< draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-06.txt		draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-07.txt >
	KITTEN W. Mills		KITTEN W. Mills
	Internet-Draft Yahoo! Inc.		Internet-Draft Yahoo! Inc.
	Intended status: Standards Track T. Showalter		Intended status: Standards Track T. Showalter
	Expires: March 5, 2013		Expires: March 17, 2013
	H. Tschofenig		H. Tschofenig
	Nokia Siemens Networks		Nokia Siemens Networks
	September 1, 2012		September 13, 2012
	A set of SASL and GSS-API Mechanisms for OAuth		A set of SASL and GSS-API Mechanisms for OAuth
	draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-06		draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-07
	Abstract		Abstract
	OAuth enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to a		OAuth enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to a
	protected resource, either on behalf of a resource owner by		protected resource, either on behalf of a resource owner by
	orchestrating an approval interaction, or by allowing the third-party		orchestrating an approval interaction, or by allowing the third-party
	application to obtain access on its own behalf.		application to obtain access on its own behalf.
	This document defines how an application client uses credentials		This document defines how an application client uses credentials
	obtained via OAuth over the Simple Authentication and Security Layer		obtained via OAuth over the Simple Authentication and Security Layer
	skipping to change at page 2, line 4 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 4 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on March 5, 2013.		This Internet-Draft will expire on March 17, 2013.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 3, line 20 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 20 ¶
	3.1. Initial Client Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		3.1. Initial Client Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	3.1.1. Reserved Key/Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		3.1.1. Reserved Key/Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	3.1.2. Use of the gs2-header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		3.1.2. Use of the gs2-header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	3.2. Server's Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		3.2. Server's Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	3.2.1. Mapping to SASL Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		3.2.1. Mapping to SASL Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	3.2.2. Canonicalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		3.2.2. Canonicalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	3.2.3. Server response to failed authentication. . . . . . . 11		3.2.3. Server response to failed authentication. . . . . . . 11
	3.2.4. Completing an error message sequence. . . . . . . . . 12		3.2.4. Completing an error message sequence. . . . . . . . . 12
	3.3. Use of Signature Type Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . 12		3.3. Use of Signature Type Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	3.4. Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		3.4. Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	4. GSS-API OAuth Mechanism Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		4. GSS-API OAuth Mechanism Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	5. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		5. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	5.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		5.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	5.2. OAuth 1.0a Authorization with Channel Binding . . . . . . 17		5.2. OAuth 1.0a Authorization with Channel Binding . . . . . . 18
	5.3. Failed Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		5.3. Failed Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	5.4. Failed Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		5.4. Failed Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
	5.5. SMTP Example of a failed negotiation. . . . . . . . . . . 19		5.5. SMTP Example of a failed negotiation. . . . . . . . . . . 20
	6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21		6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
	7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22		7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
	7.1. SASL Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22		7.1. SASL Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
	7.2. GSS-API Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23		7.2. GSS-API Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
	8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24		8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
	8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24		8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
	8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25		8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
	Appendix A. Acknowlegements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26		Appendix A. Acknowlegements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
	Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27		Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	OAuth [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] enables a third-party application to obtain		OAuth [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] enables a third-party application to obtain
	limited access to a protected resource, either on behalf of a		limited access to a protected resource, either on behalf of a
	resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction, or by		resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction, or by
	allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own		allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own
	behalf. The core OAuth specification [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] does not		behalf. The core OAuth specification [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] does not
	define the interaction between the client and the resource server		define the interaction between the client and the resource server
	with the access to a protected resource using an Access Token. This		with the access to a protected resource using an Access Token. This
	skipping to change at page 8, line 45 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 45 ¶
	server in order to allow the server to finish the exchange. Some		server in order to allow the server to finish the exchange. Some
	protocols and common SASL implementations do not support both sending		protocols and common SASL implementations do not support both sending
	a SASL message and finalizing a SASL negotiation, the additional		a SASL message and finalizing a SASL negotiation, the additional
	client message in the error case deals with this problem. This		client message in the error case deals with this problem. This
	exchange is:		exchange is:
	o Client sends an invalid initial client response.		o Client sends an invalid initial client response.
	o Server responds with an error message.		o Server responds with an error message.
	o Client sends an empty client reponse.		o Client sends a dummy client reponse.
	o Server fails the authentication.		o Server fails the authentication.
	3.1. Initial Client Response		3.1. Initial Client Response
	Client responses are a key/value pair sequence. The initial client		Client responses are a key/value pair sequence. The initial client
	response includes a gs2-header as defined in GS2 [RFC5801], which		response includes a gs2-header as defined in GS2 [RFC5801], which
	carries the authorization ID. These key/value pairs carry the		carries the authorization ID. These key/value pairs carry the
	equivalent values from an HTTP context in order to be able to		equivalent values from an HTTP context in order to be able to
	complete an OAuth style HTTP authorization. The client MUST send an		complete an OAuth style HTTP authorization. The ABNF [RFC5234]
	authorization ID in the gs2-header. The ABNF [RFC5234] syntax is:		syntax is:
	kvsep = %x01		kvsep = %x01
	key = 1*ALPHA		key = 1*ALPHA
	value = *(VCHAR | SP | HTAB | CR | LF )		value = *(VCHAR | SP | HTAB | CR | LF )
	kvpair = key "=" value kvsep		kvpair = key "=" value kvsep
	client_resp = 0*kvpair kvsep		client_resp = 0*kvpair kvsep
	;; gs2-header = As defined in GSS-API		;; gs2-header = As defined in GSS-API
	initial_client_resp = gs2-header kvsep client_resp		initial_client_resp = gs2-header kvsep client_resp
	The following key/value pairs are defined in the client response:		The following key/value pairs are defined in the client response:
	skipping to change at page 10, line 29 ¶		skipping to change at page 10, line 29 ¶
	post (RESERVED): HTTP post data, the default value is "".		post (RESERVED): HTTP post data, the default value is "".
	3.1.2. Use of the gs2-header		3.1.2. Use of the gs2-header
	The OAuth scheme related mechanisms are also GSS-API mechanisms, see		The OAuth scheme related mechanisms are also GSS-API mechanisms, see
	Section 4 for further detail. The gs2-header is used as follows:		Section 4 for further detail. The gs2-header is used as follows:
	o The "gs2-nonstd-flag" MUST NOT be present.		o The "gs2-nonstd-flag" MUST NOT be present.
	o The "gs2-authzid" carries the authorization identity as specified		o The "gs2-authzid" carries the authorization identity as specified
	in [RFC5801]. This MUST agree with the identity asserted in the		in [RFC5801]. If present the application MUST determine whether
	OAuth credential.		access is granted for the identity asserted in the OAuth
			credential, if it does not the server MUST fail the negotiation.
	In the non "-PLUS" mechanisms the "gs2-cb-flag" MUST be set to "n"		In the non "-PLUS" mechanisms the "gs2-cb-flag" MUST be set to "n"
	because channel-binding [RFC5056] data is not expected. In the		because channel-binding [RFC5056] data is not expected. In the
	OAUTH10A-PLUS mechanism (or other -PLUS variants based on this		OAUTH10A-PLUS mechanism (or other -PLUS variants based on this
	specification) the "gs2-cb-flag" MUST be set appropriately by the		specification) the "gs2-cb-flag" MUST be set appropriately by the
	client.		client.
	3.2. Server's Response		3.2. Server's Response
	The server validates the response per the specification for the		The server validates the response per the specification for the
	skipping to change at page 10, line 50 ¶		skipping to change at page 11, line 4 ¶
	The server validates the response per the specification for the		The server validates the response per the specification for the
	authorization scheme used. If the authorization scheme used includes		authorization scheme used. If the authorization scheme used includes
	signing of the request parameters the client must provide a client		signing of the request parameters the client must provide a client
	response that satisfies the data requirements for the scheme in use.		response that satisfies the data requirements for the scheme in use.
	In a "-PLUS" mechanism the server examines the channel binding data,		In a "-PLUS" mechanism the server examines the channel binding data,
	extracts the channel binding unique prefix, and extracts the raw		extracts the channel binding unique prefix, and extracts the raw
	channel biding data based on the channel binding type used. It then		channel biding data based on the channel binding type used. It then
	computes it's own copy of the channel binding payload and compares		computes it's own copy of the channel binding payload and compares
	that to the payload sent by the client in the cbdata key/value.		that to the payload sent by the client in the cbdata key/value.
	Those two must be equal for channel binding to succeed.		Those two must be equal for channel binding to succeed.
	The server responds to a successfully verified client message by		The server responds to a successfully verified client message by
	completing the SASL negotiation. The authorization scheme MUST carry		completing the SASL negotiation. The authenticated identity reported
	the user ID to be used as the authorization identity (identity to act		by the mechanism is the identity which the mechanism has securely
	as). The server MUST use the ID obtained from the credential as the		established for the client with the OAuth credential.
	user being authorized.
	3.2.1. Mapping to SASL Identities		3.2.1. Mapping to SASL Identities
	Some OAuth mechanisms can provide both an authorization identity and		Note that the semantics of the authz-id are specified by the SASL
	an authentication identity. An example of this is OAuth 1.0a		framework [RFC4422]. A SASL application is, of course, free to apply
	[RFC5849] where the consumer key (oauth_consumer_key) identifies the		mappings of the OAuth authcid to authz-ids as per-SASL, and it is
	entity using the token which equates to the SASL authentication		free to apply mappings common to non-SASL OAuth applications.
	identity, and is authenticated using the shared secret. The server
	MAY use a consumer key, a value derived from it, or other comparable		Some OAuth schemes can carry both a user identity and a "proxy"
	identity in the OAuth authorization scheme to allow SASL an		identity, for example an OAuth 1.0a [RFC5849] mechanism where the
	authentication identity different from the authorization identity to		consumer key (oauth_consumer_key) identifies the entity using the
	be set.		token and the token itself identifies the user. If both identities
			are needed by an application the developer will need to provide a way
			to communicate that from the SASL mechanism back to the application
			such as a GS2 [RFC2473] named type like GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME or a
			comparable newly defined GS2 attribute.
	3.2.2. Canonicalization		3.2.2. Canonicalization
	The identity asserted by the OAuth authorization server is canonical		The identity asserted by the OAuth authorization server is canonical
	for display. The server MAY provide a different canonical form based		for display. The server MAY provide a different canonical form based
	on local data.		on local data.
	3.2.3. Server response to failed authentication.		3.2.3. Server response to failed authentication.
	For a failed authentication the server returns a JSON [RFC4627]		For a failed authentication the server returns a JSON [RFC4627]
	skipping to change at page 17, line 29 ¶		skipping to change at page 18, line 29 ¶
	5.2. OAuth 1.0a Authorization with Channel Binding		5.2. OAuth 1.0a Authorization with Channel Binding
	This example shows channel binding in the context of an OAuth 1.0a		This example shows channel binding in the context of an OAuth 1.0a
	signed authorization request. Note that line breaks are inserted for		signed authorization request. Note that line breaks are inserted for
	readability.		readability.
	S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTH10A-PLUS SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server		S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTH10A-PLUS SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server
	Ready		Ready
	S: t0 OK Completed		S: t0 OK Completed
	C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTH10A-PLUS eSxhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BaG9zdD1zZ		C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTH10A-PLUS cCxhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BaG9zdD1zZ
	XJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BcG9ydD0xNDMBYXV0aD1PQXV0aCByZWFsbT0iRXhhb		XJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BcG9ydD0xNDMBYXV0aD1PQXV0aCByZWFsbT0iRXhhb
	XBsZSIsb2F1dGhfY29uc3VtZXJfa2V5PSI5ZGpkajgyaDQ4ZGpzOWQyIixvYXV0a		XBsZSIsb2F1dGhfY29uc3VtZXJfa2V5PSI5ZGpkajgyaDQ4ZGpzOWQyIixvYXV0a
	F90b2tlbj0ia2trOWQ3ZGgzazM5c2p2NyIsb2F1dGhfc2lnbmF0dXJlX21ldGhvZ		F90b2tlbj0ia2trOWQ3ZGgzazM5c2p2NyIsb2F1dGhfc2lnbmF0dXJlX21ldGhvZ
	D0iSE1BQy1TSEExIixvYXV0aF90aW1lc3RhbXA9IjEzNzEzMTIwMSIsb2F1dGhfb		D0iSE1BQy1TSEExIixvYXV0aF90aW1lc3RhbXA9IjEzNzEzMTIwMSIsb2F1dGhfb
	m9uY2U9IjdkOGYzZTRhIixvYXV0aF9zaWduYXR1cmU9IlNTZHRJR0VnYkdsMGRHe		m9uY2U9IjdkOGYzZTRhIixvYXV0aF9zaWduYXR1cmU9IlNTZHRJR0VnYkdsMGRHe
	GxJSFJsWVNCd2IzUXUiAXFzPWNiZGF0YT10bHMtdW5pcXVlOlNHOTNJR0pwWnlCc		GxJSFJsWVNCd2IzUXUiAXFzPWNiZGF0YT10bHMtdW5pcXVlOlNHOTNJR0pwWnlCc
	GN5QmhJRlJNVXlCbWFXNWhiQ0J0WlhOellXZGxQd289AQE=		GN5QmhJRlJNVXlCbWFXNWhiQ0J0WlhOellXZGxQd289AQE=
	S: t1 OK SASL authentication succeeded		S: t1 OK SASL authentication succeeded
	As required by IMAP [RFC3501], the payloads are base64-encoded. The		As required by IMAP [RFC3501], the payloads are base64-encoded. The
	decoded initial client response (with %x01 represented as ^A and		decoded initial client response (with %x01 represented as ^A and
	lines wrapped for readability) is:		lines wrapped for readability) is:
	y,a=user@example.com^A		p,a=user@example.com^A
	host=server.example.com^A		host=server.example.com^A
	port=143^A		port=143^A
	auth=OAuth realm="Example",		auth=OAuth realm="Example",
	oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2",		oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2",
	oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7",		oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7",
	oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",		oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",
	oauth_timestamp="137131201",		oauth_timestamp="137131201",
	oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a",		oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a",
	oauth_signature="SSdtIGEgbGl0dGxlIHRlYSBwb3Qu"^A		oauth_signature="SSdtIGEgbGl0dGxlIHRlYSBwb3Qu"^A
	qs=cbdata=tls-unique:SG93IGJpZyBpcyBhIFRMUyBmaW5hbCBtZXNzYWdlPwo=^A^A		qs=cbdata=tls-unique:SG93IGJpZyBpcyBhIFRMUyBmaW5hbCBtZXNzYWdlPwo=^A^A
	skipping to change at page 19, line 10 ¶		skipping to change at page 20, line 10 ¶
	n,a=user@example.com,^Ahost=server.example.com^A		n,a=user@example.com,^Ahost=server.example.com^A
	port=143^Aauth=^A^A		port=143^Aauth=^A^A
	The decoded server error response is:		The decoded server error response is:
	{		{
	"status":"401",		"status":"401",
	"scope":"example_scope"		"scope":"example_scope"
	}		}
	The client responds with the required empty response.		The client responds with the required dummy response.
	5.4. Failed Channel Binding		5.4. Failed Channel Binding
	This example shows a channel binding failure in an empty request.		This example shows a channel binding failure in an empty request.
	The channel binding information is empty. Note that line breaks are		The channel binding information is empty. Note that line breaks are
	inserted for readability.		inserted for readability.
	S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTH10A-PLUS SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server		S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTH10A-PLUS SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server
	Ready		Ready
	S: t0 OK Completed		S: t0 OK Completed
	C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTH10A-PLUS eSxhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BaG9z		C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTH10A-PLUS cCxhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BaG9z
	dD1zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BcG9ydD0xNDMBYXV0aD0BY2JkYXRhPQEB		dD1zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BcG9ydD0xNDMBYXV0aD0BY2JkYXRhPQEB
	S: + ewoic3RhdHVzIjoiNDEyIiwKInNjb3BlIjoiZXhhbXBsZV9zY29wZSIKfQ==		S: + ewoic3RhdHVzIjoiNDEyIiwKInNjb3BlIjoiZXhhbXBsZV9zY29wZSIKfQ==
	C: + AQ==		C: + AQ==
	S: t1 NO SASL authentication failed		S: t1 NO SASL authentication failed
	The decoded initial client response is:		The decoded initial client response is:
	y,a=user@example.com,^Ahost=server.example.com^A		p,a=user@example.com,^Ahost=server.example.com^A
	port=143^Aauth=^Acbdata=^A^A		port=143^Aauth=^Acbdata=^A^A
	The decoded server response is:		The decoded server response is:
	{		{
	"status":"412",		"status":"412",
	"scope":"example_scope"		"scope":"example_scope"
	}		}
	The client responds with the required empty response.		The client responds with the required dummy response.
	5.5. SMTP Example of a failed negotiation.		5.5. SMTP Example of a failed negotiation.
	This example shows an authorization failure in an SMTP exchange.		This example shows an authorization failure in an SMTP exchange.
	Note that line breaks are inserted for readability, and that the SMTP		Note that line breaks are inserted for readability, and that the SMTP
	protocol terminates lines with CR and LF characters (ASCII values		protocol terminates lines with CR and LF characters (ASCII values
	0x0D and 0x0A), these are not displayed explicitly in the example.		0x0D and 0x0A), these are not displayed explicitly in the example.
	[connection begins]		[connection begins]
	S: 220 mx.example.com ESMTP 12sm2095603fks.9		S: 220 mx.example.com ESMTP 12sm2095603fks.9
	skipping to change at page 20, line 24 ¶		skipping to change at page 21, line 24 ¶
	C: AUTH OAUTHBEARER bixhPT1zb21ldXNlckBleGFtcGxlLmNvbQFhdXRoPUJlYXJlciB2		C: AUTH OAUTHBEARER bixhPT1zb21ldXNlckBleGFtcGxlLmNvbQFhdXRoPUJlYXJlciB2
	RjlkZnQ0cW1UYzJOdmIzUmxja0JoZEhSaGRtbHpkR0V1WTI5dENnPT0BAQ==		RjlkZnQ0cW1UYzJOdmIzUmxja0JoZEhSaGRtbHpkR0V1WTI5dENnPT0BAQ==
	S: 334 eyJzdGF0dXMiOiI0MDEiLCJzY2hlbWVzIjoiYmVhcmVyIG1hYyIsInNjb3BlIjoia		S: 334 eyJzdGF0dXMiOiI0MDEiLCJzY2hlbWVzIjoiYmVhcmVyIG1hYyIsInNjb3BlIjoia
	HR0cHM6Ly9tYWlsLmdvb2dsZS5jb20vIn0K		HR0cHM6Ly9tYWlsLmdvb2dsZS5jb20vIn0K
	C: AQ==		C: AQ==
	S: 535-5.7.1 Username and Password not accepted. Learn more at		S: 535-5.7.1 Username and Password not accepted. Learn more at
	S: 535 5.7.1 http://support.example.com/mail/oauth		S: 535 5.7.1 http://support.example.com/mail/oauth
	[connection continues...]		[connection continues...]
	The server returned an error message in the 334 SASL message, the		The server returned an error message in the 334 SASL message, the
	client responds with the required empty response, and the server		client responds with the required dummy response, and the server
	finalizes the negotiation.		finalizes the negotiation.
	6. Security Considerations		6. Security Considerations
	This mechanism does not provide a security layer, but does provide a		This mechanism does not provide a security layer, but does provide a
	provision for channel binding. The OAuth 2 specification		provision for channel binding. The OAuth 2 specification
	[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] allows for a variety of usages, and the security		[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] allows for a variety of usages, and the security
	properties of these profiles vary. The usage of bearer tokens, for		properties of these profiles vary. The usage of bearer tokens, for
	example, provide security features similar to cookies. Applications		example, provide security features similar to cookies. Applications
	using this mechanism SHOULD exercise the same level of care using		using this mechanism SHOULD exercise the same level of care using
	skipping to change at page 24, line 22 ¶		skipping to change at page 25, line 22 ¶
	[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-bearer]		[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-bearer]
	Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization		Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
	Framework: Bearer Token Usage",		Framework: Bearer Token Usage",
	draft-ietf-oauth-v2-bearer-23 (work in progress),		draft-ietf-oauth-v2-bearer-23 (work in progress),
	August 2012.		August 2012.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
			[RFC2473] Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Generic Packet Tunneling in
			IPv6 Specification", RFC 2473, December 1998.
	[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,		[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
	Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext		Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
	Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.		Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
	[RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,		[RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
	Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP		Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
	Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",		Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
	RFC 2617, June 1999.		RFC 2617, June 1999.
	[RFC2743] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program		[RFC2743] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
	skipping to change at page 27, line 9 ¶		skipping to change at page 28, line 9 ¶
	Appendix A. Acknowlegements		Appendix A. Acknowlegements
	The authors would like to thank the members of the Kitten working		The authors would like to thank the members of the Kitten working
	group, and in addition and specifically: Simon Josefson, Torsten		group, and in addition and specifically: Simon Josefson, Torsten
	Lodderstadt, Ryan Troll, and Nico Williams.		Lodderstadt, Ryan Troll, and Nico Williams.
	Appendix B. Document History		Appendix B. Document History
	[[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]		[[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
			-07
			o Struck the MUST langiage from authzid.
			o
	-06		-06
	o Removed the user field. Fixed the examples again.		o Removed the user field. Fixed the examples again.
	o Added canonicalization language.		o Added canonicalization language.
	o		o
	-05		-05
End of changes. 20 change blocks.
	46 lines changed or deleted		60 lines changed or added
This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.48. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/