< draft-ietf-drip-rid-21.txt   draft-ietf-drip-rid-22.txt >
DRIP R. Moskowitz DRIP R. Moskowitz
Internet-Draft HTT Consulting Internet-Draft HTT Consulting
Updates: 7401, 7343 (if approved) S. Card Updates: 7401, 7343 (if approved) S. Card
Intended status: Standards Track A. Wiethuechter Intended status: Standards Track A. Wiethuechter
Expires: 10 October 2022 AX Enterprize, LLC Expires: 15 October 2022 AX Enterprize, LLC
A. Gurtov A. Gurtov
Linköping University Linköping University
8 April 2022 13 April 2022
DRIP Entity Tag (DET) for Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification DRIP Entity Tag (DET) for Unmanned Aircraft System Remote ID (UAS RID)
(UAS RID) draft-ietf-drip-rid-22
draft-ietf-drip-rid-21
Abstract Abstract
This document describes the use of Hierarchical Host Identity Tags This document describes the use of Hierarchical Host Identity Tags
(HHITs) as self-asserting IPv6 addresses and thereby a trustable (HHITs) as self-asserting IPv6 addresses and thereby a trustable
identifier for use as the Unmanned Aircraft System Remote identifier for use as the Unmanned Aircraft System Remote
Identification and tracking (UAS RID). Identification and tracking (UAS RID).
This document updates RFC7401 and RFC7343. This document updates RFC7401 and RFC7343.
Within the context of RID, HHITs will be called DRIP Entity Tags Within the context of RID, HHITs will be called DRIP Entity Tags
(DETs). HHITs self-attest to the included explicit hierarchy that (DETs). HHITs self-attest to the included explicit hierarchy that
provides registry (e.g., DNS, EPP) discovery for 3rd-party identifier provides registry (via, e.g., DNS, EPP) discovery for 3rd-party
attestation. identifier attestation.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 10 October 2022. This Internet-Draft will expire on 15 October 2022.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. HHIT Statistical Uniqueness different from UUID or X.509
Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. Notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.3. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. The Hierarchical Host Identity Tag (HHIT) . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. The Hierarchical Host Identity Tag (HHIT) . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. HHIT Prefix for RID Purposes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1. HHIT Prefix for RID Purposes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. HHIT Suite IDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2. HHIT Suite IDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.1. HDA custom HIT Suite IDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.2.1. HDA custom HIT Suite IDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. The Hierarchy ID (HID) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.3. The Hierarchy ID (HID) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3.1. The Registered Assigning Authority (RAA) . . . . . . 8 3.3.1. The Registered Assigning Authority (RAA) . . . . . . 8
3.3.2. The Hierarchical HIT Domain Authority (HDA) . . . . . 9 3.3.2. The Hierarchical HIT Domain Authority (HDA) . . . . . 9
3.4. Edward Digital Signature Algorithm for HHITs . . . . . . 9 3.4. Edward-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm for HHITs . . . 9
3.4.1. HOST_ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.4.1. HOST_ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.4.2. HIT_SUITE_LIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.4.2. HIT_SUITE_LIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.5. ORCHIDs for Hierarchical HITs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.5. ORCHIDs for Hierarchical HITs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.5.1. Adding Additional Information to the ORCHID . . . . . 12 3.5.1. Adding Additional Information to the ORCHID . . . . . 12
3.5.2. ORCHID Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.5.2. ORCHID Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.5.3. ORCHID Decoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3.5.3. ORCHID Decoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.5.4. Decoding ORCHIDs for HIPv2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3.5.4. Decoding ORCHIDs for HIPv2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4. Hierarchical HITs as Remote ID DRIP Entity Tags (DETs) . . . 15 4. Hierarchical HITs as DRIP Entity Tags . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.1. Nontransferablity of DETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.1. Nontransferablity of DETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2. Encoding HHITs in CTA 2063-A Serial Numbers . . . . . . . 16 4.2. Encoding HHITs in CTA 2063-A Serial Numbers . . . . . . . 16
4.3. Remote ID DET as one Class of Hierarchical HITs . . . . . 17 4.3. Remote ID DET as one Class of Hierarchical HITs . . . . . 17
4.4. Hierarchy in ORCHID Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.4. Hierarchy in ORCHID Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.5. DRIP Entity Tag (DET) Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.5. DRIP Entity Tag (DET) Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.6. Remote ID Authentication using DETs . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.6. Remote ID Authentication using DETs . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5. DRIP Entity Tags (DETs) in DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 5. DRIP Entity Tags (DETs) in DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6. Other UTM Uses of HHITs Beyond DET . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6. Other UTM Uses of HHITs Beyond DET . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7. Summary of Addressed DRIP Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . 20 7. Summary of Addressed DRIP Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8. DET Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 8.1. New Well-Known IPv6 prefix for DETs . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9.1. New IANA DRIP Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 8.2. New IANA DRIP Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
9.2. IANA CGA Registry Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 8.3. IANA CGA Registry Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
9.3. IANA HIP Registry Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 8.4. IANA HIP Registry Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
9.4. IANA IPSECKEY Registry Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 8.5. IANA IPSECKEY Registry Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
9.5. New Well-Known IPv6 prefix for DETs . . . . . . . . . . . 23 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 9.1. DET Trust in ASTM messaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
10.1. DET Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 9.2. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.2. Collision Risks with DETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 9.3. Collision Risks with DETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Appendix A. EU U-Space RID Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . 30 Appendix A. EU U-Space RID Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . 30
Appendix B. The 14/14 HID split . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Appendix B. The 14/14 HID split . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Appendix C. Calculating Collision Probabilities . . . . . . . . 32 Appendix C. Calculating Collision Probabilities . . . . . . . . 32
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
DRIP Requirements [RFC9153] describe an Unmanned Aircraft System DRIP Requirements [RFC9153] describe an Unmanned Aircraft System
Remote Identification and tracking (UAS ID) as unique (ID-4), non- Remote ID (UAS ID) as unique (ID-4), non-spoofable (ID-5), and
spoofable (ID-5), and identify a registry where the ID is listed (ID- identify a registry where the ID is listed (ID-2); all within a
2); all within a 20-character identifier (ID-1). 20-character identifier (ID-1).
This document describes the use of Hierarchical Host Identity Tags This document describes the use of Hierarchical Host Identity Tags
(HHITs) (Section 3) as self-asserting IPv6 addresses and thereby a (HHITs) (Section 3) as self-asserting IPv6 addresses and thereby a
trustable identifier for use as the UAS Remote ID. HHITs include trustable identifier for use as the UAS Remote ID. HHITs include
explicit hierarchy to enable DNS HHIT queries (Host ID for explicit hierarchy to enable DNS HHIT queries (Host ID for
authentication, e.g., [drip-authentication]) and for Extensible authentication, e.g., [drip-authentication]) and for Extensible
Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Registrar discovery [RFC9224] for 3rd- Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Registrar discovery [RFC9224] for 3rd-
party identification attestation (e.g., [drip-authentication]). party identification attestation (e.g., [drip-authentication]).
This addition of hierarchy to HITs is an extension to [RFC7401] and This addition of hierarchy to HITs is an extension to [RFC7401] and
requires an update to [RFC7343]. As this document also adds EdDSA requires an update to [RFC7343]. As this document also adds EdDSA
(Section 3.4) for Host Identities (HIs), a number of HIP parameters (Section 3.4) for Host Identities (HIs), a number of Host Identity
in [RFC7401] are updated, these should not be needed in a DRIP Protocol (HIP) parameters in [RFC7401] are updated, these should not
implementation that does not use HIP. be needed in a DRIP implementation that does not use HIP.
HHITs as used within the context of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) HHITs as used within the context of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)
are labeled as DRIP Entity Tags (DETs). Throughout this document are labeled as DRIP Entity Tags (DETs). Throughout this document
HHIT and DET will be used appropriately. HHIT will be used when HHIT and DET will be used appropriately. HHIT will be used when
covering the technology, and DET for their context within UAS RID. covering the technology, and DET for their context within UAS RID.
Hierarchical HITs provide self-attestation of the HHIT registry. A
HHIT can only be in a single registry within a registry system (e.g.,
EPP and DNS).
Hierarchical HITs are valid, though non-routable, IPv6 addresses
[RFC8200]. As such, they fit in many ways within various IETF
technologies.
1.1. HHIT Statistical Uniqueness different from UUID or X.509 Subject
HHITs are statistically unique through the cryptographic hash feature HHITs are statistically unique through the cryptographic hash feature
of second-preimage resistance. The cryptographically-bound addition of second-preimage resistance. The cryptographically-bound addition
of the hierarchy and a HHIT registration process [drip-registries] of the hierarchy and a HHIT registration process [drip-registries]
provide complete, global HHIT uniqueness. This contrasts with using provide complete, global HHIT uniqueness. This contrasts with using
general identifiers (e.g., a Universally Unique IDentifiers (UUID) general identifiers (e.g., a Universally Unique IDentifiers (UUID)
[RFC4122] or device serial numbers) as the subject in an X.509 [RFC4122] or device serial numbers) as the subject in an X.509
[RFC5280] certificate. [RFC5280] certificate.
In a multi-Certificate Authority (multi-CA) PKI alternative to HHITs, In a multi-Certificate Authority (multi-CA) PKI alternative to HHITs,
a Remote ID as the Subject (Section 4.1.2.6 of [RFC5280]) can occur a Remote ID as the Subject (Section 4.1.2.6 of [RFC5280]) can occur
in multiple CAs, possibly fraudulently. CAs within the PKI would in multiple CAs, possibly fraudulently. CAs within the PKI would
need to implement an approach to enforce assurance of the uniqueness need to implement an approach to enforce assurance of the uniqueness
achieved with HHITs. achieved with HHITs.
Hierarchical HITs provide self-attestation of the HHIT registry. A
HHIT can only be in a single registry within a registry system (e.g.,
EPP and DNS).
Hierarchical HITs are valid, though non-routable, IPv6 addresses
[RFC8200]. As such, they fit in many ways within various IETF
technologies.
2. Terms and Definitions 2. Terms and Definitions
2.1. Requirements Terminology 2.1. Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
skipping to change at page 5, line 5 skipping to change at page 4, line 45
2.3. Definitions 2.3. Definitions
This document uses the terms defined in Section 2.2 of [RFC9153]. This document uses the terms defined in Section 2.2 of [RFC9153].
The following new terms are used in the document: The following new terms are used in the document:
cSHAKE (The customizable SHAKE function [NIST.SP.800-185]): cSHAKE (The customizable SHAKE function [NIST.SP.800-185]):
Extends the SHAKE [NIST.FIPS.202] scheme to allow users to Extends the SHAKE [NIST.FIPS.202] scheme to allow users to
customize their use of the SHAKE function. customize their use of the SHAKE function.
HDA (Hierarchical HIT Domain Authority): HDA (HHIT Domain Authority):
The 14-bit field that identifies the HHIT Domain Authority under a The 14-bit field that identifies the HHIT Domain Authority under a
Registered Assigning Authority (RAA). Registered Assigning Authority (RAA).
HHIT HHIT
Hierarchical Host Identity Tag. A HIT with extra hierarchical Hierarchical Host Identity Tag. A HIT with extra hierarchical
information not found in a standard HIT [RFC7401]. information not found in a standard HIT [RFC7401].
HI HI
Host Identity. The public key portion of an asymmetric key pair Host Identity. The public key portion of an asymmetric key pair
as defined in [RFC9063]. as defined in [RFC9063].
HID (Hierarchy ID): HID (Hierarchy ID):
The 28-bit field providing the HIT Hierarchy ID. The 28-bit field providing the HIT Hierarchy ID.
HIP (Host Identity Protocol) HIP (Host Identity Protocol)
The origin of HI, HIT, and HHIT. The origin [RFC7401] of HI, HIT, and HHIT.
HIT HIT
Host Identity Tag. A 128-bit handle on the HI. HITs are valid Host Identity Tag. A 128-bit handle on the HI. HITs are valid
IPv6 addresses. IPv6 addresses.
Keccak (KECCAK Message Authentication Code): Keccak (KECCAK Message Authentication Code):
The family of all sponge functions with a KECCAK-f permutation as The family of all sponge functions with a KECCAK-f permutation as
the underlying function and multi-rate padding as the padding the underlying function and multi-rate padding as the padding
rule. It refers in particular to all the functions referenced rule. It refers in particular to all the functions referenced
from [NIST.FIPS.202] and [NIST.SP.800-185]. from [NIST.FIPS.202] and [NIST.SP.800-185].
skipping to change at page 6, line 8 skipping to change at page 5, line 47
SHAKE (Secure Hash Algorithm KECCAK [NIST.FIPS.202]): SHAKE (Secure Hash Algorithm KECCAK [NIST.FIPS.202]):
A secure hash that allows for an arbitrary output length. A secure hash that allows for an arbitrary output length.
XOF (eXtendable-Output Function [NIST.FIPS.202]): XOF (eXtendable-Output Function [NIST.FIPS.202]):
A function on bit strings (also called messages) in which the A function on bit strings (also called messages) in which the
output can be extended to any desired length. output can be extended to any desired length.
3. The Hierarchical Host Identity Tag (HHIT) 3. The Hierarchical Host Identity Tag (HHIT)
The Hierarchical HIT (HHIT) is a small but important enhancement over The Hierarchical HIT (HHIT) is a small but important enhancement over
the flat HIT space, constructed as an Overlay Routable Cryptographic the flat Host Identity Tag (HIT) space, constructed as an Overlay
Hash IDentifier (ORCHID) [RFC7343]. By adding two levels of Routable Cryptographic Hash IDentifier (ORCHID) [RFC7343]. By adding
hierarchical administration control, the HHIT provides for device two levels of hierarchical administration control, the HHIT provides
registration/ownership, thereby enhancing the trust framework for for device registration/ownership, thereby enhancing the trust
HITs. framework for HITs.
HHITs represent the HI in only a 64-bit hash, expand the Suite ID to HHITs represent the HI in only a 64-bit hash, expand the Suite ID to
8 bits, and use the other 28 bits to create a hierarchical 8 bits, and use the other 28 bits to create a hierarchical
administration organization for HIT domains. Hierarchical HIT administration organization for HIT domains. Hierarchical HIT
construction is defined in Section 3.5. The input values for the construction is defined in Section 3.5. The input values for the
Encoding rules are described in Section 3.5.1. Encoding rules are described in Section 3.5.1.
A HHIT is built from the following fields (Figure 1): A HHIT is built from the following fields (Figure 1):
* p = an IPV6 prefix (max 28 bit) * p = an IPV6 prefix (max 28 bit)
skipping to change at page 6, line 46 skipping to change at page 6, line 37
14 bits| 14 bits 8 bits 14 bits| 14 bits 8 bits
+-------+-------+ +--------------+ +-------+-------+ +--------------+
| RAA | HDA | |HHIT Suite ID | | RAA | HDA | |HHIT Suite ID |
+-------+-------+ +--------------+ +-------+-------+ +--------------+
\ | ____/ ___________/ \ | ____/ ___________/
\ \ _/ ___/ \ \ _/ ___/
\ \/ / \ \/ /
| p bits | 28 bits |8bits| o=96-p-8 bits | | p bits | 28 bits |8bits| o=96-p-8 bits |
+--------------+------------+-----+------------------------+ +--------------+------------+-----+------------------------+
| IANA Prefix | HID |HHSI | ORCHID hash | | IPV6 Prefix | HID |HHSI | ORCHID hash |
+--------------+------------+-----+------------------------+ +--------------+------------+-----+------------------------+
Figure 1: HHIT Format Figure 1: HHIT Format
The Context ID (generated with openssl rand) for the ORCHID hash is: The Context ID (generated with openssl rand) for the ORCHID hash is:
Context ID := 0x00B5 A69C 795D F5D5 F008 7F56 843F 2C40 Context ID := 0x00B5 A69C 795D F5D5 F008 7F56 843F 2C40
Context IDs are allocated out of the namespace introduced for Context IDs are allocated out of the namespace introduced for
Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) Type Tags [RFC3972]. Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) Type Tags [RFC3972].
A script for generating HHITs based on an early version of this
specification is available at [hhit-gen].
3.1. HHIT Prefix for RID Purposes 3.1. HHIT Prefix for RID Purposes
The IPv6 HHIT prefix MUST be distinct from that used in the flat- The IPv6 HHIT prefix MUST be distinct from that used in the flat-
space HIT as allocated in [RFC7343]. Without this distinct prefix, space HIT as allocated in [RFC7343]. Without this distinct prefix,
the first 4 bits of the RAA would be interpreted as the HIT Suite ID the first 4 bits of the RAA would be interpreted as the HIT Suite ID
per HIPv2 [RFC7401]. per HIPv2 [RFC7401].
Initially, for DET use, one 28-bit prefix should be assigned out of Initially, for DET use, one 28-bit prefix should be assigned out of
the IANA IPv6 Special Purpose Address Block ([RFC6890]). the IANA IPv6 Special Purpose Address Block ([RFC6890]).
HHIT Use Bits Value HHIT Use Bits Value
DET 28 TBD6 (suggested value 2001:30::/28) DET 28 TBD6 (suggested value 2001:30::/28)
Other prefixes may be added in the future either for DET use or other Other prefixes may be added in the future either for DET use or other
applications of HHITs. For a prefix to be added to the registry in applications of HHITs. For a prefix to be added to the registry in
Section 9.1, its usage and HID allocation process have to be publicly Section 8.2, its usage and HID allocation process have to be publicly
available. available.
3.2. HHIT Suite IDs 3.2. HHIT Suite IDs
The HHIT Suite IDs specify the HI and hash algorithms. These are a The HHIT Suite IDs specify the HI and hash algorithms. These are a
superset of the HIT Suite ID as defined in Section 5.2.10 of superset of the HIT Suite ID as defined in Section 5.2.10 of
[RFC7401]. [RFC7401].
The HHIT values of 1 - 15 map to the 4-bit HIT Suite IDs. HHIT The HHIT values of 1 - 15 map to the 4-bit HIT Suite IDs. HHIT
values of 17 - 31 map to the 8-bit HIT Suite IDs. HHIT values unique values of 17 - 31 map to the 8-bit HIT Suite IDs. HHIT values unique
skipping to change at page 8, line 18 skipping to change at page 8, line 5
ECDSA/SHA-384 2 [RFC7401] ECDSA/SHA-384 2 [RFC7401]
ECDSA_LOW/SHA-1 3 [RFC7401] ECDSA_LOW/SHA-1 3 [RFC7401]
EdDSA/cSHAKE128 TBD3 (suggested value 5) (RECOMMENDED) EdDSA/cSHAKE128 TBD3 (suggested value 5) (RECOMMENDED)
RESERVED 16 RESERVED 16
3.2.1. HDA custom HIT Suite IDs 3.2.1. HDA custom HIT Suite IDs
Support for 8-bit HHIT Suite IDs allows for HDA custom HIT Suite IDs. Support for 8-bit HHIT Suite IDs allows for HDA custom HIT Suite IDs.
These will be assigned values greater than 15 as follows: These will be assigned values greater than 15 as follows:
HIT Suite Value HHIT Suite Value
HDA Assigned 1 TBD4 (suggested value 254) HDA Private Use 1 TBD4 (suggested value 254)
HDA Assigned 2 TBD5 (suggested value 255) HDA Private Use 2 TBD5 (suggested value 255)
These custom HIT Suite IDs, for example, may be used for large-scale These custom HIT Suite IDs, for example, may be used for large-scale
experimenting with post quantum computing hashes or similar domain experimenting with post quantum computing hashes or similar domain
specific needs. Note that currently there is no support for domain- specific needs. Note that currently there is no support for domain-
specific HI algorithms. specific HI algorithms.
3.3. The Hierarchy ID (HID) 3.3. The Hierarchy ID (HID)
The Hierarchy ID (HID) provides the structure to organize HITs into The Hierarchy ID (HID) provides the structure to organize HITs into
administrative domains. HIDs are further divided into two fields: administrative domains. HIDs are further divided into two fields:
* 14-bit Registered Assigning Authority (RAA) * 14-bit Registered Assigning Authority (RAA)
* 14-bit Hierarchical HIT Domain Authority (HDA) * 14-bit Hierarchical HIT Domain Authority (HDA)
The rationale for the 14/14 HID split is described in Appendix B. The rationale for the 14/14 HID split is described in Appendix B.
The two levels of hierarchy allows for CAAs to have it least one RAA
for their National Air Space (NAS). Within its RAA(s), the CAAs can
delegate HDAs as needed. There may be other RAAs allowed to operate
within a given NAS; this is a policy decision of each CAA.
3.3.1. The Registered Assigning Authority (RAA) 3.3.1. The Registered Assigning Authority (RAA)
An RAA is a business or organization that manages a registry of HDAs. An RAA is a business or organization that manages a registry of HDAs.
For example, the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) or Japan Civil For example, the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) or Japan Civil
Aviation Bureau (JCAB) could be an RAA. Aviation Bureau (JCAB) could be an RAA.
The RAA is a 14-bit field (16,384 RAAs). The management of this The RAA is a 14-bit field (16,384 RAAs). The management of this
space is further elaborated in [drip-registries]. An RAA must space is further elaborated in [drip-registries]. An RAA must
provide a set of services to allocate HDAs to organizations. It must provide a set of services to allocate HDAs to organizations. It must
have a public policy on what is necessary to obtain an HDA. The RAA have a public policy on what is necessary to obtain an HDA. The RAA
need not maintain any HIP related services. It must maintain a DNS need not maintain any HIP related services. It must maintain a DNS
zone minimally for discovering HID RVS servers. The zone delegation zone minimally for discovering HIP RVS servers for the HID. The zone
is also covered in [drip-registries]. delegation is also covered in [drip-registries].
As HHITs may be used in many different domains, RAA should be As DETs under an administrative control may be used in many different
allocated in blocks with consideration on the likely size of a domains (e.g., commercial, recreation, military), RAAs should be
particular usage. Alternatively, different prefixes can be used to allocated in blocks (e.g. 16-19) with consideration on the likely
separate different domains of use of HHITs. size of a particular usage. Alternatively, different prefixes can be
used to separate different domains of use of HHITs.
This DNS zone may be a PTR for its RAA. It may be a zone in an HHIT The RAA DNS zone within the UAS DNS tree may be a PTR for its RAA.
specific DNS zone. Assume that the RAA is 100. The PTR record could It may be a zone in an HHIT specific DNS zone. Assume that the RAA
be constructed as follows: is decimal 100. The PTR record could be constructed as follows:
100.hhit.arpa IN PTR raa.bar.com. 100.hhit.arpa IN PTR raa.bar.com.
Note that if the zone hhit.arpa is ultimately used, some registrar
will need to manage this for all HHIT applications. Thus further
thought will be needed in the actual zone tree and registration
process [drip-registries].
3.3.2. The Hierarchical HIT Domain Authority (HDA) 3.3.2. The Hierarchical HIT Domain Authority (HDA)
An HDA may be an Internet Service Provider (ISP), UAS Service An HDA may be an Internet Service Provider (ISP), UAS Service
Supplier (USS), or any third party that takes on the business to Supplier (USS), or any third party that takes on the business to
provide UAS services management, HIP rendezvous server (RVS) or other provide UAS services management, HIP RVSs or other needed services
needed services such as those required for HHIT and/or HIP-enabled such as those required for HHIT and/or HIP-enabled devices.
devices.
The HDA is a 14-bit field (16,384 HDAs per RAA) assigned by an RAA is The HDA is a 14-bit field (16,384 HDAs per RAA) assigned by an RAA is
further elaborated in [drip-registries]. An HDA must maintain public further elaborated in [drip-registries]. An HDA must maintain public
and private UAS registration information and should maintain a set of and private UAS registration information and should maintain a set of
RVS servers for UAS clients that may use HIP. How this is done and RVS servers for UAS clients that may use HIP. How this is done and
scales to the potentially millions of customers are outside the scope scales to the potentially millions of customers are outside the scope
of this document, though covered in [drip-registries]. This service of this document, though covered in [drip-registries]. This service
should be discoverable through the DNS zone maintained by the HDA's should be discoverable through the DNS zone maintained by the HDA's
RAA. RAA.
An RAA may assign a block of values to an individual organization. An RAA may assign a block of values to an individual organization.
This is completely up to the individual RAA's published policy for This is completely up to the individual RAA's published policy for
delegation. Such policy is out of scope. delegation. Such policy is out of scope.
3.4. Edward Digital Signature Algorithm for HHITs 3.4. Edward-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm for HHITs
The Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) [RFC8032] is The Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) [RFC8032] is
specified here for use as Host Identities (HIs) per HIPv2 [RFC7401]. specified here for use as HIs per HIPv2 [RFC7401].
The intent in this document is to add EdDSA as a HI algorithm for The intent in this document is to add EdDSA as a HI algorithm for
DETs, but doing so impacts the HIP parameters used in a HIP exchange. DETs, but doing so impacts the HIP parameters used in a HIP exchange.
As such the following updates HIP parameters. Other than the HIP DNS As such the following updates HIP parameters. Other than the HIP DNS
RR (Resource Record), these should not be needed in a DRIP RR (Resource Record), these should not be needed in a DRIP
implementation that does not use HIP. implementation that does not use HIP.
See Section 3.2 for use of the HIT Suite in the context of DRIP. See Section 3.2 for use of the HIT Suite in the context of DRIP.
3.4.1. HOST_ID 3.4.1. HOST_ID
skipping to change at page 12, line 25 skipping to change at page 12, line 17
operation that other hashes need. The invocation of cSHAKE specifies operation that other hashes need. The invocation of cSHAKE specifies
the desired number of bits in the hash output. Further, cSHAKE has a the desired number of bits in the hash output. Further, cSHAKE has a
parameter 'S' as a customization bit string. This parameter will be parameter 'S' as a customization bit string. This parameter will be
used for including the ORCHID Context Identifier in a standard used for including the ORCHID Context Identifier in a standard
fashion. fashion.
This ORCHID construction includes the fields in the ORCHID in the This ORCHID construction includes the fields in the ORCHID in the
hash to protect them against substitution attacks. It also provides hash to protect them against substitution attacks. It also provides
for inclusion of additional information, in particular the for inclusion of additional information, in particular the
hierarchical bits of the Hierarchical HIT, in the ORCHID generation. hierarchical bits of the Hierarchical HIT, in the ORCHID generation.
This should be viewed as an addendum to ORCHIDv2 [RFC7343], as it can This should be viewed as an update to ORCHIDv2 [RFC7343], as it can
produce ORCHIDv2 output. produce ORCHIDv2 output.
3.5.1. Adding Additional Information to the ORCHID 3.5.1. Adding Additional Information to the ORCHID
ORCHIDv2 [RFC7343] is defined as consisting of three components: ORCHIDv2 [RFC7343] is defined as consisting of three components:
ORCHID := Prefix | OGA ID | Encode_96( Hash ) ORCHID := Prefix | OGA ID | Encode_96( Hash )
where: where:
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(IPV6 prefix) (IPV6 prefix)
OGA ID : A 4-bit long identifier for the Hash_function OGA ID : A 4-bit long identifier for the Hash_function
in use within the specific usage context. When in use within the specific usage context. When
used for HIT generation this is the HIT Suite ID. used for HIT generation this is the HIT Suite ID.
Encode_96( ) : An extraction function in which output is obtained Encode_96( ) : An extraction function in which output is obtained
by extracting the middle 96-bit-long bitstring by extracting the middle 96-bit-long bitstring
from the argument bitstring. from the argument bitstring.
This addendum will be constructed as follows: The new ORCHID function is as follows:
ORCHID := Prefix (p) | Info (n) | OGA ID (o) | Hash (m) ORCHID := Prefix (p) | Info (n) | OGA ID (o) | Hash (m)
where: where:
Prefix (p) : An IPv6 prefix (max 28-bit-long). Prefix (p) : An IPv6 prefix of length p (max 28-bit-long).
Info (n) : n bits of information that define a use of the Info (n) : n bits of information that define a use of the
ORCHID. 'n' can be zero, that is no additional ORCHID. 'n' can be zero, that is no additional
information. information.
OGA ID (o) : A 4- or 8-bit long identifier for the Hash_function OGA ID (o) : A 4- or 8-bit long identifier for the Hash_function
in use within the specific usage context. When in use within the specific usage context. When
used for HIT generation this is the HIT Suite ID. used for HIT generation this is the HIT Suite ID.
When used for HHIT generation this is the When used for HHIT generation this is the
HHIT Suite ID. HHIT Suite ID.
Hash (m) : An extraction function in which output is 'm' bits. Hash (m) : An extraction function in which output is 'm' bits.
p + n + o + m = 128 bits p + n + o + m = 128 bits
With a 28-bit IPv6 prefix, the remaining 100 bits can be divided in The ORCHID length MUST be 128 bits. With a 28-bit IPv6 prefix, the
any manner between the additional information ("Info"), OGA ID, and remaining 100 bits can be divided in any manner between the
the hash output. Care must be considering the size of the hash additional information ("Info"), OGA ID, and the hash output. Care
portion, taking into account risks like pre-image attacks. 64 bits, must be considering the size of the hash portion, taking into account
as used in Hierarchical HITs may be as small as is acceptable. The risks like pre-image attacks. 64 bits, as used in Hierarchical HITs
size of 'n' is determined as what is left; in the case of the 8-bit may be as small as is acceptable. The size of 'n' is determined as
OGA used for HHIT, this is 28 bits. what is left; in the case of the 8-bit OGA used for HHIT, this is 28
bits.
3.5.2. ORCHID Encoding 3.5.2. ORCHID Encoding
This addendum adds a different encoding process to that currently This update adds a different encoding process to that currently used
used in ORCHIDv2. The input to the hash function explicitly includes in ORCHIDv2. The input to the hash function explicitly includes all
all the header content plus the Context ID. The header content the header content plus the Context ID. The header content consists
consists of the Prefix, the Additional Information ("Info"), and OGA of the Prefix, the Additional Information ("Info"), and OGA ID (HIT
ID (HIT Suite ID). Secondly, the length of the resulting hash is set Suite ID). Secondly, the length of the resulting hash is set by sum
by sum of the length of the ORCHID header fields. For example, a of the length of the ORCHID header fields. For example, a 28-bit
28-bit prefix with 28 bits for the HID and 8 bits for the OGA ID prefix with 28 bits for the HID and 8 bits for the OGA ID leaves 64
leaves 64 bits for the hash length. bits for the hash length.
To achieve the variable length output in a consistent manner, the To achieve the variable length output in a consistent manner, the
cSHAKE hash is used. For this purpose, cSHAKE128 is appropriate. cSHAKE hash is used. For this purpose, cSHAKE128 is appropriate.
The cSHAKE function call for this addendum is: The cSHAKE function call for this update is:
cSHAKE128(Input, L, "", Context ID) cSHAKE128(Input, L, "", Context ID)
Input := Prefix | Additional Information | OGA ID | HOST_ID Input := Prefix | Additional Information | OGA ID | HOST_ID
L := Length in bits of hash portion of ORCHID L := Length in bits of hash portion of ORCHID
For full Suite ID support (those that use fixed length hashes like For full Suite ID support (those that use fixed length hashes like
SHA256), the following hashing can be used (Note: this does not SHA256), the following hashing can be used (Note: this does not
produce output Identical to ORCHIDv2 for a /28 prefix and Additional produce output Identical to ORCHIDv2 for a /28 prefix and Additional
Information of zero-length): Information of zero-length):
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Context ID := 0xF0EF F02F BFF4 3D0F E793 0C3C 6E61 74EA Context ID := 0xF0EF F02F BFF4 3D0F E793 0C3C 6E61 74EA
Hash[L] := The L-bit output from the hash function Hash[L] := The L-bit output from the hash function
Then, the ORCHID is constructed as follows: Then, the ORCHID is constructed as follows:
Prefix | OGA ID | Hash Output Prefix | OGA ID | Hash Output
3.5.3. ORCHID Decoding 3.5.3. ORCHID Decoding
With this addendum, the decoding of an ORCHID is determined by the With this update, the decoding of an ORCHID is determined by the
Prefix and OGA ID. ORCHIDv2 [RFC7343] decoding is selected when the Prefix and OGA ID. ORCHIDv2 [RFC7343] decoding is selected when the
Prefix is: 2001:20::/28. Prefix is: 2001:20::/28.
For Hierarchical HITs, the decoding is determined by the presence of For Hierarchical HITs, the decoding is determined by the presence of
the HHIT Prefix as specified in Section 9.1. the HHIT Prefix as specified in Section 8.2.
3.5.4. Decoding ORCHIDs for HIPv2 3.5.4. Decoding ORCHIDs for HIPv2
This section is included to provide backwards compatibility for This section is included to provide backwards compatibility for
ORCHIDv2 [RFC7343] as used for HIPv2 [RFC7401]. ORCHIDv2 [RFC7343] as used for HIPv2 [RFC7401].
HITs are identified by a Prefix of 2001:20::/28. The next 4 bits are HITs are identified by a Prefix of 2001:20::/28. The next 4 bits are
the OGA ID. The remaining 96 bits are the HI Hash. the OGA ID. The remaining 96 bits are the HI Hash.
4. Hierarchical HITs as Remote ID DRIP Entity Tags (DETs) 4. Hierarchical HITs as DRIP Entity Tags
Hierarchical HITs are a refinement on the Host Identity Tag (HIT) of
HIPv2. HHITs require a new ORCHID mechanism as described in
Section 3.5.
HHITs for UAS ID (called, DETs) also use the new EdDSA/SHAKE128 HIT
suite defined in Section 3.4 (GEN-2 in [RFC9153]). This hierarchy,
cryptographically embedded within the HHIT, provides the information
for finding the UA's HHIT registry (ID-3 in [RFC9153]).
As per 2022, ASTM Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking
[F3411] specifies four UAS ID types:
TYPE-1 A static, manufacturer assigned, hardware serial number per
ANSI/CTA-2063-A "Small Unmanned Aerial System Serial Numbers"
[CTA2063A].
TYPE-2 A Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) assigned (presumably static) HHITs for UAS ID (called, DETs) use the new EdDSA/SHAKE128 HIT suite
ID. defined in Section 3.4 (GEN-2 in [RFC9153]). This hierarchy,
cryptographically bound within the HHIT, provides the information for
finding the UA's HHIT registry (ID-3 in [RFC9153]).
TYPE-3 An UAS Traffic Management (UTM) system assigned UUID The 2022 forthcoming ASTM Standard Specification for Remote ID and
[RFC4122]. These can be dynamic, but do not need to be. Tracking [F3411] adds support for DETs. This is within the UAS ID
type 4, "Specific Session ID (SSI)".
TYPE-4 Specific Session ID (SSI) Note that the original Types 1 - 3 allow for an UAS ID with a maximum
Note that Types 1 - 3 allow for an UAS ID with a maximum length of 20 length of 20 bytes, the new SSI (Type 4) uses the first byte of the
bytes, the SSI (Type 4) uses the first byte of the ID for the SSI ID for the SSI value, thus restricting the UAS ID to a maximum of 19
value, thus restricting the UAS ID to a maximum of 19 bytes. The SSI bytes. The SSI values initially assigned (as per 2022) are:
values initially assigned (as per 2022) are:
ID 1 IETF - DRIP Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) entity ID 1 IETF - DRIP Drone Remote ID Protocol (DRIP) entity ID.
ID.
ID 2 3GPP - IEEE 1609.2-2016 HashedID8 ID 2 3GPP - IEEE 1609.2-2016 HashedID8
4.1. Nontransferablity of DETs 4.1. Nontransferablity of DETs
A HI and its HHIT SHOULD NOT be transferable between UA or even A HI and its HHIT SHOULD NOT be transferable between UA or even
between replacement electronics (e.g., replacement of damaged between replacement electronics (e.g., replacement of damaged
controller CPU) for a UA. The private key for the HI SHOULD be held controller CPU) for a UA. The private key for the HI SHOULD be held
in a cryptographically secure component. in a cryptographically secure component.
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ID Message (Section 2.2 of [RFC9153]). The DET is used in the ID Message (Section 2.2 of [RFC9153]). The DET is used in the
Authentication Messages (i.e., the messages that provide framing for Authentication Messages (i.e., the messages that provide framing for
authentication data only). authentication data only).
4.3. Remote ID DET as one Class of Hierarchical HITs 4.3. Remote ID DET as one Class of Hierarchical HITs
UAS Remote ID DET may be one of a number of uses of HHITs. However, UAS Remote ID DET may be one of a number of uses of HHITs. However,
it is out of the scope of the document to elaborate on other uses of it is out of the scope of the document to elaborate on other uses of
HHITs. As such these follow-on uses need to be considered in HHITs. As such these follow-on uses need to be considered in
allocating the RAAs (Section 3.3.1) or HHIT prefix assignments allocating the RAAs (Section 3.3.1) or HHIT prefix assignments
(Section 9). (Section 8).
4.4. Hierarchy in ORCHID Generation 4.4. Hierarchy in ORCHID Generation
ORCHIDS, as defined in [RFC7343], do not cryptographically bind an ORCHIDS, as defined in [RFC7343], do not cryptographically bind an
IPv6 prefix nor the ORCHID Generation Algorithm (OGA) ID (the HIT IPv6 prefix nor the ORCHID Generation Algorithm (OGA) ID (the HIT
Suite ID) to the hash of the HI. The rationale at the time of Suite ID) to the hash of the HI. The rationale at the time of
developing ORCHID was attacks against these fields are Denial-of- developing ORCHID was attacks against these fields are Denial-of-
Service (DoS) attacks against protocols using ORCHIDs and thus up to Service (DoS) attacks against protocols using ORCHIDs and thus up to
those protocols to address the issue. those protocols to address the issue.
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in the HHIT. This provides a strong, self-attestation for using the in the HHIT. This provides a strong, self-attestation for using the
hierarchy to find the DET Registry based on the HID (Section 4.5). hierarchy to find the DET Registry based on the HID (Section 4.5).
4.5. DRIP Entity Tag (DET) Registry 4.5. DRIP Entity Tag (DET) Registry
DETs are registered to HDAs. A registration process, DETs are registered to HDAs. A registration process,
[drip-registries], ensures DET global uniqueness (ID-4 in [RFC9153]). [drip-registries], ensures DET global uniqueness (ID-4 in [RFC9153]).
It also provides the mechanism to create UAS public/private data that It also provides the mechanism to create UAS public/private data that
are associated with the DET (REG-1 and REG-2 in [RFC9153]). are associated with the DET (REG-1 and REG-2 in [RFC9153]).
The two levels of hierarchy within the DET allows for CAAs to have
their own RAA for their National Air Space (NAS). Within the RAA,
the CAAs can delegate HDAs as needed. There may be other RAAs
allowed to operate within a given NAS; this is a policy decision of
each CAA.
4.6. Remote ID Authentication using DETs 4.6. Remote ID Authentication using DETs
The EdDSA25519 HI (Section 3.4) underlying the DET can be used in an The EdDSA25519 HI (Section 3.4) underlying the DET can be used in an
84-byte self-proof attestation (timestamp, HHIT, and signature of 84-byte self-proof attestation (timestamp, HHIT, and signature of
these) to provide proof of Remote ID ownership (GEN-1 in [RFC9153]). these) to provide proof of Remote ID ownership (GEN-1 in [RFC9153]).
In practice, the Wrapper and Manifest authentication formats In practice, the Wrapper and Manifest authentication formats
(Sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4 of [drip-authentication]) implicitly (Sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4 of [drip-authentication]) implicitly
provide this self-attestation. A lookup service like DNS can provide provide this self-attestation. A lookup service like DNS can provide
the HI and registration proof (GEN-3 in [RFC9153]). the HI and registration proof (GEN-3 in [RFC9153]).
skipping to change at page 19, line 24 skipping to change at page 19, line 8
document does not intent to provide a recommendation. Further DNS- document does not intent to provide a recommendation. Further DNS-
related considerations are covered in [drip-registries]. related considerations are covered in [drip-registries].
* As FQDNs, for example, ".icao.int.". * As FQDNs, for example, ".icao.int.".
* Reverse DNS lookups as IPv6 addresses per [RFC8005]. * Reverse DNS lookups as IPv6 addresses per [RFC8005].
A DET can be used to construct an FQDN that points to the USS that A DET can be used to construct an FQDN that points to the USS that
has the public/private information for the UA (REG-1 and REG-2 in has the public/private information for the UA (REG-1 and REG-2 in
[RFC9153]). For example, the USS for the HHIT could be found via the [RFC9153]). For example, the USS for the HHIT could be found via the
following: Assume the RAA is 100 and the HDA is 50. The PTR record following: assume the RAA is decimal 100 and the HDA is decimal 50.
is constructed as follows: The PTR record is constructed as follows:
100.50.det.uas.icao.int IN PTR foo.uss.icao.int. 100.50.det.uas.icao.int IN PTR foo.uss.icao.int.
The individual DETs may be potentially too numerous (e.g., 60 - 600M) The individual DETs may be potentially too numerous (e.g., 60 - 600M)
and dynamic (e.g., new DETs every minute for some HDAs) to store in a and dynamic (e.g., new DETs every minute for some HDAs) to store in a
signed, DNS zone. The HDA SHOULD provide DNS service for its zone signed, DNS zone. The HDA SHOULD provide DNS service for its zone
and provide the HHIT detail response. A secure connection (e.g., and provide the HHIT detail response. A secure connection (e.g.,
DNS-over-TLS [RFC7858]) to the authoritative zone may be a viable DNS-over-TLS [RFC7858]) to the authoritative servers may be a viable
alternative to DNSSEC. alternative to DNSSEC.
The DET reverse lookup can be a standard IPv6 reverse look up, or it The DET reverse lookup can be a standard IPv6 reverse look up, or it
can leverage off the HHIT structure. If we assume a prefix of can leverage off the HHIT structure. If we assume a prefix of
2001:30::/28, the RAA is 10 and the HDA is 20, the DET is: 2001:30::/28, the RAA is 10 and the HDA is 20, the DET is:
2001:30:280:1405:a3ad:1952:ad0:a69e 2001:30:280:1405:a3ad:1952:ad0:a69e
A DET reverse lookup could be to: A DET reverse lookup could be to:
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or: or:
a3ad1952ad0a69e.5.20.10.30.2001.det.remoteid.icao.int. a3ad1952ad0a69e.5.20.10.30.2001.det.remoteid.icao.int.
A 'standard' ip6.arpa RR has the advantage of only one Registry A 'standard' ip6.arpa RR has the advantage of only one Registry
service supported. service supported.
$ORIGIN 5.0.4.1.0.8.2.0.0.3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa. $ORIGIN 5.0.4.1.0.8.2.0.0.3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa.
e.9.6.a.0.d.a.0.2.5.9.1.d.a.3.a IN PTR e.9.6.a.0.d.a.0.2.5.9.1.d.a.3.a IN PTR
a3ad1952ad0a69e.20.10.det.rid.icao.int.
6. Other UTM Uses of HHITs Beyond DET 6. Other UTM Uses of HHITs Beyond DET
HHITs might be used within the UTM architecture beyond DET (and USS HHITs will be used within the UTM architecture beyond DET (and USS in
in UA ID registration and authentication), for example, as a Ground UA ID registration and authentication), for example, as a Ground
Control Station (GCS) HHIT ID. The GCS may use its HHIT if it is the Control Station (GCS) HHIT ID. Some GCS will use its HHIT for
source of Network Remote ID for securing its transport and for secure securing its Network Remote ID (to USS HHIT) and C2 transports.
Command and Control (C2) transport.
Observers may have their own HHITs to facilitate UAS information Observers may have their own HHITs to facilitate UAS information
retrieval (e.g., for authorization to private UAS data). They could retrieval (e.g., for authorization to private UAS data). They could
also use their HHIT for establishing a HIP connection with the UA also use their HHIT for establishing a HIP connection with the UA
Pilot for direct communications per authorization. Details about Pilot for direct communications per authorization. Details about
such issues are out of the scope of this document). such issues are out of the scope of this document).
7. Summary of Addressed DRIP Requirements 7. Summary of Addressed DRIP Requirements
This document provides the details to solutions for GEN 1 - 3, ID 1 - This document provides the details to solutions for GEN 1 - 3, ID 1 -
5, and REG 1 - 2 requirements that are described in [RFC9153]. 5, and REG 1 - 2 requirements that are described in [RFC9153].
8. DET Privacy 8. IANA Considerations
There is no expectation of privacy for DETs; it is not part of the 8.1. New Well-Known IPv6 prefix for DETs
privacy normative requirements listed in, Section 4.3.1, of
[RFC9153]. DETs are broadcast in the clear over the open air via
Bluetooth and Wi-Fi. They will be collected and collated with other
public information about the UAS. This will include DET registration
information and location and times of operations for a DET. A DET
can be for the life of a UA if there is no concern about DET/UA
activity harvesting.
Further, the MAC address of the wireless interface used for Remote ID Since the DET format is not compatible with [RFC7343], IANA is
broadcasts are a target for UA operation aggregation that may not be requested to allocate a new prefix following this template for the
mitigated through address randomization. For Bluetooth 4 Remote ID IPv6 Special-Purpose Address Registry.
messaging, the MAC address is used by observers to link the Basic ID
Message that contains the RID with other Remote ID messages, thus
must be constant for a UA operation. This message linkage use of MAC
addresses may not be needed with the Bluetooth 5 or Wi-Fi PHYs.
These PHYs provide for a larger message payload and can use the
Message Pack (Msg Type 0xF) and the Authentication Message to
transmit the RID with other Remote ID messages. However, it is not
mandatory to send the RID in a Message Pack or Authentication
Message, so allowance for using the MAC address for UA message
linking must be maintained. That is, the MAC address should be
stable for at least a UA operation.
Finally, it is not adequate to simply change the DET and MAC for a UA Address Block:
per operation to defeat historically tracking a UA's activity. IANA is requested to allocate a new 28-bit prefix out of the IANA
IPv6 Special Purpose Address Block, namely 2001::/23, as per
[RFC6890] (TBD6, suggested: 2001:30::/28).
Any changes to the UA MAC may have impacts to C2 setup and use. A Name:
constant GCS MAC may well defeat any privacy gains in UA MAC and RID This block should be named "DRIP Entity Tags (DETs) Prefix".
changes. UA/GCS binding is complicated with changing MAC addresses;
historically UAS design assumed these to be "forever" and made setup
a one-time process. Additionally, if IP is used for C2, a changing
MAC may mean a changing IP address to further impact the UAS
bindings. Finally, an encryption wrapper's identifier (such as ESP
[RFC4303] SPI) would need to change per operation to insure operation
tracking separation.
Creating and maintaining UAS operational privacy is a multifaceted RFC:
problem. Many communication pieces need to be considered to truly This document.
create a separation between UA operations. Simply changing the UAS
RID only starts the changes that need to be implemented.
9. IANA Considerations Allocation Date:
Date this document published.
9.1. New IANA DRIP Registry Termination Date:
Forever.
Source:
False.
Destination:
False.
Forwardable:
False.
Globally Reachable:
False.
Reserved-by-Protocol:
False?
8.2. New IANA DRIP Registry
This document requests IANA to create a new registry titled "Drone This document requests IANA to create a new registry titled "Drone
Remote Identification Protocol" registry. The following two Remote ID Protocol" registry. The following two subregistries should
subregistries should be created under that registry. be created under that registry.
Hierarchical HIT (HHIT) Prefixes: Hierarchical HIT (HHIT) Prefixes:
Initially, for DET use, one 28-bit prefix should be assigned out Initially, for DET use, one 28-bit prefix should be assigned out
of the IANA IPv6 Special Purpose Address Block, namely 2001::/23, of the IANA IPv6 Special Purpose Address Block, namely 2001::/23,
as per [RFC6890]. Future additions to this subregistry are to be as per [RFC6890]. Future additions to this subregistry are to be
made through Expert Review (Section 4.5 of [RFC8126]). Entries made through Expert Review (Section 4.5 of [RFC8126]). Entries
with network-specific prefixes may be present in the registry. with network-specific prefixes may be present in the registry.
HHIT Use Bits Value HHIT Use Bits Value
DET 28 TBD6 (suggested value 2001:30::/28) DET 28 TBD6 (suggested value 2001:30::/28)
skipping to change at page 22, line 12 skipping to change at page 21, line 35
subregistry are to be made through IETF Review (Section 4.8 of subregistry are to be made through IETF Review (Section 4.8 of
[RFC8126]). The following HHIT Suite IDs are defined: [RFC8126]). The following HHIT Suite IDs are defined:
HHIT Suite Value HHIT Suite Value
RESERVED 0 RESERVED 0
RSA,DSA/SHA-256 1 [RFC7401] RSA,DSA/SHA-256 1 [RFC7401]
ECDSA/SHA-384 2 [RFC7401] ECDSA/SHA-384 2 [RFC7401]
ECDSA_LOW/SHA-1 3 [RFC7401] ECDSA_LOW/SHA-1 3 [RFC7401]
EdDSA/cSHAKE128 TBD3 (suggested value 5) (RECOMMENDED) EdDSA/cSHAKE128 TBD3 (suggested value 5) (RECOMMENDED)
RESERVED 16 RESERVED 16
HDA Assigned 1 TBD4 (suggested value 254) HDA Private Use 1 TBD4 (suggested value 254)
HDA Assigned 2 TBD5 (suggested value 255) HDA Private Use 2 TBD5 (suggested value 255)
9.2. IANA CGA Registry Update 8.3. IANA CGA Registry Update
This document requests IANA to make the following change to the IANA This document requests IANA to make the following change to the IANA
"CGA Extension Type Tags registry [IANA-CGA] registry: "CGA Extension Type Tags registry [IANA-CGA] registry:
Context ID: Context ID:
The Context ID (Section 3) shares the namespace introduced for CGA The Context ID (Section 3) shares the namespace introduced for CGA
Type Tags. Defining new Context IDs follow the rules in Section 8 Type Tags. Defining new Context IDs follow the rules in Section 8
of [RFC3972]: of [RFC3972]:
Context ID := 0x00B5 A69C 795D F5D5 F008 7F56 843F 2C40 Context ID := 0x00B5 A69C 795D F5D5 F008 7F56 843F 2C40
9.3. IANA HIP Registry Updates 8.4. IANA HIP Registry Updates
This document requests IANA to make the following changes to the IANA This document requests IANA to make the following changes to the IANA
"Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters" [IANA-HIP] registry: "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters" [IANA-HIP] registry:
Host ID: Host ID:
This document defines the new EdDSA Host ID with value TBD1 This document defines the new EdDSA Host ID with value TBD1
(suggested: 13) (Section 3.4.1) in the "HI Algorithm" subregistry (suggested: 13) (Section 3.4.1) in the "HI Algorithm" subregistry
of the "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters" registry. of the "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters" registry.
Algorithm Algorithm
skipping to change at page 23, line 12 skipping to change at page 22, line 32
"EdDSA Curve Label". The values for this subregistry are defined "EdDSA Curve Label". The values for this subregistry are defined
in Section 3.4.1.1. in Section 3.4.1.1.
Algorithm Curve Values Algorithm Curve Values
EdDSA RESERVED 0 EdDSA RESERVED 0
EdDSA EdDSA25519 1 [RFC8032] (RECOMMENDED) EdDSA EdDSA25519 1 [RFC8032] (RECOMMENDED)
EdDSA EdDSA25519ph 2 [RFC8032] EdDSA EdDSA25519ph 2 [RFC8032]
EdDSA EdDSA448 3 [RFC8032] (RECOMMENDED) EdDSA EdDSA448 3 [RFC8032] (RECOMMENDED)
EdDSA EdDSA448ph 4 [RFC8032] EdDSA EdDSA448ph 4 [RFC8032]
5-65535 Unassigned
HIT Suite ID: HIT Suite ID:
This document defines the new HIT Suite of EdDSA/cSHAKE with value This document defines the new HIT Suite of EdDSA/cSHAKE with value
TBD3 (suggested: 5) (Section 3.4.2) in the "HIT Suite ID" TBD3 (suggested: 5) (Section 3.4.2) in the "HIT Suite ID"
subregistry of the "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters" subregistry of the "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters"
registry. registry.
HIT Suite Value HIT Suite Value
EdDSA/cSHAKE128 TBD3 (suggested value 5) (RECOMMENDED) EdDSA/cSHAKE128 TBD3 (suggested value 5) (RECOMMENDED)
9.4. IANA IPSECKEY Registry Update 8.5. IANA IPSECKEY Registry Update
This document requests IANA to make the following change to the This document requests IANA to make the following change to the
"IPSECKEY Resource Record Parameters" [IANA-IPSECKEY] registry: "IPSECKEY Resource Record Parameters" [IANA-IPSECKEY] registry:
IPSECKEY: IPSECKEY:
This document defines the new IPSECKEY value TBD2 (suggested: 4) This document defines the new IPSECKEY value TBD2 (suggested: 4)
(Section 3.4.1.2) in the "Algorithm Type Field" subregistry of the (Section 3.4.1.2) in the "Algorithm Type Field" subregistry of the
"IPSECKEY Resource Record Parameters" registry. "IPSECKEY Resource Record Parameters" registry.
Value Description Value Description
TBD2 (suggested value 4) TBD2 (suggested value 4)
An EdDSA key is present, in the format defined in [RFC8080] An EdDSA key is present, in the format defined in [RFC8080]
9.5. New Well-Known IPv6 prefix for DETs 9. Security Considerations
Since the DET format is not compatible with [RFC7343], IANA is
requested to allocate a new prefix following this template for the
IPv6 Special-Purpose Address Registry.
Address Block:
IANA is requested to allocate a new 28-bit prefix out of the IANA
IPv6 Special Purpose Address Block, namely 2001::/23, as per
[RFC6890] (TBD6, suggested: 2001:30::/28).
Name:
This block should be named "DRIP Device Entity Tags (DETs)
Prefix".
RFC:
This document.
Allocation Date:
Date this document published.
Termination Date:
Forever.
Source:
False.
Destination:
False.
Forwardable:
False.
Globally Reachable:
False.
Reserved-by-Protocol:
False?
10. Security Considerations
The 64-bit hash in HHITs presents a real risk of second pre-image The 64-bit hash in HHITs presents a real risk of second pre-image
cryptographic hash attack Section 10.2. There are no known (to the cryptographic hash attack Section 9.3. There are no known (to the
authors) studies of hash size to cryptographic hash attacks. A authors) studies of hash size to cryptographic hash attacks. A
Python script is available to randomly generate 1M HHITs that did not Python script is available to randomly generate 1M HHITs that did not
produce a hash collision which is a simpler attack than a first or produce a hash collision which is a simpler attack than a first or
second pre-image attack. second pre-image attack.
However, with today's computing power, producing 2^64 EdDSA keypairs However, with today's computing power, producing 2^64 EdDSA keypairs
and then generating the corresponding HHIT is economically feasible. and then generating the corresponding HHIT is economically feasible.
Consider that a *single* bitcoin mining ASIC can do on the order of Consider that a *single* bitcoin mining ASIC can do on the order of
2^46 sha256 hashes a second or about 2^62 hashes in a single day. 2^46 sha256 hashes a second or about 2^62 hashes in a single day.
The point being, 2^64 is not prohibitive, especially as this can be The point being, 2^64 is not prohibitive, especially as this can be
skipping to change at page 25, line 10 skipping to change at page 23, line 41
Now it should be noted that the 2^64 attempts is for stealing a Now it should be noted that the 2^64 attempts is for stealing a
specific HHIT. Consider a scenario of a street photography company specific HHIT. Consider a scenario of a street photography company
with 1,024 UAs (each with its own HHIT); you'd be happy stealing any with 1,024 UAs (each with its own HHIT); you'd be happy stealing any
one of them. Then rather than needing to satisfy a 64-bit condition one of them. Then rather than needing to satisfy a 64-bit condition
on the cSHAKE128 output, you need only satisfy what is equivalent to on the cSHAKE128 output, you need only satisfy what is equivalent to
a 54-bit condition (since there are 2^10 more opportunities for a 54-bit condition (since there are 2^10 more opportunities for
success). success).
Thus, although the probability of a collision or pre-image attack is Thus, although the probability of a collision or pre-image attack is
low in a collection of 1,024 HHITs out of a total population of 2^64, low in a collection of 1,024 HHITs out of a total population of 2^64,
per Section 10.2, it is computationally and economically feasible. per Section 9.3, it is computationally and economically feasible.
Therefore, the HHIT registration and HHIT/HI registration validation Therefore, the HHIT registration and HHIT/HI registration validation
is strongly recommended. is strongly recommended.
The DET Registry services effectively block attempts to "take over" The DET Registry services effectively block attempts to "take over"
or "hijack" a DET. It does not stop a rogue attempting to or "hijack" a DET. It does not stop a rogue attempting to
impersonate a known DET. This attack can be mitigated by the impersonate a known DET. This attack can be mitigated by the
receiver of the DET using DNS to find the HI for the DET. As such, receiver of messages containing DETs using DNS to find the HI for the
use of DNSSEC and DNS-over-TLS by the DET registries is recommended. DET. As such, use of DNSSEC by the DET registries is recommended to
provide trust in HI retrieval.
The 60-bit hash for DETs with 8-bit OGAs have a greater hash attack The 60-bit hash for DETs with 8-bit OGAs have a greater hash attack
risk. As such its use should be restricted to testing and to small, risk. As such its use should be restricted to testing and to small,
well managed UAS/USS. well managed UAS/USS.
Another mitigation of HHIT hijacking is if the HI owner (UA) supplies Another mitigation of HHIT hijacking is if the HI owner (UA) supplies
an object containing the HHIT and signed by the HI private key of the an object containing the HHIT and signed by the HI private key of the
HDA such as discussed in Section 4.6. HDA such as detailed in [drip-authentication].
The two risks with hierarchical HITs are the use of an invalid HID The two risks with hierarchical HITs are the use of an invalid HID
and forced HIT collisions. The use of a DNS zone (e.g., "det.arpa.") and forced HIT collisions. The use of a DNS zone (e.g., "det.arpa.")
is a strong protection against invalid HIDs. Querying an HDA's RVS is a strong protection against invalid HIDs. Querying an HDA's RVS
for a HIT under the HDA protects against talking to unregistered for a HIT under the HDA protects against talking to unregistered
clients. The Registry service [drip-registries], through its HHIT clients. The Registry service [drip-registries], through its HHIT
uniqueness enforcement, provides against forced or accidental HHIT uniqueness enforcement, provides against forced or accidental HHIT
hash collisions. hash collisions.
Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGAs) provide an assurance of Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGAs) provide an assurance of
skipping to change at page 26, line 5 skipping to change at page 24, line 38
approach. approach.
The second aspect of assured uniqueness is the digital signing The second aspect of assured uniqueness is the digital signing
(attestation) process of the DET by the HI private key and the (attestation) process of the DET by the HI private key and the
further signing (attestation) of the HI public key by the Registry's further signing (attestation) of the HI public key by the Registry's
key. This completes the ownership process. The observer at this key. This completes the ownership process. The observer at this
point does not know what owns the DET, but is assured, other than the point does not know what owns the DET, but is assured, other than the
risk of theft of the HI private key, that this UAS ID is owned by risk of theft of the HI private key, that this UAS ID is owned by
something and is properly registered. something and is properly registered.
10.1. DET Trust 9.1. DET Trust in ASTM messaging
The DET in the ASTM Basic ID Message (Msg Type 0x0, the actual Remote The DET in the ASTM Basic ID Message (Msg Type 0x0, the actual Remote
ID message) does not provide any assertion of trust. The best that ID message) does not provide any assertion of trust. The best that
might be done within this Basic ID Message is 4 bytes truncated from might be done within this Basic ID Message is 4 bytes truncated from
a HI signing of the HHIT (the UA ID field is 20 bytes and a HHIT is a HI signing of the HHIT (the UA ID field is 20 bytes and a HHIT is
16). This is not trustable; that is, too open to a hash attack. 16). This is not trustable; that is, too open to a hash attack.
Minimally, it takes 84 bytes (Section 4.6) to prove ownership of a Minimally, it takes 84 bytes (Section 4.6) to prove ownership of a
DET with a full EdDSA signature. Thus, no attempt has been made to DET with a full EdDSA signature. Thus, no attempt has been made to
add DET trust directly within the very small Basic ID Message. add DET trust directly within the very small Basic ID Message.
skipping to change at page 26, line 33 skipping to change at page 25, line 22
Proof of UA transmission comes when the Authentication Message Proof of UA transmission comes when the Authentication Message
includes proofs for the ASTM Location/Vector Message (Msg Type 0x1) includes proofs for the ASTM Location/Vector Message (Msg Type 0x1)
and the observer can see the UA or that information is validated by and the observer can see the UA or that information is validated by
ground multilateration. Only then does an observer gain full trust ground multilateration. Only then does an observer gain full trust
in the DET of the UA. in the DET of the UA.
DETs obtained via the Network RID path provides a different approach DETs obtained via the Network RID path provides a different approach
to trust. Here the UAS SHOULD be securely communicating to the USS, to trust. Here the UAS SHOULD be securely communicating to the USS,
thus asserting DET trust. thus asserting DET trust.
10.2. Collision Risks with DETs 9.2. Privacy Considerations
There is no expectation of privacy for DETs; it is not part of the
privacy normative requirements listed in, Section 4.3.1, of
[RFC9153]. DETs are broadcast in the clear over the open air via
Bluetooth and Wi-Fi. They will be collected and collated with other
public information about the UAS. This will include DET registration
information and location and times of operations for a DET. A DET
can be for the life of a UA if there is no concern about DET/UA
activity harvesting.
Further, the MAC address of the wireless interface used for Remote ID
broadcasts are a target for UA operation aggregation that may not be
mitigated through MAC address randomization. For Bluetooth 4 Remote
ID messaging, the MAC address is used by observers to link the Basic
ID Message that contains the RID with other Remote ID messages, thus
must be constant for a UA operation. This message linkage use of MAC
addresses may not be needed with the Bluetooth 5 or Wi-Fi PHYs.
These PHYs provide for a larger message payload and can use the
Message Pack (Msg Type 0xF) and the Authentication Message to
transmit the RID with other Remote ID messages. However, it is not
mandatory to send the RID in a Message Pack or Authentication
Message, so allowance for using the MAC address for UA message
linking must be maintained. That is, the MAC address should be
stable for at least a UA operation.
Finally, it is not adequate to simply change the DET and MAC for a UA
per operation to defeat historically tracking a UA's activity.
Any changes to the UA MAC may have impacts to C2 setup and use. A
constant GCS MAC may well defeat any privacy gains in UA MAC and RID
changes. UA/GCS binding is complicated with changing MAC addresses;
historically UAS design assumed these to be "forever" and made setup
a one-time process. Additionally, if IP is used for C2, a changing
MAC may mean a changing IP address to further impact the UAS
bindings. Finally, an encryption wrapper's identifier (such as ESP
[RFC4303] SPI) would need to change per operation to insure operation
tracking separation.
Creating and maintaining UAS operational privacy is a multifaceted
problem. Many communication pieces need to be considered to truly
create a separation between UA operations. Simply changing the DET
only starts the changes that need to be implemented.
9.3. Collision Risks with DETs
The 64-bit hash size does have an increased risk of collisions over The 64-bit hash size does have an increased risk of collisions over
the 96-bit hash size used for the other HIT Suites. There is a 0.01% the 96-bit hash size used for the other HIT Suites. There is a 0.01%
probability of a collision in a population of 66 million. The probability of a collision in a population of 66 million. The
probability goes up to 1% for a population of 663 million. See probability goes up to 1% for a population of 663 million. See
Appendix C for the collision probability formula. Appendix C for the collision probability formula.
However, this risk of collision is within a single "Additional However, this risk of collision is within a single "Additional
Information" value, i.e., a RAA/HDA domain. The UAS/USS registration Information" value, i.e., a RAA/HDA domain. The UAS/USS registration
process should include registering the DET and MUST reject a process should include registering the DET and MUST reject a
collision, forcing the UAS to generate a new HI and thus HHIT and collision, forcing the UAS to generate a new HI and thus HHIT and
reapplying to the DET registration process. reapplying to the DET registration process.
11. References 10. References
11.1. Normative References 10.1. Normative References
[NIST.FIPS.202] [NIST.FIPS.202]
Dworkin, M., "SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Dworkin, M., "SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and
Extendable-Output Functions", National Institute of Extendable-Output Functions", National Institute of
Standards and Technology report, Standards and Technology report,
DOI 10.6028/nist.fips.202, July 2015, DOI 10.6028/nist.fips.202, July 2015,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.fips.202>. <https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.fips.202>.
[NIST.SP.800-185] [NIST.SP.800-185]
Kelsey, J., Change, S., and R. Perlner, "SHA-3 derived Kelsey, J., Change, S., and R. Perlner, "SHA-3 derived
skipping to change at page 27, line 43 skipping to change at page 27, line 29
[RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Ed., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T. [RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Ed., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T.
Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)", Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)",
RFC 7401, DOI 10.17487/RFC7401, April 2015, RFC 7401, DOI 10.17487/RFC7401, April 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7401>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7401>.
[RFC8005] Laganier, J., "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Domain Name [RFC8005] Laganier, J., "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Domain Name
System (DNS) Extension", RFC 8005, DOI 10.17487/RFC8005, System (DNS) Extension", RFC 8005, DOI 10.17487/RFC8005,
October 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8005>. October 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8005>.
[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for [RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017, RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
11.2. Informative References 10.2. Informative References
[cfrg-comment] [cfrg-comment]
"A CFRG review of draft-ietf-drip-rid", September 2021, "A CFRG review of draft-ietf-drip-rid", September 2021,
<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/ <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/
tAJJq60W6TlUv7_pde5cw5TDTCU/>. tAJJq60W6TlUv7_pde5cw5TDTCU/>.
[corus] CORUS, "U-space Concept of Operations", September 2019, [corus] CORUS, "U-space Concept of Operations", September 2019,
<https://www.sesarju.eu/node/3411>. <https://www.sesarju.eu/node/3411>.
[CTA2063A] ANSI/CTA, "Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers", [CTA2063A] ANSI/CTA, "Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers",
skipping to change at page 28, line 41 skipping to change at page 28, line 33
[F3411] ASTM International, "Standard Specification for Remote ID [F3411] ASTM International, "Standard Specification for Remote ID
and Tracking", and Tracking",
<http://www.astm.org/cgi-bin/resolver.cgi?F3411>. <http://www.astm.org/cgi-bin/resolver.cgi?F3411>.
[FAA_RID] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), [FAA_RID] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
"Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft", 2021, "Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft", 2021,
<https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-15/ <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-15/
pdf/2020-28948.pdf>. pdf/2020-28948.pdf>.
[hhit-gen] "Python script to generate HHITs", September 2021,
<https://github.com/ietf-wg-drip/draft-ietf-drip-
rid/blob/master/hhit-gen.py>.
[IANA-CGA] IANA, "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) Message [IANA-CGA] IANA, "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) Message
Type Name Space", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/cga- Type Name Space", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/cga-
message-types/cga-message-types.xhtml>. message-types/cga-message-types.xhtml>.
[IANA-HIP] IANA, "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters", [IANA-HIP] IANA, "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/hip-parameters/hip- <https://www.iana.org/assignments/hip-parameters/hip-
parameters.xhtml>. parameters.xhtml>.
[IANA-IPSECKEY] [IANA-IPSECKEY]
IANA, "IPSECKEY Resource Record Parameters", IANA, "IPSECKEY Resource Record Parameters",
skipping to change at page 30, line 5 skipping to change at page 29, line 38
[RFC7858] Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D., [RFC7858] Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>. 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.
[RFC8004] Laganier, J. and L. Eggert, "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [RFC8004] Laganier, J. and L. Eggert, "Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
Rendezvous Extension", RFC 8004, DOI 10.17487/RFC8004, Rendezvous Extension", RFC 8004, DOI 10.17487/RFC8004,
October 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8004>. October 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8004>.
[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
[RFC8080] Sury, O. and R. Edmonds, "Edwards-Curve Digital Security [RFC8080] Sury, O. and R. Edmonds, "Edwards-Curve Digital Security
Algorithm (EdDSA) for DNSSEC", RFC 8080, Algorithm (EdDSA) for DNSSEC", RFC 8080,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8080, February 2017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8080, February 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8080>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8080>.
[RFC8200] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 [RFC8200] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200, (IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>.
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