< draft-ietf-netconf-sztp-csr-05.txt   draft-ietf-netconf-sztp-csr-06.txt >
NETCONF Working Group K. Watsen NETCONF Working Group K. Watsen
Internet-Draft Watsen Networks Internet-Draft Watsen Networks
Updates: 8572 (if approved) R. Housley Updates: 8572 (if approved) R. Housley
Intended status: Standards Track Vigil Security, LLC Intended status: Standards Track Vigil Security, LLC
Expires: 8 January 2022 S. Turner Expires: 16 February 2022 S. Turner
sn3rd sn3rd
7 July 2021 15 August 2021
Conveying a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) in a Secure Zero Touch Conveying a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) in a Secure Zero Touch
Provisioning (SZTP) Bootstrapping Request Provisioning (SZTP) Bootstrapping Request
draft-ietf-netconf-sztp-csr-05 draft-ietf-netconf-sztp-csr-06
Abstract Abstract
This draft extends the "get-bootstrapping-data" RPC defined in RFC This draft extends the "get-bootstrapping-data" RPC defined in RFC
8572 to include an optional certificate signing request (CSR), 8572 to include an optional certificate signing request (CSR),
enabling a bootstrapping device to additionally obtain an identity enabling a bootstrapping device to additionally obtain an identity
certificate (e.g., an LDevID, from IEEE 802.1AR) as part of the certificate (e.g., an LDevID, from IEEE 802.1AR) as part of the
"onboarding information" response provided in the RPC-reply. "onboarding information" response provided in the RPC-reply.
Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor) Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)
skipping to change at page 1, line 42 skipping to change at page 1, line 42
* "XXXX" --> the assigned numerical RFC value for this draft * "XXXX" --> the assigned numerical RFC value for this draft
* "AAAA" --> the assigned RFC value for I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto- * "AAAA" --> the assigned RFC value for I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-
types types
Artwork in this document contains a placeholder value for the Artwork in this document contains a placeholder value for the
publication date of this draft. Please apply the following publication date of this draft. Please apply the following
replacement: replacement:
* "2021-07-07" --> the publication date of this draft * "2021-08-15" --> the publication date of this draft
This document contains references to other drafts in progress, both This document contains references to other drafts in progress, both
in the Normative References section, as well as in body text in the Normative References section, as well as in body text
throughout. Please update the following references to reflect their throughout. Please update the following references to reflect their
final RFC assignments: final RFC assignments:
* I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types * I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types
* I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore * I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore
* I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors * I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors
skipping to change at page 2, line 25 skipping to change at page 2, line 25
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 8 January 2022. This Internet-Draft will expire on 16 February 2022.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.3. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.4. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. The "ietf-sztp-csr" Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. The "ietf-sztp-csr" Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Data Model Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. Data Model Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Example Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2. Example Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.3. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3. The "ietf-ztp-types" Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.1. SZTP-Client Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3.1. Data Model Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.1.1. Ensuring the Integrity of Asymmetric Private Keys . . 23 3.2. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.1.2. Reuse of a Manufacturer-generated Private Key . . . . 23 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.1.3. Replay Attack Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4.1. SZTP-Client Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.1.4. Connecting to an Untrusted Bootstrap Server . . . . . 24 4.1.1. Ensuring the Integrity of Asymmetric Private Keys . . 27
3.1.5. Selecting the Best Origin Authentication Mechanism . 25 4.1.2. Reuse of a Manufacturer-generated Private Key . . . . 27
3.1.6. Clearing the Private Key and Associated 4.1.3. Replay Attack Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4.1.4. Connecting to an Untrusted Bootstrap Server . . . . . 28
3.2. SZTP-Server Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4.1.5. Selecting the Best Origin Authentication Mechanism . 29
3.2.1. Conveying Proof of Possession to a CA . . . . . . . . 25 4.1.6. Clearing the Private Key and Associated
3.2.2. Supporting SZTP-Clients that don't trust the Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
SZTP-Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 4.2. SZTP-Server Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2.3. YANG Module Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 4.2.1. Conveying Proof of Possession to a CA . . . . . . . . 29
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 4.2.2. Supporting SZTP-Clients that don't trust the
4.1. The "IETF XML" Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 SZTP-Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.2. The "YANG Module Names" Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 4.3. Security Considerations for the "ietf-sztp-csr" YANG
5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 4.4. Security Considerations for the "ietf-ztp-types" YANG
5.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.1. The "IETF XML" Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.2. The "YANG Module Names" Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
1.1. Overview 1.1. Overview
This draft extends the "get-bootstrapping-data" RPC defined in This draft extends the "get-bootstrapping-data" RPC defined in
[RFC8572] to include an optional certificate signing request (CSR) [RFC8572] to include an optional certificate signing request (CSR)
[RFC2986], enabling a bootstrapping device to additionally obtain an [RFC2986], enabling a bootstrapping device to additionally obtain an
identity certificate (e.g., an LDevID [Std-802.1AR-2018]) as part of identity certificate (e.g., an LDevID [Std-802.1AR-2018]) as part of
the "onboarding information" response provided in the RPC-reply. the "onboarding information" response provided in the RPC-reply.
The ability to provision an identity certificate that is purpose- The ability to provision an identity certificate that is purpose-
built for a production environment during the bootstrapping process built for a production environment during the bootstrapping process
removes reliance on the manufacturer CA, and it also enables the removes reliance on the manufacturer CA, and it also enables the
bootstraped device to join the production environment with an bootstraped device to join the production environment with an
appropriate identity and other attributes in its LDevID certificate. appropriate identity and other attributes in its LDevID certificate.
Two YANG [RFC7950] modules are defined. The "ietf-ztp-types" module
defines three YANG groupings for the various messages defined in this
document. The "ietf-sztp-csr" module augments two groupings into the
"get-bootstrapping-data" RPC and defines a YANG Data Structure
[RFC8791] around the third grouping.
1.2. Terminology 1.2. Terminology
This document uses the following terms from [RFC8572]: This document uses the following terms from [RFC8572]:
* Bootstrap Server * Bootstrap Server
* Bootstrapping Data * Bootstrapping Data
* Conveyed Information * Conveyed Information
* Device * Device
* Manufacturer * Manufacturer
* Onboarding Information * Onboarding Information
skipping to change at page 4, line 32 skipping to change at page 4, line 49
1.4. Conventions 1.4. Conventions
Various examples used in this document use a placeholder value for Various examples used in this document use a placeholder value for
binary data that has been base64 encoded (e.g., "BASE64VALUE="). binary data that has been base64 encoded (e.g., "BASE64VALUE=").
This placeholder value is used as real base64 encoded structures are This placeholder value is used as real base64 encoded structures are
often many lines long and hence distracting to the example being often many lines long and hence distracting to the example being
presented. presented.
2. The "ietf-sztp-csr" Module 2. The "ietf-sztp-csr" Module
This section defines a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module that augments the The "ietf-sztp-csr" module is a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module that
"ietf-sztp-bootstrap-server" module defined in [RFC8572] and defines augments the "ietf-sztp-bootstrap-server" module defined in [RFC8572]
a YANG "structure". and defines a YANG "structure" that is to be conveyed in the "error-
info" node defined in Section 7.1 of [RFC8040].
The augmentation adds two nodes ("csr-support" and "csr") to the
"input" parameter of the "get-bootstrapping-data" RPC defined in
[RFC8572].
The YANG structure, "request-info", defines data returned in the
"error-info" node defined in Section 7.1 of [RFC8040].
2.1. Data Model Overview 2.1. Data Model Overview
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "ietf-sztp-csr" The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "ietf-sztp-csr"
module. The diagram shows the definition of an augmentation adding module.
descendant nodes "csr-support" and "csr" and the definition of a
structure called "request-info".
In the order of their intended use:
* The "csr-support" node is used by the SZTP-client to signal to the
SZTP-server that it supports the ability the generate CSRs, per
this specification. The "csr-support" parameter carries details
regarding the SZTP-client's ability to generate CSRs.
* The "request-info" structure is used by the SZTP-server to signal
back to the SZTP-client its desire to sign a CSR. The "request-
info" structure additionally communicates details about the CSR
the SZTP-client is to generate.
* The "csr" node is used by the SZTP-client to communicate its CSR
to the SZTP-server. Not shown is how the SZTP-server communicates
the signed certificate to the SZTP-client; how to do this is
discussed later in this document.
module: ietf-sztp-csr module: ietf-sztp-csr
augment /sztp-svr:get-bootstrapping-data/sztp-svr:input: augment /sztp-svr:get-bootstrapping-data/sztp-svr:input:
+---w (msg-type)? +---w (msg-type)?
+--:(csr-support) +--:(csr-support)
| +---w csr-support! | +---w csr-support
| +---w key-generation! | +---w key-generation!
| | +---w supported-algorithms | | +---w supported-algorithms
| | +---w algorithm-identifier* binary | | +---w algorithm-identifier* binary
| +---w csr-generation | +---w csr-generation
| +---w supported-formats | +---w supported-formats
| +---w format-identifier* identityref | +---w format-identifier* identityref
+--:(csr) +--:(csr)
+---w csr! +---w (csr-type)
+---w (request-type) +--:(p10-csr)
+--:(p10) | +---w p10-csr? ct:csr
| +---w p10? ct:csr +--:(cmc-csr)
+--:(cmc) | +---w cmc-csr? binary
| +---w cmc? binary +--:(cmp-csr)
+--:(cmp) +---w cmp-csr? binary
+---w cmp? binary
structure: request-info structure: csr-request
+--ro key-generation! +--ro key-generation!
| +--ro selected-algorithm | +--ro selected-algorithm
| +--ro algorithm-identifier binary | +--ro algorithm-identifier binary
+--ro csr-generation +--ro csr-generation
| +--ro selected-format | +--ro selected-format
| +--ro format-identifier identityref | +--ro format-identifier identityref
+--ro cert-req-info? ietf-crypto-types:csr-info +--ro csr-parameters? ietf-crypto-types:csr-info
The augmentation defines two kinds of parameters that an SZTP-client
can send to an SZTP-server. The YANG structure defines one
collection of parameters that an SZTP-server can send to an SZTP-
client.
In the order of their intended use:
* The "csr-support" node is used by the SZTP-client to signal to the
SZTP-server that it supports the ability the generate CSRs. This
parameter conveys if the SZTP-client is able to generate an new
asymmetric key and, if so, which key algorithms it supports, as
well as conveys what kinds of CSR structures the SZTP-client is
able to generate.
* The "csr-request" structure is used by the SZTP-server to request
the SZTP-client to generate a CSR. This structure is used to
select the key algorithm the SZTP-client should use to generate a
new asymmetric key, if supported, the kind of CSR structure the
SZTP-client should generate and, optionally, the content for the
CSR itself.
* The various "csr" nodes are used by the SZTP-client to communicate
a CSR to the SZTP-server.
| No data model is defined enabling an SZTP-server to communicate
| the signed certificate to the SZTP-client. How to do this is
| discussed in Section 2.2.
To further illustrate how the augmentation and structure defined by To further illustrate how the augmentation and structure defined by
the "ietf-sztp-csr" module are used, below are two additional tree the "ietf-sztp-csr" module are used, below are two additional tree
diagrams showing these nodes placed where they are used. diagrams showing these nodes placed where they are used.
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates SZTP's "get- The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates SZTP's "get-
bootstrapping-data" RPC with the augmentation in place. bootstrapping-data" RPC with the augmentation in place.
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================ =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
module: ietf-sztp-bootstrap-server module: ietf-sztp-bootstrap-server
rpcs: rpcs:
+---x get-bootstrapping-data +---x get-bootstrapping-data
+---w input +---w input
| +---w signed-data-preferred? empty | +---w signed-data-preferred? empty
| +---w hw-model? string | +---w hw-model? string
| +---w os-name? string | +---w os-name? string
| +---w os-version? string | +---w os-version? string
| +---w nonce? binary | +---w nonce? binary
| +---w (sztp-csr:msg-type)? | +---w (sztp-csr:msg-type)?
| +--:(sztp-csr:csr-support) | +--:(sztp-csr:csr-support)
| | +---w sztp-csr:csr-support! | | +---w sztp-csr:csr-support
| | +---w sztp-csr:key-generation! | | +---w sztp-csr:key-generation!
| | | +---w sztp-csr:supported-algorithms | | | +---w sztp-csr:supported-algorithms
| | | +---w sztp-csr:algorithm-identifier* bina\ | | | +---w sztp-csr:algorithm-identifier* bina\
ry ry
| | +---w sztp-csr:csr-generation | | +---w sztp-csr:csr-generation
| | +---w sztp-csr:supported-formats | | +---w sztp-csr:supported-formats
| | +---w sztp-csr:format-identifier* identit\ | | +---w sztp-csr:format-identifier* identit\
yref yref
| +--:(sztp-csr:csr) | +--:(sztp-csr:csr)
| +---w sztp-csr:csr! | +---w (sztp-csr:csr-type)
| +---w (sztp-csr:request-type) | +--:(sztp-csr:p10-csr)
| +--:(sztp-csr:p10) | | +---w sztp-csr:p10-csr? ct:csr
| | +---w sztp-csr:p10? ct:csr | +--:(sztp-csr:cmc-csr)
| +--:(sztp-csr:cmc) | | +---w sztp-csr:cmc-csr? binary
| | +---w sztp-csr:cmc? binary | +--:(sztp-csr:cmp-csr)
| +--:(sztp-csr:cmp) | +---w sztp-csr:cmp-csr? binary
| +---w sztp-csr:cmp? binary
+--ro output +--ro output
+--ro reporting-level? enumeration {onboarding-server}? +--ro reporting-level? enumeration {onboarding-server}?
+--ro conveyed-information cms +--ro conveyed-information cms
+--ro owner-certificate? cms +--ro owner-certificate? cms
+--ro ownership-voucher? cms +--ro ownership-voucher? cms
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates RESTCONF's "errors" The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates RESTCONF's "errors"
RPC-reply message with the "request-info" structure in place. RPC-reply message with the "csr-request" structure in place.
module: ietf-restconf module: ietf-restconf
+--ro errors +--ro errors
+--ro error* [] +--ro error* []
+--ro error-type enumeration +--ro error-type enumeration
+--ro error-tag string +--ro error-tag string
+--ro error-app-tag? string +--ro error-app-tag? string
+--ro error-path? instance-identifier +--ro error-path? instance-identifier
+--ro error-message? string +--ro error-message? string
+--ro error-info +--ro error-info
+--ro request-info +--ro csr-request
+--ro key-generation! +--ro key-generation!
| +--ro selected-algorithm | +--ro selected-algorithm
| +--ro algorithm-identifier binary | +--ro algorithm-identifier binary
+--ro csr-generation +--ro csr-generation
| +--ro selected-format | +--ro selected-format
| +--ro format-identifier identityref | +--ro format-identifier identityref
+--ro cert-req-info? ct:csr-info +--ro csr-parameters? ct:csr-info
2.2. Example Usage 2.2. Example Usage
| The examples below are encoded using JSON, but they could | The examples below are encoded using JSON, but they could
| equally well be encoded using XML, as is supported by SZTP. | equally well be encoded using XML, as is supported by SZTP.
An SZTP-client implementing this specification would signal to the An SZTP-client implementing this specification would signal to the
bootstrap server its willingness to generate a CSR by including the bootstrap server its willingness to generate a CSR by including the
"csr-support" node in its "get-bootstrapping-data" RPC, as "csr-support" node in its "get-bootstrapping-data" RPC, as
illustrated below. illustrated below.
skipping to change at page 8, line 30 skipping to change at page 9, line 30
"algorithm-identifier": [ "algorithm-identifier": [
"BASE64VALUE1", "BASE64VALUE1",
"BASE64VALUE2", "BASE64VALUE2",
"BASE64VALUE3" "BASE64VALUE3"
] ]
} }
}, },
"csr-generation": { "csr-generation": {
"supported-formats": { "supported-formats": {
"format-identifier": [ "format-identifier": [
"ietf-sztp-csr:p10", "ietf-ztp-types:p10-csr",
"ietf-sztp-csr:cmc", "ietf-ztp-types:cmc-csr",
"ietf-sztp-csr:cmp" "ietf-ztp-types:cmp-csr"
] ]
} }
} }
} }
} }
} }
Assuming the SZTP-server wishes to prompt the SZTP-client to provide Assuming the SZTP-server wishes to prompt the SZTP-client to provide
a CSR, then it would respond with an HTTP 400 Bad Request error code: a CSR, then it would respond with an HTTP 400 Bad Request error code:
skipping to change at page 9, line 17 skipping to change at page 10, line 17
Content-Type: application/yang.data+json Content-Type: application/yang.data+json
{ {
"ietf-restconf:errors" : { "ietf-restconf:errors" : {
"error" : [ "error" : [
{ {
"error-type": "application", "error-type": "application",
"error-tag": "missing-attribute", "error-tag": "missing-attribute",
"error-message": "Missing input parameter", "error-message": "Missing input parameter",
"error-info": { "error-info": {
"ietf-sztp-csr:request-info": { "ietf-sztp-csr:csr-request": {
"key-generation": { "key-generation": {
"selected-algorithm": { "selected-algorithm": {
"algorithm-identifier": "BASE64VALUE=" "algorithm-identifier": "BASE64VALUE="
} }
}, },
"csr-generation": { "csr-generation": {
"selected-format": { "selected-format": {
"format-identifier": "ietf-sztp-csr:cmc" "format-identifier": "ietf-ztp-types:p10-csr"
} }
}, },
"cert-req-info": "BASE64VALUE=" "csr-parameters": "BASE64VALUE="
} }
} }
} }
] ]
} }
} }
Upon being prompted to provide a CSR, the SZTP-client would POST Upon being prompted to provide a CSR, the SZTP-client would POST
another "get-bootstrapping-data" request, but this time including the another "get-bootstrapping-data" request, but this time including one
"csr" node to convey its CSR to the SZTP-server: of the "csr" nodes to convey its CSR to the SZTP-server:
REQUEST REQUEST
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================ =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
POST /restconf/operations/ietf-sztp-bootstrap-server:get-bootstrappi\ POST /restconf/operations/ietf-sztp-bootstrap-server:get-bootstrappi\
ng-data HTTP/1.1 ng-data HTTP/1.1
HOST: example.com HOST: example.com
Content-Type: application/yang.data+json Content-Type: application/yang.data+json
{ {
"ietf-sztp-bootstrap-server:input" : { "ietf-sztp-bootstrap-server:input" : {
"hw-model": "model-x", "hw-model": "model-x",
"os-name": "vendor-os", "os-name": "vendor-os",
"os-version": "17.3R2.1", "os-version": "17.3R2.1",
"nonce": "extralongbase64encodedvalue=", "nonce": "extralongbase64encodedvalue=",
"ietf-sztp-csr:csr": { "ietf-sztp-csr:p10-csr": "BASE64VALUE="
"p10": "BASE64VALUE="
}
} }
} }
The SZTP-server responds with "onboarding-information" (encoded The SZTP-server responds with "onboarding-information" (encoded
inside the "conveyed-information" node) containing a signed identity inside the "conveyed-information" node) containing a signed identity
certificate for the CSR provided by the SZTP-client: certificate for the CSR provided by the SZTP-client:
RESPONSE RESPONSE
HTTP/1.1 200 OK HTTP/1.1 200 OK
skipping to change at page 13, line 7 skipping to change at page 14, line 7
In addition to configuring the signed certificate, it is often In addition to configuring the signed certificate, it is often
necessary to also configure the Issuer's signing certificate so that necessary to also configure the Issuer's signing certificate so that
the device (i.e., STZP-client) can authenticate certificates the device (i.e., STZP-client) can authenticate certificates
presented by peer devices signed by the same issuer as its own. presented by peer devices signed by the same issuer as its own.
While outside the scope of this document, one way to do this would be While outside the scope of this document, one way to do this would be
to use the "ietf-truststore" module defined in to use the "ietf-truststore" module defined in
[I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors]. [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors].
2.3. YANG Module 2.3. YANG Module
This module augments an RPC defined in [RFC8572], uses a data type This module augments an RPC defined in [RFC8572]. The module uses a
defined in [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types], has normative references data types and groupings defined in [RFC8572], [RFC8791], and
to [RFC2986] and [ITU.X690.2015], and an informative reference to [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]. The module has additional normative
[Std-802.1AR-2018]. references to [RFC2986], [RFC5272], [RFC4210], and [ITU.X690.2015],
and an informative reference to [Std-802.1AR-2018].
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-sztp-csr@2021-07-07.yang" <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-sztp-csr@2021-08-15.yang"
module ietf-sztp-csr { module ietf-sztp-csr {
yang-version 1.1; yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-sztp-csr"; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-sztp-csr";
prefix sztp-csr; prefix sztp-csr;
import ietf-sztp-bootstrap-server { import ietf-sztp-bootstrap-server {
prefix sztp-svr; prefix sztp-svr;
reference reference
"RFC 8572: Secure Zero Touch Provisioning (SZTP)"; "RFC 8572: Secure Zero Touch Provisioning (SZTP)";
} }
import ietf-yang-structure-ext { import ietf-yang-structure-ext {
prefix sx; prefix sx;
reference reference
"RFC 8791: YANG Data Structure Extensions"; "RFC 8791: YANG Data Structure Extensions";
} }
import ietf-crypto-types { import ietf-ztp-types {
prefix ct; prefix zt;
reference reference
"RFC AAAA: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography"; "RFC XXXX: Conveying a Certificate Signing Request (CSR)
in a Secure Zero Touch Provisioning (SZTP)
Bootstrapping Request";
} }
organization organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group"; "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact contact
"WG Web: http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf "WG Web: http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf
WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org> WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
Authors: Kent Watsen <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net> Authors: Kent Watsen <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>
Russ Housley <mailto:housley@vigilsec.com> Russ Housley <mailto:housley@vigilsec.com>
Sean Turner <mailto:sean@sn3rd.com>"; Sean Turner <mailto:sean@sn3rd.com>";
description description
"This module augments the 'get-bootstrapping-data' RPC, "This module augments the 'get-bootstrapping-data' RPC,
defined in the 'ietf-sztp-bootstrap-server' module from defined in the 'ietf-sztp-bootstrap-server' module from
SZTP (RFC 8572), enabling the SZTP-client to obtain a SZTP (RFC 8572), enabling the SZTP-client to obtain a
signed identity certificate (e.g., an LDevID from IEEE signed identity certificate (e.g., an LDevID from IEEE
802.1AR) as part of the SZTP onboarding information 802.1AR) as part of the SZTP onboarding information
response. response.
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified
as authors of the code. All rights reserved. as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified
BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC
itself for full legal notices. itself for full legal notices.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this 'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14
(RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear
in all capitals, as shown here."; in all capitals, as shown here.";
revision 2021-07-07 { revision 2021-08-15 {
description description
"Initial version"; "Initial version";
reference reference
"RFC XXXX: Conveying a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) "RFC XXXX: Conveying a Certificate Signing Request (CSR)
in a Secure Zero Touch Provisioning (SZTP) in a Secure Zero Touch Provisioning (SZTP)
Bootstrapping Request"; Bootstrapping Request";
} }
identity certificate-request-format {
description
"A base identity for the request formats supported
by the SZTP-client.
Additional derived identities MAY be defined by
future efforts.";
}
identity p10 {
base certificate-request-format;
description
"Indicates that the SZTP-client supports generating
requests using the 'CertificationRequest' structure
defined in RFC 2986.";
reference
"RFC 2986: PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
Specification Version 1.7";
}
identity cmc {
base certificate-request-format;
description
"Indicates that the SZTP-client supports generating
requests using a constrained version of the 'Full
PKI Request' structure defined in RFC 5272.";
reference
"RFC 5272: Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)";
}
identity cmp {
base certificate-request-format;
description
"Indicates that the SZTP-client supports generating
requests that contain a PKCS#10 Certificate Signing
Request (p10cr), as defined in RFC 2986, encapsulated
in a Nested Message Content (nested), as defined in
RFC 4210.";
reference
"RFC 2986: PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
Specification Version 1.7
RFC 4210: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)";
}
// Protocol-accessible nodes // Protocol-accessible nodes
augment "/sztp-svr:get-bootstrapping-data/sztp-svr:input" { augment "/sztp-svr:get-bootstrapping-data/sztp-svr:input" {
description description
"This augmentation adds the 'csr-support' and 'csr' nodes to "This augmentation adds the 'csr-support' and 'csr' nodes to
the SZTP (RFC 8572) 'get-bootstrapping-data' request message, the SZTP (RFC 8572) 'get-bootstrapping-data' request message,
enabling the SZTP-client to obtain an identity certificate enabling the SZTP-client to obtain an identity certificate
(e.g., an LDevID from IEEE 802.1AR) as part of the onboarding (e.g., an LDevID from IEEE 802.1AR) as part of the onboarding
information response provided by the SZTP-server. information response provided by the SZTP-server.
skipping to change at page 16, line 8 skipping to change at page 16, line 14
to generate. to generate.
The 'csr' node enables the SZTP-client to relay a CSR to The 'csr' node enables the SZTP-client to relay a CSR to
the SZTP-server."; the SZTP-server.";
reference reference
"IEEE 802.1AR: IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan "IEEE 802.1AR: IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan
area networks - Secure Device Identity area networks - Secure Device Identity
RFC 8572: Secure Zero Touch Provisioning (SZTP)"; RFC 8572: Secure Zero Touch Provisioning (SZTP)";
choice msg-type { choice msg-type {
description description
"Only a 'csr-support' or a 'csr' message may be sent."; "Messages are mutually exclusive.";
container csr-support { case csr-support {
presence
"Indicates that the SZTP-client is capable of sending
CSRs.";
description description
"The 'csr-support' node enables the SZTP-client to "Indicates how the SZTP-client supports generating CSRs.
indicate that it supports generating certificate
signing requests (CSRs), and provide details around
the CSRs it is able to generate.
When present, the SZTP-server MAY respond with the HTTP
code 400 Bad Request with an 'ietf-restconf:errors'
document having the 'error-tag' value 'missing-attribute'
and the 'error-info' node containing the 'request-info'
structure described in this module.";
container key-generation {
presence
"Indicates that the SZTP-client is capable of
generating a new asymmetric key pair.
If this node is not present, the SZTP-server MAY
request a CSR using the asymmetric key associated
with the device's existing identity certificate
(e.g., an IDevID from IEEE 802.1AR).";
description
"Specifies details for the SZTP-client's ability to
generate a new asymmetric key pair.";
container supported-algorithms {
description
"A list of public key algorithms supported by the
SZTP-client for generating a new key.";
leaf-list algorithm-identifier {
type binary;
min-elements 1;
description
"An AlgorithmIdentifier, as defined in RFC 2986,
encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules
(DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986: PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
Specification Version 1.7
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), If present and a SZTP-server wishes to request the
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished SZTP-client generate a CSR, the SZTP-server MUST
Encoding Rules (DER)."; respond with HTTP code 400 Bad Request with an
} 'ietf-restconf:errors' message having the 'error-tag'
} value 'missing-attribute' and the 'error-info' node
} containing the 'csr-request' structure described
container csr-generation { in this module.";
description uses zt:csr-support-grouping;
"Specifies details for the SZTP-client's ability to
generate a certificate signing requests.";
container supported-formats {
description
"A list of certificate request formats supported
by the SZTP-client for generating a new key.";
leaf-list format-identifier {
type identityref {
base certificate-request-format;
}
min-elements 1;
description
"A certificate request format supported by the
SZTP-client.";
}
}
}
} }
container csr { case csr {
presence "Indicates that the SZTP-client has sent a CSR.";
description description
"The 'csr' node enables the SZTP-client to convey "Provides the CSR generated by the SZTP-client.
a certificate signing request, using the encoding
format selected by the SZTP-server's 'request-info'
response to the SZTP-client's previously sent
'get-bootstrapping-data' request containing the
'csr-support' node.
When present, the SZTP-server SHOULD respond with When present, the SZTP-server SHOULD respond with
an SZTP onboarding information message containing an SZTP onboarding information message containing
a signed certificate for the conveyed CSR. The a signed certificate for the conveyed CSR. The
SZTP-server MAY alternatively respond with another SZTP-server MAY alternatively respond with another
HTTP error containing another 'request-info', in HTTP error containing another 'csr-request', in
which case the SZTP-client MUST invalidate the CSR which case the SZTP-client MUST invalidate the
sent in this node."; previously generated CSR.";
choice request-type { uses zt:csr-grouping;
mandatory true; }
description }
"A choice amongst certificate signing request formats. }
Additional formats MAY be augmented into this 'choice' sx:structure csr-request {
statement by future efforts."; description
case p10 { "A YANG data structure, per RFC 8791, that specifies
leaf p10 { details for the CSR that the ZTP-client is to generate.";
type ct:csr; reference
description "RFC 8791: YANG Data Structure Extensions";
"A CertificationRequest structure, per RFC 2986. uses zt:csr-request-grouping;
Please see 'csr' in RFC AAAA for encoding details."; }
reference
"RFC 2986: PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification
RFC AAAA: YANG Data Types and Groupings
for Cryptography";
}
}
case cmc {
leaf cmc {
type binary;
description
"A constrained version of the 'Full PKI Request'
message defined in RFC 5272, encoded using ASN.1
distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified
in ITU-T X.690.
For asymmetric key-based origin authentication }
of a CSR based on the IDevID's private key for the
associated IDevID's public key, the PKIData contains
one reqSequence element and no controlSequence,
cmsSequence, or otherMsgSequence elements. The
reqSequence is the TaggedRequest and it is the tcr
CHOICE. The tcr is the TaggedCertificationRequest
and it a bodyPartId and the certificateRequest
elements. The certificateRequest is signed with
the IDevID's private key.
For asymmetric key-based origin authentication <CODE ENDS>
based on the IDevID's private key that encapsulates
a CSR signed by the LDevID's private key, the
PKIData contains one cmsSequence element and no
controlSequence, reqSequence, or otherMsgSequence
elements. The cmsSequence is the TaggedContentInfo
and it includes a bodyPartID element and a
contentInfo. The contentInfo is a SignedData
encapsulating a PKIData with one reqSequence
element and no controlSequence, cmsSequence, or
otherMsgSequence elements. The reqSequence is
the TaggedRequest and it is the tcr CHOICE. The
tcr is the TaggedCertificationRequest and it a
bodyPartId and the certificateRequest elements.
The certificateRequest is signed with the LDevID's
private key.
For shared secret-based origin authentication of 3. The "ietf-ztp-types" Module
a CSR signed by the LDevID's private key, the
PKIData contains one cmsSequence element and no
controlSequence, reqSequence, or otherMsgSequence
elements. The cmsSequence is the TaggedContentInfo
and it includes a bodyPartID element and a
contentInfo. The contentInfo is an AuthenticatedData
encapsulating a PKIData with one reqSequence
element and no controlSequence, cmsSequence, or
otherMsgSequence elements. The reqSequence is the
TaggedRequest and it is the tcr CHOICE. The tcr
is the TaggedCertificationRequest and it a
bodyPartId and the certificateRequest elements.
The certificateRequest is signed with the LDevID's
private key.";
reference
"RFC 5272: Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
case cmp {
leaf cmp {
type binary;
description
"A PKIMessage structure, as defined in RFC 4210,
encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules
(DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.
The PKIMessage structure contains a PKCS#10 This section defines a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module that defines three
Certificate Signing Request (p10cr), as defined in YANG groupings, one each for messages sent between a ZTP-client and
RFC 2986, encapsulated in a Nested Message Content ZTP-server. This module is defines independently of the "ietf-sztp-
(nested) structure, as defined in RFC 4210. csr" module so that it's groupings may be used by bootstrapping
protocols other than SZTP [RFC8572].
For asymmetric key-based origin authentication of 3.1. Data Model Overview
a CSR based on the IDevID's private key for the
associated IDevID's public key, PKIMessages contains
one PKIMessage with one body element, a header
element that is an empty sequence, and no protection
or extraCerts elements. The body element contains a
p10cr CHOICE.
For asymmetric key-based origin authentication based The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the three groupings
on the IDevID's private key that encapsulates a CSR defined in the "ietf-ztp-types" module.
signed by the LDevID's private key, PKIMessages
contains one PKIMessage with one header element,
one body element, one protection element, and one
extraCerts element. The header element contains
pvno, sender, recipient, and protectionAlg elements
and no other elements. The body element contains the
nested CHOICE. The nested element's PKIMessages
contains one PKIMessage with one body element, one
header element that is an empty sequence, and no
protection or extraCerts elements. The nested
element's body element contains a p10cr CHOICE. The
protection element contains the digital signature
generated with the IDevID's private key. The
extraCerts element contains the IDevID certificate.
For shared secret-based origin authentication of a module: ietf-ztp-types
CSR signed by the LDevID's private key, PKIMessages
contains one PKIMessage with one header element, grouping csr-support-grouping
one body element, one protection element, and no +-- csr-support
extraCerts element. The header element contains +-- key-generation!
pvno, sender, recipient, and protectionAlg elements | +-- supported-algorithms
and no other elements. The body element contains | +-- algorithm-identifier* binary
the nested CHOICE. The nested element's PKIMessages +-- csr-generation
contains one PKIMessage with one body element, one +-- supported-formats
header element that is an empty sequence, and no +-- format-identifier* identityref
protection or extraCerts elements. The body element grouping csr-request-grouping
contains a p10cr CHOICE. The protection element +-- key-generation!
contains the MAC value generated with the shared | +-- selected-algorithm
secret."; | +-- algorithm-identifier binary
reference +-- csr-generation
"RFC 2986: | +-- selected-format
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax | +-- format-identifier identityref
Specification Version 1.7 +-- csr-parameters? ct:csr-info
RFC 4210: grouping csr-grouping
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure +-- (csr-type)
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) +--:(p10-csr)
ITU-T X.690: | +-- p10-csr? ct:csr
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: +--:(cmc-csr)
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), | +-- cmc-csr? binary
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished +--:(cmp-csr)
Encoding Rules (DER)."; +-- cmp-csr? binary
3.2. YANG Module
This module uses a data types and groupings [RFC8791] and
[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]. The module has additional normative
references to [RFC2986], [RFC4210], [RFC5272], and [ITU.X690.2015],
and an informative reference to [Std-802.1AR-2018].
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-ztp-types@2021-08-15.yang"
module ietf-ztp-types {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ztp-types";
prefix zt;
import ietf-crypto-types {
prefix ct;
reference
"RFC AAAA: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
}
organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf
WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
Authors: Kent Watsen <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>
Russ Housley <mailto:housley@vigilsec.com>
Sean Turner <mailto:sean@sn3rd.com>";
description
"This module defines three groupings that enable
bootstrapping devices to 1) indicate if and how they
support generating CSRs, 2) obtain a request to
generate a CSR, and 3) communicate the requested CSR.
The terms 'IDevID' and 'LDevID' are used herein to
mean 'initial device identifier' and 'local device
identifer'. These terms are defined consistent with
the IEEE 802.1AR specification, though there is no
requirement that a ZTP-client's identity certificate
conform to IEEE 802.1AR.
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified
as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified
BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC
itself for full legal notices.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14
(RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear
in all capitals, as shown here.";
revision 2021-08-15 {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC XXXX: Conveying a Certificate Signing Request (CSR)
in a Secure Zero Touch Provisioning (SZTP)
Bootstrapping Request";
}
identity certificate-request-format {
description
"A base identity for the request formats supported
by the ZTP-client.
Additional derived identities MAY be defined by
future efforts.";
}
identity p10-csr {
base certificate-request-format;
description
"Indicates that the ZTP-client supports generating
requests using the 'CertificationRequest' structure
defined in RFC 2986.";
reference
"RFC 2986: PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
Specification Version 1.7";
}
identity cmp-csr {
base certificate-request-format;
description
"Indicates that the ZTP-client supports generating
requests using a constrained version of the PKIMessage
containing a p10cr structure defined in RFC 4210.";
reference
"RFC 4210: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)";
}
identity cmc-csr {
base certificate-request-format;
description
"Indicates that the ZTP-client supports generating
requests using a constrained version of the 'Full
PKI Request' structure defined in RFC 5272.";
reference
"RFC 5272: Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)";
}
// Protocol-accessible nodes
grouping csr-support-grouping {
description
"A grouping enabling use by other efforts.";
container csr-support {
description
"Enables a ZTP-client to indicate that it supports
generating certificate signing requests (CSRs) and
provides details about the CSRs it is able to
generate.";
container key-generation {
presence
"Indicates that the ZTP-client is capable of
generating a new asymmetric key pair.
If this node is not present, the ZTP-server MAY
request a CSR using the asymmetric key associated
with the device's existing identity certificate
(e.g., an IDevID from IEEE 802.1AR).";
description
"Specifies details for the ZTP-client's ability to
generate a new asymmetric key pair.";
container supported-algorithms {
description
"A list of public key algorithms supported by the
ZTP-client for generating a new asymmetric key.";
leaf-list algorithm-identifier {
type binary;
min-elements 1;
description
"An AlgorithmIdentifier, as defined in RFC 2986,
encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules
(DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986: PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
Specification Version 1.7
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
}
container csr-generation {
description
"Specifies details for the ZTP-client's ability to
generate a certificate signing requests.";
container supported-formats {
description
"A list of certificate request formats supported
by the ZTP-client for generating a new key.";
leaf-list format-identifier {
type identityref {
base zt:certificate-request-format;
} }
min-elements 1;
description
"A certificate request format supported by the
ZTP-client.";
} }
} }
} }
} }
} }
sx:structure request-info { grouping csr-request-grouping {
description
"A grouping enabling use by other efforts.";
container key-generation { container key-generation {
presence presence
"Indicates that the SZTP-client is to generate a new "Provided by a ZTP-server to indicate that it wishes
asymmetric key. If missing, then the SZTP-client the ZTP-client to generate a new asymmetric key.
MUST reuse the key associated with its existing
identity certificate (e.g., IDevID).
This leaf MUST only appear if the SZTP-clients This statement is present so the mandatory descendant
'csr-support' included the 'key-generation' node."; nodes do not imply that this node must be configured.";
description description
"A YANG data structure, per RFC 8791, that specifies "The key generation parameters selected by the ZTP-server.
details for the key that the SZTP-client is to
generate."; This leaf MUST only appear if the ZTP-client's
reference 'csr-support' included the 'key-generation' node.";
"RFC 8791: YANG Data Structure Extensions";
container selected-algorithm { container selected-algorithm {
description description
"The key algorithm selected by the SZTP-server. The "The key algorithm selected by the ZTP-server. The
algorithm MUST be one of the algorithms specified algorithm MUST be one of the algorithms specified by
by the 'supported-algorithms' node in the the 'supported-algorithms' node in the ZTP-client's
SZTP-client's request message."; message containing the 'csr-support' structure.";
leaf algorithm-identifier { leaf algorithm-identifier {
type binary; type binary;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"An AlgorithmIdentifier, as defined in RFC 2986, "An AlgorithmIdentifier, as defined in RFC 2986,
encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules
(DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690."; (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference reference
"RFC 2986: PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax "RFC 2986: PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
Specification Version 1.7 Specification Version 1.7
ITU-T X.690: ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER)."; Encoding Rules (DER).";
} }
} }
} }
container csr-generation { container csr-generation {
description description
"Specifies details for the CSR that the SZTP-client "Specifies details for the CSR that the ZTP-client
is to generate."; is to generate.";
container selected-format { container selected-format {
description description
"The CSR format selected by the SZTP-server. The "The CSR format selected by the ZTP-server. The
format MUST be one of the formats specified by format MUST be one of the formats specified by
the 'supported-formats' node in the SZTP-client's the 'supported-formats' node in the ZTP-client's
request message."; request message.";
leaf format-identifier { leaf format-identifier {
type identityref { type identityref {
base certificate-request-format; base zt:certificate-request-format;
} }
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"A certificate request format to be used by the "A certificate request format to be used by the
SZTP-client."; ZTP-client.";
} }
} }
} }
leaf cert-req-info { leaf csr-parameters {
type ct:csr-info; type ct:csr-info;
description description
"A CertificationRequestInfo structure, as defined in "A CertificationRequestInfo structure, as defined in
RFC 2986, and modeled via a 'typedef' statement by RFC 2986, and modeled via a 'typedef' statement by
RFC AAAA. RFC AAAA.
Enables the SZTP-server to provide a fully-populated Enables the ZTP-server to provide a fully-populated
CertificationRequestInfo structure that the SZTP-client CertificationRequestInfo structure that the ZTP-client
only needs to sign in order to generate the complete only needs to sign in order to generate the complete
'CertificationRequest' structure to send to SZTP-server 'CertificationRequest' structure to send to ZTP-server
in its next 'get-bootstrapping-data' request message. in its next 'get-bootstrapping-data' request message.
When provided, the SZTP-client SHOULD use this When provided, the ZTP-client SHOULD use this
structure to generate its CSR; failure to do so MAY structure to generate its CSR; failure to do so MAY
result in a 400 Bad Request response containing result in a 400 Bad Request response containing
another 'request-info' structure. another 'csr-request' structure.
When not provided, the SZTP-client SHOULD generate a When not provided, the ZTP-client SHOULD generate a
CSR using the same structure defined in its existing CSR using the same structure defined in its existing
identity certificate (e.g., IDevID). identity certificate (e.g., IDevID).
It is an error if the 'AlgorithmIdentifier' field It is an error if the 'AlgorithmIdentifier' field
contained inside the 'SubjectPublicKeyInfo' field contained inside the 'SubjectPublicKeyInfo' field
does not match the algorithm identified by the does not match the algorithm identified by the
'selected-algorithm' node."; 'selected-algorithm' node.";
reference reference
"RFC 2986: "RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
RFC AAAA: RFC AAAA:
YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography"; YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
} }
} }
grouping csr-grouping {
description
"Enables a ZTP-client to convey a certificate signing
request, using the encoding format selected by a
ZTP-server's 'csr-request' response to the ZTP-client's
previously sent 'get-bootstrapping-data' request
containing the 'csr-support' node.";
choice csr-type {
mandatory true;
description
"A choice amongst certificate signing request formats.
Additional formats MAY be augmented into this 'choice'
statement by future efforts.";
case p10-csr {
leaf p10-csr {
type ct:csr;
description
"A CertificationRequest structure, per RFC 2986.";
reference
"RFC 2986: PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification";
}
}
case cmc-csr {
leaf cmc-csr {
type binary;
description
"A constrained version of the 'Full PKI Request'
message defined in RFC 5272, encoded using ASN.1
distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified
in ITU-T X.690.
For asymmetric key-based origin authentication of
a CSR based on the IDevID's private key for the
associated IDevID's public key, the PKIData
contains one reqSequence element and no cmsSequence
or otherMsgSequence elements. The reqSequence is
the TaggedRequest and it is the tcr CHOICE. The
tcr is the TaggedCertificationRequest and it a
bodyPartId and the certificateRequest elements.
The certificateRequest is signed with the IDevID's
private key. The IDevID certificate and optionally
its certificate chain is included in the SignedData
certificates that encapsulates the PKIData.
For asymmetric key-based origin authentication
based on the IDevID's private key that signs the
encapsulated CSR signed by the LDevID's private key,
the PKIData contains one cmsSequence element and no
otherMsgSequence element. The cmsSequence is the
TaggedContentInfo and it includes a bodyPartID
element and a contentInfo. The contentInfo is
a SignedData encapsulating a PKIData with one
reqSequence element and no cmsSequence or
otherMsgSequence elements. The reqSequence is
the TaggedRequest and it is the tcr CHOICE. The
tcr is the TaggedCertificationRequest and it a
bodyPartId and the certificateRequest elements.
The certificateRequest is signed with the LDevID's
private key. The IDevID certificate and optionally
its certificate chain is included in the SignedData
certificates that encapsulates the PKIData.
For shared secret-based origin authentication of a
CSR signed by the LDevID's private key, the PKIData
contains one cmsSequence element and no reqSequence
or otherMsgSequence elements. The cmsSequence is
the TaggedContentInfo and it includes a bodyPartID
element and a contentInfo. The contentInfo is an
AuthenticatedData encapsulating a PKIData with one
reqSequence element and no cmsSequences or
otherMsgSequence elements. The reqSequence is the
TaggedRequest and it is the tcr CHOICE. The tcr is
the TaggedCertificationRequest and it a bodyPartId
and the certificateRequest elements. The
certificateRequest is signed with the LDevID's
private key. The IDevID certificate and optionally
its certificate chain is included in the SignedData
certificates that encapsulates the PKIData.";
reference
"RFC 5272: Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
case cmp-csr {
leaf cmp-csr {
type binary;
description
"A PKIMessage structure, as defined in RFC 4210,
encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules
(DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.
For asymmetric key-based origin authentication of
a CSR based on the IDevID's private key for the
associated IDevID's public key, PKIMessages
contains one PKIMessage with the header and body
elements, no protection element, and should contain
the extraCerts element. The header element contains
the pvno, sender, and recipient elements. The pvno
contains cmp2000, and the sender contains the
subject of the IDevID certificate. The body element
contains a p10cr CHOICE of type CertificationRequet.
It is signed with the IDevID's private key. The
extraCerts element contains the IDevID certificate,
optionally followed by its certificate chain
excluding the trust anchor.
For asymmetric key-based origin authentication
based on the IDevID's private key that signs the
encapsulated CSR signed by the LDevID's private
key, PKIMessages contains one PKIMessage with the
header, body, and protection elements, and should
contain the extraCerts element. The header element
contains the pvno, sender, recipient, protectionAlg,
and optionally senderKID elements. The pvno contains
cmp2000, the sender contains the subject of the
IDevID certificate, the protectionAlg contains the
AlgorithmIdentifier of the used signature algorithm,
and the senderKID contains the subject key
identifier of the IDevID certificate. The body
element contains a p10cr CHOICE of type
CertificationRequet. It is signed with the LDevID's
private key. The protection element contains the
digital signature generated with the IDevID's
private key. The extraCerts element contains the
IDevID certificate, optionally followed by its
certificate chain excluding the trust anchor.
For shared secret-based origin authentication of a
CSR signed by the LDevID's private key, PKIMessages
contains one PKIMessage with the header, body, and
protection element, and no extraCerts element. The
header element contains the pvno, sender, recipient,
protectionAlg, and senderKID elements. The pvno
contains cmp2000, the protectionAlg contains the
AlgorithmIdentifier of the used MAC algorithm, and
the senderKID contains a reference the recipient
can use to identify the shared secret. The body
element contains a p10cr CHOICE of type
CertificationRequet. It is signed with the LDevID's
private key. The protection element contains the
MAC value generated with the shared secret.";
reference
"RFC 4210:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
}
}
} }
<CODE ENDS> <CODE ENDS>
3. Security Considerations 4. Security Considerations
This document builds on top of the solution presented in [RFC8572] This document builds on top of the solution presented in [RFC8572]
and therefore all the Security Considerations discussed in RFC 8572 and therefore all the Security Considerations discussed in RFC 8572
apply here as well. apply here as well.
3.1. SZTP-Client Considerations 4.1. SZTP-Client Considerations
3.1.1. Ensuring the Integrity of Asymmetric Private Keys 4.1.1. Ensuring the Integrity of Asymmetric Private Keys
The private key the SZTP-client uses for the dynamically-generated The private key the SZTP-client uses for the dynamically-generated
identity certificate MUST be protected from inadvertent disclosure in identity certificate MUST be protected from inadvertent disclosure in
order to prevent identity fraud. order to prevent identity fraud.
The security of this private key is essential in order to ensure the The security of this private key is essential in order to ensure the
associated identity certificate can be used as a root of trust. associated identity certificate can be used as a root of trust.
It is RECOMMENDED that devices are manufactured with an HSM (hardware It is RECOMMENDED that devices are manufactured with an HSM (hardware
security module), such as a TPM (trusted platform module), to security module), such as a TPM (trusted platform module), to
generate and forever contain the private key within the security generate and forever contain the private key within the security
perimeter of the HSM. In such cases, the private key, and its perimeter of the HSM. In such cases, the private key, and its
associated certificates, MAY have long validity periods. associated certificates, MAY have long validity periods.
In cases where the device does not possess an HSM, or otherwise is In cases where the SZTP-client does not possess an HSM, or otherwise
unable to use an HSM for the private key, it is RECOMMENDED to is unable to use an HSM for the private key, it is RECOMMENDED to
regenerate the private key (and associated identity certificates) regenerate the private key (and associated identity certificates)
periodically. Details for how to generate a new private key and periodically. Details for how to generate a new private key and
associate a new identity certificate are outside the scope of this associate a new identity certificate are outside the scope of this
document. document.
3.1.2. Reuse of a Manufacturer-generated Private Key 4.1.2. Reuse of a Manufacturer-generated Private Key
It is RECOMMENDED that a new private key is generated for each CSR It is RECOMMENDED that a new private key is generated for each CSR
described in this document. described in this document.
This private key SHOULD be protected as well as the built-in private This private key SHOULD be protected as well as the built-in private
key associated with the device's initial secure device identity key associated with the SZTP-client's initial device identity
certificate (e.g., the IDevID, from [Std-802.1AR-2018]). certificate (e.g., the IDevID, from [Std-802.1AR-2018]).
In cases where it is not possible to generate a new private key that In cases where it is not possible to generate a new private key that
is protected as well as the built-in private key, it is RECOMMENDED is protected as well as the built-in private key, it is RECOMMENDED
to reuse the built-in private key rather than generate a new private to reuse the built-in private key rather than generate a new private
key that is not as well protected. key that is not as well protected.
3.1.3. Replay Attack Protection 4.1.3. Replay Attack Protection
This RFC enables an SZTP-client to announce an ability to generate a This RFC enables an SZTP-client to announce an ability to generate a
new key to use for its CSR. new key to use for its CSR.
When the SZTP-server responds with a request for the device to When the SZTP-server responds with a request for the SZTP-client to
generate a new key, it is essential that the device actually generate a new key, it is essential that the SZTP-client actually
generates a new key. generates a new key.
Generating a new key each time enables the random bytes used to Generating a new key each time enables the random bytes used to
create the key to also serve the dual-purpose of acting like a create the key to also serve the dual-purpose of acting like a
"nonce" used in other mechanisms to detect replay attacks. "nonce" used in other mechanisms to detect replay attacks.
When a fresh public/private key pair is generated for the request, When a fresh public/private key pair is generated for the request,
confirmation to the SZTP-client that the response has not been confirmation to the SZTP-client that the response has not been
replayed is enabled by the SZTP-client's fresh public key appearing replayed is enabled by the SZTP-client's fresh public key appearing
in the signed certificate provided by the SZTP-server. in the signed certificate provided by the SZTP-server.
When a public/private key pair associated with the manufacturer- When a public/private key pair associated with the manufacturer-
generated identity certificate (e.g., IDevID) is used for the generated identity certificate (e.g., IDevID) is used for the
request, there may not be confirmation to the SZTP-client that the request, there may not be confirmation to the SZTP-client that the
response has not been replayed; however, the worst case result is a response has not been replayed; however, the worst case result is a
lost certificate that is associated to the private key known only to lost certificate that is associated to the private key known only to
the SZTP-client. the SZTP-client.
3.1.4. Connecting to an Untrusted Bootstrap Server 4.1.4. Connecting to an Untrusted Bootstrap Server
[RFC8572] allows SZTP-clients to connect to untrusted SZTP-servers, [RFC8572] allows SZTP-clients to connect to untrusted SZTP-servers,
by blindly authenticating the SZTP-server's TLS end-entity by blindly authenticating the SZTP-server's TLS end-entity
certificate. certificate.
As is discussed in Section 9.5 of [RFC8572], in such cases the SZTP- As is discussed in Section 9.5 of [RFC8572], in such cases the SZTP-
client MUST assert that the bootstrapping data returned is signed, if client MUST assert that the bootstrapping data returned is signed, if
the SZTP-client is to trust it. the SZTP-client is to trust it.
However, the HTTP error message used in this document cannot be However, the HTTP error message used in this document cannot be
skipping to change at page 25, line 5 skipping to change at page 29, line 11
Therefore, the solution presented in this document cannot be used Therefore, the solution presented in this document cannot be used
when the SZTP-client connects to an untrusted SZTP-server. when the SZTP-client connects to an untrusted SZTP-server.
Consistent with the recommendation presented in Section 9.6 of Consistent with the recommendation presented in Section 9.6 of
[RFC8572], SZTP-clients SHOULD NOT pass the "csr-support" input [RFC8572], SZTP-clients SHOULD NOT pass the "csr-support" input
parameter to an untrusted SZTP-server. SZTP-clients SHOULD pass parameter to an untrusted SZTP-server. SZTP-clients SHOULD pass
instead the "signed-data-preferred" input parameter, as discussed in instead the "signed-data-preferred" input parameter, as discussed in
Appendix B of [RFC8572]. Appendix B of [RFC8572].
3.1.5. Selecting the Best Origin Authentication Mechanism 4.1.5. Selecting the Best Origin Authentication Mechanism
When generating a new key, it is important that the client be able to When generating a new key, it is important that the client be able to
provide additional proof to the CA that it was the entity that provide additional proof to the CA that it was the entity that
generated the key. generated the key.
All the certificate request formats defined in this document (e.g., All the certificate request formats defined in this document (e.g.,
CMC, CMP, etc.), not including a raw PKCS#10, support origin CMC, CMP, etc.), not including a raw PKCS#10, support origin
authentication. authentication.
These formats support origin authentication using both PKI and shared These formats support origin authentication using both PKI and shared
skipping to change at page 25, line 29 skipping to change at page 29, line 35
possibly be used but, in the case that the SZTP-client authenticates possibly be used but, in the case that the SZTP-client authenticates
itself using both TLS-level (e.g., IDevID) and HTTP-level credentials itself using both TLS-level (e.g., IDevID) and HTTP-level credentials
(e.g., Basic), as is allowed by Section 5.3 of [RFC8572], then the (e.g., Basic), as is allowed by Section 5.3 of [RFC8572], then the
SZTP-client may need to choose between the two options. SZTP-client may need to choose between the two options.
In the case that the SZTP-client must choose between the asymmetric In the case that the SZTP-client must choose between the asymmetric
key option versus a shared secret for origin authentication, it is key option versus a shared secret for origin authentication, it is
RECOMMENDED that the SZTP-client choose using the asymmetric key RECOMMENDED that the SZTP-client choose using the asymmetric key
option. option.
3.1.6. Clearing the Private Key and Associated Certificate 4.1.6. Clearing the Private Key and Associated Certificate
Unlike a manufacturer-generated identity certificate (e.g., IDevID), Unlike a manufacturer-generated identity certificate (e.g., IDevID),
the deployment-generated identity certificate (e.g., LDevID) and the the deployment-generated identity certificate (e.g., LDevID) and the
associated private key (assuming a new private key was generated for associated private key (assuming a new private key was generated for
the purpose), are considered user data and SHOULD be cleared whenever the purpose), are considered user data and SHOULD be cleared whenever
the device is reset to its factory default state, such as by the the SZTP-client is reset to its factory default state, such as by the
"factory-reset" RPC defined in [I-D.ietf-netmod-factory-default]. "factory-reset" RPC defined in [I-D.ietf-netmod-factory-default].
3.2. SZTP-Server Considerations 4.2. SZTP-Server Considerations
3.2.1. Conveying Proof of Possession to a CA 4.2.1. Conveying Proof of Possession to a CA
When the bootstrapping device's manufacturer-generated private key When the bootstrapping device's manufacturer-generated private key
(e.g., the IDevID key) is reused, a CA may validate that the CSR was (e.g., the IDevID key) is reused, a CA may validate that the CSR was
signed by that key. signed by that key.
Both the CMP and CMC formats entail the bootstrapping device signing Both the CMP and CMC formats entail the bootstrapping device signing
the request once with its (e.g., LDevID) key and then again with its the request once with its (e.g., LDevID) key and then again with its
(e.g., IDevID) key, which enables a downstream CA to be assured that (e.g., IDevID) key, which enables a downstream CA to be assured that
the device possesses the public key being signed. the bootstrapping device possesses the public key being signed.
3.2.2. Supporting SZTP-Clients that don't trust the SZTP-Server 4.2.2. Supporting SZTP-Clients that don't trust the SZTP-Server
[RFC8572] allows SZTP-clients to connect to untrusted SZTP-servers, [RFC8572] allows SZTP-clients to connect to untrusted SZTP-servers,
by blindly authenticating the SZTP-server's TLS end-entity by blindly authenticating the SZTP-server's TLS end-entity
certificate. certificate.
As is recommended in Section 3.1.4 in this document, in such cases, As is recommended in Section 4.1.4 in this document, in such cases,
SZTP-clients SHOULD pass the "signed-data-preferred" input parameter. SZTP-clients SHOULD pass the "signed-data-preferred" input parameter.
The reciprocal of this statement is that SZTP-servers, wanting to The reciprocal of this statement is that SZTP-servers, wanting to
support SZTP-clients that don't trust them, SHOULD support the support SZTP-clients that don't trust them, SHOULD support the
"signed-data-preferred" input parameter, as discussed in Appendix B "signed-data-preferred" input parameter, as discussed in Appendix B
of [RFC8572]. of [RFC8572].
3.2.3. YANG Module Considerations 4.3. Security Considerations for the "ietf-sztp-csr" YANG Module
The recommended format for documenting the Security Considerations The recommended format for documenting the Security Considerations
for YANG modules is described in Section 3.7 of [RFC8407]. However, for YANG modules is described in Section 3.7 of [RFC8407]. However,
the module defined in this document only augments two input this module only augments two input parameters into the "get-
parameters into the "get-bootstrapping-data" RPC in [RFC8572], and bootstrapping-data" RPC in [RFC8572], and therefore only needs to
therefore only needs to point to the relevant Security Considerations point to the relevant Security Considerations sections in that RFC.
sections in that RFC.
* Security considerations for the "get-bootstrapping-data" RPC are * Security considerations for the "get-bootstrapping-data" RPC are
described in Section 9.16 of [RFC8572]. described in Section 9.16 of [RFC8572].
* Security considerations for the "input" parameters passed inside * Security considerations for the "input" parameters passed inside
the "get-bootstrapping-data" RPC are described in Section 9.6 of the "get-bootstrapping-data" RPC are described in Section 9.6 of
[RFC8572]. [RFC8572].
4. IANA Considerations 4.4. Security Considerations for the "ietf-ztp-types" YANG Module
4.1. The "IETF XML" Registry The recommended format for documenting the Security Considerations
for YANG modules is described in Section 3.7 of [RFC8407]. However,
this module does not define any protocol-accessible nodes (it only
defines "identity" and "grouping" statements) and therefore there are
no Security considerations to report.
This document registers one URI in the "ns" subregistry of the IETF 5. IANA Considerations
5.1. The "IETF XML" Registry
This document registers two URIs in the "ns" subregistry of the IETF
XML Registry [RFC3688] maintained at XML Registry [RFC3688] maintained at
https://www.iana.org/assignments/xml-registry/xml-registry.xhtml#ns. https://www.iana.org/assignments/xml-registry/xml-registry.xhtml#ns.
Following the format in [RFC3688], the following registration is Following the format in [RFC3688], the following registrations are
requested: requested:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-sztp-csr URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-sztp-csr
Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF. Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace. XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
4.2. The "YANG Module Names" Registry URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ztp-types
Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
This document registers one YANG module in the YANG Module Names 5.2. The "YANG Module Names" Registry
This document registers two YANG modules in the YANG Module Names
registry [RFC6020] maintained at https://www.iana.org/assignments/ registry [RFC6020] maintained at https://www.iana.org/assignments/
yang-parameters/yang-parameters.xhtml. Following the format defined yang-parameters/yang-parameters.xhtml. Following the format defined
in [RFC6020], the below registration is requested: in [RFC6020], the below registrations are requested:
name: ietf-sztp-csr name: ietf-sztp-csr
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-sztp-csr namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-sztp-csr
prefix: sztp-csr prefix: sztp-csr
reference: RFC XXXX reference: RFC XXXX
5. References name: ietf-ztp-types
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ztp-types
prefix: ztp-types
reference: RFC XXXX
5.1. Normative References 6. References
6.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types] [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]
Watsen, K., "YANG Data Types and Groupings for Watsen, K., "YANG Data Types and Groupings for
Cryptography", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- Cryptography", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-netconf-crypto-types-19, 10 February 2021, ietf-netconf-crypto-types-20, 18 May 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-
crypto-types-19>. crypto-types-20>.
[ITU.X690.2015] [ITU.X690.2015]
International Telecommunication Union, "Information International Telecommunication Union, "Information
Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic
Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation
X.690, ISO/IEC 8825-1, August 2015, X.690, ISO/IEC 8825-1, August 2015,
<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690/>. <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690/>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
skipping to change at page 28, line 5 skipping to change at page 32, line 22
[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification [RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000, DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, [RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
[RFC4210] Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4210, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4210>.
[RFC5272] Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS
(CMC)", RFC 5272, DOI 10.17487/RFC5272, June 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5272>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for [RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010, DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.
[RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language", [RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016, RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.
[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF [RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
skipping to change at page 28, line 27 skipping to change at page 33, line 10
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8572] Watsen, K., Farrer, I., and M. Abrahamsson, "Secure Zero [RFC8572] Watsen, K., Farrer, I., and M. Abrahamsson, "Secure Zero
Touch Provisioning (SZTP)", RFC 8572, Touch Provisioning (SZTP)", RFC 8572,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8572, April 2019, DOI 10.17487/RFC8572, April 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8572>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8572>.
5.2. Informative References [RFC8791] Bierman, A., Björklund, M., and K. Watsen, "YANG Data
Structure Extensions", RFC 8791, DOI 10.17487/RFC8791,
June 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8791>.
6.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore] [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore]
Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Keystore", Work in Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Keystore", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-21, Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-22,
10 February 2021, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/ 18 May 2021, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-21>. ietf-netconf-keystore-22>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors]
Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Truststore", Work in Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Truststore", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-trust- Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-trust-
anchors-14, 10 February 2021, anchors-15, 18 May 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-
trust-anchors-14>. trust-anchors-15>.
[I-D.ietf-netmod-factory-default] [I-D.ietf-netmod-factory-default]
Wu, Q., Lengyel, B., and Y. Niu, "A YANG Data Model for Wu, Q., Lengyel, B., and Y. Niu, "A YANG Data Model for
Factory Default Settings", Work in Progress, Internet- Factory Default Settings", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-netmod-factory-default-15, 25 April Draft, draft-ietf-netmod-factory-default-15, 25 April
2020, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf- 2020, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
netmod-factory-default-15>. netmod-factory-default-15>.
[RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams", [RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018, BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
skipping to change at page 29, line 16 skipping to change at page 34, line 5
Documents Containing YANG Data Models", BCP 216, RFC 8407, Documents Containing YANG Data Models", BCP 216, RFC 8407,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8407, October 2018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8407, October 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8407>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8407>.
[Std-802.1AR-2018] [Std-802.1AR-2018]
Group, W. -. H. L. L. P. W., "IEEE Standard for Local and Group, W. -. H. L. L. P. W., "IEEE Standard for Local and
metropolitan area networks - Secure Device Identity", 14 metropolitan area networks - Secure Device Identity", 14
June 2018, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/ June 2018, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
standard/802.1AR-2018.html>. standard/802.1AR-2018.html>.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions
on list and in the halls (ordered by first name): David von Oheimb,
Hendrik Brockhaus, Guy Fedorkow, Joe Clarke, Rich Salz, Rob Wilton,
and Qin Wu.
Contributors
Special thanks goes to David von Oheimb and Hendrik Brockhaus for
helping with the descriptions for the "cmc-csr" and "cmp-csr" nodes.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Kent Watsen Kent Watsen
Watsen Networks Watsen Networks
Email: kent+ietf@watsen.net Email: kent+ietf@watsen.net
Russ Housley Russ Housley
Vigil Security, LLC Vigil Security, LLC
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