< draft-ietf-lamps-cms-mix-with-psk-03.txt		draft-ietf-lamps-cms-mix-with-psk-04.txt >
	INTERNET-DRAFT R. Housley		INTERNET-DRAFT R. Housley
	Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Vigil Security		Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Vigil Security
	Intended Status: Proposed Standard		Intended Status: Proposed Standard
	Expires: 8 September 2019 8 March 2019		Expires: 11 November 2019 10 May 2019
	Using Pre-Shared Key (PSK) in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)		Using Pre-Shared Key (PSK) in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
	<draft-ietf-lamps-cms-mix-with-psk-03.txt>		<draft-ietf-lamps-cms-mix-with-psk-04.txt>
	Abstract		Abstract
	The invention of a large-scale quantum computer would pose a serious		The invention of a large-scale quantum computer would pose a serious
	challenge for the cryptographic algorithms that are widely deployed		challenge for the cryptographic algorithms that are widely deployed
	today. The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) supports key transport		today. The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) supports key transport
	and key agreement algorithms that could be broken by the invention of		and key agreement algorithms that could be broken by the invention of
	such a quantum computer. By storing communications that are		such a quantum computer. By storing communications that are
	protected with the CMS today, someone could decrypt them in the		protected with the CMS today, someone could decrypt them in the
	future when a large-scale quantum computer becomes available. Once		future when a large-scale quantum computer becomes available. Once
	skipping to change at page 1, line 44 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 44 ¶
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	skipping to change at page 11, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 11, line 5 ¶
	OKM is the output keying material, which is exactly L octets. The		OKM is the output keying material, which is exactly L octets. The
	OKM is the key-encryption key that is used to encrypt the content-		OKM is the key-encryption key that is used to encrypt the content-
	encryption key or the content-authenticated-encryption key.		encryption key or the content-authenticated-encryption key.
	6. ASN.1 Module		6. ASN.1 Module
	This section contains the ASN.1 module for the two key management		This section contains the ASN.1 module for the two key management
	techniques defined in this document. This module imports types from		techniques defined in this document. This module imports types from
	other ASN.1 modules that are defined in [RFC5911] and [RFC5912].		other ASN.1 modules that are defined in [RFC5911] and [RFC5912].
			<CODE BEGINS>
	CMSORIforPSK-2019		CMSORIforPSK-2019
	{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)		{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
	smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-ori-psk-2019(TBD0) }		smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-ori-psk-2019(TBD0) }
	DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=		DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
	BEGIN		BEGIN
	-- EXPORTS All		-- EXPORTS All
	IMPORTS		IMPORTS
	skipping to change at page 13, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 12, line 50 ¶
	psk OCTET STRING,		psk OCTET STRING,
	keyMgmtAlgType ENUMERATED {		keyMgmtAlgType ENUMERATED {
	keyTrans (5),		keyTrans (5),
	keyAgree (10) },		keyAgree (10) },
	keyEncryptionAlgorithm KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,		keyEncryptionAlgorithm KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
	pskLength INTEGER (1..MAX),		pskLength INTEGER (1..MAX),
	kdkLength INTEGER (1..MAX) }		kdkLength INTEGER (1..MAX) }
	END		END
			<CODE ENDS>
	7. Security Considerations		7. Security Considerations
	Implementations must protect the pre-shared key (PSK), key transport		Implementations must protect the pre-shared key (PSK), key transport
	private key, the agreement private key, the key-derivation key, and		private key, the agreement private key, the key-derivation key, and
	the key-encryption key. Compromise of the PSK will make the		the key-encryption key. Compromise of the PSK will make the
	encrypted content vulnerable to the future invention of a large-scale		encrypted content vulnerable to the future invention of a large-scale
	quantum computer. Compromise of the PSK and either the key transport		quantum computer. Compromise of the PSK and either the key transport
	private key or the agreement private key may result in the disclosure		private key or the agreement private key may result in the disclosure
	of all contents protected with that combination of keying material.		of all contents protected with that combination of keying material.
	Compromise of the PSK and the key-derivation key may result in		Compromise of the PSK and the key-derivation key may result in
	skipping to change at page 16, line 35 ¶		skipping to change at page 16, line 35 ¶
	[IANA-SMIME] https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-		[IANA-SMIME] https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-
	numbers.xhtml#security-smime.		numbers.xhtml#security-smime.
	[IANA-ORI] https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-		[IANA-ORI] https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-
	numbers.xhtml#security-smime-13.		numbers.xhtml#security-smime-13.
	[RFC2631] Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method",		[RFC2631] Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method",
	RFC 2631, June 1999.		RFC 2631, June 1999.
	[RFC3560] Housley, R., "Use of the RSAES-OAEP Key Transport
	Algorithm in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
	RFC 3560, July 2003.
	[RFC4086] D. Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,		[RFC4086] D. Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
	"Randomness Requirements for Security", RFC 4086,		"Randomness Requirements for Security", RFC 4086,
	June 2005.		June 2005.
	[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,		[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
	Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key		Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
	Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List		Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
	(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.		(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
	[RFC5753] Turner, S., and D. Brown, "Use of Elliptic Curve		[RFC5753] Turner, S., and D. Brown, "Use of Elliptic Curve
End of changes. 6 change blocks.
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