< draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-36.txt		draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-37.txt >
	JOSE Working Group M. Jones		JOSE Working Group M. Jones
	Internet-Draft Microsoft		Internet-Draft Microsoft
	Intended status: Standards Track J. Hildebrand		Intended status: Standards Track J. Hildebrand
	Expires: April 27, 2015 Cisco		Expires: May 23, 2015 Cisco
	October 24, 2014		November 19, 2014
	JSON Web Encryption (JWE)		JSON Web Encryption (JWE)
	draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-36		draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-37
	Abstract		Abstract
	JSON Web Encryption (JWE) represents encrypted content using		JSON Web Encryption (JWE) represents encrypted content using
	JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) based data structures.		JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) based data structures.
	Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this		Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this
	specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)		specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)
	specification and IANA registries defined by that specification.		specification and IANA registries defined by that specification.
	Related digital signature and MAC capabilities are described in the		Related digital signature and MAC capabilities are described in the
	separate JSON Web Signature (JWS) specification.		separate JSON Web Signature (JWS) specification.
	skipping to change at page 1, line 37 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 37 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on April 27, 2015.		This Internet-Draft will expire on May 23, 2015.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 3, line 22 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 22 ¶
	12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29		12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
	12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29		12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
	12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30		12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
	Appendix A. JWE Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31		Appendix A. JWE Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
	A.1. Example JWE using RSAES OAEP and AES GCM . . . . . . . . . 31		A.1. Example JWE using RSAES OAEP and AES GCM . . . . . . . . . 31
	A.1.1. JOSE Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31		A.1.1. JOSE Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
	A.1.2. Content Encryption Key (CEK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31		A.1.2. Content Encryption Key (CEK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
	A.1.3. Key Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32		A.1.3. Key Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
	A.1.4. Initialization Vector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33		A.1.4. Initialization Vector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
	A.1.5. Additional Authenticated Data . . . . . . . . . . . . 33		A.1.5. Additional Authenticated Data . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
	A.1.6. Content Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33		A.1.6. Content Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
	A.1.7. Complete Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34		A.1.7. Complete Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
	A.1.8. Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34		A.1.8. Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
	A.2. Example JWE using RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 and		A.2. Example JWE using RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 and
	AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35		AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
	A.2.1. JOSE Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35		A.2.1. JOSE Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
	A.2.2. Content Encryption Key (CEK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35		A.2.2. Content Encryption Key (CEK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
	A.2.3. Key Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35		A.2.3. Key Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
	A.2.4. Initialization Vector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37		A.2.4. Initialization Vector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
	A.2.5. Additional Authenticated Data . . . . . . . . . . . . 37		A.2.5. Additional Authenticated Data . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
	A.2.6. Content Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37		A.2.6. Content Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
	A.2.7. Complete Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38		A.2.7. Complete Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
	A.2.8. Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38		A.2.8. Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
	A.3. Example JWE using AES Key Wrap and		A.3. Example JWE using AES Key Wrap and
	AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38		AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
	A.3.1. JOSE Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39		A.3.1. JOSE Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
	A.3.2. Content Encryption Key (CEK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39		A.3.2. Content Encryption Key (CEK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
	A.3.3. Key Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39		A.3.3. Key Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
	A.3.4. Initialization Vector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40		A.3.4. Initialization Vector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
	A.3.5. Additional Authenticated Data . . . . . . . . . . . . 40		A.3.5. Additional Authenticated Data . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
	A.3.6. Content Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40		A.3.6. Content Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
	A.3.7. Complete Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41		A.3.7. Complete Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
	A.3.8. Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41		A.3.8. Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
	A.4. Example JWE using General JWE JSON Serialization . . . . . 41		A.4. Example JWE using General JWE JSON Serialization . . . . . 43
	A.4.1. JWE Per-Recipient Unprotected Headers . . . . . . . . 42		A.4.1. JWE Per-Recipient Unprotected Headers . . . . . . . . 43
	A.4.2. JWE Protected Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42		A.4.2. JWE Protected Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
	A.4.3. JWE Unprotected Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42		A.4.3. JWE Unprotected Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
	A.4.4. Complete JOSE Header Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42		A.4.4. Complete JOSE Header Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
	A.4.5. Additional Authenticated Data . . . . . . . . . . . . 43		A.4.5. Additional Authenticated Data . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
	A.4.6. Content Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43		A.4.6. Content Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
	A.4.7. Complete JWE JSON Serialization Representation . . . . 43		A.4.7. Complete JWE JSON Serialization Representation . . . . 45
	A.5. Example JWE using Flattened JWE JSON Serialization . . . . 44		A.5. Example JWE using Flattened JWE JSON Serialization . . . . 46
	Appendix B. Example AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 Computation . . . . 45		Appendix B. Example AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 Computation . . . . 46
	B.1. Extract MAC_KEY and ENC_KEY from Key . . . . . . . . . . . 45		B.1. Extract MAC_KEY and ENC_KEY from Key . . . . . . . . . . . 46
	B.2. Encrypt Plaintext to Create Ciphertext . . . . . . . . . . 46		B.2. Encrypt Plaintext to Create Ciphertext . . . . . . . . . . 47
	B.3. 64 Bit Big Endian Representation of AAD Length . . . . . . 46		B.3. 64 Bit Big Endian Representation of AAD Length . . . . . . 47
	B.4. Initialization Vector Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46		B.4. Initialization Vector Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
	B.5. Create Input to HMAC Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46		B.5. Create Input to HMAC Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
	B.6. Compute HMAC Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47		B.6. Compute HMAC Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
	B.7. Truncate HMAC Value to Create Authentication Tag . . . . . 47		B.7. Truncate HMAC Value to Create Authentication Tag . . . . . 48
	Appendix C. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47		Appendix C. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
	Appendix D. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48		Appendix D. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	JSON Web Encryption (JWE) represents encrypted content using		JSON Web Encryption (JWE) represents encrypted content using
	JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [RFC7159] based data structures.		JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [RFC7159] based data structures.
	The JWE cryptographic mechanisms encrypt and provide integrity		The JWE cryptographic mechanisms encrypt and provide integrity
	protection for an arbitrary sequence of octets.		protection for an arbitrary sequence of octets.
	Two closely related serializations for JWE objects are defined. The		Two closely related serializations for JWE objects are defined. The
	JWE Compact Serialization is a compact, URL-safe representation		JWE Compact Serialization is a compact, URL-safe representation
	skipping to change at page 12, line 41 ¶		skipping to change at page 12, line 41 ¶
	4.1.2. "enc" (Encryption Algorithm) Header Parameter		4.1.2. "enc" (Encryption Algorithm) Header Parameter
	The "enc" (encryption algorithm) Header Parameter identifies the		The "enc" (encryption algorithm) Header Parameter identifies the
	content encryption algorithm used to perform authenticated encryption		content encryption algorithm used to perform authenticated encryption
	on the Plaintext to produce the Ciphertext and the Authentication		on the Plaintext to produce the Ciphertext and the Authentication
	Tag. This algorithm MUST be an AEAD algorithm with a specified key		Tag. This algorithm MUST be an AEAD algorithm with a specified key
	length. The recipient MUST reject the JWE if the "enc" value does		length. The recipient MUST reject the JWE if the "enc" value does
	not represent a supported algorithm. "enc" values should either be		not represent a supported algorithm. "enc" values should either be
	registered in the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms		registered in the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms
	registry defined in [JWA] or be a value that contains a Collision-		registry defined in [JWA] or be a value that contains a Collision-
	Resistant Name. The "enc" value is a case-sensitive string		Resistant Name. The "enc" value is a case-sensitive ASCII string
	containing a StringOrURI value. This Header Parameter MUST be		containing a StringOrURI value. This Header Parameter MUST be
	present and MUST be understood and processed by implementations.		present and MUST be understood and processed by implementations.
	A list of defined "enc" values for this use can be found in the IANA		A list of defined "enc" values for this use can be found in the IANA
	JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry defined in		JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry defined in
	[JWA]; the initial contents of this registry are the values defined		[JWA]; the initial contents of this registry are the values defined
	in Section 5.1 of the JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [JWA] specification.		in Section 5.1 of the JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [JWA] specification.
	4.1.3. "zip" (Compression Algorithm) Header Parameter		4.1.3. "zip" (Compression Algorithm) Header Parameter
	skipping to change at page 17, line 41 ¶		skipping to change at page 17, line 41 ¶
	The message decryption process is the reverse of the encryption		The message decryption process is the reverse of the encryption
	process. The order of the steps is not significant in cases where		process. The order of the steps is not significant in cases where
	there are no dependencies between the inputs and outputs of the		there are no dependencies between the inputs and outputs of the
	steps. If any of these steps fails, the encrypted content cannot be		steps. If any of these steps fails, the encrypted content cannot be
	validated.		validated.
	When there are multiple recipients, it is an application decision		When there are multiple recipients, it is an application decision
	which of the recipients' encrypted content must successfully validate		which of the recipients' encrypted content must successfully validate
	for the JWE to be accepted. In some cases, encrypted content for all		for the JWE to be accepted. In some cases, encrypted content for all
	recipients must successfully validate or the JWE will be rejected.		recipients must successfully validate or the JWE will be considered
	In other cases, only the encrypted content for a single recipient		invalid. In other cases, only the encrypted content for a single
	needs to be successfully validated. However, in all cases, the		recipient needs to be successfully validated. However, in all cases,
	encrypted content for at least one recipient MUST successfully		the encrypted content for at least one recipient MUST successfully
	validate or the JWE MUST be rejected.		validate or the JWE MUST be considered invalid.
	1. Parse the JWE representation to extract the serialized values		1. Parse the JWE representation to extract the serialized values
	for the components of the JWE. When using the JWE Compact		for the components of the JWE. When using the JWE Compact
	Serialization, these components are the base64url encoded		Serialization, these components are the base64url encoded
	representations of the JWE Protected Header, the JWE Encrypted		representations of the JWE Protected Header, the JWE Encrypted
	Key, the JWE Initialization Vector, the JWE Ciphertext, and the		Key, the JWE Initialization Vector, the JWE Ciphertext, and the
	JWE Authentication Tag, and when using the JWE JSON		JWE Authentication Tag, and when using the JWE JSON
	Serialization, these components also include the base64url		Serialization, these components also include the base64url
	encoded representation of the JWE AAD and the unencoded JWE		encoded representation of the JWE AAD and the unencoded JWE
	Shared Unprotected Header and JWE Per-Recipient Unprotected		Shared Unprotected Header and JWE Per-Recipient Unprotected
	skipping to change at page 20, line 13 ¶		skipping to change at page 20, line 13 ¶
	calculation) using the specified content encryption algorithm,		calculation) using the specified content encryption algorithm,
	returning the decrypted plaintext and validating the JWE		returning the decrypted plaintext and validating the JWE
	Authentication Tag in the manner specified for the algorithm,		Authentication Tag in the manner specified for the algorithm,
	rejecting the input without emitting any decrypted output if the		rejecting the input without emitting any decrypted output if the
	JWE Authentication Tag is incorrect.		JWE Authentication Tag is incorrect.
	17. If a "zip" parameter was included, uncompress the decrypted		17. If a "zip" parameter was included, uncompress the decrypted
	plaintext using the specified compression algorithm.		plaintext using the specified compression algorithm.
	18. If there was no recipient for which all of the decryption steps		18. If there was no recipient for which all of the decryption steps
	succeeded, then the JWE MUST be rejected. Otherwise, output the		succeeded, then the JWE MUST be considered invalid. Otherwise,
	Plaintext. In the JWE JSON Serialization case, also return a		output the Plaintext. In the JWE JSON Serialization case, also
	result to the application indicating for which of the recipients		return a result to the application indicating for which of the
	the decryption succeeded and failed.		recipients the decryption succeeded and failed.
	Finally, note that it is an application decision which algorithms may		Finally, note that it is an application decision which algorithms may
	be used in a given context. Even if a JWE can be successfully		be used in a given context. Even if a JWE can be successfully
	decrypted, unless the algorithms used in the JWE are acceptable to		decrypted, unless the algorithms used in the JWE are acceptable to
	the application, it SHOULD reject the JWE.		the application, it SHOULD consider the JWE to be invalid.
	5.3. String Comparison Rules		5.3. String Comparison Rules
	The string comparison rules for this specification are the same as		The string comparison rules for this specification are the same as
	those defined in Section 5.3 of [JWS].		those defined in Section 5.3 of [JWS].
	6. Key Identification		6. Key Identification
	The key identification methods for this specification are the same as		The key identification methods for this specification are the same as
	those defined in Section 6 of [JWS], except that the key being		those defined in Section 6 of [JWS], except that the key being
	skipping to change at page 29, line 21 ¶		skipping to change at page 29, line 21 ¶
	of receiving an improperly formatted key, that the recipient		of receiving an improperly formatted key, that the recipient
	substitute a randomly generated CEK and proceed to the next step, to		substitute a randomly generated CEK and proceed to the next step, to
	mitigate timing attacks.		mitigate timing attacks.
	12. References		12. References
	12.1. Normative References		12.1. Normative References
	[JWA] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)",		[JWA] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)",
	draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms (work in progress),		draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms (work in progress),
	October 2014.		November 2014.
	[JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)",		[JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)",
	draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key (work in progress),		draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key (work in progress),
	October 2014.		November 2014.
	[JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web		[JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
	Signature (JWS)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature (work		Signature (JWS)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature (work
	in progress), October 2014.		in progress), November 2014.
	[RFC1951] Deutsch, P., "DEFLATE Compressed Data Format Specification		[RFC1951] Deutsch, P., "DEFLATE Compressed Data Format Specification
	version 1.3", RFC 1951, May 1996.		version 1.3", RFC 1951, May 1996.
	[RFC20] Cerf, V., "ASCII format for Network Interchange", RFC 20,		[RFC20] Cerf, V., "ASCII format for Network Interchange", RFC 20,
	October 1969.		October 1969.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
	skipping to change at page 32, line 27 ¶		skipping to change at page 32, line 27 ¶
	psk_ZkoFnilakGygTwpZ3uesH-PFABNIUYpOiN15dsQRkgr0vEhxN92i2a		psk_ZkoFnilakGygTwpZ3uesH-PFABNIUYpOiN15dsQRkgr0vEhxN92i2a
	sbOenSZeyaxziK72UwxrrKoExv6kc5twXTq4h-QChLOln0_mtUZwfsRaMS		sbOenSZeyaxziK72UwxrrKoExv6kc5twXTq4h-QChLOln0_mtUZwfsRaMS
	tPs6mS6XrgxnxbWhojf663tuEQueGC-FCMfra36C9knDFGzKsNa7LZK2dj		tPs6mS6XrgxnxbWhojf663tuEQueGC-FCMfra36C9knDFGzKsNa7LZK2dj
	YgyD3JR_MB_4NUJW_TqOQtwHYbxevoJArm-L5StowjzGy-_bq6Gw",		YgyD3JR_MB_4NUJW_TqOQtwHYbxevoJArm-L5StowjzGy-_bq6Gw",
	"e":"AQAB",		"e":"AQAB",
	"d":"kLdtIj6GbDks_ApCSTYQtelcNttlKiOyPzMrXHeI-yk1F7-kpDxY4-WY5N		"d":"kLdtIj6GbDks_ApCSTYQtelcNttlKiOyPzMrXHeI-yk1F7-kpDxY4-WY5N
	WV5KntaEeXS1j82E375xxhWMHXyvjYecPT9fpwR_M9gV8n9Hrh2anTpTD9		WV5KntaEeXS1j82E375xxhWMHXyvjYecPT9fpwR_M9gV8n9Hrh2anTpTD9
	3Dt62ypW3yDsJzBnTnrYu1iwWRgBKrEYY46qAZIrA2xAwnm2X7uGR1hghk		3Dt62ypW3yDsJzBnTnrYu1iwWRgBKrEYY46qAZIrA2xAwnm2X7uGR1hghk
	qDp0Vqj3kbSCz1XyfCs6_LehBwtxHIyh8Ripy40p24moOAbgxVw3rxT_vl		qDp0Vqj3kbSCz1XyfCs6_LehBwtxHIyh8Ripy40p24moOAbgxVw3rxT_vl
	t3UVe4WO3JkJOzlpUf-KTVI2Ptgm-dARxTEtE-id-4OJr0h-K-VFs3VSnd		t3UVe4WO3JkJOzlpUf-KTVI2Ptgm-dARxTEtE-id-4OJr0h-K-VFs3VSnd
	VTIznSxfyrj8ILL6MG_Uv8YAu7VILSB3lOW085-4qE3DzgrTjgyQ"		VTIznSxfyrj8ILL6MG_Uv8YAu7VILSB3lOW085-4qE3DzgrTjgyQ",
			"p":"1r52Xk46c-LsfB5P442p7atdPUrxQSy4mti_tZI3Mgf2EuFVbUoDBvaRQ-
			SWxkbkmoEzL7JXroSBjSrK3YIQgYdMgyAEPTPjXv_hI2_1eTSPVZfzL0lf
			fNn03IXqWF5MDFuoUYE0hzb2vhrlN_rKrbfDIwUbTrjjgieRbwC6Cl0",
			"q":"wLb35x7hmQWZsWJmB_vle87ihgZ19S8lBEROLIsZG4ayZVe9Hi9gDVCOBm
			UDdaDYVTSNx_8Fyw1YYa9XGrGnDew00J28cRUoeBB_jKI1oma0Orv1T9aX
			IWxKwd4gvxFImOWr3QRL9KEBRzk2RatUBnmDZJTIAfwTs0g68UZHvtc",
			"dp":"ZK-YwE7diUh0qR1tR7w8WHtolDx3MZ_OTowiFvgfeQ3SiresXjm9gZ5KL
			hMXvo-uz-KUJWDxS5pFQ_M0evdo1dKiRTjVw_x4NyqyXPM5nULPkcpU827
			rnpZzAJKpdhWAgqrXGKAECQH0Xt4taznjnd_zVpAmZZq60WPMBMfKcuE",
			"dq":"Dq0gfgJ1DdFGXiLvQEZnuKEN0UUmsJBxkjydc3j4ZYdBiMRAy86x0vHCj
			ywcMlYYg4yoC4YZa9hNVcsjqA3FeiL19rk8g6Qn29Tt0cj8qqyFpz9vNDB
			UfCAiJVeESOjJDZPYHdHY8v1b-o-Z2X5tvLx-TCekf7oxyeKDUqKWjis",
			"qi":"VIMpMYbPf47dT1w_zDUXfPimsSegnMOA1zTaX7aGk_8urY6R8-ZW1FxU7
			AlWAyLWybqq6t16VFd7hQd0y6flUK4SlOydB61gwanOsXGOAOv82cHq0E3
			eL4HrtZkUuKvnPrMnsUUFlfUdybVzxyjz9JF_XyaY14ardLSjf4L_FNY"
	}		}
	The resulting JWE Encrypted Key value is:		The resulting JWE Encrypted Key value is:
	[56, 163, 154, 192, 58, 53, 222, 4, 105, 218, 136, 218, 29, 94, 203,		[56, 163, 154, 192, 58, 53, 222, 4, 105, 218, 136, 218, 29, 94, 203,
	22, 150, 92, 129, 94, 211, 232, 53, 89, 41, 60, 138, 56, 196, 216,		22, 150, 92, 129, 94, 211, 232, 53, 89, 41, 60, 138, 56, 196, 216,
	82, 98, 168, 76, 37, 73, 70, 7, 36, 8, 191, 100, 136, 196, 244, 220,		82, 98, 168, 76, 37, 73, 70, 7, 36, 8, 191, 100, 136, 196, 244, 220,
	145, 158, 138, 155, 4, 117, 141, 230, 199, 247, 173, 45, 182, 214,		145, 158, 138, 155, 4, 117, 141, 230, 199, 247, 173, 45, 182, 214,
	74, 177, 107, 211, 153, 11, 205, 196, 171, 226, 162, 128, 171, 182,		74, 177, 107, 211, 153, 11, 205, 196, 171, 226, 162, 128, 171, 182,
	13, 237, 239, 99, 193, 4, 91, 219, 121, 223, 107, 167, 61, 119, 228,		13, 237, 239, 99, 193, 4, 91, 219, 121, 223, 107, 167, 61, 119, 228,
	skipping to change at page 36, line 18 ¶		skipping to change at page 37, line 18 ¶
	cbAYxknTcQkhslANGRUZmdTOQ5qTRsLAt6BTYuyvVRdhS8exSZEy_c4gs_		cbAYxknTcQkhslANGRUZmdTOQ5qTRsLAt6BTYuyvVRdhS8exSZEy_c4gs_
	7svlJJQ4H9_NxsiIoLwAEk7-Q3UXERGYw_75IDrGA84-lA_-Ct4eTlXHBI		7svlJJQ4H9_NxsiIoLwAEk7-Q3UXERGYw_75IDrGA84-lA_-Ct4eTlXHBI
	Y2EaV7t7LjJaynVJCpkv4LKjTTAumiGUIuQhrNhZLuF_RJLqHpM2kgWFLU		Y2EaV7t7LjJaynVJCpkv4LKjTTAumiGUIuQhrNhZLuF_RJLqHpM2kgWFLU
	7-VTdL1VbC2tejvcI2BlMkEpk1BzBZI0KQB0GaDWFLN-aEAw3vRw",		7-VTdL1VbC2tejvcI2BlMkEpk1BzBZI0KQB0GaDWFLN-aEAw3vRw",
	"e":"AQAB",		"e":"AQAB",
	"d":"VFCWOqXr8nvZNyaaJLXdnNPXZKRaWCjkU5Q2egQQpTBMwhprMzWzpR8Sxq		"d":"VFCWOqXr8nvZNyaaJLXdnNPXZKRaWCjkU5Q2egQQpTBMwhprMzWzpR8Sxq
	1OPThh_J6MUD8Z35wky9b8eEO0pwNS8xlh1lOFRRBoNqDIKVOku0aZb-ry		1OPThh_J6MUD8Z35wky9b8eEO0pwNS8xlh1lOFRRBoNqDIKVOku0aZb-ry
	nq8cxjDTLZQ6Fz7jSjR1Klop-YKaUHc9GsEofQqYruPhzSA-QgajZGPbE_		nq8cxjDTLZQ6Fz7jSjR1Klop-YKaUHc9GsEofQqYruPhzSA-QgajZGPbE_
	0ZaVDJHfyd7UUBUKunFMScbflYAAOYJqVIVwaYR5zWEEceUjNnTNo_CVSj		0ZaVDJHfyd7UUBUKunFMScbflYAAOYJqVIVwaYR5zWEEceUjNnTNo_CVSj
	-VvXLO5VZfCUAVLgW4dpf1SrtZjSt34YLsRarSb127reG_DUwg9Ch-Kyvj		-VvXLO5VZfCUAVLgW4dpf1SrtZjSt34YLsRarSb127reG_DUwg9Ch-Kyvj
	T1SkHgUWRVGcyly7uvVGRSDwsXypdrNinPA4jlhoNdizK2zF2CWQ"		T1SkHgUWRVGcyly7uvVGRSDwsXypdrNinPA4jlhoNdizK2zF2CWQ",
			"p":"9gY2w6I6S6L0juEKsbeDAwpd9WMfgqFoeA9vEyEUuk4kLwBKcoe1x4HG68
			ik918hdDSE9vDQSccA3xXHOAFOPJ8R9EeIAbTi1VwBYnbTp87X-xcPWlEP
			krdoUKW60tgs1aNd_Nnc9LEVVPMS390zbFxt8TN_biaBgelNgbC95sM",
			"q":"uKlCKvKv_ZJMVcdIs5vVSU_6cPtYI1ljWytExV_skstvRSNi9r66jdd9-y
			BhVfuG4shsp2j7rGnIio901RBeHo6TPKWVVykPu1iYhQXw1jIABfw-MVsN
			-3bQ76WLdt2SDxsHs7q7zPyUyHXmps7ycZ5c72wGkUwNOjYelmkiNS0",
			"dp":"w0kZbV63cVRvVX6yk3C8cMxo2qCM4Y8nsq1lmMSYhG4EcL6FWbX5h9yuv
			ngs4iLEFk6eALoUS4vIWEwcL4txw9LsWH_zKI-hwoReoP77cOdSL4AVcra
			Hawlkpyd2TWjE5evgbhWtOxnZee3cXJBkAi64Ik6jZxbvk-RR3pEhnCs",
			"dq":"o_8V14SezckO6CNLKs_btPdFiO9_kC1DsuUTd2LAfIIVeMZ7jn1Gus_Ff
			7B7IVx3p5KuBGOVF8L-qifLb6nQnLysgHDh132NDioZkhH7mI7hPG-PYE_
			odApKdnqECHWw0J-F0JWnUd6D2B_1TvF9mXA2Qx-iGYn8OVV1Bsmp6qU",
			"qi":"eNho5yRBEBxhGBtQRww9QirZsB66TrfFReG_CcteI1aCneT0ELGhYlRlC
			tUkTRclIfuEPmNsNDPbLoLqqCVznFbvdB7x-Tl-m0l_eFTj2KiqwGqE9PZ
			B9nNTwMVvH3VRRSLWACvPnSiwP8N5Usy-WRXS-V7TbpxIhvepTfE0NNo"
	}		}
	The resulting JWE Encrypted Key value is:		The resulting JWE Encrypted Key value is:
	[80, 104, 72, 58, 11, 130, 236, 139, 132, 189, 255, 205, 61, 86, 151,		[80, 104, 72, 58, 11, 130, 236, 139, 132, 189, 255, 205, 61, 86, 151,
	176, 99, 40, 44, 233, 176, 189, 205, 70, 202, 169, 72, 40, 226, 181,		176, 99, 40, 44, 233, 176, 189, 205, 70, 202, 169, 72, 40, 226, 181,
	156, 223, 120, 156, 115, 232, 150, 209, 145, 133, 104, 112, 237, 156,		156, 223, 120, 156, 115, 232, 150, 209, 145, 133, 104, 112, 237, 156,
	116, 250, 65, 102, 212, 210, 103, 240, 177, 61, 93, 40, 71, 231, 223,		116, 250, 65, 102, 212, 210, 103, 240, 177, 61, 93, 40, 71, 231, 223,
	226, 240, 157, 15, 31, 150, 89, 200, 215, 198, 203, 108, 70, 117, 66,		226, 240, 157, 15, 31, 150, 89, 200, 215, 198, 203, 108, 70, 117, 66,
	212, 238, 193, 205, 23, 161, 169, 218, 243, 203, 128, 214, 127, 253,		212, 238, 193, 205, 23, 161, 169, 218, 243, 203, 128, 214, 127, 253,
	skipping to change at page 48, line 21 ¶		skipping to change at page 49, line 34 ¶
	Sakimura, Jim Schaad, Hannes Tschofenig, and Sean Turner.		Sakimura, Jim Schaad, Hannes Tschofenig, and Sean Turner.
	Jim Schaad and Karen O'Donoghue chaired the JOSE working group and		Jim Schaad and Karen O'Donoghue chaired the JOSE working group and
	Sean Turner, Stephen Farrell, and Kathleen Moriarty served as		Sean Turner, Stephen Farrell, and Kathleen Moriarty served as
	Security area directors during the creation of this specification.		Security area directors during the creation of this specification.
	Appendix D. Document History		Appendix D. Document History
	[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]		[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]
			-37
			o Restricted algorithm names to using only ASCII characters.
			o When describing actions taken as a result of validation failures,
			changed statements about rejecting the JWE to statements about
			considering the JWE to be invalid.
			o Added the CRT parameter values to example RSA private key
			representations.
	-36		-36
	o Defined a flattened JWE JSON Serialization syntax, which is		o Defined a flattened JWE JSON Serialization syntax, which is
	optimized for the single recipient case.		optimized for the single recipient case.
	o Clarified where white space and line breaks may occur in JSON		o Clarified where white space and line breaks may occur in JSON
	objects by referencing Section 2 of RFC 7159.		objects by referencing Section 2 of RFC 7159.
	-35		-35
End of changes. 18 change blocks.
	58 lines changed or deleted		99 lines changed or added
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