< draft-ietf-ipsecme-labeled-ipsec-03.txt		draft-ietf-ipsecme-labeled-ipsec-04.txt >
	Network P. Wouters		Network P. Wouters
	Internet-Draft S. Prasad		Internet-Draft S. Prasad
	Updates: 7296 (if approved) Red Hat		Updates: 7296 (if approved) Red Hat
	Intended status: Standards Track July 13, 2020		Intended status: Standards Track October 30, 2020
	Expires: January 14, 2021		Expires: May 3, 2021
	Labeled IPsec Traffic Selector support for IKEv2		Labeled IPsec Traffic Selector support for IKEv2
	draft-ietf-ipsecme-labeled-ipsec-03		draft-ietf-ipsecme-labeled-ipsec-04
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document defines a new Traffic Selector (TS) Type for Internet		This document defines a new Traffic Selector (TS) Type for Internet
	Key Exchange version 2 to add support for negotiating Mandatory		Key Exchange version 2 to add support for negotiating Mandatory
	Access Control (MAC) security labels as a traffic selector of the		Access Control (MAC) security labels as a traffic selector of the
	Security Policy Database (SPD). Security Labels for IPsec are also		Security Policy Database (SPD). Security Labels for IPsec are also
	known as "Labeled IPsec". The new TS type is TS_SECLABEL, which		known as "Labeled IPsec". The new TS type is TS_SECLABEL, which
	consists of a variable length opaque field specifying the security		consists of a variable length opaque field specifying the security
	label. This document updates the IKEv2 TS negotiation specified in		label. This document updates the IKEv2 TS negotiation specified in
	skipping to change at page 1, line 38 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 38 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on January 14, 2021.		This Internet-Draft will expire on May 3, 2021.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 2, line 14 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 14 ¶
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	1.2. Traffic Selector clarification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1.2. Traffic Selector clarification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	1.3. Traffic Selector update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1.3. Traffic Selector update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	2. TS_SECLABEL Traffic Selector Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2. TS_SECLABEL Traffic Selector Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	2.1. TS_SECLABEL payload format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2.1. TS_SECLABEL payload format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	2.2. TS_SECLABEL properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2.2. TS_SECLABEL properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3. Traffic Selector negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3. Traffic Selector negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.1. Example TS negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3.1. Example TS negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	3.2. Considerations for using multiple TS_TYPEs in a TS . . . 6		3.2. Considerations for using multiple TS_TYPEs in a TS . . . 6
	4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		6. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		6.1. Libreswan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
			8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
			Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	In computer security, Mandatory Access Control usually refers to		In computer security, Mandatory Access Control usually refers to
	systems in which all subjects and objects are assigned a security		systems in which all subjects and objects are assigned a security
	label. A security label is comprised of a set of security		label. A security label is comprised of a set of security
	attributes. The security labels along with a system authorization		attributes. The security labels along with a system authorization
	policy determine access. Rules within the system authorization		policy determine access. Rules within the system authorization
	policy determine whether the access will be granted based on the		policy determine whether the access will be granted based on the
	security attributes of the subject and object.		security attributes of the subject and object.
	skipping to change at page 3, line 19 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 23 ¶
	selectors for the Security Policy Database (SPD) to further restrict		selectors for the Security Policy Database (SPD) to further restrict
	the type of traffic allowed to be sent and received over the IPsec		the type of traffic allowed to be sent and received over the IPsec
	SA.		SA.
	1.1. Requirements Language		1.1. Requirements Language
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
	"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP		"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
	14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all		14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
	captials, as shown here.		capitals, as shown here.
	1.2. Traffic Selector clarification		1.2. Traffic Selector clarification
	The negotiation of Traffic Selectors is specified in Section 2.9 of		The negotiation of Traffic Selectors is specified in Section 2.9 of
	[RFC7296] where it defines two TS Types (TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE and		[RFC7296] where it defines two TS Types (TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE and
	TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE). The Traffic Selector payload format is		TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE). The Traffic Selector payload format is
	specified in Section 3.13 of [RFC7296]. However, the term Traffic		specified in Section 3.13 of [RFC7296]. However, the term Traffic
	Selector is used to denote the traffic selector payloads and		Selector is used to denote the traffic selector payloads and
	individual traffic selectors of that payload. Sometimes the exact		individual traffic selectors of that payload. Sometimes the exact
	meaning can only be learned from context or if the item is written in		meaning can only be learned from context or if the item is written in
	skipping to change at page 3, line 43 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 47 ¶
	A Traffic Selector (no acronym) is one selector for traffic of a		A Traffic Selector (no acronym) is one selector for traffic of a
	specific Traffic Selector Type (TS_TYPE). For example a Traffic		specific Traffic Selector Type (TS_TYPE). For example a Traffic
	Selector of TS_TYPE TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE for UDP traffic in the IP		Selector of TS_TYPE TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE for UDP traffic in the IP
	network 198.51.100.0/24 covering all ports, is denoted as (17, 0,		network 198.51.100.0/24 covering all ports, is denoted as (17, 0,
	198.51.100.0-198.51.100.255)		198.51.100.0-198.51.100.255)
	A Traffic Selector payload (TS) is a set of one or more Traffic		A Traffic Selector payload (TS) is a set of one or more Traffic
	Selectors of the same or different TS_TYPEs, but MUST include at		Selectors of the same or different TS_TYPEs, but MUST include at
	least one TS_TYPE of TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE. For		least one TS_TYPE of TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE. For
	example, the above Traffic Selector by itself in a TS payload is		example, the above Traffic Selector by itself in a TS payload is
	denotated as TS((17, 0, 198.51.100.0-198.51.100.255))		denoted as TS((17, 0, 198.51.100.0-198.51.100.255))
	1.3. Traffic Selector update		1.3. Traffic Selector update
	The negotiation of Traffic Selectors is specified in Section 2.9 of		The negotiation of Traffic Selectors is specified in Section 2.9 of
	[RFC7296] and states that the TSi/TSr payloads MUST contain at least		[RFC7296] and states that the TSi/TSr payloads MUST contain at least
	one Traffic Selector type. This document updates the text to mean		one Traffic Selector type. This document updates the text to mean
	that the TSi/TSr payloads MUST contain at least one Traffic Selector		that the TSi/TSr payloads MUST contain at least one Traffic Selector
	of type TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE, as other Traffic		of type TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE, as other Traffic
	Selector types can be defined that are complimentary to these Traffic		Selector types can be defined that are complimentary to these Traffic
	Selector Types and cannot be selected on their own without		Selector Types and cannot be selected on their own without
	skipping to change at page 5, line 21 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 28 ¶
	TS_UNACCEPTABLE Error Notify message MUST be returned. A zero length		TS_UNACCEPTABLE Error Notify message MUST be returned. A zero length
	Security Label MUST NOT be interpreted as a wildcard security label.		Security Label MUST NOT be interpreted as a wildcard security label.
	If multiple Security Labels are allowed for a given IP protocol,		If multiple Security Labels are allowed for a given IP protocol,
	start and end address/port match, multiple TS_SECLABEL can be		start and end address/port match, multiple TS_SECLABEL can be
	included in a TS payload.		included in a TS payload.
	If the Security Label traffic selector is optional from a		If the Security Label traffic selector is optional from a
	configuration point of view, the initiator will have to choose which		configuration point of view, the initiator will have to choose which
	TS payload to attempt first. If it includes the Security Label and		TS payload to attempt first. If it includes the Security Label and
	receives a TS_UNAVAILABLE, it can attempt a new Child SA negotiation		receives a TS_UNACCEPTABLE, it can attempt a new Child SA negotiation
	without that Security Label.		without that Security Label.
	A responder that selected a TS with TS_SECLABEL MUST use the Security		A responder that selected a TS with TS_SECLABEL MUST use the Security
	Label for all selector operations on the resulting IPsec SA. It MUST		Label for all selector operations on the resulting IPsec SA. It MUST
	NOT select a TS_set with a TS_SECLABEL without using the specified		NOT select a TS_set with a TS_SECLABEL without using the specified
	Security Label, even if it deems the Security Label optional, as the		Security Label, even if it deems the Security Label optional, as the
	initiator TS_set with TS_SECLABEL means the initiator mandates using		initiator TS_set with TS_SECLABEL means the initiator mandates using
	that Security Label.		that Security Label.
	3. Traffic Selector negotiation		3. Traffic Selector negotiation
	skipping to change at page 5, line 43 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 50 ¶
	This document updates the [RFC7296] specification as follows:		This document updates the [RFC7296] specification as follows:
	Each TS payload (TSi and TSr) MUST contain at least one TS_TYPE of		Each TS payload (TSi and TSr) MUST contain at least one TS_TYPE of
	TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE.		TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE.
	Each TS payload (TSi or TSr) MAY contain one or more other TS_TYPEs,		Each TS payload (TSi or TSr) MAY contain one or more other TS_TYPEs,
	such as TS_SECLABEL.		such as TS_SECLABEL.
	A responder MUST create its TS response by selecting one of each		A responder MUST create its TS response by selecting one of each
	TS_TYPE present in the offered TS by the initiator. If it cannot		TS_TYPE present in the offered TS by the initiator. If it cannot
	select one of each TS_TYPE, it MUST return a TS_UNAVAILABLE Error		select one of each TS_TYPE, it MUST return a TS_UNACCEPTABLE Error
	Notify payload.		Notify payload.
	If a specific TS_TYPE (other than TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or		If a specific TS_TYPE (other than TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or
	TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE which are mandatory) is deemed optional, the		TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE which are mandatory) is deemed optional, the
	initiator SHOULD first try to negotiate the Child SA with the TS		initiator SHOULD first try to negotiate the Child SA with the TS
	payload including the optional TS_TYPE. Upon receiving		payload including the optional TS_TYPE. Upon receiving
	TS_UNAVAILABLE, it SHOULD attempt a new Child SA negotiation using		TS_UNACCEPTABLE, it SHOULD attempt a new Child SA negotiation using
	the same TS but without the optional TS_TYPE.		the same TS but without the optional TS_TYPE.
	Some TS_TYPE's support narrowing, where the responder is allowed to		Some TS_TYPE's support narrowing, where the responder is allowed to
	select a subset of the original TS. Narrowing MUST NOT result in an		select a subset of the original TS. Narrowing MUST NOT result in an
	empty selector for that TS_TYPE.		empty selector for that TS_TYPE.
	3.1. Example TS negotiation		3.1. Example TS negotiation
	An initiator could send:		An initiator could send:
	skipping to change at page 7, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 7, line 12 ¶
	first Security Label first, and upon failure retry a new Child SA		first Security Label first, and upon failure retry a new Child SA
	negotiation with only the second Security Label.		negotiation with only the second Security Label.
	If different IP ranges can only use different specific Security		If different IP ranges can only use different specific Security
	Labels, than these should be negotiated in two different Child SA		Labels, than these should be negotiated in two different Child SA
	negotiations. If in the example above, the initiator only allows		negotiations. If in the example above, the initiator only allows
	192.0.2.0/24 with TS_SECLABEL1, and 198.51.0/24 with TS_SECLABEL2,		192.0.2.0/24 with TS_SECLABEL1, and 198.51.0/24 with TS_SECLABEL2,
	than it MUST NOT combine these two ranges and security labels into		than it MUST NOT combine these two ranges and security labels into
	one Child SA negotiation.		one Child SA negotiation.
	Narrowing of Traffic Selectors currenrtly only applies only to		The mechanism of narrowing of Traffic Selectors with
	TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE and TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE and not to TS_SECLABEL as		TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE and TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE does not apply to
	the Security Label itself is not interpreted and cannot itself be		TS_SECLABEL as the Security Label itself is not interpreted and
	narrowed. It MUST be matched exactly. Rekey of an IPsec SA MUST		cannot itself be narrowed. It MUST be matched exactly. Rekey of an
	only use identical Traffic Selectors, which means the same TS Type		IPsec SA MUST only use identical Traffic Selectors, which means the
	and selectors MUST be used. This guarantees that a Security Label		same TS Type and selectors MUST be used. This guarantees that a
	once negotiated, remains part of the IPsec SA after a rekey.		Security Label once negotiated, remains part of the IPsec SA after a
			rekey.
	4. Security Considerations		4. Security Considerations
	It is assumed that the Security Label can be matched by the IKE		It is assumed that the Security Label can be matched by the IKE
	implementation to its own configured value, even if the IKE		implementation to its own configured value, even if the IKE
	implemention itself cannot interpret the Security Label value.		implementation itself cannot interpret the Security Label value.
			A packet that matches an SPD entry for all components except the
			Security Label would be treated as "not matching". If no other SPD
			entries match, the (mis-labeled) traffic might end up being
			transmitted in the clear. It is presumed that other Mandatory Access
			Control methods are in place to prevent mis-labeled traffic from
			reaching the IPsec subsystem, or that the IPsec subsystem itself
			would install a REJECT/DISCARD rule in the SPD to prevent unlabeled
			traffic otherwise matching a labeled security SPD rule from being
			transmitted without IPsec protection.
	5. IANA Considerations		5. IANA Considerations
	This document defines two new entries in the IKEv2 Traffic Selector		This document defines two new entries in the IKEv2 Traffic Selector
	Types registry:		Types registry:
	Value TS Type Reference		Value TS Type Reference
	----- --------------------------- -----------------		----- --------------------------- -----------------
	TBD TS_SECLABEL [this document]		TBD TS_SECLABEL [this document]
	Figure 4		Figure 4
	6. Acknowledgements		6. Implementation Status
			[Note to RFC Editor: Please remove this section and the reference to
			[RFC6982] before publication.]
			This section records the status of known implementations of the
			protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
			Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942].
			The description of implementations in this section is intended to
			assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
			RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
			here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort
			has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
			supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not
			be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
			features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
			exist.
			According to [RFC7942], "this will allow reviewers and working groups
			to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
			running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
			and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
			It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
			they see fit".
			Authors are requested to add a note to the RFC Editor at the top of
			this section, advising the Editor to remove the entire section before
			publication, as well as the reference to [RFC7942].
			6.1. Libreswan
			Organization: The Libreswan Project
			Name: https://lists.libreswan.org/mailman/listinfo/swan-dev/
			Description: A Proof of Concept branch is available for interop
			testing.
			Level of maturity: Alpha
			Coverage: Implements the entire draft using SElinux based labels
			Licensing: GPLv2
			Implementation experience: TBD
			Contact: Libreswan Development: swan-dev@libreswan.org
			7. Acknowledgements
	A large part of the introduction text was taken verbatim from		A large part of the introduction text was taken verbatim from
	[draft-jml-ipsec-ikev2-security-label] whose authors are J Latten, D.		[draft-jml-ipsec-ikev2-security-label] whose authors are J Latten, D.
	Quigley and J. Lu.		Quigley and J. Lu.
	7. References		8. References
	7.1. Normative References		8.1. Normative References
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.		[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
	Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2		Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
	(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October		(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
	2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.		2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
	[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC		[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
	2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,		2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
	May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.		May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
	7.2. Informative References		8.2. Informative References
	[draft-jml-ipsec-ikev2-security-label]		[draft-jml-ipsec-ikev2-security-label]
	Latten, J., Quigley, D., and J. Lu, "Security Label		Latten, J., Quigley, D., and J. Lu, "Security Label
	Extension to IKE", draft-wouters-edns-tcp-keeaplive (work		Extension to IKE", draft-wouters-edns-tcp-keeaplive (work
	in progress), January 2011.		in progress), January 2011.
	[FIPS188] NIST, "National Institute of Standards and Technology,		[FIPS188] NIST, "National Institute of Standards and Technology,
	"Standard Security Label for Information Transfer"",		"Standard Security Label for Information Transfer"",
	Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication		Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication
	188, September 1994.		188, September 1994.
	[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the		[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
	Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,		Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,
	December 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>.		December 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>.
	[RFC5570] StJohns, M., Atkinson, R., and G. Thomas, "Common		[RFC5570] StJohns, M., Atkinson, R., and G. Thomas, "Common
	Architecture Label IPv6 Security Option (CALIPSO)",		Architecture Label IPv6 Security Option (CALIPSO)",
	RFC 5570, DOI 10.17487/RFC5570, July 2009,		RFC 5570, DOI 10.17487/RFC5570, July 2009,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5570>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5570>.
			[RFC6982] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
			Code: The Implementation Status Section", RFC 6982,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC6982, July 2013,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6982>.
			[RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
			Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
			RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Paul Wouters		Paul Wouters
	Red Hat		Red Hat
	Email: pwouters@redhat.com		Email: pwouters@redhat.com
	Sahana Prasad		Sahana Prasad
	Red Hat		Red Hat
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