< draft-ietf-kitten-tls-channel-bindings-for-tls13-11.txt		draft-ietf-kitten-tls-channel-bindings-for-tls13-12.txt >
	Transport Layer Security S. Whited		Transport Layer Security S. Whited
	Internet-Draft 18 October 2021		Internet-Draft 25 October 2021
	Updates: 5801, 5802, 5929, 8446 (if approved)		Updates: 5801, 5802, 5929, 7677, 8446 (if
			approved)
	Intended status: Standards Track		Intended status: Standards Track
	Expires: 21 April 2022		Expires: 28 April 2022
	Channel Bindings for TLS 1.3		Channel Bindings for TLS 1.3
	draft-ietf-kitten-tls-channel-bindings-for-tls13-11		draft-ietf-kitten-tls-channel-bindings-for-tls13-12
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document defines a channel binding type, tls-exporter, that is		This document defines a channel binding type, tls-exporter, that is
	compatible with TLS 1.3 in accordance with RFC 5056, On Channel		compatible with TLS 1.3 in accordance with RFC 5056, On Channel
	Binding. Furthermore it updates the "default" channel binding to the		Binding. Furthermore it updates the "default" channel binding to the
	new binding for versions of TLS greater than 1.2. This document		new binding for versions of TLS greater than 1.2. This document
	updates RFC5801, RFC5802, RFC5929, and RFC8446.		updates RFC5801, RFC5802, RFC5929, RFC7677, and RFC8446.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 April 2022.		This Internet-Draft will expire on 28 April 2022.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
	license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.		license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
	Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights		Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
	skipping to change at page 2, line 12 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 21 ¶
	as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are		as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
	provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.		provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	1.1. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1.1. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	2. The 'tls-exporter' Channel Binding Type . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. The 'tls-exporter' Channel Binding Type . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3. TLS 1.3 with SCRAM or GSS-API over SASL . . . . . . . . . . . 3		3. TLS 1.3 with SCRAM or GSS-API over SASL . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	4.1. Use with Legacy TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		4.1. Use with Legacy TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	5.1. Registration of Channel Binding Type . . . . . . . . . . 4		5.1. Registration of Channel Binding Type . . . . . . . . . . 4
	5.2. Registration of Channel Binding TLS Exporter Label . . . 5		5.2. Registration of Channel Binding TLS Exporter Label . . . 5
	6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	The "tls-unique" channel binding type defined in [RFC5929] was found		The "tls-unique" channel binding type defined in [RFC5929] was found
	to be vulnerable to the "triple handshake vulnerability"		to be vulnerable to the "triple handshake vulnerability"
	[TRIPLE-HANDSHAKE] without the extended master secret extension		[TRIPLE-HANDSHAKE] without the extended master secret extension
	defined in [RFC7627]. While TLS 1.3 uses a complete transcript hash		defined in [RFC7627]. While TLS 1.3 uses a complete transcript hash
	akin to the extended master secret procedures, the safety of channel		akin to the extended master secret procedures, the safety of channel
	bindings with TLS 1.3 was not analyzed as part of the core protocol		bindings with TLS 1.3 was not analyzed as part of the core protocol
	skipping to change at page 3, line 29 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 35 ¶
	Length: 32 bytes.		Length: 32 bytes.
	This channel binding mechanism is defined only when TLS cipher		This channel binding mechanism is defined only when TLS cipher
	negotiation results in unique master secrets, which is true of TLS		negotiation results in unique master secrets, which is true of TLS
	1.3 which always behaves as if it were using the extended master		1.3 which always behaves as if it were using the extended master
	secret fix required by previous versions of TLS (see [RFC8446]		secret fix required by previous versions of TLS (see [RFC8446]
	appendix D).		appendix D).
	3. TLS 1.3 with SCRAM or GSS-API over SASL		3. TLS 1.3 with SCRAM or GSS-API over SASL
	SCRAM [RFC5802] and GSS-API over SASL [RFC5801] define "tls-unique"		SCRAM ([RFC5802], and [RFC7677]) and GSS-API over SASL [RFC5801]
	as the default channel binding to use over TLS. As "tls-unique" is		define "tls-unique" as the default channel binding to use over TLS.
	not defined for TLS 1.3 (and greater), this document updates		As "tls-unique" is not defined for TLS 1.3 (and greater), this
	[RFC5801] and [RFC5802] to use "tls-exporter" as the default channel		document updates [RFC5801], [RFC5802], and [RFC7677] to use "tls-
	binding over TLS 1.3 (and greater).		exporter" as the default channel binding over TLS 1.3 (and greater).
			Note that this document does not change the default channel binding
			for SCRAM mechanisms over TLS 1.2 [RFC5246], which is still "tls-
			unique".
	4. Security Considerations		4. Security Considerations
	The channel binding type defined in this document is constructed so		The channel binding type defined in this document is constructed so
	that disclosure of the channel binding data does not leak secret		that disclosure of the channel binding data does not leak secret
	information about the TLS channel and does not affect the security of		information about the TLS channel and does not affect the security of
	the TLS channel.		the TLS channel.
	The Security Considerations sections of [RFC5056], [RFC5705], and		The Security Considerations sections of [RFC5056], [RFC5705], and
	[RFC8446] apply to this document.		[RFC8446] apply to this document.
	skipping to change at page 4, line 33 ¶		skipping to change at page 4, line 41 ¶
	Subject: Registration of channel binding tls-exporter		Subject: Registration of channel binding tls-exporter
	Channel binding unique prefix: tls-exporter		Channel binding unique prefix: tls-exporter
	Channel binding type: unique		Channel binding type: unique
	Channel type: TLS [RFC8446]		Channel type: TLS [RFC8446]
	Published specification: draft-ietf-kitten-tls-channel-bindings-for-		Published specification: draft-ietf-kitten-tls-channel-bindings-for-
	tls13-11		tls13-12
	Channel binding is secret: no		Channel binding is secret: no
	Description: The EKM value obtained from the current TLS connection.		Description: The EKM value obtained from the current TLS connection.
	Intended usage: COMMON		Intended usage: COMMON
	Person and email address to contact for further information: Sam		Person and email address to contact for further information: Sam
	Whited <sam@samwhited.com>.		Whited <sam@samwhited.com>.
	skipping to change at page 5, line 35 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 41 ¶
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC5056] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure		[RFC5056] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure
	Channels", RFC 5056, DOI 10.17487/RFC5056, November 2007,		Channels", RFC 5056, DOI 10.17487/RFC5056, November 2007,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5056>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5056>.
	[RFC5705] Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport		[RFC5705] Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport
	Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705,		Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705,
	March 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705>.		March 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705>.
			[RFC7677] Hansen, T., "SCRAM-SHA-256 and SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS Simple
			Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) Mechanisms",
			RFC 7677, DOI 10.17487/RFC7677, November 2015,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7677>.
	[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC		[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
	2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,		2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
	May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.		May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
	[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol		[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
	Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,		Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
	6.2. Informative References		6.2. Informative References
			[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
			(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
	[RFC5801] Josefsson, S. and N. Williams, "Using Generic Security		[RFC5801] Josefsson, S. and N. Williams, "Using Generic Security
	Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Mechanisms		Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Mechanisms
	in Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL): The		in Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL): The
	GS2 Mechanism Family", RFC 5801, DOI 10.17487/RFC5801,		GS2 Mechanism Family", RFC 5801, DOI 10.17487/RFC5801,
	July 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5801>.		July 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5801>.
	[RFC5802] Newman, C., Menon-Sen, A., Melnikov, A., and N. Williams,		[RFC5802] Newman, C., Menon-Sen, A., Melnikov, A., and N. Williams,
	"Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism		"Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism
	(SCRAM) SASL and GSS-API Mechanisms", RFC 5802,		(SCRAM) SASL and GSS-API Mechanisms", RFC 5802,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC5802, July 2010,		DOI 10.17487/RFC5802, July 2010,
End of changes. 11 change blocks.
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