< draft-ietf-ipsecme-split-dns-03.txt		draft-ietf-ipsecme-split-dns-04.txt >
	Network T. Pauly		Network T. Pauly
	Internet-Draft Apple Inc.		Internet-Draft Apple Inc.
	Intended status: Standards Track P. Wouters		Intended status: Standards Track P. Wouters
	Expires: May 16, 2018 Red Hat		Expires: July 26, 2018 Red Hat
	November 12, 2017		January 22, 2018
	Split DNS Configuration for IKEv2		Split DNS Configuration for IKEv2
	draft-ietf-ipsecme-split-dns-03		draft-ietf-ipsecme-split-dns-04
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document defines two Configuration Payload Attribute Types for		This document defines two Configuration Payload Attribute Types for
	the IKEv2 protocol that add support for private DNS domains. These		the IKEv2 protocol that add support for private DNS domains. These
	domains should be resolved using DNS servers reachable through an		domains should be resolved using DNS servers reachable through an
	IPsec connection, while leaving all other DNS resolution unchanged.		IPsec connection, while leaving all other DNS resolution unchanged.
	This approach of resolving a subset of domains using non-public DNS		This approach of resolving a subset of domains using non-public DNS
	servers is referred to as "Split DNS".		servers is referred to as "Split DNS".
	skipping to change at page 1, line 36 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 36 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on May 16, 2018.		This Internet-Draft will expire on July 26, 2018.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	skipping to change at page 2, line 24 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 24 ¶
	3.2. Configuration Reply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3.2. Configuration Reply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3.3. Mapping DNS Servers to Domains . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3.3. Mapping DNS Servers to Domains . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.4. Example Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3.4. Example Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.4.1. Simple Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3.4.1. Simple Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.4.2. Requesting Domains and DNSSEC trust anchors . . . . . 6		3.4.2. Requesting Domains and DNSSEC trust anchors . . . . . 6
	4. Payload Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		4. Payload Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	4.1. INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN Configuration Attribute Type . . . . 6		4.1. INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN Configuration Attribute Type . . . . 6
	4.2. INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA Configuration Attribute . . . . . . . 7		4.2. INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA Configuration Attribute . . . . . . . 7
	5. Split DNS Usage Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		5. Split DNS Usage Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	Split DNS is a common configuration for secure tunnels, such as		Split DNS is a common configuration for secure tunnels, such as
	Virtual Private Networks in which host machines private to an		Virtual Private Networks in which host machines private to an
	organization can only be resolved using internal DNS resolvers		organization can only be resolved using internal DNS resolvers
	skipping to change at page 8, line 37 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 37 ¶
	using some other external DNS resolver(s), configured independently		using some other external DNS resolver(s), configured independently
	from IKE. Queries for these other domains MAY be sent to the		from IKE. Queries for these other domains MAY be sent to the
	internal DNS resolver(s) listed in that CFG_REPLY message, but have		internal DNS resolver(s) listed in that CFG_REPLY message, but have
	no guarantee of being answered. For example, if the		no guarantee of being answered. For example, if the
	INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute specifies "example.com", then		INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute specifies "example.com", then
	"example.com", "www.example.com" and "mail.eng.example.com" MUST be		"example.com", "www.example.com" and "mail.eng.example.com" MUST be
	resolved using the internal DNS resolver(s), but "anotherexample.com"		resolved using the internal DNS resolver(s), but "anotherexample.com"
	and "ample.com" SHOULD NOT be resolved using the internal resolver		and "ample.com" SHOULD NOT be resolved using the internal resolver
	and SHOULD use the system's external DNS resolver(s).		and SHOULD use the system's external DNS resolver(s).
	An initiator SHOULD ignore INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes containing
	domains that are designated Special Use Domain Names in [RFC6761],
	such as "local", "localhost", "invalid", etc. Although it may
	explicitly wish to support some Special Use Domain Names.
	When an IKE SA is terminated, the DNS forwarding must be		When an IKE SA is terminated, the DNS forwarding must be
	unconfigured. The DNS forwarding itself MUST be be deleted. All		unconfigured. The DNS forwarding itself MUST be be deleted. All
	cached data of the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN provided DNS domainis MUST be		cached data of the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN provided DNS domainis MUST be
	flushed. This includes negative cache entries. Obtained DNSSEC		flushed. This includes negative cache entries. Obtained DNSSEC
	trust anchors MUST be removed from the list of trust anchors. The		trust anchors MUST be removed from the list of trust anchors. The
	outstanding DNS request queue MUST be cleared.		outstanding DNS request queue MUST be cleared.
	INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN and INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attributes SHOULD only be		INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN and INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attributes SHOULD only be
	used on split tunnel configurations where only a subset of traffic is		used on split tunnel configurations where only a subset of traffic is
	routed into a private remote network using the IPsec connection. If		routed into a private remote network using the IPsec connection. If
	skipping to change at page 9, line 44 ¶		skipping to change at page 9, line 42 ¶
	public DNS view, for which it has not explicitely requested such		public DNS view, for which it has not explicitely requested such
	deletation by specifying the domain specifically using a		deletation by specifying the domain specifically using a
	INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN(domain) request.		INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN(domain) request.
	A domain that is served via INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN should pay close		A domain that is served via INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN should pay close
	attention to their use of indirect reference RRtypes such as CNAME,		attention to their use of indirect reference RRtypes such as CNAME,
	DNAME, MX or SRV records so that resolving works as intended when		DNAME, MX or SRV records so that resolving works as intended when
	all, some or none of the IPsec connections are established.		all, some or none of the IPsec connections are established.
	The content of INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN and INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA may be		The content of INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN and INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA may be
	passed to another (DNS) program for processing. The content MUST be		passed to another (DNS) program for processing. As with any network
	verified and sanitized before passing it to other software. For		input, the content should be considered untrusted and handled
	example, domain names are limited to alphanumeric characters and the		accordingly.
	minus ("-") and underscore ("_") symbol and if other other characters
	are present, the entire payload could be ignored and not passed to
	DNS software, or the malicious characters could be filtered out
	before passing the payload to DNS software.
	7. IANA Considerations		7. IANA Considerations
	This document defines two new IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute		This document defines two new IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute
	Types, which are allocated from the "IKEv2 Configuration Payload		Types, which are allocated from the "IKEv2 Configuration Payload
	Attribute Types" namespace.		Attribute Types" namespace.
	Multi-		Multi-
	Value Attribute Type Valued Length Reference		Value Attribute Type Valued Length Reference
	------ ------------------- ------ ---------- ---------------		------ ------------------- ------ ---------- ---------------
	skipping to change at page 11, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 10, line 48 ¶
	Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2		Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
	(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October		(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
	2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.		2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
	8.2. Informative References		8.2. Informative References
	[RFC2775] Carpenter, B., "Internet Transparency", RFC 2775,		[RFC2775] Carpenter, B., "Internet Transparency", RFC 2775,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2775, February 2000, <https://www.rfc-		DOI 10.17487/RFC2775, February 2000, <https://www.rfc-
	editor.org/info/rfc2775>.		editor.org/info/rfc2775>.
	[RFC6761] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Special-Use Domain Names",
	RFC 6761, DOI 10.17487/RFC6761, February 2013,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6761>.
	[RFC7435] Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection		[RFC7435] Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection
	Most of the Time", RFC 7435, DOI 10.17487/RFC7435,		Most of the Time", RFC 7435, DOI 10.17487/RFC7435,
	December 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435>.		December 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435>.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Tommy Pauly		Tommy Pauly
	Apple Inc.		Apple Inc.
	1 Infinite Loop		1 Infinite Loop
	Cupertino, California 95014		Cupertino, California 95014
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