< draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-14.txt		draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-15.txt >
	KITTEN W. Mills		KITTEN W. Mills
	Internet-Draft Yahoo! Inc.		Internet-Draft Skype
	Intended status: Standards Track T. Showalter		Intended status: Standards Track T. Showalter
	Expires: September 7, 2014		Expires: January 23, 2015
	H. Tschofenig		H. Tschofenig
	ARM Ltd.		ARM Ltd.
	March 6, 2014		July 22, 2014
	A set of SASL Mechanisms for OAuth		A set of SASL Mechanisms for OAuth
	draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-14.txt		draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-15.txt
	Abstract		Abstract
	OAuth enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to a		OAuth enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to a
	protected resource, either on behalf of a resource owner by		protected resource, either on behalf of a resource owner by
	orchestrating an approval interaction, or by allowing the third-party		orchestrating an approval interaction, or by allowing the third-party
	application to obtain access on its own behalf.		application to obtain access on its own behalf.
	This document defines how an application client uses credentials		This document defines how an application client uses credentials
	obtained via OAuth over the Simple Authentication and Security Layer		obtained via OAuth over the Simple Authentication and Security Layer
	skipping to change at page 2, line 4 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 4 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on September 7, 2014.		This Internet-Draft will expire on January 23, 2015.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 2, line 33 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 33 ¶
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3. OAuth SASL Mechanism Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3. OAuth SASL Mechanism Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	3.1. Initial Client Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		3.1. Initial Client Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	3.1.1. Reserved Key/Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		3.1.1. Reserved Key/Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3.2. Server's Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		3.2. Server's Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3.2.1. OAuth Identifiers in the SASL Context . . . . . . . . 8		3.2.1. OAuth Identifiers in the SASL Context . . . . . . . . 8
	3.2.2. Server Response to Failed Authentication . . . . . . 9		3.2.2. Server Response to Failed Authentication . . . . . . 9
	3.2.3. Completing an Error Message Sequence . . . . . . . . 9		3.2.3. Completing an Error Message Sequence . . . . . . . . 9
	3.3. OAuth Access Token Types using Keyed Message Digests . . 9		3.3. OAuth Access Token Types using Keyed Message Digests . . 9
	4. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		4. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	4.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		4.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	4.2. Failed Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		4.2. Successful OAuth 1.0a Token Exchange . . . . . . . . . . 12
	4.3. SMTP Example of a Failed Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . 12		4.3. Failed Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		4.4. SMTP Example of a Failed Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . 13
	6. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		6. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	7.1. SASL Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		7.1. SASL Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	Appendix A. Acknowlegements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		Appendix A. Acknowlegements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
			Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	OAuth 1.0a [RFC5849] and OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] are protocol frameworks		OAuth 1.0a [RFC5849] and OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] are protocol frameworks
	that enable a third-party application to obtain limited access to a		that enable a third-party application to obtain limited access to a
	protected resource, either on behalf of a resource owner by		protected resource, either on behalf of a resource owner by
	orchestrating an approval interaction, or by allowing the third-party		orchestrating an approval interaction, or by allowing the third-party
	application to obtain access on its own behalf.		application to obtain access on its own behalf.
	The core OAuth 2.0 specification [RFC6749] specifies the interaction		The core OAuth 2.0 specification [RFC6749] specifies the interaction
	skipping to change at page 4, line 50 ¶		skipping to change at page 4, line 50 ¶
	When OAuth is integrated into SASL the high-level steps are as		When OAuth is integrated into SASL the high-level steps are as
	follows:		follows:
	(A) The client requests authorization from the resource owner.		(A) The client requests authorization from the resource owner.
	The authorization request can be made directly to the resource		The authorization request can be made directly to the resource
	owner (as shown), or preferably indirectly via the authorization		owner (as shown), or preferably indirectly via the authorization
	server as an intermediary.		server as an intermediary.
	(B) The client receives an authorization grant which is a		(B) The client receives an authorization grant which is a
	credential representing the resource owner's authorization,		credential representing the resource owner's authorization,
	expressed using one of four grant types defined in this		expressed using one of the grant types defined in [RFC6749] or
	specification or using an extension grant type. The authorization		[RFC5849] or using an extension grant type. The authorization
	grant type depends on the method used by the client to request		grant type depends on the method used by the client to request
	authorization and the types supported by the authorization server.		authorization and the types supported by the authorization server.
	(C) The client requests an access token by authenticating with the		(C) The client requests an access token by authenticating with the
	authorization server and presenting the authorization grant.		authorization server and presenting the authorization grant.
	(D) The authorization server authenticates the client and		(D) The authorization server authenticates the client and
	validates the authorization grant, and if valid issues an access		validates the authorization grant, and if valid issues an access
	token.		token.
	skipping to change at page 7, line 7 ¶		skipping to change at page 7, line 7 ¶
	1. Client sends an invalid initial client response.		1. Client sends an invalid initial client response.
	2. Server responds with an error message.		2. Server responds with an error message.
	3. Client sends a dummy client response.		3. Client sends a dummy client response.
	4. Server fails the authentication.		4. Server fails the authentication.
	3.1. Initial Client Response		3.1. Initial Client Response
	Client responses are a key/value pair sequence. The initial client		Client responses are a GS2 [RFC5801] header followed by a key/value
	response includes a gs2-header as defined in GS2 [RFC5801] which is		pair sequence, or may be empty. The gs2-header is defined here for
	defined here as a stub for compatibility with GS2 if a GS2 mechanism		compatibility with GS2 if a GS2 mechanism is formally defined, but
	is formally defined, but this document does not define one. These		this document does not define one. These key/value pairs carry the
	key/value pairs carry the equivalent values from an HTTP context in		equivalent values from an HTTP context in order to be able to
	order to be able to complete an OAuth style HTTP authorization.		complete an OAuth style HTTP authorization. Unknown key/value pairs
	Unknown key/value pairs MUST be ignored by the server. The ABNF		MUST be ignored by the server. The ABNF [RFC5234] syntax is:
	[RFC5234] syntax is:
	kvsep = %x01		kvsep = %x01
	key = 1*(ALPHA / ",")		key = 1*(ALPHA / ",")
	value = *(VCHAR / SP / HTAB / CR / LF )		value = *(VCHAR / SP / HTAB / CR / LF )
	kvpair = key "=" value kvsep		kvpair = key "=" value kvsep
	gs2-header = ALPHA "," value		;;gs2-header = See RFC 5801
	client_resp = gs2-header kvsep 0*kvpair kvsep		client_resp = (gs2-header kvsep 0*kvpair kvsep) / kvsep
	The GS2		The GS2 header MAY include the user name associated with the resource
			being accessed, the "authzid". It is worth noting that application
			protocols are allowed to require an authzid, as are specific server
			implementations.
	The following key/value pairs are defined in the client response:		The following key/value pairs are defined in the client response:
	auth (REQUIRED): The payload of the HTTP Authorization header for		auth (REQUIRED): The payload of the HTTP Authorization header for
	an equivalent HTTP OAuth authorization.		an equivalent HTTP OAuth authorization.
	user (REQUIRED): Contains the user name being authenticated. The
	server MAY use this as a routing or database lookup hint. The
	server MUST NOT use this as authoritative, the user name MUST
	be asserted by the OAuth credential.
	host: Contains the host name to which the client connected.		host: Contains the host name to which the client connected.
	port: Contains the port number represented as a decimal positive		port: Contains the port number represented as a decimal positive
	integer string without leading zeros to which the client		integer string without leading zeros to which the client
	connected.		connected.
	qs: The HTTP query string. This is reserved for future use, the		qs: The HTTP query string. This is reserved for future use, the
	client SHOUD NOT send it, and has the default value of "".		client SHOUD NOT send it, and has the default value of "".
	For OAuth token types that use keyed message digests the client MUST		For OAuth token types that use keyed message digests the client MUST
	skipping to change at page 9, line 21 ¶		skipping to change at page 9, line 21 ¶
	status (REQUIRED): The authorization error code. Valid error		status (REQUIRED): The authorization error code. Valid error
	codes are defined in the IANA "OAuth Extensions Error Registry"		codes are defined in the IANA "OAuth Extensions Error Registry"
	specified in the OAuth 2 core specification.		specified in the OAuth 2 core specification.
	scope (OPTIONAL): An OAuth scope which is valid to access the		scope (OPTIONAL): An OAuth scope which is valid to access the
	service. This may be empty which implies that unscoped tokens		service. This may be empty which implies that unscoped tokens
	are required, or a scope value. If a scope is specified then a		are required, or a scope value. If a scope is specified then a
	single scope is preferred, use of a space separated list of		single scope is preferred, use of a space separated list of
	scopes is NOT RECOMMENDED.		scopes is NOT RECOMMENDED.
			oauth-configuration (OPTIONAL): The URL for for a document
			following the OpenID Provider Configuration Information schema
			as described in OpenID Connect Discovery [OpenID.Discovery]
			section 3 that is appropriate for the user. This document MUST
			have all OAuth related data elements populated. The server MAY
			return different URLs for users in different domains and the
			client SHOULD NOT cache a single returned value and assume it
			applies for all users/domains that the server suports.
	If the resource server provides a scope then the client MUST always		If the resource server provides a scope then the client MUST always
	request scoped tokens from the token endpoint. If the resource		request scoped tokens from the token endpoint. If the resource
	server provides no scope to the client then the client SHOULD presume		server provides no scope to the client then the client SHOULD presume
	an empty scope (unscoped token) is needed.		an empty scope (unscoped token) is needed.
	3.2.3. Completing an Error Message Sequence		3.2.3. Completing an Error Message Sequence
	Section 3.6 of [RFC4422] explicitly prohibits additional information		Section 3.6 of [RFC4422] explicitly prohibits additional information
	in an unsuccessful authentication outcome. Therefore, the error		in an unsuccessful authentication outcome. Therefore, the error
	message is sent in a normal message. The client MUST then send an		message is sent in a normal message. The client MUST then send an
	skipping to change at page 10, line 10 ¶		skipping to change at page 10, line 21 ¶
	These atoms are defined as extension points so that no changes are		These atoms are defined as extension points so that no changes are
	needed if there is a revision of SASL which supports more specific		needed if there is a revision of SASL which supports more specific
	resource authorization, e.g., IMAP access to a specific folder or FTP		resource authorization, e.g., IMAP access to a specific folder or FTP
	access limited to a specific directory.		access limited to a specific directory.
	Using the example in the OAuth 1.0a specification as a starting		Using the example in the OAuth 1.0a specification as a starting
	point, on an IMAP server running on port 143 and given the OAuth 1.0a		point, on an IMAP server running on port 143 and given the OAuth 1.0a
	style authorization request (with %x01 shown as ^A and line breaks		style authorization request (with %x01 shown as ^A and line breaks
	added for readability) below:		added for readability) below:
	n,^A		n,a=user@example.com,^A
	host=example.com^A		host=example.com^A
	user=user@example.com^A
	port=143^A		port=143^A
	auth=OAuth realm="Example",		auth=OAuth realm="Example",
	oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2",		oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2",
	oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7",		oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7",
	oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",		oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",
	oauth_timestamp="137131201",		oauth_timestamp="137131201",
	oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a",		oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a",
	oauth_signature="Tm90IGEgcmVhbCBzaWduYXR1cmU%3D"^A^A		oauth_signature="Tm90IGEgcmVhbCBzaWduYXR1cmU"^A^A
	The signature base string would be constructed per the OAuth 1.0		The signature base string would be constructed per the OAuth 1.0
	specification [RFC5849] with the following things noted:		specification [RFC5849] with the following things noted:
	o The method value is defaulted to POST.		o The method value is defaulted to POST.
	o The scheme defaults to be "http", and any port number other than		o The scheme defaults to be "http", and any port number other than
	80 is included.		80 is included.
	o The path defaults to "/".		o The path defaults to "/".
	skipping to change at page 11, line 11 ¶		skipping to change at page 11, line 20 ¶
	Note to implementers: The SASL OAuth method names are case		Note to implementers: The SASL OAuth method names are case
	insensitive. One example uses "Bearer" but that could as easily be		insensitive. One example uses "Bearer" but that could as easily be
	"bearer", "BEARER", or "BeArEr".		"bearer", "BEARER", or "BeArEr".
	4.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange		4.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange
	This example shows a successful OAuth 2.0 bearer token exchange.		This example shows a successful OAuth 2.0 bearer token exchange.
	Note that line breaks are inserted for readability and the underlying		Note that line breaks are inserted for readability and the underlying
	TLS establishment is not shown either.		TLS establishment is not shown either.
	S: * OK IMAP4rev1 Server Ready		S: * OK IMAP4rev1 Server Ready
	C: t0 CAPABILITY		C: t0 CAPABILITY
	S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTHBEARER SASL-IR		S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTHBEARER SASL-IR
	S: t0 OK Completed		S: t0 OK Completed
	C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER biwBdXNlcj11c2VyQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tAWhvc3Q9c2Vyd		C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20sAWhvc3Q9c2
	mVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9QmVhcmVyIHZGOWRmdDRxbVRjMk52YjN		VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9QmVhcmVyIHZGOWRmdDRxb
	SbGNrQmhiSFJoZG1semRHRXVZMjl0Q2c9PQEB		VRjMk52YjNSbGNrQmhiSFJoZG1semRHRXVZMjl0Q2c9PQEB
	S: t1 OK SASL authentication succeeded		S: t1 OK SASL authentication succeeded
	As required by IMAP [RFC3501], the payloads are base64-encoded. The		As required by IMAP [RFC3501], the payloads are base64-encoded. The
	decoded initial client response (with %x01 represented as ^A and long		decoded initial client response (with %x01 represented as ^A and long
	lines wrapped for readability) is:		lines wrapped for readability) is:
	n,^Auser=user@example.com^Ahost=server.example.com^Aport=143^A		n,a=user@example.com,^Ahost=server.example.com^Aport=143^A
	auth=Bearer vF9dft4qmTc2Nvb3RlckBhbHRhdmlzdGEuY29tCg==^A^A		auth=Bearer vF9dft4qmTc2Nvb3RlckBhbHRhdmlzdGEuY29tCg==^A^A
	The same credential used in an SMTP exchange is shown below. Note		The same credential used in an SMTP exchange is shown below. Note
	that line breaks are inserted for readability, and that the SMTP		that line breaks are inserted for readability, and that the SMTP
	protocol terminates lines with CR and LF characters (ASCII values		protocol terminates lines with CR and LF characters (ASCII values
	0x0D and 0x0A), these are not displayed explicitly in the example.		0x0D and 0x0A), these are not displayed explicitly in the example.
	[connection begins]		[connection begins]
	S: 220 mx.example.com ESMTP 12sm2095603fks.9		S: 220 mx.example.com ESMTP 12sm2095603fks.9
	C: EHLO sender.example.com		C: EHLO sender.example.com
	S: 250-mx.example.com at your service,[172.31.135.47]		S: 250-mx.example.com at your service,[172.31.135.47]
	S: 250-SIZE 35651584		S: 250-SIZE 35651584
	S: 250-8BITMIME		S: 250-8BITMIME
	S: 250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN OAUTHBEARER		S: 250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN OAUTHBEARER
	S: 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES		S: 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES
	S: 250 PIPELINING		S: 250 PIPELINING
	C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER biwBdXNlcj11c2VyQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tAWhvc		C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20sAWhvc3Q9c
	3Q9c2VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9QmVhcmVyIHZGOWR		2VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9QmVhcmVyIHZGOWRmdDR
	mdDRxbVRjMk52YjNSbGNrQmhiSFJoZG1semRHRXVZMjl0Q2c9PQEB		xbVRjMk52YjNSbGNrQmhiSFJoZG1semRHRXVZMjl0Q2c9PQEB
	S: 235 Authentication successful.		S: 235 Authentication successful.
	[connection continues...]		[connection continues...]
	4.2. Failed Exchange		4.2. Successful OAuth 1.0a Token Exchange
			This example shows a successful OAuth 1.0a token exchange. Note that
			line breaks are inserted for readability and the underlying TLS
			establishment is not shown. Signature computation is discussed in
			Section 3.3.
			S: * OK IMAP4rev1 Server Ready
			C: t0 CAPABILITY
			S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTHBEARER OAUTH10A SASL-IR
			S: t0 OK Completed
			C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTH10A bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20sAWhvc3Q9ZXhhb
			XBsZS5jb20BcG9ydD0xNDMBYXV0aD1PQXV0aCByZWFsbT0iRXhhbXBsZSIsb2F1
			dGhfY29uc3VtZXJfa2V5PSI5ZGpkajgyaDQ4ZGpzOWQyIixvYXV0aF90b2tlbj0
			ia2trOWQ3ZGgzazM5c2p2NyIsb2F1dGhfc2lnbmF0dXJlX21ldGhvZD0iSE1BQy
			1TSEExIixvYXV0aF90aW1lc3RhbXA9IjEzNzEzMTIwMSIsb2F1dGhfbm9uY2U9I
			jdkOGYzZTRhIixvYXV0aF9zaWduYXR1cmU9IlRtOTBJR0VnY21WaGJDQnphV2R1
			WVhSMWNtVSUzRCIBAQ==
			S: t1 OK SASL authentication succeeded
			As required by IMAP [RFC3501], the payloads are base64-encoded. The
			decoded initial client response (with %x01 represented as ^A and
			lines wrapped for readability) is:
			n,a=user@example.com,^A
			host=example.com^A
			port=143^A
			auth=OAuth realm="Example",
			oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2",
			oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7",
			oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",
			oauth_timestamp="137131201",
			oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a",
			oauth_signature="SSdtIGEgbGl0dGxlIHRlYSBwb3Qu"^A^A
			4.3. Failed Exchange
	This example shows a failed exchange because of the empty		This example shows a failed exchange because of the empty
	Authorization header, which is how a client can query for the needed		Authorization header, which is how a client can query for the needed
	scope. Note that line breaks are inserted for readability.		scope. Note that line breaks are inserted for readability.
	S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTHBEARER SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server		S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTHBEARER SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server
	Ready		Ready
	S: t0 OK Completed		S: t0 OK Completed
	C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER biwBdXNlcj11c2VyQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tAWhvc3Q9c2Vyd		C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20sAW
	mVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9AWNiZGF0YT0BAQ==		hvc3Q9c2VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9AQE=
	S: + ewoic3RhdHVzIjoiNDAxIgoic2NvcGUiOiJleGFtcGxlX3Njb3BlIgp9		S: + eyJzdGF0dXMiOiI0MDEiLCJzY29wZSI6ImV4YW1wbGVfc2NvcGUiLCJv
	C: + AQ==		cGVuaWQtY29uZmlndXJhdGlvbiI6Imh0dHBzOi8vZXhhbXBsZS5jb20v
	S: t1 NO SASL authentication failed		LndlbGwta25vd24vb3BlbmlkLWNvbmZpZ3VyYXRpb24ifQ==
			C: + AQ==
			S: t1 NO SASL authentication failed
	The decoded initial client response is:		The decoded initial client response is:
	n,^Auser=user@example.com^Ahost=server.example.com^A		n,a=user@example.com,^Ahost=server.example.com^A
	port=143^Aauth=^A^A		port=143^Aauth=^A^A
	The decoded server error response is:		The decoded server error response is:
	{		{
	"status":"401",		"status":"401",
	"scope":"example_scope"		"scope":"example_scope",
	}		"openid-configuration":"https://example.com/.well-known/openid-configuration"
			}
	The client responds with the required dummy response.		The client responds with the required dummy response.
	4.3. SMTP Example of a Failed Negotiation		4.4. SMTP Example of a Failed Negotiation
	This example shows an authorization failure in an SMTP exchange.		This example shows an authorization failure in an SMTP exchange.
	Note that line breaks are inserted for readability, and that the SMTP		Note that line breaks are inserted for readability, and that the SMTP
	protocol terminates lines with CR and LF characters (ASCII values		protocol terminates lines with CR and LF characters (ASCII values
	0x0D and 0x0A), these are not displayed explicitly in the example.		0x0D and 0x0A), these are not displayed explicitly in the example.
	[connection begins]		[connection begins]
	S: 220 mx.example.com ESMTP 12sm2095603fks.9		S: 220 mx.example.com ESMTP 12sm2095603fks.9
	C: EHLO sender.example.com		C: EHLO sender.example.com
	S: 250-mx.example.com at your service,[172.31.135.47]		S: 250-mx.example.com at your service,[172.31.135.47]
	S: 250-SIZE 35651584		S: 250-SIZE 35651584
	S: 250-8BITMIME		S: 250-8BITMIME
	S: 250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN OAUTHBEARER		S: 250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN OAUTHBEARER
	S: 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES		S: 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES
	S: 250 PIPELINING		S: 250 PIPELINING
	C: AUTH OAUTHBEARER biwBdXNlcj1zb21ldXNlckBleGFtcGxlLmNvbQFhdXRoPUJlYXJl		C: AUTH OAUTHBEARER bix1c2VyPXNvbWV1c2VyQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tLAFhdXRoPUJlYXJl
	ciB2RjlkZnQ0cW1UYzJOdmIzUmxja0JoZEhSaGRtbHpkR0V1WTI5dENnPT0BAQ==		ciB2RjlkZnQ0cW1UYzJOdmIzUmxja0JoZEhSaGRtbHpkR0V1WTI5dENnPT0BAQ==
	S: 334 eyJzdGF0dXMiOiI0MDEiLCJzY2hlbWVzIjoiYmVhcmVyIG1hYyIsInNjb3BlIjoia		S: 334 eyJzdGF0dXMiOiI0MDEiLCJzY2hlbWVzIjoiYmVhcmVyIG1hYyIsInNjb3BlIjoia
	HR0cHM6Ly9tYWlsLmdvb2dsZS5jb20vIn0K		HR0cHM6Ly9tYWlsLmdvb2dsZS5jb20vIn0K
	C: AQ==		C: AQ==
	S: 535-5.7.1 Username and Password not accepted. Learn more at		S: 535-5.7.1 Username and Password not accepted. Learn more at
	S: 535 5.7.1 http://support.example.com/mail/oauth		S: 535 5.7.1 http://support.example.com/mail/oauth
	[connection continues...]		[connection continues...]
	The server returned an error message in the 334 SASL message, the		The server returned an error message in the 334 SASL message, the
	client responds with the required dummy response, and the server		client responds with the required dummy response, and the server
	finalizes the negotiation.		finalizes the negotiation.
	5. Security Considerations		5. Security Considerations
	OAuth 1.0a and OAuth 2 allows for a variety of deployment scenarios,		OAuth 1.0a and OAuth 2 allows for a variety of deployment scenarios,
	and the security properties of these profiles vary. As shown in		and the security properties of these profiles vary. As shown in
	Figure 1 this specification is aimed to be integrated into a larger		Figure 1 this specification is aimed to be integrated into a larger
	OAuth deployment. Application developers therefore need to		OAuth deployment. Application developers therefore need to
	skipping to change at page 14, line 19 ¶		skipping to change at page 15, line 40 ¶
	problem with this mechanism per se. Resource servers may		problem with this mechanism per se. Resource servers may
	unilaterally disconnect clients in accordance with the application		unilaterally disconnect clients in accordance with the application
	protocol.		protocol.
	Access tokens have a lifetime.		Access tokens have a lifetime.
	Reducing the lifetime of an access token provides security		Reducing the lifetime of an access token provides security
	benefits and OAuth 2.0 introduces refresh tokens to obtain new		benefits and OAuth 2.0 introduces refresh tokens to obtain new
	access token on the fly without any need for a human interaction.		access token on the fly without any need for a human interaction.
	Additionally, a previously obtained access token may be revoked or		Additionally, a previously obtained access token may be revoked or
	rendered invalid at any time by the authorization server. The		rendered invalid at any time. The client may request a new access
	client may request a new access token for each connection to a		token for each connection to a resource server, but it SHOULD
	resource server, but it should cache and re-use valid credentials.		cache and re-use valid credentials.
	6. Internationalization Considerations		6. Internationalization Considerations
	The identifer asserted by the OAuth authorization server about the		The identifer asserted by the OAuth authorization server about the
	resource owner inside the access token may be displayed to a human.		resource owner inside the access token may be displayed to a human.
	For example, when SASL is used in the context of IMAP the resource		For example, when SASL is used in the context of IMAP the resource
	server may assert the resource owner's email address to the IMAP		server may assert the resource owner's email address to the IMAP
	server for usage in an email-based application. The identifier may		server for usage in an email-based application. The identifier may
	therefore contain internationalized characters and an application		therefore contain internationalized characters and an application
	needs to ensure that the mapping between the identifier provided by		needs to ensure that the mapping between the identifier provided by
	skipping to change at page 15, line 28 ¶		skipping to change at page 16, line 49 ¶
	For further information: Contact the authors of this document.		For further information: Contact the authors of this document.
	Owner/Change controller: the IETF		Owner/Change controller: the IETF
	Note: None		Note: None
	8. References		8. References
	8.1. Normative References		8.1. Normative References
			[OpenID.Discovery]
			Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and E. Jay, "OpenID
			Connect Discovery 1.0", July 2011.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
	[RFC3174] Eastlake, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1		[RFC3174] Eastlake, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1
	(SHA1)", RFC 3174, September 2001.		(SHA1)", RFC 3174, September 2001.
	[RFC4422] Melnikov, A. and K. Zeilenga, "Simple Authentication and		[RFC4422] Melnikov, A. and K. Zeilenga, "Simple Authentication and
	Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422, June 2006.		Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422, June 2006.
	[RFC4627] Crockford, D., "The application/json Media Type for		[RFC4627] Crockford, D., "The application/json Media Type for
	skipping to change at page 16, line 23 ¶		skipping to change at page 17, line 44 ¶
	[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC		[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC
	6749, October 2012.		6749, October 2012.
	[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization		[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
	Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, October 2012.		Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, October 2012.
	8.2. Informative References		8.2. Informative References
	[I-D.ietf-oauth-json-web-token]		[I-D.ietf-oauth-json-web-token]
	Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token		Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
	(JWT)", draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-18 (work in		(JWT)", draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-25 (work in
	progress), March 2014.		progress), July 2014.
	[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac]		[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac]
	Richer, J., Mills, W., Tschofenig, H., and P. Hunt, "OAuth		Richer, J., Mills, W., Tschofenig, H., and P. Hunt, "OAuth
	2.0 Message Authentication Code (MAC) Tokens", draft-ietf-		2.0 Message Authentication Code (MAC) Tokens", draft-ietf-
	oauth-v2-http-mac-05 (work in progress), January 2014.		oauth-v2-http-mac-05 (work in progress), January 2014.
	[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,		[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
	Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext		Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
	Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.		Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
	skipping to change at page 17, line 20 ¶		skipping to change at page 18, line 40 ¶
	Williams, and Matt Miller.		Williams, and Matt Miller.
	This document was produced under the chairmanship of Alexey Melnikov,		This document was produced under the chairmanship of Alexey Melnikov,
	Tom Yu, Shawn Emery, Josh Howlett, Sam Hartman. The supervising area		Tom Yu, Shawn Emery, Josh Howlett, Sam Hartman. The supervising area
	director was Stephen Farrell.		director was Stephen Farrell.
	Appendix B. Document History		Appendix B. Document History
	[[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]		[[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
	-14		-15
			o Last call feedack on the GS2 stuff being ripped out completely.
			o Removed the "user" parameter and put stuff back into the
			gs2-header. Call out that the authzid goes in the gs2-header with
			some prose about when it might be required. Very comparable to
			-10.
			o Added an OAuth 1.0A example explicitly.
			-14
	o Last call feedack on RFC citations needed, small editorial.		o Last call feedack on RFC citations needed, small editorial.
	o Added the "user" parameter back, which was pulled when we started		o Added the "user" parameter back, which was pulled when we started
	down the GS2 path. Same language as -03.		down the GS2 path. Same language as -03.
	o Defined a stub GS2 header to make sure that when the GS2 bride is		o Defined a stub GS2 header to make sure that when the GS2 bride is
	defined for this that nothing will break when it actually starts		defined for this that nothing will break when it actually starts
	to get populated.		to get populated.
	-13		-13
	skipping to change at page 19, line 45 ¶		skipping to change at page 21, line 28 ¶
	-00		-00
	o Renamed draft into proper IETF naming format now that it's		o Renamed draft into proper IETF naming format now that it's
	adopted.		adopted.
	o Minor fixes.		o Minor fixes.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	William Mills		William Mills
	Yahoo! Inc.		Skype
	Email: wmills_92105@yahoo.com		Email: wmills_92105@yahoo.com
	Tim Showalter		Tim Showalter
	Email: tjs@psaux.com		Email: tjs@psaux.com
	Hannes Tschofenig		Hannes Tschofenig
	ARM Ltd.		ARM Ltd.
	110 Fulbourn Rd		110 Fulbourn Rd
	Cambridge CB1 9NJ		Cambridge CB1 9NJ
	Great Britain		Great Britain
	Email: Hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net		Email: Hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net
	URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at		URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at
End of changes. 33 change blocks.
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