< draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-01.txt		draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-02.txt >
	KITTEN W. Mills		KITTEN W. Mills
	Internet-Draft Yahoo! Inc.		Internet-Draft Yahoo! Inc.
	Intended status: Standards Track T. Showalter		Intended status: Standards Track T. Showalter
	Expires: December 1, 2012		Expires: February 5, 2013
	H. Tschofenig		H. Tschofenig
	Nokia Siemens Networks		Nokia Siemens Networks
	May 30, 2012		August 4, 2012
	A SASL and GSS-API Mechanism for OAuth		A SASL and GSS-API Mechanism for OAuth
	draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-01		draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-02
	Abstract		Abstract
	OAuth enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to a		OAuth enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to a
	protected resource, either on behalf of a resource owner by		protected resource, either on behalf of a resource owner by
	orchestrating an approval interaction, or by allowing the third-party		orchestrating an approval interaction, or by allowing the third-party
	application to obtain access on its own behalf.		application to obtain access on its own behalf.
	This document defines how an application client uses OAuth over the		This document defines how an application client uses OAuth over the
	Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) or the Generic		Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) or the Generic
	skipping to change at page 2, line 4 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 4 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on December 1, 2012.		This Internet-Draft will expire on February 5, 2013.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 3, line 11 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 11 ¶
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	3. OAuth SASL Mechanism Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		3. OAuth SASL Mechanism Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3.1. Initial Client Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		3.1. Initial Client Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3.1.1. Reserved Key/Values in OAUTH . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		3.1.1. Reserved Key/Values in OAUTH . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	3.2. Server's Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		3.2. Server's Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	3.2.1. Mapping to SASL Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		3.2.1. Mapping to SASL Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	3.2.2. Server response to failed authentication. . . . . . . 10		3.2.2. Server response to failed authentication. . . . . . . 10
	3.3. Use of Signature Type Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . 10		3.3. Use of Signature Type Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	3.4. Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		3.4. Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	4. GSS-API OAuth Mechanism Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		4. GSS-API OAuth Mechanism Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	5. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		5. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	5.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		5.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	5.2. MAC Authentication with Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . 13		5.2. MAC Authentication with Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . 14
	5.3. Failed Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		5.3. Failed Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	5.4. Failed Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		5.4. Failed Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	7.1. SASL Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		7.1. SASL Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	7.2. GSS-API Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		7.2. GSS-API Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	8. Appendix A -- Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
	9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	OAuth [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] enables a third-party application to obtain		OAuth [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] enables a third-party application to obtain
	limited access to a protected resource, either on behalf of a		limited access to a protected resource, either on behalf of a
	resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction, or by		resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction, or by
	allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own		allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own
	behalf. The core OAuth specification [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] does not		behalf. The core OAuth specification [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] does not
	define the interaction between the client and the resource server		define the interaction between the client and the resource server
	with the access to a protected resource using an Access Token. This		with the access to a protected resource using an Access Token. This
	skipping to change at page 8, line 17 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 17 ¶
	SASL is used as a generalized authentication method in a variety of		SASL is used as a generalized authentication method in a variety of
	application layer protocols. This document defines two SASL		application layer protocols. This document defines two SASL
	mechanisms for usage with OAuth: "OAUTH" and "OAUTH-PLUS". The		mechanisms for usage with OAuth: "OAUTH" and "OAUTH-PLUS". The
	"OAUTH" SASL mechanism enables OAuth authorizattion schemes for SASL,		"OAUTH" SASL mechanism enables OAuth authorizattion schemes for SASL,
	"OAUTH-PLUS" adds channel binding [RFC5056] capability for additional		"OAUTH-PLUS" adds channel binding [RFC5056] capability for additional
	security guarantees.		security guarantees.
	3.1. Initial Client Response		3.1. Initial Client Response
	Client responses are a key/value pair sequence. These key/value		Client responses are a key/value pair sequence. These key/value
	pairs carry the equivalent values form an HTTP context in order to be		pairs carry the equivalent values from an HTTP context in order to be
	able to complete an OAuth style HTTP authorization. The ABNF		able to complete an OAuth style HTTP authorization. The ABNF
	[RFC2234] syntax is:		[RFC5234] syntax is
	kvsep = %x01		kvsep = %x01
	key = 1*ALPHA		key = 1*ALPHA
	value = *(VCHAR | SP | HTAB | CR | LF )		value = *(VCHAR | SP | HTAB | CR | LF )
	kvpair = key "=" value kvsep		kvpair = key "=" value kvsep
	client_resp = 1*kvpair kvsep		client_resp = 1*kvpair kvsep
	The following key/value pairs are defined in the client response:		The following key/value pairs are defined in the client response:
	auth (REQUIRED): The payload of the HTTP Authorization header for		auth (REQUIRED): The payload of the HTTP Authorization header for
	an equivalent HTTP OAuth authroization.		an equivalent HTTP OAuth authroization.
			user (REQUIRED): Contains the user name being authenticated. The
			server MAY use this as a routing or database lookup hint. The
			server MUST NOT use this as authoritative, the user name MUST
			be asserted by the OAuth credential.
	host: Contains the host name to which the client connected.		host: Contains the host name to which the client connected.
	port: Contains the port number represented as a decimal positive		port: Contains the port number represented as a decimal positive
	integer string without leading zeros to which the client		integer string without leading zeros to which the client
	connected.		connected.
	In authorization schemes that use signatures, the client MUST send		In authorization schemes that use signatures, the client MUST send
	host and port number key/values, and the server MUST fail		host and port number key/values, and the server MUST fail an
	authorization request requiring signatures that do not have host and		authorization request requiring signatures that does not have host
	port values.		and port values.
	3.1.1. Reserved Key/Values in OAUTH		3.1.1. Reserved Key/Values in OAUTH
	In the OAUTH mechanism values for path, query string and post body		In the OAUTH mechanism values for path, query string and post body
	are assigned default values. OAuth authorization schemes MAY define		are assigned default values. OAuth authorization schemes MAY define
	usage of these in the SASL context and extend this specification.		usage of these in the SASL context and extend this specification.
	For OAuth schemes that use request signatures the default values MUST		For OAuth schemes that use request signatures the default values MUST
	be used unless explict values are provided in the client response.		be used unless explict values are provided in the client response.
	The following key values are reserved for future use:		The following key values are reserved for future use:
	skipping to change at page 9, line 38 ¶		skipping to change at page 9, line 45 ¶
	completing the SASL negotiation. The authentication scheme MUST		completing the SASL negotiation. The authentication scheme MUST
	carry the user ID to be used as the authorization identity (identity		carry the user ID to be used as the authorization identity (identity
	to act as). The server MUST use the ID obtained from the credential		to act as). The server MUST use the ID obtained from the credential
	as the user being authorized.		as the user being authorized.
	3.2.1. Mapping to SASL Identities		3.2.1. Mapping to SASL Identities
	Some OAuth mechanisms can provide both an authorization identity and		Some OAuth mechanisms can provide both an authorization identity and
	an authentication identity. An example of this is OAuth 1.0a		an authentication identity. An example of this is OAuth 1.0a
	[RFC5849] where the consumer key (oauth_consumer_key) identifies the		[RFC5849] where the consumer key (oauth_consumer_key) identifies the
	entity using to token which equates to the SASL authentication		entity using the token which equates to the SASL authentication
	identity, and is authenticated using the shared secret. The		identity, and is authenticated using the shared secret. The
	authorization identity in the OAuth 1.0a case is carried in the token		authorization identity in the OAuth 1.0a case is carried in the token
	(per the requirement above), which SHOULD validated independently.		(per the requirement above), which SHOULD be validated independently.
	The server MAY use a consumer key, a value derived from it, or other		The server MAY use a consumer key, a value derived from it, or other
	comparable identity in the OAuth authorization scheme as the SASL		comparable identity in the OAuth authorization scheme as the SASL
	authentication identity. If an appropriate authentication identity		authentication identity. If an appropriate authentication identity
	is not available the server MUST use the authorization identity as		is not available the server MUST use the authorization identity as
	the wuthentication identity.		the authentication identity.
	3.2.2. Server response to failed authentication.		3.2.2. Server response to failed authentication.
	For a failed authentication the server returns a JSON [RFC4627]		For a failed authentication the server returns a JSON [RFC4627]
	formatted error result, and fails the authentication. The error		formatted error result, and fails the authentication. The error
	result consists of the following values:		result consists of the following values:
	status (REQUIRED): The authorization error code. Valid error		status (REQUIRED): The authorization error code. Valid error
	codes are defined in the IANA [[need registry name]] registry		codes are defined in the IANA [[need registry name]] registry
	specified in the OAuth 2 core specification.		specified in the OAuth 2 core specification.
			schemes (REQUIRED): A space separated list of the OAuth
			authroization schemes supported by the server, i.e. "bearer" or
			"bearer mac".
	scope (OPTIONAL): The OAuth scope required to access the service.		scope (OPTIONAL): The OAuth scope required to access the service.
	If the resource server provides a scope the client SHOULD always		If the resource server provides a scope the client SHOULD always
	request scoped tokens from the token endpoint. The client MAY use a		request scoped tokens from the token endpoint. The client MAY use a
	scope other than the one provided by the resource server. Scopes		scope other than the one provided by the resource server. Scopes
	other than those advertised by the resource server are be defined by		other than those advertised by the resource server are be defined by
	the resource owner and provided in service documentation or discovery		the resource owner and provided in service documentation or discovery
	information (which is beyond the scope of this memo). If not present		information (which is beyond the scope of this memo). If not present
	then the client SHOULD presume an empty scope (unscoped token) is		then the client SHOULD presume an empty scope (unscoped token) is
	needed.		needed.
	skipping to change at page 18, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 19, line 5 ¶
	Note: None		Note: None
	7.2. GSS-API Registration		7.2. GSS-API Registration
	IANA is further requested to assign an OID for this GSS mechanism in		IANA is further requested to assign an OID for this GSS mechanism in
	the SMI numbers registry, with the prefix of		the SMI numbers registry, with the prefix of
	iso.org.dod.internet.security.mechanisms (1.3.6.1.5.5) and to		iso.org.dod.internet.security.mechanisms (1.3.6.1.5.5) and to
	reference this specification in the registry.		reference this specification in the registry.
	8. Appendix A -- Document History		8. References
	[[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
	-01
	o Ripping out discovery. Changed to refer to I-D.jones-appsawg-
	webfinger instead of WF and SWD older drafts.
	o Replacing HTTP as the message format and adjusted all examples.
	-00
	o Renamed draft into proper IETF naming format now that it's
	adopted.
	o Minor fixes.
	-00
	o Initial revision
	9. References
	9.1. Normative References		8.1. Normative References
	[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2]		[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2]
	Hammer-Lahav, E., Recordon, D., and D. Hardt, "The OAuth		Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
	2.0 Authorization Framework", draft-ietf-oauth-v2-26 (work		draft-ietf-oauth-v2-31 (work in progress), August 2012.
	in progress), May 2012.
	[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-bearer]		[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-bearer]
	Jones, M., Hardt, D., and D. Recordon, "The OAuth 2.0		Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
	Authorization Protocol: Bearer Tokens",		Framework: Bearer Token Usage",
	draft-ietf-oauth-v2-bearer-19 (work in progress),		draft-ietf-oauth-v2-bearer-23 (work in progress),
	April 2012.		August 2012.
	[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac]		[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac]
	Hammer-Lahav, E., "HTTP Authentication: MAC Access		Hammer-Lahav, E., "HTTP Authentication: MAC Access
	Authentication", draft-ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac-01 (work in		Authentication", draft-ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac-01 (work in
	progress), February 2012.		progress), February 2012.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
	[RFC2234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
	Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997.
	[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,		[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
	Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext		Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
	Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.		Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
	[RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,		[RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
	Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP		Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
	Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",		Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
	RFC 2617, June 1999.		RFC 2617, June 1999.
	[RFC2743] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program		[RFC2743] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
	skipping to change at page 20, line 6 ¶		skipping to change at page 19, line 51 ¶
	[RFC4422] Melnikov, A. and K. Zeilenga, "Simple Authentication and		[RFC4422] Melnikov, A. and K. Zeilenga, "Simple Authentication and
	Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422, June 2006.		Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422, June 2006.
	[RFC4627] Crockford, D., "The application/json Media Type for		[RFC4627] Crockford, D., "The application/json Media Type for
	JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)", RFC 4627, July 2006.		JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)", RFC 4627, July 2006.
	[RFC5056] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure		[RFC5056] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure
	Channels", RFC 5056, November 2007.		Channels", RFC 5056, November 2007.
			[RFC5234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
			Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.
	[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security		[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
	(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.		(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
	[RFC5801] Josefsson, S. and N. Williams, "Using Generic Security		[RFC5801] Josefsson, S. and N. Williams, "Using Generic Security
	Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Mechanisms		Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Mechanisms
	in Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL): The		in Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL): The
	GS2 Mechanism Family", RFC 5801, July 2010.		GS2 Mechanism Family", RFC 5801, July 2010.
	[RFC5849] Hammer-Lahav, E., "The OAuth 1.0 Protocol", RFC 5849,		[RFC5849] Hammer-Lahav, E., "The OAuth 1.0 Protocol", RFC 5849,
	April 2010.		April 2010.
	skipping to change at page 20, line 28 ¶		skipping to change at page 20, line 27 ¶
	for TLS", RFC 5929, July 2010.		for TLS", RFC 5929, July 2010.
	[RFC5988] Nottingham, M., "Web Linking", RFC 5988, October 2010.		[RFC5988] Nottingham, M., "Web Linking", RFC 5988, October 2010.
	[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and		[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
	Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity		Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
	within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509		within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
	(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer		(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
	Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.		Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.
	9.2. Informative References		8.2. Informative References
	[I-D.jones-appsawg-webfinger]		[I-D.jones-appsawg-webfinger]
	Jones, P., Salgueiro, G., and J. Smarr, "WebFinger",		Jones, P., Salgueiro, G., and J. Smarr, "WebFinger",
	draft-jones-appsawg-webfinger-05 (work in progress),		draft-jones-appsawg-webfinger-06 (work in progress),
	May 2012.		June 2012.
	[RFC3501] Crispin, M., "INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - VERSION		[RFC3501] Crispin, M., "INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - VERSION
	4rev1", RFC 3501, March 2003.		4rev1", RFC 3501, March 2003.
			Appendix A. Document History
			[[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
			-02
			o Added the user data element back in.
			o Minor editorial changes.
			-01
			o Ripping out discovery. Changed to refer to I-D.jones-appsawg-
			webfinger instead of WF and SWD older drafts.
			o Replacing HTTP as the message format and adjusted all examples.
			-00
			o Renamed draft into proper IETF naming format now that it's
			adopted.
			o Minor fixes.
			-00
			o Initial revision
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	William Mills		William Mills
	Yahoo! Inc.		Yahoo! Inc.
	Phone:		Phone:
	Email: wmills@yahoo-inc.com		Email: wmills@yahoo-inc.com
	Tim Showalter		Tim Showalter
End of changes. 23 change blocks.
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