< draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-04.txt		draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-05.txt >
	OAuth Working Group Y. Sheffer		OAuth Working Group Y. Sheffer
	Internet-Draft Intuit		Internet-Draft Intuit
	Intended status: Best Current Practice D. Hardt		Intended status: Best Current Practice D. Hardt
	Expires: May 12, 2019 Amazon		Expires: October 18, 2019
	M. Jones		M. Jones
	Microsoft		Microsoft
	November 08, 2018		April 16, 2019
	JSON Web Token Best Current Practices		JSON Web Token Best Current Practices
	draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-04		draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-05
	Abstract		Abstract
	JSON Web Tokens, also known as JWTs, are URL-safe JSON-based security		JSON Web Tokens, also known as JWTs, are URL-safe JSON-based security
	tokens that contain a set of claims that can be signed and/or		tokens that contain a set of claims that can be signed and/or
	encrypted. JWTs are being widely used and deployed as a simple		encrypted. JWTs are being widely used and deployed as a simple
	security token format in numerous protocols and applications, both in		security token format in numerous protocols and applications, both in
	the area of digital identity, and in other application areas. The		the area of digital identity, and in other application areas. The
	goal of this Best Current Practices document is to provide actionable		goal of this Best Current Practices document is to provide actionable
	guidance leading to secure implementation and deployment of JWTs.		guidance leading to secure implementation and deployment of JWTs.
	skipping to change at page 1, line 39 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 39 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on May 12, 2019.		This Internet-Draft will expire on October 18, 2019.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	1.1. Target Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1.1. Target Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	1.2. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		1.2. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	2. Threats and Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2. Threats and Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	2.1. Weak Signatures and Insufficient Signature Validation . . 4		2.1. Weak Signatures and Insufficient Signature Validation . . 4
	2.2. Weak symmetric keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2.2. Weak symmetric keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	2.3. Multiplicity of JSON encodings . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		2.3. Multiplicity of JSON encodings . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	2.4. Incorrect Composition of Encryption and Signature . . . . 5		2.4. Incorrect Composition of Encryption and Signature . . . . 5
	2.5. Insecure Use of Elliptic Curve Encryption . . . . . . . . 5		2.5. Insecure Use of Elliptic Curve Encryption . . . . . . . . 5
	2.6. Substitution Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		2.6. Substitution Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	2.7. Cross-JWT Confusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		2.7. Cross-JWT Confusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	3. Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3. Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	3.1. Perform Algorithm Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3.1. Perform Algorithm Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	3.2. Use Appropriate Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3.2. Use Appropriate Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	3.3. Validate All Cryptographic Operations . . . . . . . . . . 7		3.3. Validate All Cryptographic Operations . . . . . . . . . . 7
	3.4. Validate Cryptographic Inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		3.4. Validate Cryptographic Inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	3.5. Ensure Cryptographic Keys have Sufficient Entropy . . . . 8		3.5. Ensure Cryptographic Keys have Sufficient Entropy . . . . 8
	3.6. Avoid Length-Dependent Encryption Inputs . . . . . . . . 8		3.6. Avoid Length-Dependent Encryption Inputs . . . . . . . . 8
	3.7. Use UTF-8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		3.7. Use UTF-8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3.8. Validate Issuer and Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		3.8. Validate Issuer and Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3.9. Use and Validate Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		3.9. Use and Validate Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	skipping to change at page 2, line 44 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 44 ¶
	3.11. Use Explicit Typing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		3.11. Use Explicit Typing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	3.12. Use Mutually Exclusive Validation Rules for Different		3.12. Use Mutually Exclusive Validation Rules for Different
	Kinds of JWTs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		Kinds of JWTs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	A.1. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		A.1. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	A.2. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		A.2. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	A.3. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		A.3. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	A.4. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		A.4. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	A.5. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		A.5. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	A.6. draft-sheffer-oauth-jwt-bcp-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		A.6. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	A.7. draft-sheffer-oauth-jwt-bcp-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		A.7. draft-sheffer-oauth-jwt-bcp-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
			A.8. draft-sheffer-oauth-jwt-bcp-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	JSON Web Tokens, also known as JWTs [RFC7519], are URL-safe JSON-		JSON Web Tokens, also known as JWTs [RFC7519], are URL-safe JSON-
	based security tokens that contain a set of claims that can be signed		based security tokens that contain a set of claims that can be signed
	and/or encrypted. The JWT specification has seen rapid adoption		and/or encrypted. The JWT specification has seen rapid adoption
	because it encapsulates security-relevant information in one, easy to		because it encapsulates security-relevant information in one, easy to
	protect location, and because it is easy to implement using widely-		protect location, and because it is easy to implement using widely-
	available tools. One application area in which JWTs are commonly		available tools. One application area in which JWTs are commonly
	skipping to change at page 5, line 11 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 20 ¶
	attacks [Langkemper].		attacks [Langkemper].
	For mitigations, see Section 3.5.		For mitigations, see Section 3.5.
	2.3. Multiplicity of JSON encodings		2.3. Multiplicity of JSON encodings
	Previous versions of the JSON format [RFC8259] allowed several		Previous versions of the JSON format [RFC8259] allowed several
	different character encodings: UTF-8, UTF-16 and UTF-32. This is not		different character encodings: UTF-8, UTF-16 and UTF-32. This is not
	the case anymore, with the latest standard only allowing UTF-8.		the case anymore, with the latest standard only allowing UTF-8.
	However older implementations may result in the JWT being		However older implementations may result in the JWT being
	misinterpreted by its recipient.		misinterpreted by its recipient, and this could be used by a
			malicious sender to bypass the recipient's validation checks.
	For mitigations, see Section 3.7.		For mitigations, see Section 3.7.
	2.4. Incorrect Composition of Encryption and Signature		2.4. Incorrect Composition of Encryption and Signature
	Some libraries that decrypt a JWE-encrypted JWT to obtain a JWS-		Some libraries that decrypt a JWE-encrypted JWT to obtain a JWS-
	signed object do not always validate the internal signature.		signed object do not always validate the internal signature.
	For mitigations, see Section 3.3.		For mitigations, see Section 3.3.
	skipping to change at page 8, line 24 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 29 ¶
	encryption, password-based encryption is still subject to brute-force		encryption, password-based encryption is still subject to brute-force
	attacks.		attacks.
	3.6. Avoid Length-Dependent Encryption Inputs		3.6. Avoid Length-Dependent Encryption Inputs
	Many encryption algorithms leak information about the length of the		Many encryption algorithms leak information about the length of the
	plaintext, with a varying amount of leakage depending on the		plaintext, with a varying amount of leakage depending on the
	algorithm and mode of operation. Sensitive information, such as		algorithm and mode of operation. Sensitive information, such as
	passwords, SHOULD be padded before being encrypted. It is		passwords, SHOULD be padded before being encrypted. It is
	RECOMMENDED to avoid any compression of data before encryption since		RECOMMENDED to avoid any compression of data before encryption since
	such compression often reveals information about the plaintext.		such compression often reveals information about the plaintext. See
			[Kelsey] for general background on compression and encryption, and
			[Alawatugoda] for a specific example of attacks on HTTP cookies.
	3.7. Use UTF-8		3.7. Use UTF-8
	[RFC7515], [RFC7516], and [RFC7519] all specify that UTF-8 be used		[RFC7515], [RFC7516], and [RFC7519] all specify that UTF-8 be used
	for encoding and decoding JSON used in Header Parameters and JWT		for encoding and decoding JSON used in Header Parameters and JWT
	Claims Sets. This is also in line with the latest JSON specification		Claims Sets. This is also in line with the latest JSON specification
	[RFC8259]. Implementations and applications MUST do this, and not		[RFC8259]. Implementations and applications MUST do this, and not
	use or admit the use of other Unicode encodings for these purposes.		use or admit the use of other Unicode encodings for these purposes.
	3.8. Validate Issuer and Subject		3.8. Validate Issuer and Subject
	skipping to change at page 9, line 4 ¶		skipping to change at page 9, line 12 ¶
	are "https" URLs that reference a JSON metadata document that		are "https" URLs that reference a JSON metadata document that
	contains a "jwks_uri" value that is an "https" URL from which the		contains a "jwks_uri" value that is an "https" URL from which the
	issuer's keys are retrieved as a JWK Set [RFC7517]. This same		issuer's keys are retrieved as a JWK Set [RFC7517]. This same
	mechanism is used by [I-D.ietf-oauth-discovery]. Other applications		mechanism is used by [I-D.ietf-oauth-discovery]. Other applications
	may use different means of binding keys to issuers.		may use different means of binding keys to issuers.
	Similarly, when the JWT contains a "sub" (subject) claim, the		Similarly, when the JWT contains a "sub" (subject) claim, the
	application MUST validate that the subject value corresponds to a		application MUST validate that the subject value corresponds to a
	valid subject and/or issuer/subject pair at the application. This		valid subject and/or issuer/subject pair at the application. This
	may include confirming that the issuer is trusted by the application.		may include confirming that the issuer is trusted by the application.
	If the issuer, subject, or the pair are invalid, the application MUST		If the issuer, subject, or the pair are invalid, the application MUST
	reject the JWT.		reject the JWT.
	3.9. Use and Validate Audience		3.9. Use and Validate Audience
	If the same issuer can issue JWTs that are intended for use by more		If the same issuer can issue JWTs that are intended for use by more
	than one relying party or application, the JWT MUST contain an "aud"		than one relying party or application, the JWT MUST contain an "aud"
	(audience) claim that can be used to determine whether the JWT is		(audience) claim that can be used to determine whether the JWT is
	being used by an intended party or was substituted by an attacker at		being used by an intended party or was substituted by an attacker at
	an unintended party. Furthermore, the relying party or application		an unintended party. Furthermore, the relying party or application
	MUST validate the audience value and if the audience value is not		MUST validate the audience value and if the audience value is not
	present or not associated with the recipient, it MUST reject the JWT.		present or not associated with the recipient, it MUST reject the JWT.
	3.10. Do Not Trust Received Claims		3.10. Do Not Trust Received Claims
	The "kid" (key ID) header is used by the relying application to		The "kid" (key ID) header is used by the relying application to
	perform key lookup. Applications should ensure that this does not		perform key lookup. Applications should ensure that this does not
	create SQL or LDAP injection vulnerabilities.		create SQL or LDAP injection vulnerabilities, by validating and/or
			sanitizing the received value.
	Similarly, blindly following a "jku" (JWK set URL) header, which may		Similarly, blindly following a "jku" (JWK set URL) header, which may
	contain an arbitrary URL, could result in server-side request forgery		contain an arbitrary URL, could result in server-side request forgery
	(SSRF) attacks.		(SSRF) attacks. Applications should protect against such attacks,
			e.g., by matching the URL to a whitelist of allowed locations, and
			ensuring no cookies are sent in the GET request.
	3.11. Use Explicit Typing		3.11. Use Explicit Typing
	Confusion of one kind of JWT for another can be prevented by having		Confusion of one kind of JWT for another can be prevented by having
	all the kinds of JWTs that could otherwise potentially be confused		all the kinds of JWTs that could otherwise potentially be confused
	include an explicit JWT type value and include checking the type		include an explicit JWT type value and include checking the type
	value in their validation rules. Explicit JWT typing is accomplished		value in their validation rules. Explicit JWT typing is accomplished
	by using the "typ" header parameter. For instance, the		by using the "typ" header parameter. For instance, the
	[I-D.ietf-secevent-token] specification uses the "application/		[I-D.ietf-secevent-token] specification uses the "application/
	secevent+jwt" media type to perform explicit typing of Security Event		secevent+jwt" media type to perform explicit typing of Security Event
	skipping to change at page 11, line 20 ¶		skipping to change at page 11, line 30 ¶
	5. IANA Considerations		5. IANA Considerations
	This document requires no IANA actions.		This document requires no IANA actions.
	6. Acknowledgements		6. Acknowledgements
	Thanks to Antonio Sanso for bringing the "ECDH-ES" invalid point		Thanks to Antonio Sanso for bringing the "ECDH-ES" invalid point
	attack to the attention of JWE and JWT implementers. Tim McLean		attack to the attention of JWE and JWT implementers. Tim McLean
	published the RSA/HMAC confusion attack. Thanks to Nat Sakimura for		published the RSA/HMAC confusion attack. Thanks to Nat Sakimura for
	advocating the use of explicit typing. Thanks to Neil Madden for his		advocating the use of explicit typing. Thanks to Neil Madden for his
	numerous comments, and to Carsten Bormann, Brian Campbell and Eric		numerous comments, and to Carsten Bormann, Brian Campbell, Brian
	Rescorla for their reviews.		Carpenter and Eric Rescorla for their reviews.
	7. References		7. References
	7.1. Normative References		7.1. Normative References
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	skipping to change at page 12, line 21 ¶		skipping to change at page 12, line 33 ¶
	2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,		2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
	May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.		May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
	[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data		[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
	Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,		Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,		DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
	7.2. Informative References		7.2. Informative References
			[Alawatugoda]
			Alawatugoda, J., Stebila, D., and C. Boyd, "Protecting
			Encrypted Cookies from Compression Side-Channel Attacks",
			Financial Cryptography and Data Security pp. 86-106,
			DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-47854-7_6, 2015.
	[I-D.ietf-oauth-discovery]		[I-D.ietf-oauth-discovery]
	Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0		Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0
	Authorization Server Metadata", draft-ietf-oauth-		Authorization Server Metadata", draft-ietf-oauth-
	discovery-10 (work in progress), March 2018.		discovery-10 (work in progress), March 2018.
	[I-D.ietf-secevent-token]		[I-D.ietf-secevent-token]
	Hunt, P., Jones, M., Denniss, W., and M. Ansari, "Security		Hunt, P., Jones, M., Denniss, W., and M. Ansari, "Security
	Event Token (SET)", draft-ietf-secevent-token-13 (work in		Event Token (SET)", draft-ietf-secevent-token-13 (work in
	progress), May 2018.		progress), May 2018.
			[Kelsey] Kelsey, J., "Compression and Information Leakage of
			Plaintext", Fast Software Encryption pp. 263-276,
			DOI 10.1007/3-540-45661-9_21, 2002.
	[Langkemper]		[Langkemper]
	Langkemper, S., "Attacking JWT Authentication", September		Langkemper, S., "Attacking JWT Authentication", September
	2016, <https://www.sjoerdlangkemper.nl/2016/09/28/		2016, <https://www.sjoerdlangkemper.nl/2016/09/28/
	attacking-jwt-authentication/>.		attacking-jwt-authentication/>.
	[nist-sp-800-56a-r3]		[nist-sp-800-56a-r3]
	Barker, E., Chen, L., Keller, S., Roginsky, A., Vassilev,		Barker, E., Chen, L., Keller, S., Roginsky, A., Vassilev,
	A., and R. Davis, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key		A., and R. Davis, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
	Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm		Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
	Cryptography, Draft NIST Special Publication 800-56A		Cryptography, Draft NIST Special Publication 800-56A
	skipping to change at page 14, line 9 ¶		skipping to change at page 14, line 9 ¶
	[Valenta] Valenta, L., Sullivan, N., Sanso, A., and N. Heninger, "In		[Valenta] Valenta, L., Sullivan, N., Sanso, A., and N. Heninger, "In
	search of CurveSwap: Measuring elliptic curve		search of CurveSwap: Measuring elliptic curve
	implementations in the wild", March 2018,		implementations in the wild", March 2018,
	<https://ia.cr/2018/298>.		<https://ia.cr/2018/298>.
	Appendix A. Document History		Appendix A. Document History
	[[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]		[[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
	A.1. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-04		A.1. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-05
			- Genart review comments.
			A.2. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-04
	- AD review comments.		- AD review comments.
	A.2. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-03		A.3. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-03
	- Acknowledgements.		- Acknowledgements.
	A.3. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-02		A.4. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-02
	- Implemented WGLC feedback.		- Implemented WGLC feedback.
	A.4. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-01		A.5. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-01
	- Feedback from Brian Campbell.		- Feedback from Brian Campbell.
	A.5. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-00		A.6. draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-00
	- Initial WG draft. No change from the latest individual version.		- Initial WG draft. No change from the latest individual version.
	A.6. draft-sheffer-oauth-jwt-bcp-01		A.7. draft-sheffer-oauth-jwt-bcp-01
	- Added explicit typing.		- Added explicit typing.
	A.7. draft-sheffer-oauth-jwt-bcp-00		A.8. draft-sheffer-oauth-jwt-bcp-00
	- Initial version.		- Initial version.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Yaron Sheffer		Yaron Sheffer
	Intuit		Intuit
	EMail: yaronf.ietf@gmail.com		EMail: yaronf.ietf@gmail.com
	Dick Hardt		Dick Hardt
	Amazon
	EMail: dick@amazon.com		EMail: dick.hardt@gmail.com
	Michael B. Jones		Michael B. Jones
	Microsoft		Microsoft
	EMail: mbj@microsoft.com		EMail: mbj@microsoft.com
	URI: http://self-issued.info/		URI: http://self-issued.info/
End of changes. 26 change blocks.
	31 lines changed or deleted		51 lines changed or added
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