< draft-ietf-ipsecme-labeled-ipsec-00.txt		draft-ietf-ipsecme-labeled-ipsec-01.txt >
	Network P. Wouters		Network P. Wouters
	Internet-Draft Red Hat		Internet-Draft Red Hat
	Intended status: Standards Track S. Prasad		Updates: 7296 (if approved) S. Prasad
	Expires: September 11, 2019 Technical University of Munich		Intended status: Standards Track Technical University of Munich
	March 10, 2019		Expires: January 9, 2020 July 8, 2019
	Labeled IPsec Traffic Selector support for IKEv2		Labeled IPsec Traffic Selector support for IKEv2
	draft-ietf-ipsecme-labeled-ipsec-00		draft-ietf-ipsecme-labeled-ipsec-01
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document defines two new Traffic Selector (TS) Types for		This document defines a new Traffic Selector (TS) Type for Internet
	Internet Key Exchange version 2 to add support for Mandatory Access		Key Exchange version 2 to add support for negotiating Mandatory
	Control (MAC) security labels, also known as "Labeled IPsec". The		Access Control (MAC) security labels as a traffic selector of the
	two new TS Types are TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE_SECLABEL and		Security Policy Database (SPD). Security Labels for IPsec are also
	TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE_SECLABEL, which are identical to their non-		known as "Labeled IPsec". The new TS type is TS_SECLABEL, which
	seclabel namesakes except for the addition of a variable length		consists of a variable length opaque field specifying the security
	opaque field specifying the security label. These new Traffic		label. This document updates the IKEv2 TS negotiation specified in
	Selector Types facilitate negotiating security labels as an		RFC 7296 Section 2.9.
	additional selector of the Security Policy Database to further
	restrict the type of traffic allowed to be send and received over the
	IPsec SA.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
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	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
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	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. Traffic Selector negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1.2. Traffic Selector clarification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3. SECLABEL Traffic Selector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. TS_SECLABEL Traffic Selector Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	4. Traffic Selector matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		2.1. TS_SECLABEL payload format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		2.2. TS_SECLABEL properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3. Traffic Selector negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3.1. Example TS negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3.2. Considerations for using multiple TS_TYPEs in a TS . . . 6
	8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
			7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
			7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
			7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
			Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	In computer security, Mandatory Access Control usually refers to		In computer security, Mandatory Access Control usually refers to
	systems in which all subjects and objects are assigned a security		systems in which all subjects and objects are assigned a security
	label. A security label is comprised of a set of security		label. A security label is comprised of a set of security
	attributes. The security labels along with a system authorization		attributes. The security labels along with a system authorization
	policy determine access. Rules within the system authorization		policy determine access. Rules within the system authorization
	policy determine whether the access will be granted based on the		policy determine whether the access will be granted based on the
	security attributes of the subject and object.		security attributes of the subject and object.
	skipping to change at page 2, line 47 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 48 ¶
	Traditionally, security labels used by Multilevel Systems (MLS) are		Traditionally, security labels used by Multilevel Systems (MLS) are
	comprised of a sensitivity level (or classification) field and a		comprised of a sensitivity level (or classification) field and a
	compartment (or category) field, as defined in [FIPS188] and		compartment (or category) field, as defined in [FIPS188] and
	[RFC5570]. As MAC systems evolved, other MAC models gained in		[RFC5570]. As MAC systems evolved, other MAC models gained in
	popularity. For example, SELinux, a Flux Advanced Security Kernel		popularity. For example, SELinux, a Flux Advanced Security Kernel
	(FLASK) implementation, has security labels represented as colon-		(FLASK) implementation, has security labels represented as colon-
	separated ASCII strings composed of values for identity, role, and		separated ASCII strings composed of values for identity, role, and
	type. The security labels are often referred to as security		type. The security labels are often referred to as security
	contexts.		contexts.
	This document specifies two new Traffic Selector Types for IKEv2 that		Traffic Selector (TS) payloads specify the selection criteria for
	can be used to negotiate security labels as additional selectors for		packets that will be forwarded over the newly set up IPsec SA as
	the Security Policy Database (SPD) to further restrict the type of		enforced by the Security Policy Database (SPD, see [RFC4301]). This
	traffic allowed to be send and received over the IPsec SA.		document updates the Traffic Selector negotiation specified in
			Section 2.9 of [RFC7296].
	Traffic Selector (TS) payloads allow endpoints to communicate some of
	the information from their SPD to their peers. These must be
	communicated to IKE from the SPD. TS payloads specify the selection
	criteria for packets that will be forwarded over the newly set up SA.
	Section 2.9 in the Internet Key Exchange protocol version 2 [RFC7296]
	illustrates the Traffic Selector negotiation procedure.
	Two TS payloads appear in each of the messages in the exchange that
	creates a Child SA pair. Each TS payload contains one or more
	Traffic Selectors. Currently, each Traffic Selector consists of an
	address range (IPv4 or IPv6), a port range, and an IP protocol ID.
	However, a security context or a label is missing. Therefore this
	document extends the section 2.9 in the Internet Key Exchange
	protocol version 2 [RFC7296] to add support for a new traffic
	selector type which would be used to negotiate the security label or
	context.
	Negotiating and verifying the security context or label in the new TS		This document specifies a new Traffic Selector Type TS_SECLABEL for
	types will act as an additional criteria that has to match along with		IKEv2 that can be used to negotiate security labels as additional
	the previously mentioned Traffic Selectors.		selectors for the Security Policy Database (SPD) to further restrict
			the type of traffic allowed to be sent and received over the IPsec
			SA.
	1.1. Requirements Language		1.1. Requirements Language
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
	document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].		"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
			14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
			captials, as shown here.
	2. Traffic Selector negotiation		1.2. Traffic Selector clarification
	The negotiation of Traffic Selectors is specified in Section 2.9 of		The negotiation of Traffic Selectors is specified in Section 2.9 of
	[RFC7296]. The initiating IKE peer sends a Traffic Selector payload		[RFC7296] where it defines two TS Types (TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE and
	for the initiator side (TSi) and a Traffic Selector payload for the		TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE). The Traffic Selector payload format is
	responder side (TSr). The TSi and TSr payloads contain a list of one		specified in Section 3.13 of [RFC7296]. However, the term Traffic
	or more Traffic Selectors (TS). The responder picks one TS from the		Selector is used to denote the traffic selector payloads and
	TSi list and one TS from the TSr list and returns these in their own		individual traffic selectors of that payload. Sometimes the exact
	TSi/TSr payloads to the initiator in the IKE response as confirmation		meaning can only be learned from context or if the item is written in
	of the chosen traffic selectors. [RFC7296] defines two TS Types,		plural ("Traffic Selectors" or "TSs"). This section clarifies these
	TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE and TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE. These TS payloads contain		terms as follows:
	the TS Type, IP protocol ID, Selector Length, Start and End Port and
	Start and End Address.
	3. SECLABEL Traffic Selector		A Traffic Selector (no acronym) is one selector for traffic of a
			specific Traffic Selector Type (TS_TYPE). For example a Traffic
			Selector of TS_TYPE TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE for UDP traffic in the IP
			network 198.51.100.0/24 covering all ports, is denoted as (17, 0,
			198.51.100.0-198.51.100.255)
	This document defines two new TS Types, TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE_SECLABEL		A Traffic Selector payload (TS) is a set of one or more Traffic
	and TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE_SECLABEL. In addition to the above mentioned		Selectors of the same or different TS_TYPEs, but MUST include at
	selectors, it contains a single new opaque Security Label selector.		least one TS_TYPE of TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE. For
			example, the above Traffic Selector by itself in a TS payload is
			denotated as TS((17, 0, 198.51.100.0-198.51.100.255))
			2. TS_SECLABEL Traffic Selector Type
			This document defines a new TS Type, TS_SECLABEL that contains a
			single new opaque Security Label.
			2.1. TS_SECLABEL payload format
	1 2 3		1 2 3
	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1		0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
	+---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+		+---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
	| TS Type |IP Protocol ID*| Selector Length |		| TS Type | Reserved | Selector Length |
	+---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+		+---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
	| Start Port* | End Port* |
	+-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
	| |
	~ Starting Address* ~
	| |
	+---------------------------------------------------------------+
	| |
	~ Ending Address* ~
	| |
	+---------------------------------------------------------------+
	| |		| |
	~ Security Label* ~		~ Security Label* ~
	| |		| |
	+---------------------------------------------------------------+		+---------------------------------------------------------------+
	Figure 1: Labeled IPsec Traffic Selector		Figure 1: Labeled IPsec Traffic Selector
	*Note: All fields other than TS Type and Selector Length depend on		*Note: All fields other than TS Type and Selector Length depend on
	the TS Type. The fields shown are for TS Types [TBD] and [TBD], the		the TS Type. The fields shown is for TS Type TS_SECLABEL, the
	two values this document defines.		selector this document defines.
	o TS Type (one octet) - Specifies the type of Traffic Selector.
	o IP protocol ID (1 octet) - Value specifying an associated IP		o TS Type (one octet) - Set to [TBD] for TS_SECLABEL,
	protocol ID (such as UDP, TCP, and ICMP). A value of zero means
	that the protocol ID is not relevant to this Traffic Selector --
	the SA can carry all protocols.
	o Selector Length (2 octets, unsigned integer) - Specifies the		o Selector Length (2 octets, unsigned integer) - Specifies the
	length of this Traffic Selector substructure including the header.		length of this Traffic Selector substructure including the header.
	o Start Port (2 octets, unsigned integer) - Value specifying the		o Security Label - An opaque byte stream of at least one octet.
	smallest port number allowed by this Traffic Selector. For
	protocols for which port is undefined (including protocol 0), or
	if all ports are allowed, this field MUST be zero. ICMP and
	ICMPv6 Type and Code values, as well as Mobile IP version 6
	(MIPv6) mobility header (MH) Type values, are represented in this
	field as specified in Section 4.4.1.1 of [RFC4301]. ICMP Type and
	Code values are treated as a single 16-bit integer port number,
	with Type in the most significant eight bits and Code in the least
	significant eight bits. MIPv6 MH Type values are treated as a
	single 16-bit integer port number, with Type in the most
	significant eight bits and the least significant eight bits set to
	zero.
	o End Port (2 octets, unsigned integer) - Value specifying the		2.2. TS_SECLABEL properties
	largest port number allowed by this Traffic Selector. For
	protocols for which port is undefined (including protocol 0), or
	if all ports are allowed, this field MUST be 65535. ICMP and
	ICMPv6 Type and Code values, as well as MIPv6 MH Type values, are
	represented in this field as specified in Section 4.4.1.1 of
	[RFC4301]. ICMP Type and Code values are treated as a single
	16-bit integer port number, with Type in the most significant
	eight bits and Code in the least significant eight bits. MIPv6 MH
	Type values are treated as a single 16-bit integer port number,
	with Type in the most significant eight bits and the least
	significant eight bits set to zero.
	o Starting Address - The smallest address included in this Traffic		The TS_SECLABEL Traffic Selector Type does not support narrowing or
	Selector (length determined by TS Type).		wildcards. It MUST be used as an exact match value.
	o Ending Address - The largest address included in this Traffic		The Security Label contents are opague to the IKE implementation.
	Selector (length determined by TS Type).		That is, the IKE implementation might not have any knowledge of the
			meaning of this selector, other than as a type and opaque value to
			pass to the SPD.
	o Security Label - An opaque byte stream of at least one octet.		A zero length Security Label MUST NOT be used. If a received TS
			payload contains a TS_TYPE of TS_SECLABEL with a zero length Security
			Label, that specific Traffic Selector MUST be ignored. If no other
			Traffic Selector of TS_TYPE TS_SECLABEL can be selected, a
			TS_UNACCEPTABLE Error Notify message MUST be returned. A zero length
			Security Label MUST NOT be interpreted as a wildcard security label.
	4. Traffic Selector matching		If multiple Security Labels are allowed for a given IP protocol,
			start and end address/port match, multiple TS_SECLABEL can be
			included in a TS payload.
	Matching of the IP protocol, start and end address, and start and end		If the Security Label traffic selector is optional from a
	port is performed the same way as for the TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE and		configuration point of view, the initiator will have to choose which
	TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE TS types. Additionally, the Security Label is		TS payload to attempt first. If it includes the Security Label and
	compared for an exact match as well. Label matching is done by		receives a TS_UNAVAILABLE, it can attempt a new Child SA negotiation
	comparing the opaque bytestream.		without that Security Label .
	The Security Label in the TSi and TSr MUST be identical. If the		A responder that selected a TS with TS_SECLABEL MUST use the Security
	responder's policy does not allow it to accept any part of the		Label for all selector operations on the resulting IPsec SA. It MUST
	proposed Traffic Selector including the Security Label, it MUST		NOT select a TS_set with a TS_SECLABEL without using the specified
	ignore the TS and look for another matching TS in the list. If no		Security Label, even if it deems the Security Label optional, as the
	list entry matches, a TS_UNACCEPTABLE Notify message is returned.		initiator TS_set with TS_SECLABEL means the initiator mandates using
			that Security Label.
	A zero length Security Label MUST NOT be sent. If the SPD policy		3. Traffic Selector negotiation
	contains no Security Label selectors, the TS Types
	TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE_SECLABEL and TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE_SECLABEL should
	not be used and TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE and TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE should be
	used instead. Any received Traffic Selector with a zero length
	Security Label MUST be ignored, and if no valid TS can be selected,
	an TS_UNACCEPTABLE Error Notify message is returned. A zero length
	Security Label MUST NOT be interpreted as a wildcard security label.
	If multiple Security Labels are allowed for a given IP protocol,		This document updates the [RFC7296] specification as follows:
	start and end address/port match, multiple
	TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE_SECLABEL or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE_SECLABEL Traffic
	Selectors must be included that only differ in the Security Label.
	Narrowing of Traffic Selectors applies to TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE_SECLABEL		Each TS payload (TSi and TSr) MUST contain at least one TS_TYPE of
	and TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE_SECLABEL as well, but the Security Label		TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE.
	itself is not interpreted and cannot itself be narrowed. It MUST be
	matched exactly. Rekey of an IPsec SA MUST only use identical
	Traffic Selectors, which means the same TS Type and selectors MUST be
	used. This guarantees that a Security Label once negotiated, remains
	part of the IPsec SA after a rekey.
	5. Security Considerations		Each TS payload (TSi or TSr) MAY contain one or more other TS_TYPEs,
			such as TS_SECLABEL.
			A responder MUST create its TS response by selecting one of each
			TS_TYPE present in the offered TS by the initiator. If it cannot
			select one of each TS_TYPE, it MUST return a TS_UNAVAILABLE Error
			Notify payload.
			If a specific TS_TYPE (other than TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or
			TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE which are mandatory) is deemed optional, the
			initiator SHOULD first try to negotiate the Child SA with the TS
			payload including the optional TS_TYPE. Upon receiving
			TS_UNAVAILABLE, it SHOULD attempt a new Child SA negotiation using
			the same TS but without the optional TS_TYPE.
			Some TS_TYPE's support narrowing, where the responder is allowed to
			select a subset of the original TS. Narrowing MUST NOT result in an
			empty selector for that TS_TYPE.
			3.1. Example TS negotiation
			An initiator could send:
			TSi = ((17,0,192.0.2.0-192.0.2.255),
			(0,0,198.51.0-198.51.255),
			TS_SECLABEL1, TS_SECLABEL2)
			TSr = ((17,0,203.0.113.0-203.0.113.255),
			(0,0,203.0.113.0-203.0.113.255),
			TS_SECLABEL1, TS_SECLABEL2)
			Figure 2: initiator TS payloads example
			The responder could answer with the following example:
			TSi = ((0,0,198.51.0-198.51.255),
			TS_SECLABEL1)
			TSr = (((0,0,203.0.113.0-203.0.113.255),
			TS_SECLABEL1)
			Figure 3: responder TS payloads example
			3.2. Considerations for using multiple TS_TYPEs in a TS
			It would be unlikely that the traffic for TSi and TSr would have a
			different Security Label, but this specification does allow this to
			be specified. If the initiator does not support this, and wants to
			prevent the responder from picking different labels for the TSi / TSr
			payloads, it should attempt a Child SA negotiation with only the
			first Security Label first, and upon failure retry a new Child SA
			negotiation with only the second Security Label.
			If different IP ranges can only use different specific Security
			Labels, than these should be negotiated in two different Child SA
			negotiations. If in the example above, the initiator only allows
			192.0.2.0/24 with TS_SECLABEL1, and 198.51.0/24 with TS_SECLABEL2,
			than it MUST NOT combine these two ranges and security labels into
			one Child SA negotiation.
			Narrowing of Traffic Selectors currenrtly only applies only to
			TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE and TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE and not to TS_SECLABEL as
			the Security Label itself is not interpreted and cannot itself be
			narrowed. It MUST be matched exactly. Rekey of an IPsec SA MUST
			only use identical Traffic Selectors, which means the same TS Type
			and selectors MUST be used. This guarantees that a Security Label
			once negotiated, remains part of the IPsec SA after a rekey.
			4. Security Considerations
	It is assumed that the Security Label can be matched by the IKE		It is assumed that the Security Label can be matched by the IKE
	implementation to its own configured value, even if the IKE		implementation to its own configured value, even if the IKE
	implemention itself cannot interpret the Security Label value.		implemention itself cannot interpret the Security Label value.
	6. IANA Considerations		5. IANA Considerations
	This document defines two new entries in the IKEv2 Traffic Selector		This document defines two new entries in the IKEv2 Traffic Selector
	Types registry:		Types registry:
	Value TS Type Reference		Value TS Type Reference
	----- --------------------------- -----------------		----- --------------------------- -----------------
	TBD TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE_SECLABEL [this document]		TBD TS_SECLABEL [this document]
	TBD TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE_SECLABEL [this document]
	Figure 2		Figure 4
	7. Acknowledgements		6. Acknowledgements
	A large part of the introduction text was taken verbatim from		A large part of the introduction text was taken verbatim from
	[draft-jml-ipsec-ikev2-security-label] whose authors are J Latten, D.		[draft-jml-ipsec-ikev2-security-label] whose authors are J Latten, D.
	Quigley and J. Lu. Part of the Traffic Selector description is		Quigley and J. Lu.
	reproduced from [RFC7296].
	8. References		7. References
	8.1. Normative References		7.1. Normative References
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-
	editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.		[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
	Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2		Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
	(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October		(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
	2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.		2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
	8.2. Informative References		[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
			2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
			May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
			7.2. Informative References
	[draft-jml-ipsec-ikev2-security-label]		[draft-jml-ipsec-ikev2-security-label]
	Latten, J., Quigley, D., and J. Lu, "Security Label		Latten, J., Quigley, D., and J. Lu, "Security Label
	Extension to IKE", draft-wouters-edns-tcp-keeaplive (work		Extension to IKE", draft-wouters-edns-tcp-keeaplive (work
	in progress), January 2011.		in progress), January 2011.
	[FIPS188] NIST, "National Institute of Standards and Technology,		[FIPS188] NIST, "National Institute of Standards and Technology,
	"Standard Security Label for Information Transfer"",		"Standard Security Label for Information Transfer"",
	Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication		Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication
	188, September 1994.		188, September 1994.
End of changes. 36 change blocks.
	159 lines changed or deleted		186 lines changed or added
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