< draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-20.txt   draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-21.txt >
DOTS R. Dobbins DOTS R. Dobbins
Internet-Draft Arbor Networks Internet-Draft Arbor Networks
Intended status: Informational D. Migault Intended status: Informational D. Migault
Expires: March 8, 2020 Ericsson Expires: November 16, 2020 Ericsson
R. Moskowitz R. Moskowitz
HTT Consulting HTT Consulting
N. Teague N. Teague
Iron Mountain Data Centers Iron Mountain Data Centers
L. Xia L. Xia
Huawei Huawei
K. Nishizuka K. Nishizuka
NTT Communications NTT Communications
September 05, 2019 May 15, 2020
Use cases for DDoS Open Threat Signaling Use cases for DDoS Open Threat Signaling
draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-20 draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-21
Abstract Abstract
The DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) effort is intended to provide The DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) effort is intended to provide
protocols to facilitate interoperability across disparate DDoS protocols to facilitate interoperability across disparate DDoS
mitigation solutions. This document presents sample use cases which mitigation solutions. This document presents sample use cases which
describe the interactions expected between the DOTS components as describe the interactions expected between the DOTS components as
well as DOTS messaging exchanges. These use cases are meant to well as DOTS messaging exchanges. These use cases are meant to
identify the interacting DOTS components, how they collaborate, and identify the interacting DOTS components, how they collaborate, and
what are the typical information to be exchanged. what are the typical information to be exchanged.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on March 8, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on November 16, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
skipping to change at page 2, line 29 skipping to change at page 2, line 29
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Upstream DDoS Mitigation by an Upstream Internet Transit 3.1. Upstream DDoS Mitigation by an Upstream Internet Transit
Provider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Provider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. DDoS Mitigation by a Third Party DDoS Mitigation Service 3.2. DDoS Mitigation by a Third Party DDoS Mitigation Service
Provider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Provider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. DDoS Orchestration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.3. DDoS Orchestration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
At the time of writing, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack At the time of writing, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack
mitigation solutions are largely based upon siloed, proprietary mitigation solutions are largely based upon siloed, proprietary
communications schemes with vendor lock-in as a side-effect. This communications schemes with vendor lock-in as a side-effect. This
can result in the configuration, provisioning, operation, and can result in the configuration, provisioning, operation, and
activation of these solutions being a highly manual and often time- activation of these solutions being a highly manual and often time-
consuming process. Additionally, coordinating multiple DDoS consuming process. Additionally, coordinating multiple DDoS
mitigation solutions simultaneously is fraught with both technical mitigation solutions simultaneously is fraught with both technical
and process-related hurdles. This greatly increases operational and process-related hurdles. This greatly increases operational
complexity which, in turn, can degrade the efficacy of mitigations. complexity which, in turn, can degrade the efficacy of mitigations.
The DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) effort is intended to specify The DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) effort is intended to specify
protocols that facilitate interoperability between diverse DDoS protocols that facilitate interoperability between diverse DDoS
mitigation solutions and ensure greater integration in term of attack mitigation solutions and ensure greater integration in term of attack
detection, mitigation requests, and attack characterization patterns. detection, mitigation requests, and attack characterization patterns.
As DDoS solutions are broadly heterogeneous among vendors, the As DDoS solutions are broadly heterogeneous among vendors, the
primary goal of DOTS is to provide high-level interaction amongst primary goal of DOTS is to provide high-level interaction amongst
differing DDoS solutions, such as detecting, initiating, terminating differing DDoS solutions, such as detecting, initiating/terminating
DDoS mitigation assistance or requesting the status of a DDoS DDoS mitigation assistance or requesting the status of a DDoS
mitigation. mitigation.
This document provides sample use cases to provide inputs for the This document provides sample use cases that provided input for the
design of the DOTS protocols. The use cases are not exhaustive and design of the DOTS protocols. The use cases are not exhaustive and
future use cases are expected to emerge as DOTS is adopted and future use cases are expected to emerge as DOTS is adopted and
evolves. evolves.
2. Terminology and Acronyms 2. Terminology and Acronyms
This document makes use of the same terminology and definitions as This document makes use of the same terminology and definitions as
[RFC8612]. In addition it uses the terms defined below: [RFC8612]. In addition it uses the terms defined below:
o DDoS Mitigation Service Provider: designates the administrative o DDoS Mitigation Service Provider: designates the administrative
entity providing the DDoS Mitigation Service. entity providing the DDoS Mitigation Service.
o DDoS Mitigation System (DMS): A system that performs DDoS o DDoS Mitigation System (DMS): A system that performs DDoS
mitigation. The DDoS Mitigation System may be composed by a mitigation. The DDoS Mitigation System may be composed by a
cluster of hardware and/or software resources, but could also cluster of hardware and/or software resources, but could also
involve an orchestrator that may take decisions such as involve an orchestrator that may take decisions such as
outsourcing partial or more of the mitigation to another DDoS outsourcing some or all of the mitigation to another DDoS
Mitigation System. Mitigation System.
o DDoS Mitigation: The action performed by the DDoS Mitigation o DDoS Mitigation: The action performed by the DDoS Mitigation
System. System.
o DDoS Mitigation Service: designates a service provided to a o DDoS Mitigation Service: designates a service provided to a
customer to mitigate DDoS attacks. Service subscriptions usually customer to mitigate DDoS attacks. Service subscriptions usually
involve Service Level Agreement (SLA) that have to be met. It is involve Service Level Agreement (SLA) that have to be met. It is
the responsibility of the DDoS Service provider to instantiate the the responsibility of the DDoS Service provider to instantiate the
DDoS Mitigation System to meet these SLAs. DDoS Mitigation System to meet these SLAs.
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3. Use Cases 3. Use Cases
3.1. Upstream DDoS Mitigation by an Upstream Internet Transit Provider 3.1. Upstream DDoS Mitigation by an Upstream Internet Transit Provider
This use case describes how an enterprise or a residential customer This use case describes how an enterprise or a residential customer
network may take advantage of a pre-existing relation with its network may take advantage of a pre-existing relation with its
Internet Transit Provider (ITP) in order to mitigate a DDoS attack Internet Transit Provider (ITP) in order to mitigate a DDoS attack
targeting its network. targeting its network.
To improve the clarity of our purpose, the targeted network will be For clarity of discussion, the targeted network is indicated as an
designated as enterprise network, but the same scenario applies to enterprise network, but the same scenario applies to any downstream
any downstream network, including residential network and cloud network, including residential and cloud hosting networks.
hosting network.
As the ITP provides connectivity to the enterprise network, it is As the ITP provides connectivity to the enterprise network, it is
already on the path of the inbound and outbound traffic of the already on the path of the inbound and outbound traffic of the
enterprise network and well aware of the networking parameters enterprise network and well aware of the networking parameters
associated to the enterprise network WAN connectivity. This eases associated to the enterprise network WAN connectivity. This eases
both the configuration and the instantiation of a DDoS Mitigation both the configuration and the instantiation of a DDoS Mitigation
Service. Service.
This section considers two kind of DDoS Mitigation Service between an This section considers two kind of DDoS Mitigation Service between an
enterprise network and an ITP: enterprise network and an ITP:
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typically corresponds to the case when the enterprise network is typically corresponds to the case when the enterprise network is
under attack. under attack.
o On the other hand, the ITP may identify an enterprise network as o On the other hand, the ITP may identify an enterprise network as
the source of an attack and send a mitigation request to the the source of an attack and send a mitigation request to the
enterprise DMS to mitigate this at the source. enterprise DMS to mitigate this at the source.
The two scenarios, thought different, have similar interactions The two scenarios, thought different, have similar interactions
between the DOTS client and server. For the sake of simplicity, only between the DOTS client and server. For the sake of simplicity, only
the first scenario will be detailed in this section. Nevertheless, the first scenario will be detailed in this section. Nevertheless,
the second scenario is also in scope of DOTS. the second scenario is also in scope for DOTS.
In the first scenario, as depicted in Figure 1, an enterprise network In the first scenario, as depicted in Figure 1, an enterprise network
with self-hosted Internet-facing properties such as Web servers, with self-hosted Internet-facing properties such as Web servers,
authoritative DNS servers, and VoIP servers has a DMS deployed to authoritative DNS servers, and VoIP servers has a DMS deployed to
protect those servers and applications from DDoS attacks. In protect those servers and applications from DDoS attacks. In
addition to on-premise DDoS defense capability, the enterprise has addition to on-premise DDoS defense capability, the enterprise has
contracted with its ITP for DDoS Mitigation Services which threaten contracted with its ITP for DDoS Mitigation Services when attacks
to overwhelm their WAN link(s) bandwidth. threaten to overwhelm the bandwidth of their WAN link(s).
+------------------+ +------------------+ +------------------+ +------------------+
| Enterprise | | Upstream | | Enterprise | | Upstream |
| Network | | Internet Transit | | Network | | Internet Transit |
| | | Provider | | | | Provider |
| +--------+ | | DDoS Attack | +--------+ | | DDoS Attack
| | DDoS | | <================================= | | DDoS | | <=================================
| | Target | | <================================= | | Target | | <=================================
| +--------+ | | +------------+ | | +--------+ | | +------------+ |
| | +-------->| DDoS | | | | +-------->| DDoS | |
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* C is for DOTS client functionality * C is for DOTS client functionality
* S is for DOTS server functionality * S is for DOTS server functionality
Figure 1: Upstream Internet Transit Provider DDoS Mitigation Figure 1: Upstream Internet Transit Provider DDoS Mitigation
The enterprise DMS is configured such that if the incoming Internet The enterprise DMS is configured such that if the incoming Internet
traffic volume exceeds 50% of the provisioned upstream Internet WAN traffic volume exceeds 50% of the provisioned upstream Internet WAN
link capacity, the DMS will request DDoS mitigation assistance from link capacity, the DMS will request DDoS mitigation assistance from
the upstream transit provider. More sophisticated detection means the upstream transit provider. More sophisticated detection means
may be considered. may be considered as well.
The requests to trigger, manage, and finalize a DDoS Mitigation The requests to trigger, manage, and finalize a DDoS Mitigation
between the enterprise DMS and the ITP is performed using DOTS. The between the enterprise DMS and the ITP is performed using DOTS. The
enterprise DMS implements a DOTS client while the ITP implements a enterprise DMS implements a DOTS client while the ITP implements a
DOTS server which is integrated with their DMS in this example. DOTS server which is integrated with their DMS in this example.
When the enterprise DMS locally detects an inbound DDoS attack When the enterprise DMS locally detects an inbound DDoS attack
targeting its resources (e.g., servers, hosts, or applications), it targeting its resources (e.g., servers, hosts, or applications), it
immediately begins a DDoS Mitigation. immediately begins a DDoS Mitigation.
During the course of the attack, the inbound traffic volume to the During the course of the attack, the inbound traffic volume to the
enterprise network exceeds the 50% threshold and the enterprise DMS enterprise network exceeds the 50% threshold and the enterprise DMS
escalates the DDoS mitigation. The enterprise DMS DOTS client escalates the DDoS mitigation. The enterprise DMS DOTS client
signals to the DOTS server on the upstream ITP to initiate DDoS signals to the DOTS server on the upstream ITP to initiate DDoS
Mitigation. The DOTS server replies to the DOTS client that it can Mitigation. The DOTS server replies to the DOTS client that it can
serve this request, and mitigation is initiated on the ITP network by serve this request, and mitigation is initiated on the ITP network by
the ITP DMS. the ITP DMS.
Over the course of the attack, the DOTS server of the ITP Over the course of the attack, the DOTS server of the ITP
periodically informs the DOTS client on the enterprise DMS mitigation periodically informs the DOTS client on the mitigation status,
status, statistics related to DDoS attack traffic mitigation, and statistics related to DDoS attack traffic mitigation, and related
related information. Once the DDoS attack has ended, or decreased to information. Once the DDoS attack has ended, or decreased to the
the certain level that the enterprise DMS can handle by itself, the certain level that the enterprise DMS might handle by itself, the
DOTS server signals the enterprise DMS DOTS client that the attack DOTS server signals the enterprise DMS DOTS client that the attack
has subsided. has subsided.
The DOTS client on the enterprise DMS then requests the ITP to The DOTS client on the enterprise DMS then requests the ITP to
terminate the DDoS Mitigation. The DOTS server on the ITP receives terminate the DDoS Mitigation. The DOTS server on the ITP receives
this request and once the mitigation has ended, confirms the end of this request and once the mitigation has ended, confirms the end of
upstream DDoS Mitigation to the enterprise DMS DOTS client. upstream DDoS Mitigation to the enterprise DMS DOTS client.
The following is an overview of the DOTS communication model for this The following is an overview of the DOTS communication model for this
use-case: use-case:
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o (b) The enterprise DMS detects, classifies, and begins the DDoS o (b) The enterprise DMS detects, classifies, and begins the DDoS
Mitigation. Mitigation.
o (c) The enterprise DMS determines that its capacity and/or o (c) The enterprise DMS determines that its capacity and/or
capability to mitigate the DDoS attack is insufficient, and sends capability to mitigate the DDoS attack is insufficient, and sends
via its DOTS client a DOTS DDoS Mitigation request to one or more via its DOTS client a DOTS DDoS Mitigation request to one or more
DOTS servers residing on the upstream ITP. DOTS servers residing on the upstream ITP.
o (d) The DOTS server which receives the DOTS Mitigation request o (d) The DOTS server which receives the DOTS Mitigation request
determines that it has been configured to honor requests from the determines that it has been configured to honor requests from the
requesting DOTS client, and honors its DDoS Mitigation by requesting DOTS client, and honors the request by orchestrating
orchestrating its DMS. its own DMS.
o (e) While the DDoS Mitigation is active, the DOTS server regularly o (e) While the DDoS Mitigation is active, the DOTS server regularly
transmits DOTS DDoS Mitigation status updates to the DOTS client. transmits DOTS DDoS Mitigation status updates to the DOTS client.
o (f) Informed by the DOTS server status update that the attack has o (f) Informed by the DOTS server status update that the attack has
ended or subsided, the DOTS client transmits a DOTS DDoS ended or subsided, the DOTS client transmits a DOTS DDoS
Mitigation termination request to the DOTS server. Mitigation termination request to the DOTS server.
o (g) The DOTS server terminates DDoS Mitigation, and sends the o (g) The DOTS server terminates DDoS Mitigation, and sends the
notification to the DOTS client. notification to the DOTS client.
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Note also that a DOTS client that sends a DOTS Mitigation request may Note also that a DOTS client that sends a DOTS Mitigation request may
be also triggered by a network admin that manually confirms the be also triggered by a network admin that manually confirms the
request to the upstream ITP, in which case the request may be sent request to the upstream ITP, in which case the request may be sent
from an application such as a web browser or a dedicated mobile from an application such as a web browser or a dedicated mobile
application. application.
Note also that when the enterprise is multihomed and connected to Note also that when the enterprise is multihomed and connected to
multiple upstream ITPs, each ITP is only able to provide a DDoS multiple upstream ITPs, each ITP is only able to provide a DDoS
Mitigation Service for the traffic it transits. As a result, the Mitigation Service for the traffic it transits. As a result, the
enterprise network may require to coordinate the various DDoS enterprise network may be required to coordinate the various DDoS
Mitigation Services associated to each link. More multi-homing Mitigation Services associated to each link. More multi-homing
considerations are discussed in [I-D.ietf-dots-multihoming]. considerations are discussed in [I-D.ietf-dots-multihoming].
3.2. DDoS Mitigation by a Third Party DDoS Mitigation Service Provider 3.2. DDoS Mitigation by a Third Party DDoS Mitigation Service Provider
This use case differs from the previous use case described in This use case differs from the previous use case described in
Section 3.1 in that the DDoS Mitigation Service is not provided by an Section 3.1 in that the DDoS Mitigation Service is not provided by an
upstream ITP. In other words, as represented in Figure 2, the upstream ITP. In other words, as represented in Figure 2, the
traffic is not forwarded through the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider traffic is not forwarded through the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider
by default. In order to steer the traffic to the DDoS Mitigation by default. In order to steer the traffic to the DDoS Mitigation
Service Provider, some network configuration changes are required. Service Provider, some network configuration changes are required.
As such, this use case is likely to match large enterprises or large As such, this use case is likely to apply to large enterprises or
data centers, but not exclusively. large data centers, but as for the other use cases is not exclusively
limited to them.
Another typical scenario for this use case is the relation between Another typical scenario for this use case is for there to be a
DDoS Mitigation Service Providers forming an overlay of DMS. When a relationship between DDoS Mitigation Service Providers, forming an
DDoS Mitigation Service Provider mitigating a DDoS attack reaches it overlay of DMS. When a DDoS Mitigation Service Provider mitigating a
resources capacities, it may chose to delegate the DDoS Mitigation to DDoS attack reaches its resources capacity, it may chose to delegate
another DDoS Mitigation Service Provider. the DDoS Mitigation to another DDoS Mitigation Service Provider.
+------------------+ +------------------+ +------------------+ +------------------+
| Enterprise | | Upstream | | Enterprise | | Upstream |
| Network | | Internet Transit | | Network | | Internet Transit |
| | | Provider | | | | Provider |
| +--------+ | | DDoS Attack | +--------+ | | DDoS Attack
| | DDoS | | <================================= | | DDoS | | <=================================
| | Target | | <================================= | | Target | | <=================================
| +--------+ | | | | +--------+ | | |
| | | | | | | |
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| +------------+ | | +------------+ | | +------------+ | | +------------+ |
+------------------+ +------------------+ +------------------+ +------------------+
* C is for DOTS client functionality * C is for DOTS client functionality
* S is for DOTS server functionality * S is for DOTS server functionality
Figure 2: DDoS Mitigation between an Enterprise Network and Third Figure 2: DDoS Mitigation between an Enterprise Network and Third
Party DDoS Mitigation Service Provider Party DDoS Mitigation Service Provider
In this scenario, an enterprise network has entered into a pre- In this scenario, an enterprise network has entered into a pre-
arranged DDoS mitigation assistance agreement with one or more other arranged DDoS mitigation assistance agreement with one or more third-
DDoS Mitigation Service Providers in order to ensure that sufficient party DDoS Mitigation Service Providers in order to ensure that
DDoS mitigation capacity and/or capabilities may be activated in the sufficient DDoS mitigation capacity and/or capabilities may be
event that a given DDoS attack threatens to overwhelm the ability of activated in the event that a given DDoS attack threatens to
the enterprise's or any other given DMS to mitigate the attack on its overwhelm the ability of the enterprise's or any other given DMS to
own. mitigate the attack on its own.
The pre-arrangement typically includes the agreement on the The pre-arrangement typically includes agreement on the mechanisms
mechanisms used to redirect the traffic to the DDoS Mitigation used to redirect the traffic to the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider,
Service Provider, as well as the mechanism to re-inject the traffic as well as the mechanism to re-inject the traffic back to the
back to the Enterprise Network. Redirection to the DDoS Mitigation Enterprise Network. Redirection to the DDoS Mitigation Service
Service Provider typically involves BGP prefix announcement or DNS Provider typically involves BGP prefix announcement or DNS
redirection, while re-injection of the scrubbed traffic to the redirection, while re-injection of the scrubbed traffic to the
enterprise network may be performed via tunneling mechanisms (e.g., enterprise network may be performed via tunneling mechanisms (e.g.,
GRE). These exact mechanisms used for traffic steering are out of GRE). These exact mechanisms used for traffic steering are out of
scope. scope of DOTS, but will need to be pre-arranged, while in some
contexts such changes could be detected and considered as an attack.
In some cases the communication between the enterprise DOTS client In some cases the communication between the enterprise DOTS client
and the DOTS server of the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider may go and the DOTS server of the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider may go
through the ITP carrying the DDoS attack, which would affect the through the ITP carrying the DDoS attack, which would affect the
communication. On the other hand, the communication between the DOTS communication. On the other hand, the communication between the DOTS
client and DOTS server may take a path that is not undergoing a DDoS client and DOTS server may take a path that is not undergoing a DDoS
attack. attack.
+------------------+ +------------------+ +------------------+ +------------------+
| Enterprise | | Upstream | | Enterprise | | Upstream |
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| | system | | | | system |<======++ | | system | | | | system |<======++
| +------------+ | | +------------+ | | +------------+ | | +------------+ |
+------------------+ +------------------+ +------------------+ +------------------+
* C is for DOTS client functionality * C is for DOTS client functionality
* S is for DOTS server functionality * S is for DOTS server functionality
Figure 3: Redirection to a DDoS Mitigation Service Provider Figure 3: Redirection to a DDoS Mitigation Service Provider
When the enterprise network is under attack or at least is reaching When the enterprise network is under attack or at least is reaching
its capacity or ability to mitigate a given DDoS attack traffic, the its capacity or ability to mitigate a given DDoS attack, the DOTS
DOTS client sends a DOTS request to the DDoS Mitigation Service client sends a DOTS request to the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider
Provider to initiate network traffic diversion - as represented in to initiate network traffic diversion - as represented in Figure 3 -
Figure 3 - and DDoS mitigation activities. Ongoing attack and and DDoS mitigation activities. Ongoing attack and mitigation status
mitigation status messages may be passed between the enterprise messages may be passed between the enterprise network and the DDoS
network and the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider using DOTS. If the Mitigation Service Provider using DOTS. If the DDoS attack has
DDoS attack has stopped or the severity of the attack has subsided, stopped or the severity of the attack has subsided, the DOTS client
the DOTS client can request the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider to can request the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider to terminate the
stop the DDoS Mitigation. DDoS Mitigation.
3.3. DDoS Orchestration 3.3. DDoS Orchestration
In this use case, one or more DDoS telemetry systems or monitoring In this use case, one or more DDoS telemetry systems or monitoring
devices monitor a network - typically an ISP network, an enterprise devices monitor a network - typically an ISP network, an enterprise
network, or a data center. Upon detection of a DDoS attack, these network, or a data center. Upon detection of a DDoS attack, these
DDoS telemetry systems alert an orchestrator in charge of DDoS telemetry systems alert an orchestrator in charge of
coordinating the various DMS's within the domain. The DDoS telemetry coordinating the various DMS's within the domain. The DDoS telemetry
systems may be configured to provide required information, such as a systems may be configured to provide required information, such as a
preliminary analysis of the observation to the orchestrator. preliminary analysis of the observation, to the orchestrator.
The orchestrator analyses the various information it receives from The orchestrator analyses the various information it receives from
DDoS telemetry system, and initiates one or multiple DDoS mitigation DDoS telemetry systems, and initiates one or more DDoS mitigation
strategies. For example, the orchestrator could select the DDoS strategies. For example, the orchestrator could select the DDoS
mitigation system in the enterprise network or one provided by the mitigation system in the enterprise network or one provided by the
ITP. ITP.
DDoS Mitigation System selection and DDoS Mitigation techniques may DDoS Mitigation System selection and DDoS Mitigation techniques may
depends on the type of the DDoS attack. In some case, a manual depend on the type of the DDoS attack. In some case, a manual
confirmation or selection may also be required to choose a proposed confirmation or selection may also be required to choose a proposed
strategy to initiate a DDoS Mitigation. The DDoS Mitigation may strategy to initiate a DDoS Mitigation. The DDoS Mitigation may
consist of multiple steps such as configuring the network, or consist of multiple steps such as configuring the network, or of
updating already instantiated DDoS mitigation functions. Eventually, updating already instantiated DDoS mitigation functions. Eventually,
the coordination of the mitigation may involve external DDoS the coordination of the mitigation may involve external DDoS
mitigation resources such as a transit provider or a Third Party DDoS mitigation resources such as a transit provider or a Third Party DDoS
Mitigation Service Provider. Mitigation Service Provider.
The communication used to trigger a DDoS Mitigation between the DDoS The communication used to trigger a DDoS Mitigation between the DDoS
telemetry and monitoring systems and the orchestrator is performed telemetry and monitoring systems and the orchestrator is performed
using DOTS. The DDoS telemetry system implements a DOTS client while using DOTS. The DDoS telemetry system implements a DOTS client while
the orchestrator implements a DOTS server. the orchestrator implements a DOTS server.
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Figure 4: DDoS Orchestration Figure 4: DDoS Orchestration
The DDoS telemetry systems monitor various network traffic and The DDoS telemetry systems monitor various network traffic and
perform some measurement tasks. perform some measurement tasks.
These systems are configured so that when an event or some These systems are configured so that when an event or some
measurement indicators reach a predefined level their associated DOTS measurement indicators reach a predefined level their associated DOTS
client sends a DOTS mitigation request to the orchestrator DOTS client sends a DOTS mitigation request to the orchestrator DOTS
server. The DOTS mitigation request may be associated with some server. The DOTS mitigation request may be associated with some
optional mitigation hints to let the orchestrator know what has optional mitigation hints to let the orchestrator know what has
triggered the request. triggered the request. In particular, it's possible for something
that locally to one telemetry system looks like an attack is not
actually an attack when seen from the broader scope (e.g., of the
orchestrator)
Upon receipt of the DOTS mitigation request from the DDoS telemetry Upon receipt of the DOTS mitigation request from the DDoS telemetry
system, the orchestrator DOTS server responds with an acknowledgment, system, the orchestrator DOTS server responds with an acknowledgment,
to avoid retransmission of the request for mitigation. The to avoid retransmission of the request for mitigation. The
orchestrator may begin collecting additional fine-grained and orchestrator may begin collecting additional fine-grained and
specific information from various DDoS telemetry systems in order to specific information from various DDoS telemetry systems in order to
correlate the measurements and provide an analysis of the event. correlate the measurements and provide an analysis of the event.
Eventually, the orchestrator may ask for additional information from Eventually, the orchestrator may ask for additional information from
the DDoS telemetry system; however, the collection of this the DDoS telemetry system; however, the collection of this
information is out of scope. information is out of scope of DOTS.
The orchestrator may be configured to start a DDoS Mitigation upon The orchestrator may be configured to start a DDoS Mitigation upon
approval from a network administrator. The analysis from the approval from a network administrator. The analysis from the
orchestrator is reported to the network administrator via a web orchestrator is reported to the network administrator via a web
interface. If the network administrator decides to start the interface. If the network administrator decides to start the
mitigation, the network administrator triggers the DDoS mitigation mitigation, the network administrator triggers the DDoS mitigation
request using the web interface of a DOTS client communicating to the request using the web interface of a DOTS client communicating to the
orchestrator DOTS server. This request is expected to be associated orchestrator DOTS server. This request is expected to be associated
with a context that provides sufficient information to the with a context that provides sufficient information to the
orchestrator DOTS server to infer the DDoS Mitigation to elaborate orchestrator DOTS server to infer the DDoS Mitigation to elaborate
and coordinate. and coordinate.
Upon receiving a request to mitigate a DDoS attack performed over a Upon receiving a request to mitigate a DDoS attack aimed at a target,
target, the orchestrator may evaluate the volumetry of the attack as the orchestrator may evaluate the volume of the attack as well as the
well as the value that the target represents. The orchestrator may value that the target represents. The orchestrator may select the
select the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider based on the attack DDoS Mitigation Service Provider based on the attack severity. It
severity. It may also coordinate the DDoS Mitigation performed by may also coordinate the DDoS Mitigation performed by the DDoS
the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider with some other tasks such as Mitigation Service Provider with some other tasks such as, for
for example, moving the target to another network so new sessions example, moving the target to another network so new sessions will
will not be impacted. The orchestrator requests a DDoS Mitigation to not be impacted. The orchestrator requests a DDoS Mitigation by the
the selected DDoS mitigation systems via its DOTS client, as selected DDoS mitigation systems via its DOTS client, as described in
described in Section 3.1. Section 3.1.
The orchestrator DOTS client is notified that the DDoS Mitigation is The orchestrator DOTS client is notified that the DDoS Mitigation is
effective by the selected DDoS mitigation systems. The orchestrator effective by the selected DDoS mitigation systems. The orchestrator
DOTS servers returns back this information to the network DOTS servers returns this information back to the network
administrator. administrator.
Similarly, when the DDoS attack has stopped, the orchestrator DOTS Similarly, when the DDoS attack has stopped, the orchestrator DOTS
client are being notified and the orchestrator's DOTS servers client is notified and the orchestrator's DOTS servers indicate to
indicate to the DDoS telemetry systems as well as to the network the DDoS telemetry systems as well as to the network administrator
administrator the end of the DDoS Mitigation. the end of the DDoS Mitigation.
In addition to the above DDoS Orchestration, the selected DDoS In addition to the above DDoS Orchestration, the selected DDoS
mitigation system can return back a mitigation request to the mitigation system can return back a mitigation request to the
orchestrator as an offloading. For example, when the DDoS attack orchestrator as an offloading. For example, when the DDoS attack
becomes severe and the DDoS mitigation system's utilization rate becomes severe and the DDoS mitigation system's utilization rate
reaches its maximum capacity, the DDoS mitigation system can send reaches its maximum capacity, the DDoS mitigation system can send
mitigation requests with additional hints such as its blocked traffic mitigation requests with additional hints such as its blocked traffic
information to the orchestrator. Then the orchestrator can take information to the orchestrator. Then the orchestrator can take
further actions like requesting forwarding nodes such as routers to further actions like requesting forwarding nodes such as routers to
filter the traffic. In this case, the DDoS mitigation system filter the traffic. In this case, the DDoS mitigation system
implements a DOTS client while the orchestrator implements a DOTS implements a DOTS client while the orchestrator implements a DOTS
server. Similar to other DOTS use cases, the offloading scenario server. Similar to other DOTS use cases, the offloading scenario
assumes that some validation checks are followed by the DMS, the assumes that some validation checks are followed by the DMS, the
orchestrator, or both (e.g., avoid exhausting the resources of the orchestrator, or both (e.g., avoid exhausting the resources of the
forwarding nodes or disrupting the service). These validation checks forwarding nodes or inadvertent disruption of legitimate services).
are part of the mitigation, and are therefore out of the scope of the These validation checks are part of the mitigation, and are therefore
document. out of the scope of the document.
4. Security Considerations 4. Security Considerations
The document does not describe any protocol. The document does not describe any protocol, though there are still a
few high-level security considerations to discuss.
DOTS is at risk from three primary attacks: DOTS agent impersonation, DOTS is at risk from three primary attacks: DOTS agent impersonation,
traffic injection, and signaling blocking. traffic injection, and signaling blocking.
Impersonation and traffic injection mitigation can be mitigated Impersonation and traffic injection mitigation can be mitigated
through current secure communications best practices. Preconfigured through current secure communications best practices including mutual
mitigation steps to take on the loss of keepalive traffic can authentication. Preconfigured mitigation steps to take on the loss
partially mitigate signal blocking, but in general it is impossible of keepalive traffic can partially mitigate signal blocking, but in
to comprehensively defend against an attacker that can selectively general it is impossible to comprehensively defend against an
block any or all traffic attacker that can selectively block any or all traffic. Alternate
communication paths that are (hopefully) not subject to blocking by
the attacker in question is another potential mitigation.
Additional details of DOTS security requirements can be found in Additional details of DOTS security requirements can be found in
[RFC8612]. [RFC8612].
Service disruption may be experienced if inadequate mitigation Service disruption may be experienced if inadequate mitigation
actions are applied. These considerations are out of the scope of actions are applied. These considerations are out of the scope of
DOTS. DOTS.
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
skipping to change at page 13, line 41 skipping to change at page 13, line 44
The authors would like to thank among others Tirumaleswar Reddy; The authors would like to thank among others Tirumaleswar Reddy;
Andrew Mortensen; Mohamed Boucadair; Artyom Gavrichenkov; Jon Andrew Mortensen; Mohamed Boucadair; Artyom Gavrichenkov; Jon
Shallow, Yuuhei Hayashi, the DOTS WG chairs, Roman Danyliw and Tobias Shallow, Yuuhei Hayashi, the DOTS WG chairs, Roman Danyliw and Tobias
Gondrom as well as the Security AD Benjamin Kaduk for their valuable Gondrom as well as the Security AD Benjamin Kaduk for their valuable
feedback. feedback.
We also would like to thank Stephan Fouant that was part of the We also would like to thank Stephan Fouant that was part of the
initial co-authors of the documents. initial co-authors of the documents.
7. Informative References 7. References
[I-D.ietf-dots-multihoming] 7.1. Normative References
Boucadair, M., K, R., and W. Pan, "Multi-homing Deployment
Considerations for Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open
Threat Signaling (DOTS)", draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-02
(work in progress), July 2019.
[RFC8612] Mortensen, A., Reddy, T., and R. Moskowitz, "DDoS Open [RFC8612] Mortensen, A., Reddy, T., and R. Moskowitz, "DDoS Open
Threat Signaling (DOTS) Requirements", RFC 8612, Threat Signaling (DOTS) Requirements", RFC 8612,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8612, May 2019, DOI 10.17487/RFC8612, May 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8612>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8612>.
7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-dots-multihoming]
Boucadair, M., Reddy.K, T., and W. Pan, "Multi-homing
Deployment Considerations for Distributed-Denial-of-
Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS)", draft-ietf-dots-
multihoming-03 (work in progress), January 2020.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Roland Dobbins Roland Dobbins
Arbor Networks Arbor Networks
Singapore Singapore
EMail: rdobbins@arbor.net EMail: rdobbins@arbor.net
Daniel Migault Daniel Migault
Ericsson Ericsson
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