< draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-13.txt   draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-14.txt >
DOTS M. Boucadair, Ed. DOTS M. Boucadair, Ed.
Internet-Draft Orange Internet-Draft Orange
Intended status: Standards Track T. Reddy, Ed. Intended status: Standards Track T. Reddy, Ed.
Expires: April 11, 2021 McAfee Expires: May 19, 2021 McAfee
E. Doron E. Doron
Radware Ltd. Radware Ltd.
M. Chen M. Chen
CMCC CMCC
J. Shallow J. Shallow
October 8, 2020 November 15, 2020
Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry
draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-13 draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-14
Abstract Abstract
This document aims to enrich DOTS signal channel protocol with This document aims to enrich DOTS signal channel protocol with
various telemetry attributes allowing optimal Distributed Denial-of- various telemetry attributes allowing optimal Distributed Denial-of-
Service attack mitigation. It specifies the normal traffic baseline Service attack mitigation. It specifies the normal traffic baseline
and attack traffic telemetry attributes a DOTS client can convey to and attack traffic telemetry attributes a DOTS client can convey to
its DOTS server in the mitigation request, the mitigation status its DOTS server in the mitigation request, the mitigation status
telemetry attributes a DOTS server can communicate to a DOTS client, telemetry attributes a DOTS server can communicate to a DOTS client,
and the mitigation efficacy telemetry attributes a DOTS client can and the mitigation efficacy telemetry attributes a DOTS client can
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 11, 2021. This Internet-Draft will expire on May 19, 2021.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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learned during active attacks because attack conditions do not learned during active attacks because attack conditions do not
characterize the protected entities' normal behavior. characterize the protected entities' normal behavior.
If the DOTS client has calculated the normal baseline of its If the DOTS client has calculated the normal baseline of its
protected entities, signaling such information to the DOTS server protected entities, signaling such information to the DOTS server
along with the attack traffic levels is significantly valuable. The along with the attack traffic levels is significantly valuable. The
DOTS server benefits from this telemetry by tuning its mitigation DOTS server benefits from this telemetry by tuning its mitigation
resources with the DOTS client's normal baseline. The DOTS server resources with the DOTS client's normal baseline. The DOTS server
mitigators use the baseline to familiarize themselves with the attack mitigators use the baseline to familiarize themselves with the attack
victim's normal behavior and target the baseline as the level of victim's normal behavior and target the baseline as the level of
normality they need to achieve. Fed with this inforamtion, the normality they need to achieve. Fed with this information, the
overall mitigation performances is expected to be improved in terms overall mitigation performances is expected to be improved in terms
of time to mitigate, accuracy, false-negative, and false-positive. of time to mitigate, accuracy, false-negative, and false-positive.
Mitigation of attacks without having certain knowledge of normal Mitigation of attacks without having certain knowledge of normal
traffic can be inaccurate at best. This is especially true for traffic can be inaccurate at best. This is especially true for
recursive signaling (see Section 3.2.3 in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases]). recursive signaling (see Section 3.2.3 in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases]).
In addition, the highly diverse types of use cases where DOTS clients In addition, the highly diverse types of use cases where DOTS clients
are integrated also emphasize the need for knowledge of each DOTS are integrated also emphasize the need for knowledge of each DOTS
client domain behavior. Consequently, common global thresholds for client domain behavior. Consequently, common global thresholds for
attack detection practically cannot be realized. Each DOTS client attack detection practically cannot be realized. Each DOTS client
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[I-D.ietf-dots-rfc8782-bis] to control the size of a response when [I-D.ietf-dots-rfc8782-bis] to control the size of a response when
the data to be returned does not fit within a single datagram. the data to be returned does not fit within a single datagram.
DOTS clients can also use CoAP Block1 Option in a PUT request (see DOTS clients can also use CoAP Block1 Option in a PUT request (see
Section 2.5 of [RFC7959]) to initiate large transfers, but these Section 2.5 of [RFC7959]) to initiate large transfers, but these
Block1 transfers will fail if the inbound "pipe" is running full, so Block1 transfers will fail if the inbound "pipe" is running full, so
consideration needs to be made to try to fit this PUT into a single consideration needs to be made to try to fit this PUT into a single
transfer, or to separate out the PUT into several discrete PUTs where transfer, or to separate out the PUT into several discrete PUTs where
each of them fits into a single packet. each of them fits into a single packet.
Quick-Block1 and Quick-Block2 Options that are similar to the CoAP Q-Block1 and Q-Block2 Options that are similar to the CoAP Block1 and
Block1 and Block2 Options, but enable faster transmissions of big Block2 Options, but enable faster transmissions of big blocks of data
blocks of data with less packet interchanges, are defined in with less packet interchanges, are defined in
[I-D.ietf-core-new-block]. DOTS implementations can consider the use [I-D.ietf-core-new-block]. DOTS implementations can consider the use
of Quick-Block1 and Quick-Block2 Options. of Q-Block1 and Q-Block2 Options.
4.4. DOTS Multi-homing Considerations 4.4. DOTS Multi-homing Considerations
Multi-homed DOTS clients are assumed to follow the recommendations in Multi-homed DOTS clients are assumed to follow the recommendations in
[I-D.ietf-dots-multihoming] to select which DOTS server to contact [I-D.ietf-dots-multihoming] to select which DOTS server to contact
and which IP prefixes to include in a telemetry message to a given and which IP prefixes to include in a telemetry message to a given
peer DOTS server. For example, if each upstream network exposes a peer DOTS server. For example, if each upstream network exposes a
DOTS server and the DOTS client maintains DOTS channels with all of DOTS server and the DOTS client maintains DOTS channels with all of
them, only the information related to prefixes assigned by an them, only the information related to prefixes assigned by an
upstream network to the DOTS client domain will be signaled via the upstream network to the DOTS client domain will be signaled via the
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vendor identifier that is different to the one it uses to transmit vendor identifier that is different to the one it uses to transmit
telemetry data. Furthermore, it is possible that the DOTS client and telemetry data. Furthermore, it is possible that the DOTS client and
DOTS server are provided by the same vendor, but the vendor mapping DOTS server are provided by the same vendor, but the vendor mapping
tables are at different revisions. The DOTS client SHOULD transmit tables are at different revisions. The DOTS client SHOULD transmit
telemetry information using the vendor mapping(s) that it provided to telemetry information using the vendor mapping(s) that it provided to
the DOTS server and the DOTS server SHOULD use the vendor mappings(s) the DOTS server and the DOTS server SHOULD use the vendor mappings(s)
provided to the DOTS client when transmitting telemetry data to peer provided to the DOTS client when transmitting telemetry data to peer
DOTS agent. DOTS agent.
The "ietf-dots-mapping" YANG module defined in Section 10.2 augments The "ietf-dots-mapping" YANG module defined in Section 10.2 augments
the "ietf-dots-data-channel" [RFC8783]. The tree structure of this the "ietf-dots-data-channel" [RFC8783]. The tree structure of the
module is shown in Figure 30. "ietf-dots-mapping" module is shown in Figure 30.
module: ietf-dots-mapping module: ietf-dots-mapping
augment /data-channel:dots-data/data-channel:dots-client: augment /data-channel:dots-data/data-channel:dots-client:
+--rw vendor-mapping {dots-telemetry}? +--rw vendor-mapping {dots-telemetry}?
+--rw vendor* [vendor-id] +--rw vendor* [vendor-id]
+--rw vendor-id uint32 +--rw vendor-id uint32
+--rw vendor-name? string +--rw vendor-name? string
+--rw last-updated uint64 +--rw last-updated uint64
+--rw attack-mapping* [attack-id] +--rw attack-mapping* [attack-id]
+--rw attack-id uint32 +--rw attack-id uint32
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| telemetry-setup | container |TBA80 | 5 map | Object | | telemetry-setup | container |TBA80 | 5 map | Object |
| ietf-dots-telemetry: | | | | | | ietf-dots-telemetry: | | | | |
| total-traffic | list |TBA81 | 4 array | Array | | total-traffic | list |TBA81 | 4 array | Array |
| ietf-dots-telemetry: | | | | | | ietf-dots-telemetry: | | | | |
| total-attack-traffic | list |TBA82 | 4 array | Array | | total-attack-traffic | list |TBA82 | 4 array | Array |
| ietf-dots-telemetry: | | | | | | ietf-dots-telemetry: | | | | |
| total-attack- | | | | | | total-attack- | | | | |
| connection | container |TBA83 | 5 map | Object | | connection | container |TBA83 | 5 map | Object |
| ietf-dots-telemetry: | | | | | | ietf-dots-telemetry: | | | | |
| attack-detail | list |TBA84 | 4 array | Array | | attack-detail | list |TBA84 | 4 array | Array |
| ietf-dots-telemetry: | | | | |
| telemetry | container |TBA85 | 5 map | Object |
+----------------------+-------------+------+---------------+--------+ +----------------------+-------------+------+---------------+--------+
12. IANA Considerations 12. IANA Considerations
12.1. DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Key Values 12.1. DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Key Values
This specification registers the DOTS telemetry attributes in the This specification registers the DOTS telemetry attributes in the
IANA "DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Key Values" registry [Key-Map]. IANA "DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Key Values" registry [Key-Map].
The DOTS telemetry attributes defined in this specification are The DOTS telemetry attributes defined in this specification are
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| telemetry-setup | | | | | | telemetry-setup | | | | |
| ietf-dots-telemetry: | TBA81 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | ietf-dots-telemetry: | TBA81 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
| total-traffic | | | | | | total-traffic | | | | |
| ietf-dots-telemetry: | TBA82 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | ietf-dots-telemetry: | TBA82 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
| total-attack-traffic | | | | | | total-attack-traffic | | | | |
| ietf-dots-telemetry: | TBA83 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | ietf-dots-telemetry: | TBA83 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
| total-attack- | | | | | | total-attack- | | | | |
| connection | | | | | | connection | | | | |
| ietf-dots-telemetry: | TBA84 | 4 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] | | ietf-dots-telemetry: | TBA84 | 4 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
| attack-detail | | | | | | attack-detail | | | | |
| ietf-dots-telemetry: | TBA85 | 5 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
| telemetry | | | | |
+----------------------+-------+-------+------------+---------------+ +----------------------+-------+-------+------------+---------------+
12.2. DOTS Signal Channel Conflict Cause Codes 12.2. DOTS Signal Channel Conflict Cause Codes
This specification requests IANA to assign a new code from the "DOTS This specification requests IANA to assign a new code from the "DOTS
Signal Channel Conflict Cause Codes" registry [Cause]. Signal Channel Conflict Cause Codes" registry [Cause].
+------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+ +------+-------------------+------------------------+-------------+
| Code | Label | Description | Reference | | Code | Label | Description | Reference |
+======+===================+========================+=============+ +======+===================+========================+=============+
skipping to change at page 105, line 38 skipping to change at page 105, line 46
[I-D.doron-dots-telemetry] [I-D.doron-dots-telemetry]
Doron, E., Reddy, T., Andreasen, F., Xia, L., and K. Doron, E., Reddy, T., Andreasen, F., Xia, L., and K.
Nishizuka, "Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Nishizuka, "Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry Specifications", draft-doron- Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry Specifications", draft-doron-
dots-telemetry-00 (work in progress), October 2016. dots-telemetry-00 (work in progress), October 2016.
[I-D.ietf-core-new-block] [I-D.ietf-core-new-block]
Boucadair, M. and J. Shallow, "Constrained Application Boucadair, M. and J. Shallow, "Constrained Application
Protocol (CoAP) Block-Wise Transfer Options for Faster Protocol (CoAP) Block-Wise Transfer Options for Faster
Transmission", draft-ietf-core-new-block-01 (work in Transmission", draft-ietf-core-new-block-02 (work in
progress), September 2020. progress), October 2020.
[I-D.ietf-dots-multihoming] [I-D.ietf-dots-multihoming]
Boucadair, M., Reddy.K, T., and W. Pan, "Multi-homing Boucadair, M., Reddy.K, T., and W. Pan, "Multi-homing
Deployment Considerations for Distributed-Denial-of- Deployment Considerations for Distributed-Denial-of-
Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS)", draft-ietf-dots- Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS)", draft-ietf-dots-
multihoming-04 (work in progress), May 2020. multihoming-04 (work in progress), May 2020.
[I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases] [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases]
Dobbins, R., Migault, D., Moskowitz, R., Teague, N., Xia, Dobbins, R., Migault, D., Moskowitz, R., Teague, N., Xia,
L., and K. Nishizuka, "Use cases for DDoS Open Threat L., and K. Nishizuka, "Use cases for DDoS Open Threat
 End of changes. 11 change blocks. 
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