< draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-13.txt		draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-14.txt >
	KITTEN W. Mills		KITTEN W. Mills
	Internet-Draft Yahoo! Inc.		Internet-Draft Yahoo! Inc.
	Intended status: Standards Track T. Showalter		Intended status: Standards Track T. Showalter
	Expires: August 18, 2014		Expires: September 7, 2014
	H. Tschofenig		H. Tschofenig
	ARM Ltd.		ARM Ltd.
	February 14, 2014		March 6, 2014
	A set of SASL Mechanisms for OAuth		A set of SASL Mechanisms for OAuth
	draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-13.txt		draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-14.txt
	Abstract		Abstract
	OAuth enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to a		OAuth enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to a
	protected resource, either on behalf of a resource owner by		protected resource, either on behalf of a resource owner by
	orchestrating an approval interaction, or by allowing the third-party		orchestrating an approval interaction, or by allowing the third-party
	application to obtain access on its own behalf.		application to obtain access on its own behalf.
	This document defines how an application client uses credentials		This document defines how an application client uses credentials
	obtained via OAuth over the Simple Authentication and Security Layer		obtained via OAuth over the Simple Authentication and Security Layer
	skipping to change at page 2, line 4 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 4 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on August 18, 2014.		This Internet-Draft will expire on September 7, 2014.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 2, line 27 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 27 ¶
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3. OAuth SASL Mechanism Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3. OAuth SASL Mechanism Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	3.1. Initial Client Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		3.1. Initial Client Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	3.1.1. Reserved Key/Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		3.1.1. Reserved Key/Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3.2. Server's Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		3.2. Server's Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3.2.1. OAuth Identifiers in the SASL Context . . . . . . . . 8		3.2.1. OAuth Identifiers in the SASL Context . . . . . . . . 8
	3.2.2. Server Response to Failed Authentication . . . . . . 8		3.2.2. Server Response to Failed Authentication . . . . . . 9
	3.2.3. Completing an Error Message Sequence . . . . . . . . 9		3.2.3. Completing an Error Message Sequence . . . . . . . . 9
	3.3. OAuth Access Token Types using Keyed Message Digests . . 9		3.3. OAuth Access Token Types using Keyed Message Digests . . 9
	4. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		4. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	4.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		4.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	4.2. Failed Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		4.2. Failed Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	4.3. SMTP Example of a Failed Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . 12		4.3. SMTP Example of a Failed Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . 12
	5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	6. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		6. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	7.1. SASL Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		7.1. SASL Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	Appendix A. Acknowlegements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		Appendix A. Acknowlegements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	OAuth 1.0a [RFC5849] and OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] are protocol frameworks		OAuth 1.0a [RFC5849] and OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] are protocol frameworks
	that enable a third-party application to obtain limited access to a		that enable a third-party application to obtain limited access to a
	protected resource, either on behalf of a resource owner by		protected resource, either on behalf of a resource owner by
	orchestrating an approval interaction, or by allowing the third-party		orchestrating an approval interaction, or by allowing the third-party
	application to obtain access on its own behalf.		application to obtain access on its own behalf.
	skipping to change at page 3, line 25 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 25 ¶
	define the interaction between the OAuth client and the resource		define the interaction between the OAuth client and the resource
	server for the access to a protected resource using an Access Token.		server for the access to a protected resource using an Access Token.
	Instead, the OAuth client to resource server interaction is described		Instead, the OAuth client to resource server interaction is described
	in separate specifications, such as the bearer token specification		in separate specifications, such as the bearer token specification
	[RFC6750] and the MAC Token specification		[RFC6750] and the MAC Token specification
	[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac]. OAuth 1.0a included the protocol		[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac]. OAuth 1.0a included the protocol
	specification for the communication between the OAuth client and the		specification for the communication between the OAuth client and the
	resource server in [RFC5849].		resource server in [RFC5849].
	The main use cases for OAuth 2.0 and OAuth 1.0a have so far focused		The main use cases for OAuth 2.0 and OAuth 1.0a have so far focused
	on an HTTP-based environment only. This document integrates OAuth		on an HTTP-based [RFC2616] environment only. This document
	1.0a and OAuth 2.0 into non-HTTP-based applications using the		integrates OAuth 1.0a and OAuth 2.0 into non-HTTP-based applications
	integration into SASL. Hence, this document takes advantage of the		using the integration into SASL. Hence, this document takes
	OAuth protocol and its deployment base to provide a way to use the		advantage of the OAuth protocol and its deployment base to provide a
	Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) [RFC4422] to gain		way to use the Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)
	access to resources when using non-HTTP-based protocols, such as the		[RFC4422] to gain access to resources when using non-HTTP-based
	Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) [RFC3501] and SMTP [RFC5321],		protocols, such as the Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP)
			[RFC3501] and the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) [RFC5321],
	which is what this memo uses in the examples.		which is what this memo uses in the examples.
	To illustrate the impact of integrating this specification into an		To illustrate the impact of integrating this specification into an
	OAuth-enabled application environment Figure 1 shows the abstract		OAuth-enabled application environment Figure 1 shows the abstract
	message flow of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. As indicated in the figure,		message flow of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. As indicated in the figure,
	this document impacts the exchange of messages (E) and (F) since SASL		this document impacts the exchange of messages (E) and (F) since SASL
	is used for interaction between the client and the resource server		is used for interaction between the client and the resource server
	instead of HTTP.		instead of HTTP.
	----+		----+
	skipping to change at page 5, line 46 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 46 ¶
	and does not separate the resource server from the authorization		and does not separate the resource server from the authorization
	server.		server.
	2. Terminology		2. Terminology
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
	document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].		document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
	The reader is assumed to be familiar with the terms used in the OAuth		The reader is assumed to be familiar with the terms used in the OAuth
	2.0 specification [RFC6749].		2.0 specification [RFC6749] and SASL [RFC4422].
	In examples, "C:" and "S:" indicate lines sent by the client and		In examples, "C:" and "S:" indicate lines sent by the client and
	server respectively. Line breaks have been inserted for readability.		server respectively. Line breaks have been inserted for readability.
	Note that the IMAP SASL specification requires base64 encoding, see		Note that the IMAP SASL specification requires base64 encoding, see
	Section 4 of [RFC4648], not this memo.		Section 4 of [RFC4648], not this memo.
	3. OAuth SASL Mechanism Specifications		3. OAuth SASL Mechanism Specifications
	SASL is used as an authentication framework in a variety of		SASL is used as an authentication framework in a variety of
	skipping to change at page 6, line 31 ¶		skipping to change at page 6, line 31 ¶
	New extensions may be defined to add additional OAuth Access Token		New extensions may be defined to add additional OAuth Access Token
	Types. Such a new SASL OAuth mechanism can be added by simply		Types. Such a new SASL OAuth mechanism can be added by simply
	registering the new name(s) and citing this specification for the		registering the new name(s) and citing this specification for the
	further definition.		further definition.
	These mechanisms are client initiated and lock-step, the server		These mechanisms are client initiated and lock-step, the server
	always replying to a client message. In the case where the client		always replying to a client message. In the case where the client
	has and correctly uses a valid token the flow is:		has and correctly uses a valid token the flow is:
	o Client sends a valid and correct initial client response.		1. Client sends a valid and correct initial client response.
	o Server responds with a successful authentication.		2. Server responds with a successful authentication.
	In the case where authorization fails the server sends an error		In the case where authorization fails the server sends an error
	result, then client MUST then send an additional message to the		result, then client MUST then send an additional message to the
	server in order to allow the server to finish the exchange. Some		server in order to allow the server to finish the exchange. Some
	protocols and common SASL implementations do not support both sending		protocols and common SASL implementations do not support both sending
	a SASL message and finalizing a SASL negotiation, the additional		a SASL message and finalizing a SASL negotiation, the additional
	client message in the error case deals with this problem. This		client message in the error case deals with this problem. This
	exchange is:		exchange is:
	o Client sends an invalid initial client response.		1. Client sends an invalid initial client response.
	o Server responds with an error message.		2. Server responds with an error message.
	o Client sends a dummy client response.		3. Client sends a dummy client response.
	o Server fails the authentication.		4. Server fails the authentication.
	3.1. Initial Client Response		3.1. Initial Client Response
	Client responses are a key/value pair sequence. These key/value		Client responses are a key/value pair sequence. The initial client
	pairs carry the equivalent values from an HTTP context in order to be		response includes a gs2-header as defined in GS2 [RFC5801] which is
	able to complete an OAuth style HTTP authorization. Unknown key/		defined here as a stub for compatibility with GS2 if a GS2 mechanism
	value pairs MUST be ignored by the server. The ABNF [RFC5234] syntax		is formally defined, but this document does not define one. These
	is:		key/value pairs carry the equivalent values from an HTTP context in
			order to be able to complete an OAuth style HTTP authorization.
			Unknown key/value pairs MUST be ignored by the server. The ABNF
			[RFC5234] syntax is:
	kvsep = %x01		kvsep = %x01
	key = 1*ALPHA		key = 1*(ALPHA / ",")
	value = *(VCHAR / SP / HTAB / CR / LF )		value = *(VCHAR / SP / HTAB / CR / LF )
	kvpair = key "=" value kvsep		kvpair = key "=" value kvsep
	client_resp = 0*kvpair kvsep		gs2-header = ALPHA "," value
			client_resp = gs2-header kvsep 0*kvpair kvsep
			The GS2
	The following key/value pairs are defined in the client response:		The following key/value pairs are defined in the client response:
	auth (REQUIRED): The payload of the HTTP Authorization header for		auth (REQUIRED): The payload of the HTTP Authorization header for
	an equivalent HTTP OAuth authorization.		an equivalent HTTP OAuth authorization.
			user (REQUIRED): Contains the user name being authenticated. The
			server MAY use this as a routing or database lookup hint. The
			server MUST NOT use this as authoritative, the user name MUST
			be asserted by the OAuth credential.
	host: Contains the host name to which the client connected.		host: Contains the host name to which the client connected.
	port: Contains the port number represented as a decimal positive		port: Contains the port number represented as a decimal positive
	integer string without leading zeros to which the client		integer string without leading zeros to which the client
	connected.		connected.
	qs: The HTTP query string. This is reserved for future use, the		qs: The HTTP query string. This is reserved for future use, the
	client SHOUD NOT send it, and has the default value of "".		client SHOUD NOT send it, and has the default value of "".
	For OAuth token types that use keyed message digests the client MUST		For OAuth token types that use keyed message digests the client MUST
	skipping to change at page 8, line 48 ¶		skipping to change at page 9, line 12 ¶
	need to provide a way to communicate that from the SASL mechanism		need to provide a way to communicate that from the SASL mechanism
	back to the application.		back to the application.
	3.2.2. Server Response to Failed Authentication		3.2.2. Server Response to Failed Authentication
	For a failed authentication the server returns a JSON [RFC4627]		For a failed authentication the server returns a JSON [RFC4627]
	formatted error result, and fails the authentication. The error		formatted error result, and fails the authentication. The error
	result consists of the following values:		result consists of the following values:
	status (REQUIRED): The authorization error code. Valid error		status (REQUIRED): The authorization error code. Valid error
	codes are defined in the IANA [[need registry name]] registry		codes are defined in the IANA "OAuth Extensions Error Registry"
	specified in the OAuth 2 core specification.		specified in the OAuth 2 core specification.
	scope (OPTIONAL): An OAuth scope which is valid to access the		scope (OPTIONAL): An OAuth scope which is valid to access the
	service. This may be empty which implies that unscoped tokens		service. This may be empty which implies that unscoped tokens
	are required, or a space separated list. Use of a space		are required, or a scope value. If a scope is specified then a
	separated list is NOT RECOMMENDED.		single scope is preferred, use of a space separated list of
			scopes is NOT RECOMMENDED.
	If the resource server provides a scope then the client MUST always		If the resource server provides a scope then the client MUST always
	request scoped tokens from the token endpoint. If the resource		request scoped tokens from the token endpoint. If the resource
	server provides no scope to the client then the client SHOULD presume		server provides no scope to the client then the client SHOULD presume
	an empty scope (unscoped token) is needed.		an empty scope (unscoped token) is needed.
	If channel binding is in use and the channel binding fails the server
	responds with a status code set to 412 to indicate that the channel
	binding precondition failed. If the authentication scheme in use
	does not include signing the server SHOULD revoke the presented
	credential and the client SHOULD discard that credential.
	3.2.3. Completing an Error Message Sequence		3.2.3. Completing an Error Message Sequence
	Section 3.6 of [RFC4422] explicitly prohibits additional information		Section 3.6 of [RFC4422] explicitly prohibits additional information
	in an unsuccessful authentication outcome. Therefore, the error		in an unsuccessful authentication outcome. Therefore, the error
	message is sent in a normal message. The client MUST then send an		message is sent in a normal message. The client MUST then send an
	additional client response consisting of a single %x01 (control A)		additional client response consisting of a single %x01 (control A)
	character to the server in order to allow the server to finish the		character to the server in order to allow the server to finish the
	exchange.		exchange.
	3.3. OAuth Access Token Types using Keyed Message Digests		3.3. OAuth Access Token Types using Keyed Message Digests
	skipping to change at page 10, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 10, line 10 ¶
	These atoms are defined as extension points so that no changes are		These atoms are defined as extension points so that no changes are
	needed if there is a revision of SASL which supports more specific		needed if there is a revision of SASL which supports more specific
	resource authorization, e.g., IMAP access to a specific folder or FTP		resource authorization, e.g., IMAP access to a specific folder or FTP
	access limited to a specific directory.		access limited to a specific directory.
	Using the example in the OAuth 1.0a specification as a starting		Using the example in the OAuth 1.0a specification as a starting
	point, on an IMAP server running on port 143 and given the OAuth 1.0a		point, on an IMAP server running on port 143 and given the OAuth 1.0a
	style authorization request (with %x01 shown as ^A and line breaks		style authorization request (with %x01 shown as ^A and line breaks
	added for readability) below:		added for readability) below:
	n,a=user@example.com^A		n,^A
	host=example.com^A		host=example.com^A
	user=user@example.com^A		user=user@example.com^A
	port=143^A		port=143^A
	auth=OAuth realm="Example",		auth=OAuth realm="Example",
	oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2",		oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2",
	oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7",		oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7",
	oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",		oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",
	oauth_timestamp="137131201",		oauth_timestamp="137131201",
	oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a",		oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a",
	oauth_signature="Tm90IGEgcmVhbCBzaWduYXR1cmU%3D"^A^A		oauth_signature="Tm90IGEgcmVhbCBzaWduYXR1cmU%3D"^A^A
	skipping to change at page 11, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 11, line 11 ¶
	Note to implementers: The SASL OAuth method names are case		Note to implementers: The SASL OAuth method names are case
	insensitive. One example uses "Bearer" but that could as easily be		insensitive. One example uses "Bearer" but that could as easily be
	"bearer", "BEARER", or "BeArEr".		"bearer", "BEARER", or "BeArEr".
	4.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange		4.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange
	This example shows a successful OAuth 2.0 bearer token exchange.		This example shows a successful OAuth 2.0 bearer token exchange.
	Note that line breaks are inserted for readability and the underlying		Note that line breaks are inserted for readability and the underlying
	TLS establishment is not shown either.		TLS establishment is not shown either.
	S: * OK IMAP4rev1 Server Ready		S: * OK IMAP4rev1 Server Ready
	C: t0 CAPABILITY		C: t0 CAPABILITY
	S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTHBEARER SASL-IR		S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTHBEARER SASL-IR
	S: t0 OK Completed		S: t0 OK Completed
	C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BaG9zdD1zZX		C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER biwBdXNlcj11c2VyQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tAWhvc3Q9c2Vyd
	J2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BcG9ydD0xNDMBYXV0aD1CZWFyZXIgdkY5ZGZ0NHFtV		mVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9QmVhcmVyIHZGOWRmdDRxbVRjMk52YjN
	GMyTnZiM1JsY2tCaGJIUmhkbWx6ZEdFdVkyOXRDZz09AQE=		SbGNrQmhiSFJoZG1semRHRXVZMjl0Q2c9PQEB
	S: t1 OK SASL authentication succeeded		S: t1 OK SASL authentication succeeded
	As required by IMAP [RFC3501], the payloads are base64-encoded. The		As required by IMAP [RFC3501], the payloads are base64-encoded. The
	decoded initial client response (with %x01 represented as ^A and long		decoded initial client response (with %x01 represented as ^A and long
	lines wrapped for readability) is:		lines wrapped for readability) is:
	n,a=user@example.com^Ahost=server.example.com^Aport=143^A		n,^Auser=user@example.com^Ahost=server.example.com^Aport=143^A
	auth=Bearer vF9dft4qmTc2Nvb3RlckBhbHRhdmlzdGEuY29tCg==^A^A		auth=Bearer vF9dft4qmTc2Nvb3RlckBhbHRhdmlzdGEuY29tCg==^A^A
	The same credential used in an SMTP exchange is shown below. Note		The same credential used in an SMTP exchange is shown below. Note
	that line breaks are inserted for readability, and that the SMTP		that line breaks are inserted for readability, and that the SMTP
	protocol terminates lines with CR and LF characters (ASCII values		protocol terminates lines with CR and LF characters (ASCII values
	0x0D and 0x0A), these are not displayed explicitly in the example.		0x0D and 0x0A), these are not displayed explicitly in the example.
	[connection begins]		[connection begins]
	S: 220 mx.example.com ESMTP 12sm2095603fks.9		S: 220 mx.example.com ESMTP 12sm2095603fks.9
	C: EHLO sender.example.com		C: EHLO sender.example.com
	S: 250-mx.example.com at your service,[172.31.135.47]		S: 250-mx.example.com at your service,[172.31.135.47]
	S: 250-SIZE 35651584		S: 250-SIZE 35651584
	S: 250-8BITMIME		S: 250-8BITMIME
	S: 250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN OAUTHBEARER		S: 250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN OAUTHBEARER
	S: 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES		S: 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES
	S: 250 PIPELINING		S: 250 PIPELINING
	C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BaG9zdD1zZX		C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER biwBdXNlcj11c2VyQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tAWhvc
	J2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BcG9ydD0xNDMBYXV0aD1CZWFyZXIgdkY5ZGZ0NHFtV		3Q9c2VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9QmVhcmVyIHZGOWR
	GMyTnZiM1JsY2tCaGJIUmhkbWx6ZEdFdVkyOXRDZz09AQE=		mdDRxbVRjMk52YjNSbGNrQmhiSFJoZG1semRHRXVZMjl0Q2c9PQEB
	S: 235 Authentication successful.		S: 235 Authentication successful.
	[connection continues...]		[connection continues...]
	4.2. Failed Exchange		4.2. Failed Exchange
	This example shows a failed exchange because of the empty		This example shows a failed exchange because of the empty
	Authorization header, which is how a client can query for the needed		Authorization header, which is how a client can query for the needed
	scope. Note that line breaks are inserted for readability.		scope. Note that line breaks are inserted for readability.
	S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTHBEARER SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server		S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTHBEARER SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server
	Ready		Ready
	S: t0 OK Completed		S: t0 OK Completed
	C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER cD10bHMtdW5pcXVlLGE9dXNlckBleGFtcG		C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER biwBdXNlcj11c2VyQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tAWhvc3Q9c2Vyd
	xlLmNvbQFob3N0PXNlcnZlci5leGFtcGxlLmNvbQFwb3J0PTE0MwFhdXRoP		mVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9AWNiZGF0YT0BAQ==
	QFjYmRhdGE9AQE=		S: + ewoic3RhdHVzIjoiNDAxIgoic2NvcGUiOiJleGFtcGxlX3Njb3BlIgp9
	S: + ewoic3RhdHVzIjoiNDAxIgoic2NvcGUiOiJleGFtcGxlX3Njb3BlIgp9		C: + AQ==
	C: + AQ==		S: t1 NO SASL authentication failed
	S: t1 NO SASL authentication failed
	The decoded initial client response is:		The decoded initial client response is:
	n,a=user@example.com,^Ahost=server.example.com^A		n,^Auser=user@example.com^Ahost=server.example.com^A
	port=143^Aauth=^A^A		port=143^Aauth=^A^A
	The decoded server error response is:		The decoded server error response is:
	{		{
	"status":"401",		"status":"401",
	"scope":"example_scope"		"scope":"example_scope"
	}		}
	The client responds with the required dummy response.		The client responds with the required dummy response.
	skipping to change at page 12, line 45 ¶		skipping to change at page 12, line 44 ¶
	[connection begins]		[connection begins]
	S: 220 mx.example.com ESMTP 12sm2095603fks.9		S: 220 mx.example.com ESMTP 12sm2095603fks.9
	C: EHLO sender.example.com		C: EHLO sender.example.com
	S: 250-mx.example.com at your service,[172.31.135.47]		S: 250-mx.example.com at your service,[172.31.135.47]
	S: 250-SIZE 35651584		S: 250-SIZE 35651584
	S: 250-8BITMIME		S: 250-8BITMIME
	S: 250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN OAUTHBEARER		S: 250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN OAUTHBEARER
	S: 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES		S: 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES
	S: 250 PIPELINING		S: 250 PIPELINING
	C: AUTH OAUTHBEARER bixhPT1zb21ldXNlckBleGFtcGxlLmNvbQFhdXRoPUJlYXJlciB2		C: AUTH OAUTHBEARER biwBdXNlcj1zb21ldXNlckBleGFtcGxlLmNvbQFhdXRoPUJlYXJl
	RjlkZnQ0cW1UYzJOdmIzUmxja0JoZEhSaGRtbHpkR0V1WTI5dENnPT0BAQ==		ciB2RjlkZnQ0cW1UYzJOdmIzUmxja0JoZEhSaGRtbHpkR0V1WTI5dENnPT0BAQ==
	S: 334 eyJzdGF0dXMiOiI0MDEiLCJzY2hlbWVzIjoiYmVhcmVyIG1hYyIsInNjb3BlIjoia		S: 334 eyJzdGF0dXMiOiI0MDEiLCJzY2hlbWVzIjoiYmVhcmVyIG1hYyIsInNjb3BlIjoia
	HR0cHM6Ly9tYWlsLmdvb2dsZS5jb20vIn0K		HR0cHM6Ly9tYWlsLmdvb2dsZS5jb20vIn0K
	C: AQ==		C: AQ==
	S: 535-5.7.1 Username and Password not accepted. Learn more at		S: 535-5.7.1 Username and Password not accepted. Learn more at
	S: 535 5.7.1 http://support.example.com/mail/oauth		S: 535 5.7.1 http://support.example.com/mail/oauth
	[connection continues...]		[connection continues...]
	The server returned an error message in the 334 SASL message, the		The server returned an error message in the 334 SASL message, the
	client responds with the required dummy response, and the server		client responds with the required dummy response, and the server
	finalizes the negotiation.		finalizes the negotiation.
	skipping to change at page 13, line 21 ¶		skipping to change at page 13, line 21 ¶
	and the security properties of these profiles vary. As shown in		and the security properties of these profiles vary. As shown in
	Figure 1 this specification is aimed to be integrated into a larger		Figure 1 this specification is aimed to be integrated into a larger
	OAuth deployment. Application developers therefore need to		OAuth deployment. Application developers therefore need to
	understand the needs of their security requirements based on a threat		understand the needs of their security requirements based on a threat
	assessment before selecting a specific SASL OAuth mechanism. For		assessment before selecting a specific SASL OAuth mechanism. For
	OAuth 2.0 a detailed security document [RFC6819] provides guidance to		OAuth 2.0 a detailed security document [RFC6819] provides guidance to
	select those OAuth 2.0 components that help to mitigate threats for a		select those OAuth 2.0 components that help to mitigate threats for a
	given deployment. For OAuth 1.0a Section 4 of RFC 5849 [RFC5849]		given deployment. For OAuth 1.0a Section 4 of RFC 5849 [RFC5849]
	provides guidance specific to OAuth 1.0.		provides guidance specific to OAuth 1.0.
	This document specifies three SASL Mechanisms for OAuth and each		This document specifies two SASL Mechanisms for OAuth and each comes
	comes with different security properties.		with different security properties.
	OAUTHBEARER: This mechanism borrows from OAuth 2.0 bearer tokens		OAUTHBEARER: This mechanism borrows from OAuth 2.0 bearer tokens
	[RFC6750]. It relies on the application using TLS to protect the		[RFC6750]. It relies on the application using TLS to protect the
	OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token exchange; without TLS usage at the		OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token exchange; without TLS usage at the
	application layer this method is completely insecure.		application layer this method is completely insecure.
	Consequently, TLS MUST be provided by the application when		Consequently, TLS MUST be provided by the application when
	choosing this authentication mechanism.		choosing this authentication mechanism.
	OAUTH10A: This mechanism re-uses OAuth 1.0a MAC tokens (using the		OAUTH10A: This mechanism re-uses OAuth 1.0a MAC tokens (using the
	HMAC-SHA1 keyed message digest), as described in Section 3.4.2 of		HMAC-SHA1 keyed message digest), as described in Section 3.4.2 of
	skipping to change at page 13, line 46 ¶		skipping to change at page 13, line 46 ¶
	supports client authentication. If server-side authentication is		supports client authentication. If server-side authentication is
	desireable then it must be provided by the application underneath		desireable then it must be provided by the application underneath
	the SASL layer. The use of TLS is strongly RECOMMENDED.		the SASL layer. The use of TLS is strongly RECOMMENDED.
	Additionally, the following aspects are worth pointing out:		Additionally, the following aspects are worth pointing out:
	An access token is not equivalent to the user's long term password.		An access token is not equivalent to the user's long term password.
	Care has to be taken when these OAuth credentials are used for		Care has to be taken when these OAuth credentials are used for
	actions like changing passwords (as it is possible with some		actions like changing passwords (as it is possible with some
	protocols, e.g., XMPP). The resource server should ensure that		protocols, e.g., XMPP [RFC6120]). The resource server should
	actions taken in the authenticated channel are appropriate to the		ensure that actions taken in the authenticated channel are
	strength of the presented credential.		appropriate to the strength of the presented credential.
	Lifetime of the appliation sessions.		Lifetime of the appliation sessions.
	It is possible that SASL will be authenticating a connection and		It is possible that SASL will be authenticating a connection and
	the life of that connection may outlast the life of the access		the life of that connection may outlast the life of the access
	token used to establish it. This is a common problem in		token used to establish it. This is a common problem in
	application protocols where connections are long-lived, and not a		application protocols where connections are long-lived, and not a
	problem with this mechanism per se. Resource servers may		problem with this mechanism per se. Resource servers may
	unilaterally disconnect clients in accordance with the application		unilaterally disconnect clients in accordance with the application
	protocol.		protocol.
	skipping to change at page 15, line 43 ¶		skipping to change at page 15, line 43 ¶
	[RFC4422] Melnikov, A. and K. Zeilenga, "Simple Authentication and		[RFC4422] Melnikov, A. and K. Zeilenga, "Simple Authentication and
	Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422, June 2006.		Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422, June 2006.
	[RFC4627] Crockford, D., "The application/json Media Type for		[RFC4627] Crockford, D., "The application/json Media Type for
	JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)", RFC 4627, July 2006.		JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)", RFC 4627, July 2006.
	[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data		[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
	Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.		Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.
	[RFC5056] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure
	Channels", RFC 5056, November 2007.
	[RFC5234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax		[RFC5234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
	Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.		Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.
	[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security		[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
	(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.		(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
			[RFC5801] Josefsson, S. and N. Williams, "Using Generic Security
			Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Mechanisms
			in Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL): The
			GS2 Mechanism Family", RFC 5801, July 2010.
	[RFC5849] Hammer-Lahav, E., "The OAuth 1.0 Protocol", RFC 5849,		[RFC5849] Hammer-Lahav, E., "The OAuth 1.0 Protocol", RFC 5849,
	April 2010.		April 2010.
	[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC		[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC
	6749, October 2012.		6749, October 2012.
	[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization		[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
	Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, October 2012.		Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, October 2012.
	8.2. Informative References		8.2. Informative References
	[I-D.ietf-oauth-json-web-token]		[I-D.ietf-oauth-json-web-token]
	Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token		Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
	(JWT)", draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-15 (work in		(JWT)", draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-18 (work in
	progress), January 2014.		progress), March 2014.
	[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac]		[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac]
	Richer, J., Mills, W., Tschofenig, H., and P. Hunt, "OAuth		Richer, J., Mills, W., Tschofenig, H., and P. Hunt, "OAuth
	2.0 Message Authentication Code (MAC) Tokens", draft-ietf-		2.0 Message Authentication Code (MAC) Tokens", draft-ietf-
	oauth-v2-http-mac-05 (work in progress), January 2014.		oauth-v2-http-mac-05 (work in progress), January 2014.
			[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
			Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
			Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
	[RFC3501] Crispin, M., "INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - VERSION		[RFC3501] Crispin, M., "INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - VERSION
	4rev1", RFC 3501, March 2003.		4rev1", RFC 3501, March 2003.
	[RFC5321] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,		[RFC5321] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
	October 2008.		October 2008.
			[RFC6120] Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence
			Protocol (XMPP): Core", RFC 6120, March 2011.
	[RFC6819] Lodderstedt, T., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0		[RFC6819] Lodderstedt, T., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0
	Threat Model and Security Considerations", RFC 6819,		Threat Model and Security Considerations", RFC 6819,
	January 2013.		January 2013.
	[RFC7033] Jones, P., Salgueiro, G., Jones, M., and J. Smarr,		[RFC7033] Jones, P., Salgueiro, G., Jones, M., and J. Smarr,
	"WebFinger", RFC 7033, September 2013.		"WebFinger", RFC 7033, September 2013.
	Appendix A. Acknowlegements		Appendix A. Acknowlegements
	The authors would like to thank the members of the Kitten working		The authors would like to thank the members of the Kitten working
	group, and in addition and specifically: Simon Josefson, Torsten		group, and in addition and specifically: Simon Josefson, Torsten
	Lodderstadt, Ryan Troll, Alexey Melnikov, Jeffrey Hutzelman, and Nico		Lodderstadt, Ryan Troll, Alexey Melnikov, Jeffrey Hutzelman, Nico
	Williams.		Williams, and Matt Miller.
	This document was produced under the chairmanship of Alexey Melnikov,		This document was produced under the chairmanship of Alexey Melnikov,
	Tom Yu, Shawn Emery, Josh Howlett, Sam Hartman. The supervising area		Tom Yu, Shawn Emery, Josh Howlett, Sam Hartman. The supervising area
	directors was Stephen Farrell.		director was Stephen Farrell.
	Appendix B. Document History		Appendix B. Document History
	[[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]		[[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
			-14
			o Last call feedack on RFC citations needed, small editorial.
			o Added the "user" parameter back, which was pulled when we started
			down the GS2 path. Same language as -03.
			o Defined a stub GS2 header to make sure that when the GS2 bride is
			defined for this that nothing will break when it actually starts
			to get populated.
	-13		-13
	o Changed affiliation.		o Changed affiliation.
	-12		-12
	o Removed -PLUS components from the specification.		o Removed -PLUS components from the specification.
	-11		-11
End of changes. 40 change blocks.
	76 lines changed or deleted		102 lines changed or added
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