< draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-04.txt   draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-05.txt >
KITTEN W. Mills KITTEN W. Mills
Internet-Draft Yahoo! Inc. Internet-Draft Yahoo! Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track T. Showalter Intended status: Standards Track T. Showalter
Expires: February 21, 2013 Expires: February 24, 2013
H. Tschofenig H. Tschofenig
Nokia Siemens Networks Nokia Siemens Networks
August 20, 2012 August 23, 2012
A SASL and GSS-API Mechanism for OAuth A set of SASL and GSS-API Mechanisms for OAuth
draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-04 draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-05
Abstract Abstract
OAuth enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to a OAuth enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to a
protected resource, either on behalf of a resource owner by protected resource, either on behalf of a resource owner by
orchestrating an approval interaction, or by allowing the third-party orchestrating an approval interaction, or by allowing the third-party
application to obtain access on its own behalf. application to obtain access on its own behalf.
This document defines how an application client uses OAuth over the This document defines how an application client uses credentials
Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) or the Generic obtained via OAuth over the Simple Authentication and Security Layer
Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) to access a (SASL) or the Generic Security Service Application Program Interface
protected resource at a resource serve. Thereby, it enables schemes (GSS-API) to access a protected resource at a resource serve.
defined within the OAuth framework for non-HTTP-based application Thereby, it enables schemes defined within the OAuth framework for
protocols. non-HTTP-based application protocols.
Clients typically store the user's long term credential. This does, Clients typically store the user's long term credential. This does,
however, lead to significant security vulnerabilities, for example, however, lead to significant security vulnerabilities, for example,
when such a credential leaks. A significant benefit of OAuth for when such a credential leaks. A significant benefit of OAuth for
usage in those clients is that the password is replaced by a token. usage in those clients is that the password is replaced by a token.
Tokens typically provided limited access rights and can be managed Tokens typically provided limited access rights and can be managed
and revoked separately from the user's long-term credential and revoked separately from the user's long-term credential
(password). (password).
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on February 21, 2013. This Internet-Draft will expire on February 24, 2013.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. OAuth SASL Mechanism Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3. OAuth SASL Mechanism Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1. Initial Client Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.1. Initial Client Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.1. Reserved Key/Values in OAUTH . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.1.1. Reserved Key/Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1.2. Use of the gs2-header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.1.2. Use of the gs2-header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2. Server's Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.2. Server's Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.1. Mapping to SASL Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.2.1. Mapping to SASL Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.2. Server response to failed authentication. . . . . . . 12 3.2.2. Server response to failed authentication. . . . . . . 11
3.2.3. Completing an error message sequence. . . . . . . . . 12 3.2.3. Completing an error message sequence. . . . . . . . . 12
3.3. Use of Signature Type Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.3. Use of Signature Type Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.4. Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.4. Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. GSS-API OAuth Mechanism Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4. GSS-API OAuth Mechanism Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2. OAuth 1.0a Authorization with Channel Binding . . . . . . 17 5.2. OAuth 1.0a Authorization with Channel Binding . . . . . . 16
5.3. Failed Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5.3. Failed Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.4. Failed Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 5.4. Failed Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.5. SMTP Example of a failed negotiation. . . . . . . . . . . 19 5.5. SMTP Example of a failed negotiation. . . . . . . . . . . 18
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.1. SASL Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 7.1. SASL Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.2. GSS-API Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 7.2. GSS-API Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix A. Acknowlegements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Appendix A. Acknowlegements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
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The resulting framework allows new protocols to reuse existing The resulting framework allows new protocols to reuse existing
mechanisms and allows old protocols to make use of new mechanisms. mechanisms and allows old protocols to make use of new mechanisms.
The framework also provides a protocol for securing subsequent The framework also provides a protocol for securing subsequent
protocol exchanges within a data security layer. protocol exchanges within a data security layer.
The Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) The Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API)
[RFC2743] provides a framework for applications to support multiple [RFC2743] provides a framework for applications to support multiple
authentication mechanisms through a unified interface. authentication mechanisms through a unified interface.
This document defines a SASL mechanism for OAuth, but it conforms to This document defines SASL mechanisms for OAuth, and it conforms to
the new bridge between SASL and the GSS-API called GS2 [RFC5801]. the new bridge between SASL and the GSS-API called GS2 [RFC5801].
This means that this document defines both a SASL mechanism and a This means that this document defines both SASL and GSS-API
GSS-API mechanism. Implementers may be interested in either the mechanisms. Implementers may be interested in either the SASL, the
SASL, the GSS-API, or even both mechanisms. To faciliate these two GSS-API, or even both mechanisms. To faciliate these two variants,
variants, the description has been split into two parts, one part the description has been split into two parts, one part that provides
that provides normative references for those interested in the SASL normative references for those interested in the SASL OAuth mechanism
OAuth mechanism (see Section 3), and a second part for those (see Section 3), and a second part for those implementers that wish
implementers that wish to implement the GSS-API portion (see to implement the GSS-API portion (see Section 4).
Section 4).
When OAuth is integrated into SASL and the GSS-API the high-level When OAuth is integrated into SASL and the GSS-API the high-level
steps are as follows: steps are as follows:
(A) The client requests authorization from the resource owner. (A) The client requests authorization from the resource owner.
The authorization request can be made directly to the resource The authorization request can be made directly to the resource
owner (as shown), or preferably indirectly via the authorization owner (as shown), or preferably indirectly via the authorization
server as an intermediary. server as an intermediary.
(B) The client receives an authorization grant which is a (B) The client receives an authorization grant which is a
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authentication endpoints (and perhaps the service endpoints) before authentication endpoints (and perhaps the service endpoints) before
the OAuth 2.0 protocol exchange messages in steps (A)-(D) are the OAuth 2.0 protocol exchange messages in steps (A)-(D) are
executed. The discovery of the resource owner and authorization executed. The discovery of the resource owner and authorization
server endpoints is outside the scope of this specification. The server endpoints is outside the scope of this specification. The
client must discover those endpoints using a discovery mechanisms client must discover those endpoints using a discovery mechanisms
such as Webfinger using host-meta [I-D.jones-appsawg-webfinger]. In such as Webfinger using host-meta [I-D.jones-appsawg-webfinger]. In
band discovery is not tenable if clients support the OAuth 2.0 band discovery is not tenable if clients support the OAuth 2.0
password grant. Once credentials are obtained the client proceeds to password grant. Once credentials are obtained the client proceeds to
steps (E) and (F) defined in this specification. steps (E) and (F) defined in this specification.
The client need not implement more than one authorization scheme, and
there are no mandatory to implement schemes. The server MUST
advertise at least one scheme if the OAUTH mechanism is offered.
During discovery the client might not find any schemes that it
supports, an OAuth 2.0 enabled client MAY attempt to fetch a
credential for a scheme it supports from a discovered OAuth 2.0
authorization endpoint. If the client finds no schemes it supports
the client SHOULD provide feedback to the user that the requested
enpoint can not be supported.
----+ ----+
+--------+ +---------------+ | +--------+ +---------------+ |
| |--(A)-- Authorization Request --->| Resource | | | |--(A)-- Authorization Request --->| Resource | |
| | | Owner | |Plain | | | Owner | |Plain
| |<-(B)------ Access Grant ---------| | |OAuth | |<-(B)------ Access Grant ---------| | |OAuth
| | +---------------+ |2.0 | | +---------------+ |2.0
| | | | | |
| | Client Credentials & +---------------+ | | | Client Credentials & +---------------+ |
| |--(C)------ Access Grant -------->| Authorization | | | |--(C)------ Access Grant -------->| Authorization | |
| Client | | Server | | | Client | | Server | |
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In examples, "C:" and "S:" indicate lines sent by the client and In examples, "C:" and "S:" indicate lines sent by the client and
server respectively. Line breaks have been inserted for readability. server respectively. Line breaks have been inserted for readability.
Note that the IMAP SASL specification requires base64 encoding Note that the IMAP SASL specification requires base64 encoding
message, not this memo. message, not this memo.
3. OAuth SASL Mechanism Specification 3. OAuth SASL Mechanism Specification
SASL is used as a generalized authentication method in a variety of SASL is used as a generalized authentication method in a variety of
application layer protocols. This document defines two SASL application layer protocols. This document defines the following
mechanisms for usage with OAuth: "OAUTH" and "OAUTH-PLUS". The SASL mechanisms for usage with OAuth:
"OAUTH" SASL mechanism enables OAuth authorization schemes for SASL,
"OAUTH-PLUS" adds channel binding [RFC5056] capability for additional
security guarantees.
This mechanism is client initiated and lock-step, the server always OAUTHBEARER Authorization using Bearer tokens.
replying to a client message. In the case where the client has and
correctly uses a valid token the flow is: OAUTH10A Authorization using OAuth 1.0a tokens.
OAUTH10A-PLUS Adds channel binding [RFC5056] capability to
OAUTH10A for additional security guarantees.
Any new OAuth token scheme MAY define a new SASL mechanism compatible
with the mechanisms defined here by simply registering the new
name(s) and citing this specification for the further definition.
New channel binding enabled "-PLUS" mechanisms defined in this way
MUST include message integrity protection.
These mechanisms are client initiated and lock-step, the server
always replying to a client message. In the case where the client
has and correctly uses a valid token the flow is:
o Client sends a valid and correct initial client response. o Client sends a valid and correct initial client response.
o Server responds with a successful authentication. o Server responds with a successful authentication.
In the case where authorization fails the server sends an error In the case where authorization fails the server sends an error
result, then client MUST then send an additional message to the result, then client MUST then send an additional message to the
server in order to allow the server to finish the exchange. Some server in order to allow the server to finish the exchange. Some
protocols and common SASL implementations do not support both sending protocols and common SASL implementations do not support both sending
a SASL message and finalizing a SASL negotiation, the additional a SASL message and finalizing a SASL negotiation, the additional
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o Server responds with an error message. o Server responds with an error message.
o Client sends an empty client reponse. o Client sends an empty client reponse.
o Server fails the authentication. o Server fails the authentication.
3.1. Initial Client Response 3.1. Initial Client Response
Client responses are a key/value pair sequence. The initial client Client responses are a key/value pair sequence. The initial client
response includes a gs2-header as defined in GSS-API [RFC5801], which response includes a gs2-header as defined in GS2 [RFC5801], which
carries the authorization ID as a hint. These key/value pairs carry carries the authorization ID. These key/value pairs carry the
the equivalent values from an HTTP context in order to be able to equivalent values from an HTTP context in order to be able to
complete an OAuth style HTTP authorization. The client MUST send an complete an OAuth style HTTP authorization. The client MUST send an
authorization ID in the gs2-header. The server MAY use this as a authorization ID in the gs2-header. The ABNF [RFC5234] syntax is:
routing or database lookup hint. The server MUST NOT use this as
authoritative, the user name MUST be asserted by the OAuth
credential. The ABNF [RFC5234] syntax is:
kvsep = %x01 kvsep = %x01
key = 1*ALPHA key = 1*ALPHA
value = *(VCHAR | SP | HTAB | CR | LF ) value = *(VCHAR | SP | HTAB | CR | LF )
kvpair = key "=" value kvsep kvpair = key "=" value kvsep
client_resp = 0*kvpair kvsep client_resp = 0*kvpair kvsep
;; gs2-header = As defined in GSS-API ;; gs2-header = As defined in GSS-API
initial_client_resp = gs2-header kvsep client_resp initial_client_resp = gs2-header kvsep client_resp
The following key/value pairs are defined in the client response: The following key/value pairs are defined in the client response:
auth (REQUIRED): The payload of the HTTP Authorization header for auth (REQUIRED): The payload of the HTTP Authorization header for
an equivalent HTTP OAuth authroization. an equivalent HTTP OAuth authroization.
user (REQUIRED): The authorization ID. The server MAY use this
as a routing or database lookup hint. The server MUST NOT use
this as authoritative, the user name MUST be asserted by the
OAuth credential.
host: Contains the host name to which the client connected. host: Contains the host name to which the client connected.
port: Contains the port number represented as a decimal positive port: Contains the port number represented as a decimal positive
integer string without leading zeros to which the client integer string without leading zeros to which the client
connected. connected.
qs: The HTTP query string. In OAUTH this is reserved, the client qs: The HTTP query string. In non-channel binding mechanisms
SHOUD NOT send it, and has the default value of "". In OAUTH- this is reserved, the client SHOUD NOT send it, and has the
PLUS this carries a single key value pair "cbdata" for the default value of "". In "-PLUS" variants this carries a single
channel binding data payload formatted as an HTTP query string. key value pair "cbdata" for the channel binding data payload
formatted as an HTTP query string.
In authorization schemes that use signatures, the client MUST send In authorization schemes that use signatures, the client MUST send
host and port number key/values, and the server MUST fail an host and port number key/values, and the server MUST fail an
authorization request requiring signatures that does not have host authorization request requiring signatures that does not have host
and port values. For authorization schemes that require a scheme as and port values. For authorization schemes that require a URI scheme
part of the URI being signed "http" is always used. as part of the data being signed "http" is always used. In OAuth
1.0a for example, the signature base string includes the
reconstructed HTTP URL.
3.1.1. Reserved Key/Values in OAUTH 3.1.1. Reserved Key/Values
In the OAUTH mechanism values for path, query string and post body In these mechanisms values for path, query string and post body are
are assigned default values. OAuth authorization schemes MAY define assigned default values. OAuth authorization schemes MAY define
usage of these in the SASL context and extend this specification. usage of these in the SASL context and extend this specification.
For OAuth schemes that use request signatures the default values MUST For OAuth schemes that use request signatures the default values MUST
be used unless explict values are provided in the client response. be used unless explict values are provided in the client response.
The following key values are reserved for future use: The following key values are reserved for future use:
mthd (RESERVED): HTTP method for use in signatures, the default mthd (RESERVED): HTTP method for use in signatures, the default
value is "POST". value is "POST".
path (RESERVED): HTTP path data, the default value is "/". path (RESERVED): HTTP path data, the default value is "/".
post (RESERVED): HTTP post data, the default value is "". post (RESERVED): HTTP post data, the default value is "".
3.1.2. Use of the gs2-header 3.1.2. Use of the gs2-header
The gs2-header is used as follows: The OAuth scheme related mechanisms are also GSS-API mechanisms, see
Section 4 for further detail. The gs2-header is used as follows:
o The "gs2-nonstd-flag" MUST NOT be present. o The "gs2-nonstd-flag" MUST NOT be present.
o The "gs2-authzid" carries the authorization identity as specified o The "gs2-authzid" carries the authorization identity as specified
in [RFC5801]. in [RFC5801].
In the OAUTH mechanism the "gs2-cb-flag" MUST be set to "n" because In the non "-PLUS" mechanisms the "gs2-cb-flag" MUST be set to "n"
channel-binding [RFC5056] data is not expected. In the OAUTH-PLUS because channel-binding [RFC5056] data is not expected. In the
mechanism the "gs2-cb-flag" MUST be set appropriately by the client. OAUTH10A-PLUS mechanism (or other -PLUS variants based on this
specification) the "gs2-cb-flag" MUST be set appropriately by the
client.
3.2. Server's Response 3.2. Server's Response
The server validates the response per the specification for the The server validates the response per the specification for the
authorization scheme used. If the authorization scheme used includes authorization scheme used. If the authorization scheme used includes
signing of the request parameters the client must provide a client signing of the request parameters the client must provide a client
response that satisfies the data requirements for the scheme in use. response that satisfies the data requirements for the scheme in use.
In the OAUTH-PLUS mechanism the server examines the channel binding In a "-PLUS" mechanism the server examines the channel binding data,
data, extracts the channel binding unique prefix, and extracts the extracts the channel binding unique prefix, and extracts the raw
raw channel biding data based on the channel binding type used. It channel biding data based on the channel binding type used. It then
then computes it's own copy of the channel binding payload and computes it's own copy of the channel binding payload and compares
compares that to the payload sent by the client in the cbdata key/ that to the payload sent by the client in the cbdata key/value.
value. Those two must be equal for channel binding to succeed. Those two must be equal for channel binding to succeed.
The server responds to a successfully verified client message by The server responds to a successfully verified client message by
completing the SASL negotiation. The authorization scheme MUST carry completing the SASL negotiation. The authorization scheme MUST carry
the user ID to be used as the authorization identity (identity to act the user ID to be used as the authorization identity (identity to act
as). The server MUST use the ID obtained from the credential as the as). The server MUST use the ID obtained from the credential as the
user being authorized. user being authorized.
3.2.1. Mapping to SASL Identities 3.2.1. Mapping to SASL Identities
Some OAuth mechanisms can provide both an authorization identity and Some OAuth mechanisms can provide both an authorization identity and
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3.2.2. Server response to failed authentication. 3.2.2. Server response to failed authentication.
For a failed authentication the server returns a JSON [RFC4627] For a failed authentication the server returns a JSON [RFC4627]
formatted error result, and fails the authentication. The error formatted error result, and fails the authentication. The error
result consists of the following values: result consists of the following values:
status (REQUIRED): The authorization error code. Valid error status (REQUIRED): The authorization error code. Valid error
codes are defined in the IANA [[need registry name]] registry codes are defined in the IANA [[need registry name]] registry
specified in the OAuth 2 core specification. specified in the OAuth 2 core specification.
schemes (REQUIRED): A space separated list of the OAuth
authorization schemes supported by the server, i.e. "bearer" or
"bearer mac".
scope (OPTIONAL): An OAuth scope which is valid to access the scope (OPTIONAL): An OAuth scope which is valid to access the
service. This may be empty which implies that unscoped tokens service. This may be empty which implies that unscoped tokens
are required, or a space separated list. Use of a space are required, or a space separated list. Use of a space
separated list is NOT RECOMMENDED. separated list is NOT RECOMMENDED.
If the resource server provides a scope the client SHOULD always If the resource server provides a scope the client SHOULD always
request scoped tokens from the token endpoint. The client MAY use a request scoped tokens from the token endpoint. The client MAY use a
scope other than the one provided by the resource server. Scopes scope other than the one provided by the resource server. Scopes
other than those advertised by the resource server are be defined by other than those advertised by the resource server are be defined by
the resource owner and provided in service documentation or discovery the resource owner and provided in service documentation or discovery
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needed. needed.
If channel binding is in use and the channel binding fails the server If channel binding is in use and the channel binding fails the server
responds with a status code set to 412 to indicate that the channel responds with a status code set to 412 to indicate that the channel
binding precondition failed. If the authentication scheme in use binding precondition failed. If the authentication scheme in use
does not include signing the server SHOULD revoke the presented does not include signing the server SHOULD revoke the presented
credential and the client SHOULD discard that credential. credential and the client SHOULD discard that credential.
3.2.3. Completing an error message sequence. 3.2.3. Completing an error message sequence.
If the client gets an error message form the server it MUST send an If the client gets an error message from the server it MUST send an
empty client response consisting of a single %x01 (control A) empty client response consisting of a single %x01 (control A)
character, which is a correctly formatted client response with no character, which is a correctly formatted client response with no
key/value pairs. The server then completes the SASL negotiation with key/value pairs. The server then completes the SASL negotiation with
a failure result. a failure result.
3.3. Use of Signature Type Authorization 3.3. Use of Signature Type Authorization
This mechanism supports authorization using signatures, which This mechanism supports authorization using signatures, which
requires that both client and server construct the string to be requires that both client and server construct the string to be
signed. OAuth 2 is designed for authentication/authorization to signed. OAuth 2 is designed for authentication/authorization to
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specific resource authorization, e.g. IMAP access to a specific specific resource authorization, e.g. IMAP access to a specific
folder or FTP access limited to a specific directory. folder or FTP access limited to a specific directory.
Using the example in the OAuth 1.0a specification as a starting Using the example in the OAuth 1.0a specification as a starting
point, on an IMAP server running on port 143 and given the OAuth 1.0a point, on an IMAP server running on port 143 and given the OAuth 1.0a
style authorization request (with %x01 shown as ^A and line breaks style authorization request (with %x01 shown as ^A and line breaks
added for readability) below: added for readability) below:
n,a=user@example.com,^A n,a=user@example.com,^A
host=example.com^A host=example.com^A
user=user@example.com^A
port=143^A port=143^A
auth=OAuth realm="Example", auth=OAuth realm="Example",
oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2", oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2",
oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7", oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7",
oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1", oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",
oauth_timestamp="137131201", oauth_timestamp="137131201",
oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a", oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a",
oauth_signature="Tm90IGEgcmVhbCBzaWduYXR1cmU%3D"^A^A oauth_signature="Tm90IGEgcmVhbCBzaWduYXR1cmU%3D"^A^A
The signature base string would be constructed per the OAuth 1.0 The signature base string would be constructed per the OAuth 1.0
skipping to change at page 14, line 15 skipping to change at page 13, line 30
POST&http%3A%2F%2Fexample.com:143%2F&oauth_consumer_key%3D9djdj82h4 POST&http%3A%2F%2Fexample.com:143%2F&oauth_consumer_key%3D9djdj82h4
8djs9d2%26oauth_nonce%3D7d8f3e4a%26oauth_signature_method%3DHMAC-SH 8djs9d2%26oauth_nonce%3D7d8f3e4a%26oauth_signature_method%3DHMAC-SH
A1%26oauth_timestamp%3D137131201%26oauth_token%3Dkkk9d7dh3k39sjv7 A1%26oauth_timestamp%3D137131201%26oauth_token%3Dkkk9d7dh3k39sjv7
3.4. Channel Binding 3.4. Channel Binding
The channel binding data is carried in the "qs" (query string) key The channel binding data is carried in the "qs" (query string) key
value pair formatted as a standard HTTP query parameter with the name value pair formatted as a standard HTTP query parameter with the name
"cbdata". Channel binding requires that the channel binding data be "cbdata". Channel binding requires that the channel binding data be
integrity protected end-to-end in order to protect against man-in- integrity protected end-to-end in order to protect against man-in-
the-middle attacks. All authorization schemes offered in an OAUTH- the-middle attacks. All authorization schemes offered with "-PLUS"
PLUS mechanism MUST provide integrity protection. It should be noted mechanisms MUST provide integrity protection. It should be noted
that while the Bearer token scheme specifies SSL for normal usage it that while the Bearer token scheme specifies SSL for normal usage it
offers no integrity protection and is not suitable for use in OAUTH- offers no integrity protection and is not suitable for use with
PLUS. channel binding.
The channel binding data is computed by the client based on it's The channel binding data is computed by the client based on it's
choice of preferred channel binding type. As specified in [RFC5056], choice of preferred channel binding type. As specified in [RFC5056],
the channel binding information MUST start with the channel binding the channel binding information MUST start with the channel binding
unique prefix, followed by a colon (ASCII 0x3A), followed by a base64 unique prefix, followed by a colon (ASCII 0x3A), followed by a base64
encoded channel binding payload. The channel binding payload is the encoded channel binding payload. The channel binding payload is the
raw data from the channel binding type. For example, if the client raw data from the channel binding type. For example, if the client
is using tls-unique for channel binding then the raw channel binding is using tls-unique for channel binding then the raw channel binding
data is the TLS finished message as specified in section 3.1 of data is the TLS finished message as specified in section 3.1 of
[RFC5929]. [RFC5929].
4. GSS-API OAuth Mechanism Specification 4. GSS-API OAuth Mechanism Specification
Note: The normative references in this section are informational for Note: The normative references in this section are informational for
SASL implementers, but they are normative for GSS-API implementers. SASL implementers, but they are normative for GSS-API implementers.
The SASL OAuth mechanism is also a GSS-API mechanism and the messages The SASL OAuth mechanism is also a GSS-API mechanism and the messages
described in Section 3 are the same, but described in Section 3 are the same with the following changes to the
GS2 related elements:
1. the initial context token header is prefixed to the client's 1. the GS2 header on the client's first message and the following
%x01 (control A) are excluded when used as a GSS-API mechanism.
2. the initial context token header is prefixed to the client's
first authentication message (context token), as described in first authentication message (context token), as described in
Section 3.1 of RFC 2743, Section 3.1 of RFC 2743,
The GSS-API mechanism OID for OAuth is [[TBD: IANA]]. The GSS-API mechanism OID for OAuth is [[TBD: IANA]].
OAuth security contexts always have the mutual_state flag OAuth security contexts always have the mutual_state flag
(GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) set to TRUE. OAuth supports credential (GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) set to TRUE. OAuth supports credential
delegation, therefore security contexts may have the deleg_state flag delegation, therefore security contexts may have the deleg_state flag
(GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG) set to either TRUE or FALSE. (GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG) set to either TRUE or FALSE.
skipping to change at page 16, line 21 skipping to change at page 15, line 21
insensitive. One example uses "Bearer" but that could as easily be insensitive. One example uses "Bearer" but that could as easily be
"bearer", "BEARER", or "BeArEr". "bearer", "BEARER", or "BeArEr".
5.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange 5.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange
This example shows a successful OAuth 2.0 bearer token exchange. This example shows a successful OAuth 2.0 bearer token exchange.
Note that line breaks are inserted for readability. Note that line breaks are inserted for readability.
S: * IMAP4rev1 Server Ready S: * IMAP4rev1 Server Ready
C: t0 CAPABILITY C: t0 CAPABILITY
S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTH S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTHBEARER
S: t0 OK Completed S: t0 OK Completed
C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTH bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20sAWhvc3Q9c2VydmVy C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BaG9zdD1zZX
LmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9QmVhcmVyIHZGOWRmdDRxbVRjMk5 J2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BdXNlcj11c2VyQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzA
2YjNSbGNrQmhiSFJoZG1semRHRXVZMjl0Q2c9PQEB WF1dGg9QmVhcmVyIHZGOWRmdDRxbVRjMk52YjNSbGNrQmhiSFJoZG1semRHRXVZ
Mjl0Q2c9PQEB
S: t1 OK SASL authentication succeeded S: t1 OK SASL authentication succeeded
As required by IMAP [RFC3501], the payloads are base64-encoded. The As required by IMAP [RFC3501], the payloads are base64-encoded. The
decoded initial client response (with %x01 represented as ^A and long decoded initial client response (with %x01 represented as ^A and long
lines wrapped for readability) is: lines wrapped for readability) is:
n,a=user@example.com,^Ahost=server.example.com^Aport=143^A n,a=user@example.com^Ahost=server.example.com^Auser=user@example.com^A
auth=Bearer vF9dft4qmTc2Nvb3RlckBhbHRhdmlzdGEuY29tCg==^A^A port=143^Aauth=Bearer vF9dft4qmTc2Nvb3RlckBhbHRhdmlzdGEuY29tCg==^A^A
The same credential used in an SMTP exchange is shown below. Note The same credential used in an SMTP exchange is shown below. Note
that line breaks are inserted for readability, and that the SMTP that line breaks are inserted for readability, and that the SMTP
protocol terminates lines with CR and LF characters (ASCII values protocol terminates lines with CR and LF characters (ASCII values
0x0D and 0x0A), these are not displayed explicitly in the example. 0x0D and 0x0A), these are not displayed explicitly in the example.
[connection begins] [connection begins]
S: 220 mx.example.com ESMTP 12sm2095603fks.9 S: 220 mx.example.com ESMTP 12sm2095603fks.9
C: EHLO sender.example.com C: EHLO sender.example.com
S: 250-mx.example.com at your service,[172.31.135.47] S: 250-mx.example.com at your service,[172.31.135.47]
S: 250-SIZE 35651584 S: 250-SIZE 35651584
S: 250-8BITMIME S: 250-8BITMIME
S: 250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN OAUTH S: 250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN OAUTHBEARER
S: 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES S: 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES
S: 250-PIPELINING S: 250-PIPELINING
C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTH bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20sAWhvc3Q9c2VydmVy C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BaG9zdD1zZX
LmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9QmVhcmVyIHZGOWRmdDRxbVRjMk5 J2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BdXNlcj11c2VyQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzA
2YjNSbGNrQmhiSFJoZG1semRHRXVZMjl0Q2c9PQEB WF1dGg9QmVhcmVyIHZGOWRmdDRxbVRjMk52YjNSbGNrQmhiSFJoZG1semRHRXVZ
Mjl0Q2c9PQEB
S: 235 Authentication successful. S: 235 Authentication successful.
[connection continues...] [connection continues...]
5.2. OAuth 1.0a Authorization with Channel Binding 5.2. OAuth 1.0a Authorization with Channel Binding
This example shows channel binding in the context of an OAuth 1.0a This example shows channel binding in the context of an OAuth 1.0a
signed authorization request. Note that line breaks are inserted for signed authorization request. Note that line breaks are inserted for
readability. readability.
S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTH SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server Ready S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTH10A-PLUS SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server
S: t0 OK Completed Ready
C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTH-PLUS eSxhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20sAWhvc3Q9c2Vydm S: t0 OK Completed
VyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9T0F1dGggcmVhbG09IkV4YW1wbGUi C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTH10A-PLUS eSxhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BaG9zdD1zZ
LG9hdXRoX2NvbnN1bWVyX2tleT0iOWRqZGo4Mmg0OGRqczlkMiIsb2F1dGhfdG9rZW XJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BcG9ydD0xNDMBYXV0aD1PQXV0aCByZWFsbT0iRXhhb
49ImtrazlkN2RoM2szOXNqdjciLG9hdXRoX3NpZ25hdHVyZV9tZXRob2Q9IkhNQUMt XBsZSIsb2F1dGhfY29uc3VtZXJfa2V5PSI5ZGpkajgyaDQ4ZGpzOWQyIixvYXV0a
U0hBMSIsb2F1dGhfdGltZXN0YW1wPSIxMzcxMzEyMDEiLG9hdXRoX25vbmNlPSI3ZD F90b2tlbj0ia2trOWQ3ZGgzazM5c2p2NyIsb2F1dGhfc2lnbmF0dXJlX21ldGhvZ
hmM2U0YSIsb2F1dGhfc2lnbmF0dXJlPSJTU2R0SUdFZ2JHbDBkR3hsSUhSbFlTQndi D0iSE1BQy1TSEExIixvYXV0aF90aW1lc3RhbXA9IjEzNzEzMTIwMSIsb2F1dGhfb
M1F1IgFxcz1jYmRhdGE9dGxzLXVuaXF1ZTpTRzkzSUdKcFp5QnBjeUJoSUZSTVV5Qm m9uY2U9IjdkOGYzZTRhIixvYXV0aF9zaWduYXR1cmU9IlNTZHRJR0VnYkdsMGRHe
1hVzVoYkNCdFpYTnpZV2RsUHdvPQEB GxJSFJsWVNCd2IzUXUiAXFzPWNiZGF0YT10bHMtdW5pcXVlOlNHOTNJR0pwWnlCc
S: t1 OK SASL authentication succeeded GN5QmhJRlJNVXlCbWFXNWhiQ0J0WlhOellXZGxQd289AQE=
S: t1 OK SASL authentication succeeded
As required by IMAP [RFC3501], the payloads are base64-encoded. The As required by IMAP [RFC3501], the payloads are base64-encoded. The
decoded initial client response (with %x01 represented as ^A and decoded initial client response (with %x01 represented as ^A and
lines wrapped for readability) is: lines wrapped for readability) is:
y,a=user@example.com,^A y,a=user@example.com^A
host=server.example.com^A host=server.example.com^A
user=user@example.com^A
port=143^A port=143^A
auth=OAuth realm="Example", auth=OAuth realm="Example",
oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2", oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2",
oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7", oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7",
oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1", oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",
oauth_timestamp="137131201", oauth_timestamp="137131201",
oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a", oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a",
oauth_signature="SSdtIGEgbGl0dGxlIHRlYSBwb3Qu"^A oauth_signature="SSdtIGEgbGl0dGxlIHRlYSBwb3Qu"^A
qs=cbdata=tls-unique:SG93IGJpZyBpcyBhIFRMUyBmaW5hbCBtZXNzYWdlPwo=^A^A qs=cbdata=tls-unique:SG93IGJpZyBpcyBhIFRMUyBmaW5hbCBtZXNzYWdlPwo=^A^A
skipping to change at page 18, line 32 skipping to change at page 17, line 33
j82h48djs9d2%26oauth_nonce%3D7d8f3e4a%26oauth_signature_method%3DHM j82h48djs9d2%26oauth_nonce%3D7d8f3e4a%26oauth_signature_method%3DHM
AC-SHA1%26oauth_timestamp%3D137131201%26oauth_token%3Dkkk9d7dh3k39s AC-SHA1%26oauth_timestamp%3D137131201%26oauth_token%3Dkkk9d7dh3k39s
jv7 jv7
5.3. Failed Exchange 5.3. Failed Exchange
This example shows a failed exchange because of the empty This example shows a failed exchange because of the empty
Authorization header, which is how a client can query for the needed Authorization header, which is how a client can query for the needed
scope. Note that line breaks are inserted for readability. scope. Note that line breaks are inserted for readability.
S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTH SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server Ready S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTHBEARER SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server
Ready
S: t0 OK Completed S: t0 OK Completed
C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTH bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20sAWhvc3Q9c2Vy C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BaG9zdD
dmVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9AQE= 1zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BdXNlcj11c2VyQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvc
S: + ewoic3RhdHVzIjoiNDAxIiwKInNjaGVtZXMiOiJiZWFyZXIiLAoic2NvcGUi nQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9AQE=
OiJleGFtcGxlX3Njb3BlIgp9 S: + ewoic3RhdHVzIjoiNDAxIgoic2NvcGUiOiJleGFtcGxlX3Njb3BlIgp9
C: + AQ== C: + AQ==
S: t1 NO SASL authentication failed S: t1 NO SASL authentication failed
The decoded initial client response is: The decoded initial client response is:
n,a=user@example.com,^Ahost=server.example.com^Aport=143^Aauth=^A^A n,a=user@example.com,^Ahost=server.example.com^Auser=user@example.
com^Aport=143^Aauth=^A^A
The decoded server error response is: The decoded server error response is:
{ {
"status":"401", "status":"401",
"schemes":"bearer",
"scope":"example_scope" "scope":"example_scope"
} }
The client responds with the required empty response. The client responds with the required empty response.
5.4. Failed Channel Binding 5.4. Failed Channel Binding
This example shows a channel binding failure in an empty request. This example shows a channel binding failure in an empty request.
The channel binding information is empty. Note that line breaks are The channel binding information is empty. Note that line breaks are
inserted for readability. inserted for readability.
S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTH OAUTH-PLUS SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTH10A-PLUS SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server
Ready Ready
S: t0 OK Completed S: t0 OK Completed
C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTH-PLUS eSxhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20sAWhvc3Q9c2Vydm C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTH10A-PLUS eSxhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20sAWhv
VyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9AWNiZGF0YT0BAQ== c3Q9c2VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXVzZXI9dXNlckBleGFtcGxlLmNvbQF
S: + ewoic3RhdHVzIjoiNDEyIiwKInNjaGVtZXMiOiJiZWFyZXIgb2F1dGgiLAoi wb3J0PTE0MwFhdXRoPQFjYmRhdGE9AQE=
c2NvcGUiOiJleGFtcGxlX3Njb3BlIgp9 S: + ewoic3RhdHVzIjoiNDEyIiwKInNjb3BlIjoiZXhhbXBsZV9zY29wZSIKfQ==
C: + AQ== C: + AQ==
S: t1 NO SASL authentication failed S: t1 NO SASL authentication failed
The decoded initial client response is: The decoded initial client response is:
y,a=user@example.com,^A y,a=user@example.com,^Ahost=server.example.com^A
host=server.example.com^Aport=143^A user=user@example.com^Aport=143^Aauth=^Acbdata=^A^A
auth=^Acbdata=^A^A
The decoded server response is: The decoded server response is:
{ {
"status":"412", "status":"412",
"schemes":"bearer oauth",
"scope":"example_scope" "scope":"example_scope"
} }
The client responds with the required empty response. The client responds with the required empty response.
5.5. SMTP Example of a failed negotiation. 5.5. SMTP Example of a failed negotiation.
This example shows an authorization failure in an SMTP exchange. This example shows an authorization failure in an SMTP exchange.
Note that line breaks are inserted for readability, and that the SMTP Note that line breaks are inserted for readability, and that the SMTP
protocol terminates lines with CR and LF characters (ASCII values protocol terminates lines with CR and LF characters (ASCII values
0x0D and 0x0A), these are not displayed explicitly in the example. 0x0D and 0x0A), these are not displayed explicitly in the example.
[connection begins] [connection begins]
S: 220 mx.example.com ESMTP 12sm2095603fks.9 S: 220 mx.example.com ESMTP 12sm2095603fks.9
C: EHLO sender.example.com C: EHLO sender.example.com
S: 250-mx.example.com at your service,[172.31.135.47] S: 250-mx.example.com at your service,[172.31.135.47]
S: 250-SIZE 35651584 S: 250-SIZE 35651584
S: 250-8BITMIME S: 250-8BITMIME
S: 250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN OAUTH S: 250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN OAUTHBEARER
S: 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES S: 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES
S: 250-PIPELINING S: 250-PIPELINING
C: AUTH OAUTH dXNlcj1zb21ldXNlckBleGFtcGxlLmNvbQFhdXRoPUJlYXJlciB2RjlkZn C: AUTH OAUTHBEARER dXNlcj1zb21ldXNlckBleGFtcGxlLmNvbQFhdXRoPUJlYXJlciB2
Q0cW1UYzJOdmIzUmxja0JoZEhSaGRtbHpkR0V1WTI5dENnPT0BAQo= RjlkZnQ0cW1UYzJOdmIzUmxja0JoZEhSaGRtbHpkR0V1WTI5dENnPT0BAQo=
S: 334 eyJzdGF0dXMiOiI0MDEiLCJzY2hlbWVzIjoiYmVhcmVyIG1hYyIsInNjb3BlIjoia S: 334 eyJzdGF0dXMiOiI0MDEiLCJzY2hlbWVzIjoiYmVhcmVyIG1hYyIsInNjb3BlIjoia
HR0cHM6Ly9tYWlsLmdvb2dsZS5jb20vIn0K HR0cHM6Ly9tYWlsLmdvb2dsZS5jb20vIn0K
C: AQ== C: AQ==
S: 535-5.7.1 Username and Password not accepted. Learn more at S: 535-5.7.1 Username and Password not accepted. Learn more at
S: 535 5.7.1 http://support.example.com/mail/oauth S: 535 5.7.1 http://support.example.com/mail/oauth
[connection continues...] [connection continues...]
The client responds with the required empty response. The server returned an error message in the 334 SASL message, the
client responds with the required empty response, and the server
finalizes the negotiation.
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
This mechanism does not provide a security layer, but does provide a This mechanism does not provide a security layer, but does provide a
provision for channel binding. The OAuth 2 specification provision for channel binding. The OAuth 2 specification
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] allows for a variety of usages, and the security [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] allows for a variety of usages, and the security
properties of these profiles vary. The usage of bearer tokens, for properties of these profiles vary. The usage of bearer tokens, for
example, provide security features similar to cookies. Applications example, provide security features similar to cookies. Applications
using this mechanism SHOULD exercise the same level of care using using this mechanism SHOULD exercise the same level of care using
this mechanism as they would in using the SASL PLAIN mechanism. In this mechanism as they would in using the SASL PLAIN mechanism. In
skipping to change at page 22, line 11 skipping to change at page 21, line 11
invalid at any time. The client MAY request a new access token for invalid at any time. The client MAY request a new access token for
each connection to a resource server, but it SHOULD cache and re-use each connection to a resource server, but it SHOULD cache and re-use
access credentials that appear to be valid. access credentials that appear to be valid.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
7.1. SASL Registration 7.1. SASL Registration
The IANA is requested to register the following SASL profile: The IANA is requested to register the following SASL profile:
SASL mechanism profile: OAUTH SASL mechanism profile: OAUTHBEARER
Security Considerations: See this document Security Considerations: See this document
Published Specification: See this document Published Specification: See this document
For further information: Contact the authors of this document. For further information: Contact the authors of this document.
Owner/Change controller: the IETF Owner/Change controller: the IETF
Note: None Note: None
The IANA is requested to register the following SASL profile: The IANA is requested to register the following SASL profile:
SASL mechanism profile: OAUTH-PLUS SASL mechanism profile: OAUTH10A
Security Considerations: See this document
Published Specification: See this document
For further information: Contact the authors of this document.
Owner/Change controller: the IETF
Note: None
The IANA is requested to register the following SASL profile:
SASL mechanism profile: OAUTH10A-PLUS
Security Considerations: See this document Security Considerations: See this document
Published Specification: See this document Published Specification: See this document
For further information: Contact the authors of this document. For further information: Contact the authors of this document.
Owner/Change controller: the IETF Owner/Change controller: the IETF
Note: None Note: None
7.2. GSS-API Registration 7.2. GSS-API Registration
IANA is further requested to assign an OID for this GSS mechanism in IANA is further requested to assign an OID for thESE GSS mechanismS
the SMI numbers registry, with the prefix of in the SMI numbers registry, with the prefix of
iso.org.dod.internet.security.mechanisms (1.3.6.1.5.5) and to iso.org.dod.internet.security.mechanisms (1.3.6.1.5.5) and to
reference this specification in the registry. reference this specification in the registry.
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2]
Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
draft-ietf-oauth-v2-31 (work in progress), August 2012. draft-ietf-oauth-v2-31 (work in progress), August 2012.
skipping to change at page 26, line 9 skipping to change at page 26, line 9
Appendix A. Acknowlegements Appendix A. Acknowlegements
The authors would like to thank the members of the Kitten working The authors would like to thank the members of the Kitten working
group, and in addition and specifically: Simon Josefson, Torsten group, and in addition and specifically: Simon Josefson, Torsten
Lodderstadt, Ryan Troll, and Nico Williams. Lodderstadt, Ryan Troll, and Nico Williams.
Appendix B. Document History Appendix B. Document History
[[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]] [[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
-05
o Fixed the GS2 header language again.
o Separated out different OAuth schemes into different SASL
mechanisms. Took out the scheme in the error return. Tuned up
the IANA registrations.
o Added the user field back into the SASL message.
o Fixed the examples (again).
o
-04 -04
o Changed user field to be carried in the gs2-header, and made gs2 o Changed user field to be carried in the gs2-header, and made gs2
header explicit in all cases. header explicit in all cases.
o Converted MAC examples to OAuth 1.0a. Moved MAC to an informative o Converted MAC examples to OAuth 1.0a. Moved MAC to an informative
reference. reference.
o Changed to sending an empty client response (single control-A) as o Changed to sending an empty client response (single control-A) as
the second message of a failed sequence. the second message of a failed sequence.
 End of changes. 53 change blocks. 
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