2017.		November 2017.
	[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]		[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]
	Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol		Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
	Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-22 (work in progress),		Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23 (work in progress),
	November 2017.		January 2018.
	[proto_numbers]		[proto_numbers]
	"IANA, "Protocol Numbers"", 2011,		"IANA, "Protocol Numbers"", 2011,
	<http://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers>.		<http://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers>.
	[RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,		[RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC0791, September 1981,		DOI 10.17487/RFC0791, September 1981,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc791>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc791>.
			[RFC1983] Malkin, G., Ed., "Internet Users' Glossary", FYI 18,
			RFC 1983, DOI 10.17487/RFC1983, August 1996,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1983>.
	[RFC3022] Srisuresh, P. and K. Egevang, "Traditional IP Network		[RFC3022] Srisuresh, P. and K. Egevang, "Traditional IP Network
	Address Translator (Traditional NAT)", RFC 3022,		Address Translator (Traditional NAT)", RFC 3022,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC3022, January 2001,		DOI 10.17487/RFC3022, January 2001,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3022>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3022>.
	[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform		[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
	Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,		Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
	RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,		RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
	[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
	"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
	[RFC4340] Kohler, E., Handley, M., and S. Floyd, "Datagram		[RFC4340] Kohler, E., Handley, M., and S. Floyd, "Datagram
	Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)", RFC 4340,		Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)", RFC 4340,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC4340, March 2006,		DOI 10.17487/RFC4340, March 2006,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4340>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4340>.
	[RFC4632] Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing		[RFC4632] Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing
	(CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation		(CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation
	Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, DOI 10.17487/RFC4632, August		Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, DOI 10.17487/RFC4632, August
	2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4632>.		2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4632>.
	[RFC4732] Handley, M., Ed., Rescorla, E., Ed., and IAB, "Internet		[RFC4732] Handley, M., Ed., Rescorla, E., Ed., and IAB, "Internet
	Denial-of-Service Considerations", RFC 4732,		Denial-of-Service Considerations", RFC 4732,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC4732, December 2006,		DOI 10.17487/RFC4732, December 2006,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4732>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4732>.
	[RFC4787] Audet, F., Ed. and C. Jennings, "Network Address		[RFC4787] Audet, F., Ed. and C. Jennings, "Network Address
	Translation (NAT) Behavioral Requirements for Unicast		Translation (NAT) Behavioral Requirements for Unicast
	UDP", BCP 127, RFC 4787, DOI 10.17487/RFC4787, January		UDP", BCP 127, RFC 4787, DOI 10.17487/RFC4787, January
	2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4787>.		2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4787>.
	[RFC4941] Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy
	Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in
	IPv6", RFC 4941, DOI 10.17487/RFC4941, September 2007,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4941>.
	[RFC4960] Stewart, R., Ed., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol",		[RFC4960] Stewart, R., Ed., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol",
	RFC 4960, DOI 10.17487/RFC4960, September 2007,		RFC 4960, DOI 10.17487/RFC4960, September 2007,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4960>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4960>.
	[RFC4987] Eddy, W., "TCP SYN Flooding Attacks and Common		[RFC4987] Eddy, W., "TCP SYN Flooding Attacks and Common
	Mitigations", RFC 4987, DOI 10.17487/RFC4987, August 2007,		Mitigations", RFC 4987, DOI 10.17487/RFC4987, August 2007,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4987>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4987>.
	[RFC5077] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,		[RFC5077] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
	"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without		"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without
	skipping to change at page 87, line 42 ¶		skipping to change at page 82, line 42 ¶
	[RFC6146] Bagnulo, M., Matthews, P., and I. van Beijnum, "Stateful		[RFC6146] Bagnulo, M., Matthews, P., and I. van Beijnum, "Stateful
	NAT64: Network Address and Protocol Translation from IPv6		NAT64: Network Address and Protocol Translation from IPv6
	Clients to IPv4 Servers", RFC 6146, DOI 10.17487/RFC6146,		Clients to IPv4 Servers", RFC 6146, DOI 10.17487/RFC6146,
	April 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6146>.		April 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6146>.
	[RFC6296] Wasserman, M. and F. Baker, "IPv6-to-IPv6 Network Prefix		[RFC6296] Wasserman, M. and F. Baker, "IPv6-to-IPv6 Network Prefix
	Translation", RFC 6296, DOI 10.17487/RFC6296, June 2011,		Translation", RFC 6296, DOI 10.17487/RFC6296, June 2011,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6296>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6296>.
	[RFC6555] Wing, D. and A. Yourtchenko, "Happy Eyeballs: Success with
	Dual-Stack Hosts", RFC 6555, DOI 10.17487/RFC6555, April
	2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6555>.
	[RFC6724] Thaler, D., Ed., Draves, R., Matsumoto, A., and T. Chown,		[RFC6724] Thaler, D., Ed., Draves, R., Matsumoto, A., and T. Chown,
	"Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol Version 6		"Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol Version 6
	(IPv6)", RFC 6724, DOI 10.17487/RFC6724, September 2012,		(IPv6)", RFC 6724, DOI 10.17487/RFC6724, September 2012,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6724>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6724>.
	[RFC6887] Wing, D., Ed., Cheshire, S., Boucadair, M., Penno, R., and		[RFC6887] Wing, D., Ed., Cheshire, S., Boucadair, M., Penno, R., and
	P. Selkirk, "Port Control Protocol (PCP)", RFC 6887,		P. Selkirk, "Port Control Protocol (PCP)", RFC 6887,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC6887, April 2013,		DOI 10.17487/RFC6887, April 2013,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6887>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6887>.
	[RFC6888] Perreault, S., Ed., Yamagata, I., Miyakawa, S., Nakagawa,		[RFC6888] Perreault, S., Ed., Yamagata, I., Miyakawa, S., Nakagawa,
	A., and H. Ashida, "Common Requirements for Carrier-Grade		A., and H. Ashida, "Common Requirements for Carrier-Grade
	NATs (CGNs)", BCP 127, RFC 6888, DOI 10.17487/RFC6888,		NATs (CGNs)", BCP 127, RFC 6888, DOI 10.17487/RFC6888,
	April 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6888>.		April 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6888>.
	[RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
	"Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.
	[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object		[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
	Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,		Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
	October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.		October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.
	[RFC7413] Cheng, Y., Chu, J., Radhakrishnan, S., and A. Jain, "TCP		[RFC7413] Cheng, Y., Chu, J., Radhakrishnan, S., and A. Jain, "TCP
	Fast Open", RFC 7413, DOI 10.17487/RFC7413, December 2014,		Fast Open", RFC 7413, DOI 10.17487/RFC7413, December 2014,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7413>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7413>.
	[RFC7452] Tschofenig, H., Arkko, J., Thaler, D., and D. McPherson,		[RFC7452] Tschofenig, H., Arkko, J., Thaler, D., and D. McPherson,
	"Architectural Considerations in Smart Object Networking",		"Architectural Considerations in Smart Object Networking",
	skipping to change at page 89, line 13 ¶		skipping to change at page 84, line 5 ¶
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>.
	[RFC7951] Lhotka, L., "JSON Encoding of Data Modeled with YANG",		[RFC7951] Lhotka, L., "JSON Encoding of Data Modeled with YANG",
	RFC 7951, DOI 10.17487/RFC7951, August 2016,		RFC 7951, DOI 10.17487/RFC7951, August 2016,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7951>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7951>.
	[RFC8085] Eggert, L., Fairhurst, G., and G. Shepherd, "UDP Usage		[RFC8085] Eggert, L., Fairhurst, G., and G. Shepherd, "UDP Usage
	Guidelines", BCP 145, RFC 8085, DOI 10.17487/RFC8085,		Guidelines", BCP 145, RFC 8085, DOI 10.17487/RFC8085,
	March 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8085>.		March 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8085>.
			[RFC8305] Schinazi, D. and T. Pauly, "Happy Eyeballs Version 2:
			Better Connectivity Using Concurrency", RFC 8305,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC8305, December 2017,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8305>.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Tirumaleswar Reddy (editor)		Tirumaleswar Reddy (editor)
	McAfee, Inc.		McAfee, Inc.
	Embassy Golf Link Business Park		Embassy Golf Link Business Park
	Bangalore, Karnataka 560071		Bangalore, Karnataka 560071
	India		India
	Email: kondtir@gmail.com		Email: kondtir@gmail.com
End of changes. 320 change blocks.
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