< draft-ietf-pana-pana-10.txt   draft-ietf-pana-pana-11.txt >
PANA Working Group D. Forsberg PANA Working Group D. Forsberg
Internet-Draft Nokia Internet-Draft Nokia
Expires: January 17, 2006 Y. Ohba (Ed.) Expires: September 4, 2006 Y. Ohba (Ed.)
Toshiba Toshiba
B. Patil B. Patil
Nokia Nokia
H. Tschofenig H. Tschofenig
Siemens Siemens
A. Yegin A. Yegin
Samsung Samsung
July 16, 2005 March 3, 2006
Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA) Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)
draft-ietf-pana-pana-10 draft-ietf-pana-pana-11
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Abstract Abstract
This document defines the Protocol for Carrying Authentication for This document defines the Protocol for Carrying Authentication for
Network Access (PANA), a link-layer agnostic transport for Extensible Network Access (PANA), a link-layer agnostic transport for Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) to enable network access authentication Authentication Protocol (EAP) to enable network access authentication
between clients and access networks. PANA protocol specification between clients and access networks. PANA protocol specification
covers the client-to-network access authentication part of an overall covers the client-to-network access authentication part of an overall
secure network access framework, which additionally includes other secure network access framework, which additionally includes other
protocols and mechanisms for service provisioning, access control as protocols and mechanisms for service provisioning, access control as
a result of initial authentication, and accounting. a result of initial authentication, and accounting.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1 Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.1. Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4. Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1 Transport Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.1. Transport Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2 Payload Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.2. Payload Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3 Discovery and Handshake Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.3. Discovery and Handshake Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.4 Authentication and Authorization Phase . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.4. Authentication and Authorization Phase . . . . . . . . . 15
4.5 Access Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.5. Access Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.6 Re-authentication Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.6. Re-authentication Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.7 Termination Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.7. Termination Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.8 Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4.8. Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.8.1 Negotiating Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . 21 4.8.1. Negotiating Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . 21
4.8.2 Execution of Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . 22 4.8.2. Execution of Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . 22
4.8.3 AAA-Key Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4.8.3. AAA-Key Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5. Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 5. Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.1 Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 5.1. Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.2 Sequence Number and Retransmission . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 5.2. Sequence Number and Retransmission . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.3 PANA Security Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5.3. PANA Security Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.4 Message Authentication Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 5.4. Message Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.5 Message Validity Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 5.5. Message Validity Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.6 PaC-EP-Master-Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 5.6. PaC-EP-Master-Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.7 Device ID Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 5.7. Device ID Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.8 PaC Updating its IP Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 5.8. PaC Updating its IP Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.9 Session Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 5.9. Session Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.10 Network Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 5.10. Network Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.11 Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 5.11. Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6. Header Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 6. Header Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.1 IP and UDP Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 6.1. IP and UDP Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.2 PANA Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 6.2. PANA Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.3 AVP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 6.3. AVP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7. PANA Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 7. PANA Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7.1 PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 7.1. PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7.2 PANA-Start-Request (PSR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 7.2. PANA-Start-Request (PSR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.3 PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 7.3. PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.4 PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 7.4. PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.5 PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 7.5. PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7.6 PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 7.6. PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7.7 PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 7.7. PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7.8 PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 7.8. PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7.9 PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 7.9. PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.10 PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 7.10. PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.11 PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 7.11. PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.12 PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 7.12. PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.13 PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 7.13. PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.14 PANA-Error-Request (PER) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 7.14. PANA-Error-Request (PER) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.15 PANA-Error-Answer (PEA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 7.15. PANA-Error-Answer (PEA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.16 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER) . . . . . . . . . . . 46 7.16. PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER) . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7.17 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA) . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 7.17. PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA) . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7.18 PANA-Update-Request (PUR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 7.18. PANA-Update-Request (PUR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7.19 PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 7.19. PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8. AVPs in PANA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 8. AVPs in PANA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8.1 Cookie AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 8.1. Algorithm AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
8.2 Device-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 8.2. AUTH AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
8.3 EAP-Payload AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 8.3. Cookie AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
8.4 Failed-AVP AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 8.4. Device-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
8.5 ISP-Information AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 8.5. EAP-Payload AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
8.6 Key-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 8.6. Failed-AVP AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
8.7 MAC AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 8.7. ISP-Information AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
8.8 NAP-Information AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 8.8. Key-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
8.9 Nonce AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 8.9. NAP-Information AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
8.10 Notification AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 8.10. Nonce AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
8.11 Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC) AVP . . . . . . . 53 8.11. Notification AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
8.12 Protection-Capability AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 8.12. Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC) AVP . . . . . . . 53
8.13 Provider-Identifier AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 8.13. Protection-Capability AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
8.14 Provider-Name AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 8.14. Provider-Identifier AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
8.15 Result-Code AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 8.15. Provider-Name AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
8.15.1 Authentication Results Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 8.16. Result-Code AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
8.15.2 Protocol Error Result Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 8.16.1. Authentication Results Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
8.16 Session-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 8.16.2. Protocol Error Result Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
8.17 Session-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 8.17. Session-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
8.18 Termination-Cause AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 8.18. Session-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
9. Retransmission Timers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 8.19. Termination-Cause AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
9.1 Transmission and Retransmission Parameters . . . . . . . . 60 9. Retransmission Timers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 9.1. Transmission and Retransmission Parameters . . . . . . . 61
10.1 PANA UDP Port Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
10.2 PANA Multicast Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 10.1. PANA UDP Port Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
10.3 PANA Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 10.2. PANA Multicast Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
10.3.1 Message Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 10.3. PANA Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
10.3.2 Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 10.3.1. Message Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
10.4 AVP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 10.3.2. Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
10.4.1 AVP Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 10.4. AVP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
10.4.2 Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 10.4.1. AVP Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
10.5 AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 10.4.2. Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
10.5.1 Algorithm Values of MAC AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
10.5.2 Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP Values . . . . . 64 10.5. AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
10.5.3 Protection-Capability AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . 64 10.5.1. Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP Values . . . . . . 65
10.5.4 Result-Code AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 10.5.2. Protection-Capability AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . 65
10.5.5 Termination-Cause AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 10.5.3. Result-Code AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 10.5.4. Termination-Cause AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
11.1 General Security Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
11.2 Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 11.1. General Security Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
11.3 EAP Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 11.2. Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
11.4 Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . . . . . . . . 68 11.3. EAP Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
11.5 Cryptographic Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 11.4. Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . 69
11.6 Per-packet Ciphering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 11.5. Cryptographic Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
11.7 PAA-to-EP Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 11.6. Per-packet Ciphering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
11.8 Liveness Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 11.7. PAA-to-EP Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
11.9 Updating PaC's IP Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 11.8. Liveness Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
11.10 Early Termination of a Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 11.9. Updating PaC's IP Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
12. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 11.10. Early Termination of a Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 12. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
13.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
13.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
A. Example Sequence of Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . 76 Appendix A. Example Sequence of Separate NAP and ISP
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 78 Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 80
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Providing secure network access service requires access control based Providing secure network access service requires access control based
on the authentication and authorization of the clients and the access on the authentication and authorization of the clients and the access
networks. Client-to-network authentication provides parameters that networks. Client-to-network authentication provides parameters that
are needed to police the traffic flow through the enforcement points. are needed to police the traffic flow through the enforcement points.
A protocol is needed to carry authentication methods between the A protocol is needed to carry authentication methods between the
client and the access network. client and the access network.
skipping to change at page 5, line 44 skipping to change at page 5, line 44
There are components that are part of a complete secure network There are components that are part of a complete secure network
access solution but are outside of the PANA protocol specification, access solution but are outside of the PANA protocol specification,
including IP address configuration, authentication method choice, including IP address configuration, authentication method choice,
filter rule installation, data traffic protection and PAA-EP filter rule installation, data traffic protection and PAA-EP
protocol. These components are described in separate documents (see protocol. These components are described in separate documents (see
[I-D.ietf-pana-framework] and [I-D.ietf-pana-snmp]). The readers are [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] and [I-D.ietf-pana-snmp]). The readers are
recommended to go through the PANA Framework document [I-D.ietf-pana- recommended to go through the PANA Framework document [I-D.ietf-pana-
framework] prior to reading this protocol specification document. framework] prior to reading this protocol specification document.
1.1 Specification of Requirements 1.1. Specification of Requirements
In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
of the specification. These words are often capitalized. The key of the specification. These words are often capitalized. The key
words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",
"SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document
are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
PANA Client (PaC): PANA Client (PaC):
skipping to change at page 8, line 12 skipping to change at page 8, line 12
For additional terminology definitions see the PANA framework For additional terminology definitions see the PANA framework
document [I-D.ietf-pana-framework]. document [I-D.ietf-pana-framework].
3. Protocol Overview 3. Protocol Overview
The PANA protocol is run between a client (PaC) and a server (PAA) in The PANA protocol is run between a client (PaC) and a server (PAA) in
order to perform authentication and authorization for the network order to perform authentication and authorization for the network
access service. access service.
The protocol messaging consists of a series of request and responses, The protocol messaging consists of a series of request and responses,
some of which may be initiated by either ends. Each message can some of which may be initiated by either end. Each message can carry
carry zero or more AVPs as payload. The main payload of PANA is EAP zero or more AVPs within the payload. The main payload of PANA is
which performs authentication. PANA helps the PaC and PAA establish EAP which performs authentication. PANA helps the PaC and PAA
an EAP session. establish an EAP session.
PANA is a UDP-based protocol. It has its own retransmission PANA is a UDP-based protocol. It has its own retransmission
mechanism to reliably deliver messages. mechanism to reliably deliver messages.
PANA messages are sent between the PaC and PAA as part of a PANA PANA messages are sent between the PaC and PAA as part of a PANA
session. A PANA session consists of distinct phases: session. A PANA session consists of distinct phases:
o Discovery and handshake phase: This is the phase that initiates a o Discovery and handshake phase: This is the phase that initiates a
new PANA session. The PaC discovers the PAA(s) by either new PANA session. The PaC discovers the PAA(s) by either
explicitly soliciting advertisements for them or receiving explicitly soliciting advertisements for them or receiving
skipping to change at page 8, line 40 skipping to change at page 8, line 40
discovery and handshake phase is the EAP execution between the PAA discovery and handshake phase is the EAP execution between the PAA
and PaC. The EAP payload (which carry an EAP method inside) is and PaC. The EAP payload (which carry an EAP method inside) is
what is used for authentication. The PAA conveys the result of what is used for authentication. The PAA conveys the result of
authentication and authorization to the PaC at the end of this authentication and authorization to the PaC at the end of this
phase. This phase may involve execution of two EAP sessions back- phase. This phase may involve execution of two EAP sessions back-
to-back, one for the NAP and one for the ISP. to-back, one for the NAP and one for the ISP.
o Access phase: After a successful authentication and authorization o Access phase: After a successful authentication and authorization
the host gains access to the network and can send and receive IP the host gains access to the network and can send and receive IP
data traffic through the EP(s). At any time during this phase, data traffic through the EP(s). At any time during this phase,
the PaC and PAA may optionally ping each other to test liveness of the PaC and PAA may optionally send PANA ping messages to test
the PANA session on each end. liveness of the PANA session on the peer.
o Re-authentication phase: During the access phase, the PAA must o Re-authentication phase: During the access phase, the PAA must
initiate re-authentication before the PANA session lifetime initiate re-authentication before the PANA session lifetime
expires. EAP is carried by PANA to perform authentication. This expires. EAP is carried by PANA to perform authentication. This
phase may be optionally triggered by both the PaC and the PAA phase may be optionally triggered by both the PaC and the PAA
without any respect to the session lifetime. The session moves to without any respect to the session lifetime. The session moves to
this phase from the access phase, and returns back there upon this phase from the access phase, and returns back there upon
successful re-authentication. successful re-authentication.
o Termination phase: The PaC or PAA may choose to discontinue the o Termination phase: The PaC or PAA may choose to discontinue the
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-----> PANA-Bind-Answer -----> PANA-Bind-Answer
// Access phase (IP data traffic allowed) // Access phase (IP data traffic allowed)
<----- PANA-Ping-Request <----- PANA-Ping-Request
-----> PANA-Ping-Answer -----> PANA-Ping-Answer
// Termination phase // Termination phase
-----> PANA-Termination-Request -----> PANA-Termination-Request
<----- PANA-Termination-Answer <----- PANA-Termination-Answer
Figure 1: Illustration of PANA messages in a session Figure 1: Illustration of PANA messages in a session
Note that depending on the environment and deployment the protocol Note that depending on the environment and deployment the protocol
flow depicted in Figure 1 can be abbreviated. flow depicted in Figure 1 can be abbreviated (An unsolicited PANA-
Start-Request can be sent without a triggering PANA-PAA-Discover, EAP
responses can be piggybacked on the PANA-Auth-Answers, and PANA-Ping
and PANA-Termination usage is optional).
Cryptographic protection of messages between the PaC and PAA is Cryptographic protection of messages between the PaC and PAA is
possible as soon as EAP in conjunction with the EAP method exports a possible as soon as EAP in conjunction with the EAP method exports a
shared key. That shared key is used to create a PANA SA. The PANA shared key. That shared key is used to create a PANA SA. The PANA
SA helps generating per-message authentication codes that provide SA helps generate per-message authentication codes that provide
integrity protection and authentication. integrity protection and authentication.
Throughout the lifetime of a session, various problems found with the Throughout the lifetime of a session, various problems found with the
incoming messages can generate a PANA error message sent in response. incoming messages can generate a PANA error message sent in response.
4. Protocol Details 4. Protocol Details
The following sections explain in detail the various phases of a PANA The following sections explain in detail the various phases of a PANA
session. session.
4.1 Transport Layer 4.1. Transport Layer
PANA uses UDP as its transport layer protocol. The UDP port number PANA uses UDP as its transport layer protocol. The UDP port number
is To Be Assigned by IANA. All messages except for PANA-PAA-Discover is To Be Assigned by IANA. All messages except for PANA-PAA-Discover
are always unicast. The PANA-PAA-Discover message MAY be unicast are always unicast. The PANA-PAA-Discover message MAY be unicast
when the PaC knows the IP address of the PAA. when the PaC knows the IP address of the PAA.
4.2 Payload Encoding 4.2. Payload Encoding
The payload of any PANA message consists of zero or more AVPs The payload of any PANA message consists of zero or more AVPs
(Attribute Value Pairs). The subsequent sections refer to these (Attribute Value Pairs). The subsequent sections refer to these
AVPs, therefore the list of AVPs are provided with a brief AVPs, therefore the list of AVPs are provided with a brief
description before more extensive descriptions are included later in description before more extensive descriptions are included later in
the document. the document (see Section 8).
o Cookie AVP: contains a random value that is generated by the PAA o Algorithm AVP: contains a pseudo-random function and an integrity
and used for making PAA discovery robust against blind resource algorithm.
consumption DoS attacks.
o Protection-Capability AVP: contains the type of per-packet o AUTH AVP: contains a Message Authentication Code that integrity
protection (link-layer vs. network-layer) when a cryptographic protects the PANA message.
mechanism should be enabled after PANA authentication.
o Cookie AVP: contains a random value that is generated by the PAA
according to [RFC4086] and used for making PAA discovery robust
against blind resource consumption DoS attacks.
o Device-Id AVP: contains a device identifier (link-layer address or o Device-Id AVP: contains a device identifier (link-layer address or
an IP address) of the PaC or an EP. an IP address) of the PaC or an EP.
o EAP AVP: contains an EAP PDU. o EAP AVP: contains an EAP PDU.
o MAC AVP: contains a Message Authentication Code that integrity o Failed-AVP: contains an offending AVP that caused a failure.
protects the PANA message.
o Termination-Cause AVP: contains the reason of session termination. o Key-Id AVP: contains a AAA-Key identifier.
o Result-Code AVP: contains information about the protocol execution o Protection-Capability AVP: contains the type of per-packet
results. protection (link-layer vs. network-layer) when a cryptographic
mechanism should be enabled after PANA authentication.
o Session-Id AVP: contains the PANA session identifier value. o NAP-Information AVP, ISP-Information AVP: contains the identifier
of a NAP and an ISP, respectively.
o Session-Lifetime AVP: contains the duration of authorized access. o Nonce AVP: contains a randomly chosen value [RFC4086] that is used
in cryptographic key computations.
o Failed-AVP: contains an offending AVP that caused a failure. o Notification AVP: contains a displayable message.
o Provider-Identifier AVP: contains the identifier of a NAP or an o Provider-Identifier AVP: contains the identifier of a NAP or an
ISP. ISP.
o PPAC AVP: Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP. Used to indicate
the available/chosen IP address configuration methods that can be
used by the PaC after successful PANA authentication.
o Provider-Name AVP: contains a name of a NAP or an ISP. o Provider-Name AVP: contains a name of a NAP or an ISP.
o NAP-Information AVP, ISP-Information AVP: contains the identifier o Result-Code AVP: contains information about the protocol execution
of a NAP and an ISP, respectively. results.
o Key-Id AVP: contains a AAA-Key identifier. o Session-Id AVP: contains the PANA session identifier value.
o PPAC AVP: Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP. Used to indicate o Session-Lifetime AVP: contains the duration of authorized access.
the available/chosen IP address configuration methods that can be
used by the PaC after successful PANA authentication.
o Nonce AVP: contains a randomly chosen value that is used in o Termination-Cause AVP: contains the reason of session termination.
cryptographic key computations.
o Notification AVP: contains a displayable message. 4.3. Discovery and Handshake Phase
4.3 Discovery and Handshake Phase When the PaC knows the IP address of the PAA, it can send a unicast
PANA-PAA-Discover message and initiate the PANA exchange. In other
cases, the PaC MUST rely on dynamic discovery methods, such as
multicast-based and a traffic-driven discovery.
When a PaC attaches to a network, and it does not already know the IP Multicast-based Discovery:
address of the PAA, it MUST rely on dynamic discovery methods, such
as a multicast-based and a traffic-driven discovery.
The PaCs and PAAs MUST implement multicast-based discovery where the The PaCs and PAAs MUST implement multicast-based discovery where
PaC sends a PANA-PAA-Discover message to a well-known the PaC sends a PANA-PAA-Discover message to a well-known
administratively scoped multicast address (To Be Assigned by IANA) administratively scoped multicast address (To Be Assigned by IANA)
and UDP port (To Be Assigned by IANA). and UDP port (To Be Assigned by IANA).
The network administrator MUST configure the multicast scope such The network administrator MUST configure the multicast scope such
that the discovery messages can reach only the designated PAA(s). In that the discovery messages can reach only the designated PAA(s).
case the PAA(s) is on the same link as the PaC, the administratively In case the PAA(s) is on the same link as the PaC, the
scoped multicast messages MUST not be forwarded by the routers. administratively scoped multicast messages MUST not be forwarded
Details of scope configuration are discussed in [RFC2365]. by the routers. Details of scope configuration are discussed in
[RFC2365].
The PAA(s) that receive the discovery message MUST respond with a The PAA(s) that receive the discovery message MUST respond with a
unicast PANA-Start-Request message sent to the soliciting PaC. unicast PANA-Start-Request message sent to the soliciting PaC.
Alternatively, the PaC MAY also choose to start sending data packets Traffic-driven Discovery:
before getting authenticated. The EP in an access network that
implements PANA SHOULD drop such unauthorized packets upon receipt.
Additionally, the EP MAY also take this traffic as an indication of
unauthorized PaC and notify the PAA. The EP-to-PAA notification
SHOULD be sent via [I-D.ietf-pana-snmp]. In response, the PAA SHOULD
send an unsolicited PANA-Start-Request message to the PaC. This is
called traffic-driven PAA discovery (an alternative to the PaC
explicitly soliciting for a PAA). Deployment of this alternate
scheme is optional.
The EP-to-PAA notification MAY also be generated in response to Alternatively, the PaC MAY also choose to start sending data
receiving a link-up event notification on the EP [I-D.ietf-dna-link- packets before getting authenticated. The EP in an access network
information]. that implements PANA SHOULD drop such unauthorized packets upon
receipt. Additionally, the EP MAY also take this traffic as an
indication of unauthorized PaC and notify the PAA. The EP-to-PAA
notification SHOULD be sent via [I-D.ietf-pana-snmp]. In
response, the PAA SHOULD send an unsolicited PANA-Start-Request
message to the PaC. This is called traffic-driven PAA discovery
(an alternative to the PaC explicitly soliciting for a PAA).
Deployment of this alternate scheme is optional.
Alternative PAA discovery schemes may be designed (e.g., DHCP-based) Other Alternatives:
but they are outside the scope of this specification.
If the PaC knows the IP address of the PAA, it can send a unicast The EP-to-PAA notification MAY also be generated in response to
PANA-PAA-Discover message and initiate the PANA exchange. receiving a link-up event notification on the EP [I-D.ietf-dna-
link-information].
Alternative PAA discovery schemes may be designed (e.g., DHCP-
based) but they are outside the scope of this specification.
When the PaC receives a PANA-Start-Request message from a PAA, it When the PaC receives a PANA-Start-Request message from a PAA, it
responds with a PANA-Start-Answer message if it wishes to enter the responds with a PANA-Start-Answer message if it wishes to enter the
authentication and authorization phase. authentication and authorization phase.
There can be multiple PAAs in the access network and the PaC may There can be multiple PAAs in the access network and the PaC may
receive multiple PANA-Start-Request messages from those PAAs. The receive multiple PANA-Start-Request messages from those PAAs. The
authentication and authorization result does not depend on which PAA authentication and authorization result does not depend on which PAA
is chosen by the PaC. By default the PaC MAY choose the PAA that is chosen by the PaC. By default the PaC MAY choose the PAA that
sent the first PANA-Start-Request message. sent the first PANA-Start-Request message.
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as a cookie. The cookie is used for preventing the PAA from resource as a cookie. The cookie is used for preventing the PAA from resource
consumption DoS attacks by blind attackers which bombard the PAA with consumption DoS attacks by blind attackers which bombard the PAA with
PANA-PAA-Discover messages. By relying on a cookie mechanism the PAA PANA-PAA-Discover messages. By relying on a cookie mechanism the PAA
can avoid per-PaC state creation until after the PaC can produce the can avoid per-PaC state creation until after the PaC can produce the
same cookie in its PANA-Start-Answer message. In order to do that, same cookie in its PANA-Start-Answer message. In order to do that,
the cookie MUST be computed in such a way that it does not require the cookie MUST be computed in such a way that it does not require
any per-session state maintenance on the PAA in order to verify the any per-session state maintenance on the PAA in order to verify the
cookie returned in the PANA-Start-Answer message. The PAA discovery cookie returned in the PANA-Start-Answer message. The PAA discovery
that takes advantage of cookies is called "stateless PAA discovery". that takes advantage of cookies is called "stateless PAA discovery".
The exact algorithms and syntax used by the PAA to generate cookies The exact algorithms and syntax used by the PAA to generate cookies
does not affect interoperability and hence is not specified here. An does not affect interoperability and hence is not specified here.
example algorithm is described below. Additionally, the PAA MAY limit the rate it processes incoming PANA-
PAA-Discover messages.
Cookie =
<secret-version> | HMAC_SHA1( <Device-Id of PaC> , <secret> )
where <secret> is a randomly generated secret known only to the PAA,
<secret-version> is an index used for choosing the secret for
generating the cookie and '|' indicates concatenation. The secret-
version should be changed frequently enough to prevent replay
attacks. The secret key is valid for a certain time frame. The
device identifier of the PaC can be extracted from a link-layer or IP
header of PANA messages.
When the PaC sends a PANA-Start-Answer message in response to a PANA- When the PaC sends a PANA-Start-Answer message in response to a PANA-
Start-Request containing a Cookie AVP, the answer MUST contain a Start-Request containing a Cookie AVP, the answer MUST contain a
Cookie AVP with the cookie value copied from the request. Cookie AVP with the cookie value copied from the request.
When the PAA receives the PANA-Start-Answer message from the PaC, it When the PAA receives the PANA-Start-Answer message from the PaC, it
verifies the cookie. The cookie is considered as valid if the verifies the cookie. The cookie is considered as valid if the
received cookie has the expected value. If the computed cookie is received cookie matches the send cookie. If the match is verified,
valid, the protocol enters the authentication and authorization the protocol enters the authentication and authorization phase.
phase. Otherwise, it MUST silently discard the received message. Otherwise, the PAA MUST silently discard the received message.
The initial EAP Request message MAY be optionally carried by the The initial EAP Request message MAY be optionally carried by the
PANA-Start-Request (as opposed to by a later PANA-Auth-Request) PANA-Start-Request (as opposed to by a later PANA-Auth-Request)
message in order to reduce the number of round-trips. This message in order to reduce the number of round-trips. This
optimization SHOULD NOT be used if the PAA discovery is desired to be optimization SHOULD NOT be used if the PAA discovery is desired to be
stateless since transmission of an EAP Request message creates a stateless since transmission of an EAP Request message creates a
state at EAP layer. See [I-D.ietf-eap-statemachine] for more state at EAP layer. See [RFC4137] for more information on the EAP
information on the EAP state machine and the allocation of state state machine and the allocation of state information in the
information in the respective protocol steps. respective protocol steps.
A Protection-Capability AVP and a Post-PANA-Address-Configuration A Protection-Capability AVP, an Algorithm AVP and a Post-PANA-
(PPAC) AVP MAY be included in the PANA-Start-Request in order to Address-Configuration (PPAC) AVP MAY be included in the PANA-Start-
indicate required and available capabilities for the network access. Request in order to indicate required and available capabilities for
These AVPs MAY be used by the PaC for assessing the capability match the network access. These AVPs MAY be used by the PaC for assessing
even before the authentication takes place. Since these AVPs are the capability match even before the authentication takes place.
provided during the insecure discovery and handshake phase, there are Since these AVPs are provided during the insecure discovery and
certain security risks involved in using the provided information. handshake phase, there are certain security risks involved in using
See Section 11 for further discussion on this. the provided information. See Section 11 for further discussion on
this.
If the initial EAP Request message is carried in the PANA-Start- If the initial EAP Request message is carried in the PANA-Start-
Request message, an EAP Response message MUST be carried in the PANA- Request message, an EAP Response message MUST be carried in the PANA-
Start-Answer message returned to the PAA. Start-Answer message returned to the PAA.
The PANA-Start-Request/Answer exchange is needed before entering the The PANA-Start-Request/Answer exchange is needed before entering the
authentication and authorization phase even when the PaC is pre- authentication and authorization phase even when the PaC is pre-
configured with the IP address of the PAA and the PANA-PAA-Discover configured with the IP address of the PAA and the PANA-PAA-Discover
message is unicast. message is unicast.
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Auth-Answer messages in the authentication and authorization phase Auth-Answer messages in the authentication and authorization phase
when stateless PAA discovery is used, and in PANA-Start-Request and when stateless PAA discovery is used, and in PANA-Start-Request and
PANA-Start-Answer messages in this phase otherwise. PANA-Start-Answer messages in this phase otherwise.
A PANA-Start-Request message in stateless PAA discovery MUST NOT be A PANA-Start-Request message in stateless PAA discovery MUST NOT be
retransmitted as this voids the statelessness on the PAA. Instead, retransmitted as this voids the statelessness on the PAA. Instead,
the PaC MUST retransmit the PANA-PAA-Discover message until it the PaC MUST retransmit the PANA-PAA-Discover message until it
receives a PANA-Start-Request message, and retransmit the PANA-Start- receives a PANA-Start-Request message, and retransmit the PANA-Start-
Answer message until it receives a PANA-Auth-Request message. The Answer message until it receives a PANA-Auth-Request message. The
PaC can determine whether the PAA is using stateless PAA discovery by PaC can determine whether the PAA is using stateless PAA discovery by
the presence of Cookie AVP. The PANA-Start-Request message MUST be looking at the L-flag in the PANA header. The PANA-Start-Request
retransmitted instead of the PANA-Start-Answer message when stateless message MUST be retransmitted instead of the PANA-Start-Answer
PAA discovery is not used. message when stateful PAA discovery is used (L-flag is not set).
It is possible that both the PAA and the PaC initiate the discovery It is possible that both the PAA and the PaC initiate the discovery
and handshake procedure at the same time, i.e., the PAA sends a PANA- and handshake procedure at the same time, i.e., the PAA sends a PANA-
Start-Request message while the PaC sends a PANA-PAA-Discover Start-Request message while the PaC sends a PANA-PAA-Discover
message. To resolve the race condition, the PAA SHOULD silently message. To resolve the race condition, the PAA SHOULD silently
discard the PANA-PAA-Discover message received from the PaC after it discard the PANA-PAA-Discover message received from the PaC after it
has sent a PANA-Start-Request message with creating a state (i.e., no has sent a PANA-Start-Request message with creating a state (i.e.,
Cookie AVP is included in the message) for the PaC. In this case the L-flag is not set) for the PaC. In this case the PAA will retransmit
PAA will retransmit the PANA-Start-Request message based on a timer, the PANA-Start-Request message based on a timer, if the PaC doesn't
if the PaC doesn't respond in time (the message was lost for respond in time (the message was lost for example). If the PAA had
example). If the PAA had sent a PANA-Start-Request message without sent a PANA-Start-Request message without creating a state for the
creating a state for the PaC (i.e., a Cookie AVP was included in the PaC (i.e., L-flag is set), then it SHOULD answer to the PANA-PAA-
message), then it SHOULD answer to the PANA-PAA-Discover message. Discover message.
Figure 2 shows an example sequence for the discovery and handshake Figure 2 shows an example sequence for the discovery and handshake
phase when a PANA-PAA-Discover message is sent by the PaC. Figure 3 phase when a PANA-PAA-Discover message is sent by the PaC. Figure 3
shows an example sequence for the discovery and handshake phase with shows an example sequence for the discovery and handshake phase with
traffic-driven PAA discovery. traffic-driven PAA discovery.
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-PAA-Discover(0) -----> PANA-PAA-Discover(0)
<----- PANA-Start-Request(x)[Cookie] <----- PANA-Start-Request(x)[Cookie]
-----> PANA-Start-Answer(x)[Cookie] -----> PANA-Start-Answer(x)[Cookie]
(continued to the authentication and (continued to the authentication and
authorization phase) authorization phase)
Figure 2: Example sequence for the discovery and handshake phase when Figure 2: Example sequence for the discovery and handshake phase when
PANA-PAA-Discover is sent by the PaC PANA-PAA-Discover is sent by the PaC
PaC EP PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs] PaC EP PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------
---->o (Data packet arrival or L2 trigger) ---->o (Data packet arrival or L2 trigger)
------> PAA-to-EP protocol, or another mechanism ------> PAA-to-EP protocol, or another mechanism
<------------ PANA-Start-Request(x)[Cookie] <------------ PANA-Start-Request(x)[Cookie]
------------> PANA-Start-Answer(x)[Cookie] ------------> PANA-Start-Answer(x)[Cookie]
(continued to the authentication and (continued to the authentication and
authorization phase) authorization phase)
Figure 3: Example sequence for the discovery and handshake phase with Figure 3: Example sequence for the discovery and handshake phase with
traffic-driven PAA discovery traffic-driven PAA discovery
4.4 Authentication and Authorization Phase 4.4. Authentication and Authorization Phase
The main task of the authentication and authorization phase is to The main task of the authentication and authorization phase is to
carry EAP messages between the PaC and the PAA. EAP Request and carry EAP messages between the PaC and the PAA. EAP Request and
Response messages are carried in PANA-Auth-Request messages. PANA- Response messages are carried in PANA-Auth-Request messages. PANA-
Auth-Answer messages are simply used to acknowledge receipt of the Auth-Answer messages are simply used to acknowledge receipt of the
requests. As an optimization, a PANA-Auth-Answer message MAY include requests. As an optimization, a PANA-Auth-Answer message MAY include
the EAP Response message. This optimization MAY not be used when it the EAP Response message. This optimization MAY not be used when it
takes time to generate the EAP Response message (due to, e.g., takes time to generate the EAP Response message (due to, e.g.,
intervention of human input), in which case returning an EAP-Auth- intervention of human input), in which case returning an EAP-Auth-
Answer message without piggybacking an EAP Response message can avoid Answer message without piggybacking an EAP Response message can avoid
skipping to change at page 16, line 22 skipping to change at page 16, line 22
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(y) -----> PANA-Auth-Request(y)
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}] [Session-Id, EAP{Response}]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y) <----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y)
[Session-Id] [Session-Id]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+2) <----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+2)
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}] [Session-Id, EAP{Request}]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+2) // Piggybacking EAP Response -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+2) // Piggybacking EAP Response
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}] [Session-Id, EAP{Response}]
<----- PANA-Bind-Request(x+3) <----- PANA-Bind-Request(x+3)
[Session-Id, Result-Code, EAP{Success}, Device-Id, [Session-Id, Result-Code, EAP{Success}, Device-Id,
Key-Id, Lifetime, Protection-Cap., PPAC, MAC] Key-Id, Algorithm,
Lifetime, Protection-Cap., PPAC, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Bind-Answer(x+3) -----> PANA-Bind-Answer(x+3)
[Session-Id, Device-Id, Key-Id, PPAC, MAC] [Session-Id, Device-Id, Key-Id, PPAC, AUTH]
Figure 4: Example sequence for the authentication and authorization Figure 4: Example sequence for the authentication and authorization
phase phase
When an EAP method that is capable of deriving keys is used during When an EAP method that is capable of deriving keys is used during
the authentication and authorization phase and the keys are the authentication and authorization phase and the keys are
successfully derived, the PANA message that carries the EAP Success successfully derived, the PANA message that carries the EAP Success
message (i.e., a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request or a PANA-Bind-Request message (i.e., a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request or a PANA-Bind-Request
message) and any subsequent message MUST contain a MAC AVP. message) MUST contain a Key-Id AVP and an AUTH AVP, and an Algorithm
AVP for the first derivation of keys in the session, and any
subsequent message MUST contain an AUTH AVP. An Algorithm AVP MUST
NOT be contained in a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request or a PANA-Bind-
Request message after the first derivation of keys in the session.
The PANA-Bind-Request and the PANA-Bind-Answer message exchange is The PANA-Bind-Request and the PANA-Bind-Answer message exchange is
also used for binding device identifiers of the PaC and EP(s) to the also used for binding device identifiers of the PaC and EP(s) to the
PANA SA. To achieve this, if a Protection-Capability AVP is included PANA SA. To achieve this, if a Protection-Capability AVP is included
in the PANA-Bind-Request message, the message MUST contain the device in the PANA-Bind-Request message, the message MUST contain the device
identifier in a Device-Id AVP for each EP. Otherwise, if a identifier in a Device-Id AVP for each EP. Otherwise, if a
Protection-Capability AVP is not included in the PANA-Bind-Request Protection-Capability AVP is not included in the PANA-Bind-Request
message, the message MUST contain the device identifier in a message, the message MUST contain the device identifier in a
Device-Id AVP for each EP when a link-layer or IP address is used as Device-Id AVP for each EP when a link-layer or IP address is used as
the device identifier of the PaC. The PANA-Bind-Answer message MUST the device identifier of the PaC. The PANA-Bind-Answer message MUST
contain the PaC's device identifier in a Device-Id AVP when it is contain the PaC's device identifier in a Device-Id AVP when it is
already presented with that of EP(s) in the request with using the already presented with that of EP(s) in the request with using the
same type of device identifier as contained in the request. If the same type of device identifier as contained in the request. If the
PANA-Bind-Answer message sent from the PaC does not contain a PANA-Bind-Answer message sent from the PaC does not contain a
Device-Id AVP with the same device identifier type contained in the Device-Id AVP with the same device identifier type contained in the
request, the PAA sends a PANA-Error-Request message with a request, the PAA sends a PANA-Error-Request message with a
PANA_MISSING_AVP result code, and wait for a PANA-Error-Answer PANA_MISSING_AVP result code, and wait for a PANA-Error-Answer
message to terminate the session. The PANA-Bind-Request message with message to terminate the session.
a PANA_SUCCESS result code MUST also contain a Protection-Capability
AVP if link-layer or network-layer ciphering is enabled after the The PANA-Bind-Request message with a PANA_SUCCESS result code MUST
authentication and authorization phase. The PANA-Bind-Request also contain a Protection-Capability AVP if link-layer or network-
message MAY also contain a Protection-Capability AVP to indicate if layer ciphering is enabled after the authentication and authorization
link-layer or network-layer ciphering should be enabled after the phase. The PANA-Bind-Request message MAY also contain a Protection-
authentication and authorization phase. No link-layer or network- Capability AVP to indicate if link-layer or network-layer ciphering
layer specific information is included in the Protection-Capability should be enabled after the authentication and authorization phase.
AVP. It is assumed that the PAA is aware of the security No link-layer or network-layer specific information is included in
capabilities of the access network. The PANA protocol does not the Protection-Capability AVP. It is assumed that the PAA is aware
specify how the PANA SA and the Protection-Capability AVP will be of the security capabilities of the access network. The PANA
used to provide per-packet protection for data traffic. When the PaC protocol does not specify how the PANA SA and the Protection-
does not support the protection capability indicated in the Capability AVP will be used to provide per-packet protection for data
Protection-Capability AVP, the PaC MUST send a PANA-Error-Request traffic. When the PaC does not support the protection capability
message with a PANA_PROTECTION_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED result code and indicated in the Protection-Capability AVP, the PaC MUST send a PANA-
terminate the PANA session. Error-Request message with a PANA_PROTECTION_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED
result code and terminate the PANA session.
Additionally, the PANA-Bind-Request message with a PANA_SUCCESS Additionally, the PANA-Bind-Request message with a PANA_SUCCESS
result code MUST include a Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC) result code MUST include a Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC)
AVP, which helps the PAA to inform the PaC about whether a new IP AVP, which helps the PAA to inform the PaC about whether a new IP
address MUST be configured and the available methods to do so. In address MUST be configured and the available methods to do so. In
this case, the PaC MUST include a PPAC AVP in the PANA-Bind-Answer this case, the PaC MUST include a PPAC AVP in the PANA-Bind-Answer
message in order to indicate its choice of method when there is a message in order to indicate its choice of method when there is a
match between the methods offered by the PAA and the methods match between the methods offered by the PAA and the methods
available on the PaC. When there is no match, the PaC MUST send a available on the PaC. When there is no match, the PaC MUST send a
PANA-Error-Request message with a PANA_PPAC_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED PANA-Error-Request message with a PANA_PPAC_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED
result code and terminate the PANA session. result code and terminate the PANA session.
EAP authentication can fail at a pass-through authenticator without EAP authentication can fail at a pass-through authenticator without
sending an EAP Failure message [I-D.ietf-eap-statemachine]. When sending an EAP Failure message [RFC4137]. When this occurs, the PAA
this occurs, the PAA SHOULD send a PANA-Error-Request message to the SHOULD send a PANA-Error-Request message to the PaC with using
PaC with using PANA_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY result code. The PaC SHOULD not PANA_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY result code. The PaC MUST NOT change its state
change its state unless the error message is secured by PANA or unless the error message is secured by PANA or lower-layer. In any
lower-layer. In any case, a more appropriate way is to rely on a case, a more appropriate way is to rely on a timeout on the PaC.
timeout on the PaC.
There is a case where EAP authentication succeeds with producing an There is a case where EAP authentication succeeds with producing an
EAP Success message but network access authorization fails due to, EAP Success message but network access authorization fails due to,
e.g., authorization rejected by a AAA or authorization locally e.g., authorization rejected by a AAA or authorization locally
rejected by the PAA. When this occurs, the PAA MUST send a PANA- rejected by the PAA. When this occurs, the PAA MUST send a PANA-
Bind-Request with a result code PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED. If a Bind-Request with a result code PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED. If a
AAA-Key is established between the PaC and the PAA by the time when AAA-Key is established between the PaC and the PAA by the time when
the EAP Success message is generated by the EAP server (this is the the EAP Success message is generated by the EAP server (this is the
case when the EAP method provides protected success indication), the case when the EAP method provides protected success indication), the
PANA-Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages MUST be protected PANA-Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages MUST be protected
with a MAC AVP and carry a Key-Id AVP. The AAA-Key and the PANA with an AUTH AVP and carry a Key-Id AVP. The PANA-Bind-Request
session MUST be deleted immediately after the PANA-Bind message message MUST also carry an Algorithm AVP if it is for the first
exchange. derivation of keys in the session. The AAA-Key and the PANA session
MUST be deleted immediately after the PANA-Bind message exchange.
4.5 Access Phase 4.5. Access Phase
Once the authentication and authorization phase or the re- Once the authentication and authorization phase or the re-
authentication phase successfully completes, the PaC gains access to authentication phase successfully completes, the PaC gains access to
the network and can send and receive IP data traffic through the the network and can send and receive IP data traffic through the
EP(s) and the PANA session enters the access phase. In this phase, EP(s) and the PANA session enters the access phase. In this phase,
PANA-Ping-Request and PANA-Ping-Answer messages can be used for PANA-Ping-Request and PANA-Ping-Answer messages can be used for
testing the liveness of the PANA session on the PANA peer. Both the testing the liveness of the PANA session on the PANA peer. Both the
PaC and the PAA are allowed to send a PANA-Ping-Request message to PaC and the PAA are allowed to send a PANA-Ping-Request message to
the communicating peer whenever they need to make sure the the communicating peer whenever they need to make sure the
availability of the session on the peer and expect the peer to return availability of the session on the peer and expect the peer to return
a PANA-Ping-Answer message. Both PANA-Ping-Request and PANA-Ping- a PANA-Ping-Answer message. Both PANA-Ping-Request and PANA-Ping-
Answer messages MUST be protected with a MAC AVP when a PANA SA is Answer messages MUST be protected with an AUTH AVP when a PANA SA is
available. available.
Implementations MUST limit the rate of performing this test. The PaC Implementations MUST limit the rate of performing this test. The PaC
and the PAA can handle rate limitation on their own, they do not have and the PAA can handle rate limitation on their own, they do not have
to perform any coordination with each other. There is no negotiation to perform any coordination with each other. There is no negotiation
of timers for this purpose. of timers for this purpose. Additionally, an implementation MAY
rate-limit processing the incoming PANA-Ping-Requests.
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show liveness tests as they are initiated by Figure 5 and Figure 6 show liveness tests as they are initiated by
the PaC and the PAA respectively. the PaC and the PAA respectively.
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-Ping-Request(q)[Session-Id, MAC] -----> PANA-Ping-Request(q)[Session-Id, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Ping-Answer(q)[Session-Id, MAC] <----- PANA-Ping-Answer(q)[Session-Id, AUTH]
Figure 5: Example sequence for PaC-initiated liveness test Figure 5: Example sequence for PaC-initiated liveness test
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------
<----- PANA-Ping-Request(p)[Session-Id, MAC] <----- PANA-Ping-Request(p)[Session-Id, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Ping-Answer(p)[Session-Id, MAC] -----> PANA-Ping-Answer(p)[Session-Id, AUTH]
Figure 6: Example sequence for PAA-initiated liveness test Figure 6: Example sequence for PAA-initiated liveness test
4.6 Re-authentication Phase 4.6. Re-authentication Phase
The PANA session in the access phase can enter the re-authentication The PANA session in the access phase can enter the re-authentication
phase to extend the current session lifetime by re-executing EAP. phase to extend the current session lifetime by re-executing EAP.
Once the re-authentication phase successfully completes, the session Once the re-authentication phase successfully completes, the session
re-enters the access phase. Otherwise, the session is deleted. re-enters the access phase. Otherwise, the session is deleted.
When the PaC wants to initiate re-authentication, it sends a PANA- When the PaC wants to initiate re-authentication, it sends a PANA-
Reauth-Request message to the PAA. This message MUST contain a Reauth-Request message to the PAA. This message MUST contain a
Session-Id AVP which is used for identifying the PANA session on the Session-Id AVP which is used for identifying the PANA session on the
PAA. If the PAA already has an established PANA session for the PaC PAA. If the PAA already has an established PANA session for the PaC
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enter the re-authentication phase. The PAA SHOULD initiate EAP re- enter the re-authentication phase. The PAA SHOULD initiate EAP re-
authentication before the current session lifetime expires. authentication before the current session lifetime expires.
Re-authentication of an on-going PANA session MUST maintain the Re-authentication of an on-going PANA session MUST maintain the
existing sequence numbers. existing sequence numbers.
For any re-authentication, if there is an established PANA SA, PANA- For any re-authentication, if there is an established PANA SA, PANA-
Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST be protected by Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST be protected by
adding a MAC AVP to each message. Any subsequent EAP authentication adding a MAC AVP to each message. Any subsequent EAP authentication
MUST be performed with the same ISP and NAP that was selected during MUST be performed with the same ISP and NAP that was selected during
the discovery and handshake phase. The value of the S-flag of the the discovery and handshake phase. The value of the S-flag
PANA messages exchanged in the re-authentication phase MUST be ("separate authentication" flag, see Section 4.8.1) of the PANA
inherited from the previous authentication and authorization phase or messages exchanged in the re-authentication phase MUST be inherited
re-authentication phase. from the previous authentication and authorization phase or re-
authentication phase.
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-Reauth-Request(q) -----> PANA-Reauth-Request(q)
[Session-Id, MAC] [Session-Id, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Reauth-Answer(q) <----- PANA-Reauth-Answer(q)
[Session-Id, MAC] [Session-Id, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(p) <----- PANA-Auth-Request(p)
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}, MAC] [Session-Id, EAP{Request}, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p) // No piggybacking EAP Response -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p) // No piggybacking EAP Response
[Session-Id, MAC] [Session-Id, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(q+1) -----> PANA-Auth-Request(q+1)
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, MAC] [Session-Id, EAP{Response}, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(q+1) // No piggybacking EAP Response <----- PANA-Auth-Answer(q+1) // No piggybacking EAP Response
[Session-Id, MAC] [Session-Id, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(p+1) <----- PANA-Auth-Request(p+1)
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}, MAC] [Session-Id, EAP{Request}, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p+1) // Piggybacking EAP Response -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p+1) // Piggybacking EAP Response
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, MAC] [Session-Id, EAP{Response}, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Bind-Request(p+2) <----- PANA-Bind-Request(p+2)
[Session-Id, Result-Code, EAP{Success}, [Session-Id, Result-Code, EAP{Success},
Device-Id, Key-Id, Device-Id, Key-Id, Algorithm,
Lifetime, Protection-Cap., PPAC, MAC] Lifetime, Protection-Cap., PPAC, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Bind-Answer(p+2) -----> PANA-Bind-Answer(p+2)
[Session-Id, Device-Id, Key-Id, PPAC, MAC] [Session-Id, Device-Id, Key-Id, PPAC, AUTH]
Figure 7: Example sequence for the re-authentication phase initiated Figure 7: Example sequence for the re-authentication phase initiated
by PaC by PaC
4.7 Termination Phase 4.7. Termination Phase
A procedure for explicitly terminating a PANA session can be A procedure for explicitly terminating a PANA session can be
initiated either from the PaC (i.e., disconnect indication) or from initiated either from the PaC (i.e., disconnect indication) or from
the PAA (i.e., session revocation). The PANA-Termination-Request and the PAA (i.e., session revocation). The PANA-Termination-Request and
PANA-Termination-Answer message exchanges are used for disconnect PANA-Termination-Answer message exchanges are used for disconnect
indication and session revocation procedures. indication and session revocation procedures.
The reason for termination is indicated in the Termination-Cause AVP. The reason for termination is indicated in the Termination-Cause AVP.
When there is an established PANA SA between the PaC and the PAA, all When there is an established PANA SA between the PaC and the PAA, all
messages exchanged during the termination phase MUST be protected messages exchanged during the termination phase MUST be protected
with a MAC AVP. When the sender of the PANA-Termination-Request with an AUTH AVP. When the sender of the PANA-Termination-Request
message receives a valid acknowledgment, all states maintained for message receives a valid acknowledgment, all states maintained for
the PANA session MUST be deleted immediately. the PANA session MUST be deleted immediately.
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-Termination-Request(q)[Session-Id, MAC] -----> PANA-Termination-Request(q)[Session-Id, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Termination-Answer(q)[Session-Id, MAC] <----- PANA-Termination-Answer(q)[Session-Id, AUTH]
Figure 8: Example sequence for the termination phase triggered by PaC Figure 8: Example sequence for the termination phase triggered by PaC
4.8 Separate NAP and ISP Authentication 4.8. Separate NAP and ISP Authentication
PANA allows running at most two EAP sessions in sequence in the PANA allows running at most two EAP sessions in sequence in the
authentication and authorization phase to support separate NAP and authentication and authorization phase to support separate NAP and
ISP authentication as described in this section. A typical network ISP authentication as described in this section. A typical network
access authentication includes execution of one EAP method with the access authentication includes execution of one EAP method with the
ISP. This separation allows the PaC to perform an additional ISP. This separation allows the PaC to perform an additional
authentication method for receiving differentiated services from the authentication method for receiving differentiated services from the
NAP. NAP.
Currently, running multiple EAP sessions in sequence in the Currently, running multiple EAP sessions in sequence in the
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of EAP sessions in sequence, or giving the PaC another chance to try of EAP sessions in sequence, or giving the PaC another chance to try
another EAP authentication method within an integrated NAP and ISP another EAP authentication method within an integrated NAP and ISP
authentication when an EAP authentication method fails. authentication when an EAP authentication method fails.
Within separate NAP and ISP authentication, the NAP authentication Within separate NAP and ISP authentication, the NAP authentication
and the ISP authentication are considered completely independent. and the ISP authentication are considered completely independent.
Presence or success of one should not effect the other. Making a Presence or success of one should not effect the other. Making a
network access authorization decision based on the success or failure network access authorization decision based on the success or failure
of each authentication is a network policy issue. of each authentication is a network policy issue.
4.8.1 Negotiating Separate NAP and ISP Authentication 4.8.1. Negotiating Separate NAP and ISP Authentication
When the PaC and PAA negotiates in the discovery and handshake phase When the PaC and PAA negotiates in the discovery and handshake phase
to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, the PaC and the PAA to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, the PaC and the PAA
operate in the following way in addition to the behavior defined in operate in the following way in addition to the behavior defined in
Section 4.3 Section 4.3
In the discovery and handshake phase, the PAA MAY advertise In the discovery and handshake phase, the PAA MAY advertise
availability of separate NAP and ISP authentication ([I-D.ietf-pana- availability of separate NAP and ISP authentication ([I-D.ietf-pana-
framework]) by setting the S-flag on the PANA header of the PANA- framework]) by setting the S-flag on the PANA header of the PANA-
Start-Request message. Start-Request message.
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authentication is performed (ISP-only) and the processing occurs as authentication is performed (ISP-only) and the processing occurs as
described in Section 4.3. described in Section 4.3.
When the S-flag is set in a PANA-Start-Request message, the initial When the S-flag is set in a PANA-Start-Request message, the initial
EAP Request message MUST NOT be carried in the PANA-Start-Request EAP Request message MUST NOT be carried in the PANA-Start-Request
message. (If the initial EAP Request message were contained in the message. (If the initial EAP Request message were contained in the
PANA-Start-Request message during the S-flag negotiation, the PaC PANA-Start-Request message during the S-flag negotiation, the PaC
cannot tell whether the EAP Request message is for NAP authentication cannot tell whether the EAP Request message is for NAP authentication
or ISP authentication.) or ISP authentication.)
4.8.2 Execution of Separate NAP and ISP Authentication 4.8.2. Execution of Separate NAP and ISP Authentication
When the PaC and PAA have negotiated in the discovery and handshake When the PaC and PAA have negotiated in the discovery and handshake
phase to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, the PaC and the phase to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, the PaC and the
PAA operate in the following way in addition to the behavior defined PAA operate in the following way in addition to the behavior defined
in Section 4.4 in Section 4.4
o The S-flag of PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST o The S-flag of PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST
be set. be set.
o An EAP Success/Failure message is carried in a PANA-FirstAuth-End- o An EAP Success/Failure message is carried in a PANA-FirstAuth-End-
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the S-flag of the PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer message. If the first the S-flag of the PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer message. If the first
EAP authentication failed and the S-flag is not set in the PANA- EAP authentication failed and the S-flag is not set in the PANA-
FirstAuth-End-Answer message as a result of those operations, the FirstAuth-End-Answer message as a result of those operations, the
PANA session MUST be immediately deleted. Otherwise, the second PANA session MUST be immediately deleted. Otherwise, the second
EAP authentication MUST be performed. EAP authentication MUST be performed.
o The PAA determines the execution order of NAP authentication and o The PAA determines the execution order of NAP authentication and
ISP authentication. In this case, the PAA can indicate which ISP authentication. In this case, the PAA can indicate which
authentication (NAP authentication or ISP authentication) is authentication (NAP authentication or ISP authentication) is
currently occurring by using N-flag in the PANA message header. currently occurring by using N-flag in the PANA message header.
When NAP authentication is being performed, the N-flag MUST be When NAP authentication is being performed, the N-flag MUST be
set. When ISP authentication is being performed, the N-flag MUST set. When ISP authentication is being performed, the N-flag MUST
NOT be set. The N-flag MUST NOT be set when S-flag is not set. NOT be set. The N-flag MUST NOT be set when S-flag is not set.
When the PaC and PAA have negotiated in the discovery and handshake When the PaC and PAA have negotiated in the discovery and handshake
phase to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, and the lower- phase to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, and the lower-
layer is insecure, the two EAP authentication methods used in the layer is insecure, the two EAP authentication methods used in the
separate authentication MUST be capable of deriving keys (AAA-Key). separate authentication MUST be capable of deriving keys (AAA-Key).
4.8.3 AAA-Key Calculation 4.8.3. AAA-Key Calculation
When the PaC and PAA have negotiated in the discovery and handshake When the PaC and PAA have negotiated in the discovery and handshake
phase to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, if the lower- phase to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, if the lower-
layer is insecure, the two EAP authentication methods used in the layer is insecure, the two EAP authentication methods used in the
separate authentication MUST be capable of deriving keys. In this separate authentication MUST be capable of deriving keys. In this
case, if the first EAP authentication is successful, the PANA- case, if the first EAP authentication is successful, the PANA-
FirstAuth-End-Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer messages as well FirstAuth-End-Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer messages as well
as PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages in the second EAP as PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages in the second EAP
authentication MUST be protected with the key derived from the AAA- authentication MUST be protected with the key derived from the AAA-
Key for the first EAP authentication. The PANA-Bind-Request and Key for the first EAP authentication. The PANA-Bind-Request and
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second EAP authentication fails, or with the AAA-Key for the second second EAP authentication fails, or with the AAA-Key for the second
EAP authentication if the first EAP authentication fails and the EAP authentication if the first EAP authentication fails and the
second EAP authentication succeeds, or with the compound AAA-Key second EAP authentication succeeds, or with the compound AAA-Key
derived from the two AAA-Keys, one for the first EAP authentication derived from the two AAA-Keys, one for the first EAP authentication
and the other from the second EAP authentication, if both the first and the other from the second EAP authentication, if both the first
and second EAP authentication succeed. See Section 5.3 for how to and second EAP authentication succeed. See Section 5.3 for how to
derive the AAA-Key. derive the AAA-Key.
5. Processing Rules 5. Processing Rules
5.1 Fragmentation 5.1. Fragmentation
PANA does not provide fragmentation of PANA messages. Instead, it PANA does not provide fragmentation of PANA messages. Instead, it
relies on fragmentation provided by EAP methods and IP layer when relies on fragmentation provided by EAP methods and IP layer when
needed. needed.
5.2 Sequence Number and Retransmission 5.2. Sequence Number and Retransmission
PANA uses sequence numbers to provide ordered and reliable delivery PANA uses sequence numbers to provide ordered and reliable delivery
of messages. of messages.
The PaC and PAA maintain two sequence numbers: the next one to be The PaC and PAA maintain two sequence numbers: the next one to be
used for a request it initiates and the next one it expects to see in used for a request it initiates and the next one it expects to see in
a request from the other end. These sequence numbers are 32-bit a request from the other end. These sequence numbers are 32-bit
unsigned numbers. They are monotonically incremented by 1 as new unsigned numbers. They are monotonically incremented by 1 as new
requests are generated and received, and wrapped to zero on the next requests are generated and received, and wrapped to zero on the next
message after 2^32-1. Answers always contain the same sequence message after 2^32-1. Answers always contain the same sequence
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PANA messages are retransmitted based on a timer until a response is PANA messages are retransmitted based on a timer until a response is
received (in which case the retransmission timer is stopped) or the received (in which case the retransmission timer is stopped) or the
number of retransmission reaches the maximum value (in which case the number of retransmission reaches the maximum value (in which case the
PANA session MUST be deleted immediately). PANA session MUST be deleted immediately).
The retransmission timers SHOULD be calculated as described in The retransmission timers SHOULD be calculated as described in
[RFC2988] to provide congestion control. See Section 9 for default [RFC2988] to provide congestion control. See Section 9 for default
timer and maximum retransmission count parameters. timer and maximum retransmission count parameters.
The PaC and PAA MUST respond to duplicate requests. The last The PaC and PAA MUST respond to duplicate requests as long as the
responding rate does not exceed a certain threshold value. The last
transmitted answer MAY be cached in case it is not received by the transmitted answer MAY be cached in case it is not received by the
peer and that generates a retransmission of the last request. When peer and that generates a retransmission of the last request. When
available, the cached answer can be used instead of fully processing available, the cached answer can be used instead of fully processing
the retransmitted request and forming a new answer from scratch. the retransmitted request and forming a new answer from scratch.
PANA MUST NOT generate EAP message duplication. EAP payload of a PANA MUST NOT generate EAP message duplication. EAP payload of a
retransmitted PANA message MUST NOT be passed to the EAP layer. retransmitted PANA message MUST NOT be passed to the EAP layer.
5.3 PANA Security Association 5.3. PANA Security Association
A PANA SA is created as an attribute of a PANA session when EAP A PANA SA is created as an attribute of a PANA session when EAP
authentication succeeds with a creation of a AAA-Key. A PANA SA is authentication succeeds with a creation of a AAA-Key. A PANA SA is
not created when the PANA authentication fails or no AAA-Key is not created when the PANA authentication fails or no AAA-Key is
produced by any EAP authentication method. In the case where two EAP produced by any EAP authentication method. In the case where two EAP
sessions are performed in sequence in the PANA authentication and sessions are performed in sequence in the PANA authentication and
authorization phase, it is possible that two AAA-Keys are derived. authorization phase, it is possible that two AAA-Keys are derived.
If this happens, the PANA SA MUST be generated from both AAA-Keys. If this happens, the PANA SA MUST be generated from both AAA-Keys.
When a new AAA-Key is derived in the PANA re-authentication phase, When a new AAA-Key is derived in the PANA re-authentication phase,
any key derived from the old AAA-Key MUST be updated to a new one any key derived from the old AAA-Key MUST be updated to a new one
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Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages or PANA-FirstAuth-End- Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages or PANA-FirstAuth-End-
Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer messages at the end of the EAP Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer messages at the end of the EAP
authentication which resulted in deriving a new AAA-Key. The Key-Id authentication which resulted in deriving a new AAA-Key. The Key-Id
AVP is of type Unsigned32 and MUST contain a value that uniquely AVP is of type Unsigned32 and MUST contain a value that uniquely
identifies the AAA-Key within the PANA session. The PANA-Bind-Answer identifies the AAA-Key within the PANA session. The PANA-Bind-Answer
message (or the PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer message) sent in response message (or the PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer message) sent in response
to a PANA-Bind-Request message (or a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request to a PANA-Bind-Request message (or a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request
message) with a Key-Id AVP MUST contain a Key-Id AVP with the same message) with a Key-Id AVP MUST contain a Key-Id AVP with the same
AAA-Key identifier carried in the request. PANA-Bind-Request, PANA- AAA-Key identifier carried in the request. PANA-Bind-Request, PANA-
Bind-Answer, PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer Bind-Answer, PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer
messages with a Key-Id AVP MUST also carry a MAC AVP whose value is messages with a Key-Id AVP MUST also carry an AUTH AVP whose value is
computed by using the new PANA_MAC_KEY derived from the new AAA-Key computed by using the new PANA_AUTH_KEY derived from the new AAA-Key
(or the new pair of AAA-Keys when the PANA_MAC_KEY is derived from (or the new pair of AAA-Keys when the PANA_AUTH_KEY is derived from
two AAA-Keys). Although the specification does not mandate a two AAA-Keys). Although the specification does not mandate a
particular method for calculation of the Key-Id AVP value, a simple particular method for calculation of the Key-Id AVP value, a simple
method is to use monotonically increasing numbers. method is to use monotonically increasing numbers.
The PANA session lifetime is bounded by the authorization lifetime The PANA session lifetime is bounded by the authorization lifetime
granted by the authentication server (same as the AAA-Key lifetime). granted by the authentication server (same as the AAA-Key lifetime).
The lifetime of the PANA SA (hence the PANA_MAC_KEY) is the same as The lifetime of the PANA SA (hence the PANA_AUTH_KEY) is the same as
the lifetime of the PANA session. The created PANA SA is deleted the lifetime of the PANA session. The created PANA SA is deleted
when the corresponding PANA session is deleted. when the corresponding PANA session is deleted.
PANA SA attributes as well as PANA session attributes are listed PANA SA attributes as well as PANA session attributes are listed
below: below:
PANA Session attributes: PANA Session attributes:
* Session-Id * Session-Id
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* Sequence number of the last received request * Sequence number of the last received request
* Last transmitted message payload * Last transmitted message payload
* Retransmission interval * Retransmission interval
* Session lifetime * Session lifetime
* Protection-Capability * Protection-Capability
* PANA SA attributes: * PANA SA attributes
+ Nonce generated by PaC (PaC_nonce) PANA SA attributes:
+ Nonce generated by PAA (PAA_nonce) * Nonce generated by PaC (PaC_nonce)
+ AAA-Key * Nonce generated by PAA (PAA_nonce)
+ AAA-Key Identifier * AAA-Key
+ PANA_MAC_KEY * AAA-Key Identifier
The PANA_MAC_KEY is derived from the available AAA-Key(s) and it is * PANA_AUTH_KEY
* Pseudo-random function
* Integrity algorithm
The PANA_AUTH_KEY is derived from the available AAA-Key(s) and it is
used to integrity protect PANA messages. If there is only one AAA- used to integrity protect PANA messages. If there is only one AAA-
Key available, e.g., due to ISP-only authentication, or with one Key available, e.g., due to ISP-only authentication, or with one
failed and one successful separate NAP and ISP authentication (see failed and one successful separate NAP and ISP authentication (see
Section 4.8), the PANA_MAC_KEY computation is based on that single Section 4.8), the PANA_AUTH_KEY computation is based on that single
key. Otherwise, two AAA-Keys available to PANA can be combined in key. Otherwise, two AAA-Keys available to PANA can be combined in
following way ('|' indicates concatenation): following way ('|' indicates concatenation):
AAA-Key = AAA-Key1 | AAA-Key2 AAA-Key = AAA-Key1 | AAA-Key2
The PANA_MAC_KEY is computed in the following way: The PANA_AUTH_KEY is computed in the following way:
PANA_MAC_KEY = The first N bits of PANA_AUTH_KEY = prf+(AAA-Key, PaC_nonce | PAA_nonce | Session-ID)
HMAC_SHA1(AAA-Key, PaC_nonce | PAA_nonce | Session-ID)
where the value of N depends on the integrity protection algorithm in where the prf+ function is defined in IKEv2 [RFC4306]. The pseudo-
use, i.e., N=160 for HMAC-SHA1. The length of the AAA-Key MUST be N random function to be used for the prf+ function is specified in the
bits or longer. See Section 5.4 for the detailed usage of the Algorithm AVP in a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request or a PANA-Bind-Request
PANA_MAC_KEY. message. The length of PANA_AUTH_KEY depends on the integrity
algorithm in use. See Section 5.4 for the detailed usage of the
PANA_AUTH_KEY.
5.4 Message Authentication Code 5.4. Message Authentication
A PANA message can contain a MAC (Message Authentication Code) AVP A PANA message can contain an AUTH AVP for cryptographically
for cryptographically protecting the message. protecting the message.
When a MAC AVP is included in a PANA message, the value field of the When an AUTH AVP is included in a PANA message, the value field of
MAC AVP is calculated by using the PANA_MAC_KEY in the following way: the AUTH AVP is calculated by using the PANA_AUTH_KEY in the
following way:
MAC AVP value = PANA_MAC_PRF(PANA_MAC_KEY, PANA_PDU) AUTH AVP value = PANA_AUTH_HASH(PANA_AUTH_KEY, PANA_PDU)
where PANA_PDU is the PANA message including the PANA header, with where PANA_PDU is the PANA message including the PANA header, with
the MAC AVP value field first initialized to 0. PANA_MAC_PRF the AUTH AVP value field first initialized to 0. PANA_AUTH_HASH
represents the pseudo random function corresponding to the MAC represents the integrity algorithm specified in the Algorithm AVP in
algorithm specified in the MAC AVP. In this version of draft, a PANA-Bind-Request message. The PaC and PAA MUST use the same
PANA_MAC_PRF is HMAC-SHA1. The PaC and PAA MUST use the same integrity algorithm to calculate an AUTH AVP they originate and
algorithm to calculate a MAC AVP they originate and receive. The receive. The algorithm is determined by the PAA. When the PaC does
algorithm is determined by the PAA when a PANA-Bind-Request with a not support the integrity algorithm specified in the PANA-Bind-
MAC AVP is sent. When the PaC does not support the MAC algorithm Request message, it MUST silently discard the message.
specified in the PANA-Bind-Request message, it MUST silently discard
the message. The PAA MUST NOT change the MAC algorithm throughout
the continuation of the PANA session.
5.5 Message Validity Check 5.5. Message Validity Check
When a PANA message is received, the message is considered to be When a PANA message is received, the message is considered to be
invalid at least when one of the following conditions are not met: invalid at least when one of the following conditions are not met:
o Each field in the message header contains a valid value including o Each field in the message header contains a valid value including
sequence number, message length, message type, version number, sequence number, message length, message type, version number,
flags, etc. flags, etc.
o The message type is one of the expected types in the current o The message type is one of the expected types in the current
state. Specifically the following messages are unexpected and state. Specifically the following messages are unexpected and
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+ PANA-PAA-Discover. + PANA-PAA-Discover.
* In the termination phase: * In the termination phase:
+ PANA-PAA-Discover. + PANA-PAA-Discover.
+ All requests but PANA-Termination-Request. + All requests but PANA-Termination-Request.
o The message payload contains a valid set of AVPs allowed for the o The message payload contains a valid set of AVPs allowed for the
message type and there is no missing AVP that needs to be included message type and there is no missing AVP that needs to be included
in the payload. in the payload and no AVP, which needs to be at a fixed position,
is included in a position different from this fixed position.
o Each AVP is decoded correctly. o Each AVP is decoded correctly.
o When a MAC AVP is included, the AVP value matches the MAC value o When an AUTH AVP is included, the AVP value matches the hash value
computed against the received message. computed against the received message.
o When a Device-Id AVP is included, the AVP is valid if the device o When a Device-Id AVP is included, the AVP is valid if the device
identifier type contained in the AVP is supported (check performed identifier type contained in the AVP is supported (check performed
by both the PaC and the PAA) and is the requested one (check by both the PaC and the PAA) and is the requested one (check
performed by the PAA only). Note that a Device-Id AVP carries the performed by the PAA only). Note that a Device-Id AVP carries the
device identifier of the PaC in messages from the PaC to the PAA device identifier of the PaC in messages from the PaC to the PAA
and the device identifier(s) of the EP(s) in messages from the PAA and the device identifier(s) of the EP(s) in messages from the PAA
to the PaC. to the PaC.
Invalid messages MUST be discarded in order to provide robustness Invalid messages MUST be discarded in order to provide robustness
against DoS attacks. In addition, an error notification message MAY against DoS attacks. In addition, an error notification message MAY
be returned to the sender. See Section 5.11 for details. be returned to the sender. See Section 5.11 for details.
5.6 PaC-EP-Master-Key 5.6. PaC-EP-Master-Key
As described in Section 4.4, use of a cryptographic filtering As described in Section 4.4, use of a cryptographic filtering
mechanism is indicated by inclusion of a Protection-Capability AVP in mechanism is indicated by inclusion of a Protection-Capability AVP in
the PANA-Bind-Request message in the authentication and authorization the PANA-Bind-Request message in the authentication and authorization
phase. In this case, a PaC-EP-Master-Key is derived from the AAA-Key phase. In this case, a PaC-EP-Master-Key is derived from the AAA-Key
for each EP and used by a secure association protocol for for each EP and used by a secure association protocol for
bootstrapping link-layer or IPsec ciphering betweeen the PaC and EP. bootstrapping link-layer or IPsec ciphering between the PaC and EP.
The PaC-EP-Master-Key derivation algorithm is defined as follows. The PaC-EP-Master-Key derivation algorithm is defined as follows.
PaC-EP-Master-Key = HMAC-SHA-1 (AAA-Key, "PaC-EP master key" | PaC-EP-Master-Key = The first 64 octets of
Session ID | Key-ID | EP-Device-Id) prf+(AAA-Key, "PaC-EP master key" |
Session ID | Key-ID | EP-Device-Id)
The prf+ function is defined in IKEv2 [RFC4306]. The pseudo-random
function used for the prf+ function is specified in the Algorithm AVP
carried in a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request or a PANA-Bind-Request
message.
EP-Device-Id is the Data field of the Device-Id AVP for the EP-Device-Id is the Data field of the Device-Id AVP for the
corresponding EP. corresponding EP.
5.7 Device ID Choice 5.7. Device ID Choice
The device identifier used in the context of PANA can be an IP The device identifier used in the context of PANA can be an IP
address, a MAC address, or an identifier that is not carried in data address, a MAC address, or an identifier that may not be carried in
packets but has local significance in identifying a connected device data packets but has local significance in identifying a connected
(e.g., circuit id, PPP interface id). The last type of identifiers device (e.g., circuit id, PPP interface id). The last type of
are commonly used in point-to-point links where MAC addresses are not identifiers are commonly used in point-to-point links where MAC
available and lower-layers are already physically or addresses are not available and lower-layers are already physically
cryptographically secured. or cryptographically secured.
It is assumed that the PAA knows the link type and the security It is assumed that the PAA knows the link type and the security
mechanisms being provided or required on the access network (e.g., mechanisms being provided or required on the access network (based on
based on physical security, link-layer ciphers enabled before or configuration of the network administrator). For example, one
after PANA, or IPsec). Based on that information, the PAA can decide network administrator might want to use IPsec for securing the
what type of EP device id will be usedused when running PANA with the network access while another one (for a different network) might rely
client. on physical security.
When IPsec-based security [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] is the choice of When IPsec-based security [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] is the choice of
access control, the PAA SHOULD provide IP address(es) as EP(s)' access control, the PAA MUST provide IP address(es) as EP(s)' device
device ID, and expect the PaC to provide its IP address in return. ID, and expect the PaC to provide its IP address in return.
Similarly, IP addresses are used when the EP(s) is not on the same IP Similarly, IP addresses are used when the EP(s) is not on the same IP
subnet as the PaC is. subnet as the PaC is.
In other cases, MAC addresses are used as device identifiers when In other cases, MAC addresses are used as device identifiers when
they are available. they are available.
If non-IPsec access control is enabled, and a MAC address is not If non-IPsec access control is enabled, and a MAC address is not
available, locally-significant identifiers (e.g., as a circuit id) available, locally-significant identifiers (e.g., as a circuit id)
MUST be used as device id. Note that these identifiers are not MUST be used as device id. Note that these identifiers are not
exchanged within PANA messages. Instead, peers rely on lower-layers exchanged within PANA messages. Instead, peers rely on lower-layers
to provide them along with received PANA messages. to provide them along with received PANA messages.
5.8 PaC Updating its IP Address 5.8. PaC Updating its IP Address
A PaC's IP address can change in certain situations. For example, A PaC's IP address can change in certain situations. For example,
the PANA framework [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] describes a case in the PANA framework [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] describes a case in
which a PaC replaces a pre-PANA address (PRPA) with a post-PANA which a PaC replaces a pre-PANA address (PRPA) with a post-PANA
address (POPA). In order to establish reachability, the PAA needs to address (POPA). In another situation a PaC may change its IP address
be notified about the change of PaC address. used for PANA when it moves from one IP link to another within the
same PAA's realm. In order to maintain the PANA session, the PAA
needs to be notified about the change of PaC address.
After the PaC has changed its address, it MUST send a PANA-Update- If the device identifier of the PaC is the IP address, it is also
Request message to the PAA. The PAA MUST update the PANA session subject to the same change. The PAA needs to be notified about the
with the new PaC address (source IP address) and return a PANA- change of device identifier as well so that the PAA can update the
Update-Answer message. If there is an established PANA SA, both EP(s). If IPsec is used between the PaC and the EPs, an IKE or
PANA-Update-Request and PANA-Update-Answer messages MUST be protected MOBIKE [I-D.ietf-mobike-protocol] run is needed following such a
with a MAC AVP. change.
5.9 Session Lifetime After the PaC has changed its IP address, it MUST send a PANA-Update-
Request message to the PAA. If the PaC has also changed its device
identifier, the PANA-Update-Request message MUST include a Device-Id
AVP containing the new device identifier. The PAA MUST update the
PANA session with the new PaC address carried in the Source Address
field of the IP header and the new device identifier carried in the
Device-Id AVP, and return a PANA-Update-Answer message. The PANA-
Update-Answer message MUST contain one or more Device-Id AVPs for the
EPs if the set of EPs serving the PaC has also changed. If there is
an established PANA SA, both PANA-Update-Request and PANA-Update-
Answer messages MUST be protected with an AUTH AVP.
5.9. Session Lifetime
The authentication and authorization phase determines the PANA The authentication and authorization phase determines the PANA
session lifetime when the network access authorization succeeds. The session lifetime when the network access authorization succeeds. The
Session-Lifetime AVP MAY be optionally included in the PANA-Bind- Session-Lifetime AVP MAY be optionally included in the PANA-Bind-
Request message to inform the PaC about the valid lifetime of the Request message to inform the PaC about the valid lifetime of the
PANA session. It MUST be ignored when included in other PANA PANA session. It MUST be ignored when included in other PANA
messages. messages.
When the Session-Lifetime AVP is not included in the PANA-Bind-
Request message then the PaC has no knowledge about a PANA session
limitation and must therefore conclude that the session is not
limited.
The lifetime is a non-negotiable parameter that can be used by the The lifetime is a non-negotiable parameter that can be used by the
PaC to manage PANA-related state. The PaC does not have to perform PaC to manage PANA-related state. The PaC does not have to perform
any actions when the lifetime expires, other than purging local any actions when the lifetime expires, other than purging local
state. The PAA SHOULD initiate the PANA re-authentication phase state. The PAA SHOULD initiate the PANA re-authentication phase
before the current session lifetime expires. before the current session lifetime expires.
The PaC and PAA MAY optionally rely on lower-layer indications to The PaC and the PAA MAY use information obtained outside PANA (e.g.,
expedite the detection of a disconnected peer. Availability and lower-layer indications) to expedite the detection of a disconnected
reliability of such indications depend on the specific access peer. Availability and reliability of such indications MAY depend on
technologies. A PANA peer can use the PANA-Ping exchange to verify a specific link layer or network topology and are therefore only
the disconnection before taking an action. hints. A PANA peer SHOULD use the PANA-Ping message exchange to
verify the liveness of a peer before taking an action.
The session lifetime parameter is not related to the transmission of The session lifetime parameter is not related to the transmission of
PANA-Ping-Request messages. These messages can be used for PANA-Ping-Request messages. These messages can be used for
asynchronously verifying the liveness of the peer. The decision to asynchronously verifying the liveness of the peer. The decision to
send a PANA-Ping-Request message is taken locally and does not send a PANA-Ping-Request message is taken locally and does not
require coordination between the peers. require coordination between the peers.
When separate ISP and NAP authentication is performed, it is possible When separate ISP and NAP authentication is performed, it is possible
that different authorization lifetime values are associated with the that different authorization lifetime values are associated with the
two EAP authentication sessions. In this case, the smaller two EAP authentication sessions. In this case, the smaller
authorization lifetime value MUST be used for calculating the PANA authorization lifetime value MUST be used for calculating the PANA
Session-Lifetime value. As a result, both NAP and ISP authentication Session-Lifetime value. As a result, both NAP and ISP authentication
will be performed in the re-authentication phase. will be performed in the re-authentication phase.
5.10 Network Selection 5.10. Network Selection
The PANA discovery and handshake phase allows the PaC to learn The PANA discovery and handshake phase allows the PaC to learn
identity of the NAP and a list of ISPs that are available through the identity of the NAP and a list of ISPs that are available through the
NAP. The PaC can not only learn the ISPs but also convey the NAP. The PaC can not only learn the ISPs but also convey the
selected ISP explicitly during the handshake phase. The PAA is selected ISP explicitly during the handshake phase. The PAA is
assumed to be pre-configured with the information of ISPs that are assumed to be pre-configured with the information of ISPs that are
served by the NAP. served by the NAP.
A PANA-Start-Request message sent from the PAA MAY contain zero or A PANA-Start-Request message sent from the PAA MAY contain zero or
one NAP-Information AVP, and zero or more ISP-Information AVPs. The one NAP-Information AVP, and zero or more ISP-Information AVPs. The
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The PANA-based ISP selection mechanism dictates the next-hop AAA The PANA-based ISP selection mechanism dictates the next-hop AAA
proxy on the PAA. If the NAP requires all AAA traffic to go through proxy on the PAA. If the NAP requires all AAA traffic to go through
its local AAA proxy, it may have to rely on a mechanism to relay the its local AAA proxy, it may have to rely on a mechanism to relay the
selected ISP information from PAA (AAA client) to the local AAA selected ISP information from PAA (AAA client) to the local AAA
proxy. The local AAA proxy can forward the AAA traffic to the proxy. The local AAA proxy can forward the AAA traffic to the
selected ISP domain upon processing. Further details, including how selected ISP domain upon processing. Further details, including how
the AAA client relays AAA routing information to the AAA proxy, are the AAA client relays AAA routing information to the AAA proxy, are
outside the scope of PANA. outside the scope of PANA.
An alternative ISP discovery mechanism is outlined in [I-D.adrangi- An alternative ISP discovery mechanism is outlined in [RFC4284] which
eap-network-discovery] which suggests advertising ISP information in- suggests advertising ISP information in-band with the ongoing EAP
band with the ongoing EAP method execution. Deployments using the method execution. Deployments using the PANA's built-in ISP
PANA's built-in ISP discovery mechanism need not use the other discovery mechanism need not use the other mechanism.
mechanism.
5.11 Error Handling 5.11. Error Handling
A PANA-Error-Request message MAY be sent by either the PaC or the PAA A PANA-Error-Request message MAY be sent by either the PaC or the PAA
when a badly formed PANA message is received or in case of other when a badly formed PANA message is received or in case of other
errors. The receiver of this request MUST respond with a PANA-Error- errors. The receiver of this request MUST respond with a PANA-Error-
Answer message. If the cause of this error message was a request Answer message.
message, then the request MAY be retransmitted immediately without
waiting for its retransmission timer to go off. If the cause of the
error was a response message, the receiver of the PANA-Error-Request
message SHOULD NOT resend the same response until it receives the
next request.
Erroneous PANA messages may be exploited by adversaries to launch DoS An adversary might craft erroneous PANA messages to launch a Denial
attacks on the victims. Unless the PaC or PAA rate-limits the of Service attack. Unless the PaC or the PAA performs a rate-
generated PANA-Error-Request messages it may be overburdened by limitation of the generated PANA-Error-Request messages it may be
having to respond to bogus messages. Limiting the number of error overburdened by responding to bogus messages. Note that a PANA-
notifications sent to a given peer during a (configurable) period of Error-Answer message that is sent in response to a PANA-Error-Request
time may be useful. message does not require either the PaC or the PAA to create state.
When an error message is sent unprotected (i.e., no MAC AVP) and the If an error message is sent unprotected (i.e., without using an AUTH
lower-layer is insecure, the error message is treated as an AVP) and the lower-layer is insecure then the error message MUST be
informational message. The receiver of such an error message MUST processed such that the receiver does not change its state.
NOT change its state unless the error persists and the PANA session
is not making any progress.
6. Header Format 6. Header Format
This section defines message formats for PANA protocol. This section defines message formats for PANA protocol.
6.1 IP and UDP Headers 6.1. IP and UDP Headers
When a PANA-PAA-Discover message is multicast, IP destination address When a PANA-PAA-Discover message is multicast, IP destination address
of the message is set to a well-known administratively scoped of the message is set to a well-known administratively scoped
multicast address (To Be Assigned by IANA). A PANA-PAA-Discover multicast address (To Be Assigned by IANA). A PANA-PAA-Discover
message MAY be unicast in some cases as specified in Section 4.3. message MAY be unicast in some cases as specified in Section 4.3.
Any other PANA message is unicast between the PaC and the PAA. The Any other PANA message is unicast between the PaC and the PAA. The
source and destination addresses SHOULD be set to the addresses on source and destination addresses SHOULD be set to the addresses on
the interfaces from which the message will be sent and received, the interfaces from which the message will be sent and received,
respectively. respectively.
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source and destination ports of the response message MUST be copied source and destination ports of the response message MUST be copied
from the destination and source ports of the request message, from the destination and source ports of the request message,
respectively. respectively.
The source port of an unsolicited PANA message MUST be set to a value The source port of an unsolicited PANA message MUST be set to a value
chosen by the sender. The destination port MUST be set to the peer's chosen by the sender. The destination port MUST be set to the peer's
port number if it has already been discovered via earlier PANA port number if it has already been discovered via earlier PANA
exchanges, set to the assigned PANA port (To Be Assigned by IANA) exchanges, set to the assigned PANA port (To Be Assigned by IANA)
otherwise. otherwise.
When the PANA message is sent in response to a request, the UDP 6.2. PANA Header
source and destination ports of the response message MUST be copied
from the destination and source ports of the request message,
respectively.
The source port of an unsolicited PANA message MUST be set to a value
chosen by the sender. The destination port MUST be set to the peer's
port number if it has already been discovered via earlier PANA
exchanges, set to the assigned PANA port (To Be Assigned by IANA)
otherwise.
The maximum PANA message size is limited by the maximum UDP payload.
6.2 PANA Header
A summary of the PANA header format is shown below. The fields are A summary of the PANA header format is shown below. The fields are
transmitted in network byte order. transmitted in network byte order.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Version | Reserved | Message Length | | Version | Reserved | Message Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Flags | Message Type | | Flags | Message Type |
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The Message Length field is two octets and indicates the length of The Message Length field is two octets and indicates the length of
the PANA message including the header fields. the PANA message including the header fields.
Flags Flags
The Flags field is two octets. The following bits are assigned: The Flags field is two octets. The following bits are assigned:
0 1 0 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|R S N r r r r r r r r r r r r r| |R S N L r r r r r r r r r r r r|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
R(equest) R(equest)
If set, the message is a request. If cleared, the message is If set, the message is a request. If cleared, the message is
an answer. an answer.
S(eparate) S(eparate)
When the S-flag is set in a PANA-Start-Request message it When the S-flag is set in a PANA-Start-Request message it
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separate NAP and ISP authentication. The PaC may also respond separate NAP and ISP authentication. The PaC may also respond
with the S-flag not set which implies the PaC has chosen to with the S-flag not set which implies the PaC has chosen to
authenticate with the ISP only. When the S-flag is set in a authenticate with the ISP only. When the S-flag is set in a
PANA-Auth-Request/Answer, PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request/Answer and PANA-Auth-Request/Answer, PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request/Answer and
PANA-Bind-Request/Answer messages it indicates that separate PANA-Bind-Request/Answer messages it indicates that separate
NAP and ISP authentication is being performed in the NAP and ISP authentication is being performed in the
authentication and authorization phase. For other cases, authentication and authorization phase. For other cases,
S-flag MUST NOT be set. S-flag MUST NOT be set.
N(AP authentication) N(AP authentication)
When the N-flag is set in a PANA-Auth-Request, a PANA- When the N-flag is set in a PANA-Auth-Request, a PANA-
FirstAuth-End-Request or a PANA-Bind-Request message, it FirstAuth-End-Request or a PANA-Bind-Request message, it
indicates that the current EAP authentication is for NAP indicates that the current EAP authentication is for NAP
authentication. When the N-flag is unset in a PANA-Auth- authentication. When the N-flag is unset in a PANA-Auth-
Request, a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request or a PANA-Bind-Request Request, a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request or a PANA-Bind-Request
message, it indicates that the current EAP authentication is message, it indicates that the current EAP authentication is
for ISP authentication. The PaC MUST copy the value of the for ISP authentication. The PaC MUST copy the value of the
flag in its answer from the last received request of the PAA. flag in its answer from the last received request of the PAA.
The value of the flag on an answer MUST be copied from the The value of the flag on an answer MUST be copied from the
request. The N-flag MUST NOT be set when S-flag is not set. request. The N-flag MUST NOT be set when S-flag is not set.
L(stateLess discovery)
When the L-flag is set in a PANA-Start-Request message it
indicates that the PAA is performing stateless discovery.
Cookie AVP MUST be included in both the PANA-Start-Request and
the PANA-Start-Answer messages when performing stateless
discovery.
r(eserved) r(eserved)
These flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to These flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to
zero, and ignored by the receiver. zero, and ignored by the receiver.
Message Type Message Type
The Message Type field is two octets, and is used in order to The Message Type field is two octets, and is used in order to
communicate the message type with the message. The 16-bit address communicate the message type with the message. The 16-bit address
space is managed by IANA [ianaweb]. PANA uses its own address space is managed by IANA [ianaweb]. PANA uses its own address
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Sequence Number Sequence Number
The Sequence Number field contains a 32 bit value. The Sequence Number field contains a 32 bit value.
AVPs AVPs
AVPs are a method of encapsulating information relevant to the AVPs are a method of encapsulating information relevant to the
PANA message. See section Section 6.3 for more information on PANA message. See section Section 6.3 for more information on
AVPs. AVPs.
6.3 AVP Header 6.3. AVP Header
Each AVP of type OctetString MUST be padded to align on a 32-bit Each AVP of type OctetString MUST be padded to align on a 32-bit
boundary, while other AVP types align naturally. A number of zero- boundary, while other AVP types align naturally. A number of zero-
valued bytes are added to the end of the AVP Data field till a word valued bytes are added to the end of the AVP Data field till a word
boundary is reached. The length of the padding is not reflected in boundary is reached. The length of the padding is not reflected in
the AVP Length field [RFC3588]. the AVP Length field [RFC3588].
The fields in the AVP header are sent in network byte order. The The fields in the AVP header are sent in network byte order. The
format of the header is: format of the header is:
skipping to change at page 37, line 10 skipping to change at page 37, line 7
MUST be rejected and the receiver MUST send a PANA-Error- MUST be rejected and the receiver MUST send a PANA-Error-
Request message. If the AVP was unrecognized the PANA-Error- Request message. If the AVP was unrecognized the PANA-Error-
Request message result code MUST be PANA_AVP_UNSUPPORTED. If Request message result code MUST be PANA_AVP_UNSUPPORTED. If
the AVP value was unrecognized the PANA-Error-Request message the AVP value was unrecognized the PANA-Error-Request message
result code MUST be PANA_INVALID_AVP_DATA. In either case the result code MUST be PANA_INVALID_AVP_DATA. In either case the
PANA-Error-Request message MUST carry a Failed-AVP AVP PANA-Error-Request message MUST carry a Failed-AVP AVP
containing the offending mandatory AVP. containing the offending mandatory AVP.
AVPs with the 'M' bit cleared are informational only and a AVPs with the 'M' bit cleared are informational only and a
receiver that receives a message with such an AVP that is not receiver that receives a message with such an AVP that is not
supported, or whose value is not supported, MAY simply ignore recognized, or whose value is not recognized, MAY simply ignore
the AVP. the AVP.
V(endor) V(endor)
The 'V' bit, known as the Vendor-Specific bit, indicates The 'V' bit, known as the Vendor-Specific bit, indicates
whether the optional Vendor-Id field is present in the AVP whether the optional Vendor-Id field is present in the AVP
header. When set the AVP Code belongs to the specific vendor header. When set the AVP Code belongs to the specific vendor
code address space. code address space.
r(eserved) r(eserved)
skipping to change at page 39, line 39 skipping to change at page 39, line 39
PANA-Termination-Request PTR 7 <-------> 7.12 PANA-Termination-Request PTR 7 <-------> 7.12
PANA-Termination-Answer PTA 7 <-------> 7.13 PANA-Termination-Answer PTA 7 <-------> 7.13
PANA-Error-Request PER 8 <-------> 7.14 PANA-Error-Request PER 8 <-------> 7.14
PANA-Error-Answer PEA 8 <-------> 7.15 PANA-Error-Answer PEA 8 <-------> 7.15
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request PFER 9 <-------- 7.16 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request PFER 9 <-------- 7.16
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer PFEA 9 --------> 7.17 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer PFEA 9 --------> 7.17
PANA-Update-Request PUR 10 <-------> 7.18 PANA-Update-Request PUR 10 <-------> 7.18
PANA-Update-Answer PUA 10 <-------> 7.19 PANA-Update-Answer PUA 10 <-------> 7.19
----------------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------------
Figure 9: Table of PANA Messages Figure 9: Table of PANA Messages
Every PANA message defined MUST include a corresponding ABNF Every PANA message defined MUST include a corresponding ABNF
[RFC2234] specification, which is used to define the AVPs that MUST [RFC2234] specification, which is used to define the AVPs that MUST
or MAY be present. The following format is used in the definition: or MAY be present. The following format is used in the definition:
message-def = Message-Name "::=" PANA-message message-def = Message-Name "::=" PANA-message
message-name = PANA-name message-name = PANA-name
PANA-name = ALPHA *(ALPHA / DIGIT / "-") PANA-name = ALPHA *(ALPHA / DIGIT / "-")
skipping to change at page 40, line 26 skipping to change at page 40, line 26
s-bit = ", SEP" s-bit = ", SEP"
; If present, the 'S' bit in the Message ; If present, the 'S' bit in the Message
; Flags is set, indicating support for ; Flags is set, indicating support for
; separate NAP and ISP authentication. ; separate NAP and ISP authentication.
n-bit = ", NAP" n-bit = ", NAP"
; If present, the 'N' bit in the Message ; If present, the 'N' bit in the Message
; Flags is set, indicating that current ; Flags is set, indicating that current
; EAP authentication is for NAP authentication. ; EAP authentication is for NAP authentication.
l-bit = ", SLS"
; If present, the 'L' bit in the Message
; Flags is set, indicating PAA is performing
; stateless discovery
fixed = [qual] "<" avp-spec ">" fixed = [qual] "<" avp-spec ">"
; Defines the fixed position of an AVP ; Defines the fixed position of an AVP
required = [qual] "{" avp-spec "}" required = [qual] "{" avp-spec "}"
; The AVP MUST be present and can appear ; The AVP MUST be present and can appear
; anywhere in the message. ; anywhere in the message.
optional = [qual] "[" avp-name "]" optional = [qual] "[" avp-name "]"
; The avp-name in the 'optional' rule cannot ; The avp-name in the 'optional' rule cannot
; evaluate to any AVP Name which is included ; evaluate to any AVP Name which is included
skipping to change at page 40, line 48 skipping to change at page 41, line 4
qual = [min] "*" [max] qual = [min] "*" [max]
; See ABNF conventions, RFC 2234 Section 6.6. ; See ABNF conventions, RFC 2234 Section 6.6.
; The absence of any qualifiers depends on whether ; The absence of any qualifiers depends on whether
; it precedes a fixed, required, or optional ; it precedes a fixed, required, or optional
; rule. If a fixed or required rule has no ; rule. If a fixed or required rule has no
; qualifier, then exactly one such AVP MUST ; qualifier, then exactly one such AVP MUST
; be present. If an optional rule has no ; be present. If an optional rule has no
; qualifier, then 0 or 1 such AVP may be ; qualifier, then 0 or 1 such AVP may be
; present. ; present.
; ;
; NOTE: "[" and "]" have a different meaning ; NOTE: "[" and "]" have a different meaning
; than in ABNF (see the optional rule, above). ; than in ABNF (see the optional rule, above).
; These braces cannot be used to express ; These braces cannot be used to express
; optional fixed rules (such as an optional ; optional fixed rules (such as an optional
; MAC at the end). To do this, the convention ; AUTH at the end). To do this, the convention
; is '0*1fixed'. ; is '0*1fixed'.
min = 1*DIGIT min = 1*DIGIT
; The minimum number of times the element may ; The minimum number of times the element may
; be present. The default value is zero. ; be present. The default value is zero.
max = 1*DIGIT max = 1*DIGIT
; The maximum number of times the element may ; The maximum number of times the element may
; be present. The default value is infinity. A ; be present. The default value is infinity. A
; value of zero implies the AVP MUST NOT be ; value of zero implies the AVP MUST NOT be
skipping to change at page 41, line 32 skipping to change at page 41, line 38
avp-name = avp-spec / "AVP" avp-name = avp-spec / "AVP"
; The string "AVP" stands for *any* arbitrary ; The string "AVP" stands for *any* arbitrary
; AVP Name, which does not conflict with the ; AVP Name, which does not conflict with the
; required or fixed position AVPs defined in ; required or fixed position AVPs defined in
; the message definition. ; the message definition.
Example-Request ::= < "PANA-Header: 9999999, REQ > Example-Request ::= < "PANA-Header: 9999999, REQ >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
{ Result-Code } { Result-Code }
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.1 PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI) 7.1. PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI)
The PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI) message is used to discover the address The PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI) message is used to discover the address
of PAA(s). The sequence number in this message is always set to zero of PAA(s). The sequence number in this message is always set to zero
(0). (0).
PANA-PAA-Discover ::= < PANA-Header: 1 > PANA-PAA-Discover ::= < PANA-Header: 1 >
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
7.2 PANA-Start-Request (PSR) 7.2. PANA-Start-Request (PSR)
The PANA-Start-Request (PSR) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC to The PANA-Start-Request (PSR) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC to
advertise availability of the PAA and start PANA authentication. The advertise availability of the PAA and start PANA authentication. The
PAA sets the sequence number to an initial random value. PAA sets the sequence number to an initial random value.
PANA-Start-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 2, REQ [,SEP] > PANA-Start-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 2, REQ [,SEP] [,SLS] >
[ Nonce ] [ Nonce ]
[ Cookie ] [ Cookie ]
[ EAP-Payload ] [ EAP-Payload ]
[ NAP-Information ] [ NAP-Information ]
* [ ISP-Information ] * [ ISP-Information ]
[ Protection-Capability] [ Protection-Capability]
[ Algorithm ]
[ PPAC ] [ PPAC ]
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
7.3 PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) 7.3. PANA-Start-Answer (PSA)
The PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA in The PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA in
response to a PANA-Start-Request message. This message completes the response to a PANA-Start-Request message. This message completes the
handshake to start PANA authentication. handshake to start PANA authentication.
PANA-Start-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 2 [,SEP] > PANA-Start-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 2 [,SEP] >
[ Nonce ] [ Nonce ]
[ Cookie ] [ Cookie ]
[ EAP-Payload ] [ EAP-Payload ]
[ ISP-Information ] [ ISP-Information ]
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
7.4 PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) 7.4. PANA-Auth-Request (PAR)
The PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) message is either sent by the PAA or the The PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) message is either sent by the PAA or the
PaC. Its main task is to carry an EAP-Payload AVP. PaC. Its main task is to carry an EAP-Payload AVP.
PANA-Auth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 3, REQ [,SEP] [,NAP] > PANA-Auth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 3, REQ [,SEP] [,NAP] >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
< EAP-Payload > < EAP-Payload >
[ Nonce ] [ Nonce ]
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.5 PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) 7.5. PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN)
THe PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) message is sent by either the PaC or the THe PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) message is sent by either the PaC or the
PAA in response to a PANA-Auth-Request message. It MAY carry an EAP- PAA in response to a PANA-Auth-Request message. It MAY carry an EAP-
Payload AVP. Payload AVP.
PANA-Auth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 3 [,SEP] [,NAP] > PANA-Auth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 3 [,SEP] [,NAP] >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Nonce ] [ Nonce ]
[ EAP-Payload ] [ EAP-Payload ]
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.6 PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR) 7.6. PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR)
The PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA The PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA
to re-initiate EAP authentication. to re-initiate EAP authentication.
PANA-Reauth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 4, REQ > PANA-Reauth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 4, REQ >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.7 PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA) 7.7. PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA)
The PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC The PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC
in response to a PANA-Reauth-Request message. in response to a PANA-Reauth-Request message.
PANA-Reauth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 4 > PANA-Reauth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 4 >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.8 PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) 7.8. PANA-Bind-Request (PBR)
The PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC to The PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC to
deliver the result of PANA authentication. deliver the result of PANA authentication.
PANA-Bind-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 5, REQ [,SEP] [,NAP] > PANA-Bind-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 5, REQ [,SEP] [,NAP] >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
{ Result-Code } { Result-Code }
[ PPAC ] [ PPAC ]
[ EAP-Payload ] [ EAP-Payload ]
[ Session-Lifetime ] [ Session-Lifetime ]
[ Protection-Capability ] [ Protection-Capability ]
[ Key-Id ] [ Key-Id ]
[ Algorithm ]
* [ Device-Id ] * [ Device-Id ]
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.9 PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) 7.9. PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA)
The PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA in The PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA in
response to a PANA-Bind-Request message. response to a PANA-Bind-Request message.
PANA-Bind-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 5 [,SEP] [,NAP] > PANA-Bind-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 5 [,SEP] [,NAP] >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ PPAC ] [ PPAC ]
[ Device-Id ] [ Device-Id ]
[ Key-Id ] [ Key-Id ]
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.10 PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) 7.10. PANA-Ping-Request (PPR)
The PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) message is either sent by the PaC or the The PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) message is either sent by the PaC or the
PAA for performing liveness test. PAA for performing liveness test.
PANA-Ping-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 6, REQ > PANA-Ping-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 6, REQ >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.11 PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) 7.11. PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA)
The PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) message is sent in response to a PANA- The PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) message is sent in response to a PANA-
Ping-Request. Ping-Request.
PANA-Ping-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 6 > PANA-Ping-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 6 >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC >
7.12 PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) 0*1 < AUTH >
7.12. PANA-Termination-Request (PTR)
The PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) message is sent either by the PaC The PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) message is sent either by the PaC
or the PAA to terminate a PANA session. or the PAA to terminate a PANA session.
PANA-Termination-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 7, REQ > PANA-Termination-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 7, REQ >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
< Termination-Cause > < Termination-Cause >
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.13 PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) 7.13. PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA)
The PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) message is sent either by the PaC The PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) message is sent either by the PaC
or the PAA in response to PANA-Termination-Request. or the PAA in response to PANA-Termination-Request.
PANA-Termination-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 7 > PANA-Termination-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 7 >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.14 PANA-Error-Request (PER) 7.14. PANA-Error-Request (PER)
The PANA-Error-Request (PER) message is sent either by the PaC or the The PANA-Error-Request (PER) message is sent either by the PaC or the
PAA to report an error with the last received PANA message. PAA to report an error with the last received PANA message.
PANA-Error-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 8, REQ > PANA-Error-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 8, REQ >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
< Result-Code > < Result-Code >
* [ Failed-AVP ] * [ Failed-AVP ]
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.15 PANA-Error-Answer (PEA) 7.15. PANA-Error-Answer (PEA)
The PANA-Error-Answer (PEA) message is sent in response to a PANA- The PANA-Error-Answer (PEA) message is sent in response to a PANA-
Error-Request. Error-Request.
PANA-Error-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 8 > PANA-Error-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 8 >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.16 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER) 7.16. PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER)
The PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER) message is sent by the PAA to The PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER) message is sent by the PAA to
the PaC to signal the result of the first EAP authentication method the PaC to signal the result of the first EAP authentication method
when separate NAP and ISP authentication is performed. when separate NAP and ISP authentication is performed.
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 9, REQ [,SEP] [,NAP] > PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 9, REQ [,SEP] [,NAP] >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
{ Result-Code } { Result-Code }
[ EAP-Payload ] [ EAP-Payload ]
[ Key-Id ] [ Key-Id ]
[ Algorithm ]
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.17 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA) 7.17. PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA)
The PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA) message is sent by the PaC to The PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA) message is sent by the PaC to
the PAA in response to a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message. the PAA in response to a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message.
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 9, REQ [,SEP] [,NAP] > PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 9, REQ [,SEP] [,NAP] >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Key-Id ] [ Key-Id ]
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.18 PANA-Update-Request (PUR) 7.18. PANA-Update-Request (PUR)
The PANA-Update-Request (PUR) message is sent either by the PaC or The PANA-Update-Request (PUR) message is sent either by the PaC or
the PAA to deliver attribute updates and notifications. In the scope the PAA to deliver attribute updates and notifications. In the scope
of this specification only the PaC IP address can be updated via this of this specification only the IP address and device identifer of the
mechanism. PaC can be updated via this message.
PANA-Update-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 10, REQ > PANA-Update-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 10, REQ >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Device-Id ]
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < AUTH >
7.19 PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) 7.19. PANA-Update-Answer (PUA)
The PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) message is sent by the PAA (PaC) to the The PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) message is sent by the PAA (PaC) to the
PaC (PAA) in response to a PANA-Update-Request from the PaC (PAA). PaC (PAA) in response to a PANA-Update-Request from the PaC (PAA).
PANA-Update-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 10 > PANA-Update-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 10 >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
* [ Device-Id ]
[ Notification ] [ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < AUTH >
8. AVPs in PANA 8. AVPs in PANA
PANA defines several AVPs that are specific to the protocol. A PANA defines several AVPs that are specific to the protocol. A
number of others AVPs are reused. These are specified in other number of others AVPs are reused. These are specified in other
documents such as [RFC3588]. documents such as [RFC3588].
The following tables lists the AVPs used in this document, and The following tables lists the AVPs used in this document, and
specifies in which PANA messages they MAY, or MAY NOT be present. specifies in which PANA messages they MAY, or MAY NOT be present.
skipping to change at page 49, line 11 skipping to change at page 49, line 11
1+ At least one instance of the AVP MUST be present in the 1+ At least one instance of the AVP MUST be present in the
message. message.
+---------------------------------------------+ +---------------------------------------------+
| Message | | Message |
| Type | | Type |
+---+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+---+---+
Attribute Name |PDI|PSR|PSA|PAR|PAN|PRAR|PRAA|PBR|PBA|PPR|PPA| Attribute Name |PDI|PSR|PSA|PAR|PAN|PRAR|PRAA|PBR|PBA|PPR|PPA|
----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+---+---+ ----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+---+---+
Algorithm | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 |
AUTH | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|
Cookie | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Cookie | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Device-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0+|0-1| 0 | 0 | Device-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0+|0-1| 0 | 0 |
EAP-Payload | 0 |0-1|0-1| 1 |0-1| 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | EAP-Payload | 0 |0-1|0-1| 1 |0-1| 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 |
Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
ISP-Information | 0 | 0+|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ISP-Information | 0 | 0+|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Key-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | Key-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 |
MAC | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|
NAP-Information | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | NAP-Information | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Nonce | 0 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Nonce | 0 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Notification |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1| Notification |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|
PPAC | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | PPAC | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 |
Protection-Capability | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | Protection-Capability | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 |
Result-Code | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Result-Code | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Session-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Session-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 |
Termination-Cause | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Termination-Cause | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+---+---+ ----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+---+---+
Figure 10: AVP Occurrence Table (1/2) Figure 10: AVP Occurrence Table (1/2)
+---------------------------------+ +---------------------------------+
| Message | | Message |
| Type | | Type |
+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+
Attribute Name |PTR|PTA|PER|PEA|PFER|PFEA|PUR|PUA| Attribute Name |PTR|PTA|PER|PEA|PFER|PFEA|PUR|PUA|
----------------------+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+ ----------------------+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+
Algorithm | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
AUTH |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1|
Cookie | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Cookie | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Device-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Device-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
EAP-Payload | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | EAP-Payload | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 0+| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 0+| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
ISP-Information | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ISP-Information | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Key-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1 |0-1 | 0 | 0 | Key-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1 |0-1 | 0 | 0 |
MAC |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1|
NAP-Information | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | NAP-Information | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Nonce | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Nonce | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Notification |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1| Notification |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1|
PPAC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | PPAC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Protection-Capability | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Protection-Capability | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Result-Code | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Result-Code | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Session-Id | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Session-Id | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Termination-Cause | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Termination-Cause | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
----------------------+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+ ----------------------+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+
Figure 11: AVP Occurrence Table (2/2) Figure 11: AVP Occurrence Table (2/2)
8.1 Cookie AVP 8.1. Algorithm AVP
The Cookie AVP (AVP Code 1) is used for carrying a random value The Algorithm AVP (AVP Code 1) is used for conveying the pseudo-
generated by the PAA. The AVP data is of type OctetString. The random function to derive PANA_AUTH_KEY and PaC-EP-Master-Key as well
random value is referred to as a cookie and used for making PAA as the integrity algorithm to compute an AUTH AVP. The AVP data is
discovery robust against blind resource consumption DoS attacks. The of type Unsigned32.
exact algorithms and syntax used by the PAA to generate a cookie does
not affect interoperability and not specified in this document. An
example cookie generation algorithm is shown in Section 4.3.
8.2 Device-Id AVP The first 16-bit of the AVP data contains an IKEv2 Transform ID of
Transform Type 2 [RFC4306] corresponding to the key derivation
function.
The Device-Id AVP (AVP Code 2) is used for carrying device The last 16-bit of the AVP data contains an IKEv2 Transform ID of
Transform Type 3 [RFC4306] for the integrity algorithm.
All PANA implementations MUST support PRF_HMAC_SHA1 (2) [RFC2104] for
the key derivation algorithm and AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_160 (7) [ianaweb]
corresponding to the integrity algorithm.
8.2. AUTH AVP
The AUTH AVP (AVP Code 2) is used to integrity protect PANA messages.
The AVP data payload contains the Message Authentication Code encoded
in network byte order. The AVP length varies depending on the
integrity algorithm specified in an Algorithm AVP.
8.3. Cookie AVP
The Cookie AVP (AVP Code 3) is used for carrying a random value
generated by the PAA according to [RFC4086]. The AVP data is of type
OctetString. The random value is referred to as a cookie and used
for making PAA discovery robust against blind resource consumption
DoS attacks. The exact algorithms and syntax used by the PAA to
generate a cookie does not affect interoperability and not specified
in this document. An example cookie generation algorithm is shown in
Section 4.3.
8.4. Device-Id AVP
The Device-Id AVP (AVP Code 4) is used for carrying device
identifiers of PaC and EP(s). The AVP data is of Address type identifiers of PaC and EP(s). The AVP data is of Address type
[RFC3588]. IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are encoded as specified in [RFC3588]. IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are encoded as specified in
[RFC3588]. The content and format of data (including byte and bit [RFC3588]. The content and format of data (including byte and bit
ordering) for link-layer addresses is expected to be specified in ordering) for link-layer addresses is expected to be specified in
specific documents that describe how IP operates over different link- specific documents that describe how IP operates over different link-
layers. For instance, [RFC2464]. Address families other than that layers. For instance, [RFC2464]. Address families other than that
are defined for link-layer or IP addresses MUST NOT be used for this are defined for link-layer or IP addresses MUST NOT be used for this
AVP. AVP.
8.3 EAP-Payload AVP 8.5. EAP-Payload AVP
The EAP-Payload AVP (AVP Code 3) is used for encapsulating the actual The EAP-Payload AVP (AVP Code 5) is used for encapsulating the actual
EAP message that is being exchanged between the EAP peer and the EAP EAP message that is being exchanged between the EAP peer and the EAP
authenticator. The AVP data is of type OctetString. authenticator. The AVP data is of type OctetString.
8.4 Failed-AVP AVP 8.6. Failed-AVP AVP
The Failed-AVP AVP (AVP Code 4) provides debugging information in The Failed-AVP AVP (AVP Code 6) provides debugging information in
cases where a request is rejected or not fully processed due to cases where a request is rejected or not fully processed due to
erroneous information in a specific AVP. The AVP data is of type erroneous information in a specific AVP. The AVP data is of type
Grouped. The format of the Failed-AVP AVP is defined in [RFC3588]. Grouped. The format of the Failed-AVP AVP is defined in [RFC3588].
In case of a failed grouped AVP, the Failed-AVP contains the whole In case of a failed grouped AVP, the Failed-AVP contains the whole
grouped AVP. In case of a failed AVP inside a grouped AVP, the grouped AVP. In case of a failed AVP inside a grouped AVP, the
Failed-AVP contains the single offending AVP. Failed-AVP contains the single offending AVP.
8.5 ISP-Information AVP 8.7. ISP-Information AVP
The ISP-Information AVP (AVP Code 5) contains zero or one Provider- The ISP-Information AVP (AVP Code 7) contains zero or one Provider-
Identifier AVP which carries the identifier of the ISP and one Identifier AVP which carries the identifier of the ISP and one
Provider-Name AVP which carries the name of the ISP. The AVP data is Provider-Name AVP which carries the name of the ISP. The AVP data is
of type Grouped, and it has the following ABNF grammar: of type Grouped, and it has the following ABNF grammar:
ISP-Information ::= < AVP Header: 5 > ISP-Information ::= < AVP Header: 7 >
0*1 { Provider-Identifier } 0*1 { Provider-Identifier }
{ Provider-Name } { Provider-Name }
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
8.6 Key-Id AVP 8.8. Key-Id AVP
The Key-Id AVP (AVP Code 6) is of type Integer32, and contains an The Key-Id AVP (AVP Code 8) is of type Integer32, and contains an
AAA-Key identifier. The AAA-Key identifier is assigned by PAA and AAA-Key identifier. The AAA-Key identifier is assigned by PAA and
MUST be unique within the PANA session. MUST be unique within the PANA session.
8.7 MAC AVP 8.9. NAP-Information AVP
The MAC (Message Authentication Code) AVP is used to integrity
protect PANA messages. The first octet of the this AVP (AVP Code 7)
data contains the MAC algorithm type. Rest of the AVP data payload
contains the MAC encoded in network byte order. The 8-bit Algorithm
name space is managed by IANA [ianaweb]. The AVP length varies
depending on the used algorithm.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Algorithm | MAC...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Algorithm
1 HMAC-SHA1 (20 bytes)
MAC
The Message Authentication Code is encoded in network byte order.
8.8 NAP-Information AVP
The NAP-Information AVP (AVP Code 8) contains zero or one Provider- The NAP-Information AVP (AVP Code 9) contains zero or one Provider-
Identifier AVP which carries the identifier of the NAP and one Identifier AVP which carries the identifier of the NAP and one
Provider-Name AVP which carries the name of the NAP. The AVP data is Provider-Name AVP which carries the name of the NAP. The AVP data is
of type Grouped, and it has the following ABNF grammar: of type Grouped, and it has the following ABNF grammar:
NAP-Information ::= < AVP Header: 8 > NAP-Information ::= < AVP Header: 9 >
0*1 { Provider-Identifier } 0*1 { Provider-Identifier }
{ Provider-Name } { Provider-Name }
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
8.9 Nonce AVP 8.10. Nonce AVP
The Nonce AVP (AVP Code 9) carries a randomly chosen value that is The Nonce AVP (AVP Code 10) carries a randomly chosen value that is
used in cryptographic key computations. The AVP data is of type used in cryptographic key computations. The recommendations in
OctetString and it contains a randomly generated value in opaque [RFC4086] apply with regard to generation of random values. The AVP
format. The data length MUST be between 8 and 256 bytes inclusive. data is of type OctetString and it contains a randomly generated
value in opaque format. The data length MUST be between 8 and 256
octets inclusive.
8.10 Notification AVP The length of the nonces are determined based on the available
pseudo-random functions (PRFs) and the degree of trust placed into
the two PaC and the PAA to compute random values. The length of the
random value for the nonce is determined whether
The Notification AVP (AVP Code 10) is optionally used to convey a 1. The PaC and the PAA each are likely to be able to compute a
random nonce (according to [RFC4086]). The length of the nonce
has to be 1/2 the length of the PRF key (e.g., 10 octets in the
case of HMAC-SHA1).
2. The PaC and the PAA each are not trusted with regard to the
computation a random nonce (according to [RFC4086]). The length
of the nonce has to have the full length of the PRF key (e.g., 20
octets in the case of HMAC-SHA1).
Furthermore, the strongest available PRF available for PANA has to be
considered in this computation. Currently, only a single PRF (namely
HMAC-SHA1) is available and therefore the maximum output length is 20
octets). The recommended maximum length of the nonce value is
therefore currently 20 octets.
8.11. Notification AVP
The Notification AVP (AVP Code 11) is optionally used to convey a
displayable message sent by either the PaC or the PAA. It can be displayable message sent by either the PaC or the PAA. It can be
included in any message, whether it is a request or answer. In case included in any message, whether it is a request or answer. In case
a notification needs to be sent but there is no outgoing PANA message a notification needs to be sent but there is no outgoing PANA message
to deliver this AVP, a PANA-Update-Request that only carries a to deliver this AVP, a PANA-Update-Request that only carries a
Notification AVP SHOULD be generated. Notification AVP SHOULD be generated.
The 'M' bit in the AVP header of this AVP MUST NOT be set. The 'M' bit in the AVP header of this AVP MUST NOT be set.
Receipt this AVP does not change PANA state. Receipt this AVP does not change PANA state.
AVP data is of type OctetString and it contains UTF-8 encoded ISO AVP data is of type OctetString and it contains the following fields
10646 characters [RFC2279]. The length of the displayable message is in the listed order:
determined by the AVP Length field. The message MUST NOT be null
terminated.
8.11 Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC) AVP Language Tag Length
The PPAC AVP (AVP Code 11) is used for conveying the available types This field contains the length of the Language Tag in octets. The
length of this field is 2 octets.
Language Tag
This field contains the language tag defined in [I-D.ietf-ltru-
registry] to indicate the language used for Displayable String.
The length of this data is determined by the Language Tag Length
field.
Displayable String
This field contains UTF-8 encoded ISO 10646 characters [RFC2279]
using the language indicated by the Language Tag. The length of
this data is determined by the AVP Length field and the Language
Tag Length field. This data MUST NOT be null terminated.
8.12. Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC) AVP
The PPAC AVP (AVP Code 12) is used for conveying the available types
of post-PANA IP address configuration mechanisms when sent by the of post-PANA IP address configuration mechanisms when sent by the
PAA, and the chosen one when sent by the PaC. Each possible PAA, and the chosen one when sent by the PaC. Each possible
mechanisms is represented by a flag. The AVP data is of type mechanisms is represented by a flag. The AVP data is of type
Unsigned32. Unsigned32.
The format of the AVP data is as follows: The format of the AVP data is as follows:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
skipping to change at page 54, line 4 skipping to change at page 54, line 36
The PaC can (if sent by PAA) or will (if sent by PaC) use The PaC can (if sent by PAA) or will (if sent by PaC) use
DHCPv6 [RFC3315] to configure a new IPv4 address after PANA. DHCPv6 [RFC3315] to configure a new IPv4 address after PANA.
A (stateless autoconfiguration) A (stateless autoconfiguration)
The PaC can/will use stateless IPv6 address autoconfiguration The PaC can/will use stateless IPv6 address autoconfiguration
[RFC2462] to configure a new IPv6 address after PANA. [RFC2462] to configure a new IPv6 address after PANA.
T (DHCPv4 with IPsec tunnel mode) T (DHCPv4 with IPsec tunnel mode)
The PaC can/will use [RFC3456] to configure a new IPv4 address The PaC can/will use [RFC3456] to configure a new IPv4 address
after PANA. after PANA.
I (IKEv2) I (IKEv2)
The PaC can/will use [I-D.ietf-ipsec-ikev2] to configure (a) The PaC can/will use [RFC4306] to configure (a) new IPv4 and/or
new IPv4 and/or IPv6 address(es) after PANA. IPv6 address(es) after PANA.
Reserved Reserved
These flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to These flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to
zero, and ignored by the receiver. zero, and ignored by the receiver.
The PAA MUST set either the N-flag, or one or more of the other The PAA MUST set either the N-flag, or one or more of the other
flags. If the N-flag is set, the PaC MUST only set its N-flag in its flags. If the N-flag is set, the PaC MUST only set its N-flag in its
response. If the N-flag is not set by the PAA, that means the PaC response. If the N-flag is not set by the PAA, that means the PaC
MUST configure POPA(s) using the method(s) indicated by the flags. MUST configure POPA(s) using the method(s) indicated by the flags.
If IPsec-based access control is not used, the F-flag, S-flag or If IPsec-based access control is not used, the F-flag, S-flag or
A-flag MUST be set by the PAA, and the PaC MUST echo the same flag(s) A-flag MUST be set by the PAA, and the PaC MUST echo the same flag(s)
in its response. Refer to [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] for a detailed in its response. Refer to [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] for a detailed
discussion on when these methods can be used. discussion on when these methods can be used.
8.12 Protection-Capability AVP 8.13. Protection-Capability AVP
The Protection-Capability AVP (AVP Code 12) indicates the The Protection-Capability AVP (AVP Code 13) indicates the
cryptographic data protection capability supported and required by cryptographic data protection capability supported and required by
the EPs. The AVP data is of type Unsigned32. Below is a list of the EPs. The AVP data is of type Unsigned32. Below is a list of
valid data values and associated protection capabilities: valid data values and associated protection capabilities:
0 L2_PROTECTION 0 L2_PROTECTION
1 IPSEC_PROTECTION 1 IPSEC_PROTECTION
8.13 Provider-Identifier AVP 8.14. Provider-Identifier AVP
The Provider-Identifier AVP (AVP Code 13) is of type Unsigned32, and The Provider-Identifier AVP (AVP Code 14) is of type Unsigned32, and
contains an IANA assigned "SMI Network Management Private Enterprise contains an IANA assigned "SMI Network Management Private Enterprise
Codes" [ianaweb] value, encoded in network byte order. Codes" [ianaweb] value, encoded in network byte order.
8.14 Provider-Name AVP 8.15. Provider-Name AVP
The Provider-Name AVP (AVP Code 14) is of type UTF8String, and The Provider-Name AVP (AVP Code 15) is of type UTF8String, and
contains the UTF8-encoded name of the provider. contains the UTF8-encoded name of the provider.
8.15 Result-Code AVP 8.16. Result-Code AVP
The Result-Code AVP (AVP Code 15) is of type Unsigned32 and indicates The Result-Code AVP (AVP Code 16) is of type Unsigned32 and indicates
whether an EAP authentication was completed successfully or whether whether an EAP authentication was completed successfully or whether
an error occurred. Here are Result-Code AVP values taken from an error occurred. Here are Result-Code AVP values taken from
[RFC3588] and adapted for PANA. [RFC3588] and adapted for PANA.
8.15.1 Authentication Results Codes 8.16.1. Authentication Results Codes
These result code values inform the PaC about the authentication and These result code values inform the PaC about the authentication and
authorization result. The authentication result and authorization authorization result. The authentication result and authorization
result can be different as described below, but only one result is result can be different as described below, but only one result is
returned to the PaC. These codes are used with PANA-Bind-Request and returned to the PaC. These codes are used with PANA-Bind-Request and
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request messages. PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request messages.
PANA_SUCCESS 2001 PANA_SUCCESS 2001
Both authentication and authorization processes are successful. Both authentication and authorization processes are successful.
skipping to change at page 55, line 30 skipping to change at page 56, line 16
Authentication has failed. When this error is returned, it is Authentication has failed. When this error is returned, it is
assumed that authorization is automatically failed. assumed that authorization is automatically failed.
PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED 5003 PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED 5003
The authorization process has failed. This error could occur when The authorization process has failed. This error could occur when
authorization is rejected by a AAA server or rejected locally by a authorization is rejected by a AAA server or rejected locally by a
PAA, even if the authentication procedure has succeeded. PAA, even if the authentication procedure has succeeded.
8.15.2 Protocol Error Result Codes 8.16.2. Protocol Error Result Codes
These codes are used with PANA-Error-Request messages. Unless stated These codes are used with PANA-Error-Request messages. Unless stated
otherwise, they can be generated by both the PaC and the PAA. otherwise, they can be generated by both the PaC and the PAA.
PANA_MESSAGE_UNSUPPORTED 3001 PANA_MESSAGE_UNSUPPORTED 3001
Message type not recognized or supported. Message type not recognized or supported.
PANA_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER 3002 PANA_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER 3002
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offending AVPs within a Failed-AVP AVP. offending AVPs within a Failed-AVP AVP.
PANA_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 5015 PANA_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 5015
This error is returned when a message is received with an invalid This error is returned when a message is received with an invalid
message length. message length.
PANA_PROTECTION_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED 5016 PANA_PROTECTION_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED 5016
This error is returned when the PaC receives a PANA-Bind-Request This error is returned when the PaC receives a PANA-Bind-Request
message with a Protection-Capability AVP and a valid MAC AVP but message with a Protection-Capability AVP and a valid AUTH AVP but
does not support the protection capability specified in the does not support the protection capability specified in the
Protection-Capability AVP. Only the PaC can generate this code. Protection-Capability AVP. Only the PaC can generate this code.
PANA_PPAC_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED 5017 PANA_PPAC_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED 5017
This error is returned when there is no match between the list of This error is returned when there is no match between the list of
PPAC methods offered by the PAA and the ones available on the PaC. PPAC methods offered by the PAA and the ones available on the PaC.
Only the PaC can generate this code. Only the PaC can generate this code.
8.16 Session-Id AVP 8.17. Session-Id AVP
All messages pertaining to a specific PANA session MUST include a All messages pertaining to a specific PANA session MUST include a
Session-Id AVP (AVP Code 16) which carries a PAA-assigned fixed Session-Id AVP (AVP Code 17) which carries a PAA-assigned fixed
session identifier value throughout the lifetime of a session. When session identifier value throughout the lifetime of a session. When
present, the Session-Id AVP SHOULD appear immediately following the present, the Session-Id AVP MUST appear immediately following the
PANA header. PANA header.
The Session-Id MUST be globally and eternally unique, as it is meant The Session-Id MUST be globally and eternally unique, as it is meant
to identify a PANA session without reference to any other to identify a PANA session without reference to any other
information, and may be needed to correlate historical authentication information, and may be needed to correlate historical authentication
information with accounting information. The PANA Session-Id AVP has information with accounting information. The PANA Session-Id AVP has
the same format as the Diameter Session-Id AVP [RFC3588]. the same format as the Diameter Session-Id AVP [RFC3588].
8.17 Session-Lifetime AVP 8.18. Session-Lifetime AVP
The Session-Lifetime AVP (AVP Code 17) contains the number of seconds The Session-Lifetime AVP (AVP Code 18) contains the number of seconds
remaining before the current session is considered expired. The AVP remaining before the current session is considered expired. The AVP
data is of type Unsigned32. data is of type Unsigned32.
8.18 Termination-Cause AVP 8.19. Termination-Cause AVP
The Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 18) is used for indicating the The Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 19) is used for indicating the
reason why a session is terminated by the requester. The AVP data is reason why a session is terminated by the requester. The AVP data is
of type Enumerated. The following Termination-Cause data values are of type Enumerated. The following Termination-Cause data values are
used with PANA. used with PANA.
LOGOUT 1 (PaC -> PAA) LOGOUT 1 (PaC -> PAA)
The client initiated a disconnect The client initiated a disconnect
ADMINISTRATIVE 4 (PAA -> PaC) ADMINISTRATIVE 4 (PAA -> PaC)
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once MRD seconds have elapsed since the client first transmitted the once MRD seconds have elapsed since the client first transmitted the
message. message.
If both MRC and MRD are non-zero, the message exchange fails whenever If both MRC and MRD are non-zero, the message exchange fails whenever
either of the conditions specified in the previous two paragraphs are either of the conditions specified in the previous two paragraphs are
met. met.
If both MRC and MRD are zero, the client continues to transmit the If both MRC and MRD are zero, the client continues to transmit the
message until it receives a response. message until it receives a response.
9.1 Transmission and Retransmission Parameters 9.1. Transmission and Retransmission Parameters
This section presents a table of values used to describe the message This section presents a table of values used to describe the message
retransmission behavior of PANA requests and answers that are retransmission behavior of PANA requests and answers that are
retransmitted (REQ_*) and PANA-PAA-Discover message (PDI_*). The retransmitted (REQ_*) and PANA-PAA-Discover message (PDI_*). The
table shows default values. table shows default values.
Parameter Default Description Parameter Default Description
------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------
PDI_IRT 1 sec Initial PDI timeout. PDI_IRT 1 sec Initial PDI timeout.
PDI_MRT 120 secs Max PDI timeout value. PDI_MRT 120 secs Max PDI timeout value.
skipping to change at page 62, line 30 skipping to change at page 63, line 30
Required, the request is posted to the PANA WG mailing list (or, if Required, the request is posted to the PANA WG mailing list (or, if
it has been disbanded, a successor designated by the Area Director) it has been disbanded, a successor designated by the Area Director)
for comment and review, and MUST include a pointer to a public for comment and review, and MUST include a pointer to a public
specification. Before a period of 30 days has passed, the Designated specification. Before a period of 30 days has passed, the Designated
Expert will either approve or deny the registration request and Expert will either approve or deny the registration request and
publish a notice of the decision to the PANA WG mailing list or its publish a notice of the decision to the PANA WG mailing list or its
successor. A denial notice must be justified by an explanation and, successor. A denial notice must be justified by an explanation and,
in the cases where it is possible, concrete suggestions on how the in the cases where it is possible, concrete suggestions on how the
request can be modified so as to become acceptable. request can be modified so as to become acceptable.
10.1 PANA UDP Port Number 10.1. PANA UDP Port Number
PANA uses one well-known UDP port number (Section 4.1, Section 4.3 PANA uses one well-known UDP port number (Section 4.1, Section 4.3
and Section 6.1), which needs to be assigned by the IANA. and Section 6.1), which needs to be assigned by the IANA.
10.2 PANA Multicast Address 10.2. PANA Multicast Address
PANA uses one well-known administratively scoped IPv4 multicast PANA uses one well-known administratively scoped IPv4 multicast
address, and one well-known administratively scoped IPv6 multicast address, and one well-known administratively scoped IPv6 multicast
address (Section 4.3 and Section 6.1), which need to be assigned by address (Section 4.3 and Section 6.1), which need to be assigned by
the IANA. the IANA.
10.3 PANA Header 10.3. PANA Header
As defined in Section 6.2, the PANA header contains two fields that As defined in Section 6.2, the PANA header contains two fields that
requires IANA namespace management; the Message Type and Flags field. requires IANA namespace management; the Message Type and Flags field.
10.3.1 Message Type 10.3.1. Message Type
The Message Type namespace is used to identify PANA messages. Values The Message Type namespace is used to identify PANA messages. Values
0-65,533 are for permanent, standard message types, allocated by IETF 0-65,533 are for permanent, standard message types, allocated by IETF
Consensus [IANA]. This document defines the Message Types 1-10. See Consensus [IANA]. This document defines the Message Types 1-10. See
Section 7.1 through Section 7.19 for the assignment of the namespace Section 7.1 through Section 7.19 for the assignment of the namespace
in this specification. in this specification.
The values 65,534 and 65,535 (hexadecimal values 0xfffe - 0xffff) are The values 65,534 and 65,535 (hexadecimal values 0xfffe - 0xffff) are
reserved for experimental messages. As these codes are only for reserved for experimental messages. As these codes are only for
experimental and testing purposes, no guarantee is made for experimental and testing purposes, no guarantee is made for
interoperability between the communicating PaC and PAA using interoperability between the communicating PaC and PAA using
experimental commands, as outlined in [IANA-EXP]. experimental commands, as outlined in [IANA-EXP].
10.3.2 Flags 10.3.2. Flags
There are 16 bits in the Flags field of the PANA header. This There are 16 bits in the Flags field of the PANA header. This
document assigns bit 0 ('R'equest), bit 1 ('S'eparate) and bit 2 document assigns bit 0 ('R'equest), bit 1 ('S'eparate) and bit 2
('N'AP Authentication). The remaining bits MUST only be assigned via ('N'AP Authentication). The remaining bits MUST only be assigned via
a Standards Action [IANA]. a Standards Action [IANA].
10.4 AVP Header 10.4. AVP Header
As defined in Section 6.3, the AVP header contains three fields that As defined in Section 6.3, the AVP header contains three fields that
requires IANA namespace management; the AVP Code, AVP Flags and requires IANA namespace management; the AVP Code, AVP Flags and
Vendor-Id fields where only the AVP Code and AVP Flags create new Vendor-Id fields where only the AVP Code and AVP Flags create new
namespaces. namespaces.
10.4.1 AVP Code 10.4.1. AVP Code
The AVP Code namespace is used to identify attributes. There are The AVP Code namespace is used to identify attributes. There are
multiple namespaces. Vendors can have their own AVP Codes namespace multiple namespaces. Vendors can have their own AVP Codes namespace
which will be identified by their Vendor-ID (also known as which will be identified by their Vendor-ID (also known as
Enterprise-Number) and they control the assignments of their vendor- Enterprise-Number) and they control the assignments of their vendor-
specific AVP codes within their own namespace. The absence of a specific AVP codes within their own namespace. The absence of a
Vendor-ID or a Vendor-ID value of zero (0) identifies the IETF IANA Vendor-ID or a Vendor-ID value of zero (0) identifies the IETF IANA
controlled AVP Codes namespace. The AVP Codes and sometimes also controlled AVP Codes namespace. The AVP Codes and sometimes also
possible values in an AVP are controlled and maintained by IANA. possible values in an AVP are controlled and maintained by IANA.
AVP Code 0 is not used. This document defines the AVP Codes 1-18. AVP Code 0 is not used. This document defines the AVP Codes 1-19.
See Section 8.1 through Section 8.18 for the assignment of the See Section 8.1 through Section 8.19 for the assignment of the
namespace in this specification. namespace in this specification.
AVPs may be allocated following Designated Expert with Specification AVPs may be allocated following Designated Expert with Specification
Required [IANA]. Release of blocks of AVPs (more than 3 at a time Required [IANA]. Release of blocks of AVPs (more than 3 at a time
for a given purpose) should require IETF Consensus. for a given purpose) should require IETF Consensus.
Note that PANA defines a mechanism for Vendor-Specific AVPs, where Note that PANA defines a mechanism for Vendor-Specific AVPs, where
the Vendor-Id field in the AVP header is set to a non-zero value. the Vendor-Id field in the AVP header is set to a non-zero value.
Vendor-Specific AVPs codes are for Private Use and should be Vendor-Specific AVPs codes are for Private Use and should be
encouraged instead of allocation of global attribute types, for encouraged instead of allocation of global attribute types, for
functions specific only to one vendor's implementation of PANA, where functions specific only to one vendor's implementation of PANA, where
no interoperability is deemed useful. Where a Vendor-Specific AVP is no interoperability is deemed useful. Where a Vendor-Specific AVP is
implemented by more than one vendor, allocation of global AVPs should implemented by more than one vendor, allocation of global AVPs should
be encouraged instead. be encouraged instead.
10.4.2 Flags 10.4.2. Flags
There are 16 bits in the AVP Flags field of the AVP header, defined There are 16 bits in the AVP Flags field of the AVP header, defined
in Section 6.3. This document assigns bit 0 ('V'endor Specific) and in Section 6.3. This document assigns bit 0 ('V'endor Specific) and
bit 1 ('M'andatory). The remaining bits should only be assigned via bit 1 ('M'andatory). The remaining bits should only be assigned via
a Standards Action . a Standards Action .
10.5 AVP Values 10.5. AVP Values
Certain AVPs in PANA define a list of values with various meanings. Certain AVPs in PANA define a list of values with various meanings.
For attributes other than those specified in this section, adding For attributes other than those specified in this section, adding
additional values to the list can be done on a First Come, First additional values to the list can be done on a First Come, First
Served basis by IANA [IANA]. Served basis by IANA [IANA].
10.5.1 Algorithm Values of MAC AVP 10.5.1. Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP Values
As defined in Section 8.7, the Algorithm field of MAC AVP (AVP Code
7) defines the value of 1 (one) for HMAC-SHA1.
All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus
[IANA].
10.5.2 Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP Values
As defined in Section 8.11, the Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP As defined in Section 8.12, the Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP
(AVP Code 11) defines the bits 0 ('N': no configuration), 1 ('F': (AVP Code 12) defines the bits 0 ('N': no configuration), 1 ('F':
DHCPv4), 2 ('S': DHCPv6), 3 ('A' stateless autoconfiguration), 4 DHCPv4), 2 ('S': DHCPv6), 3 ('A' stateless autoconfiguration), 4
('T': DHCPv4 with IPsec tunnel mode) and 5 ('I': IKEv2). ('T': DHCPv4 with IPsec tunnel mode) and 5 ('I': IKEv2).
All remaining values are available for assignment via a Standards All remaining values are available for assignment via a Standards
Action [IANA]. Action [IANA].
10.5.3 Protection-Capability AVP Values 10.5.2. Protection-Capability AVP Values
As defined in Section 8.12, the Protection-Capability AVP (AVP Code As defined in Section 8.13, the Protection-Capability AVP (AVP Code
12) defines the values 0 and 1. 13) defines the values 0 and 1.
All remaining values are available for assignment via a Standards All remaining values are available for assignment via a Standards
Action [IANA]. Action [IANA].
10.5.4 Result-Code AVP Values 10.5.3. Result-Code AVP Values
As defined in Section 8.15.1 and Section 8.15.2 the Result-Code AVP As defined in Section 8.16.1 and Section 8.16.2 the Result-Code AVP
(AVP Code 15) defines the values 2001, 3001-3002, 3008-3009, 4001, (AVP Code 16) defines the values 2001, 3001-3002, 3008-3009, 4001,
5001-5009 and 5011-5017. 5001-5009 and 5011-5017.
All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus
[IANA]. [IANA].
10.5.5 Termination-Cause AVP Values 10.5.4. Termination-Cause AVP Values
As defined in Section 8.18, the Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 18) As defined in Section 8.19, the Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 19)
defines the values 1, 4 and 8. defines the values 1, 4 and 8.
All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus
[IANA]. [IANA].
11. Security Considerations 11. Security Considerations
The PANA protocol defines a UDP-based EAP encapsulation that runs The PANA protocol defines a UDP-based EAP encapsulation that runs
between two IP-enabled nodes on the same IP link. Various security between two IP-enabled nodes on the same IP link. Various security
threats that are relevant to a protocol of this nature are outlined threats that are relevant to a protocol of this nature are outlined
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link-layer) security. In the context of this document, lower-layers link-layer) security. In the context of this document, lower-layers
are said to be secure if they can prevent eavesdropping and spoofing are said to be secure if they can prevent eavesdropping and spoofing
of packets. Examples of such networks are physically-secured DSL of packets. Examples of such networks are physically-secured DSL
networks and 3GPP2 networks with cryptographically-secured cdma2000 networks and 3GPP2 networks with cryptographically-secured cdma2000
link-layer. In these examples, the lower-layer security is enabled link-layer. In these examples, the lower-layer security is enabled
even before running the first PANA-based authentication. In the even before running the first PANA-based authentication. In the
absence of such a pre-established secure channel, one needs to be absence of such a pre-established secure channel, one needs to be
created in conjunction with PANA using a link-layer or network-layer created in conjunction with PANA using a link-layer or network-layer
cryptographic mechanism (e.g., IPsec). cryptographic mechanism (e.g., IPsec).
11.1 General Security Measures 11.1. General Security Measures
PANA provides multiple mechanisms to secure a PANA session. PANA provides multiple mechanisms to secure a PANA session.
PANA messages carry sequence numbers, which are monotonically PANA messages carry sequence numbers, which are monotonically
incremented by 1 with every new request message. These numbers are incremented by 1 with every new request message. These numbers are
randomly initialized at the beginning of the session, and verified randomly initialized at the beginning of the session, and verified
against expected numbers upon receipt. A message whose sequence against expected numbers upon receipt. A message whose sequence
number is different than the expected one is silently discarded. In number is different than the expected one is silently discarded. In
addition to accomplishing orderly delivery of EAP messages and addition to accomplishing orderly delivery of EAP messages and
duplicate elimination, this scheme also helps prevent an adversary duplicate elimination, this scheme also helps prevent an adversary
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The PANA framework defines EP which is ideally located on a network The PANA framework defines EP which is ideally located on a network
device that can filter traffic from the PaCs before the traffic device that can filter traffic from the PaCs before the traffic
enters the Internet/intranet. A set of filters can be used to enters the Internet/intranet. A set of filters can be used to
discard unauthorized packets, such as a PANA-Start-Request message discard unauthorized packets, such as a PANA-Start-Request message
that is received from the segment of the access network where only that is received from the segment of the access network where only
the PaCs are supposed to be connected. the PaCs are supposed to be connected.
The protocol also provides authentication and integrity protection to The protocol also provides authentication and integrity protection to
PANA messages when the used EAP method can generate cryptographic PANA messages when the used EAP method can generate cryptographic
session keys. A PANA SA is generated based on the AAA-Key exported session keys. A PANA SA is generated based on the AAA-Key exported
by the EAP method. This SA is used for generating per-packet MAC to by the EAP method. This SA is used for generating an AUTH AVP to
protect the PANA header and payload (including the complete EAP protect the PANA header and payload (including the complete EAP
message). message).
The cryptographic protection prevents an adversary from acting as a The cryptographic protection prevents an adversary from acting as a
man-in-the-middle, injecting messages, replaying messages and man-in-the-middle, injecting messages, replaying messages and
modifying the content of the exchanged messages. Any packet that modifying the content of the exchanged messages. Any packet that
fails to pass the MAC verification is silently discarded. The fails to pass the AUTH verification is silently discarded. The
earliest this protection can be enabled is when the very first PANA- earliest this protection can be enabled is when the very first PANA-
Bind-Request or PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message that signals a Bind-Request or PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message that signals a
successful authentication is generated. Starting with these successful authentication is generated. Starting with these
messages, any subsequent PANA message until the session gets torn messages, any subsequent PANA message until the session gets torn
down can be cryptographically protected. down can be cryptographically protected.
The PANA SA enables authenticated and integrity protected exchange of The PANA SA enables authenticated and integrity protected exchange of
the device ID information between the PaC and PAA. This ensures the device ID information between the PaC and PAA. This ensures
there were no man-in-the-middle during the PANA authentication. there were no man-in-the-middle during the PANA authentication.
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Unless the PANA session is extended by executing another EAP Unless the PANA session is extended by executing another EAP
authentication, the PANA SA is removed when the current session authentication, the PANA SA is removed when the current session
expires. expires.
The ability to use cryptographic protection within PANA is determined The ability to use cryptographic protection within PANA is determined
by the used EAP method, which is generally dictated by the deployment by the used EAP method, which is generally dictated by the deployment
environment. Insecure lower-layers necessitate use of key-generating environment. Insecure lower-layers necessitate use of key-generating
EAP methods. In networks where lower-layers are already secured, EAP methods. In networks where lower-layers are already secured,
cryptographic protection of PANA messages is not necessary. cryptographic protection of PANA messages is not necessary.
11.2 Discovery 11.2. Discovery
The discovery and handshake phase is vulnerable to spoofing attacks The discovery and handshake phase is vulnerable to spoofing attacks
as these messages are not authenticated and integrity protected. In as these messages are not authenticated and integrity protected. In
order to prevent very basic denial-of service attacks an adversary order to prevent very basic denial-of service attacks an adversary
should not be able to cause state creation by sending discovery should not be able to cause state creation by sending discovery
messages to the PAA. This protection is achieved by using a cookie- messages to the PAA. This protection is achieved by using a cookie-
based scheme (similar to [RFC2522] which allows the responder (PAA) based scheme (similar to [RFC2522] which allows the responder (PAA)
to be stateless in the first round of message exchange. However, it to be stateless in the first round of message exchange. However, it
is difficult to prevent all spoofing attacks in the discovery and is difficult to prevent all spoofing attacks in the discovery and
handshake phase entirely. handshake phase entirely.
In networks where lower-layers are not secured prior to running PANA, In networks where lower-layers are not secured prior to running PANA,
the capability discovery enabled through inclusion of Protection- the capability discovery enabled through inclusion of Protection-
Capability and Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVPs in a PANA-Start- Capability and Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVPs in a PANA-Start-
Request message is susceptible to spoofing leading to denial-of Request message is susceptible to spoofing leading to denial-of
service attacks. Therefore, usage of these AVPs during the discovery service attacks. Therefore, usage of these AVPs during the discovery
and handshake phase in such insecure networks is NOT RECOMMENDED. and handshake phase in such insecure networks is NOT RECOMMENDED.
The same AVPs are delivered via an integrity-protected PANA-Bind- The same AVPs are delivered via an integrity-protected PANA-Bind-
Request upon successful authentication. Request upon successful authentication.
11.3 EAP Methods 11.3. EAP Methods
Eavesdropping EAP messages might cause problems when the EAP method Eavesdropping EAP messages might cause problems when the EAP method
is weak and enables dictionary or replay attacks or even allows an is weak and enables dictionary or replay attacks or even allows an
adversary to learn the long-term password directly. Furthermore, if adversary to learn the long-term password directly. Furthermore, if
the optional EAP Response/Identity payload is used then it allows the the optional EAP Response/Identity payload is used then it allows the
adversary to learn the identity of the PaC. In such a case a privacy adversary to learn the identity of the PaC. In such a case a privacy
problem is prevalent. problem is prevalent.
To prevent these threats, [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] suggests using To prevent these threats, [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] suggests using
proper EAP methods for particular environments. Depending on the proper EAP methods for particular environments. Depending on the
deployment environment an EAP authentication method which supports deployment environment an EAP authentication method which supports
user identity confidentiality, protection against dictionary attacks user identity confidentiality, protection against dictionary attacks
and session key establishment must be used. It is therefore the and session key establishment must be used. It is therefore the
responsibility of the network operators and users to choose a proper responsibility of the network operators and users to choose a proper
EAP method. EAP method.
11.4 Separate NAP and ISP Authentication 11.4. Separate NAP and ISP Authentication
The PANA design allows running two separate EAP sessions for the same The PANA design allows running two separate EAP sessions for the same
PaC in the authentication and authorization phase: one with the NAP, PaC in the authentication and authorization phase: one with the NAP,
and one with the ISP. The process of arriving at the resultant and one with the ISP. The process of arriving at the resultant
authorization, which is a combination of the individual authorization, which is a combination of the individual
authorizations obtained from respective service providers, is outside authorizations obtained from respective service providers, is outside
the scope of this protocol. In the absence of lower-layer security, the scope of this protocol. In the absence of lower-layer security,
both authentications MUST be able to generate a AAA-Key, leading to both authentications MUST be able to generate a AAA-Key, leading to
generation of a PANA SA. The resultant PANA SA cryptographically generation of a PANA SA. The resultant PANA SA cryptographically
binds the two AAA-Keys together, hence it prevents man-in-the-middle binds the two AAA-Keys together, hence it prevents man-in-the-middle
attacks. attacks.
11.5 Cryptographic Keys 11.5. Cryptographic Keys
When the EAP method exports a AAA-Key, this key is used to produce a When the EAP method exports a AAA-Key, this key is used to produce a
PANA SA with PANA_MAC_KEY with a distinct key ID. The PANA_MAC_KEY PANA SA with PANA_AUTH_KEY with a distinct key ID. The PANA_AUTH_KEY
is unique to the PANA session, and takes PANA-based nonce values into is unique to the PANA session, and takes PANA-based nonce values into
computation to cryptographically separate itself from the AAA-Key. computation to cryptographically separate itself from the AAA-Key.
The PANA_MAC_KEY is solely used for authentication and integrity The PANA_AUTH_KEY is solely used for authentication and integrity
protection of the PANA messages within the designated session. protection of the PANA messages within the designated session.
Two AAA-Keys may be generated as a result of separate NAP and ISP Two AAA-Keys may be generated as a result of separate NAP and ISP
authentication. In that case, the AAA-Key used with the PANA SA is authentication. In that case, the AAA-Key used with the PANA SA is
the combination of both keys. the combination of both keys.
The PANA SA lifetime is bounded by the AAA-Key lifetime. Another The PANA SA lifetime is bounded by the AAA-Key lifetime. Another
execution of EAP method yields in a new AAA-Key, and updates the PANA execution of EAP method yields in a new AAA-Key, and updates the PANA
SA, PANA_MAC_KEY and key ID. SA, PANA_AUTH_KEY and key ID.
When link-layer or network-layer ciphering [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] is When link-layer or network-layer ciphering [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] is
enabled as a result of successful PANA authentication, a PaC-EP- enabled as a result of successful PANA authentication, a PaC-EP-
Master-Key is generated for each EP from the AAA-Key, session Master-Key is generated for each EP from the AAA-Key, session
identifier, key identifier, and the EP device identifier. The PaC- identifier, key identifier, and the EP device identifier. The PaC-
EP-Master-Key derivation algorithm defined in Section 5.6 ensures EP-Master-Key derivation algorithm defined in Section 5.6 ensures
cryptographic independency among different PaC-EP-Master-Keys. cryptographic independency among different PaC-EP-Master-Keys.
The lifetime of PaC-EP master key is bounded by the lifetime of the The lifetime of PaC-EP master key is bounded by the lifetime of the
PANA SA. This key may be used with a secure association protocol PANA SA. This key may be used with a secure association protocol
[I-D.ietf-ipsec-ikev2] to produce further cipher-specific and [RFC4306] to produce further cipher-specific and transient keys.
transient keys.
11.6 Per-packet Ciphering 11.6. Per-packet Ciphering
Networks that are not secured at the lower-layers prior to running Networks that are not secured at the lower-layers prior to running
PANA can rely on enabling per-packet data traffic ciphering upon PANA can rely on enabling per-packet data traffic ciphering upon
successful PANA session establishment. The PANA framework allows successful PANA session establishment. The PANA framework allows
generation of a PaC-EP master key from AAA-Key for using with a per- generation of a PaC-EP master key from AAA-Key for using with a per-
packet protection mechanism, such as link-layer or IPsec-based packet protection mechanism, such as link-layer or IPsec-based
ciphering [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec]. In case the master key is not ciphering [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec]. In case the master key is not
readily useful to the ciphering mechanism, an additional secure readily useful to the ciphering mechanism, an additional secure
association protocol [I-D.ietf-ipsec-ikev2] may be needed to produce association protocol [RFC4306] may be needed to produce the required
the required keying material. These mechanisms ultimately establish keying material. These mechanisms ultimately establish a
a cryptographic binding between the data traffic generated by and for cryptographic binding between the data traffic generated by and for a
a client and the authenticated identity of the client. Data traffic client and the authenticated identity of the client. Data traffic
must be minimally data origin authenticated, replay and integrity must be minimally data origin authenticated, replay and integrity
protected, and optionally encrypted. protected, and optionally encrypted.
11.7 PAA-to-EP Communication 11.7. PAA-to-EP Communication
The PANA framework allows separation of PAA from EP(s). SNMPv3 The PANA framework allows separation of PAA from EP(s). SNMPv3
[I-D.ietf-pana-snmp] is used between the PAA and EP for provisioning [I-D.ietf-pana-snmp] is used between the PAA and EP for provisioning
authorized PaC information on the EP. This exchange MUST be always authorized PaC information on the EP. This exchange MUST be always
physically or cryptographically protected for authentication, physically or cryptographically protected for authentication,
integrity and replay protection. It MUST also be privacy-protected integrity and replay protection. It MUST also be privacy-protected
when PaC-EP master key for per-packet ciphering is transmitted to the when PaC-EP master key for per-packet ciphering is transmitted to the
EP. EP.
The PaC-EP master key MUST be unique to the PaC and EP pair. The The PaC-EP master key MUST be unique to the PaC and EP pair. The
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[I-D.ietf-pana-snmp] is used between the PAA and EP for provisioning [I-D.ietf-pana-snmp] is used between the PAA and EP for provisioning
authorized PaC information on the EP. This exchange MUST be always authorized PaC information on the EP. This exchange MUST be always
physically or cryptographically protected for authentication, physically or cryptographically protected for authentication,
integrity and replay protection. It MUST also be privacy-protected integrity and replay protection. It MUST also be privacy-protected
when PaC-EP master key for per-packet ciphering is transmitted to the when PaC-EP master key for per-packet ciphering is transmitted to the
EP. EP.
The PaC-EP master key MUST be unique to the PaC and EP pair. The The PaC-EP master key MUST be unique to the PaC and EP pair. The
session identifier and the device identifier of the EP are taken into session identifier and the device identifier of the EP are taken into
computation for achieving this effect [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec]. computation for achieving this effect [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec].
Compromise of an EP does not automatically lead to compromise of Compromise of an EP does not automatically lead to compromise of
another EP or the PAA. another EP or the PAA.
11.8 Liveness Test 11.8. Liveness Test
A PANA session is associated with a session lifetime. The session is A PANA session is associated with a session lifetime. The session is
terminated unless it is refreshed by a new round of EAP terminated unless it is refreshed by a new round of EAP
authentication before it expires. Therefore, at the latest a authentication before it expires. Therefore, at the latest a
disconnected client can be detected when its session expires. A disconnected client can be detected when its session expires. A
disconnect may also be detected earlier by using PANA ping messages. disconnect may also be detected earlier by using PANA ping messages.
A request message can be generated by either PaC or PAA at any time A request message can be generated by either PaC or PAA at any time
and the peer must respond with an answer message. A successful and the peer must respond with an answer message. A successful
round-trip of this exchange is a simple verification that the peer is round-trip of this exchange is a simple verification that the peer is
alive. alive.
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This exchange is cryptographically protected when a PANA SA is This exchange is cryptographically protected when a PANA SA is
available in order to prevent threats associated with the abuse of available in order to prevent threats associated with the abuse of
this functionality. this functionality.
Any valid PANA answer message received in response to a recently sent Any valid PANA answer message received in response to a recently sent
request message can be taken as an indication of peer's liveness. request message can be taken as an indication of peer's liveness.
The PaC or PAA MAY forgo sending an explicit PANA-Ping-Request if a The PaC or PAA MAY forgo sending an explicit PANA-Ping-Request if a
recent exchange has already confirmed that the peer is alive. recent exchange has already confirmed that the peer is alive.
11.9 Updating PaC's IP Address 11.9. Updating PaC's IP Address
There is no way to prove the ownership of the IP address presented by There is no way to prove the ownership of the IP address presented by
the PaC. Hence an authorized PaC can launch a redirect attack by the PaC. Hence an authorized PaC can launch a redirect attack by
spoofing a victim's IP address. spoofing a victim's IP address.
11.10 Early Termination of a Session 11.10. Early Termination of a Session
The PANA protocol supports the ability for both the PaC and the PAA The PANA protocol supports the ability for both the PaC and the PAA
to transmit a tear-down message before the session lifetime expires. to transmit a tear-down message before the session lifetime expires.
This message causes state removal, a stop of the accounting procedure This message causes state removal, a stop of the accounting procedure
and removes the installed per-PaC state on the EP(s). This message and removes the installed per-PaC state on the EP(s). This message
is cryptographically protected when PANA SA is present. is cryptographically protected when PANA SA is present.
12. Acknowledgments 12. Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Jari Arkko, Mohan Parthasarathy, Julien We would like to thank Jari Arkko, Mohan Parthasarathy, Julien
Bournelle, Rafael Marin Lopez, Pasi Eronen, Randy Turner, Erik Bournelle, Rafael Marin Lopez, Pasi Eronen, Randy Turner, Erik
Nordmark, Lionel Morand, Avi Lior, Susan Thomson, Giaretta Gerardo, Nordmark, Lionel Morand, Avi Lior, Susan Thomson, Giaretta Gerardo,
Joseph Salowey and all members of the PANA working group for their Joseph Salowey, Sasikanth Bharadwaj and all members of the PANA
valuable comments to this document. working group for their valuable comments to this document.
13. References 13. References
13.1 Normative References 13.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", [RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
RFC 2131, March 1997. RFC 2131, March 1997.
[RFC2234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax [RFC2234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997. Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997.
[RFC2279] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", RFC 2279, January 1998.
[RFC2365] Meyer, D., "Administratively Scoped IP Multicast", BCP 23, [RFC2365] Meyer, D., "Administratively Scoped IP Multicast", BCP 23,
RFC 2365, July 1998. RFC 2365, July 1998.
[RFC2462] Thomson, S. and T. Narten, "IPv6 Stateless Address [RFC2462] Thomson, S. and T. Narten, "IPv6 Stateless Address
Autoconfiguration", RFC 2462, December 1998. Autoconfiguration", RFC 2462, December 1998.
[RFC2464] Crawford, M., "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over Ethernet [RFC2464] Crawford, M., "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over Ethernet
Networks", RFC 2464, December 1998. Networks", RFC 2464, December 1998.
[RFC2988] Paxson, V. and M. Allman, "Computing TCP's Retransmission [RFC2988] Paxson, V. and M. Allman, "Computing TCP's Retransmission
skipping to change at page 72, line 45 skipping to change at page 73, line 48
Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4) Configuration of Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4) Configuration of
IPsec Tunnel Mode", RFC 3456, January 2003. IPsec Tunnel Mode", RFC 3456, January 2003.
[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. [RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J.
Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003. Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H. [RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
RFC 3748, June 2004. RFC 3748, June 2004.
[RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.
[I-D.ietf-ltru-registry]
Phillips, A. and M. Davis, "Tags for Identifying
Languages", draft-ietf-ltru-registry-14 (work in
progress), October 2005.
[IANA] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [IANA] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
October 1998. October 1998.
13.2 Informative References 13.2. Informative References
[RFC2522] Karn, P. and W. Simpson, "Photuris: Session-Key Management [RFC2522] Karn, P. and W. Simpson, "Photuris: Session-Key Management
Protocol", RFC 2522, March 1999. Protocol", RFC 2522, March 1999.
[RFC4016] Parthasarathy, M., "Protocol for Carrying Authentication [RFC4016] Parthasarathy, M., "Protocol for Carrying Authentication
and Network Access (PANA) Threat Analysis and Security and Network Access (PANA) Threat Analysis and Security
Requirements", RFC 4016, March 2005. Requirements", RFC 4016, March 2005.
[RFC4058] Yegin, A., Ohba, Y., Penno, R., Tsirtsis, G., and C. Wang, [RFC4058] Yegin, A., Ohba, Y., Penno, R., Tsirtsis, G., and C. Wang,
"Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access
(PANA) Requirements", RFC 4058, May 2005. (PANA) Requirements", RFC 4058, May 2005.
[RFC4137] Vollbrecht, J., Eronen, P., Petroni, N., and Y. Ohba,
"State Machines for Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP) Peer and Authenticator", RFC 4137, August 2005.
[RFC4284] Adrangi, F., Lortz, V., Bari, F., and P. Eronen, "Identity
Selection Hints for the Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 4284, January 2006.
[RFC4306] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
RFC 4306, December 2005.
[I-D.ietf-eap-keying] [I-D.ietf-eap-keying]
Aboba, B., "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Aboba, B., "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key
Management Framework", draft-ietf-eap-keying-06 (work in Management Framework", draft-ietf-eap-keying-09 (work in
progress), April 2005. progress), January 2006.
[I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec]
Parthasarathy, M., "PANA Enabling IPsec based Access Parthasarathy, M., "PANA Enabling IPsec based Access
Control", draft-ietf-pana-ipsec-07 (work in progress), Control", draft-ietf-pana-ipsec-07 (work in progress),
July 2005. July 2005.
[I-D.ietf-pana-framework] [I-D.ietf-pana-framework]
Jayaraman, P., "PANA Framework", Jayaraman, P., "PANA Framework",
draft-ietf-pana-framework-05 (work in progress), draft-ietf-pana-framework-05 (work in progress),
July 2005. July 2005.
[I-D.ietf-pana-snmp] [I-D.ietf-pana-snmp]
Mghazli, Y., "SNMP usage for PAA-EP interface", Mghazli, Y., "SNMP usage for PAA-EP interface",
draft-ietf-pana-snmp-04 (work in progress), July 2005. draft-ietf-pana-snmp-05 (work in progress), January 2006.
[I-D.ietf-eap-statemachine]
Vollbrecht, J., Eronen, P., Petroni, N., and Y. Ohba,
"State Machines for Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP) Peer and Authenticator",
draft-ietf-eap-statemachine-06 (work in progress),
December 2004.
[I-D.ietf-ipsec-ikev2] [I-D.ietf-mobike-protocol]
Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", Eronen, P., "IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol
draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-17 (work in progress), (MOBIKE)", draft-ietf-mobike-protocol-08 (work in
October 2004. progress), February 2006.
[I-D.ietf-dna-link-information] [I-D.ietf-dna-link-information]
Yegin, A., "Link-layer Event Notifications for Detecting Yegin, A., "Link-layer Event Notifications for Detecting
Network Attachments", draft-ietf-dna-link-information-01 Network Attachments", draft-ietf-dna-link-information-03
(work in progress), February 2005. (work in progress), October 2005.
[I-D.adrangi-eap-network-discovery]
Adrangi, F., "Identity selection hints for Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
draft-adrangi-eap-network-discovery-13 (work in progress),
May 2005.
[ianaweb] IANA, "Number assignment", http://www.iana.org. [ianaweb] IANA, "Number assignment", http://www.iana.org.
[IANA-EXP] [IANA-EXP]
Narten, T., "Assigning Experimental and Testing Numbers Narten, T., "Assigning Experimental and Testing Numbers
Considered Useful", BCP 82, RFC 3692, January 2004. Considered Useful", BCP 82, RFC 3692, January 2004.
[RFC2279] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", RFC 2279, January 1998.
Authors' Addresses
Dan Forsberg
Nokia Research Center
P.O. Box 407
FIN-00045 NOKIA GROUP
Finland
Phone: +358 50 4839470
Email: dan.forsberg@nokia.com
Yoshihiro Ohba
Toshiba America Research, Inc.
1 Telcordia Drive
Piscataway, NJ 08854
USA
Phone: +1 732 699 5305
Email: yohba@tari.toshiba.com
Basavaraj Patil
Nokia
6000 Connection Dr.
Irving, TX 75039
USA
Phone: +1 972-894-6709
Email: Basavaraj.Patil@nokia.com
Hannes Tschofenig
Siemens Corporate Technology
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
81739 Munich
Germany
Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com
Alper E. Yegin
Samsung Advanced Institute of Technology
75 West Plumeria Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
USA
Phone: +1 408 544 5656
Email: alper.yegin@samsung.com
Appendix A. Example Sequence of Separate NAP and ISP Authentication Appendix A. Example Sequence of Separate NAP and ISP Authentication
A PANA message sequence with separate NAP and ISP authentication is A PANA message sequence with separate NAP and ISP authentication is
illustrated in Figure 12. The example assumes the following illustrated in Figure 12. The example assumes the following
scenario: scenario:
o The PaC initiates the discovery and handshake phase. o The PaC initiates the discovery and handshake phase.
o The PAA offers separate NAP and ISP authentication, as well as a o The PAA offers separate NAP and ISP authentication, as well as a
choice of ISP from "ISP1" and "ISP2". The PaC accepts the offer choice of ISP from "ISP1" and "ISP2". The PaC accepts the offer
from PAA, with choosing "ISP1" as the ISP. from PAA, with choosing "ISP1" as the ISP.
o NAP authentication and ISP authentication is performed in this o NAP authentication and ISP authentication is performed in this
order in the authentication and authorization phase. order in the authentication and authorization phase.
o An EAP authentication method with a single round trip is used in o An EAP authentication method with a single round trip is used in
each EAP sequence. each EAP sequence.
o After a PANA SA is established, all messages are integrity and o After a PANA SA is established, all messages are integrity and
replay protected with MAC AVPs. replay protected with AUTH AVPs.
o The access, re-authentication and termination phases are not o The access, re-authentication and termination phases are not
shown. shown.
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
----------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------
// Discovery and handshake phase // Discovery and handshake phase
-----> PANA-PAA-Discover(0) -----> PANA-PAA-Discover(0)
<----- PANA-Start-Request(x) // S-flag set. <----- PANA-Start-Request(x) // S-flag set.
[Cookie, [Cookie,
skipping to change at page 77, line 29 skipping to change at page 77, line 29
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+1) // NAP authentication. <----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+1) // NAP authentication.
[Session-Id, Nonce, // (S,N)-flags set [Session-Id, Nonce, // (S,N)-flags set
EAP{Request}] // for all messages during EAP{Request}] // for all messages during
// NAP authentication. // NAP authentication.
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+1)[Session-Id, Nonce] -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+1)[Session-Id, Nonce]
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(y)[Session-Id, EAP{Response}] -----> PANA-Auth-Request(y)[Session-Id, EAP{Response}]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y)[Session-Id] <----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y)[Session-Id]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+2)[Session-Id, EAP{Request}] <----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+2)[Session-Id, EAP{Request}]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+2)[Session-Id, EAP{Response}] -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+2)[Session-Id, EAP{Response}]
<----- PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request(x+3) <----- PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request(x+3)
[Session-Id, EAP{Success}, Key-Id, MAC] [Session-Id, EAP{Success}, Key-Id, Algorithm, AUTH]
-----> PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer(x+3) -----> PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer(x+3)
[Session-Id, Key-Id, MAC] [Session-Id, Key-Id, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+4) // ISP authentication. <----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+4) // ISP authentication.
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}, MAC] // Only S-flag set [Session-Id, EAP{Request}, AUTH] // Only S-flag set
// for all messages during // for all messages during
// ISP authentication. // ISP authentication.
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+4)[Session-Id, MAC] -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+4)[Session-Id, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(y+1)[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, MAC] -----> PANA-Auth-Request(y+1)[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y+1)[Session-Id, MAC] <----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y+1)[Session-Id, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+5)[Session-Id, EAP{Request}, MAC] <----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+5)[Session-Id, EAP{Request}, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+5)[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, MAC] -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+5)[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Bind-Request(x+6) <----- PANA-Bind-Request(x+6)
[Session-Id, Result-Code, EAP{Success}, Device-Id, [Session-Id, Result-Code, EAP{Success}, Device-Id,
Key-Id, Lifetime, Protection-Cap., PPAC, MAC] Key-Id, Lifetime, Protection-Cap., PPAC, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Bind-Answer(x+6)[Session-Id, Device-Id, Key-Id, -----> PANA-Bind-Answer(x+6)[Session-Id, Device-Id, Key-Id,
PPAC, MAC] PPAC, AUTH]
Figure 12: A Complete Message Sequence for Separate NAP and ISP Figure 12: A Complete Message Sequence for Separate NAP and ISP
Authentication Authentication
Authors' Addresses
Dan Forsberg
Nokia Research Center
P.O. Box 407
FIN-00045 NOKIA GROUP
Finland
Phone: +358 50 4839470
Email: dan.forsberg@nokia.com
Yoshihiro Ohba
Toshiba America Research, Inc.
1 Telcordia Drive
Piscataway, NJ 08854
USA
Phone: +1 732 699 5305
Email: yohba@tari.toshiba.com
Basavaraj Patil
Nokia
6000 Connection Dr.
Irving, TX 75039
USA
Phone: +1 972-894-6709
Email: Basavaraj.Patil@nokia.com
Hannes Tschofenig
Siemens Corporate Technology
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
81739 Munich
Germany
Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com
Alper E. Yegin
Samsung Advanced Institute of Technology
Istanbul,
Turkey
Phone: +90 538 719 0181
Email: alper01.yegin@partner.samsung.com
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on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
skipping to change at page 78, line 41 skipping to change at page 80, line 41
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WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
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except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
Acknowledgment Acknowledgment
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society. Internet Society.
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