< draft-ietf-dprive-bcp-op-08.txt		draft-ietf-dprive-bcp-op-09.txt >
	dprive S. Dickinson		dprive S. Dickinson
	Internet-Draft Sinodun IT		Internet-Draft Sinodun IT
	Intended status: Best Current Practice B. Overeinder		Intended status: Best Current Practice B. Overeinder
	Expires: July 27, 2020 R. van Rijswijk-Deij		Expires: November 5, 2020 R. van Rijswijk-Deij
	NLnet Labs		NLnet Labs
	A. Mankin		A. Mankin
	Salesforce		Salesforce
	January 24, 2020		May 4, 2020
	Recommendations for DNS Privacy Service Operators		Recommendations for DNS Privacy Service Operators
	draft-ietf-dprive-bcp-op-08		draft-ietf-dprive-bcp-op-09
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document presents operational, policy, and security		This document presents operational, policy, and security
	considerations for DNS recursive resolver operators who choose to		considerations for DNS recursive resolver operators who choose to
	offer DNS Privacy services. With these recommendations, the operator		offer DNS Privacy services. With these recommendations, the operator
	can make deliberate decisions regarding which services to provide,		can make deliberate decisions regarding which services to provide,
	and how the decisions and alternatives impact the privacy of users.		and how the decisions and alternatives impact the privacy of users.
	This document also presents a framework to assist writers of a DNS		This document also presents a framework to assist writers of a DNS
	skipping to change at page 1, line 43 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 43 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on July 27, 2020.		This Internet-Draft will expire on November 5, 2020.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 7, line 37 ¶		skipping to change at page 7, line 37 ¶
	In this section we consider both data on the wire and the service		In this section we consider both data on the wire and the service
	provided to the client.		provided to the client.
	5.1.1. Transport recommendations		5.1.1. Transport recommendations
	[RFC6973] Threats:		[RFC6973] Threats:
	o Surveillance:		o Surveillance:
	* Passive surveillance of traffic on the wire		* Passive surveillance of traffic on the wire
	[I-D.ietf-dprive-rfc7626-bis] Section 2.4.2.		[I-D.ietf-dprive-rfc7626-bis] Section 5.1
	DNS Privacy Threats:		DNS Privacy Threats:
	o Active injection of spurious data or traffic.		o Active injection of spurious data or traffic.
	Mitigations:		Mitigations:
	A DNS privacy service can mitigate these threats by providing service		A DNS privacy service can mitigate these threats by providing service
	over one or more of the following transports		over one or more of the following transports
	skipping to change at page 8, line 23 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 23 ¶
	Whilst encryption of DNS traffic can protect against active injection		Whilst encryption of DNS traffic can protect against active injection
	this does not diminish the need for DNSSEC, see Section 5.1.4.		this does not diminish the need for DNSSEC, see Section 5.1.4.
	5.1.2. Authentication of DNS privacy services		5.1.2. Authentication of DNS privacy services
	[RFC6973] Threats:		[RFC6973] Threats:
	o Surveillance:		o Surveillance:
	* Active attacks that can redirect traffic to rogue servers		* Active attacks on resolver configuration
	[I-D.ietf-dprive-rfc7626-bis] Section 2.5.3.		[I-D.ietf-dprive-rfc7626-bis] Section 6.1.2
	Mitigations:		Mitigations:
	DNS privacy services should ensure clients can authenticate the		DNS privacy services should ensure clients can authenticate the
	server. Note that this, in effect, commits the DNS privacy service		server. Note that this, in effect, commits the DNS privacy service
	to a public identity users will trust.		to a public identity users will trust.
	When using DNS-over-TLS clients that select a 'Strict Privacy' usage		When using DNS-over-TLS clients that select a 'Strict Privacy' usage
	profile [RFC8310] (to mitigate the threat of active attack on the		profile [RFC8310] (to mitigate the threat of active attack on the
	client) require the ability to authenticate the DNS server. To		client) require the ability to authenticate the DNS server. To
	skipping to change at page 24, line 39 ¶		skipping to change at page 24, line 39 ¶
	Jim Hague		Jim Hague
	Sinodun Internet Technologies		Sinodun Internet Technologies
	Magdalen Centre		Magdalen Centre
	Oxford Science Park		Oxford Science Park
	Oxford OX4 4GA		Oxford OX4 4GA
	United Kingdom		United Kingdom
	11. Changelog		11. Changelog
			draft-ietf-dprive-bcp-op-09
			o Fix references so they match the correct section numbers in draft-
			ietf-dprive-rfc7626-bis-05
	draft-ietf-dprive-bcp-op-08		draft-ietf-dprive-bcp-op-08
	o Address IETF Last call comments.		o Address IETF Last call comments.
	draft-ietf-dprive-bcp-op-07		draft-ietf-dprive-bcp-op-07
	o Editorial changes following AD review.		o Editorial changes following AD review.
	o Change all URIs to Informational References.		o Change all URIs to Informational References.
	draft-ietf-dprive-bcp-op-06
	o Final minor changes from second WGLC.		o Final minor changes from second WGLC.
			draft-ietf-dprive-bcp-op-05
	o Remove some text on consent:		o Remove some text on consent:
	* Paragraph 2 in section 5.3.3		* Paragraph 2 in section 5.3.3
	* Item 6 in the DROP Practice statement (and example)		* Item 6 in the DROP Practice statement (and example)
	o Remove .onion and TLSA options		o Remove .onion and TLSA options
	o Include ACME as a reference for certificate management		o Include ACME as a reference for certificate management
End of changes. 9 change blocks.
	9 lines changed or deleted		14 lines changed or added
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