< draft-ietf-intarea-provisioning-domains-10.txt   draft-ietf-intarea-provisioning-domains-11.txt >
Network Working Group P. Pfister Network Working Group P. Pfister
Internet-Draft E. Vyncke Internet-Draft E. Vyncke
Intended status: Standards Track Cisco Intended status: Standards Track Cisco
Expires: July 9, 2020 T. Pauly Expires: August 3, 2020 T. Pauly
Apple Inc. Apple Inc.
D. Schinazi D. Schinazi
Google LLC Google LLC
W. Shao W. Shao
Cisco Cisco
January 06, 2020 January 31, 2020
Discovering Provisioning Domain Names and Data Discovering Provisioning Domain Names and Data
draft-ietf-intarea-provisioning-domains-10 draft-ietf-intarea-provisioning-domains-11
Abstract Abstract
Provisioning Domains (PvDs) are defined as consistent sets of network Provisioning Domains (PvDs) are defined as consistent sets of network
configuration information. This allows hosts to manage connections configuration information. This allows hosts to manage connections
to multiple networks and interfaces simultaneously, such as when a to multiple networks and interfaces simultaneously, such as when a
home router provides connectivity through both a broadband and home router provides connectivity through both a broadband and
cellular network provider. cellular network provider.
This document defines a mechanism for explicitly identifying PvDs This document defines a mechanism for explicitly identifying PvDs
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 9, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 3, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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3.2. Router Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.2. Router Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3. Non-PvD-aware Host Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.3. Non-PvD-aware Host Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.4. PvD-aware Host Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.4. PvD-aware Host Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.4.1. DHCPv6 configuration association . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.4.1. DHCPv6 configuration association . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.4.2. DHCPv4 configuration association . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.4.2. DHCPv4 configuration association . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.4.3. Connection Sharing by the Host . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.4.3. Connection Sharing by the Host . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.4.4. Usage of DNS Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.4.4. Usage of DNS Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. Provisioning Domain Additional Information . . . . . . . . . 13 4. Provisioning Domain Additional Information . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1. Retrieving the PvD Additional Information . . . . . . . . 13 4.1. Retrieving the PvD Additional Information . . . . . . . . 13
4.2. Operational Consideration to Providing the PvD Additional 4.2. Operational Consideration to Providing the PvD Additional
Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3. PvD Additional Information Format . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.3. PvD Additional Information Format . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3.1. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.3.1. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.4. Detecting misconfiguration and misuse . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.4. Detecting misconfiguration and misuse . . . . . . . . . . 18
5. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.1. Exposing Extra RA Options to PvD-Aware Hosts . . . . . . 18 5.1. Exposing Extra RA Options to PvD-Aware Hosts . . . . . . 19
5.2. Different RAs for PvD-Aware and Non-PvD-Aware Hosts . . . 18 5.2. Different RAs for PvD-Aware and Non-PvD-Aware Hosts . . . 19
5.3. Enabling Multi-homing for PvD-Aware Hosts . . . . . . . . 20 5.3. Enabling Multi-homing for PvD-Aware Hosts . . . . . . . . 21
5.4. Providing Additional Information to PvD-Aware Hosts . . . 21 5.4. Providing Additional Information to PvD-Aware Hosts . . . 22
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 7. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
8.1. New entry in the Well-Known URIs Registry . . . . . . . . 23 8.1. New entry in the Well-Known URIs Registry . . . . . . . . 26
8.2. Additional Information PvD Keys Registry . . . . . . . . 24 8.2. Additional Information PvD Keys Registry . . . . . . . . 26
8.3. PvD Option Flags Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 8.3. PvD Option Flags Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
8.4. PvD JSON Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 8.4. PvD JSON Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Provisioning Domains (PvDs) are defined in [RFC7556] as consistent Provisioning Domains (PvDs) are defined in [RFC7556] as consistent
sets of network configuration information. This information includes sets of network configuration information. This information includes
properties that are traditionally associated with a single networking properties that are traditionally associated with a single networking
interface, such as source addresses, DNS configuration, proxy interface, such as source addresses, DNS configuration, proxy
configuration, and gateway addresses. configuration, and gateway addresses.
Clients that are aware of PvDs can take advantage of multiple network Clients that are aware of PvDs can take advantage of multiple network
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hosts to have a specialized view of the network configuration. hosts to have a specialized view of the network configuration.
Since PvD IDs are used to identify different ways to access the Since PvD IDs are used to identify different ways to access the
internet, multiple PvDs (with different PvD IDs) can be provisioned internet, multiple PvDs (with different PvD IDs) can be provisioned
on a single host interface. Similarly, the same PvD ID could be used on a single host interface. Similarly, the same PvD ID could be used
on different interfaces of a host in order to inform that those PvDs on different interfaces of a host in order to inform that those PvDs
ultimately provide equivalent services. ultimately provide equivalent services.
This document also introduces a mechanism for hosts to retrieve This document also introduces a mechanism for hosts to retrieve
optional additional information related to a specific PvD by means of optional additional information related to a specific PvD by means of
an HTTP over TLS query using an URI derived from the PvD ID. The an HTTP over TLS query using a URI derived from the PvD ID. The
retrieved JSON object contains additional information that would retrieved JSON object contains additional information that would
typically be considered too large to be directly included in the typically be considered too large to be directly included in the
Router Advertisement, but might be considered useful to the Router Advertisement, but might be considered useful to the
applications, or even sometimes users, when choosing which PvD should applications, or even sometimes users, when choosing which PvD should
be used. be used.
For example, if Alice has both a cellular network provider and a For example, if Alice has both a cellular network provider and a
broadband provider in her home, her PvD-aware devices and broadband provider in her home, her PvD-aware devices and
applications would be aware of both available uplinks. These applications would be aware of both available uplinks. These
applications could fail-over between these networks, or run applications could fail-over between these networks, or run
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included within the PvD Option. included within the PvD Option.
H-flag: (1 bit) 'HTTP' flag stating whether some PvD Additional H-flag: (1 bit) 'HTTP' flag stating whether some PvD Additional
Information is made available through HTTP over TLS, as described Information is made available through HTTP over TLS, as described
in Section 4. in Section 4.
L-flag: (1 bit) 'Legacy' flag stating whether the PvD is associated L-flag: (1 bit) 'Legacy' flag stating whether the PvD is associated
with IPv4 information assigned using DHCPv4 (see Section 3.4.2). with IPv4 information assigned using DHCPv4 (see Section 3.4.2).
R-flag: (1 bit) 'Router Advertisement' flag stating whether the PvD R-flag: (1 bit) 'Router Advertisement' flag stating whether the PvD
Option is followed (right after padding to the next 64 bits Option header is followed (right after padding to the next 64 bits
boundary) by a Router Advertisement message header (see section boundary) by a Router Advertisement message header (see section
4.2 of [RFC4861]). The usage of the inner message header is 4.2 of [RFC4861]). The usage of the inner message header is
described in Section 3.4. described in Section 3.4.
Reserved: (13 bits) Reserved for later use. It MUST be set to zero Reserved: (13 bits) Reserved for later use. It MUST be set to zero
by the sender and ignored by the receiver. by the sender and ignored by the receiver.
Delay: (4 bits) Unsigned integer used to delay HTTP GET queries from Delay: (4 bits) Unsigned integer used to delay HTTP GET queries from
hosts by a randomized backoff (see Section 4.1). hosts by a randomized backoff (see Section 4.1). If the H-flag is
not set, senders SHOULD set the delay to zero, and receivers
SHOULD ignore the value.
Sequence Number: (16 bits) Sequence number for the PvD Additional Sequence Number: (16 bits) Sequence number for the PvD Additional
Information, as described in Section 4. Information, as described in Section 4. If the H-flag is not set,
senders SHOULD set the Sequence Number to zero, and receivers
SHOULD ignore the value.
PvD ID FQDN: The FQDN used as PvD ID encoded in DNS format, as PvD ID FQDN: The FQDN used as PvD ID encoded in DNS format, as
described in Section 3.1 of [RFC1035]. Domain name compression described in Section 3.1 of [RFC1035]. Domain name compression
described in Section 4.1.4 of [RFC1035] MUST NOT be used. described in Section 4.1.4 of [RFC1035] MUST NOT be used.
Padding: Zero or more padding octets to the next 8 octet boundary Padding: Zero or more padding octets to the next 8 octet boundary
(see Section 4.6 of [RFC4861]). It MUST be set to zero by the (see Section 4.6 of [RFC4861]). It MUST be set to zero by the
sender, and ignored by the receiver. sender, and ignored by the receiver.
RA message header: (16 octets) When the R-flag is set, a full Router RA message header: (16 octets) When the R-flag is set, a full Router
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Options: Zero or more RA options that would otherwise be valid as Options: Zero or more RA options that would otherwise be valid as
part of the Router Advertisement main body, but are instead part of the Router Advertisement main body, but are instead
included in the PvD Option so as to be ignored by hosts that are included in the PvD Option so as to be ignored by hosts that are
not PvD-aware. not PvD-aware.
Figure 2 shows an example of a PvD Option with "example.org" as the Figure 2 shows an example of a PvD Option with "example.org" as the
PvD ID FQDN and including both a Recursive DNS Server (RDNSS) option PvD ID FQDN and including both a Recursive DNS Server (RDNSS) option
and a prefix information option. It has a Sequence Number of 123, and a prefix information option. It has a Sequence Number of 123,
and indicates the presence of additional information that is expected and indicates the presence of additional information that is expected
to be fetched with a delay factor of 5. to be fetched with a delay factor of 1.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+-----------------------------------------------+ +---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| Type: 21 | Length: 12 |1|0|0| Reserved |Delay:5| | Type: 21 | Length: 12 |1|0|0| Reserved |Delay:1|
+---------------+-------------------------------+---------------+ +---------------+-------------------------------+---------------+
| Seq number: 123 | 7 | e | | Seq number: 123 | 7 | e |
+---------------+-----------------------------------------------+ +---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| x | a | m | p | | x | a | m | p |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+ +---------------------------------------------------------------+
| l | e | 3 | o | | l | e | 3 | o |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+ +---------------------------------------------------------------+
| r | g | 0 | 0 (padding) | | r | g | 0 | 0 (padding) |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+ +---------------------------------------------------------------+
| 0 (padding) | 0 (padding) | 0 (padding) | 0 (padding) | | 0 (padding) | 0 (padding) | 0 (padding) | 0 (padding) |
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A router MAY send RAs containing one PvD Option, but MUST NOT include A router MAY send RAs containing one PvD Option, but MUST NOT include
more than one PvD Option in each RA. The PvD Option MUST NOT contain more than one PvD Option in each RA. The PvD Option MUST NOT contain
further PvD Options. further PvD Options.
The PvD Option MAY contain zero, one, or more RA options which would The PvD Option MAY contain zero, one, or more RA options which would
otherwise be valid as part of the same RA. Such options are otherwise be valid as part of the same RA. Such options are
processed by PvD-aware hosts, while ignored by other hosts as per processed by PvD-aware hosts, while ignored by other hosts as per
section 4.2 of [RFC4861]. section 4.2 of [RFC4861].
In order to provide multiple different PvDs, a router MUST send In order to provide multiple different PvDs, a router MUST send
multiple RAs. If more than one different Implicit PvD is advertised, multiple RAs. RAs sent from different link-local source addresses
the RAs MUST be sent from different link-local source addresses. establish distinct implicit PvDs, in the absence of a PvD Option.
Explicit PvDs MAY share link-local source addresses with an Implicit Explicit PvDs MAY share link-local source addresses with an Implicit
PvD and any number of other Explicit PvDs. PvD and any number of other Explicit PvDs.
In other words, different Explicit PvDs MAY be advertised with RAs In other words, different Explicit PvDs MAY be advertised with RAs
using the same link-local source address; but different Implicit using the same link-local source address; but different Implicit
PvDs, advertised by different RAs, MUST use different link-local PvDs, advertised by different RAs, MUST use different link-local
addresses because these Implicit PvDs are identified by the source addresses because these Implicit PvDs are identified by the source
addresses of the RAs. If a link-local address on the router is addresses of the RAs. If a link-local address on the router is
changed, then any new RA will be interpreted as a different Implicit changed, then any new RA will be interpreted as a different Implicit
PvD by PvD-aware hosts. PvD by PvD-aware hosts.
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3.4. PvD-aware Host Behavior 3.4. PvD-aware Host Behavior
Hosts MUST associate received RAs and included configuration Hosts MUST associate received RAs and included configuration
information (e.g., Router Valid Lifetime, Prefix Information information (e.g., Router Valid Lifetime, Prefix Information
[RFC4861], Recursive DNS Server [RFC8106], Routing Information [RFC4861], Recursive DNS Server [RFC8106], Routing Information
[RFC4191] options) with the Explicit PvD identified by the first PvD [RFC4191] options) with the Explicit PvD identified by the first PvD
Option present in the received RA, if any, or with the Implicit PvD Option present in the received RA, if any, or with the Implicit PvD
identified by the host interface and the source address of the identified by the host interface and the source address of the
received RA otherwise. If an RA message header is present both received RA otherwise. If an RA message header is present both
within the PvD Option and outside it, as indicated by the R-flag, the within the PvD Option and outside it, the header within the PvD
header within the PvD Option takes precedence. Option takes precedence.
In case multiple PvD Options are found in a given RA, hosts MUST In case multiple PvD Options are found in a given RA, hosts MUST
ignore all but the first PvD Option. ignore all but the first PvD Option.
If a host receives PvD Options flags that it does not recognize If a host receives PvD Options flags that it does not recognize
(currently in the Reserved field), it MUST ignore these flags. (currently in the Reserved field), it MUST ignore these flags.
Similarly, hosts MUST associate all network configuration objects Similarly, hosts MUST associate all network configuration objects
(e.g., default routers, addresses, more specific routes, DNS (e.g., default routers, addresses, more specific routes, DNS
Recursive Resolvers) with the PvD associated with the RA which last Recursive Resolvers) with the PvD associated with the RA that
updated the object. For example, addresses that are generated using provisioned the object. For example, addresses that are generated
a received Prefix Information option (PIO) are associated with the using a received Prefix Information option (PIO) are associated with
PvD of the last received RA which included the given PIO. the PvD of the last received RA which included the given PIO.
PvD IDs MUST be compared in a case-insensitive manner as defined by PvD IDs MUST be compared in a case-insensitive manner as defined by
[RFC4343]. For example, "pvd.example.com." or "PvD.Example.coM." [RFC4343]. For example, "pvd.example.com." or "PvD.Example.coM."
would refer to the same PvD. would refer to the same PvD.
While resolving names, executing the default address selection While performing PvD-specific operations such as resolving names,
algorithm [RFC6724] or executing the default router selection executing the default address selection algorithm [RFC6724] or
algorithm when forwarding packets ([RFC4861], [RFC4191] and executing the default router selection algorithm when forwarding
[RFC8028]), hosts and applications MAY consider only the packets ([RFC4861], [RFC4191] and [RFC8028]), hosts and applications
configuration associated with any non-empty subset of PvDs. MAY consider only the configuration associated with any non-empty
subset of PvDs. For example, a host MAY associate a given process
For example, a host MAY associate a given process with a specific with a specific PvD, or a specific set of PvDs, while associating
PvD, or a specific set of PvDs, while associating another process another process with another PvD. A PvD-aware application might also
with another PvD. A PvD-aware application might also be able to be able to select, on a per-connection basis, which PvDs should be
select, on a per-connection basis, which PvDs should be used. In used. In particular, constrained devices such as small battery
particular, constrained devices such as small battery operated operated devices (e.g., IoT), or devices with limited CPU or memory
devices (e.g., IoT), or devices with limited CPU or memory resources resources may purposefully use a single PvD while ignoring some
may purposefully use a single PvD while ignoring some received RAs received RAs containing different PvD IDs.
containing different PvD IDs.
The way an application expresses its desire to use a given PvD, or a The way an application expresses its desire to use a given PvD, or a
set of PvDs, or the way this selection is enforced, is out of the set of PvDs, or the way this selection is enforced, is out of the
scope of this document. Useful insights about these considerations scope of this document. Useful insights about these considerations
can be found in [I-D.kline-mif-mpvd-api-reqs]. can be found in [I-D.kline-mif-mpvd-api-reqs].
3.4.1. DHCPv6 configuration association 3.4.1. DHCPv6 configuration association
When a host retrieves stateless configuration elements using DHCPv6 When a host retrieves stateless configuration elements using DHCPv6
(e.g., DNS recursive resolvers or DNS domain search lists [RFC3646]), (e.g., DNS recursive resolvers or DNS domain search lists [RFC3646]),
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assignments MUST be associated with the received PvD which was assignments MUST be associated with the received PvD which was
received with RAs with the M-flag set and including a matching PIO. received with RAs with the M-flag set and including a matching PIO.
A PIO is considered to match a DHCPv6 assignment when the IPv6 prefix A PIO is considered to match a DHCPv6 assignment when the IPv6 prefix
from the PIO includes the assignment from DHCPv6. For example, if a from the PIO includes the assignment from DHCPv6. For example, if a
PvD's associated PIO defines the prefix 2001:db8:cafe::/64, a DHCPv6 PvD's associated PIO defines the prefix 2001:db8:cafe::/64, a DHCPv6
IA_NA message that assigns the address 2001:db8:cafe::1234:4567 would IA_NA message that assigns the address 2001:db8:cafe::1234:4567 would
be considered to match. be considered to match.
In cases where an address would be assigned by DHCPv6 and no matching In cases where an address would be assigned by DHCPv6 and no matching
PvD could be found, hosts MAY associate the assigned address with any PvD could be found, hosts MAY associate the assigned address with any
implicit PvD received on the same interface or to multiple of implicit PvD received on the same interface or to multiple implicit
implicit PvD received on the same interface. This is intended to PvDs received on the same interface. This is intended to resolve
resolve backward compatibility issues with rare deployments choosing backward compatibility issues with rare deployments choosing to
to assign addresses with DHCPv6 while not sending any matching PIO. assign addresses with DHCPv6 while not sending any matching PIO.
Implementations are suggested to flag or log such scenarios as errors
to help detect misconfigurations.
3.4.2. DHCPv4 configuration association 3.4.2. DHCPv4 configuration association
Associating DHCPv4 [RFC2131] configuration elements with Explicit Associating DHCPv4 [RFC2131] configuration elements with Explicit
PvDs allows hosts to treat a set of IPv4 and IPv6 configurations as a PvDs allows hosts to treat a set of IPv4 and IPv6 configurations as a
single PvD with shared properties. For example, consider a router single PvD with shared properties. For example, consider a router
that provides two different uplinks. One could be a broadband that provides two different uplinks. One could be a broadband
network that has data rate and streaming properties described in PvD network that has data rate and streaming properties described in PvD
additional information and that provides both IPv4 and IPv6 network additional information and that provides both IPv4 and IPv6 network
access. The other could be a cellular network that provides only access. The other could be a cellular network that provides only
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Options field depend on whether the connectivity should be shared Options field depend on whether the connectivity should be shared
only with PvD-aware hosts or not (see Section 3.2). In particular, only with PvD-aware hosts or not (see Section 3.2). In particular,
all options received within the upstream PvD Option and included in all options received within the upstream PvD Option and included in
the downstream RA SHOULD be included in the downstream PvD Option. the downstream RA SHOULD be included in the downstream PvD Option.
3.4.4. Usage of DNS Servers 3.4.4. Usage of DNS Servers
PvD-aware hosts can be provisioned with recursive DNS servers via RA PvD-aware hosts can be provisioned with recursive DNS servers via RA
options passed within an Explicit PvD, via RA options associated with options passed within an Explicit PvD, via RA options associated with
an Implicit PvD, via DHCPv6 or DHCPv4, or from some other an Implicit PvD, via DHCPv6 or DHCPv4, or from some other
provisioning mechanism that creates an Implicit PvD (such as a VPN). provisioning mechanism that creates an Explicit PvD (such as a VPN).
In all of these cases, the recursive DNS server addresses SHOULD be In all of these cases, the recursive DNS server addresses SHOULD be
associated with the corresponding PvD. Specifically, queries sent to associated with the corresponding PvD. Specifically, queries sent to
a configured recursive DNS server SHOULD be sent from a local IP a configured recursive DNS server SHOULD be sent from a local IP
address that was provisioned by the PvD via RA or DHCP. Answers address that was provisioned for the PvD via RA or DHCP. Answers
received from the DNS server SHOULD only be used on the same PvD. received from the DNS server SHOULD only be used on the same PvD.
PvD-aware applications will be able to select which PvD(s) to use for PvD-aware applications will be able to select which PvD(s) to use for
DNS resolution and connections, which allows them to effectively use DNS resolution and connections, which allows them to effectively use
multiple Explicit PvDs. In order to support non-PvD-aware multiple Explicit PvDs. In order to support non-PvD-aware
applications, however, PvD-aware hosts SHOULD ensure that non-PvD- applications, however, PvD-aware hosts SHOULD ensure that non-PvD-
aware name resolution APIs like "getaddrinfo" only use resolvers from aware name resolution APIs like "getaddrinfo" only use resolvers from
a single PvD for each query. Handling DNS across PvDs is discussed a single PvD for a given query. Handling DNS across PvDs is
in Section 5.2.1 of [RFC7556], and PvD APIs are discussed in discussed in Section 5.2.1 of [RFC7556], and PvD APIs are discussed
Section 6 of [RFC7556]. in Section 6 of [RFC7556].
Maintaining the correct usage of DNS within PvDs avoids various Maintaining the correct usage of DNS within PvDs avoids various
practical errors, such as: practical errors, such as:
o A PvD associated with a VPN or otherwise private network may o A PvD associated with a VPN or otherwise private network may
provide DNS answers that contain addresses inaccessible over provide DNS answers that contain addresses inaccessible over
another PvD. This includes the DNS queries to retrieve PvD another PvD. This includes the DNS queries to retrieve PvD
additional information, which could otherwise send identifying additional information, which could otherwise send identifying
information to the recursive DNS system (see Section 4.1). information to the recursive DNS system (see Section 4.1).
skipping to change at page 13, line 10 skipping to change at page 13, line 10
synthesize IPv6 addresses in DNS answers that are not globally synthesize IPv6 addresses in DNS answers that are not globally
routable, and would be invalid on other PvDs. Conversely, an IPv4 routable, and would be invalid on other PvDs. Conversely, an IPv4
address resolved via DNS on another PvD cannot be directly used on address resolved via DNS on another PvD cannot be directly used on
a NAT64 network. a NAT64 network.
4. Provisioning Domain Additional Information 4. Provisioning Domain Additional Information
Additional information about the network characteristics can be Additional information about the network characteristics can be
retrieved based on the PvD ID. This set of information is called PvD retrieved based on the PvD ID. This set of information is called PvD
Additional Information, and is encoded as a JSON object [RFC8259]. Additional Information, and is encoded as a JSON object [RFC8259].
This JSON object is restricted to the restricted profile of I-JSON, This JSON object is restricted to the I-JSON profile, as defined in
as defined in [RFC7493]. [RFC7493].
The purpose of this JSON object is to provide additional information The purpose of this JSON object is to provide additional information
to applications on a client host about the connectivity that is to applications on a client host about the connectivity that is
provided using a given interface and source address. It typically provided using a given interface and source address. It typically
includes data that would be considered too large, or not critical includes data that would be considered too large, or not critical
enough, to be provided within an RA option. The information enough, to be provided within an RA option. The information
contained in this object MAY be used by the operating system, network contained in this object MAY be used by the operating system, network
libraries, applications, or users, in order to decide which set of libraries, applications, or users, in order to decide which set of
PvDs should be used for which connection, as described in PvDs should be used for which connection, as described in
Section 3.4. Section 3.4.
skipping to change at page 13, line 44 skipping to change at page 13, line 44
document. document.
4.1. Retrieving the PvD Additional Information 4.1. Retrieving the PvD Additional Information
When the H-flag of the PvD Option is set, hosts MAY attempt to When the H-flag of the PvD Option is set, hosts MAY attempt to
retrieve the PvD Additional Information associated with a given PvD retrieve the PvD Additional Information associated with a given PvD
by performing an HTTP over TLS [RFC2818] GET query to https://<PvD- by performing an HTTP over TLS [RFC2818] GET query to https://<PvD-
ID>/.well-known/pvd. Inversely, hosts MUST NOT do so whenever the ID>/.well-known/pvd. Inversely, hosts MUST NOT do so whenever the
H-flag is not set. H-flag is not set.
Recommendations for how to use TLS securely can be found in
[RFC7525].
When a host retrieves the PvD Additional Information, it MUST verify
that the TLS server certificate is valid for the performed request;
specifically, that a DNS-ID [RFC6125] on the certificate is equal to
the PvD ID expressed as an FQDN. This validation indicates that the
owner of the FQDN authorizes its use with the prefix advertised by
the router. If this validation fails, hosts MUST close the
connection and treat the PvD as if it has no Additional Information.
HTTP requests and responses for PvD additional information use the HTTP requests and responses for PvD additional information use the
"application/pvd+json" media type (see Section 8). Clients SHOULD "application/pvd+json" media type (see Section 8). Clients SHOULD
include this media type as an Accept header in their GET requests, include this media type as an Accept header field in their GET
and servers MUST mark this media type as their Content-Type header in requests, and servers MUST mark this media type as their Content-Type
responses. header field in responses.
Note that the DNS name resolution of the PvD ID, the PKI (Public Key Note that the DNS name resolution of the PvD ID, any connections made
Infrastructure) checks as well as the actual query MUST be performed for certficate validation (such as OCSP [RFC6960]), and the HTTP
using the considered PvD. In other words, the name resolution, PKI request itself MUST be performed using the considered PvD. In other
checks, source address selection, as well as the next-hop router words, the name resolution, PKI checks, source address selection, as
selection MUST be performed while using exclusively the set of well as the next-hop router selection MUST be performed while using
configuration information attached with the PvD, as defined in exclusively the set of configuration information attached with the
Section 3.4. In some cases, it may therefore be necessary to wait PvD, as defined in Section 3.4. In some cases, it may therefore be
for an address to be available for use (e.g., once the Duplicate necessary to wait for an address to be available for use (e.g., once
Address Detection or DHCPv6 processes are complete) before initiating the Duplicate Address Detection or DHCPv6 processes are complete)
the HTTP over TLS query. In order to address privacy concerns around before initiating the HTTP over TLS query. In order to address
linkability of the PvD HTTP connection with future user-initiated privacy concerns around linkability of the PvD HTTP connection with
connections, if the host has a temporary address per [RFC4941] in future user-initiated connections, if the host has a temporary
this PvD, then it SHOULD use a temporary address to fetch the PvD address per [RFC4941] in this PvD, then it SHOULD use a temporary
Additional Information and MAY deprecate the used temporary address address to fetch the PvD Additional Information and MAY deprecate the
and generate a new temporary address afterward. used temporary address and generate a new temporary address
afterward.
If the HTTP status of the answer is greater than or equal to 400 the If the HTTP status of the answer is greater than or equal to 400 the
host MUST abandon and consider that there is no additional PvD host MUST close its connection and consider that there is no
information. If the HTTP status of the answer is between 300 and additional PvD information. If the HTTP status of the answer is
399, inclusive, it MUST follow the redirection(s). If the HTTP between 300 and 399, inclusive, it MUST follow the redirection(s).
status of the answer is between 200 and 299, inclusive, the host MAY If the HTTP status of the answer is between 200 and 299, inclusive,
get a file containing a single JSON object. the response is expected to be a single JSON object.
After retrieval of the PvD Additional Information, hosts MUST After retrieval of the PvD Additional Information, hosts MUST
remember the last Sequence Number value received in the RA including remember the last Sequence Number value received in an RA including
the same PvD ID. Whenever a new RA for the same PvD is received with the same PvD ID. Whenever a new RA for the same PvD is received with
a different Sequence Number value, or whenever the expiry date for a different Sequence Number value, or whenever the expiry date for
the additional information is reached, hosts MUST deprecate the the additional information is reached, hosts MUST deprecate the
additional information and stop using it until a new JSON object is additional information and stop using it.
retrieved.
Hosts retrieving a new PvD Additional Information object MUST check Hosts retrieving a new PvD Additional Information object MUST check
for the presence and validity of the mandatory fields specified in for the presence and validity of the mandatory fields specified in
Section 4.3. A retrieved object including an expiration time that is Section 4.3. A retrieved object including an expiration time that is
already past or missing a mandatory element MUST be ignored. already past or missing a mandatory element MUST be ignored.
In order to avoid synchronized queries toward the server hosting the In order to avoid synchronized queries toward the server hosting the
PvD Additional Information when an object expires, object updates are PvD Additional Information when an object expires, object updates are
delayed by a randomized backoff time. delayed by a randomized backoff time.
o When a host performs a JSON object update after it detected a o When a host performs a JSON object update after it detected a
change in the PvD Option Sequence Number, it MUST add a delay change in the PvD Option Sequence Number, it MUST add a delay
before sending the query. The target time for the delay is before sending the query. The target time for the delay is
calculated as a random time between zero and 2**(Delay * 2) calculated as a random time between zero and 2**(10 + Delay)
milliseconds, where 'Delay' corresponds to the 4-bit unsigned milliseconds, where 'Delay' corresponds to the 4-bit unsigned
integer in the last received PvD Option. integer in the last received PvD Option.
o When a host last retrieved a JSON object at time A that includes a o When a host last retrieved a JSON object at time A that includes a
expiry time B using the "expires" key, and the host is configured expiry time B using the "expires" key, and the host is configured
to keep the PvD information up to date, it MUST add some to keep the PvD information up to date, it MUST add some
randomness into its calculation of the time to fetch the update. randomness into its calculation of the time to fetch the update.
The target time for fetching the updated object is calculated as a The target time for fetching the updated object is calculated as a
uniformly random time in the interval [(B-A)/2,B]. uniformly random time in the interval [(B-A)/2,B].
In the example Figure 2, the delay field value is 5, this means that In the example Figure 2, the delay field value is 1, this means that
the host calculates its delay by choosing a random number between 0 the host calculates its delay by choosing a uniformly random time
and 2**(5 * 2) milliseconds, i.e., between 0 and 1024 milliseconds. between 0 and 2**(10 + 1) milliseconds, i.e., between 0 and 2048
milliseconds.
Since the 'Delay' value is directly within the PvD Option rather than Since the 'Delay' value is directly within the PvD Option rather than
the object itself, an operator may perform a push-based update by the object itself, an operator may perform a push-based update by
incrementing the Sequence value while changing the Delay value incrementing the Sequence Number value while changing the Delay value
depending on the criticality of the update and its PvD Additional depending on the criticality of the update and its PvD Additional
Information servers capacity. Information servers capacity.
In addition to adding a random delay when fetching Additional
Information, hosts MUST enforce a minimum time between requesting
Additional Information for a given PvD on the same network. This
minimum time is RECOMMENDED to be 10 seconds, in order to avoid hosts
causing a denial-of-service on the PvD server. Hosts also MUST limit
the number of requests that are made to different PvD Additional
Information servers on the same network within a short period of
time. A RECOMMENDED value is to issue no more than five PvD
Additional Information requests in total on a given network within 10
seconds. For more discussion, see Section 6.
The PvD Additional Information object includes a set of IPv6 prefixes The PvD Additional Information object includes a set of IPv6 prefixes
(under the key "prefixes") which MUST be checked against all the (under the key "prefixes") which MUST be checked against all the
Prefix Information Options advertised in the RA. If any of the Prefix Information Options advertised in the RA. If any of the
prefixes included in any associated PIO is not covered by at least prefixes included in any associated PIO is not covered by at least
one of the listed prefixes, the associated PvD information MUST be one of the listed prefixes, the associated PvD information MUST be
considered to be a misconfiguration, and MUST NOT be used by the considered to be a misconfiguration, and MUST NOT be used by the
host. See Section 4.4 for more discussion on handling such host. See Section 4.4 for more discussion on handling such
misconfigurations. misconfigurations.
If the request for PvD Additional Information fails due to a TLS
certificate validation error, an HTTP error, or because the retrieved
file does not contain valid PvD JSON, hosts MUST close any connection
used to fetch the PvD Additional Information, and MUST NOT request
the information for that PvD ID again for the duration of the local
network attachment. If a host detects 10 or more such failures to
fetch PvD Additional Information, the local network is assumed to be
misconfigured or under attack, and the host MUST NOT make any further
requests for any PvD Additional Information, belonging to any PvD ID,
for the duration of the local network attachment. For more
discussion, see Section 6.
4.2. Operational Consideration to Providing the PvD Additional 4.2. Operational Consideration to Providing the PvD Additional
Information Information
Whenever the H-flag is set in the PvD Option, a valid PvD Additional Whenever the H-flag is set in the PvD Option, a valid PvD Additional
Information object MUST be made available to all hosts receiving the Information object MUST be made available to all hosts receiving the
RA by the network operator. In particular, when a captive portal is RA by the network operator. In particular, when a captive portal is
present, hosts MUST still be allowed to perform DNS, PKI and HTTP present, hosts MUST still be allowed to perform DNS, certficate
over TLS operations related to the retrieval of the object, even validation, and HTTP over TLS operations related to the retrieval of
before logging into the captive portal. the object, even before logging into the captive portal.
Routers SHOULD increment the PVD Option Sequence Number by one Routers SHOULD increment the PVD Option Sequence Number by one
whenever a new PvD Additional Information object is available and whenever a new PvD Additional Information object is available and
should be retrieved by hosts. If the value exceeds what can be should be retrieved by hosts. If the value exceeds what can be
stored in the Sequence Number field, it SHOULD wrap back to zero. stored in the Sequence Number field, it MUST wrap back to zero.
The server providing the JSON files SHOULD also check whether the The server providing the JSON files SHOULD also check whether the
client address is part of the prefixes listed into the additional client address is contained by the prefixes listed in the additional
information and SHOULD return a 403 response code if there is no information, and SHOULD return a 403 response code if there is no
match. match.
4.3. PvD Additional Information Format 4.3. PvD Additional Information Format
The PvD Additional Information is a JSON object. The PvD Additional Information is a JSON object.
The following table presents the mandatory keys which MUST be The following table presents the mandatory keys which MUST be
included in the object: included in the object:
+------------+-----------------+-----------+------------------------+ +------------+-----------------+-----------+------------------------+
| JSON key | Description | Type | Example | | JSON key | Description | Type | Example |
+------------+-----------------+-----------+------------------------+ +------------+-----------------+-----------+------------------------+
| identifier | PvD ID FQDN | String | "pvd.example.com." | | identifier | PvD ID FQDN | String | "pvd.example.com." |
| | | | | | | | | |
| expires | Date after | [RFC3339] | "2017-07-23T06:00:00Z" | | expires | Date after | [RFC3339] | "2020-05-23T06:00:00Z" |
| | which this | Date | | | | which this | Date | |
| | object is no | | | | | object is no | | |
| | longer valid | | | | | longer valid | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| prefixes | Array of IPv6 | Array of | ["2001:db8:1::/48", | | prefixes | Array of IPv6 | Array of | ["2001:db8:1::/48", |
| | prefixes valid | strings | "2001:db8:4::/48"] | | | prefixes valid | strings | "2001:db8:4::/48"] |
| | for this PvD | | | | | for this PvD | | |
+------------+-----------------+-----------+------------------------+ +------------+-----------------+-----------+------------------------+
A retrieved object which does not include all three of these keys at A retrieved object which does not include all three of these keys at
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be validated, otherwise the object MUST be ignored. The value stored be validated, otherwise the object MUST be ignored. The value stored
for "identifier" MUST be matched against the PvD ID FQDN presented in for "identifier" MUST be matched against the PvD ID FQDN presented in
the PvD RA option using the comparison mechanism described in the PvD RA option using the comparison mechanism described in
Section 3.4. The value stored for "expires" MUST be a valid date in Section 3.4. The value stored for "expires" MUST be a valid date in
the future. If the PIO of the received RA is not covered by at least the future. If the PIO of the received RA is not covered by at least
one of the "prefixes" key, the retrieved object SHOULD be ignored. one of the "prefixes" key, the retrieved object SHOULD be ignored.
The following table presents some optional keys which MAY be included The following table presents some optional keys which MAY be included
in the object. in the object.
+------------+----------------------+----------+--------------------+ +------------+-----------------------+---------+--------------------+
| JSON key | Description | Type | Example | | JSON key | Description | Type | Example |
+------------+----------------------+----------+--------------------+ +------------+-----------------------+---------+--------------------+
| dnsZones | DNS zones searchable | Array of | ["example.com", | | dnsZones | DNS zones searchable | Array | ["example.com", |
| | and accessible | strings | | | | and accessible | of | "sub.example.com"] |
| | | | | | | | strings | |
| | | | "sub.example.com"] | | | | | |
| | | | | | noInternet | No Internet, set to | Boolean | true |
| noInternet | No Internet, set | Boolean | true | | | "true" when the PvD | | |
| | when the PvD is | | | | | is restricted. | | |
| | restricted. | | | +------------+-----------------------+---------+--------------------+
+------------+----------------------+----------+--------------------+
It is worth noting that the JSON format allows for extensions. It is worth noting that the JSON format allows for extensions.
Whenever an unknown key is encountered, it MUST be ignored along with Whenever an unknown key is encountered, it MUST be ignored along with
its associated elements. its associated elements.
Private-use or experimental keys MAY be used in the JSON dictionary. Private-use or experimental keys MAY be used in the JSON dictionary.
In order to avoid such keys colliding with IANA registry keys, In order to avoid such keys colliding with IANA registry keys,
implementers or vendors defining private-use or experimental keys implementers or vendors defining private-use or experimental keys
MUST create sub-dictionaries, where the sub-dictionary is added into MUST create sub-dictionaries. If a set of PvD Additional Information
the top-level JSON dictionary with a key of the format "vendor-*" keys are defined by an organization that has a Formal URN Namespace
where the "*" is replaced by the implementer's or vendor's [URN], the URN namespace SHOULD be used as the top-level JSON key for
identifier. For example, keys specific to the FooBar organization the sub-dictionary. For other private uses, the sub-dictionary key
could use "vendor-foobar". Upon receiving such a sub-dictionary, SHOULD follow the format of "vendor-*", where the "*" is replaced by
host MUST ignore this sub-dictionary if it is unknown. When the the implementer's or vendor's identifier. For example, keys specific
vendor or implementer is part of an IANA URN namespace [URN], the URN to the FooBar organization could use "vendor-foobar". If a host
namespace SHOULD be used rather than the "vendor-*" format. receives a sub-dictionary with an unknown key, the host MUST ignore
the contents of the sub-dictionary.
4.3.1. Example 4.3.1. Example
The following two examples show how the JSON keys defined in this The following two examples show how the JSON keys defined in this
document can be used: document can be used:
{ {
"identifier": "cafe.example.com", "identifier": "cafe.example.com.",
"expires": "2017-07-23T06:00:00Z", "expires": "2020-05-23T06:00:00Z",
"prefixes": ["2001:db8:1::/48", "2001:db8:4::/48"], "prefixes": ["2001:db8:1::/48", "2001:db8:4::/48"],
} }
{ {
"identifier": "company.foo.example.com", "identifier": "company.foo.example.com.",
"expires": "2017-07-23T06:00:00Z", "expires": "2020-05-23T06:00:00Z",
"prefixes": ["2001:db8:1::/48", "2001:db8:4::/48"], "prefixes": ["2001:db8:1::/48", "2001:db8:4::/48"],
"vendor-foo": "vendor-foo":
{ {
"private-key": "private-value", "private-key": "private-value",
}, },
} }
4.4. Detecting misconfiguration and misuse 4.4. Detecting misconfiguration and misuse
When a host retrieves the PvD Additional Information, it MUST verify Hosts MUST validate the TLS server certificate when retrieving PvD
that the TLS server certificate is valid for the performed request Additional Information, as detailed in Section 4.1.
(e.g., that the Subject Alternative Name is equal to the PvD ID
expressed as an FQDN). This authentication creates a secure binding
between the information provided by the trusted Router Advertisement,
and the HTTPS server. However, this does not mean the Advertising
Router and the PvD server belong to the same entity.
Hosts MUST verify that all prefixes in all the RA PIOs are covered by Hosts MUST verify that all prefixes in all the RA PIOs are covered by
a prefix from the PvD Additional Information. An adversarial router a prefix from the PvD Additional Information. An adversarial router
attempting to spoof the definition of an Explicit PvD, without the attempting to spoof the definition of an Explicit PvD, without the
ability to modify the PvD Additional Information, would need to ability to modify the PvD Additional Information, would need to
perform NAT66 in order to circumvent this check. Thus, this check perform NAT66 in order to circumvent this check. Thus, this check
cannot prevent all spoofing, but it can detect misconfiguration or cannot prevent all spoofing, but it can detect misconfiguration or
mismatched routers that are not adding a NAT. mismatched routers that are not adding a NAT.
If NAT66 is being added in order to spoof PvD ownership, the HTTPS If NAT66 is being added in order to spoof PvD ownership, the HTTPS
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information to the valid network users. If the PvD does not information to the valid network users. If the PvD does not
provision IPv4 (it does not include the 'L' bit in the RA), the provision IPv4 (it does not include the 'L' bit in the RA), the
server cannot validate the source addresses of connections using server cannot validate the source addresses of connections using
IPv4. Thus, the PvD ID FQDN for such PvDs SHOULD NOT have a DNS A IPv4. Thus, the PvD ID FQDN for such PvDs SHOULD NOT have a DNS A
record. record.
5. Operational Considerations 5. Operational Considerations
This section describes some example use cases of PvDs. For the sake This section describes some example use cases of PvDs. For the sake
of simplicity, the RA messages will not be described in the usual of simplicity, the RA messages will not be described in the usual
ASCII art but rather in an indented list. ASCII art but rather in an indented list. Values in the PvD Option
header that are not included in the example are assumed to be zero or
false (such as the H-flag, Sequence Number, and Delay fields).
5.1. Exposing Extra RA Options to PvD-Aware Hosts 5.1. Exposing Extra RA Options to PvD-Aware Hosts
In this example, there is one RA message sent by the router. This In this example, there is one RA message sent by the router. This
message contains some options applicable to all hosts on the network, message contains some options applicable to all hosts on the network,
and also a PvD Option that also contains other options only visible and also a PvD Option that also contains other options only visible
to PvD-aware hosts. to PvD-aware hosts.
o RA Header: router lifetime = 6000 o RA Header: router lifetime = 6000
skipping to change at page 19, line 46 skipping to change at page 20, line 44
* RA Header: router lifetime = 1600 (PvD-aware hosts will use * RA Header: router lifetime = 1600 (PvD-aware hosts will use
this router as a default router), implicit length = 2 this router as a default router), implicit length = 2
* Prefix Information Option: length = 4, prefix = * Prefix Information Option: length = 4, prefix =
2001:db8:f00d::/64 2001:db8:f00d::/64
* Recursive DNS Server Option: length = 3, addresses = * Recursive DNS Server Option: length = 3, addresses =
[2001:db8:f00d::53] [2001:db8:f00d::53]
In the above example, non-PvD-aware hosts will only use the first RA In the above example, non-PvD-aware hosts will only use the first
sent from their default router and using the 2001:db8:cafe::/64 listed RA sent by their default router and using the
prefix. PvD-aware hosts will autonomously configure addresses from 2001:db8:cafe::/64 prefix. PvD-aware hosts will autonomously
both PIOs, but will only use the source address in 2001:db8:f00d::/64 configure addresses from both PIOs, but will only use the source
to communicate past the first hop router since only the router address in 2001:db8:f00d::/64 to communicate past the first hop
sending the second RA will be used as default router; similarly, they router since only the router sending the second RA will be used as
will use the DNS server 2001:db8:f00d::53 when communicating with default router; similarly, they will use the DNS server
this address. 2001:db8:f00d::53 when communicating from this address.
5.3. Enabling Multi-homing for PvD-Aware Hosts 5.3. Enabling Multi-homing for PvD-Aware Hosts
In this example, the goal is to have one prefix from one RA be usable In this example, the goal is to have one prefix from one RA be usable
by both non-PvD-aware and PvD-aware hosts; and to have another prefix by both non-PvD-aware and PvD-aware hosts; and to have another prefix
usable only by PvD-aware hosts. This allows PvD-aware hosts to be usable only by PvD-aware hosts. This allows PvD-aware hosts to be
able to effectively multi-home on the network. able to effectively multi-home on the network.
The first RA is usable by all hosts. The only difference for PvD- The first RA is usable by all hosts. The only difference for PvD-
aware hosts is that they can explicitly identify the PvD ID aware hosts is that they can explicitly identify the PvD ID
skipping to change at page 21, line 28 skipping to change at page 22, line 24
o Recursive DNS Server Option: length = 3, addresses= o Recursive DNS Server Option: length = 3, addresses=
[2001:db8:cafe::53] [2001:db8:cafe::53]
o PvD Option header: length = 3, PvD ID FQDN = cafe.example.com., o PvD Option header: length = 3, PvD ID FQDN = cafe.example.com.,
Sequence Number = 7, R-flag = 0, H-flag = 1 (actual length of the Sequence Number = 7, R-flag = 0, H-flag = 1 (actual length of the
header with padding 24 bytes = 3 * 8 bytes) header with padding 24 bytes = 3 * 8 bytes)
A PvD-aware host will fetch https://cafe.example.com/.well-known/pvd A PvD-aware host will fetch https://cafe.example.com/.well-known/pvd
to get the additonal information. The following example shows a GET to get the additonal information. The following example shows a GET
request that the host sends: request that the host sends, in HTTP/2 syntax [RFC7540]:
:method = GET :method = GET
:scheme = https :scheme = https
:authority = cafe.example.com :authority = cafe.example.com
:path = /.well-known/pvd :path = /.well-known/pvd
accept = application/pvd+json accept = application/pvd+json
The HTTP server will respond with the JSON additional information: The HTTP server will respond with the JSON additional information:
:status = 200 :status = 200
content-type = application/pvd+json content-type = application/pvd+json
content-length = 116 content-length = 116
{ {
"identifier": "cafe.example.com", "identifier": "cafe.example.com.",
"expires": "2017-07-23T06:00:00Z", "expires": "2020-05-23T06:00:00Z",
"prefixes": ["2001:db8:cafe::/48"], "prefixes": ["2001:db8:cafe::/48"],
} }
At this point, the host has the additional information, and knows the At this point, the host has the additional information, and knows the
expiry time. When either the expiry time passes, or a new Sequence expiry time. When either the expiry time passes, or a new Sequence
Number is provided in an RA, the host will re-fetch the additional Number is provided in an RA, the host will re-fetch the additional
information. information.
For example, if the router sends a new RA with the Sequence Number For example, if the router sends a new RA with the Sequence Number
set to 8, the host will re-fetch the additional information: set to 8, the host will re-fetch the additional information:
skipping to change at page 22, line 19 skipping to change at page 23, line 16
cafe.example.com., Sequence Number = 8, R-flag = 0, H-flag = 1 cafe.example.com., Sequence Number = 8, R-flag = 0, H-flag = 1
(actual length of the header with padding 24 bytes = 3 * 8 bytes) (actual length of the header with padding 24 bytes = 3 * 8 bytes)
However, if the router sends a new RA, but the Sequence Number has However, if the router sends a new RA, but the Sequence Number has
not changed, the host would not re-fetch the additional information not changed, the host would not re-fetch the additional information
(until and unless the expiry time of the additional information has (until and unless the expiry time of the additional information has
passed). passed).
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
Since the PvD ID RA option can contain an RA header and other RA
options, any security considerations that apply for specific RA
options continue to apply when used within a PvD ID option.
Although some solutions such as IPsec or SeND [RFC3971] can be used Although some solutions such as IPsec or SeND [RFC3971] can be used
in order to secure the IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol, in practice in order to secure the IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol, in practice
actual deployments largely rely on link layer or physical layer actual deployments largely rely on link layer or physical layer
security mechanisms (e.g., 802.1x [IEEE8021X]) in conjunction with RA security mechanisms (e.g., 802.1x [IEEE8021X]) in conjunction with RA
Guard [RFC6105]. Guard [RFC6105].
If multiple RAs are sent for a single PvD to avoid fragmentation,
dropping packets can lead to processing only part of a PvD ID option,
which could lead to hosts receiving only part of the contained
options. As discussed in Section 3.2, routers MUST include the PvD
ID option in all fragments generated.
This specification does not improve the Neighbor Discovery Protocol This specification does not improve the Neighbor Discovery Protocol
security model, but extends the purely link-local trust relationship security model, but simply validates that the owner of the PvD FQDN
between the host and the default routers with HTTP over TLS authorizes its use with the prefix advertised by the router. In
communications which servers are authenticated as rightful owners of combination with implicit trust in the local router (if present),
the FQDN received within the trusted PvD ID RA option. this gives the host some level of assurance that the PvD is
authorized for use in this environment. However, when the local
router cannot be trusted, no such guarantee is available.
It must be noted that Section 4.4 of this document only provides It must be noted that Section 4.4 of this document only provides
reasonable assurance against misconfiguration but does not prevent an reasonable assurance against misconfiguration but does not prevent a
hostile network access provider to advertise wrong information that hostile network access provider from advertising incorrect
could lead applications or hosts to select a hostile PvD. information that could lead applications or hosts to select a hostile
PvD. However, a host that correctly implements the multiple PvD
architecture ([RFC7556]) using the mechanism described in this
document will be less susceptible to some attacks than a host that
does not by being able to check for the various misconfigurations or
inconsistencies described in this document.
Users cannot be assumed to be able to meaningfully differentiate Since expiration times provided in PvD Additional Information use
between "safe" and "unsafe" networks. This is a known attack surface absolute time, these values can be skewed for hosts without an
that is present whether or not PvDs are in use, and hence cannot be accurate time base, or due to clock skew. Such time values MUST NOT
addressed by this document. However, a host that correctly be used for security-sensitive functionality or decisions.
implements the multiple PvD architecture ([RFC7556]) using the
mechanism described in this document will be less susceptible to such An attacker generating RAs on a local network can use the H-flag and
attacks than a host that does not by being able to check for the the PvD ID to cause hosts on the network to make requests for PvD
various misconfigurations described in this document. Additional Information from servers. This can become a denial-of-
service attack, in which an attacker can amplify its attack by
triggering TLS connections to arbitrary servers in response to
sending UDP packets containing RA messages. To mitigate this attack,
hosts MUST:
o limit the rate at which they fetch a particular PvD's Additional
Information;
o limit the rate at which they fetch any PvD Additional Information
on a given local network;
o stop making requests for a PvD ID that does not respond with valid
JSON;
o stop making requests for all PvD IDs once a certain number of
failures is reached on a particular network.
Details are provided in Section 4.1. This attack can be targeted at
generic web servers, in which case the host behavior of stopping
requesting for any server that doesn't behave like a PvD Additional
Information server is critical. Limiting requests for a specific PvD
ID might not be sufficient if the attacker changes the PvD ID values
quickly, so hosts also need to stop requesting if they detect
consistent failure when on a network that is under attack. For cases
in which an attacker is pointing hosts at a valid PvD Additional
Information server (but one that is not actually associated with the
local network), the server SHOULD reject any requests that do not
originate from the expected IPv6 prefix as described in Section 4.2.
7. Privacy Considerations 7. Privacy Considerations
Retrieval of the PvD Additional Information over HTTPS requires early Retrieval of the PvD Additional Information over HTTPS requires early
communications between the connecting host and a server which may be communications between the connecting host and a server which may be
located further than the first hop router. Although this server is located further than the first hop router. Although this server is
likely to be located within the same administrative domain as the likely to be located within the same administrative domain as the
default router, this property can't be ensured. Therefore, hosts default router, this property can't be ensured. To minimize the
willing to retrieve the PvD Additional Information before using it leakage of identity information while retrieving the PvD Additional
without leaking identity information, SHOULD make use of an IPv6 Information, hosts SHOULD make use of an IPv6 temporary address and
Privacy Address and SHOULD NOT include any privacy sensitive data, SHOULD NOT include any privacy-sensitive data, such as a User-Agent
such as User Agent header or HTTP cookie, while performing the HTTP header field or an HTTP cookie.
over TLS query.
Hosts might not always fetch PvD Additional Information, depending on
whether or not they expect to use the information. However, if a
host whitelisted only certain PvD IDs for which to fetch Additional
Information, an attacker could send various PvD IDs in RAs to detect
which PvD IDs are whitelisted by the client. To avoid this, hosts
SHOULD either fetch Additional Information for all eligible PvD IDs
on a given local network, or fetch the information for none of them.
From a user privacy perspective, retrieving the PvD Additional From a user privacy perspective, retrieving the PvD Additional
Information is not different from establishing a first connection to Information is not different from establishing a first connection to
a remote server, or even performing a single DNS lookup. For a remote server, or even performing a single DNS lookup. For
example, most operating systems already perform early queries to well example, most operating systems already perform early queries to
known web sites, such as http://captive.example.com/hotspot- static web sites, such as http://captive.example.com/hotspot-
detect.html, in order to detect the presence of a captive portal. detect.html, in order to detect the presence of a captive portal.
The DNS queries associated with the PvD Additional Information MUST The DNS queries associated with the PvD Additional Information MUST
use the DNS servers indicated by the associated PvD, as described in use the DNS servers indicated by the associated PvD, as described in
Section 4.1. This ensures the name of the PvD Additional Information Section 4.1. This ensures the name of the PvD Additional Information
server is not unintentionally sent on another network, thus leaking server is not unintentionally sent on another network, thus leaking
identifying information about the networks with which the client is identifying information about the networks with which the client is
associated. associated.
There may be some cases where hosts, for privacy reasons, should There may be some cases where hosts, for privacy reasons, should
skipping to change at page 23, line 37 skipping to change at page 25, line 41
allowed to communicate with. In such scenarios, the host SHOULD allowed to communicate with. In such scenarios, the host SHOULD
check that the provided PvD ID, as well as the IP address that it check that the provided PvD ID, as well as the IP address that it
resolves into, are part of the allowed whitelist. resolves into, are part of the allowed whitelist.
Network operators SHOULD restrict access to PvD Additional Network operators SHOULD restrict access to PvD Additional
Information to only expose it to hosts that are connected to the Information to only expose it to hosts that are connected to the
local network, especially if the Additional Information would provide local network, especially if the Additional Information would provide
information about local network configuration to attackers. This can information about local network configuration to attackers. This can
be implemented by whitelisting access from the addresses and prefixes be implemented by whitelisting access from the addresses and prefixes
that the router provides for the PvD, which will match the prefixes that the router provides for the PvD, which will match the prefixes
contained in the PvD Additional Information. contained in the PvD Additional Information. This technique is
described in Section 4.2.
8. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
Upon publication of this document, IANA is asked to remove the Upon publication of this document, IANA is asked to remove the
'reclaimable' tag off the value 21 for the PvD Option (from the IPv6 'reclaimable' tag off the value 21 for the PvD Option (from the IPv6
Neighbor Discovery Option Formats registry). Neighbor Discovery Option Formats registry).
8.1. New entry in the Well-Known URIs Registry 8.1. New entry in the Well-Known URIs Registry
IANA is asked to add a new entry in the Well-Known URIs registry IANA is asked to add a new entry in the Well-Known URIs registry
skipping to change at page 24, line 26 skipping to change at page 26, line 34
use in PvD additional information. The initial contents of this use in PvD additional information. The initial contents of this
registry are given in Section 4.3, including both the table of registry are given in Section 4.3, including both the table of
mandatory keys and the table of optional keys. mandatory keys and the table of optional keys.
The status of a key as mandatory or optional is intentionally not The status of a key as mandatory or optional is intentionally not
denoted in the table to allow for flexibility in future use cases. denoted in the table to allow for flexibility in future use cases.
Any new assignments of keys will be considered as optional for the Any new assignments of keys will be considered as optional for the
purpose of the mechanism described in this document. purpose of the mechanism described in this document.
New assignments for Additional Information PvD Keys Registry will be New assignments for Additional Information PvD Keys Registry will be
administered by IANA through Expert Review [RFC8126]. administered by IANA through Expert Review [RFC8126]. Experts are
requested to ensure that defined keys do not overlap in names or
semantics, and represent non-vendor-specific use cases. Vendor-
specific keys SHOULD use sub-dictionaries, as described in
Section 4.3.
IANA is asked to place this registry in a new page, entitled IANA is asked to place this registry in a new page, entitled
"Provisioning Domains (PvDs)". "Provisioning Domains (PvDs)".
8.3. PvD Option Flags Registry 8.3. PvD Option Flags Registry
IANA is also asked to create and maintain a new registry entitled IANA is also asked to create and maintain a new registry entitled
"PvD Option Flags" reserving bit positions from 0 to 15 to be used in "PvD Option Flags" reserving bit positions from 0 to 12 to be used in
the PvD Option bitmask. Bit position 0, 1 and 2 are assigned by this the PvD Option bitmask. Bit position 0, 1 and 2 are assigned by this
document (as specified in Figure 1). Future assignments require document (as specified in Figure 1). Future assignments require
Standards Action [RFC8126], via a Standards Track RFC document. Standards Action [RFC8126].
Since these flags apply to an IPv6 Router Advertisement Option, IANA Since these flags apply to an IPv6 Router Advertisement Option, IANA
is asked to place this registry under the existing "Internet Control is asked to place this registry under the existing "Internet Control
Message Protocol version 6 (ICMPv6) Parameters" page, as well as Message Protocol version 6 (ICMPv6) Parameters" page, as well as
providing a link on the new "Provisioning Domains (PvDs)" page. providing a link on the new "Provisioning Domains (PvDs)" page.
8.4. PvD JSON Media Type Registration 8.4. PvD JSON Media Type Registration
This document registers the media type for PvD JSON text, This document registers the media type for PvD JSON text,
"application/pvd+json". "application/pvd+json".
Type Name: application Type Name: application
Subtype Name: pvd+json Subtype Name: pvd+json
Required parameters: None
Optional parameters: None Required parameters: N/A
Optional parameters: N/A
Encoding considerations: Encoding considerations are identical to Encoding considerations: Encoding considerations are identical to
those specified for the "application/json" media type. those specified for the "application/json" media type.
Security considerations: See Section 6. Security considerations: See Section 6.
Interoperability considerations: This document specifies format of Interoperability considerations: This document specifies the format
conforming messages and the interpretation thereof. of conforming messages and the interpretation thereof.
Published specification: This document Published specification: This document
Applications that use this media type: This media type is intended to Applications that use this media type: This media type is intended to
be used by network advertising additional Provisioning Domain be used by networks advertising additional Provisioning Domain
information, and clients looking up such information. information, and clients looking up such information.
Additional information: None Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
Additional information: N/A
Person and email address to contact for further information: See Person and email address to contact for further information: See
Authors' Addresses section Authors' Addresses section
Intended usage: COMMON Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: None Restrictions on usage: N/A
Author: IETF Author: IETF
Change controller: IETF Change controller: IETF
9. Acknowledgments 9. Acknowledgments
Many thanks to M. Stenberg and S. Barth for their earlier work: Many thanks to M. Stenberg and S. Barth for their earlier work:
[I-D.stenberg-mif-mpvd-dns], as well as to Basile Bruneau who was [I-D.stenberg-mif-mpvd-dns], as well as to Basile Bruneau who was
author of an early version of this document. author of an early version of this document.
skipping to change at page 26, line 18 skipping to change at page 28, line 35
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and [RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035, specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>. November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
RFC 2131, DOI 10.17487/RFC2131, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2131>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
[RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet: [RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002, Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>.
[RFC3646] Droms, R., Ed., "DNS Configuration options for Dynamic
Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3646,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3646, December 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3646>.
[RFC4191] Draves, R. and D. Thaler, "Default Router Preferences and [RFC4191] Draves, R. and D. Thaler, "Default Router Preferences and
More-Specific Routes", RFC 4191, DOI 10.17487/RFC4191, More-Specific Routes", RFC 4191, DOI 10.17487/RFC4191,
November 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4191>. November 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4191>.
[RFC4343] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Domain Name System (DNS) Case [RFC4343] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Domain Name System (DNS) Case
Insensitivity Clarification", RFC 4343, Insensitivity Clarification", RFC 4343,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4343, January 2006, DOI 10.17487/RFC4343, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4343>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4343>.
[RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman, [RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
skipping to change at page 27, line 19 skipping to change at page 29, line 29
[RFC6980] Gont, F., "Security Implications of IPv6 Fragmentation [RFC6980] Gont, F., "Security Implications of IPv6 Fragmentation
with IPv6 Neighbor Discovery", RFC 6980, with IPv6 Neighbor Discovery", RFC 6980,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6980, August 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6980, August 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6980>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6980>.
[RFC7493] Bray, T., Ed., "The I-JSON Message Format", RFC 7493, [RFC7493] Bray, T., Ed., "The I-JSON Message Format", RFC 7493,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7493, March 2015, DOI 10.17487/RFC7493, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7493>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7493>.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
[RFC7556] Anipko, D., Ed., "Multiple Provisioning Domain
Architecture", RFC 7556, DOI 10.17487/RFC7556, June 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7556>.
[RFC8028] Baker, F. and B. Carpenter, "First-Hop Router Selection by [RFC8028] Baker, F. and B. Carpenter, "First-Hop Router Selection by
Hosts in a Multi-Prefix Network", RFC 8028, Hosts in a Multi-Prefix Network", RFC 8028,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8028, November 2016, DOI 10.17487/RFC8028, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8028>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8028>.
[RFC8106] Jeong, J., Park, S., Beloeil, L., and S. Madanapalli,
"IPv6 Router Advertisement Options for DNS Configuration",
RFC 8106, DOI 10.17487/RFC8106, March 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8106>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for [RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017, RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data [RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
skipping to change at page 28, line 11 skipping to change at page 30, line 27
Kline, E., "Multiple Provisioning Domains API Kline, E., "Multiple Provisioning Domains API
Requirements", draft-kline-mif-mpvd-api-reqs-00 (work in Requirements", draft-kline-mif-mpvd-api-reqs-00 (work in
progress), November 2015. progress), November 2015.
[I-D.stenberg-mif-mpvd-dns] [I-D.stenberg-mif-mpvd-dns]
Stenberg, M. and S. Barth, "Multiple Provisioning Domains Stenberg, M. and S. Barth, "Multiple Provisioning Domains
using Domain Name System", draft-stenberg-mif-mpvd-dns-00 using Domain Name System", draft-stenberg-mif-mpvd-dns-00
(work in progress), October 2015. (work in progress), October 2015.
[IEEE8021X] [IEEE8021X]
"IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks, IEEE, "IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area
Port-based Network Access Control, IEEE Std", n.d.. Networks, Port-based Network Access Control, IEEE Std".
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, [RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000, RFC 2131, DOI 10.17487/RFC2131, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2131>.
[RFC3646] Droms, R., Ed., "DNS Configuration options for Dynamic
Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3646,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3646, December 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3646>.
[RFC3971] Arkko, J., Ed., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, [RFC3971] Arkko, J., Ed., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander,
"SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, "SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3971, March 2005, DOI 10.17487/RFC3971, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3971>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3971>.
[RFC4389] Thaler, D., Talwar, M., and C. Patel, "Neighbor Discovery [RFC4389] Thaler, D., Talwar, M., and C. Patel, "Neighbor Discovery
Proxies (ND Proxy)", RFC 4389, DOI 10.17487/RFC4389, April Proxies (ND Proxy)", RFC 4389, DOI 10.17487/RFC4389, April
2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4389>. 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4389>.
[RFC6105] Levy-Abegnoli, E., Van de Velde, G., Popoviciu, C., and J. [RFC6105] Levy-Abegnoli, E., Van de Velde, G., Popoviciu, C., and J.
Mohacsi, "IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard", RFC 6105, Mohacsi, "IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard", RFC 6105,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6105, February 2011, DOI 10.17487/RFC6105, February 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6105>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6105>.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
[RFC6146] Bagnulo, M., Matthews, P., and I. van Beijnum, "Stateful [RFC6146] Bagnulo, M., Matthews, P., and I. van Beijnum, "Stateful
NAT64: Network Address and Protocol Translation from IPv6 NAT64: Network Address and Protocol Translation from IPv6
Clients to IPv4 Servers", RFC 6146, DOI 10.17487/RFC6146, Clients to IPv4 Servers", RFC 6146, DOI 10.17487/RFC6146,
April 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6146>. April 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6146>.
[RFC6147] Bagnulo, M., Sullivan, A., Matthews, P., and I. van [RFC6147] Bagnulo, M., Sullivan, A., Matthews, P., and I. van
Beijnum, "DNS64: DNS Extensions for Network Address Beijnum, "DNS64: DNS Extensions for Network Address
Translation from IPv6 Clients to IPv4 Servers", RFC 6147, Translation from IPv6 Clients to IPv4 Servers", RFC 6147,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6147, April 2011, DOI 10.17487/RFC6147, April 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6147>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6147>.
[RFC6296] Wasserman, M. and F. Baker, "IPv6-to-IPv6 Network Prefix [RFC6296] Wasserman, M. and F. Baker, "IPv6-to-IPv6 Network Prefix
Translation", RFC 6296, DOI 10.17487/RFC6296, June 2011, Translation", RFC 6296, DOI 10.17487/RFC6296, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6296>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6296>.
[RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.
[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object [RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049, Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>. October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.
[RFC7278] Byrne, C., Drown, D., and A. Vizdal, "Extending an IPv6 [RFC7278] Byrne, C., Drown, D., and A. Vizdal, "Extending an IPv6
/64 Prefix from a Third Generation Partnership Project /64 Prefix from a Third Generation Partnership Project
(3GPP) Mobile Interface to a LAN Link", RFC 7278, (3GPP) Mobile Interface to a LAN Link", RFC 7278,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7278, June 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC7278, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7278>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7278>.
[RFC7556] Anipko, D., Ed., "Multiple Provisioning Domain [RFC7540] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
Architecture", RFC 7556, DOI 10.17487/RFC7556, June 2015, Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7556>. DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.
[RFC8106] Jeong, J., Park, S., Beloeil, L., and S. Madanapalli,
"IPv6 Router Advertisement Options for DNS Configuration",
RFC 8106, DOI 10.17487/RFC8106, March 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8106>.
[RFC8415] Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Volz, B., Yourtchenko, A., [RFC8415] Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Volz, B., Yourtchenko, A.,
Richardson, M., Jiang, S., Lemon, T., and T. Winters, Richardson, M., Jiang, S., Lemon, T., and T. Winters,
"Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)",
RFC 8415, DOI 10.17487/RFC8415, November 2018, RFC 8415, DOI 10.17487/RFC8415, November 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8415>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8415>.
[URN] "URN Namespaces", n.d.. [URN] IANA, "Uniform Resource Names (URN) Namespaces",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/urn-namespaces/
urn-namespaces.xhtml>.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Pierre Pfister Pierre Pfister
Cisco Cisco
11 Rue Camille Desmoulins 11 Rue Camille Desmoulins
Issy-les-Moulineaux 92130 Issy-les-Moulineaux 92130
France France
Email: ppfister@cisco.com Email: ppfister@cisco.com
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