< draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-05.txt		draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-06.txt >
	KITTEN W. Mills		KITTEN W. Mills
	Internet-Draft Yahoo! Inc.		Internet-Draft Yahoo! Inc.
	Intended status: Standards Track T. Showalter		Intended status: Standards Track T. Showalter
	Expires: February 24, 2013		Expires: March 5, 2013
	H. Tschofenig		H. Tschofenig
	Nokia Siemens Networks		Nokia Siemens Networks
	August 23, 2012		September 1, 2012
	A set of SASL and GSS-API Mechanisms for OAuth		A set of SASL and GSS-API Mechanisms for OAuth
	draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-05		draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-06
	Abstract		Abstract
	OAuth enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to a		OAuth enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to a
	protected resource, either on behalf of a resource owner by		protected resource, either on behalf of a resource owner by
	orchestrating an approval interaction, or by allowing the third-party		orchestrating an approval interaction, or by allowing the third-party
	application to obtain access on its own behalf.		application to obtain access on its own behalf.
	This document defines how an application client uses credentials		This document defines how an application client uses credentials
	obtained via OAuth over the Simple Authentication and Security Layer		obtained via OAuth over the Simple Authentication and Security Layer
	skipping to change at page 2, line 4 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 4 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on February 24, 2013.		This Internet-Draft will expire on March 5, 2013.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	3. OAuth SASL Mechanism Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		3. OAuth SASL Mechanism Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3.1. Initial Client Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		3.1. Initial Client Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	3.1.1. Reserved Key/Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		3.1.1. Reserved Key/Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	3.1.2. Use of the gs2-header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		3.1.2. Use of the gs2-header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	3.2. Server's Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		3.2. Server's Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	3.2.1. Mapping to SASL Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		3.2.1. Mapping to SASL Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	3.2.2. Server response to failed authentication. . . . . . . 11		3.2.2. Canonicalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	3.2.3. Completing an error message sequence. . . . . . . . . 12		3.2.3. Server response to failed authentication. . . . . . . 11
			3.2.4. Completing an error message sequence. . . . . . . . . 12
	3.3. Use of Signature Type Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . 12		3.3. Use of Signature Type Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	3.4. Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		3.4. Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	4. GSS-API OAuth Mechanism Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		4. GSS-API OAuth Mechanism Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	5. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		5. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	5.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		5.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	5.2. OAuth 1.0a Authorization with Channel Binding . . . . . . 16		5.2. OAuth 1.0a Authorization with Channel Binding . . . . . . 17
	5.3. Failed Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		5.3. Failed Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	5.4. Failed Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		5.4. Failed Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	5.5. SMTP Example of a failed negotiation. . . . . . . . . . . 18		5.5. SMTP Example of a failed negotiation. . . . . . . . . . . 19
	6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
	7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21		7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
	7.1. SASL Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21		7.1. SASL Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
	7.2. GSS-API Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22		7.2. GSS-API Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
	8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23		8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
	8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23		8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
	8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24		8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
	Appendix A. Acknowlegements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25		Appendix A. Acknowlegements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
	Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26		Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	OAuth [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] enables a third-party application to obtain		OAuth [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] enables a third-party application to obtain
	limited access to a protected resource, either on behalf of a		limited access to a protected resource, either on behalf of a
	resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction, or by		resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction, or by
	allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own		allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own
	behalf. The core OAuth specification [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] does not		behalf. The core OAuth specification [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] does not
	define the interaction between the client and the resource server		define the interaction between the client and the resource server
	with the access to a protected resource using an Access Token. This		with the access to a protected resource using an Access Token. This
	functionality is described in separate specifications, for example		functionality is described in separate specifications, for example
	[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-bearer], [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac], and OAuth		Bearer tokens [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-bearer], MAC tokens
	1.0a [RFC5849] where the focus is on an HTTP-based environment only.		[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac], and OAuth 1.0a [RFC5849]. In each of
			these are defined in an HTTP-based environment only.
	Figure 1 shows the abstract message flow as shown in Figure 1 of		Figure 1 shows the abstract message flow as shown in Figure 1 of
	[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2].		[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2].
	+--------+ +---------------+		+--------+ +---------------+
	| |--(A)- Authorization Request ->| Resource |		| |--(A)- Authorization Request ->| Resource |
	| | | Owner |		| | | Owner |
	| |<-(B)-- Authorization Grant ---| |		| |<-(B)-- Authorization Grant ---| |
	| | +---------------+		| | +---------------+
	| |		| |
	skipping to change at page 8, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 5 ¶
	The reader is assumed to be familiar with the terms used in the OAuth		The reader is assumed to be familiar with the terms used in the OAuth
	2.0 specification [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2].		2.0 specification [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2].
	In examples, "C:" and "S:" indicate lines sent by the client and		In examples, "C:" and "S:" indicate lines sent by the client and
	server respectively. Line breaks have been inserted for readability.		server respectively. Line breaks have been inserted for readability.
	Note that the IMAP SASL specification requires base64 encoding		Note that the IMAP SASL specification requires base64 encoding
	message, not this memo.		message, not this memo.
	3. OAuth SASL Mechanism Specification		3. OAuth SASL Mechanism Specifications
	SASL is used as a generalized authentication method in a variety of		SASL is used as a generalized authentication method in a variety of
	application layer protocols. This document defines the following		application layer protocols. This document defines the following
	SASL mechanisms for usage with OAuth:		SASL mechanisms for usage with OAuth:
	OAUTHBEARER Authorization using Bearer tokens.		OAUTHBEARER Authorization using Bearer tokens.
	OAUTH10A Authorization using OAuth 1.0a tokens.		OAUTH10A Authorization using OAuth 1.0a tokens.
	OAUTH10A-PLUS Adds channel binding [RFC5056] capability to		OAUTH10A-PLUS Adds channel binding [RFC5056] capability to
	OAUTH10A for additional security guarantees.		OAUTH10A for additional security guarantees.
	Any new OAuth token scheme MAY define a new SASL mechanism compatible		Any new OAuth token scheme MAY define a new SASL mechanism compatible
	with the mechanisms defined here by simply registering the new		with the mechanisms defined here by simply registering the new
	name(s) and citing this specification for the further definition.		name(s) and citing this specification for the further definition.
	New channel binding enabled "-PLUS" mechanisms defined in this way		New channel binding enabled "-PLUS" mechanisms defined in this way
	MUST include message integrity protection.		MUST include message integrity protection. A newly defined mechanism
			would also need to register a new GS2 OID.
	These mechanisms are client initiated and lock-step, the server		These mechanisms are client initiated and lock-step, the server
	always replying to a client message. In the case where the client		always replying to a client message. In the case where the client
	has and correctly uses a valid token the flow is:		has and correctly uses a valid token the flow is:
	o Client sends a valid and correct initial client response.		o Client sends a valid and correct initial client response.
	o Server responds with a successful authentication.		o Server responds with a successful authentication.
	In the case where authorization fails the server sends an error		In the case where authorization fails the server sends an error
	skipping to change at page 9, line 27 ¶		skipping to change at page 9, line 27 ¶
	kvpair = key "=" value kvsep		kvpair = key "=" value kvsep
	client_resp = 0*kvpair kvsep		client_resp = 0*kvpair kvsep
	;; gs2-header = As defined in GSS-API		;; gs2-header = As defined in GSS-API
	initial_client_resp = gs2-header kvsep client_resp		initial_client_resp = gs2-header kvsep client_resp
	The following key/value pairs are defined in the client response:		The following key/value pairs are defined in the client response:
	auth (REQUIRED): The payload of the HTTP Authorization header for		auth (REQUIRED): The payload of the HTTP Authorization header for
	an equivalent HTTP OAuth authroization.		an equivalent HTTP OAuth authroization.
	user (REQUIRED): The authorization ID. The server MAY use this
	as a routing or database lookup hint. The server MUST NOT use
	this as authoritative, the user name MUST be asserted by the
	OAuth credential.
	host: Contains the host name to which the client connected.		host: Contains the host name to which the client connected.
	port: Contains the port number represented as a decimal positive		port: Contains the port number represented as a decimal positive
	integer string without leading zeros to which the client		integer string without leading zeros to which the client
	connected.		connected.
	qs: The HTTP query string. In non-channel binding mechanisms		qs: The HTTP query string. In non-channel binding mechanisms
	this is reserved, the client SHOUD NOT send it, and has the		this is reserved, the client SHOUD NOT send it, and has the
	default value of "". In "-PLUS" variants this carries a single		default value of "". In "-PLUS" variants this carries a single
	key value pair "cbdata" for the channel binding data payload		key value pair "cbdata" for the channel binding data payload
	skipping to change at page 10, line 31 ¶		skipping to change at page 10, line 29 ¶
	post (RESERVED): HTTP post data, the default value is "".		post (RESERVED): HTTP post data, the default value is "".
	3.1.2. Use of the gs2-header		3.1.2. Use of the gs2-header
	The OAuth scheme related mechanisms are also GSS-API mechanisms, see		The OAuth scheme related mechanisms are also GSS-API mechanisms, see
	Section 4 for further detail. The gs2-header is used as follows:		Section 4 for further detail. The gs2-header is used as follows:
	o The "gs2-nonstd-flag" MUST NOT be present.		o The "gs2-nonstd-flag" MUST NOT be present.
	o The "gs2-authzid" carries the authorization identity as specified		o The "gs2-authzid" carries the authorization identity as specified
	in [RFC5801].		in [RFC5801]. This MUST agree with the identity asserted in the
			OAuth credential.
	In the non "-PLUS" mechanisms the "gs2-cb-flag" MUST be set to "n"		In the non "-PLUS" mechanisms the "gs2-cb-flag" MUST be set to "n"
	because channel-binding [RFC5056] data is not expected. In the		because channel-binding [RFC5056] data is not expected. In the
	OAUTH10A-PLUS mechanism (or other -PLUS variants based on this		OAUTH10A-PLUS mechanism (or other -PLUS variants based on this
	specification) the "gs2-cb-flag" MUST be set appropriately by the		specification) the "gs2-cb-flag" MUST be set appropriately by the
	client.		client.
	3.2. Server's Response		3.2. Server's Response
	The server validates the response per the specification for the		The server validates the response per the specification for the
	skipping to change at page 11, line 19 ¶		skipping to change at page 11, line 17 ¶
	the user ID to be used as the authorization identity (identity to act		the user ID to be used as the authorization identity (identity to act
	as). The server MUST use the ID obtained from the credential as the		as). The server MUST use the ID obtained from the credential as the
	user being authorized.		user being authorized.
	3.2.1. Mapping to SASL Identities		3.2.1. Mapping to SASL Identities
	Some OAuth mechanisms can provide both an authorization identity and		Some OAuth mechanisms can provide both an authorization identity and
	an authentication identity. An example of this is OAuth 1.0a		an authentication identity. An example of this is OAuth 1.0a
	[RFC5849] where the consumer key (oauth_consumer_key) identifies the		[RFC5849] where the consumer key (oauth_consumer_key) identifies the
	entity using the token which equates to the SASL authentication		entity using the token which equates to the SASL authentication
	identity, and is authenticated using the shared secret. The		identity, and is authenticated using the shared secret. The server
	authorization identity in the OAuth 1.0a case is carried in the token		MAY use a consumer key, a value derived from it, or other comparable
	(per the requirement above), which SHOULD be validated independently.		identity in the OAuth authorization scheme to allow SASL an
	The server MAY use a consumer key, a value derived from it, or other		authentication identity different from the authorization identity to
	comparable identity in the OAuth authorization scheme as the SASL		be set.
	authentication identity. If an appropriate authentication identity
	is not available the server MUST use the authorization identity as
	the authentication identity.
	3.2.2. Server response to failed authentication.		3.2.2. Canonicalization
			The identity asserted by the OAuth authorization server is canonical
			for display. The server MAY provide a different canonical form based
			on local data.
			3.2.3. Server response to failed authentication.
	For a failed authentication the server returns a JSON [RFC4627]		For a failed authentication the server returns a JSON [RFC4627]
	formatted error result, and fails the authentication. The error		formatted error result, and fails the authentication. The error
	result consists of the following values:		result consists of the following values:
	status (REQUIRED): The authorization error code. Valid error		status (REQUIRED): The authorization error code. Valid error
	codes are defined in the IANA [[need registry name]] registry		codes are defined in the IANA [[need registry name]] registry
	specified in the OAuth 2 core specification.		specified in the OAuth 2 core specification.
	scope (OPTIONAL): An OAuth scope which is valid to access the		scope (OPTIONAL): An OAuth scope which is valid to access the
	skipping to change at page 12, line 12 ¶		skipping to change at page 12, line 12 ¶
	information (which is beyond the scope of this memo). If not present		information (which is beyond the scope of this memo). If not present
	then the client SHOULD presume an empty scope (unscoped token) is		then the client SHOULD presume an empty scope (unscoped token) is
	needed.		needed.
	If channel binding is in use and the channel binding fails the server		If channel binding is in use and the channel binding fails the server
	responds with a status code set to 412 to indicate that the channel		responds with a status code set to 412 to indicate that the channel
	binding precondition failed. If the authentication scheme in use		binding precondition failed. If the authentication scheme in use
	does not include signing the server SHOULD revoke the presented		does not include signing the server SHOULD revoke the presented
	credential and the client SHOULD discard that credential.		credential and the client SHOULD discard that credential.
	3.2.3. Completing an error message sequence.		3.2.4. Completing an error message sequence.
	If the client gets an error message from the server it MUST send an		Section 3.6 of [RFC4422] explicitly prohibits additional information
	empty client response consisting of a single %x01 (control A)		in an unsuccessful authentication outcome. Therefor, the error
	character, which is a correctly formatted client response with no		message is sent in a normal message. The client MUST then send an
	key/value pairs. The server then completes the SASL negotiation with		additional client response consisting of a single %x01 (control A)
	a failure result.		character to the server in order to allow the server to finish the
			exchange.
	3.3. Use of Signature Type Authorization		3.3. Use of Signature Type Authorization
	This mechanism supports authorization using signatures, which		Some OAuth mechanisms support authorization using signatures, which
	requires that both client and server construct the string to be		requires that both client and server construct the string to be
	signed. OAuth 2 is designed for authentication/authorization to		signed. OAuth 2 is designed for authentication/authorization to
	access specific URIs. SASL is designed for user authentication, and		access specific URIs. SASL is designed for user authentication, and
	has no facility for being more specific. In this mechanism we		has no facility for being more specific. In this mechanism we
	require or define default values for the data elements from an HTTP		require or define default values for the data elements from an HTTP
	request which allow the signature base string to be constructed		request which allow the signature base string to be constructed
	properly. The default HTTP path is "/" and the default post body is		properly. The default HTTP path is "/" and the default post body is
	empty. These atoms are defined as extension points so that no		empty. These atoms are defined as extension points so that no
	changes are needed if there is a revision of SASL which supports more		changes are needed if there is a revision of SASL which supports more
	specific resource authorization, e.g. IMAP access to a specific		specific resource authorization, e.g. IMAP access to a specific
	folder or FTP access limited to a specific directory.		folder or FTP access limited to a specific directory.
	Using the example in the OAuth 1.0a specification as a starting		Using the example in the OAuth 1.0a specification as a starting
	point, on an IMAP server running on port 143 and given the OAuth 1.0a		point, on an IMAP server running on port 143 and given the OAuth 1.0a
	style authorization request (with %x01 shown as ^A and line breaks		style authorization request (with %x01 shown as ^A and line breaks
	added for readability) below:		added for readability) below:
	n,a=user@example.com,^A		n,a=user@example.com^A
	host=example.com^A		host=example.com^A
	user=user@example.com^A		user=user@example.com^A
	port=143^A		port=143^A
	auth=OAuth realm="Example",		auth=OAuth realm="Example",
	oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2",		oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2",
	oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7",		oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7",
	oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",		oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",
	oauth_timestamp="137131201",		oauth_timestamp="137131201",
	oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a",		oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a",
	oauth_signature="Tm90IGEgcmVhbCBzaWduYXR1cmU%3D"^A^A		oauth_signature="Tm90IGEgcmVhbCBzaWduYXR1cmU%3D"^A^A
	skipping to change at page 14, line 10 ¶		skipping to change at page 14, line 10 ¶
	raw data from the channel binding type. For example, if the client		raw data from the channel binding type. For example, if the client
	is using tls-unique for channel binding then the raw channel binding		is using tls-unique for channel binding then the raw channel binding
	data is the TLS finished message as specified in section 3.1 of		data is the TLS finished message as specified in section 3.1 of
	[RFC5929].		[RFC5929].
	4. GSS-API OAuth Mechanism Specification		4. GSS-API OAuth Mechanism Specification
	Note: The normative references in this section are informational for		Note: The normative references in this section are informational for
	SASL implementers, but they are normative for GSS-API implementers.		SASL implementers, but they are normative for GSS-API implementers.
	The SASL OAuth mechanism is also a GSS-API mechanism and the messages		A SASL OAuth mechanism is also a GSS-API mechanism and the messages
	described in Section 3 are the same with the following changes to the		described in Section 3 are the same with the following changes to the
	GS2 related elements:		GS2 related elements:
	1. the GS2 header on the client's first message and the following		1. the GS2 header on the client's first message is excluded when
	%x01 (control A) are excluded when used as a GSS-API mechanism.		used as a GSS-API mechanism.
	2. the initial context token header is prefixed to the client's		2. the initial context token header is prefixed to the client's
	first authentication message (context token), as described in		first authentication message (context token), as described in
	Section 3.1 of RFC 2743,		Section 3.1 of RFC 2743,
	The GSS-API mechanism OID for OAuth is [[TBD: IANA]].		The GSS-API mechanism OIDs are:
	OAuth security contexts always have the mutual_state flag		o OAUTHBEARER: [[TBD: IANA -- probably in the 1.3.6.1.5.5 tree]]
			o OAUTH10A: [[TBD: IANA -- probably in the 1.3.6.1.5.5 tree]]
			OAuth mechanims security contexts always have the mutual_state flag
	(GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) set to TRUE. OAuth supports credential		(GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) set to TRUE. OAuth supports credential
	delegation, therefore security contexts may have the deleg_state flag		delegation, therefore security contexts may have the deleg_state flag
	(GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG) set to either TRUE or FALSE.		(GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG) set to either TRUE or FALSE.
	The mutual authentication property of this mechanism relies on		The mutual authentication property of this mechanism relies on
	successfully comparing the TLS server identity with the negotiated		successfully comparing the TLS server identity with the negotiated
	target name. Since the TLS channel is managed by the application		target name. Since the TLS channel is managed by the application
	outside of the GSS-API mechanism, the mechanism itself is unable to		outside of the GSS-API mechanism, the mechanism itself is unable to
	confirm the name while the application is able to perform this		confirm the name while the application is able to perform this
	comparison for the mechanism. For this reason, applications MUST		comparison for the mechanism. For this reason, applications MUST
	match the TLS server identity with the target name, as discussed in		match the TLS server identity with the target name, as discussed in
	[RFC6125].		[RFC6125].
	The OAuth mechanism does not support per-message tokens or		OAuth mechanisms do not support per-message tokens or
	GSS_Pseudo_random.		GSS_Pseudo_random.
	OAuth supports a standard generic name syntax for acceptors, such as		OAuth supports a standard generic name syntax for acceptors, such as
	GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE (see [RFC2743], Section 4.1). These		GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE (see [RFC2743], Section 4.1). These
	service names MUST be associated with the "entityID" claimed by the		service names MUST be associated with the "entityID" claimed by the
	RP. OAuth supports only a single name type for initiators:		RP. OAuth mechanisms support only a single name type for initiators:
	GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME. GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME is the default name type.		GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME. GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME is the default name type.
	The query, display, and exported name syntaxes for OAuth principal		The query, display, and exported name syntaxes for OAuth principal
	names are all the same. There is no OAuth-specific name syntax;		names are all the same. There is no OAuth-specific name syntax;
	applications SHOULD use generic GSS-API name types, such as		applications SHOULD use generic GSS-API name types, such as
	GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME and GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE (see [RFC2743],		GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME and GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE (see [RFC2743],
	Section 4). The exported name token does, of course, conform to		Section 4). The exported name token does, of course, conform to
	[RFC2743], Section 3.2, but the "NAME" part of the token should be		[RFC2743], Section 3.2, but the "NAME" part of the token should be
	treated as a potential input string to the OAuth name normalization		treated as a potential input string to the OAuth name normalization
	rules.		rules.
	5. Examples		5. Examples
	These example illustrate exchanges between an IMAP client and an IMAP		These examples illustrate exchanges between an IMAP and SMTP clients
	server.		and servers.
	Note to implementers: Authorization scheme names are case		Note to implementers: Authorization scheme names are case
	insensitive. One example uses "Bearer" but that could as easily be		insensitive. One example uses "Bearer" but that could as easily be
	"bearer", "BEARER", or "BeArEr".		"bearer", "BEARER", or "BeArEr".
	5.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange		5.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange
	This example shows a successful OAuth 2.0 bearer token exchange.		This example shows a successful OAuth 2.0 bearer token exchange.
	Note that line breaks are inserted for readability.		Note that line breaks are inserted for readability.
	S: * IMAP4rev1 Server Ready		S: * IMAP4rev1 Server Ready
	C: t0 CAPABILITY		C: t0 CAPABILITY
	S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTHBEARER		S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTHBEARER
	S: t0 OK Completed		S: t0 OK Completed
	C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BaG9zdD1zZX		C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BaG9zdD1zZX
	J2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BdXNlcj11c2VyQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzA		J2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BcG9ydD0xNDMBYXV0aD1CZWFyZXIgdkY5ZGZ0NHFtV
	WF1dGg9QmVhcmVyIHZGOWRmdDRxbVRjMk52YjNSbGNrQmhiSFJoZG1semRHRXVZ		GMyTnZiM1JsY2tCaGJIUmhkbWx6ZEdFdVkyOXRDZz09AQE=
	Mjl0Q2c9PQEB
	S: t1 OK SASL authentication succeeded		S: t1 OK SASL authentication succeeded
	As required by IMAP [RFC3501], the payloads are base64-encoded. The		As required by IMAP [RFC3501], the payloads are base64-encoded. The
	decoded initial client response (with %x01 represented as ^A and long		decoded initial client response (with %x01 represented as ^A and long
	lines wrapped for readability) is:		lines wrapped for readability) is:
	n,a=user@example.com^Ahost=server.example.com^Auser=user@example.com^A		n,a=user@example.com^Ahost=server.example.com^Aport=143^A
	port=143^Aauth=Bearer vF9dft4qmTc2Nvb3RlckBhbHRhdmlzdGEuY29tCg==^A^A		auth=Bearer vF9dft4qmTc2Nvb3RlckBhbHRhdmlzdGEuY29tCg==^A^A
	The same credential used in an SMTP exchange is shown below. Note		The same credential used in an SMTP exchange is shown below. Note
	that line breaks are inserted for readability, and that the SMTP		that line breaks are inserted for readability, and that the SMTP
	protocol terminates lines with CR and LF characters (ASCII values		protocol terminates lines with CR and LF characters (ASCII values
	0x0D and 0x0A), these are not displayed explicitly in the example.		0x0D and 0x0A), these are not displayed explicitly in the example.
	[connection begins]		[connection begins]
	S: 220 mx.example.com ESMTP 12sm2095603fks.9		S: 220 mx.example.com ESMTP 12sm2095603fks.9
	C: EHLO sender.example.com		C: EHLO sender.example.com
	S: 250-mx.example.com at your service,[172.31.135.47]		S: 250-mx.example.com at your service,[172.31.135.47]
	S: 250-SIZE 35651584		S: 250-SIZE 35651584
	S: 250-8BITMIME		S: 250-8BITMIME
	S: 250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN OAUTHBEARER		S: 250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN OAUTHBEARER
	S: 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES		S: 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES
	S: 250-PIPELINING		S: 250-PIPELINING
	C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BaG9zdD1zZX		C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BaG9zdD1zZX
	J2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BdXNlcj11c2VyQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzA		J2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BcG9ydD0xNDMBYXV0aD1CZWFyZXIgdkY5ZGZ0NHFtV
	WF1dGg9QmVhcmVyIHZGOWRmdDRxbVRjMk52YjNSbGNrQmhiSFJoZG1semRHRXVZ		GMyTnZiM1JsY2tCaGJIUmhkbWx6ZEdFdVkyOXRDZz09AQE=
	Mjl0Q2c9PQEB
	S: 235 Authentication successful.		S: 235 Authentication successful.
	[connection continues...]		[connection continues...]
	5.2. OAuth 1.0a Authorization with Channel Binding		5.2. OAuth 1.0a Authorization with Channel Binding
	This example shows channel binding in the context of an OAuth 1.0a		This example shows channel binding in the context of an OAuth 1.0a
	signed authorization request. Note that line breaks are inserted for		signed authorization request. Note that line breaks are inserted for
	readability.		readability.
	S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTH10A-PLUS SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server		S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTH10A-PLUS SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server
	skipping to change at page 17, line 7 ¶		skipping to change at page 18, line 7 ¶
	GxJSFJsWVNCd2IzUXUiAXFzPWNiZGF0YT10bHMtdW5pcXVlOlNHOTNJR0pwWnlCc		GxJSFJsWVNCd2IzUXUiAXFzPWNiZGF0YT10bHMtdW5pcXVlOlNHOTNJR0pwWnlCc
	GN5QmhJRlJNVXlCbWFXNWhiQ0J0WlhOellXZGxQd289AQE=		GN5QmhJRlJNVXlCbWFXNWhiQ0J0WlhOellXZGxQd289AQE=
	S: t1 OK SASL authentication succeeded		S: t1 OK SASL authentication succeeded
	As required by IMAP [RFC3501], the payloads are base64-encoded. The		As required by IMAP [RFC3501], the payloads are base64-encoded. The
	decoded initial client response (with %x01 represented as ^A and		decoded initial client response (with %x01 represented as ^A and
	lines wrapped for readability) is:		lines wrapped for readability) is:
	y,a=user@example.com^A		y,a=user@example.com^A
	host=server.example.com^A		host=server.example.com^A
	user=user@example.com^A
	port=143^A		port=143^A
	auth=OAuth realm="Example",		auth=OAuth realm="Example",
	oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2",		oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2",
	oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7",		oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7",
	oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",		oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",
	oauth_timestamp="137131201",		oauth_timestamp="137131201",
	oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a",		oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a",
	oauth_signature="SSdtIGEgbGl0dGxlIHRlYSBwb3Qu"^A		oauth_signature="SSdtIGEgbGl0dGxlIHRlYSBwb3Qu"^A
	qs=cbdata=tls-unique:SG93IGJpZyBpcyBhIFRMUyBmaW5hbCBtZXNzYWdlPwo=^A^A		qs=cbdata=tls-unique:SG93IGJpZyBpcyBhIFRMUyBmaW5hbCBtZXNzYWdlPwo=^A^A
	skipping to change at page 17, line 37 ¶		skipping to change at page 18, line 36 ¶
	5.3. Failed Exchange		5.3. Failed Exchange
	This example shows a failed exchange because of the empty		This example shows a failed exchange because of the empty
	Authorization header, which is how a client can query for the needed		Authorization header, which is how a client can query for the needed
	scope. Note that line breaks are inserted for readability.		scope. Note that line breaks are inserted for readability.
	S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTHBEARER SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server		S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTHBEARER SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server
	Ready		Ready
	S: t0 OK Completed		S: t0 OK Completed
	C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BaG9zdD		C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BaG9zdD
	1zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BdXNlcj11c2VyQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvc		1zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BcG9ydD0xNDMBYXV0aD0BAQ==
	nQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9AQE=
	S: + ewoic3RhdHVzIjoiNDAxIgoic2NvcGUiOiJleGFtcGxlX3Njb3BlIgp9		S: + ewoic3RhdHVzIjoiNDAxIgoic2NvcGUiOiJleGFtcGxlX3Njb3BlIgp9
	C: + AQ==		C: + AQ==
	S: t1 NO SASL authentication failed		S: t1 NO SASL authentication failed
	The decoded initial client response is:		The decoded initial client response is:
	n,a=user@example.com,^Ahost=server.example.com^Auser=user@example.		n,a=user@example.com,^Ahost=server.example.com^A
	com^Aport=143^Aauth=^A^A		port=143^Aauth=^A^A
	The decoded server error response is:		The decoded server error response is:
	{		{
	"status":"401",		"status":"401",
	"scope":"example_scope"		"scope":"example_scope"
	}		}
	The client responds with the required empty response.		The client responds with the required empty response.
	5.4. Failed Channel Binding		5.4. Failed Channel Binding
	This example shows a channel binding failure in an empty request.		This example shows a channel binding failure in an empty request.
	The channel binding information is empty. Note that line breaks are		The channel binding information is empty. Note that line breaks are
	inserted for readability.		inserted for readability.
	S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTH10A-PLUS SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server		S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTH10A-PLUS SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server
	Ready		Ready
	S: t0 OK Completed		S: t0 OK Completed
	C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTH10A-PLUS eSxhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20sAWhv		C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTH10A-PLUS eSxhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BaG9z
	c3Q9c2VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXVzZXI9dXNlckBleGFtcGxlLmNvbQF		dD1zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BcG9ydD0xNDMBYXV0aD0BY2JkYXRhPQEB
	wb3J0PTE0MwFhdXRoPQFjYmRhdGE9AQE=
	S: + ewoic3RhdHVzIjoiNDEyIiwKInNjb3BlIjoiZXhhbXBsZV9zY29wZSIKfQ==		S: + ewoic3RhdHVzIjoiNDEyIiwKInNjb3BlIjoiZXhhbXBsZV9zY29wZSIKfQ==
	C: + AQ==		C: + AQ==
	S: t1 NO SASL authentication failed		S: t1 NO SASL authentication failed
	The decoded initial client response is:		The decoded initial client response is:
	y,a=user@example.com,^Ahost=server.example.com^A		y,a=user@example.com,^Ahost=server.example.com^A
	user=user@example.com^Aport=143^Aauth=^Acbdata=^A^A		port=143^Aauth=^Acbdata=^A^A
	The decoded server response is:		The decoded server response is:
	{		{
	"status":"412",		"status":"412",
	"scope":"example_scope"		"scope":"example_scope"
	}		}
	The client responds with the required empty response.		The client responds with the required empty response.
	skipping to change at page 19, line 14 ¶		skipping to change at page 20, line 14 ¶
	[connection begins]		[connection begins]
	S: 220 mx.example.com ESMTP 12sm2095603fks.9		S: 220 mx.example.com ESMTP 12sm2095603fks.9
	C: EHLO sender.example.com		C: EHLO sender.example.com
	S: 250-mx.example.com at your service,[172.31.135.47]		S: 250-mx.example.com at your service,[172.31.135.47]
	S: 250-SIZE 35651584		S: 250-SIZE 35651584
	S: 250-8BITMIME		S: 250-8BITMIME
	S: 250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN OAUTHBEARER		S: 250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN OAUTHBEARER
	S: 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES		S: 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES
	S: 250-PIPELINING		S: 250-PIPELINING
	C: AUTH OAUTHBEARER dXNlcj1zb21ldXNlckBleGFtcGxlLmNvbQFhdXRoPUJlYXJlciB2		C: AUTH OAUTHBEARER bixhPT1zb21ldXNlckBleGFtcGxlLmNvbQFhdXRoPUJlYXJlciB2
	RjlkZnQ0cW1UYzJOdmIzUmxja0JoZEhSaGRtbHpkR0V1WTI5dENnPT0BAQo=		RjlkZnQ0cW1UYzJOdmIzUmxja0JoZEhSaGRtbHpkR0V1WTI5dENnPT0BAQ==
	S: 334 eyJzdGF0dXMiOiI0MDEiLCJzY2hlbWVzIjoiYmVhcmVyIG1hYyIsInNjb3BlIjoia		S: 334 eyJzdGF0dXMiOiI0MDEiLCJzY2hlbWVzIjoiYmVhcmVyIG1hYyIsInNjb3BlIjoia
	HR0cHM6Ly9tYWlsLmdvb2dsZS5jb20vIn0K		HR0cHM6Ly9tYWlsLmdvb2dsZS5jb20vIn0K
	C: AQ==		C: AQ==
	S: 535-5.7.1 Username and Password not accepted. Learn more at		S: 535-5.7.1 Username and Password not accepted. Learn more at
	S: 535 5.7.1 http://support.example.com/mail/oauth		S: 535 5.7.1 http://support.example.com/mail/oauth
	[connection continues...]		[connection continues...]
	The server returned an error message in the 334 SASL message, the		The server returned an error message in the 334 SASL message, the
	client responds with the required empty response, and the server		client responds with the required empty response, and the server
	finalizes the negotiation.		finalizes the negotiation.
	skipping to change at page 26, line 9 ¶		skipping to change at page 27, line 9 ¶
	Appendix A. Acknowlegements		Appendix A. Acknowlegements
	The authors would like to thank the members of the Kitten working		The authors would like to thank the members of the Kitten working
	group, and in addition and specifically: Simon Josefson, Torsten		group, and in addition and specifically: Simon Josefson, Torsten
	Lodderstadt, Ryan Troll, and Nico Williams.		Lodderstadt, Ryan Troll, and Nico Williams.
	Appendix B. Document History		Appendix B. Document History
	[[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]		[[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
			-06
			o Removed the user field. Fixed the examples again.
			o Added canonicalization language.
			o
	-05		-05
	o Fixed the GS2 header language again.		o Fixed the GS2 header language again.
	o Separated out different OAuth schemes into different SASL		o Separated out different OAuth schemes into different SASL
	mechanisms. Took out the scheme in the error return. Tuned up		mechanisms. Took out the scheme in the error return. Tuned up
	the IANA registrations.		the IANA registrations.
	o Added the user field back into the SASL message.		o Added the user field back into the SASL message.
End of changes. 35 change blocks.
	78 lines changed or deleted		88 lines changed or added
This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.48. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/