< draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-01.txt   draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-02.txt >
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) C. Tjhai Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) C. Tjhai
Internet-Draft M. Tomlinson Internet-Draft M. Tomlinson
Updates: 7296 (if approved) Post-Quantum Updates: 7296 (if approved) Post-Quantum
Intended status: Standards Track G. Bartlett Intended status: Standards Track G. Bartlett
Expires: January 8, 2021 Quantum Secret Expires: July 14, 2021 Quantum Secret
S. Fluhrer S. Fluhrer
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
D. Van Geest D. Van Geest
ISARA Corporation ISARA Corporation
O. Garcia-Morchon O. Garcia-Morchon
Philips Philips
V. Smyslov V. Smyslov
ELVIS-PLUS ELVIS-PLUS
July 7, 2020 January 10, 2021
Multiple Key Exchanges in IKEv2 Multiple Key Exchanges in IKEv2
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-01 draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-02
Abstract Abstract
This document describes how to extend the Internet Key Exchange This document describes how to extend the Internet Key Exchange
Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) to allow multiple key exchanges to take Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) to allow multiple key exchanges to take
place while computing a shared secret during a Security Association place while computing a shared secret during a Security Association
(SA) setup. The primary application of this feature in IKEv2 is the (SA) setup. The primary application of this feature in IKEv2 is the
ability to perform one or more post-quantum key exchanges in ability to perform one or more post-quantum key exchanges in
conjunction with the classical (Elliptic Curve) Diffie-Hellman key conjunction with the classical (Elliptic Curve) Diffie-Hellman key
exchange, so that the resulting shared key is resistant against exchange, so that the resulting shared key is resistant against
skipping to change at page 2, line 12 skipping to change at page 2, line 12
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 8, 2021. This Internet-Draft will expire on July 14, 2021.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Problem Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Problem Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Proposed Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Proposed Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3. Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.3. Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4. Document Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.4. Document Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Design Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2. Design Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Multiple Key Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3. Multiple Key Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1. Overall Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1. Overall Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Overall Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.2. Overall Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.1. IKE_SA_INIT Round: Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.2.1. IKE_SA_INIT Round: Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.2. IKE_INTERMEDIATE Round: Additional Key Exchanges . . 11 3.2.2. IKE_INTERMEDIATE Round: Additional Key Exchanges . . 11
3.2.3. IKE_AUTH Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.2.3. IKE_AUTH Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2.4. CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.2.4. CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix A. Alternative Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Appendix A. Alternative Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
1.1. Problem Description 1.1. Problem Description
Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKEv2) as specified in [RFC7296] uses Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKEv2) as specified in [RFC7296] uses
the Diffie-Hellman (DH) or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) the Diffie-Hellman (DH) or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
algorithm to establish a shared secret between an initiator and a algorithm to establish a shared secret between an initiator and a
responder. The security of the DH and ECDH algorithms relies on the responder. The security of the DH and ECDH algorithms relies on the
difficulty to solve a discrete logarithm problem in multiplicative difficulty to solve a discrete logarithm problem in multiplicative
skipping to change at page 4, line 31 skipping to change at page 4, line 31
to make IKEv2 key exchange quantum secure is to use post-quantum pre- to make IKEv2 key exchange quantum secure is to use post-quantum pre-
shared keys as discussed in [RFC8784]. shared keys as discussed in [RFC8784].
Note also, that the proposed approach of performing multiple Note also, that the proposed approach of performing multiple
successive key exchanges in such a way that resulting session keys successive key exchanges in such a way that resulting session keys
depend on all of them is not limited to achieving quantum resistance depend on all of them is not limited to achieving quantum resistance
only. It can also be used when all the performed key exchanges are only. It can also be used when all the performed key exchanges are
classical (EC)DH ones, where for some reasons (e.g. policy classical (EC)DH ones, where for some reasons (e.g. policy
requirements) it is essential to perform multiple of them. requirements) it is essential to perform multiple of them.
This draft does not attempt to address key exchanges with KE payloads
longer than 64k; the current IKE payload format does not allow that
as a possibility. At the current time, it appears likely that there
are a number of key exchanges available that would not require such a
requirement. However, if such a requirement is needed,
[I-D.tjhai-ikev2-beyond-64k-limit] discusses approaches that should
be taken to exchange huge payloads.
1.3. Changes 1.3. Changes
RFC EDITOR PLEASE DELETE THIS SECTION. RFC EDITOR PLEASE DELETE THIS SECTION.
Changes in this draft in each version iterations. Changes in this draft in each version iterations.
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-02
o Added a reference on the handling of KE payloads larger than 64KB.
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-01 draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-01
o References are updated. o References are updated.
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-00
o Draft name changed as result of WG adoption and generalization of o Draft name changed as result of WG adoption and generalization of
the approach. the approach.
o New exchange IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE is defined for additional key o New exchange IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE is defined for additional key
exchanges performed after CREATE_CHILD_SA. exchanges performed after CREATE_CHILD_SA.
o Nonces are removed from all additional key exchanges. o Nonces are removed from all additional key exchanges.
o Clarification that IKE_INTERMEDIATE must be negotiated is added. o Clarification that IKE_INTERMEDIATE must be negotiated is added.
draft-tjhai-ipsecme-hybrid-qske-ikev2-04
o Clarification about key derivation in case of multiple key o Clarification about key derivation in case of multiple key
exchanges in CREATE_CHILD_SA is added. exchanges in CREATE_CHILD_SA is added.
o Resolving rekey collisions in case of multiple key exchanges is o Resolving rekey collisions in case of multiple key exchanges is
clarified. clarified.
draft-tjhai-ipsecme-hybrid-qske-ikev2-03 draft-tjhai-ipsecme-hybrid-qske-ikev2-03
o Using multiple key exchanges CREATE_CHILD_SA is defined. o Using multiple key exchanges CREATE_CHILD_SA is defined.
skipping to change at page 17, line 30 skipping to change at page 17, line 46
provide resistance to attacks mounted in the future. The current provide resistance to attacks mounted in the future. The current
threat is that encrypted sessions are subject to eavesdropping and threat is that encrypted sessions are subject to eavesdropping and
archived with decryption by quantum computers taking place at some archived with decryption by quantum computers taking place at some
point in the future. Until quantum computers become available there point in the future. Until quantum computers become available there
is no point in attacking the authenticity of a connection because is no point in attacking the authenticity of a connection because
there are no possibilities for exploitation. These only occur at the there are no possibilities for exploitation. These only occur at the
time of the connection, for example by mounting a man-in-the-middle time of the connection, for example by mounting a man-in-the-middle
(MitM) attack. Consequently there is not such a pressing need for (MitM) attack. Consequently there is not such a pressing need for
quantum-safe authenticity. quantum-safe authenticity.
This draft does not attempt to address key exchanges with KE payloads
longer than 64k; the current IKE payload format does not allow that
as a possibility. If such huge KE payloads are required, a work
around (such as making the KE payload a URL and a hash of the real
payload) would be needed. At the current time, it appears likely
that there will be plenty of key exchanges available that would not
require such a workaround.
6. Acknowledgements 6. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thanks Frederic Detienne and Olivier The authors would like to thanks Frederic Detienne and Olivier
Pelerin for their comments and suggestions, including the idea to Pelerin for their comments and suggestions, including the idea to
negotiate the post-quantum algorithms using the existing KE payload. negotiate the post-quantum algorithms using the existing KE payload.
The authors are also grateful to Tobias Heider and Tobias Guggemos The authors are also grateful to Tobias Heider and Tobias Guggemos
for valuable comments. for valuable comments.
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-intermediate] [I-D.ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-intermediate]
Smyslov, V., "Intermediate Exchange in the IKEv2 Smyslov, V., "Intermediate Exchange in the IKEv2
Protocol", draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-intermediate-04 (work Protocol", draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-intermediate-05 (work
in progress), June 2020. in progress), September 2020.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T. [RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>. 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
skipping to change at page 18, line 30 skipping to change at page 18, line 34
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[GROVER] Grover, L., "A Fast Quantum Mechanical Algorithm for [GROVER] Grover, L., "A Fast Quantum Mechanical Algorithm for
Database Search", Proc. of the Twenty-Eighth Annual ACM Database Search", Proc. of the Twenty-Eighth Annual ACM
Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC 1996), 1996. Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC 1996), 1996.
[I-D.tjhai-ikev2-beyond-64k-limit]
Tjhai, C., Heider, T., and V. Smyslov, "Beyond 64KB Limit
of IKEv2 Payload", draft-tjhai-ikev2-beyond-64k-limit-00
(work in progress), October 2020.
[RFC4302] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302, [RFC4302] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4302, December 2005, DOI 10.17487/RFC4302, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4302>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4302>.
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", [RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005, RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.
[RFC7383] Smyslov, V., "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 [RFC7383] Smyslov, V., "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2) Message Fragmentation", RFC 7383, (IKEv2) Message Fragmentation", RFC 7383,
 End of changes. 17 change blocks. 
23 lines changed or deleted 32 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.48. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/