Diff: draft-ietf-drip-rid-22.txt - draft-ietf-drip-rid-23.txt

	< draft-ietf-drip-rid-22.txt	draft-ietf-drip-rid-23.txt >

	DRIP R. Moskowitz	DRIP R. Moskowitz
	Internet-Draft HTT Consulting	Internet-Draft HTT Consulting
	Updates: 7401, 7343 (if approved) S. Card	Updates: 7401, 7343 (if approved) S. Card
	Intended status: Standards Track A. Wiethuechter	Intended status: Standards Track A. Wiethuechter

	Expires: 15 October 2022 AX Enterprize, LLC	Expires: 23 October 2022 AX Enterprize, LLC
	A. Gurtov	A. Gurtov
	Linköping University	Linköping University

	13 April 2022	21 April 2022

	DRIP Entity Tag (DET) for Unmanned Aircraft System Remote ID (UAS RID)	DRIP Entity Tag (DET) for Unmanned Aircraft System Remote ID (UAS RID)

	draft-ietf-drip-rid-22	draft-ietf-drip-rid-23

	Abstract	Abstract

	This document describes the use of Hierarchical Host Identity Tags	This document describes the use of Hierarchical Host Identity Tags
	(HHITs) as self-asserting IPv6 addresses and thereby a trustable	(HHITs) as self-asserting IPv6 addresses and thereby a trustable
	identifier for use as the Unmanned Aircraft System Remote	identifier for use as the Unmanned Aircraft System Remote
	Identification and tracking (UAS RID).	Identification and tracking (UAS RID).

	This document updates RFC7401 and RFC7343.	This document updates RFC7401 and RFC7343.


	skipping to change at page 1, line 44 ¶	skipping to change at page 1, line 44 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."


	This Internet-Draft will expire on 15 October 2022.	This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 October 2022.

	Copyright Notice	Copyright Notice

	Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the	Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.	document authors. All rights reserved.

	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
	license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.	license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
	Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights	Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights

	skipping to change at page 3, line 13 ¶	skipping to change at page 3, line 13 ¶
	8.4. IANA HIP Registry Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22	8.4. IANA HIP Registry Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
	8.5. IANA IPSECKEY Registry Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22	8.5. IANA IPSECKEY Registry Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
	9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23	9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
	9.1. DET Trust in ASTM messaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24	9.1. DET Trust in ASTM messaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
	9.2. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25	9.2. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
	9.3. Collision Risks with DETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26	9.3. Collision Risks with DETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
	10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26	10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
	10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26	10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
	10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27	10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
	Appendix A. EU U-Space RID Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . 30	Appendix A. EU U-Space RID Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . 30

	Appendix B. The 14/14 HID split . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30	Appendix B. The 14/14 HID split . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
	Appendix C. Calculating Collision Probabilities . . . . . . . . 32	Appendix C. Calculating Collision Probabilities . . . . . . . . 32
	Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32	Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

	1. Introduction	1. Introduction

	DRIP Requirements [RFC9153] describe an Unmanned Aircraft System	DRIP Requirements [RFC9153] describe an Unmanned Aircraft System
	Remote ID (UAS ID) as unique (ID-4), non-spoofable (ID-5), and	Remote ID (UAS ID) as unique (ID-4), non-spoofable (ID-5), and
	identify a registry where the ID is listed (ID-2); all within a	identify a registry where the ID is listed (ID-2); all within a
	20-character identifier (ID-1).	20-character identifier (ID-1).


	This document describes the use of Hierarchical Host Identity Tags	This document describes (per Section 3 of [drip-architecture]) the
	(HHITs) (Section 3) as self-asserting IPv6 addresses and thereby a	use of Hierarchical Host Identity Tags (HHITs) (Section 3) as self-
	trustable identifier for use as the UAS Remote ID. HHITs include	asserting IPv6 addresses and thereby a trustable identifier for use
	explicit hierarchy to enable DNS HHIT queries (Host ID for	as the UAS Remote ID. HHITs include explicit hierarchy to enable DNS
	authentication, e.g., [drip-authentication]) and for Extensible	HHIT queries (Host ID for authentication, e.g.,
	Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Registrar discovery [RFC9224] for 3rd-	[drip-authentication]) and for Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
	party identification attestation (e.g., [drip-authentication]).	Registrar discovery [RFC9224] for 3rd-party identification
		attestation (e.g., [drip-authentication]).

	This addition of hierarchy to HITs is an extension to [RFC7401] and	This addition of hierarchy to HITs is an extension to [RFC7401] and
	requires an update to [RFC7343]. As this document also adds EdDSA	requires an update to [RFC7343]. As this document also adds EdDSA
	(Section 3.4) for Host Identities (HIs), a number of Host Identity	(Section 3.4) for Host Identities (HIs), a number of Host Identity
	Protocol (HIP) parameters in [RFC7401] are updated, these should not	Protocol (HIP) parameters in [RFC7401] are updated, these should not
	be needed in a DRIP implementation that does not use HIP.	be needed in a DRIP implementation that does not use HIP.

	HHITs as used within the context of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)	HHITs as used within the context of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)
	are labeled as DRIP Entity Tags (DETs). Throughout this document	are labeled as DRIP Entity Tags (DETs). Throughout this document
	HHIT and DET will be used appropriately. HHIT will be used when	HHIT and DET will be used appropriately. HHIT will be used when

	skipping to change at page 18, line 20 ¶	skipping to change at page 18, line 20 ¶
	In practice, the Wrapper and Manifest authentication formats	In practice, the Wrapper and Manifest authentication formats
	(Sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4 of [drip-authentication]) implicitly	(Sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4 of [drip-authentication]) implicitly
	provide this self-attestation. A lookup service like DNS can provide	provide this self-attestation. A lookup service like DNS can provide
	the HI and registration proof (GEN-3 in [RFC9153]).	the HI and registration proof (GEN-3 in [RFC9153]).

	Similarly, for Observers without Internet access, a 200-byte offline	Similarly, for Observers without Internet access, a 200-byte offline
	self-attestation could provide the same Remote ID ownership proof.	self-attestation could provide the same Remote ID ownership proof.
	This attestation would contain the HDA's signing of the UA's HHIT,	This attestation would contain the HDA's signing of the UA's HHIT,
	itself signed by the UA's HI. Only a small cache that contains the	itself signed by the UA's HI. Only a small cache that contains the
	HDA's HI/HHIT and HDA meta-data is needed by the Observer. However,	HDA's HI/HHIT and HDA meta-data is needed by the Observer. However,

	such an object would just fit in the ASTM Authentication Message with	such an object would just fit in the ASTM Authentication Message
	no room for growth. In practice, [drip-authentication] provides this	(Section 2.2 of [RFC9153]) with no room for growth. In practice,
	offline self-attestation in two authentication messages: the HDA's	[drip-authentication] provides this offline self-attestation in two
	certification of the UA's HHIT registration in a Link authentication	authentication messages: the HDA's certification of the UA's HHIT
	message whose hash is sent in a Manifest authentication message.	registration in a Link authentication message whose hash is sent in a
		Manifest authentication message.

	Hashes of any previously sent ASTM messages can be placed in a	Hashes of any previously sent ASTM messages can be placed in a
	Manifest authentication message (GEN-2 in [RFC9153]). When a	Manifest authentication message (GEN-2 in [RFC9153]). When a
	Location/Vector Message (i.e., a message that provides UA location,	Location/Vector Message (i.e., a message that provides UA location,
	altitude, heading, speed, and status) hash along with the hash of the	altitude, heading, speed, and status) hash along with the hash of the
	HDA's UA HHIT attestation are sent in a Manifest authentication	HDA's UA HHIT attestation are sent in a Manifest authentication
	message and the Observer can visually see a UA at the claimed	message and the Observer can visually see a UA at the claimed
	location, the Observer has a very strong proof of the UA's Remote ID.	location, the Observer has a very strong proof of the UA's Remote ID.

	All this behavior and how to mix these authentication messages into	All this behavior and how to mix these authentication messages into

	skipping to change at page 19, line 46 ¶	skipping to change at page 19, line 46 ¶

	$ORIGIN 5.0.4.1.0.8.2.0.0.3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa.	$ORIGIN 5.0.4.1.0.8.2.0.0.3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa.
	e.9.6.a.0.d.a.0.2.5.9.1.d.a.3.a IN PTR	e.9.6.a.0.d.a.0.2.5.9.1.d.a.3.a IN PTR
	a3ad1952ad0a69e.20.10.det.rid.icao.int.	a3ad1952ad0a69e.20.10.det.rid.icao.int.

	6. Other UTM Uses of HHITs Beyond DET	6. Other UTM Uses of HHITs Beyond DET

	HHITs will be used within the UTM architecture beyond DET (and USS in	HHITs will be used within the UTM architecture beyond DET (and USS in
	UA ID registration and authentication), for example, as a Ground	UA ID registration and authentication), for example, as a Ground
	Control Station (GCS) HHIT ID. Some GCS will use its HHIT for	Control Station (GCS) HHIT ID. Some GCS will use its HHIT for

	securing its Network Remote ID (to USS HHIT) and C2 transports.	securing its Network Remote ID (to USS HHIT) and Command and Control
		(C2, Section 2.2.2 of [RFC9153]) transports.

	Observers may have their own HHITs to facilitate UAS information	Observers may have their own HHITs to facilitate UAS information
	retrieval (e.g., for authorization to private UAS data). They could	retrieval (e.g., for authorization to private UAS data). They could
	also use their HHIT for establishing a HIP connection with the UA	also use their HHIT for establishing a HIP connection with the UA
	Pilot for direct communications per authorization. Details about	Pilot for direct communications per authorization. Details about
	such issues are out of the scope of this document).	such issues are out of the scope of this document).

	7. Summary of Addressed DRIP Requirements	7. Summary of Addressed DRIP Requirements

	This document provides the details to solutions for GEN 1 - 3, ID 1 -	This document provides the details to solutions for GEN 1 - 3, ID 1 -

	skipping to change at page 21, line 40 ¶	skipping to change at page 21, line 43 ¶
	RSA,DSA/SHA-256 1 [RFC7401]	RSA,DSA/SHA-256 1 [RFC7401]
	ECDSA/SHA-384 2 [RFC7401]	ECDSA/SHA-384 2 [RFC7401]
	ECDSA_LOW/SHA-1 3 [RFC7401]	ECDSA_LOW/SHA-1 3 [RFC7401]
	EdDSA/cSHAKE128 TBD3 (suggested value 5) (RECOMMENDED)	EdDSA/cSHAKE128 TBD3 (suggested value 5) (RECOMMENDED)
	RESERVED 16	RESERVED 16
	HDA Private Use 1 TBD4 (suggested value 254)	HDA Private Use 1 TBD4 (suggested value 254)
	HDA Private Use 2 TBD5 (suggested value 255)	HDA Private Use 2 TBD5 (suggested value 255)

	8.3. IANA CGA Registry Update	8.3. IANA CGA Registry Update


	This document requests IANA to make the following change to the IANA	This document requests that this document be added to the reference
	"CGA Extension Type Tags registry [IANA-CGA] registry:	field for the "CGA Extension Type Tags" registry [IANA-CGA], where
		IANA registers the following Context ID:

	Context ID:	Context ID:
	The Context ID (Section 3) shares the namespace introduced for CGA	The Context ID (Section 3) shares the namespace introduced for CGA
	Type Tags. Defining new Context IDs follow the rules in Section 8	Type Tags. Defining new Context IDs follow the rules in Section 8
	of [RFC3972]:	of [RFC3972]:

	Context ID := 0x00B5 A69C 795D F5D5 F008 7F56 843F 2C40	Context ID := 0x00B5 A69C 795D F5D5 F008 7F56 843F 2C40

	8.4. IANA HIP Registry Updates	8.4. IANA HIP Registry Updates


	skipping to change at page 28, line 9 ¶	skipping to change at page 28, line 9 ¶
	<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/	<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/
	tAJJq60W6TlUv7_pde5cw5TDTCU/>.	tAJJq60W6TlUv7_pde5cw5TDTCU/>.

	[corus] CORUS, "U-space Concept of Operations", September 2019,	[corus] CORUS, "U-space Concept of Operations", September 2019,
	<https://www.sesarju.eu/node/3411>.	<https://www.sesarju.eu/node/3411>.

	[CTA2063A] ANSI/CTA, "Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers",	[CTA2063A] ANSI/CTA, "Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers",
	September 2019, <https://shop.cta.tech/products/small-	September 2019, <https://shop.cta.tech/products/small-
	unmanned-aerial-systems-serial-numbers>.	unmanned-aerial-systems-serial-numbers>.


		[drip-architecture]
		Card, S. W., Wiethuechter, A., Moskowitz, R., Zhao, S.,
		and A. Gurtov, "Drone Remote Identification Protocol
		(DRIP) Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
		draft-ietf-drip-arch-22, 21 March 2022,
		<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-drip-
		arch-22>.

	[drip-authentication]	[drip-authentication]
	Wiethuechter, A., Card, S., and R. Moskowitz, "DRIP	Wiethuechter, A., Card, S., and R. Moskowitz, "DRIP
	Authentication Formats & Protocols for Broadcast Remote	Authentication Formats & Protocols for Broadcast Remote
	ID", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-drip-	ID", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-drip-

	auth-05, 7 March 2022,	auth-07, 19 April 2022,
	<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-drip-	<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-drip-

	auth-05>.	auth-07>.

	[drip-registries]	[drip-registries]
	Wiethuechter, A., Card, S., Moskowitz, R., and J. Reid,	Wiethuechter, A., Card, S., Moskowitz, R., and J. Reid,
	"DRIP Registries", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,	"DRIP Registries", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
	draft-ietf-drip-registries-01, 7 March 2022,	draft-ietf-drip-registries-01, 7 March 2022,
	<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-drip-	<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-drip-
	registries-01>.	registries-01>.

	[F3411] ASTM International, "Standard Specification for Remote ID	[F3411] ASTM International, "Standard Specification for Remote ID
	and Tracking",	and Tracking",

End of changes. 13 change blocks.
	23 lines changed or deleted	35 lines changed or added
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