< draft-ietf-pkix-authorityclearanceconstraints-02.txt   draft-ietf-pkix-authorityclearanceconstraints-03.txt >
Network Working Group Sean Turner Network Working Group Sean Turner, IECA
Internet Draft IECA Internet Draft Santosh Chokhani, Cygnacom Solutions
Intended Status: Standard Track Santosh Chokhani Intended Status: Standard Track October 19, 2009
CygnaCom Solutions Expires: April 19, 2010
Expires: September 24, 2009 March 24, 2009
Clearance Attribute and Authority Clearance Constraints Clearance Attribute and Authority Clearance Constraints
Certificate Extension Certificate Extension
draft-ietf-pkix-authorityclearanceconstraints-02.txt draft-ietf-pkix-authorityclearanceconstraints-03.txt
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts. Drafts.
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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This Internet-Draft will expire on September 24, 2009. This Internet-Draft will expire on April 19, 2010.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Abstract Abstract
This document defines the syntax and semantics for the Clearance This document defines the syntax and semantics for the Clearance
attribute and the Authority Clearance Constraints extension in X.509 attribute and the Authority Clearance Constraints extension in X.509
certificates. The Clearance attribute is used to indicate the certificates. The Clearance attribute is used to indicate the
clearance held by the subject. The Clearance attribute may appear in clearance held by the subject. The Clearance attribute may appear in
the subject directory attributes extension of a public key the subject directory attributes extension of a public key
certificate or in the attributes field of an attribute certificate. certificate or in the attributes field of an attribute certificate.
The Authority Clearance Constraints certificate extension values in a The Authority Clearance Constraints certificate extension values in a
Trust Anchor (TA), CA public key certificates, and an Attribute Trust Anchor (TA), Certificate Authority (CA) public key
Authority (AA) public key certificate in a public key certification certificates, and an Attribute Authority (AA) public key certificate
path constrain the effective Clearance of the subject. in a public key certification path constrain the effective Clearance
of the subject.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction...................................................3 1. Introduction...................................................3
1.1. Terminology...............................................4 1.1. Terminology...............................................4
1.2. ASN.1 Syntax Notation.....................................4 1.2. ASN.1 Syntax Notation.....................................4
2. Clearance Attribute............................................4 2. Clearance Attribute............................................4
3. Authority Clearance Constraints Certificate Extension..........5 3. Authority Clearance Constraints Certificate Extension..........5
4. Clearance and Authority Clearance Constraints Processing in 4. Clearance and Authority Clearance Constraints Processing in
PKC............................................................6 PKC............................................................6
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5.1.1. Certification Path Processing.......................11 5.1.1. Certification Path Processing.......................11
5.1.1.1. Inputs.........................................11 5.1.1.1. Inputs.........................................11
5.1.1.2. Initialization.................................11 5.1.1.2. Initialization.................................11
5.1.1.3. Basic PKC Processing...........................12 5.1.1.3. Basic PKC Processing...........................12
5.1.1.4. Preparation for Certificate i+1................12 5.1.1.4. Preparation for Certificate i+1................12
5.1.1.5. Wrap-up Procedure..............................12 5.1.1.5. Wrap-up Procedure..............................12
5.1.1.5.1. Wrap Up Clearance.........................12 5.1.1.5.1. Wrap Up Clearance.........................12
5.1.1.6. Outputs........................................12 5.1.1.6. Outputs........................................12
6. Computing Intersection of permitted-clearances and 6. Computing Intersection of permitted-clearances and
AuthorityClearanceConstraints extension.......................12 AuthorityClearanceConstraints extension.......................12
7. Computing Intersection of securityCategories..................14 7. Computing Intersection of securityCategories..................13
8. Recommended securityCategories................................15 8. Recommended securityCategories................................15
9. Security Considerations.......................................15 9. Security Considerations.......................................15
10. IANA Considerations..........................................15 10. IANA Considerations..........................................16
11. References...................................................15 11. References...................................................16
11.1. Normative References....................................15 11.1. Normative References....................................16
11.2. Informative References..................................16 11.2. Informative References..................................17
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module.........................................17 Appendix A. ASN.1 Module.........................................18
Author's Addresses...............................................19 Authors' Addresses...............................................20
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Organizations that have implemented a security policy can issue Organizations that have implemented a security policy can issue
certificates that include an indication of the clearance values held certificates that include an indication of the clearance values held
by the subject. The Clearance attribute indicates the security by the subject. The Clearance attribute indicates the security
policy, the clearance levels held by the subject, and additional policy, the clearance levels held by the subject, and additional
authorization information held by the subject. This specification authorization information held by the subject. This specification
makes use of the ASN.1 syntax for clearance from [3281bis]. makes use of the ASN.1 syntax for clearance from [RFC3281bis].
Clearance attribute may be placed in the subject directory attributes Clearance attribute may be placed in the subject directory attributes
extension of a PKC or may be placed in a separate attribute extension of a Public Key Certificate (PKC) or may be placed in a
certificate (AC). separate attribute certificate (AC).
The placement of Clearance attribute in PKCs is desirable when the The placement of Clearance attribute in PKCs is desirable when the
credentials such as PKCs need to be revoked when the clearance credentials such as PKCs need to be revoked when the clearance
information changes or when clearance information is relatively information changes or when clearance information is relatively
static, and clearance information can be verified as part of PKC static, and clearance information can be verified as part of PKC
issuance process (e.g., using local databases). The placement of issuance process (e.g., using local databases). The placement of
Clearance attribute in PKCs may also be made to simplify the Clearance attribute in PKCs may also be made to simplify the
infrastructure, to reduce the infrastructure design cost, or to infrastructure, to reduce the infrastructure design cost, or to
reduce the infrastructure operations cost. An example of placement reduce the infrastructure operations cost. An example of placement
of Clearance attribute in PKCs in operational PKI is the Defense of Clearance attribute in PKCs in operational Public Key
Messaging Service. An example of placement of attributes in PKCs is Infrastructure (PKI) is the Defense Messaging Service. An example of
Qualified Certificates [RFC3739]. placement of attributes in PKCs is Qualified Certificates [RFC3739].
The placement of Clearance attribute in ACs is desirable when the The placement of Clearance attribute in ACs is desirable when the
clearance information is relatively dynamic and changes in the clearance information is relatively dynamic and changes in the
clearance information does not require revocation of credentials such clearance information does not require revocation of credentials such
as PKCs, or the clearance information can not be verified as part of as PKCs, or the clearance information can not be verified as part of
PKC issuance process. PKC issuance process.
Since [3281bis] does not permit chain of ACs, the Authority Since [RFC3281bis] does not permit chain of ACs, the Authority
Clearance Constraints extension may only appear in the PKCs of CA or Clearance Constraints extension may only appear in the PKCs of
AA. The Authority Clearance Constraints extension may also appear Certificate Authority (CA) or Attribute Authority (AA). The
in a TA or may be associated with a TA. Authority Clearance Constraints extension may also appear in a trust
anchor (TA) or may be associated with a TA.
Some organizations have multiple TAs, CAs, and/or AAs and these Some organizations have multiple TAs, CAs, and/or AAs and these
organizations may wish to indicate to relying parties which clearance organizations may wish to indicate to relying parties which clearance
values from a particular TA, CA, or AA should be accepted. For values from a particular TA, CA, or AA should be accepted. For
example, consider the security policies described in [RFC3114], where example, consider the security policies described in [RFC3114], where
a security policy has been defined for Amoco with three security a security policy has been defined for Amoco with three security
classification values (HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL, CONFIDENTIAL, and classification values (HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL, CONFIDENTIAL, and
GENERAL). To constrain a CA for just one security classification, the GENERAL). To constrain a CA for just one security classification, the
Authority Clearance Constraints certificate extension would be Authority Clearance Constraints certificate extension would be
included in the CA's PKC. included in the CA's PKC.
Cross-certified domains can also make use of the Authority Clearance Cross-certified domains can also make use of the Authority Clearance
Constraints certificate extension to indicate which clearance values Constraints certificate extension to indicate which clearance values
should be acceptable to relying parties. should be acceptable to relying parties.
This document augments the certification path validation rules for
PKCs in [RFC5280] and ACs in [RFC3281bis].
1.1. Terminology 1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
1.2. ASN.1 Syntax Notation 1.2. ASN.1 Syntax Notation
All X.509 PKC [RFC5280] extensions are defined using ASN.1 [X.680]. All X.509 PKC [RFC5280] extensions are defined using ASN.1 [X.680].
All X.509 AC [3281bis] extensions are defined using ASN.1 [X.680]. All X.509 AC [RFC3281bis] extensions are defined using ASN.1 [X.680].
2. Clearance Attribute 2. Clearance Attribute
The Clearance attribute in a certificate indicates the clearances The Clearance attribute in a certificate indicates the clearances
held by the subject. It uses the clearance attribute syntax from held by the subject. It uses the clearance attribute syntax from
Section 4.4.6 of [3281bis], which is included below for convenience, Section 4.4.6 of [RFC3281bis], which is included below for
in the Attributes field. A certificate MUST include either zero or convenience, in the Attributes field. A certificate MUST include
one instance of the Clearance attribute. If the Clearance attribute either zero or one instance of the Clearance attribute. If the
is present, it must contain a single value. Clearance attribute is present, it MUST contain a single value.
The following object identifier identifies the Clearance attribute The following object identifier identifies the Clearance attribute
(either in the subject directory attributes extension of a PKC or in (either in the subject directory attributes extension of a PKC or in
the Attributes field of an AC): the Attributes field of an AC):
id-at-clearance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2) id-at-clearance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2)
ds(5) attributeTypes(4) clearance(55) } ds(5) attributeTypes(4) clearance(55) }
The ASN.1 syntax for the Clearance attribute is as follows [PKI-ASN]: The ASN.1 syntax for the Clearance attribute is as follows [PKI-ASN]:
Clearance ::= SEQUENCE { Clearance ::= SEQUENCE {
policyId OBJECT IDENTIFIER, policyId OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
classList ClassList DEFAULT {unclassified}, classList ClassList DEFAULT {unclassified},
securityCategories SET OF SecurityCategory OPTIONAL securityCategories SET OF SecurityCategory
{{ SupportedSecurityCategories }} OPTIONAL
} }
ClassList ::= BIT STRING { ClassList ::= BIT STRING {
unmarked (0), unmarked (0),
unclassified (1), unclassified (1),
restricted (2), restricted (2),
confidential (3), confidential (3),
secret (4), secret (4),
topSecret (5) topSecret (5)
} }
SECURITY-CATEGORY ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER SECURITY-CATEGORY ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
SecurityCategory ::= SEQUENCE { SecurityCategory { SECURITY-CATEGORY:Supported }::= SEQUENCE {
type [0] type [0] IMPLICIT SECURITY-CATEGORY.&id({Supported}),
TYPE-IDENTIFIER.&id({SupportedSecurityCategories}), value [1] EXPLICIT SECURITY-CATEGORY.&Type
value [1] ({Supported}{@type})
EXPLICIT TYPE-IDENTIFIER.&Type
({SupportedSecurityCategories}{@type})
} }
NOTE: SecurityCategory is shown exactly as it is in [PKI-ASN]. That
module is an EXPLICIT tagged module whereas the module contained in
this document is an IMPLICIT tagged module.
The Clearance attribute takes its meaning from Section 4.4.6 of The Clearance attribute takes its meaning from Section 4.4.6 of
[3281bis], which is repeated here for convenience: [RFC3281bis], which is repeated here for convenience:
- policyId identifies the security policy to which the clearance - policyId identifies the security policy to which the clearance
relates. The policyId indicates the semantics of the classList relates. The policyId indicates the semantics of the classList
and securityCategory fields. and securityCategories fields.
- classlist identifies the security classifications. Six basic - classList identifies the security classifications. Six basic
values are defined in bit positions 0 through 5 and more may be values are defined in bit positions 0 through 5 and more may be
defined by an organizational security policy. defined by an organizational security policy.
- securityCategories provides additional authorization information. - securityCategories provides additional authorization information.
If a trust anchor's public key is used directly, then the Clearance If a trust anchor's public key is used directly, then the Clearance
associated with the trust anchor, if any, should be used as the associated with the trust anchor, if any, should be used as the
effective clearance (also defined as effective-clearance for a effective clearance (also defined as effective-clearance for a
certification path). certification path).
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iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pe(1) 21 } mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pe(1) 21 }
The ASN.1 syntax for the Authority Clearance Constraints certificate The ASN.1 syntax for the Authority Clearance Constraints certificate
extension is as follows: extension is as follows:
AuthorityClearanceConstraints ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AuthorityClearanceConstraints ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
Clearance Clearance
The syntax for Authority Clearance Constraints certificate extension The syntax for Authority Clearance Constraints certificate extension
contains Clearance values that the CA or the AA asserts. The contains Clearances that the CA or the AA asserts. The sequence MUST
sequence MUST NOT include more than one entry with the same policyId. NOT include more than one entry with the same policyId. This
This constraint is enforced during Clearance and Authority Clearance constraint is enforced during Clearance and Authority Clearance
Constraints Processing described below. If more than one entry with Constraints Processing described below. If more than one entry with
the same policyId is present in AuthorityClearanceConstraints the same policyId is present in AuthorityClearanceConstraints
certificate extension, the certification path is rejected. In certificate extension, the certification path is rejected.
addition, each Clearance attribute in the SEQUENCE must not contain
more than one value.
4. Clearance and Authority Clearance Constraints Processing in PKC 4. Clearance and Authority Clearance Constraints Processing in PKC
This section describes the processing of certification path when This section describes the processing of certification path when
Clearance is asserted in PKC. Clearance is asserted in PKC.
User input, Authority Clearance Constraints certificate extension, User input, Authority Clearance Constraints certificate extension,
and Clearance attribute processing determines the effective clearance and Clearance attribute processing determines the effective clearance
(henceforth called effective-clearance) for the end PKC. User input, (henceforth called effective-clearance) for the end PKC. User input,
Authority Clearance Constraints certificate extension in the TA and Authority Clearance Constraints certificate extension in the TA and
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state variable is updated by first processing Authority Clearance state variable is updated by first processing Authority Clearance
Constraints associated with the trust anchor, and then each time an Constraints associated with the trust anchor, and then each time an
intermediate PKC that contains an Authority Clearance Constraints intermediate PKC that contains an Authority Clearance Constraints
certificate extension in the path is processed. certificate extension in the path is processed.
When processing the end PKC, the value in the Clearance attribute in When processing the end PKC, the value in the Clearance attribute in
the end PKC is intersected with the permitted-clearances state the end PKC is intersected with the permitted-clearances state
variable. variable.
The output of Clearance attribute and Authority Clearance Constraint The output of Clearance attribute and Authority Clearance Constraint
certificate extensions processing is the effective-clearance, which certificate extensions processing is the effective-clearance (which
could also be an empty list; and success or failure with reason code could also be an empty list), and a status indicator of either
for failure. success or failure. If the status indicator was failure, then the
process also returns a reason code.
4.1. Collecting Constraints 4.1. Collecting Constraints
Authority Clearance Constraints are collected from the user input, Authority Clearance Constraints are collected from the user input,
the trust anchor and the intermediate PKCs in a certification path. the trust anchor and the intermediate PKCs in a certification path.
4.1.1. Certification Path Processing 4.1.1. Certification Path Processing
When processing Authority Clearance Constraints certificate extension When processing Authority Clearance Constraints certificate extension
for the purposes of validating Clearance attribute in the end PKC, for the purposes of validating Clearance attribute in the end PKC,
the processing described in this section or an equivalent algorithm the processing described in this section or an equivalent algorithm
MUST be included in the certification path validation. The MUST be performed in addition to the certification path validation.
processing is presented as additions to the certification path
The processing is presented as additions to the certification path
validation algorithm described in section 6 of [RFC5280]. Note that validation algorithm described in section 6 of [RFC5280]. Note that
this RFC is fully consistent with [RFC5280]; however, it augments this RFC is fully consistent with [RFC5280]; however, it augments
[RFC5280] with the following steps: [RFC5280] with the following steps:
. Ability to provide and process Authority Clearance Constraints . Ability to provide and process Authority Clearance Constraints
as an additional input to the certification path processing as an additional input to the certification path processing
engine engine
. Requirement to process Authority Clearance Constraints present . Requirement to process Authority Clearance Constraints present
with Trust anchor information. with Trust anchor information.
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omit it. omit it.
Trust anchor information may include the Trust anchor information may include the
AuthorityClearanceConstraints structure to specify Authority AuthorityClearanceConstraints structure to specify Authority
Clearance Constraints for the trust anchor. The trust anchor may be Clearance Constraints for the trust anchor. The trust anchor may be
constrained or unconstrained. constrained or unconstrained.
4.1.1.2. Initialization 4.1.1.2. Initialization
If user input includes AuthorityClearanceConstraints, set the If user input includes AuthorityClearanceConstraints, set the
permitted-clearances to the input value, otherwise,, set the permitted-clearances to the input value, otherwise, set the
permitted-clearances to special value all-clearances. permitted-clearances to special value all-clearances.
If any of the Clearance attributes in the permitted-clearances
contains more than one value, set effective-clearance to an empty
list, set error code to "multiple values in input", and exit with
failure.
Examine the permitted-clearances for the same Policy ID appearing Examine the permitted-clearances for the same Policy ID appearing
more then once. If a policyID appears more than once in the more then once. If a policyId appears more than once in the
permitted-clearances state variable, set effective-clearance to an permitted-clearances state variable, set effective-clearance to an
empty list, set error code to "multiple instances of same clearance", empty list, set error code to "multiple instances of same clearance",
and exit with failure. and exit with failure.
If the trust anchor does not contain an AuthorityClearanceConstraints If the trust anchor does not contain an AuthorityClearanceConstraints
extension, continue at Section 4.1.1.3. Otherwise, execute the extension, continue at Section 4.1.1.3. Otherwise, execute the
procedure described in Section 6 as an in-line macro by treating the procedure described in Section 6 as an in-line macro by treating the
trust anchor as a PKC. trust anchor as a PKC.
4.1.1.3. Basic Certificate Processing 4.1.1.3. Basic Certificate Processing
If the PKC is the last PKC (i.e., certificate n), skip the steps If the PKC is the last PKC (i.e., certificate n), skip the steps
listed in this section. Otherwise, execute the procedure described listed in this section. Otherwise, execute the procedure described
in Section 6. as an in-line macro. in Section 6 as an in-line macro.
4.1.1.4. Preparation for Certificate i+1 4.1.1.4. Preparation for Certificate i+1
No additional action associated with the Clearance attribute or No additional action associated with the Clearance attribute or
AuthorityClearanceConstraints certificate extensions is taken during AuthorityClearanceConstraints certificate extensions is taken during
this phase of certification path validation as described in section 6 this phase of certification path validation as described in section 6
of [RFC5280]. of [RFC5280].
4.1.1.5. Wrap-up Procedure 4.1.1.5. Wrap-up Procedure
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Set effective-clearance to the Clearance attribute in the end PKC. Set effective-clearance to the Clearance attribute in the end PKC.
4.1.1.5.1. Wrap Up Clearance 4.1.1.5.1. Wrap Up Clearance
Examine effective-clearance and verify that it does not contain more Examine effective-clearance and verify that it does not contain more
than one value. If effective-clearance contains more than one value, than one value. If effective-clearance contains more than one value,
set effective-clearance to an empty list, set error code to "multiple set effective-clearance to an empty list, set error code to "multiple
values", and exit with failure. values", and exit with failure.
Let us say policyID in effective-clearance is X.
If permitted-clearances is an empty list, set effective-clearance to If permitted-clearances is an empty list, set effective-clearance to
an empty list and exit with success. an empty list and exit with success.
If the permitted-clearances has special value of all-clearances, exit If the permitted-clearances has special value of all-clearances, exit
with success. with success.
If the policyID X in effective-clearance is absent from the Let us say policyId in effective-clearance is X.
If the policyId X in effective-clearance is absent from the
permitted-clearances, set effective-clearance to an empty list and permitted-clearances, set effective-clearance to an empty list and
exit with success. exit with success.
Assign those classList bits in effective-clearance a value of one (1) Assign those classList bits in effective-clearance a value of one (1)
that have a value of one (1) both in effective-clearance and in the that have a value of one (1) both in effective-clearance and in the
clearance structure in permitted-clearances associated with policyID clearance structure in permitted-clearances associated with policyId
X. Assign all other classList bits in effective-clearance a value of X. Assign all other classList bits in effective-clearance a value of
zero (0). zero (0).
If none of the classList bits have a value of one (1) in effective- If none of the classList bits have a value of one (1) in effective-
clearance, set effective-clearance to an empty list and exit with clearance, set effective-clearance to an empty list and exit with
success. success.
Set the securityCategories in effective-clearance to the intersection Set the securityCategories in effective-clearance to the intersection
of securityCategories in effective-clearance and in permitted- of securityCategories in effective-clearance and in permitted-
clearances using the algorithm described in Section 6. Note that clearances using the algorithm described in Section 7. Note that an
empty an SET is represented by simply omitting the SET. empty SET is represented by simply omitting the SET.
Exit with Success Exit with Success.
4.1.1.6. Outputs 4.1.1.6. Outputs
If certification path validation processing succeeds, effective- If certification path validation processing succeeds, effective-
clearance contains the effective clearance for the subject of the clearance contains the effective clearance for the subject of the
certification path. Processing also returns success or failure certification path. Processing also returns success or failure
indication and reason for failure, if applicable. indication and reason for failure, if applicable.
5. Clearance and Authority Clearance Constraints Processing in AC 5. Clearance and Authority Clearance Constraints Processing in AC
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the trust anchor and all the PKCs in a PKC certification path. the trust anchor and all the PKCs in a PKC certification path.
5.1.1. Certification Path Processing 5.1.1. Certification Path Processing
When processing Authority Clearance Constraints certificate extension When processing Authority Clearance Constraints certificate extension
for the purposes of validating Clearance in the AC, the processing for the purposes of validating Clearance in the AC, the processing
described in this section or an equivalent algorithm MUST be included described in this section or an equivalent algorithm MUST be included
in the certification path validation. The processing is presented as in the certification path validation. The processing is presented as
additions to the PKC certification path validation algorithm additions to the PKC certification path validation algorithm
described in section 6 of [RFC5280] for the AA PKC certification path described in section 6 of [RFC5280] for the AA PKC certification path
and the algorithm described in section 5 of [3281bis] for the AC and the algorithm described in section 5 of [RFC3281bis] for the AC
validation. Also see note related to [RFC5280 augmentation in validation. Also see note related to [RFC5280] augmentation in
Section 4.1.1. Section 4.1.1.
5.1.1.1. Inputs 5.1.1.1. Inputs
Same as Section 4.1.1.1. Same as Section 4.1.1.1.
In addition, let us assume that the PKC certification path for the AA In addition, let us assume that the PKC certification path for the AA
consists of n certificates. consists of n certificates.
5.1.1.2. Initialization 5.1.1.2. Initialization
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5.1.1.5.1. Wrap Up Clearance 5.1.1.5.1. Wrap Up Clearance
Same as Section 4.1.1.5.1. Same as Section 4.1.1.5.1.
5.1.1.6. Outputs 5.1.1.6. Outputs
Same as Section 4.1.1.6. Same as Section 4.1.1.6.
In addition, apply AC processing rules described in Section 5 of In addition, apply AC processing rules described in Section 5 of
[3281bis]. [RFC3281bis].
6. Computing Intersection of permitted-clearances and 6. Computing Intersection of permitted-clearances and
AuthorityClearanceConstraints extension AuthorityClearanceConstraints extension
Examine the PKC and verify that it does not contain more than one Examine the PKC and verify that it does not contain more than one
instance of AuthorityClearanceConstraints extension. If the PKC instance of AuthorityClearanceConstraints extension. If the PKC
contains more than one instance of AuthorityClearanceConstraints contains more than one instance of AuthorityClearanceConstraints
extension, set effective-clearance to an empty list, set error code extension, set effective-clearance to an empty list, set error code
to "multiple extension instances", and exit with failure. to "multiple extension instances", and exit with failure.
If any of the Clearance attributes in the
AuthorityClearanceConstraints extension contains more than one value,
set effective-clearance to an empty list, set error code to "multiple
values", and exit with failure.
If the AuthorityClearanceConstraints certificate extension is not If the AuthorityClearanceConstraints certificate extension is not
present in the PKC, no action is taken, and the permitted-clearances present in the PKC, no action is taken, and the permitted-clearances
value is unchanged. value is unchanged.
If the AuthorityClearanceConstraints certificate extension is present If the AuthorityClearanceConstraints certificate extension is present
in the PKC, set the variable temp-clearances to in the PKC, set the variable temp-clearances to
AuthorityClearanceConstraints certificate extension. Examine the AuthorityClearanceConstraints certificate extension. Examine the
temp-clearances for the same Policy ID appearing more then once. If temp-clearances for the same Policy ID appearing more then once. If
a policyID appears more than once in the temp-clearances state a policyId appears more than once in the temp-clearances state
variable, set effective-clearance to an empty list, set error code to variable, set effective-clearance to an empty list, set error code to
"multiple instances of same clearance", and exit with failure. "multiple instances of same clearance", and exit with failure.
If the AuthorityClearanceConstraints certificate extension is present If the AuthorityClearanceConstraints certificate extension is present
in the PKC and permitted-clearances contains the all-clearances in the PKC and permitted-clearances contains the all-clearances
special value, then assign permitted-clearances the value of the special value, then assign permitted-clearances the value of the
temp-clearances. temp-clearances.
If the AuthorityClearanceConstraints certificate extension is present If the AuthorityClearanceConstraints certificate extension is present
in the PKC and permitted-clearances does not contain the all- in the PKC and permitted-clearances does not contain the all-
clearances special value, take the intersection of temp-clearances clearances special value, take the intersection of temp-clearances
and permitted-clearances by repeating the following steps for each and permitted-clearances by repeating the following steps for each
clearance in the permitted-clearances state variable: clearance in the permitted-clearances state variable:
- If the policyID associated with the clearance is absent in the - If the policyId associated with the clearance is absent in the
temp-clearances, delete the clearance structure associated with temp-clearances, delete the clearance structure associated with
the policyID from the permitted-clearances state variable. the policyID from the permitted-clearances state variable.
- If the policyID is present in the temp-clearances: - If the policyId is present in the temp-clearances:
-- For every classList bit, assign the classList bit a value of -- For every classList bit, assign the classList bit a value of
one (1) for the policyID in permitted-clearances state one (1) for the policyId in permitted-clearances state
variable if the bit is one (1) in both the permitted- variable if the bit is one (1) in both the permitted-
clearances state variable and the temp-clearances for that clearances state variable and the temp-clearances for that
policyID; otherwise assign the bit a value of zero (0). policyId; otherwise assign the bit a value of zero (0).
-- If no bits are one (1) for the classList, delete the clearance -- If no bits are one (1) for the classList, delete the clearance
structure associated with the policyID from the permitted- structure associated with the policyId from the permitted-
clearances state variable and skip the next step of processing clearances state variable and skip the next step of processing
securityCategories. securityCategories.
-- For the policyID in permitted-clearances, set the -- For the policyId in permitted-clearances, set the
securityCategories to the intersection of securityCategories securityCategories to the intersection of securityCategories
for the policyID in permitted-clearances and in temp- for the policyId in permitted-clearances and in temp-
clearances using the algorithm described in Section 7. Note clearances using the algorithm described in Section 7. Note
that an empty SET is represented by simply omitting the SET. that an empty SET is represented by simply omitting the SET.
7. Computing Intersection of securityCategories 7. Computing Intersection of securityCategories
The algorithm described in here has the idempotency, associative, and
commutative properties, like the rest of the processing rules in this
document.
This section describes how to compute the intersection of This section describes how to compute the intersection of
securityCategories A and B. It uses the state variable temp-set. securityCategories A and B. It uses the state variable temp-set. It
also uses temporary variables X and Y
Set the SET temp-set to empty. Set the SET temp-set to empty.
If SET A is empty (i.e., securityCategories is absent), return temp- Set X = A and Y = B
If SET X is empty (i.e., securityCategories is absent), return temp-
set. set.
If SET B is empty (i.e., securityCategories is absent), return temp- If SET Y is empty (i.e., securityCategories is absent), return temp-
set. set.
For every element (i.e., securityCategory) in the SET A carry out the For each type OID in X, if all the elements for the type OID in X and
if and only if all the elements for that type OID in Y are identical,
add those elements to temp-set and delete those elements from X and
Y. Note: identical means that if the element with the type OID and
given value is present in X, it is also present in Y with the same
type OID and given value and vice versa. Delete the elements from X
and from Y.
If SET X is empty (i.e., securityCategories is absent), return temp-
set.
If SET Y is empty (i.e., securityCategories is absent), return temp-
set.
For every element (i.e., SecurityCategory) in the SET X carry out the
following steps: following steps:
1. If there is no element in SET B with the same Type OID as the 1. If there is no element in SET Y with the same Type OID as the
type OID in the element from SET A, go to step 6. type OID in the element from SET X, go to step 5.
2. If there is an element in SET B with the same Type OID and value 2. If there is an element in SET Y with the same Type OID and value
as in the element in SET A, carry out the following steps: as in the element in SET X, carry out the following steps:
a) Add an element containing the Type OID and the value to the a) If the element is not present in the SET temp-set, add an
SET temp-set. element containing the Type OID and the value to the SET
temp-set.
b) Delete all elements with the same Type OID and the same 3. If the processing semantics of Type OID in the element in SET X
value from the SET B. is not known, go to step 5.
c) Go to step 6. 4. For each element in SET Y, do the following:
3. If the processing semantics of Type OID in the element in SET A a) If the Type OID of the element in SET Y is not the same as
is not known, go to step 6. the element in SET X being processed, go to step 4.d.
4. Perform Type OID specific intersection of the value in the b) Perform Type OID specific intersection of the value in the
element in SET A with the values in the applicable elements in element in SET X with the value in the element in SET Y.
SET B with the same Type OID.
5. If the intersection is not empty, add and element containing the c) If the intersection is not empty, and the element
Type OID and intersection result as value to temp-set. representing the Type OID and intersection value is not
already present in temp-set, add the element containing
the Type OID and intersection value as an element to temp-
set.
6. If more elements remain in SET A, process the next element d) Continue Do
5. If more elements remain in SET X, process the next element
starting with step 1. starting with step 1.
Return temp-set. Return temp-set.
8. Recommended securityCategories 8. Recommended securityCategories
This RFC also include a recommended securityCategories as follows: This RFC also include a recommended securityCategories as follows:
SecurityCategory ::= SEQUENCE { recommended-category SECURITY-CATEGORY ::=
type [0] OID id-TBSL, { BIT STRING IDENTIFIED BY OID }
value [1] BIT STRING
} The above structure is provided as an example. To use this
structure, the object identifier (OID) needs to be registered and the
semantics of the bits in the bit string need to be enumerated.
Note that Type specific intersection of two values for this Type will Note that Type specific intersection of two values for this Type will
be simply setting the bits that are set in both values. If the be simply setting the bits that are set in both values. If the
resulting intersection has none of the bits set, the intersection is resulting intersection has none of the bits set, the intersection is
considered empty. considered empty.
9. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
Certificate issuers must recognize that absence of the Certificate issuers must recognize that absence of the
AuthorityClearanceConstraints in a CA or AA certificate means that in AuthorityClearanceConstraints in a CA or AA certificate means that in
skipping to change at page 15, line 47 skipping to change at page 16, line 21
must also be privacy protected. must also be privacy protected.
10. IANA Considerations 10. IANA Considerations
None. Please remove this section prior to publication as an RFC. None. Please remove this section prior to publication as an RFC.
11. References 11. References
11.1. Normative References 11.1. Normative References
[PKI-ASN] Hoffman, P., and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for PKIX", [PKI-ASN] Hoffman, P., and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for
draft-ietf-pkix-new-asn1-03, work-in-progress. PKIX", draft-ietf-pkix-new-asn1-07, work-in-progress.
/*** RFC EDITOR: Please replace PKI-ASN with RFC#### when draft-ietf- /*** RFC EDITOR: Please replace PKI-ASN with RFCXYZA when draft-ietf-
pkix-new-asn1 is published. pkix-new-asn1 is published.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[3281bis] Farrell, S., Housely, R., and S. Turner, "An Internet [RFC3281bis] Farrell, S., Housley, R., and S. Turner, "An Internet
Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization: Update", Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization:
draft-ietf-pkix-3281update-04, work-in-progress. Update", draft-ietf-pkix-3281update-05, work-in-
progress.
/*** RFC EDITOR: Please replace 3281bis with RFCXYZA when draft-ietf- /*** RFC EDITOR: Please replace RFC3281bis with RFCXYZA when draft-
pkix-3281update is published. ietf-pkix-3281update is published.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D. et. al., "Internet X.509 Public Key [RFC5280] Cooper, D. et. al., "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certification Revocation Infrastructure Certificate and Certification Revocation
List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2004) | ISO/IEC 8824-1:2004. [X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One. 1:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
Notation One.
11.2. Informative References 11.2. Informative References
[RFC3114] Nicolls, W., "Implementing Company Classification Policy [RFC3114] Nicolls, W., "Implementing Company Classification
with S/MIME Security Label", RFC3114, May 2002. Policy with S/MIME Security Label", RFC3114, May 2002.
[RFC3739] Santesson, S. et. al., "Internet X.509 Public Key [RFC3739] Santesson, S. et. al., "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure: Qualified Certificate Profile", RFC 3739, Infrastructure: Qualified Certificate Profile", RFC
March 2004. 3739, March 2004.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
This appendix provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for This appendix provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for
the structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined the structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined
in X.680. in X.680.
ClearanceConstraints { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) ClearanceConstraints { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) mod(0) 46 } internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) mod(0) 46 }
skipping to change at page 17, line 25 skipping to change at page 18, line 25
BEGIN BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL -- -- EXPORTS ALL --
IMPORTS IMPORTS
-- IMPORTS from [PKI-ASN] -- IMPORTS from [PKI-ASN]
id-at-clearance, Clearance id-at-clearance, Clearance
FROM PKIXAttributeCertificate FROM PKIXAttributeCertificate-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-attribute-cert(12) id-mod-attribute-cert-02(47)
} }
-- IMPORTS from [PKI-ASN] -- IMPORTS from [PKI-ASN]
EXTENSION EXTENSION, SECURITY-CATEGORY
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkixCommon(43) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)
} }
; ;
-- Clearance attribute OID and syntax -- Clearance attribute OID and syntax
-- The following is a '93 version for clearance. -- The following is a '02 version for clearance.
-- It is included for convenience. -- It is included for convenience.
-- id-at-clearance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= -- id-at-clearance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
-- { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) attributeTypes(4) clearance (55) } -- { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) attributeTypes(4) clearance (55) }
-- Clearance ::= SEQUENCE { -- Clearance ::= SEQUENCE {
-- policyId OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- policyId OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
-- classList ClassList DEFAULT {unclassified}, -- classList ClassList DEFAULT {unclassified},
-- securityCategories SET OF SecurityCategory OPTIONAL -- securityCategories SET OF SecurityCategory
-- {{SupportSecurityCategories }} OPTIONAL
-- } -- }
-- ClassList ::= BIT STRING { -- ClassList ::= BIT STRING {
-- unmarked (0), -- unmarked (0),
-- unclassified (1), -- unclassified (1),
-- restricted (2), -- restricted (2),
-- confidential (3), -- confidential (3),
-- secret (4), -- secret (4),
-- topSecret (5) -- topSecret (5)
-- } -- }
-- SECURITY-CATEGORY ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER -- SECURITY-CATEGORY ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
-- SecurityCategory ::= SEQUENCE { -- NOTE that the module SecurityCategory is taken from a module
-- type [0] -- that uses EXPLICIT tags [PKI-ASN]. If Clearance was not imported
-- TYPE-IDENTIFIER.&id({SupportedSecurityCategories}), -- from [PKI-ASN] and the comments were removed from the ASN.1
-- value [1] -- contained herein, then the IMPLICIT in type could also be removed
-- EXPLICIT TYPE-IDENTIFIER.&Type -- with no impact on the encoding.
-- ({SupportedSecurityCategories}{@type})
-- SecurityCategory { SECURITY-CATEGORY:Supported } ::= SEQUENCE {
-- type [0] IMPLICIT SECURITY-CATEGORY.&id({Supported}),
-- value [1] EXPLICIT SECURITY-CATEGORY.&Type
-- ({Supported}{@type})
-- } -- }
-- Authority Clearance Constraints certificate extension OID -- Authority Clearance Constraints certificate extension OID
-- and syntax -- and syntax
id-pe-clearanceConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-pe-clearanceConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pe(1) 21 } mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pe(1) 21 }
authorityClearanceConstraints EXTENSION ::= { authorityClearanceConstraints EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX AuthorityClearanceConstraints SYNTAX AuthorityClearanceConstraints
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-clearanceConstraints IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-clearanceConstraints
} }
AuthorityClearanceConstraints ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Clearance AuthorityClearanceConstraints ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Clearance
END END
Author's Addresses Authors' Addresses
Sean Turner Sean Turner
IECA, Inc. IECA, Inc.
3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106 3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106
Fairfax, VA 22031 Fairfax, VA 22031
USA USA
EMail: turners@ieca.com EMail: turners@ieca.com
Santosh Chokhani Santosh Chokhani
CygnaCom Solutions, Inc. CygnaCom Solutions, Inc.
Email: SChokhani@cygnacom.com EMail: SChokhani@cygnacom.com
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