< draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc4307bis-11.txt   draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc4307bis-12.txt >
Network Working Group Y. Nir Network Working Group Y. Nir
Internet-Draft Check Point Internet-Draft Check Point
Obsoletes: 4307 (if approved) T. Kivinen Obsoletes: 4307 (if approved) T. Kivinen
Updates: 7296 (if approved) INSIDE Secure Updates: 7296 (if approved) INSIDE Secure
Intended status: Standards Track P. Wouters Intended status: Standards Track P. Wouters
Expires: March 5, 2017 Red Hat Expires: March 13, 2017 Red Hat
D. Migault D. Migault
Ericsson Ericsson
September 1, 2016 September 9, 2016
Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance for IKEv2 Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance for IKEv2
draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc4307bis-11 draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc4307bis-12
Abstract Abstract
The IPsec series of protocols makes use of various cryptographic The IPsec series of protocols makes use of various cryptographic
algorithms in order to provide security services. The Internet Key algorithms in order to provide security services. The Internet Key
Exchange (IKE) protocol is used to negotiate the IPsec Security Exchange (IKE) protocol is used to negotiate the IPsec Security
Association (IPsec SA) parameters, such as which algorithms should be Association (IPsec SA) parameters, such as which algorithms should be
used. To ensure interoperability between different implementations, used. To ensure interoperability between different implementations,
it is necessary to specify a set of algorithm implementation it is necessary to specify a set of algorithm implementation
requirements and usage guidance to ensure that there is at least one requirements and usage guidance to ensure that there is at least one
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on March 5, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on March 13, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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1.1. Updating Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage 1.1. Updating Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage
Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Updating Algorithm Requirement Levels . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Updating Algorithm Requirement Levels . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3. Document Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.3. Document Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Algorithm Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Algorithm Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Type 1 - IKEv2 Encryption Algorithm Transforms . . . . . 5 3.1. Type 1 - IKEv2 Encryption Algorithm Transforms . . . . . 5
3.2. Type 2 - IKEv2 Pseudo-random Function Transforms . . . . 7 3.2. Type 2 - IKEv2 Pseudo-random Function Transforms . . . . 7
3.3. Type 3 - IKEv2 Integrity Algorithm Transforms . . . . . . 8 3.3. Type 3 - IKEv2 Integrity Algorithm Transforms . . . . . . 8
3.4. Type 4 - IKEv2 Diffie-Hellman Group Transforms . . . . . 9 3.4. Type 4 - IKEv2 Diffie-Hellman Group Transforms . . . . . 9
4. IKEv2 Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.5. Summary of Changes from RFC 4307 . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1. IKEv2 Authentication Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4. IKEv2 Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1.1. Recommendations for RSA key length . . . . . . . . . 11 4.1. IKEv2 Authentication Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1.1. Recommendations for RSA key length . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2. Digital Signature Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.2. Digital Signature Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. Algorithms for Internet of Things . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5. Algorithms for Internet of Things . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol [RFC7296] is used to The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol [RFC7296] is used to
negotiate the parameters of the IPsec SA, such as the encryption and negotiate the parameters of the IPsec SA, such as the encryption and
authentication algorithms and the keys for the protected authentication algorithms and the keys for the protected
communications between the two endpoints. The IKE protocol itself is communications between the two endpoints. The IKE protocol itself is
also protected by cryptographic algorithms which are negotiated also protected by cryptographic algorithms which are negotiated
between the two endpoints using IKE. Different implementations of between the two endpoints using IKE. Different implementations of
IKE may negotiate different algorithms based on their individual IKE may negotiate different algorithms based on their individual
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MODP Group with 224-bit and 256-bit Prime Order Subgroup have small MODP Group with 224-bit and 256-bit Prime Order Subgroup have small
subgroups, which means that checks specified in the "Additional subgroups, which means that checks specified in the "Additional
Diffie-Hellman Test for the IKEv2" [RFC6989] section 2.2 first bullet Diffie-Hellman Test for the IKEv2" [RFC6989] section 2.2 first bullet
point MUST be done when these groups are used. These groups are also point MUST be done when these groups are used. These groups are also
not safe-primes. The seeds for these groups have not been publicly not safe-primes. The seeds for these groups have not been publicly
released, resulting in reduced trust in these groups. These groups released, resulting in reduced trust in these groups. These groups
were proposed as alternatives for group 2 and 14 but never saw wide were proposed as alternatives for group 2 and 14 but never saw wide
deployment. It is expected in the near future to be further deployment. It is expected in the near future to be further
downgraded to MUST NOT. downgraded to MUST NOT.
3.5. Summary of Changes from RFC 4307
The following table summarizes the changes from RFC 4307.
RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THIS PARAGRAPH AND REPLACE XXXX IN THE
TABLE BELOW WITH THE NUMBER OF THIS RFC
+---------------------+------------------+------------+
| Algorithm | RFC 4307 | RFC XXXX |
+---------------------+------------------+------------+
| ENCR_3DES | MUST- | MAY |
| ENCR_NULL | MUST NOT[errata] | (*) |
| ENCR_AES_CBC | SHOULD+ | MUST |
| ENCR_AES_CTR | SHOULD | (*) |
| PRF_HMAC_MD5 | MAY | MUST NOT |
| PRF_HMAC_SHA1 | MUST | MUST- |
| PRF_AES128_XCBC | SHOULD+ | SHOULD |
| AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96 | MAY | MUST NOT |
| AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 | MUST | MUST- |
| AUTH_AES_XCBC_96 | SHOULD+ | SHOULD |
| Group 2 (1024-bit) | MUST- | SHOULD NOT |
| Group 14 (2048-bit) | SHOULD+ | MUST |
+---------------------+------------------+------------+
(*) These algorithms are not mentioned in the above sections, so they
default to MAY.
4. IKEv2 Authentication 4. IKEv2 Authentication
IKEv2 authentication may involve a signatures verification. IKEv2 authentication may involve a signatures verification.
Signatures may be used to validate a certificate or to check the Signatures may be used to validate a certificate or to check the
signature of the AUTH value. Cryptographic recommendations regarding signature of the AUTH value. Cryptographic recommendations regarding
certificate validation are out of scope of this document. What is certificate validation are out of scope of this document. What is
mandatory to implement is provided by the PKIX Community. This mandatory to implement is provided by the PKIX Community. This
document is mostly concerned on signature verification and generation document is mostly concerned on signature verification and generation
for the authentication. for the authentication.
 End of changes. 8 change blocks. 
14 lines changed or deleted 41 lines changed or added

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