< draft-ietf-ipsecme-tcp-encaps-01.txt   draft-ietf-ipsecme-tcp-encaps-02.txt >
Network T. Pauly Network T. Pauly
Internet-Draft Apple Inc. Internet-Draft Apple Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track S. Touati Intended status: Standards Track S. Touati
Expires: January 8, 2017 Ericsson Expires: February 18, 2017 Ericsson
R. Mantha R. Mantha
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
July 7, 2016 August 17, 2016
TCP Encapsulation of IKE and IPSec Packets TCP Encapsulation of IKE and IPsec Packets
draft-ietf-ipsecme-tcp-encaps-01 draft-ietf-ipsecme-tcp-encaps-02
Abstract Abstract
This document describes a method to transport IKE and IPSec packets This document describes a method to transport IKE and IPsec packets
over a TCP connection for traversing network middleboxes that may over a TCP connection for traversing network middleboxes that may
block IKE negotiation over UDP. This method, referred to as TCP block IKE negotiation over UDP. This method, referred to as TCP
encapsulation, involves sending all packets for tunnel establishment encapsulation, involves sending both IKE packets for tunnel
as well as tunneled packets over a TCP connection. This method is establishment as well as tunneled packets using ESP over a TCP
intended to be used as a fallback option when IKE cannot be connection. This method is intended to be used as a fallback option
negotiated over UDP. when IKE cannot be negotiated over UDP.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 8, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on February 18, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 34 skipping to change at page 2, line 34
9. Using IKE Message Fragmentation with TCP encapsulation . . . 9 9. Using IKE Message Fragmentation with TCP encapsulation . . . 9
10. Considerations for Keep-alives and DPD . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10. Considerations for Keep-alives and DPD . . . . . . . . . . . 9
11. Middlebox Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 11. Middlebox Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
12. Performance Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 12. Performance Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
12.1. TCP-in-TCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 12.1. TCP-in-TCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
12.2. Added Reliability for Unreliable Protocols . . . . . . . 11 12.2. Added Reliability for Unreliable Protocols . . . . . . . 11
12.3. Quality of Service Markings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 12.3. Quality of Service Markings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
12.4. Maximum Segment Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 12.4. Maximum Segment Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
15. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 15. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix A. Using TCP encapsulation with TLS . . . . . . . . . . 13 Appendix A. Using TCP encapsulation with TLS . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix B. Example exchanges of TCP Encapsulation with TLS . . 14 Appendix B. Example exchanges of TCP Encapsulation with TLS . . 14
B.1. Establishing an IKE session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 B.1. Establishing an IKE session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
B.2. Deleting an IKE session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 B.2. Deleting an IKE session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
B.3. Re-establishing an IKE session . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 B.3. Re-establishing an IKE session . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
B.4. Using MOBIKE between UDP and TCP Encapsulation . . . . . 18 B.4. Using MOBIKE between UDP and TCP Encapsulation . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
IKEv2 [RFC7296] is a protocol for establishing IPSec tunnels, using IKEv2 [RFC7296] is a protocol for establishing IPsec tunnels, using
IKE messages over UDP for control traffic, and using Encapsulating IKE messages over UDP for control traffic, and using Encapsulating
Security Payload (ESP) messages for tunneled data traffic. Many Security Payload (ESP) messages for tunneled data traffic. Many
network middleboxes that filter traffic on public hotspots block all network middleboxes that filter traffic on public hotspots block all
UDP traffic, including IKE and IPSec, but allow TCP connections UDP traffic, including IKE and IPsec, but allow TCP connections
through since they appear to be web traffic. Devices on these through since they appear to be web traffic. Devices on these
networks that need to use IPSec (to access private enterprise networks that need to use IPsec (to access private enterprise
networks, to route voice-over-IP calls to carrier networks, or networks, to route voice-over-IP calls to carrier networks, or
because of security policies) are unable to establish IPSec tunnels. because of security policies) are unable to establish IPsec tunnels.
This document defines a method for encapsulating both the IKE control This document defines a method for encapsulating both the IKE control
messages as well as the IPSec data messages within a TCP connection. messages as well as the IPsec data messages within a TCP connection.
Using TCP as a transport for IPSec packets adds a third option to the Using TCP as a transport for IPsec packets adds a third option to the
list of traditional IPSec transports: list of traditional IPsec transports:
1. Direct. Currently, IKE negotiations begin over UDP port 500. 1. Direct. Currently, IKE negotiations begin over UDP port 500.
If no NAT is detected between the initiator and the receiver, If no NAT is detected between the initiator and the receiver,
then subsequent IKE packets are sent over UDP port 500 and then subsequent IKE packets are sent over UDP port 500 and
IPSec data packets are sent using ESP [RFC4303]. IPsec data packets are sent using ESP [RFC4303].
2. UDP Encapsulation [RFC3948]. If a NAT is detected between the 2. UDP Encapsulation [RFC3948]. If a NAT is detected between the
initiator and the receiver, then subsequent IKE packets are initiator and the receiver, then subsequent IKE packets are
sent over UDP port 4500 with four bytes of zero at the start of sent over UDP port 4500 with four bytes of zero at the start of
the UDP payload and ESP packets are sent out over UDP port the UDP payload and ESP packets are sent out over UDP port
4500. Some peers default to using UDP encapsulation even when 4500. Some peers default to using UDP encapsulation even when
no NAT are detected on the path as some middleboxes do not no NAT are detected on the path as some middleboxes do not
support IP protocols other than TCP and UDP. support IP protocols other than TCP and UDP.
3. TCP Encapsulation. If both of the other two methods are not 3. TCP Encapsulation. If both of the other two methods are not
available or appropriate, both IKE negotiation packets as well available or appropriate, both IKE negotiation packets as well
as ESP packets can be sent over a single TCP connection to the as ESP packets can be sent over a single TCP connection to the
peer. peer.
Direct use of ESP or UDP Encapsulation should be preferred by IKE Direct use of ESP or UDP Encapsulation should be preferred by IKE
implementations due to performance concerns when using TCP implementations due to performance concerns when using TCP
Encapsulation Section 12. Most implementations should use TCP Encapsulation [Section 12]. Most implementations should use TCP
Encapsulation only on networks where negotiation over UDP has been Encapsulation only on networks where negotiation over UDP has been
attempted without receiving responses from the peer, or if a network attempted without receiving responses from the peer, or if a network
is known to not support UDP. is known to not support UDP.
1.1. Prior Work and Motivation 1.1. Prior Work and Motivation
Encapsulating IKE connections within TCP streams is a common approach Encapsulating IKE connections within TCP streams is a common approach
to solve the problem of UDP packets being blocked by network to solve the problem of UDP packets being blocked by network
middleboxes. The goal of this document is to promote middleboxes. The goal of this document is to promote
interoperability by providing a standard method of framing IKE and interoperability by providing a standard method of framing IKE and
ESP message within streams, and to provide guidelines for how to ESP message within streams, and to provide guidelines for how to
configure and use TCP encapsulation. configure and use TCP encapsulation.
Some previous solutions include: Some previous alternatives include:
Cellular Network Access Interworking Wireless LAN (IWLAN) uses IKEv2 Cellular Network Access Interworking Wireless LAN (IWLAN) uses IKEv2
to create secure connections to cellular carrier networks for to create secure connections to cellular carrier networks for
making voice calls and accessing other network services over making voice calls and accessing other network services over
Wi-Fi networks. 3GPP has recommended that IKEv2 and ESP packets Wi-Fi networks. 3GPP has recommended that IKEv2 and ESP packets
be sent within a TLS connection to be able to establish be sent within a TLS connection to be able to establish
connections on restrictive networks. connections on restrictive networks.
ISAKMP over TCP Various non-standard extensions to ISAKMP have been ISAKMP over TCP Various non-standard extensions to ISAKMP have been
deployed that send IPSec traffic over TCP or TCP-like packets. deployed that send IPsec traffic over TCP or TCP-like packets.
SSL VPNs Many proprietary VPN solutions use a combination of TLS and SSL VPNs Many proprietary VPN solutions use a combination of TLS and
IPSec in order to provide reliability. IPsec in order to provide reliability.
IKEv2 over TCP IKEv2 over TCP as described in IKEv2 over TCP IKEv2 over TCP as described in
[I-D.nir-ipsecme-ike-tcp] is used to avoid UDP fragmentation. [I-D.nir-ipsecme-ike-tcp] is used to avoid UDP fragmentation.
The goal of this specification is to provide a standardized method
for using TCP streams to transport IPsec that is compatible with the
current IKE standard, and avoids the overhead of other alternatives
that always rely on TCP or TLS.
1.2. Requirements Language 1.2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Configuration 2. Configuration
One of the main reasons to use TCP encapsulation is that UDP traffic One of the main reasons to use TCP encapsulation is that UDP traffic
may be entirely blocked on a network. Because of this, support for may be entirely blocked on a network. Because of this, support for
TCP encapsulation is not specifically negotiated in the IKE exchange. TCP encapsulation is not specifically negotiated in the IKE exchange.
Instead, support for TCP encapsulation must be pre-configured on both Instead, support for TCP encapsulation must be pre-configured on both
the initiator and the responder. the initiator and the responder.
The configuration defined on each peer should include the following The configuration defined on each peer should include the following
parameters: parameters:
o One or more TCP ports on which the responder will listen for o One or more TCP ports on which the responder will listen for
incoming connections. Note that the initiator may initiate TCP incoming connections. Note that the initiator may initiate TCP
connections to the responder from any local port. connections to the responder from any local port. The ports on
which the responder listens will likey be based on the ports
commonly allowed on restricted networks.
o Optionally, an extra framing protocol to use on top of TCP to o Optionally, an extra framing protocol to use on top of TCP to
further encapsulate the stream of IKE and IPSec packets. See further encapsulate the stream of IKE and IPsec packets. See
Appendix A for a detailed discussion. Appendix A for a detailed discussion.
This document leaves the selection of TCP ports up to This document leaves the selection of TCP ports up to
implementations. It is suggested to use TCP port 4500, which is implementations. It is suggested to use TCP port 4500, which is
allocated for IPSec NAT Traversal. allocated for IPsec NAT Traversal.
Since TCP encapsulation of IKE and IPSec packets adds overhead and Since TCP encapsulation of IKE and IPsec packets adds overhead and
has potential performance trade-offs compared to direct or UDP- has potential performance trade-offs compared to direct or UDP-
encapsulated tunnels (as described in Performance Considerations, encapsulated tunnels (as described in Performance Considerations,
Section 12), implementations SHOULD prefer ESP direct or UDP Section 12), implementations SHOULD prefer ESP direct or UDP
encapsulated tunnels over TCP encapsulated tunnels when possible. encapsulated tunnels over TCP encapsulated tunnels when possible.
3. TCP-Encapsulated Header Formats 3. TCP-Encapsulated Header Formats
In order to encapsulate IKE and ESP messages within a TCP stream, a Like UDP encapsulation, TCP encapsulation uses the first four bytes
16-bit length field precedes every message. If the first 32-bits of of a message to differentiate IKE and ESP messages. TCP
the message are zeros (a Non-ESP Marker), then the contents comprise encapsulation also adds a length field to define the boundaries of
an IKE message. Otherwise, the contents comprise an ESP message. messages within a stream. The message length is sent in a 16-bit
field that precedes every message. If the first 32-bits of the
message are zeros (a Non-ESP Marker), then the contents comprise an
IKE message. Otherwise, the contents comprise an ESP message.
Authentication Header (AH) messages are not supported for TCP Authentication Header (AH) messages are not supported for TCP
encapsulation. encapsulation.
Although a TCP stream may be able to send very long messages, Although a TCP stream may be able to send very long messages,
implementations SHOULD limit message lengths to typical UDP datagram implementations SHOULD limit message lengths to typical UDP datagram
ESP payload lengths. The maximum message length is used as the ESP payload lengths. The maximum message length is used as the
effective MTU for connections that are being encrypted using ESP, so effective MTU for connections that are being encrypted using ESP, so
the maximum message length will influence characteristics of inner the maximum message length will influence characteristics of inner
connections, such as the TCP Maximum Segment Size (MSS). connections, such as the TCP Maximum Segment Size (MSS).
skipping to change at page 5, line 40 skipping to change at page 5, line 51
| Non-ESP Marker | | Non-ESP Marker |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
~ IKE header [RFC7296] ~ ~ IKE header [RFC7296] ~
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1 Figure 1
The IKE header is preceded by a 16-bit length field in network byte The IKE header is preceded by a 16-bit length field in network byte
order that specifies the length of the IKE packet within the TCP order that specifies the length of the IKE message (including the
stream. As with IKE over UDP port 4500, a zeroed 32-bit Non-ESP Non-ESP marker) within the TCP stream. As with IKE over UDP port
Marker is inserted before the start of the IKE header in order to 4500, a zeroed 32-bit Non-ESP Marker is inserted before the start of
differentiate the traffic from ESP traffic between the same addresses the IKE header in order to differentiate the traffic from ESP traffic
and ports. between the same addresses and ports.
o Length (2 octets, unsigned integer) - Length of the IKE packet o Length (2 octets, unsigned integer) - Length of the IKE packet
including the Length Field and Non-ESP Marker. including the Length Field and Non-ESP Marker.
3.2. TCP-Encapsulated ESP Header Format 3.2. TCP-Encapsulated ESP Header Format
1 2 3 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | | Length |
skipping to change at page 6, line 30 skipping to change at page 6, line 36
order that specifies the length of the ESP packet within the TCP order that specifies the length of the ESP packet within the TCP
stream. stream.
The SPI field in the ESP header MUST NOT be a zero value. The SPI field in the ESP header MUST NOT be a zero value.
o Length (2 octets, unsigned integer) - Length of the ESP packet o Length (2 octets, unsigned integer) - Length of the ESP packet
including the Length Field. including the Length Field.
4. TCP-Encapsulated Stream Prefix 4. TCP-Encapsulated Stream Prefix
Each stream of bytes used for IKE and IPSec encapsulation MUST begin Each stream of bytes used for IKE and IPsec encapsulation MUST begin
with a fixed sequence of six bytes as a magic value, containing the with a fixed sequence of six bytes as a magic value, containing the
characters "IKETCP" as ASCII values. This allows peers to characters "IKETCP" as ASCII values. This allows peers to
differentiate this protocol from other protocols that may be run over differentiate this protocol from other protocols that may be run over
TCP streams, since the bytes do not overlap with the valid start of the same TCP port. Since TCP encapsulated IPsec is not assigned to a
any other known stream protocol. This value is only sent once, by specific port, responders may be able to receive multiple protocols
the Initiator only, at the beginning of any stream of IKE and ESP on the same port. The bytes of the stream prefix do not overlap with
messages. the valid start of any other known stream protocol. This value is
only sent once, by the Initiator only, at the beginning of any stream
of IKE and ESP messages.
If other framing protocols are used within TCP to further encapsulate If other framing protocols are used within TCP to further encapsulate
or encrypt the stream of IKE and ESP messages, the Stream Prefix must or encrypt the stream of IKE and ESP messages, the Stream Prefix must
be at the start of the Initiator's IKE and ESP message stream within be at the start of the Initiator's IKE and ESP message stream within
the added protocol layer [Appendix A]. the added protocol layer [Appendix A]. Although some framing
protocols do support negotiating inner protocols, the stream prefix
should always be used in order for implementations to be as generic
as possible and not rely on other framing protocols on top of TCP.
0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
+------+------+------+------+------+------+ +------+------+------+------+------+------+
| 0x49 | 0x4b | 0x45 | 0x54 | 0x43 | 0x50 | | 0x49 | 0x4b | 0x45 | 0x54 | 0x43 | 0x50 |
+------+------+------+------+------+------+ +------+------+------+------+------+------+
Figure 3 Figure 3
5. Applicability 5. Applicability
skipping to change at page 7, line 25 skipping to change at page 7, line 34
Since the support of TCP encapsulation is a configured property, not Since the support of TCP encapsulation is a configured property, not
a negotiated one, it is recommended that if there are multiple IKE a negotiated one, it is recommended that if there are multiple IKE
endpoints representing a single peer (such as multiple machines with endpoints representing a single peer (such as multiple machines with
different IP addresses when connecting by Fully-Qualified Domain different IP addresses when connecting by Fully-Qualified Domain
Name, or endpoints used with IKE redirection), all of the endpoints Name, or endpoints used with IKE redirection), all of the endpoints
equally support TCP encapsulation. equally support TCP encapsulation.
If TCP encapsulation is being used for a specific IKE SA, all If TCP encapsulation is being used for a specific IKE SA, all
messages for that IKE SA and its Child SAs MUST be sent over a TCP messages for that IKE SA and its Child SAs MUST be sent over a TCP
connection until the SA is deleted or MOBIKE is used to change the SA connection until the SA is deleted or MOBIKE is used to change the SA
endpoints and/or encapsulation protocol. No packets should be sent endpoints and/or encapsulation protocol. See Section 8 for more
over UDP or direct ESP for the IKE SA or its Child SAs while using details on using MOBIKE to transition between encapsulation modes.
TCP encapsulation.
6. Connection Establishment and Teardown 6. Connection Establishment and Teardown
When the IKE initiator uses TCP encapsulation for its negotiation, it When the IKE initiator uses TCP encapsulation for its negotiation, it
will initiate a TCP connection to the responder using the configured will initiate a TCP connection to the responder using the configured
TCP port. The first bytes sent on the stream MUST be the stream TCP port. The first bytes sent on the stream MUST be the stream
prefix value [Section 4]. After this prefix, encapsulated IKE prefix value [Section 4]. After this prefix, encapsulated IKE
messages will negotiate the IKE SA and initial Child SA [RFC7296]. messages will negotiate the IKE SA and initial Child SA [RFC7296].
After this point, both encapsulated IKE Figure 1 and ESP Figure 2 After this point, both encapsulated IKE Figure 1 and ESP Figure 2
messages will be sent over the TCP connection. messages will be sent over the TCP connection.
skipping to change at page 8, line 36 skipping to change at page 8, line 45
availability model. It is also possible to negotiate multiple IKE availability model. It is also possible to negotiate multiple IKE
SAs over the same TCP connection. SAs over the same TCP connection.
The processing of the TCP packets is the same whether its within a The processing of the TCP packets is the same whether its within a
single or multiple TCP connections. single or multiple TCP connections.
7. Interaction with NAT Detection Payloads 7. Interaction with NAT Detection Payloads
When negotiating over UDP port 500, IKE_SA_INIT packets include When negotiating over UDP port 500, IKE_SA_INIT packets include
NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP and NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP payloads to NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP and NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP payloads to
determine if UDP encapsulation of IPSec packets should be used. determine if UDP encapsulation of IPsec packets should be used.
These payloads contain SHA-1 digests of the SPIs, IP addresses, and These payloads contain SHA-1 digests of the SPIs, IP addresses, and
ports. IKE_SA_INIT packets sent on a TCP connection SHOULD include ports. IKE_SA_INIT packets sent on a TCP connection SHOULD include
these payloads, and SHOULD use the applicable TCP ports when creating these payloads, and SHOULD use the applicable TCP ports when creating
and checking the SHA-1 digests. and checking the SHA-1 digests.
If a NAT is detected due to the SHA-1 digests not matching the If a NAT is detected due to the SHA-1 digests not matching the
expected values, no change should be made for encapsulation of expected values, no change should be made for encapsulation of
subsequent IKE or ESP packets, since TCP encapsulation inherently subsequent IKE or ESP packets, since TCP encapsulation inherently
supports NAT traversal. Implementations MAY use the information that supports NAT traversal. Implementations MAY use the information that
a NAT is present to influence keep-alive timer values. a NAT is present to influence keep-alive timer values.
8. Using MOBIKE with TCP encapsulation 8. Using MOBIKE with TCP encapsulation
When an IKE session is transitioned between networks using MOBIKE When an IKE session is transitioned between networks using MOBIKE
[RFC4555], the initiator of the transition may switch between using [RFC4555], the initiator of the transition may switch between using
TCP encapsulation, UDP encapsulation, or no encapsulation. TCP encapsulation, UDP encapsulation, or no encapsulation.
Implementations that implement both MOBIKE and TCP encapsulation MUST Implementations that implement both MOBIKE and TCP encapsulation MUST
support dynamically enabling and disabling TCP encapsulation as support dynamically enabling and disabling TCP encapsulation as
interfaces change. interfaces change.
The encapsulation method of ESP packets MUST always match the When a MOBIKE-enabled initiator changes networks, the
encapsulation method of the IKE negotiation, which may be different UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES notification SHOULD be sent out first over UDP
when an IKE endpoint changes networks. When a MOBIKE-enabled before attempting over TCP. If there is a response to the
initiator changes networks, the UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES notification UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES notification sent over UDP, then the ESP packets
SHOULD be sent out first over UDP before attempting over TCP. If should be sent directly over IP or over UDP port 4500 (depending on
there is a response to the UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES notification sent over if a NAT was detected), regardless of if a connection on a previous
UDP, then the ESP packets should be sent directly over IP or over UDP network was using TCP encapsulation. Similarly, if the responder
port 4500 (depending on if a NAT was detected), regardless of if a only responds to the UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES notification over TCP, then
connection on a previous network was using TCP encapsulation. the ESP packets should be sent over the TCP connection, regardless of
Similarly, if the responder only responds to the UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES if a connection on a previous network did not use TCP encapsulation.
notification over TCP, then the ESP packets should be sent over the
TCP connection, regardless of if a connection on a previous network
did not use TCP encapsulation.
9. Using IKE Message Fragmentation with TCP encapsulation 9. Using IKE Message Fragmentation with TCP encapsulation
IKE Message Fragmentation [RFC7383] is not required when using TCP IKE Message Fragmentation [RFC7383] is not required when using TCP
encapsulation, since a TCP stream already handles the fragmentation encapsulation, since a TCP stream already handles the fragmentation
of its contents across packets. Since fragmentation is redundant in of its contents across packets. Since fragmentation is redundant in
this case, implementations might choose to not negotiate IKE this case, implementations might choose to not negotiate IKE
fragmentation. Even if fragmentation is negotiated, an fragmentation. Even if fragmentation is negotiated, an
implementation MAY choose to not fragment when going over a TCP implementation MAY choose to not fragment when going over a TCP
connection. connection.
If an implementation supports both MOBIKE and IKE fragmentation, it If an implementation supports both MOBIKE and IKE fragmentation, it
SHOULD negotiate IKE fragmentation over a TCP encapsulated session in SHOULD negotiate IKE fragmentation over a TCP encapsulated session in
case the session switches to UDP encapsulation on another network. case the session switches to UDP encapsulation on another network.
10. Considerations for Keep-alives and DPD 10. Considerations for Keep-alives and DPD
Encapsulating IKE and IPSec inside of a TCP connection can impact the Encapsulating IKE and IPsec inside of a TCP connection can impact the
strategy that implementations use to detect peer liveness and to strategy that implementations use to detect peer liveness and to
maintain middlebox port mappings. Peer liveness should be checked maintain middlebox port mappings. Peer liveness should be checked
using IKE Informational packets [RFC7296]. using IKE Informational packets [RFC7296].
In general, TCP port mappings are maintained by NATs longers than UDP In general, TCP port mappings are maintained by NATs longers than UDP
port mappings, so IPSec ESP NAT keep-alives [RFC3948] SHOULD NOT be port mappings, so IPsec ESP NAT keep-alives [RFC3948] SHOULD NOT be
sent when using TCP encapsulation. Any implementation using TCP sent when using TCP encapsulation. Any implementation using TCP
encapsulation MUST silently drop incoming NAT keep-alive packets, and encapsulation MUST silently drop incoming NAT keep-alive packets, and
not treat them as errors. NAT keep-alive packets over a TCP not treat them as errors. NAT keep-alive packets over a TCP
encapsulated IPSec connection will be sent with a length value of 1 encapsulated IPsec connection will be sent with a length value of 1
byte, whose value is 0xFF [Figure 2]. byte, whose value is 0xFF [Figure 2].
Note that depending on the configuration of TCP and TLS on the Note that depending on the configuration of TCP and TLS on the
connection, TCP keep-alives [RFC1122] and TLS keep-alives [RFC6520] connection, TCP keep-alives [RFC1122] and TLS keep-alives [RFC6520]
may be used. These MUST NOT be used as indications of IKE peer may be used. These MUST NOT be used as indications of IKE peer
liveness. liveness.
11. Middlebox Considerations 11. Middlebox Considerations
Many security networking devices such as Firewalls or Intrusion Many security networking devices such as Firewalls or Intrusion
skipping to change at page 10, line 36 skipping to change at page 10, line 37
port 80, if non-HTTP traffic is seen (such as TCP encapsulated IKE), port 80, if non-HTTP traffic is seen (such as TCP encapsulated IKE),
this could be dropped by the security device. this could be dropped by the security device.
A network device that monitors the transport layer will track the A network device that monitors the transport layer will track the
state of TCP sessions, such as TCP sequence numbers. TCP state of TCP sessions, such as TCP sequence numbers. TCP
encapsulation of IKE should therefore use standard TCP behaviors to encapsulation of IKE should therefore use standard TCP behaviors to
avoid being dropped by middleboxes. avoid being dropped by middleboxes.
12. Performance Considerations 12. Performance Considerations
Several aspects of TCP encapsulation for IKE and IPSec packets may Several aspects of TCP encapsulation for IKE and IPsec packets may
negatively impact the performance of connections within the tunnel. negatively impact the performance of connections within the tunnel.
Implementations should be aware of these and take these into Implementations should be aware of these and take these into
consideration when determining when to use TCP encapsulation. consideration when determining when to use TCP encapsulation.
12.1. TCP-in-TCP 12.1. TCP-in-TCP
If the outer connection between IKE peers is over TCP, inner TCP If the outer connection between IKE peers is over TCP, inner TCP
connections may suffer effects from using TCP within TCP. In connections may suffer effects from using TCP within TCP. In
particular, the inner TCP's round-trip-time estimation will be particular, the inner TCP's round-trip-time estimation will be
affected by the burstiness of the outer TCP. This will make loss- affected by the burstiness of the outer TCP. This will make loss-
skipping to change at page 11, line 35 skipping to change at page 11, line 35
maximum segment size (MSS) in order to avoid unnecessary maximum segment size (MSS) in order to avoid unnecessary
fragmentation of packets. fragmentation of packets.
13. Security Considerations 13. Security Considerations
IKE responders that support TCP encapsulation may become vulnerable IKE responders that support TCP encapsulation may become vulnerable
to new Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks that are specific to TCP, such to new Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks that are specific to TCP, such
as SYN-flooding attacks. Responders should be aware of this as SYN-flooding attacks. Responders should be aware of this
additional attack-surface. additional attack-surface.
Responders should be careful to ensure that the stream prefix
"IKETCP" uniquely identifies streams using the TCP encapsulation
protocol. The prefix was chosen to not overlap with the start of any
known valid protocol over TCP, but implementations should make sure
to validate this assumption in order to avoid unexpected processing
of TCP connections.
Attackers may be able to disrupt the TCP connection by sending Attackers may be able to disrupt the TCP connection by sending
spurious RST packets. Due to this, implementations SHOULD make sure spurious RST packets. Due to this, implementations SHOULD make sure
that IKE session state persists even if the underlying TCP connection that IKE session state persists even if the underlying TCP connection
is torn down. is torn down.
14. IANA Considerations 14. IANA Considerations
This memo includes no request to IANA. This memo includes no request to IANA.
TCP port 4500 is already allocated to IPSec. This port MAY be used TCP port 4500 is already allocated to IPsec. This port MAY be used
for the protocol described in this document, but implementations MAY for the protocol described in this document, but implementations MAY
prefer to use other ports based on local policy. prefer to use other ports based on local policy.
15. Acknowledgments 15. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to acknowledge the input and advice of Stuart The authors would like to acknowledge the input and advice of Stuart
Cheshire, Delziel Fernandes, Yoav Nir, Christoph Paasch, Yaron Cheshire, Delziel Fernandes, Yoav Nir, Christoph Paasch, Yaron
Sheffer, David Schinazi, Graham Bartlett, Byju Pularikkal, March Wu Sheffer, David Schinazi, Graham Bartlett, Byju Pularikkal, March Wu
and Kingwel Xie. Special thanks to Eric Kinnear for his and Kingwel Xie. Special thanks to Eric Kinnear for his
implementation work. implementation work.
skipping to change at page 14, line 4 skipping to change at page 14, line 14
The security of the IKE session is entirely derived from the IKE The security of the IKE session is entirely derived from the IKE
negotiation and key establishment and not from the TLS session (which negotiation and key establishment and not from the TLS session (which
in this context is only used for encapsulation purposes), therefore in this context is only used for encapsulation purposes), therefore
when TLS is used on the TCP connection, both the initiator and when TLS is used on the TCP connection, both the initiator and
responder SHOULD allow the NULL cipher to be selected for performance responder SHOULD allow the NULL cipher to be selected for performance
reasons. reasons.
Implementations should be aware that the use of TLS introduces Implementations should be aware that the use of TLS introduces
another layer of overhead requiring more bytes to transmit a given another layer of overhead requiring more bytes to transmit a given
IKE and IPSec packet. For this reason, direct ESP, UDP IKE and IPsec packet. For this reason, direct ESP, UDP
encapsulation, or TCP encapsulation without TLS should be preferred encapsulation, or TCP encapsulation without TLS should be preferred
in situations in which TLS is not required in order to traverse in situations in which TLS is not required in order to traverse
middle-boxes. middle-boxes.
Appendix B. Example exchanges of TCP Encapsulation with TLS Appendix B. Example exchanges of TCP Encapsulation with TLS
B.1. Establishing an IKE session B.1. Establishing an IKE session
Client Server Client Server
---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
1) -------------------- TCP Connection ------------------- 1) -------------------- TCP Connection -------------------
 End of changes. 38 change blocks. 
65 lines changed or deleted 83 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.48. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/