< draft-ietf-ipsecme-labeled-ipsec-05.txt		draft-ietf-ipsecme-labeled-ipsec-06.txt >
	Network P. Wouters		Network P. Wouters
	Internet-Draft Aiven		Internet-Draft Aiven
	Updates: 7296 (if approved) S. Prasad		Updates: 7296 (if approved) S. Prasad
	Intended status: Standards Track Red Hat		Intended status: Standards Track Red Hat
	Expires: 5 November 2021 4 May 2021		Expires: 28 April 2022 25 October 2021
	Labeled IPsec Traffic Selector support for IKEv2		Labeled IPsec Traffic Selector support for IKEv2
	draft-ietf-ipsecme-labeled-ipsec-05		draft-ietf-ipsecme-labeled-ipsec-06
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document defines a new Traffic Selector (TS) Type for Internet		This document defines a new Traffic Selector (TS) Type for Internet
	Key Exchange version 2 to add support for negotiating Mandatory		Key Exchange version 2 to add support for negotiating Mandatory
	Access Control (MAC) security labels as a traffic selector of the		Access Control (MAC) security labels as a traffic selector of the
	Security Policy Database (SPD). Security Labels for IPsec are also		Security Policy Database (SPD). Security Labels for IPsec are also
	known as "Labeled IPsec". The new TS type is TS_SECLABEL, which		known as "Labeled IPsec". The new TS type is TS_SECLABEL, which
	consists of a variable length opaque field specifying the security		consists of a variable length opaque field specifying the security
	label. This document updates the IKEv2 TS negotiation specified in		label. This document updates the IKEv2 TS negotiation specified in
	skipping to change at page 1, line 38 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 38 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on 5 November 2021.		This Internet-Draft will expire on 28 April 2022.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
	license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.		license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
	Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights		Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
	skipping to change at page 2, line 24 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 24 ¶
	2. TS_SECLABEL Traffic Selector Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2. TS_SECLABEL Traffic Selector Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	2.1. TS_SECLABEL payload format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2.1. TS_SECLABEL payload format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	2.2. TS_SECLABEL properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2.2. TS_SECLABEL properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3. Traffic Selector negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3. Traffic Selector negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.1. Example TS negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3.1. Example TS negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	3.2. Considerations for using multiple TS_TYPEs in a TS . . . 6		3.2. Considerations for using multiple TS_TYPEs in a TS . . . 6
	4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	6. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		6. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	6.1. Libreswan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		6.1. Libreswan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	In computer security, Mandatory Access Control usually refers to		In computer security, Mandatory Access Control usually refers to
	systems in which all subjects and objects are assigned a security		systems in which all subjects and objects are assigned a security
	label. A security label is comprised of a set of security		label. A security label is comprised of a set of security
	attributes. The security labels along with a system authorization		attributes. The security labels along with a system authorization
	skipping to change at page 5, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 5 ¶
	* Selector Length (2 octets, unsigned integer) - Specifies the		* Selector Length (2 octets, unsigned integer) - Specifies the
	length of this Traffic Selector substructure including the header.		length of this Traffic Selector substructure including the header.
	* Security Label - An opaque byte stream of at least one octet.		* Security Label - An opaque byte stream of at least one octet.
	2.2. TS_SECLABEL properties		2.2. TS_SECLABEL properties
	The TS_SECLABEL Traffic Selector Type does not support narrowing or		The TS_SECLABEL Traffic Selector Type does not support narrowing or
	wildcards. It MUST be used as an exact match value.		wildcards. It MUST be used as an exact match value.
	If the TS_SECLABEL is present in a TSi/TSr, at least one Traffic
	Selector of type TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE MUST also
	be present in that TSi/TSr.
	The Security Label contents are opaque to the IKE implementation.		The Security Label contents are opaque to the IKE implementation.
	That is, the IKE implementation might not have any knowledge of the		That is, the IKE implementation might not have any knowledge of the
	meaning of this selector, other than as a type and opaque value to		meaning of this selector, other than as a type and opaque value to
	pass to the SPD.		pass to the SPD.
	A zero length Security Label MUST NOT be used. If a received TS		A zero length Security Label MUST NOT be used. If a received TS
	payload contains a TS_TYPE of TS_SECLABEL with a zero length Security		payload contains a TS_TYPE of TS_SECLABEL with a zero length Security
	Label, that specific Traffic Selector MUST be ignored. If no other		Label, that specific Traffic Selector MUST be ignored. If no other
	Traffic Selector of TS_TYPE TS_SECLABEL can be selected, a		Traffic Selector of TS_TYPE TS_SECLABEL can be selected, a
	TS_UNACCEPTABLE Error Notify message MUST be returned. A zero length		TS_UNACCEPTABLE Error Notify message MUST be returned. A zero length
	Security Label MUST NOT be interpreted as a wildcard security label.		Security Label MUST NOT be interpreted as a wildcard security label.
	If multiple Security Labels are allowed for a given IP protocol,		If multiple Security Labels are allowed for a given IP protocol,
	start and end address/port match, multiple TS_SECLABEL can be		start and end address/port match, the initiator includes all of the
	included in a TS payload.		acceptable TS_SECLABEL's and the responder MUST select one of them.
	If the Security Label traffic selector is optional from a		If the Security Label traffic selector is optional from a
	configuration point of view, the initiator will have to choose which		configuration point of view, the initiator will have to choose which
	TS payload to attempt first. If it includes the Security Label and		TS payload to attempt first. If it includes the Security Label and
	receives a TS_UNACCEPTABLE, it can attempt a new Child SA negotiation		receives a TS_UNACCEPTABLE, it can attempt a new Child SA negotiation
	without that Security Label.		without that Security Label.
	A responder that selected a TS with TS_SECLABEL MUST use the Security		A responder that selected a TS with TS_SECLABEL MUST use the Security
	Label for all selector operations on the resulting IPsec SA. It MUST		Label for all selector operations on the resulting TS. It MUST NOT
	NOT select a TS_set with a TS_SECLABEL without using the specified		select a TS_SECLABEL without using the specified Security Label, even
	Security Label, even if it deems the Security Label optional, as the		if it deems the Security Label optional, as the initiator has
	initiator TS_set with TS_SECLABEL means the initiator mandates using		indicated (and expects) that Security Label will be set for all
	that Security Label.		traffic matching the negotiated TS.
	3. Traffic Selector negotiation		3. Traffic Selector negotiation
	This document updates the [RFC7296] specification as follows:		This document updates the [RFC7296] specification as follows:
	Each TS payload (TSi and TSr) MUST contain at least one TS_TYPE of		Each TS payload (TSi and TSr) MUST contain at least one TS_TYPE of
	TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE.		TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE.
	Each TS payload (TSi or TSr) MAY contain one or more other TS_TYPEs,		Each TS payload (TSi or TSr) MAY contain one or more other TS_TYPEs,
	such as TS_SECLABEL.		such as TS_SECLABEL.
	A responder MUST create its TS response by selecting one of each		A responder MUST create each TS response by creating one of more
	TS_TYPE present in the offered TS by the initiator. If it cannot		(narrowed or not) TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE entries,
	select one of each TS_TYPE, it MUST return a TS_UNACCEPTABLE Error		plus one of each further TS_TYPE present in the offered TS by the
	Notify payload.		initiator. If this is not possible, it MUST return a TS_UNACCEPTABLE
			Error Notify payload.
	If a specific TS_TYPE (other than TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or		If a specific TS_TYPE (other than TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or
	TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE which are mandatory) is deemed optional, the		TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE which are mandatory) is deemed optional, the
	initiator SHOULD first try to negotiate the Child SA with the TS		initiator SHOULD first try to negotiate the Child SA with the TS
	payload including the optional TS_TYPE. Upon receiving		payload including the optional TS_TYPE. Upon receiving
	TS_UNACCEPTABLE, it SHOULD attempt a new Child SA negotiation using		TS_UNACCEPTABLE, it SHOULD attempt a new Child SA negotiation using
	the same TS but without the optional TS_TYPE.		the same TS but without the optional TS_TYPE.
	Some TS_TYPE's support narrowing, where the responder is allowed to
	select a subset of the original TS. Narrowing MUST NOT result in an
	empty selector for that TS_TYPE.
	3.1. Example TS negotiation		3.1. Example TS negotiation
	An initiator could send:		An initiator could send:
	TSi = ((17,0,192.0.2.0-192.0.2.255),		TSi = ((17,0,192.0.2.0-192.0.2.255),
	(0,0,198.51.0-198.51.255),		(0,0,198.51.0-198.51.255),
	TS_SECLABEL1, TS_SECLABEL2)		TS_SECLABEL1, TS_SECLABEL2)
	TSr = ((17,0,203.0.113.0-203.0.113.255),		TSr = ((17,0,203.0.113.0-203.0.113.255),
	(0,0,203.0.113.0-203.0.113.255),		(0,0,203.0.113.0-203.0.113.255),
	skipping to change at page 7, line 15 ¶		skipping to change at page 7, line 8 ¶
	If different IP ranges can only use different specific Security		If different IP ranges can only use different specific Security
	Labels, than these should be negotiated in two different Child SA		Labels, than these should be negotiated in two different Child SA
	negotiations. If in the example above, the initiator only allows		negotiations. If in the example above, the initiator only allows
	192.0.2.0/24 with TS_SECLABEL1, and 198.51.0/24 with TS_SECLABEL2,		192.0.2.0/24 with TS_SECLABEL1, and 198.51.0/24 with TS_SECLABEL2,
	than it MUST NOT combine these two ranges and security labels into		than it MUST NOT combine these two ranges and security labels into
	one Child SA negotiation.		one Child SA negotiation.
	The mechanism of narrowing of Traffic Selectors with		The mechanism of narrowing of Traffic Selectors with
	TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE and TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE does not apply to		TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE and TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE does not apply to
	TS_SECLABEL as the Security Label itself is not interpreted and		TS_SECLABEL as the Security Label itself is not interpreted and
	cannot itself be narrowed. It MUST be matched exactly. Rekey of an		cannot be narrowed. It MUST be matched exactly. Since a rekey MUST
	IPsec SA MUST only use identical Traffic Selectors, which means the		NOT narrow down the Traffic Selectors narrower than the scope
	same TS Type and selectors MUST be used. This guarantees that a		currently in use, the only valid choice of TS_SECLABEL for a rekey is
	Security Label once negotiated, remains part of the IPsec SA after a		the identical TS_SECLABEL that is in use by the Child SA being
	rekey.		rekeyed. If the TS_LABEL is missing from the TS during the rekey
			negotiation, the negotiation MUST fail with TS_UNACCEPTABLE.
	4. Security Considerations		4. Security Considerations
	It is assumed that the Security Label can be matched by the IKE		It is assumed that the Security Label can be matched by the IKE
	implementation to its own configured value, even if the IKE		implementation to its own configured value, even if the IKE
	implementation itself cannot interpret the Security Label value.		implementation itself cannot interpret the Security Label value.
	A packet that matches an SPD entry for all components except the		A packet that matches an SPD entry for all components except the
	Security Label would be treated as "not matching". If no other SPD		Security Label would be treated as "not matching". If no other SPD
	entries match, the (mis-labeled) traffic might end up being		entries match, the (mis-labeled) traffic might end up being
	skipping to change at page 9, line 9 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 48 ¶
	The code works as proof of concept, but is not yet production		The code works as proof of concept, but is not yet production
	ready when using multiple different labels with on-demand kernel		ready when using multiple different labels with on-demand kernel
	ACQUIRES.		ACQUIRES.
	Contact: Libreswan Development: swan-dev@libreswan.org		Contact: Libreswan Development: swan-dev@libreswan.org
	7. Acknowledgements		7. Acknowledgements
	A large part of the introduction text was taken verbatim from		A large part of the introduction text was taken verbatim from
	[draft-jml-ipsec-ikev2-security-label] whose authors are J Latten, D.		[draft-jml-ipsec-ikev2-security-label] whose authors are J Latten, D.
	Quigley and J. Lu.		Quigley and J. Lu. Valery Smyslov provided valuable input regarding
			IKEv2 Traffic Selector semantics.
	8. References		8. References
	8.1. Normative References		8.1. Normative References
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.		[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
	Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2		Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
	(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October		(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
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