< draft-ietf-pkix-new-part1-06.txt   draft-ietf-pkix-new-part1-07.txt >
PKIX Working Group R. Housley (RSA Laboratories) PKIX Working Group R. Housley (RSA Laboratories)
Internet Draft W. Ford (VeriSign) Internet Draft W. Ford (VeriSign)
W. Polk (NIST) W. Polk (NIST)
D. Solo (Citigroup) D. Solo (Citigroup)
expires in six months April 2001 expires in six months June 2001
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and CRL Profile Certificate and CRL Profile
<draft-ietf-pkix-new-part1-06.txt> <draft-ietf-pkix-new-part1-07.txt>
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working
documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. working documents as Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001). All Rights Reserved. Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract Abstract
This is the sixth draft of a specification based upon RFC 2459. When This is the seventh draft of a specification based upon RFC 2459.
complete, this specification will obsolete RFC 2459. This When complete, this specification will obsolete RFC 2459. This
specification includes minor edits and clarifications. The most specification includes minor edits and clarifications. The most
notable departures from RFC 2459 are found in Section 6, Path notable departures from RFC 2459 are found in Section 6, Path
Validation. In RFC 2459, the reader was expected to augment the path Validation. In RFC 2459, the reader was expected to augment the path
validation algorithm, which concentrated upon policy processing, with validation algorithm, which concentrated upon policy processing, with
information embedded in earlier sections. For example, parameter information embedded in other sections. For example, parameter
inheritance is discussed in Section 7, Algorithm Support, and can inheritance is discussed in Section 7, Algorithm Support, and can
certainly affect the validity of a certification path. However, certainly affect the validity of a certification path. However,
parameter inheritance was omitted from the path validation algorithm parameter inheritance was omitted from the path validation algorithm
in RFC 2459. In this draft, the path validation algorithm has a in RFC 2459. In this document, the path validation algorithm has a
comprehensive and extremely detailed description. Details such as comprehensive and extremely detailed description. Details such as
parameter inheritance are covered thoroughly. In addition, this parameter inheritance are covered thoroughly. In addition, this
draft anticipates certain corrections proposed in the X.509 standard document anticipates certain corrections proposed in the X.509
for the policy processing aspects of path validation. standard for the policy processing aspects of path validation.
A new section 6.3, CRL validation, has been added as well. This A new section 6.3, CRL validation, has been added. This section
section provides a supplement to the path validation algorithm that provides a supplement to the path validation algorithm that
determines if a particular CRL may be used to verify the status of a determines whether a particular CRL may be used to verify the status
particular certificate. (The basic path validation algorithm is, by of a particular certificate. The basic certification path validation
design, independent of the type and format of status information.) algorithm is, by design, independent of the type and format of status
information.
The most significant enhancement in draft five is a refinement of the Significant corrections have been made to the ASN.1 modules contained
processing rules for path length constraints when applied to CA in the appendices.
certificates. This draft also completes the removal of processing
rules for unique identifiers. This was generally performed in the
fourth draft, but some details were overlooked. This draft also
incorporates significant corrections to the ASN.1 modules in the
appendices.
This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 CRL for use This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 CRL for use
in the Internet. An overview of the approach and model are provided in the Internet. An overview of the approach and model are provided
as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in
detail, with additional information regarding the format and detail, with additional information regarding the format and
semantics of Internet name forms (e.g., IP addresses). Standard semantics of Internet name forms (e.g., IP addresses). Standard
certificate extensions are described and one new Internet-specific certificate extensions are described and one new Internet-specific
extension is defined. A required set of certificate extensions is extension is defined. A required set of certificate extensions is
specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described and a required specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described, including a
extension set is defined as well. An algorithm for X.509 certificate required set of extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification
path validation is described. Supplemental information is provided path validation is described. Supplemental information describing
describing the format of public keys and digital signatures in X.509 the format of public keys and digital signatures in X.509
certificates for common Internet public key encryption algorithms certificates for common Internet public key algorithms. ASN.1
(i.e., RSA, DSA, and Diffie-Hellman). ASN.1 modules and examples are modules and examples are provided in the appendices.
provided in the appendices.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
Please send comments on this document to the ietf-pkix@imc.org mail Please send comments on this document to the ietf-pkix@imc.org mail
list. list.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
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7 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 7 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
8 Intellectual Property Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 8 Intellectual Property Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
9 Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 9 Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Appendix A. ASN.1 Structures and OIDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Appendix A. ASN.1 Structures and OIDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
A.1 Explicitly Tagged Module, 1988 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 A.1 Explicitly Tagged Module, 1988 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
A.2 Implicitly Tagged Module, 1988 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 A.2 Implicitly Tagged Module, 1988 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Appendix B. ASN.1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Appendix B. ASN.1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Appendix C. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 Appendix C. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
C.1 Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 C.1 Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
C.2 Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 C.2 Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
C.3 End-Entity Certificate Using RSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 C.3 End Entity Certificate Using RSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
C.4 Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 C.4 Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Appendix D. Author Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 Appendix D. Author Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Appendix E. Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 Appendix E. Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
1 Introduction 1 Introduction
This specification is one part of a family of standards for the X.509 This specification is one part of a family of standards for the X.509
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the Internet. This specification Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the Internet. This specification
is a standalone document; implementations of this standard may is a standalone document; implementations of this standard may
proceed independent from the other parts. proceed independent from the other parts.
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in Section 2. Section 3 presents an architectural model and in Section 2. Section 3 presents an architectural model and
describes its relationship to previous IETF and ISO/IEC/ITU describes its relationship to previous IETF and ISO/IEC/ITU
standards. In particular, this document's relationship with the IETF standards. In particular, this document's relationship with the IETF
PEM specifications and the ISO/IEC/ITU X.509 documents are described. PEM specifications and the ISO/IEC/ITU X.509 documents are described.
The specification profiles the X.509 version 3 certificate in Section The specification profiles the X.509 version 3 certificate in Section
4, and the X.509 version 2 certificate revocation list (CRL) in 4, and the X.509 version 2 certificate revocation list (CRL) in
Section 5. The profiles include the identification of ISO/IEC/ITU Section 5. The profiles include the identification of ISO/IEC/ITU
and ANSI extensions which may be useful in the Internet PKI. The and ANSI extensions which may be useful in the Internet PKI. The
profiles are presented in the 1988 Abstract Syntax Notation One profiles are presented in the 1988 Abstract Syntax Notation One
(ASN.1) rather than the 1994 syntax used in the ISO/IEC/ITU (ASN.1) rather than the 1997 ASN.1 syntax used in the ISO/IEC/ITU
standards. standards.
This specification also includes path validation procedures in This specification also includes path validation procedures in
Section 6. These procedures are based upon the ISO/IEC/ITU Section 6. These procedures are based upon the ISO/IEC/ITU
definition, but the presentation assumes one or more self-signed definition, but the presentation assumes one or more self-signed
trusted CA certificates. Implementations are required to derive the trusted CA certificates. Implementations are required to derive the
same results but are not required to use the specified procedures. same results but are not required to use the specified procedures.
Procedures for identification and encoding of public key materials Procedures for identification and encoding of public key materials
and digital signatures are defined in [PKIX ALGS]. Implementations of and digital signatures are defined in [PKIXALGS]. Implementations of
this specification are not required to use any particular this specification are not required to use any particular
cryptographic algorithms. However, conforming implementations which cryptographic algorithms. However, conforming implementations which
use the algorithms identified in [PKIX ALGS] are required to identify use the algorithms identified in [PKIXALGS] MUST identify and encode
and encode the public key materials and digital signatures as the public key materials and digital signatures as described in that
described in that specification. specification.
Finally, three appendices are provided to aid implementers. Appendix Finally, three appendices are provided to aid implementers. Appendix
A contains all ASN.1 structures defined or referenced within this A contains all ASN.1 structures defined or referenced within this
specification. As above, the material is presented in the 1988 specification. As above, the material is presented in the 1988
Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) rather than the 1994 syntax. ASN.1. Appendix B contains notes on less familiar features of the
Appendix B contains notes on less familiar features of the ASN.1 ASN.1 notation used within this specification. Appendix C contains
notation used within this specification. Appendix C contains
examples of a conforming certificate and a conforming CRL. examples of a conforming certificate and a conforming CRL.
2 Requirements and Assumptions 2 Requirements and Assumptions
The goal of this specification is to develop a profile to facilitate The goal of this specification is to develop a profile to facilitate
the use of X.509 certificates within Internet applications for those the use of X.509 certificates within Internet applications for those
communities wishing to make use of X.509 technology. Such communities wishing to make use of X.509 technology. Such
applications may include WWW, electronic mail, user authentication, applications may include WWW, electronic mail, user authentication,
and IPsec. In order to relieve some of the obstacles to using X.509 and IPsec. In order to relieve some of the obstacles to using X.509
certificates, this document defines a profile to promote the certificates, this document defines a profile to promote the
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2.1 Communication and Topology 2.1 Communication and Topology
The users of certificates will operate in a wide range of The users of certificates will operate in a wide range of
environments with respect to their communication topology, especially environments with respect to their communication topology, especially
users of secure electronic mail. This profile supports users without users of secure electronic mail. This profile supports users without
high bandwidth, real-time IP connectivity, or high connection high bandwidth, real-time IP connectivity, or high connection
availability. In addition, the profile allows for the presence of availability. In addition, the profile allows for the presence of
firewall or other filtered communication. firewall or other filtered communication.
This profile does not assume the deployment of an X.500 Directory This profile does not assume the deployment of an X.500 Directory
system. The profile does not prohibit the use of an X.500 Directory, system or a LDAP directory system. The profile does not prohibit the
but other means of distributing certificates and certificate use of an X.500 Directory or a LDAP directory; however, any means of
revocation lists (CRLs) may be used. distributing certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs) may
be used.
2.2 Acceptability Criteria 2.2 Acceptability Criteria
The goal of the Internet Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is to meet The goal of the Internet Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is to meet
the needs of deterministic, automated identification, authentication, the needs of deterministic, automated identification, authentication,
access control, and authorization functions. Support for these access control, and authorization functions. Support for these
services determines the attributes contained in the certificate as services determines the attributes contained in the certificate as
well as the ancillary control information in the certificate such as well as the ancillary control information in the certificate such as
policy data and certification path constraints. policy data and certification path constraints.
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3 Overview of Approach 3 Overview of Approach
Following is a simplified view of the architectural model assumed by Following is a simplified view of the architectural model assumed by
the PKIX specifications. the PKIX specifications.
+---+ +---+
| C | +------------+ | C | +------------+
| e | <-------------------->| End entity | | e | <-------------------->| End entity |
| r | Operational +------------+ | r | Operational +------------+
| t | transactions ^ | t | transactions ^
| | and management | Management | i | and management | Management
| / | transactions | transactions | f | transactions | transactions PKI
| | | PKI users | i | | users
| C | v | c | v
| R | -------------------+--+-----------+---------------- | a | ======================= +--+------------+ ==============
| L | ^ ^ | t | ^ ^
| | | | PKI management | e | | | PKI
| | v | entities | | v | management
| R | +------+ | | & | +------+ | entities
| e | <---------------------| RA | <---+ | | | <---------------------| RA |<----+ |
| p | Publish certificate +------+ | | | C | Publish certificate +------+ | |
| o | | | | R | | |
| s | | | | L | | |
| I | v v | | v v
| t | +------------+ | R | +------------+
| o | <------------------------------| CA | | e | <------------------------------| CA |
| r | Publish certificate +------------+ | p | Publish certificate +------------+
| y | Publish CRL ^ | o | Publish CRL ^ ^
| | | | s | | | Management
+---+ Management | | i | +------------+ | | transactions
transactions | | t | <--------------| CRL Issuer |<----+ |
v | o | Publish CRL +------------+ v
+------+ | r | +------+
| CA | | y | | CA |
+------+ +---+ +------+
Figure 1 - PKI Entities Figure 1 - PKI Entities
The components in this model are: The components in this model are:
end entity: user of PKI certificates and/or end user system that end entity: user of PKI certificates and/or end user system that
is the subject of a certificate; is the subject of a certificate;
CA: certification authority; CA: certification authority;
RA: registration authority, i.e., an optional system to RA: registration authority, i.e., an optional system to
which a CA delegates certain management functions; which a CA delegates certain management functions;
CRL issuer: an optional system to which a CA delegates the
publication of certificate revocation lists;
repository: a system or collection of distributed systems that repository: a system or collection of distributed systems that
store certificates and CRLs and serves as a means of store certificates and CRLs and serves as a means of
distributing these certificates and CRLs to end distributing these certificates and CRLs to end
entities. entities.
Note that an Attribute Authority (AA) might also choose to delegate
the publication of CRLs to a CRL issuer.
3.1 X.509 Version 3 Certificate 3.1 X.509 Version 3 Certificate
Users of a public key require confidence that the associated private Users of a public key require confidence that the associated private
key is owned by the correct remote subject (person or system) with key is owned by the correct remote subject (person or system) with
which an encryption or digital signature mechanism will be used. which an encryption or digital signature mechanism will be used.
This confidence is obtained through the use of public key This confidence is obtained through the use of public key
certificates, which are data structures that bind public key values certificates, which are data structures that bind public key values
to subjects. The binding is asserted by having a trusted CA to subjects. The binding is asserted by having a trusted CA
digitally sign each certificate. The CA may base this assertion upon digitally sign each certificate. The CA may base this assertion upon
technical means (a.k.a., proof of posession through a challenge- technical means (a.k.a., proof of possession through a challenge-
response protocol), presentation of the private key, or on an response protocol), presentation of the private key, or on an
assertion by the subject. A certificate has a limited valid lifetime assertion by the subject. A certificate has a limited valid lifetime
which is indicated in its signed contents. Because a certificate's which is indicated in its signed contents. Because a certificate's
signature and timeliness can be independently checked by a signature and timeliness can be independently checked by a
certificate-using client, certificates can be distributed via certificate-using client, certificates can be distributed via
untrusted communications and server systems, and can be cached in untrusted communications and server systems, and can be cached in
unsecured storage in certificate-using systems. unsecured storage in certificate-using systems.
ITU-T X.509 (formerly CCITT X.509) or ISO/IEC/ITU 9594-8, which was ITU-T X.509 (formerly CCITT X.509) or ISO/IEC/ITU 9594-8, which was
first published in 1988 as part of the X.500 Directory first published in 1988 as part of the X.500 Directory
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to specify a profile for use of the X.509 v3 extensions tailored for to specify a profile for use of the X.509 v3 extensions tailored for
the Internet. It is one goal of this document to specify a profile the Internet. It is one goal of this document to specify a profile
for Internet WWW, electronic mail, and IPsec applications. for Internet WWW, electronic mail, and IPsec applications.
Environments with additional requirements may build on this profile Environments with additional requirements may build on this profile
or may replace it. or may replace it.
3.2 Certification Paths and Trust 3.2 Certification Paths and Trust
A user of a security service requiring knowledge of a public key A user of a security service requiring knowledge of a public key
generally needs to obtain and validate a certificate containing the generally needs to obtain and validate a certificate containing the
required public key. If the public-key user does not already hold an required public key. If the public-key user does not already hold an
assured copy of the public key of the CA that signed the certificate, assured copy of the public key of the CA that signed the certificate,
the CA's name, and related information (such as the validity period the CA's name, and related information (such as the validity period
or name constraints), then it might need an additional certificate to or name constraints), then it might need an additional certificate to
obtain that public key. In general, a chain of multiple certificates obtain that public key. In general, a chain of multiple certificates
may be needed, comprising a certificate of the public key owner (the may be needed, comprising a certificate of the public key owner (the
end entity) signed by one CA, and zero or more additional end entity) signed by one CA, and zero or more additional
certificates of CAs signed by other CAs. Such chains, called certificates of CAs signed by other CAs. Such chains, called
certification paths, are required because a public key user is only certification paths, are required because a public key user is only
initialized with a limited number of assured CA public keys. initialized with a limited number of assured CA public keys.
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that a CA can only issue certificates for entities whose names are that a CA can only issue certificates for entities whose names are
subordinate (in the X.500 naming tree) to the name of the CA itself. subordinate (in the X.500 naming tree) to the name of the CA itself.
The trust associated with a PEM certification path is implied by the The trust associated with a PEM certification path is implied by the
PCA name. The name subordination rule ensures that CAs below the PCA PCA name. The name subordination rule ensures that CAs below the PCA
are sensibly constrained as to the set of subordinate entities they are sensibly constrained as to the set of subordinate entities they
can certify (e.g., a CA for an organization can only certify entities can certify (e.g., a CA for an organization can only certify entities
in that organization's name tree). Certificate user systems are able in that organization's name tree). Certificate user systems are able
to mechanically check that the name subordination rule has been to mechanically check that the name subordination rule has been
followed. followed.
The RFC 1422 uses the X.509 v1 certificate formats. The limitations The RFC 1422 uses the X.509 v1 certificate formats. The limitations
of X.509 v1 required imposition of several structural restrictions to of X.509 v1 required imposition of several structural restrictions to
clearly associate policy information or restrict the utility of clearly associate policy information or restrict the utility of
certificates. These restrictions included: certificates. These restrictions included:
(a) a pure top-down hierarchy, with all certification paths (a) a pure top-down hierarchy, with all certification paths
starting from IPRA; starting from IPRA;
(b) a naming subordination rule restricting the names of a CA's (b) a naming subordination rule restricting the names of a CA's
subjects; and subjects; and
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could be accepted. could be accepted.
With X.509 v3, most of the requirements addressed by RFC 1422 can be With X.509 v3, most of the requirements addressed by RFC 1422 can be
addressed using certificate extensions, without a need to restrict addressed using certificate extensions, without a need to restrict
the CA structures used. In particular, the certificate extensions the CA structures used. In particular, the certificate extensions
relating to certificate policies obviate the need for PCAs and the relating to certificate policies obviate the need for PCAs and the
constraint extensions obviate the need for the name subordination constraint extensions obviate the need for the name subordination
rule. As a result, this document supports a more flexible rule. As a result, this document supports a more flexible
architecture, including: architecture, including:
(a) Certification paths may start with a public key of a CA in a (a) Certification paths start with a public key of a CA in a
user's own domain, or with the public key of the top of a user's own domain, or with the public key of the top of a
hierarchy. Starting with the public key of a CA in a user's own hierarchy. Starting with the public key of a CA in a user's own
domain has certain advantages. In some environments, the local domain has certain advantages. In some environments, the local
domain is the most trusted. domain is the most trusted.
(b) Name constraints may be imposed through explicit inclusion of (b) Name constraints may be imposed through explicit inclusion of
a name constraints extension in a certificate, but are not a name constraints extension in a certificate, but are not
required. required.
(c) Policy extensions and policy mappings replace the PCA (c) Policy extensions and policy mappings replace the PCA concept,
concept, which permits a greater degree of automation. The which permits a greater degree of automation. The application can
application can determine if the certification path is acceptable determine if the certification path is acceptable based on the
based on the contents of the certificates instead of a priori contents of the certificates instead of a priori knowledge of
knowledge of PCAs. This permits automation of certificate chain PCAs. This permits automation of certificate chain processing.
processing.
3.3 Revocation 3.3 Revocation
When a certificate is issued, it is expected to be in use for its When a certificate is issued, it is expected to be in use for its
entire validity period. However, various circumstances may cause a entire validity period. However, various circumstances may cause a
certificate to become invalid prior to the expiration of the validity certificate to become invalid prior to the expiration of the validity
period. Such circumstances include change of name, change of period. Such circumstances include change of name, change of
association between subject and CA (e.g., an employee terminates association between subject and CA (e.g., an employee terminates
employment with an organization), and compromise or suspected employment with an organization), and compromise or suspected
compromise of the corresponding private key. Under such compromise of the corresponding private key. Under such
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freely available in a public repository. Each revoked certificate is freely available in a public repository. Each revoked certificate is
identified in a CRL by its certificate serial number. When a identified in a CRL by its certificate serial number. When a
certificate-using system uses a certificate (e.g., for verifying a certificate-using system uses a certificate (e.g., for verifying a
remote user's digital signature), that system not only checks the remote user's digital signature), that system not only checks the
certificate signature and validity but also acquires a suitably- certificate signature and validity but also acquires a suitably-
recent CRL and checks that the certificate serial number is not on recent CRL and checks that the certificate serial number is not on
that CRL. The meaning of "suitably-recent" may vary with local that CRL. The meaning of "suitably-recent" may vary with local
policy, but it usually means the most recently-issued CRL. A CA policy, but it usually means the most recently-issued CRL. A CA
issues a new CRL on a regular periodic basis (e.g., hourly, daily, or issues a new CRL on a regular periodic basis (e.g., hourly, daily, or
weekly). An entry is added to the CRL as part of the next update weekly). An entry is added to the CRL as part of the next update
following notification of revocation. An entry may be removed from following notification of revocation. An entry may be removed from
the CRL after appearing on one regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond the CRL after appearing on one regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond
the revoked certificate's validity period. the revoked certificate's validity period.
An advantage of this revocation method is that CRLs may be An advantage of this revocation method is that CRLs may be
distributed by exactly the same means as certificates themselves, distributed by exactly the same means as certificates themselves,
namely, via untrusted communications and server systems. namely, via untrusted servers and untrusted communications.
One limitation of the CRL revocation method, using untrusted One limitation of the CRL revocation method, using untrusted
communications and servers, is that the time granularity of communications and servers, is that the time granularity of
revocation is limited to the CRL issue period. For example, if a revocation is limited to the CRL issue period. For example, if a
revocation is reported now, that revocation will not be reliably revocation is reported now, that revocation will not be reliably
notified to certificate-using systems until all currently issued CRLs notified to certificate-using systems until all currently issued CRLs
are updated -- this may be up to one hour, one day, or one week are updated -- this may be up to one hour, one day, or one week
depending on the frequency that the CA issues CRLs. depending on the frequency that CRLs are issued.
As with the X.509 v3 certificate format, in order to facilitate As with the X.509 v3 certificate format, in order to facilitate
interoperable implementations from multiple vendors, the X.509 v2 CRL interoperable implementations from multiple vendors, the X.509 v2 CRL
format needs to be profiled for Internet use. It is one goal of this format needs to be profiled for Internet use. It is one goal of this
document to specify that profile. However, this profile does not document to specify that profile. However, this profile does not
require CAs to issue CRLs. Message formats and protocols supporting require CAs to issue CRLs. Message formats and protocols supporting
on-line revocation notification may be defined in other PKIX on-line revocation notification are defined in other PKIX
specifications. On-line methods of revocation notification may be specifications. On-line methods of revocation notification may be
applicable in some environments as an alternative to the X.509 CRL. applicable in some environments as an alternative to the X.509 CRL.
On-line revocation checking may significantly reduce the latency On-line revocation checking may significantly reduce the latency
between a revocation report and the distribution of the information between a revocation report and the distribution of the information
to relying parties. Once the CA accepts the report as authentic and to relying parties. Once the CA accepts the report as authentic and
valid, any query to the on-line service will correctly reflect the valid, any query to the on-line service will correctly reflect the
certificate validation impacts of the revocation. However, these certificate validation impacts of the revocation. However, these
methods impose new security requirements: the certificate validator methods impose new security requirements: the certificate validator
needs to trust the on-line validation service while the repository needs to trust the on-line validation service while the repository
does not need to be trusted. does not need to be trusted.
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forgotten password or a lost key chain file), an on-line protocol forgotten password or a lost key chain file), an on-line protocol
exchange may be needed to support such recovery. exchange may be needed to support such recovery.
(e) key pair update: All key pairs need to be updated regularly, (e) key pair update: All key pairs need to be updated regularly,
i.e., replaced with a new key pair, and new certificates issued. i.e., replaced with a new key pair, and new certificates issued.
(f) revocation request: An authorized person advises a CA of an (f) revocation request: An authorized person advises a CA of an
abnormal situation requiring certificate revocation. abnormal situation requiring certificate revocation.
(g) cross-certification: Two CAs exchange information used in (g) cross-certification: Two CAs exchange information used in
establishing a cross-certificate. A cross-certificate is a establishing a cross-certificate. A cross-certificate is a
certificate issued by one CA to another CA which contains a CA certificate issued by one CA to another CA which contains a CA
signature key used for issuing certificates. signature key used for issuing certificates.
Note that on-line protocols are not the only way of implementing the Note that on-line protocols are not the only way of implementing the
above functions. For all functions there are off-line methods of above functions. For all functions there are off-line methods of
achieving the same result, and this specification does not mandate achieving the same result, and this specification does not mandate
use of on-line protocols. For example, when hardware tokens are use of on-line protocols. For example, when hardware tokens are
used, many of the functions may be achieved as part of the physical used, many of the functions may be achieved as part of the physical
token delivery. Furthermore, some of the above functions may be token delivery. Furthermore, some of the above functions may be
combined into one protocol exchange. In particular, two or more of combined into one protocol exchange. In particular, two or more of
the registration, initialization, and certification functions can be the registration, initialization, and certification functions can be
combined into one protocol exchange. combined into one protocol exchange.
The PKIX series of specifications may define a set of standard The PKIX series of specifications defines a set of standard message
message formats supporting the above functions in future formats supporting the above functions. The protocols for conveying
specifications. In that case, the protocols for conveying these these messages in different environments (e.g., e-mail, file
messages in different environments (e.g., on-line, file transfer, e- transfer, and WWW) are described in those specifications.
mail, and WWW) will also be described in those specifications.
4 Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile 4 Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile
This section presents a profile for public key certificates that will This section presents a profile for public key certificates that will
foster interoperability and a reusable PKI. This section is based foster interoperability and a reusable PKI. This section is based
upon the X.509 v3 certificate format and the standard certificate upon the X.509 v3 certificate format and the standard certificate
extensions defined in [X.509]. The ISO/IEC/ITU documents use the extensions defined in [X.509]. The ISO/IEC/ITU documents use the
1993 version of ASN.1; while this document uses the 1988 ASN.1 1997 version of ASN.1; while this document uses the 1988 ASN.1
syntax, the encoded certificate and standard extensions are syntax, the encoded certificate and standard extensions are
equivalent. This section also defines private extensions required to equivalent. This section also defines private extensions required to
support a PKI for the Internet community. support a PKI for the Internet community.
Certificates may be used in a wide range of applications and Certificates may be used in a wide range of applications and
environments covering a broad spectrum of interoperability goals and environments covering a broad spectrum of interoperability goals and
a broader spectrum of operational and assurance requirements. The a broader spectrum of operational and assurance requirements. The
goal of this document is to establish a common baseline for generic goal of this document is to establish a common baseline for generic
applications requiring broad interoperability and limited special applications requiring broad interoperability and limited special
purpose requirements. In particular, the emphasis will be on purpose requirements. In particular, the emphasis will be on
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Extension ::= SEQUENCE { Extension ::= SEQUENCE {
extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
extnValue OCTET STRING } extnValue OCTET STRING }
The following items describe the X.509 v3 certificate for use in the The following items describe the X.509 v3 certificate for use in the
Internet. Internet.
4.1.1 Certificate Fields 4.1.1 Certificate Fields
The Certificate is a SEQUENCE of three required fields. The fields The Certificate is a SEQUENCE of three required fields. The fields
are described in detail in the following subsections. are described in detail in the following subsections.
4.1.1.1 tbsCertificate 4.1.1.1 tbsCertificate
The field contains the names of the subject and issuer, a public key The field contains the names of the subject and issuer, a public key
associated with the subject, a validity period, and other associated associated with the subject, a validity period, and other associated
information. The fields are described in detail in section 4.1.2; information. The fields are described in detail in section 4.1.2;
the tbscertificate may also include extensions which are described in the tbsCertificate MAY also include extensions which are described in
section 4.2. section 4.2.
4.1.1.2 signatureAlgorithm 4.1.1.2 signatureAlgorithm
The signatureAlgorithm field contains the identifier for the The signatureAlgorithm field contains the identifier for the
cryptographic algorithm used by the CA to sign this certificate. cryptographic algorithm used by the CA to sign this certificate.
[PKIX ALGS] lists the supported signature algorithms. [PKIXALGS] lists supported signature algorithms, but other signature
algorithms MAY also be supported.
An algorithm identifier is defined by the following ASN.1 structure: An algorithm identifier is defined by the following ASN.1 structure:
AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL } parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL }
The algorithm identifier is used to identify a cryptographic The algorithm identifier is used to identify a cryptographic
algorithm. The OBJECT IDENTIFIER component identifies the algorithm algorithm. The OBJECT IDENTIFIER component identifies the algorithm
(such as DSA with SHA-1). The contents of the optional parameters (such as DSA with SHA-1). The contents of the optional parameters
field will vary according to the algorithm identified. [PKIX ALGS] field will vary according to the algorithm identified. [PKIXALGS]
lists the supported algorithms for this specification. lists supported algorithms, but other algorithms MAY also be
implemented.
This field MUST contain the same algorithm identifier as the This field MUST contain the same algorithm identifier as the
signature field in the sequence tbsCertificate (see sec. 4.1.2.3). signature field in the sequence tbsCertificate (section 4.1.2.3).
4.1.1.3 signatureValue 4.1.1.3 signatureValue
The signatureValue field contains a digital signature computed upon The signatureValue field contains a digital signature computed upon
the ASN.1 DER encoded tbsCertificate. The ASN.1 DER encoded the ASN.1 DER encoded tbsCertificate. The ASN.1 DER encoded
tbsCertificate is used as the input to the signature function. This tbsCertificate is used as the input to the signature function. This
signature value is then ASN.1 encoded as a BIT STRING and included in signature value is then ASN.1 encoded as a BIT STRING and included in
the Certificate's signature field. The details of this process are the signature field. The details of this process are specified for
specified for each of the supported algorithms in [PKIX ALGS]. each of algorithms listed in [PKIXALGS].
By generating this signature, a CA certifies the validity of the By generating this signature, a CA certifies the validity of the
information in the tbsCertificate field. In particular, the CA information in the tbsCertificate field. In particular, the CA
certifies the binding between the public key material and the subject certifies the binding between the public key material and the subject
of the certificate. of the certificate.
4.1.2 TBSCertificate 4.1.2 TBSCertificate
The sequence TBSCertificate contains information associated with the The sequence TBSCertificate contains information associated with the
subject of the certificate and the CA who issued it. Every subject of the certificate and the CA who issued it. Every
TBSCertificate contains the names of the subject and issuer, a public TBSCertificate contains the names of the subject and issuer, a public
key associated with the subject, a validity period, a version number, key associated with the subject, a validity period, a version number,
and a serial number; some may contain optional unique identifier and a serial number; some MAY contain optional unique identifier
fields. The remainder of this section describes the syntax and fields. The remainder of this section describes the syntax and
semantics of these fields. A TBSCertificate may also include semantics of these fields. A TBSCertificate MAY also include
extensions. Extensions for the Internet PKI are described in Section extensions. Extensions for the Internet PKI are described in Section
4.2. 4.2.
4.1.2.1 Version 4.1.2.1 Version
This field describes the version of the encoded certificate. When This field describes the version of the encoded certificate. When
extensions are used, as expected in this profile, use X.509 version 3 extensions are used, as expected in this profile, use X.509 version 3
(value is 2). If no extensions are present, but a UniqueIdentifier (value is 2). If no extensions are present, but a UniqueIdentifier
is present, use version 2 (value is 1). If only basic fields are is present, use version 2 (value is 1). If only basic fields are
present, use version 1 (the value is omitted from the certificate as present, use version 1 (the value is omitted from the certificate as
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4.1.2.2 Serial number 4.1.2.2 Serial number
The serial number MUST be a positive integer assigned by the CA to The serial number MUST be a positive integer assigned by the CA to
each certificate. It MUST be unique for each certificate issued by a each certificate. It MUST be unique for each certificate issued by a
given CA (i.e., the issuer name and serial number identify a unique given CA (i.e., the issuer name and serial number identify a unique
certificate). CAs MUST force the serialNumber to be a non-negative certificate). CAs MUST force the serialNumber to be a non-negative
integer. integer.
Given the uniqueness requirements above serial numbers can be Given the uniqueness requirements above serial numbers can be
expected to contain long integers. Certificate users MUST be able to expected to contain long integers. Certificate users MUST be able to
handle serialNumber values up to 20 octets. Conformant CAs MUST NOT handle serialNumber values up to 20 octets. Conformant CAs MUST NOT
use serialNumber values longer than 20 octets. use serialNumber values longer than 20 octets.
Note: Non-conforming CAs may issue certificates with serial numbers Note: Non-conforming CAs MAY issue certificates with serial numbers
that are negative, or zero. Certificate users SHOULD be prepared to that are negative, or zero. Certificate users SHOULD be prepared to
handle such certificates. handle such certificates.
4.1.2.3 Signature 4.1.2.3 Signature
This field contains the algorithm identifier for the algorithm used This field contains the algorithm identifier for the algorithm used
by the CA to sign the certificate. by the CA to sign the certificate.
This field MUST contain the same algorithm identifier as the This field MUST contain the same algorithm identifier as the
signatureAlgorithm field in the sequence Certificate (see sec. signatureAlgorithm field in the sequence Certificate (section
4.1.1.2). The contents of the optional parameters field will vary 4.1.1.2). The contents of the optional parameters field will vary
according to the algorithm identified. [PKIX ALGS] lists the according to the algorithm identified. [PKIXALGS] lists the
supported signature algorithms. supported signature algorithms.
4.1.2.4 Issuer 4.1.2.4 Issuer
The issuer field identifies the entity who has signed and issued the The issuer field identifies the entity who has signed and issued the
certificate. The issuer field MUST contain a non-empty distinguished certificate. The issuer field MUST contain a non-empty distinguished
name (DN). The issuer field is defined as the X.501 type Name. name (DN). The issuer field is defined as the X.501 type Name
[X.501] Name is defined by the following ASN.1 structures: [X.501]. Name is defined by the following ASN.1 structures:
Name ::= CHOICE { Name ::= CHOICE {
RDNSequence } RDNSequence }
RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName
RelativeDistinguishedName ::= RelativeDistinguishedName ::=
SET OF AttributeTypeAndValue SET OF AttributeTypeAndValue
AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
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RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName
RelativeDistinguishedName ::= RelativeDistinguishedName ::=
SET OF AttributeTypeAndValue SET OF AttributeTypeAndValue
AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
type AttributeType, type AttributeType,
value AttributeValue } value AttributeValue }
AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
AttributeValue ::= ANY DEFINED BY AttributeType AttributeValue ::= ANY DEFINED BY AttributeType
DirectoryString ::= CHOICE { DirectoryString ::= CHOICE {
teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..MAX)), teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..MAX)),
printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..MAX)), printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..MAX)),
universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..MAX)), universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..MAX)),
utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1.. MAX)), utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..MAX)),
bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..MAX)) } bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..MAX)) }
The Name describes a hierarchical name composed of attributes, such The Name describes a hierarchical name composed of attributes, such
as country name, and corresponding values, such as US. The type of as country name, and corresponding values, such as US. The type of
the component AttributeValue is determined by the AttributeType; in the component AttributeValue is determined by the AttributeType; in
general it will be a DirectoryString. general it will be a DirectoryString.
The DirectoryString type is defined as a choice of PrintableString, The DirectoryString type is defined as a choice of PrintableString,
TeletexString, BMPString, UTF8String, and UniversalString. The TeletexString, BMPString, UTF8String, and UniversalString. The
UTF8String encoding is the preferred encoding, and all certificates UTF8String encoding is the preferred encoding, and all certificates
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orderly migration to UTF8String encoding. Such certificates would orderly migration to UTF8String encoding. Such certificates would
include the CA's UTF8String encoded name as issuer and and the old include the CA's UTF8String encoded name as issuer and and the old
name encoding as subject, or vice-versa. name encoding as subject, or vice-versa.
(b) As stated in section 4.1.2.6, the subject field MUST be (b) As stated in section 4.1.2.6, the subject field MUST be
populated with a non-empty distinguished name matching the populated with a non-empty distinguished name matching the
contents of the issuer field in all certificates issued by the contents of the issuer field in all certificates issued by the
subject CA regardless of encoding. subject CA regardless of encoding.
The TeletexString and UniversalString are included for backward The TeletexString and UniversalString are included for backward
compatibility, and should not be used for certificates for new compatibility, and SHOULD NOT be used for certificates for new
subjects. However, these types may be used in certificates where the subjects. However, these types MAY be used in certificates where the
name was previously established. Certificate users SHOULD be name was previously established. Certificate users SHOULD be
prepared to receive certificates with these types. prepared to receive certificates with these types.
In addition, many legacy implementations support names encoded in the In addition, many legacy implementations support names encoded in the
ISO 8859-1 character set (Latin1String) but tag them as ISO 8859-1 character set (Latin1String) but tag them as
TeletexString. The Latin1String includes characters used in Western TeletexString. The Latin1String includes characters used in Western
European countries which are not part of the TeletexString charcter European countries which are not part of the TeletexString charcter
set. Implementations that process TeletexString SHOULD be prepared set. Implementations that process TeletexString SHOULD be prepared
to handle the entire ISO 8859-1 character set.[ISO 8859-1] to handle the entire ISO 8859-1 character set.[ISO 8859-1]
As noted above, distinguished names are composed of attributes. This As noted above, distinguished names are composed of attributes. This
specification does not restrict the set of attribute types that may specification does not restrict the set of attribute types that may
appear in names. However, conforming implementations MUST be appear in names. However, conforming implementations MUST be
prepared to receive certificates with issuer names containing the set prepared to receive certificates with issuer names containing the set
of attribute types defined below. This specification also recommends of attribute types defined below. This specification RECOMMENDS
support for additional attribute types. support for additional attribute types.
Standard sets of attributes have been defined in the X.500 series of Standard sets of attributes have been defined in the X.500 series of
specifications.[X.520] Implementations of this specification MUST be specifications.[X.520] Implementations of this specification MUST be
prepared to receive the following standard attribute types in issuer prepared to receive the following standard attribute types in issuer
and subject (see 4.1.2.6) names: and subject (section 4.1.2.6) names:
* country, * country,
* organization, * organization,
* organizational-unit, * organizational-unit,
* distinguished name qualifier, * distinguished name qualifier,
* state or province name, * state or province name,
* common name (e.g., "Susan Housley"), and * common name (e.g., "Susan Housley"), and
* serial number. * serial number.
In addition, implementations of this specification SHOULD be prepared In addition, implementations of this specification SHOULD be prepared
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* locality, * locality,
* title, * title,
* surname, * surname,
* given name, * given name,
* initials, * initials,
* pseudonym, and * pseudonym, and
* generation qualifier (e.g., "Jr.", "3rd", or "IV"). * generation qualifier (e.g., "Jr.", "3rd", or "IV").
The syntax and associated object identifiers (OIDs) for these The syntax and associated object identifiers (OIDs) for these
attribute types are provided in the ASN.1 modules in Appendices A and attribute types are provided in the ASN.1 modules in Appendix A.
B.
In addition, implementations of this specification MUST be prepared In addition, implementations of this specification MUST be prepared
to receive the domainComponent attribute, as defined in [RFC 2247]. to receive the domainComponent attribute, as defined in [RFC 2247].
The Domain (Nameserver) System (DNS) provides a hierarchical resource The Domain (Nameserver) System (DNS) provides a hierarchical resource
labeling system. This attribute provides is a convenient mechanism labeling system. This attribute provides is a convenient mechanism
for organizations that wish to use DNs that parallel their DNS names. for organizations that wish to use DNs that parallel their DNS names.
This is not a replacement for the dNSName component of the This is not a replacement for the dNSName component of the
alternative name field. Implementations are not required to convert alternative name field. Implementations are not required to convert
such names into DNS names. The syntax and associated OID for this such names into DNS names. The syntax and associated OID for this
attribute type is provided in the ASN.1 modules in Appendices A and attribute type is provided in the ASN.1 modules in Appendix A.
B.
Certificate users MUST be prepared to process the issuer Certificate users MUST be prepared to process the issuer
distinguished name and subject distinguished name (see sec. 4.1.2.6) distinguished name and subject distinguished name (section 4.1.2.6)
fields to perform name chaining for certification path validation fields to perform name chaining for certification path validation
(see section 6). Name chaining is performed by matching the issuer (section 6). Name chaining is performed by matching the issuer
distinguished name in one certificate with the subject name in a CA distinguished name in one certificate with the subject name in a CA
certificate. certificate.
This specification requires only a subset of the name comparison This specification requires only a subset of the name comparison
functionality specified in the X.500 series of specifications. The functionality specified in the X.500 series of specifications. The
requirements for conforming implementations are as follows: requirements for conforming implementations are as follows:
(a) attribute values encoded in different types (e.g., (a) attribute values encoded in different types (e.g.,
PrintableString and BMPString) may be assumed to represent PrintableString and BMPString) MAY be assumed to represent
different strings; different strings;
(b) attribute values in types other than PrintableString are case (b) attribute values in types other than PrintableString are case
sensitive (this permits matching of attribute values as binary sensitive (this permits matching of attribute values as binary
objects); objects);
(c) attribute values in PrintableString are not case sensitive (c) attribute values in PrintableString are not case sensitive
(e.g., "Marianne Swanson" is the same as "MARIANNE SWANSON"); and (e.g., "Marianne Swanson" is the same as "MARIANNE SWANSON"); and
(d) attribute values in PrintableString are compared after (d) attribute values in PrintableString are compared after
removing leading and trailing white space and converting internal removing leading and trailing white space and converting internal
substrings of one or more consecutive white space characters to a substrings of one or more consecutive white space characters to a
single space. single space.
These name comparison rules permit a certificate user to validate These name comparison rules permit a certificate user to validate
certificates issued using languages or encodings unfamiliar to the certificates issued using languages or encodings unfamiliar to the
certificate user. certificate user.
In addition, implementations of this specification MAY use these In addition, implementations of this specification MAY use these
comparison rules to process unfamiliar attribute types for name comparison rules to process unfamiliar attribute types for name
chaining. This allows implementations to process certificates with chaining. This allows implementations to process certificates with
unfamiliar attributes in the issuer name. unfamiliar attributes in the issuer name.
Note that the comparison rules defined in the X.500 series of Note that the comparison rules defined in the X.500 series of
specifications indicate that the character sets used to encode data specifications indicate that the character sets used to encode data
in distinguished names are irrelevant. The characters themselves are in distinguished names are irrelevant. The characters themselves are
compared without regard to encoding. Implementations of the profile compared without regard to encoding. Implementations of the profile
are permitted to use the comparison algorithm defined in the X.500 are permitted to use the comparison algorithm defined in the X.500
series. Such an implementation will recognize a superset of name series. Such an implementation will recognize a superset of name
matches recognized by the algorithm specified above. matches recognized by the algorithm specified above.
4.1.2.5 Validity 4.1.2.5 Validity
The certificate validity period is the time interval during which the The certificate validity period is the time interval during which the
CA warrants that it will maintain information about the status of the CA warrants that it will maintain information about the status of the
certificate. The field is represented as a SEQUENCE of two dates: the certificate. The field is represented as a SEQUENCE of two dates:
date on which the certificate validity period begins (notBefore) and the date on which the certificate validity period begins (notBefore)
the date on which the certificate validity period ends (notAfter). and the date on which the certificate validity period ends
Both notBefore and notAfter may be encoded as UTCTime or (notAfter). Both notBefore and notAfter may be encoded as UTCTime or
GeneralizedTime. GeneralizedTime.
CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate
validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity
dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime. dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime.
The validity period for a certificate is the period of time from The validity period for a certificate is the period of time from
notBefore through notAfter, inclusive. notBefore through notAfter, inclusive.
4.1.2.5.1 UTCTime 4.1.2.5.1 UTCTime
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differential between local and Greenwich Mean Time. differential between local and Greenwich Mean Time.
For the purposes of this profile, GeneralizedTime values MUST be For the purposes of this profile, GeneralizedTime values MUST be
expressed Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu) and MUST include seconds (i.e., expressed Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu) and MUST include seconds (i.e.,
times are YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ), even where the number of seconds is zero. times are YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ), even where the number of seconds is zero.
GeneralizedTime values MUST NOT include fractional seconds. GeneralizedTime values MUST NOT include fractional seconds.
4.1.2.6 Subject 4.1.2.6 Subject
The subject field identifies the entity associated with the public The subject field identifies the entity associated with the public
key stored in the subject public key field. The subject name may be key stored in the subject public key field. The subject name MAY be
carried in the subject field and/or the subjectAltName extension. If carried in the subject field and/or the subjectAltName extension. If
the subject is a CA (e.g., the basic constraints extension, as the subject is a CA (e.g., the basic constraints extension, as
discussed in 4.2.1.10, is present and the value of cA is TRUE,) then discussed in 4.2.1.10, is present and the value of cA is TRUE,) then
the subject field MUST be populated with a non-empty distinguished the subject field MUST be populated with a non-empty distinguished
name matching the contents of the issuer field (see sec. 4.1.2.4) in name matching the contents of the issuer field (section 4.1.2.4) in
all certificates issued by the subject CA. If subject naming all certificates issued by the subject CA. If subject naming
information is present only in the subjectAltName extension (e.g., a information is present only in the subjectAltName extension (e.g., a
key bound only to an email address or URI), then the subject name key bound only to an email address or URI), then the subject name
MUST be an empty sequence and the subjectAltName extension MUST be MUST be an empty sequence and the subjectAltName extension MUST be
critical. critical.
Where it is non-empty, the subject field MUST contain an X.500 Where it is non-empty, the subject field MUST contain an X.500
distinguished name (DN). The DN MUST be unique for each subject distinguished name (DN). The DN MUST be unique for each subject
entity certified by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field. A entity certified by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field.
CA may issue more than one certificate with the same DN to the same A CA MAY issue more than one certificate with the same DN to the same
subject entity. subject entity.
The subject name field is defined as the X.501 type Name. The subject name field is defined as the X.501 type Name.
Implementation requirements for this field are those defined for the Implementation requirements for this field are those defined for the
issuer field (see sec. 4.1.2.4). When encoding attribute values of issuer field (section 4.1.2.4). When encoding attribute values of
type DirectoryString, the encoding rules for the issuer field MUST be type DirectoryString, the encoding rules for the issuer field MUST be
implemented. Implementations of this specification MUST be prepared implemented. Implementations of this specification MUST be prepared
to receive subject names containing the attribute types required for to receive subject names containing the attribute types required for
the issuer field. Implementations of this specification SHOULD be the issuer field. Implementations of this specification SHOULD be
prepared to receive subject names containing the recommended prepared to receive subject names containing the recommended
attribute types for the issuer field. The syntax and associated attribute types for the issuer field. The syntax and associated
object identifiers (OIDs) for these attribute types are provided in object identifiers (OIDs) for these attribute types are provided in
the ASN.1 modules in Appendices A and B. Implementations of this the ASN.1 modules in Appendix A. Implementations of this
specification MAY use these comparison rules to process unfamiliar specification MAY use these comparison rules to process unfamiliar
attribute types (i.e., for name chaining). This allows attribute types (i.e., for name chaining). This allows
implementations to process certificates with unfamiliar attributes in implementations to process certificates with unfamiliar attributes in
the subject name. the subject name.
In addition, legacy implementations exist where an RFC 822 name is In addition, legacy implementations exist where an RFC 822 name is
embedded in the subject distinguished name as an EmailAddress embedded in the subject distinguished name as an EmailAddress
attribute. The attribute value for EmailAddress is of type IA5String attribute. The attribute value for EmailAddress is of type IA5String
to permit inclusion of the character '@', which is not part of the to permit inclusion of the character '@', which is not part of the
PrintableString character set. EmailAddress attribute values are not PrintableString character set. EmailAddress attribute values are not
case sensitive (e.g., "fanfeedback@redsox.com" is the same as case sensitive (e.g., "fanfeedback@redsox.com" is the same as
"FANFEEDBACK@REDSOX.COM"). "FANFEEDBACK@REDSOX.COM").
Conforming implementations generating new certificates with Conforming implementations generating new certificates with
electronic mail addresses MUST use the rfc822Name in the subject electronic mail addresses MUST use the rfc822Name in the subject
alternative name field (see sec. 4.2.1.7) to describe such alternative name field (section 4.2.1.7) to describe such identities.
identities. Simultaneous inclusion of the EmailAddress attribute in Simultaneous inclusion of the EmailAddress attribute in the subject
the subject distinguished name to support legacy implementations is distinguished name to support legacy implementations is deprecated
deprecated but permitted. but permitted.
4.1.2.7 Subject Public Key Info 4.1.2.7 Subject Public Key Info
This field is used to carry the public key and identify the algorithm This field is used to carry the public key and identify the algorithm
with which the key is used. The algorithm is identified using the with which the key is used. The algorithm is identified using the
AlgorithmIdentifier structure specified in section 4.1.1.2. The AlgorithmIdentifier structure specified in section 4.1.1.2. The
object identifiers for the supported algorithms and the methods for object identifiers for the supported algorithms and the methods for
encoding the public key materials (public key and parameters) are encoding the public key materials (public key and parameters) are
specified in [PKIX ALGS]. specified in [PKIXALGS].
4.1.2.8 Unique Identifiers 4.1.2.8 Unique Identifiers
These fields may only appear if the version is 2 or 3 (see sec. These fields MUST only appear if the version is 2 or 3 (section
4.1.2.1). These fields MUST NOT appear if the version is 1. The 4.1.2.1). These fields MUST NOT appear if the version is 1. The
subject and issuer unique identifiers are present in the certificate subject and issuer unique identifiers are present in the certificate
to handle the possibility of reuse of subject and/or issuer names to handle the possibility of reuse of subject and/or issuer names
over time. This profile RECOMMENDS that names not be reused for over time. This profile RECOMMENDS that names not be reused for
different entities and that Internet certificates not make use of different entities and that Internet certificates not make use of
unique identifiers. CAs conforming to this profile SHOULD NOT unique identifiers. CAs conforming to this profile SHOULD NOT
generate certificates with unique identifiers. Applications generate certificates with unique identifiers. Applications
conforming to this profile SHOULD be capable of parsing unique conforming to this profile SHOULD be capable of parsing unique
identifiers and making comparisons. identifiers and making comparisons.
4.1.2.9 Extensions 4.1.2.9 Extensions
This field may only appear if the version is 3 (see sec. 4.1.2.1). This field MUST only appear if the version is 3 (section 4.1.2.1).
If present, this field is a SEQUENCE of one or more certificate If present, this field is a SEQUENCE of one or more certificate
extensions. The format and content of certificate extensions in the extensions. The format and content of certificate extensions in the
Internet PKI is defined in section 4.2. Internet PKI is defined in section 4.2.
4.2 Standard Certificate Extensions 4.2 Standard Certificate Extensions
The extensions defined for X.509 v3 certificates provide methods for The extensions defined for X.509 v3 certificates provide methods for
associating additional attributes with users or public keys and for associating additional attributes with users or public keys and for
managing the certification hierarchy. The X.509 v3 certificate managing the certification hierarchy. The X.509 v3 certificate
format also allows communities to define private extensions to carry format also allows communities to define private extensions to carry
information unique to those communities. Each extension in a information unique to those communities. Each extension in a
certificate may be designated as critical or non-critical. A certificate is designated as either critical or non-critical. A
certificate using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters certificate using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters
a critical extension it does not recognize; however, a non-critical a critical extension it does not recognize; however, a non-critical
extension may be ignored if it is not recognized. The following extension MAY be ignored if it is not recognized. The following
sections present recommended extensions used within Internet sections present recommended extensions used within Internet
certificates and standard locations for information. Communities may certificates and standard locations for information. Communities MAY
elect to use additional extensions; however, caution should be elect to use additional extensions; however, caution SHOULD be
exercised in adopting any critical extensions in certificates which exercised in adopting any critical extensions in certificates which
might prevent use in a general context. might prevent use in a general context.
Each extension includes an OID and an ASN.1 structure. When an Each extension includes an OID and an ASN.1 structure. When an
extension appears in a certificate, the OID appears as the field extension appears in a certificate, the OID appears as the field
extnID and the corresponding ASN.1 encoded structure is the value of extnID and the corresponding ASN.1 encoded structure is the value of
the octet string extnValue. Only one instance of a particular the octet string extnValue. Only one instance of a particular
extension may appear in a particular certificate. For example, a extension MUST appear in a particular certificate. For example, a
certificate may contain only one authority key identifier extension certificate may contain only one authority key identifier extension
(see sec. 4.2.1.1). An extension includes the boolean critical, with (section 4.2.1.1). An extension includes the boolean critical, with
a default value of FALSE. The text for each extension specifies the a default value of FALSE. The text for each extension specifies the
acceptable values for the critical field. acceptable values for the critical field.
Conforming CAs MUST support key identifiers (see sec. 4.2.1.1 and Conforming CAs MUST support key identifiers (sections 4.2.1.1 and
4.2.1.2), basic constraints (see sec. 4.2.1.10), key usage (see sec. 4.2.1.2), basic constraints (section 4.2.1.10), key usage (section
4.2.1.3), and certificate policies (see sec. 4.2.1.5) extensions. If 4.2.1.3), and certificate policies (section 4.2.1.5) extensions. If
the CA issues certificates with an empty sequence for the subject the CA issues certificates with an empty sequence for the subject
field, the CA MUST support the subject alternative name extension field, the CA MUST support the subject alternative name extension
(see sec. 4.2.1.7). Support for the remaining extensions is (section 4.2.1.7). Support for the remaining extensions is OPTIONAL.
OPTIONAL. Conforming CAs may support extensions that are not Conforming CAs MAY support extensions that are not identified within
identified within this specification; certificate issuers are this specification; certificate issuers are cautioned that marking
cautioned that marking such extensions as critical may inhibit such extensions as critical may inhibit interoperability.
interoperability.
At a minimum, applications conforming to this profile MUST recognize At a minimum, applications conforming to this profile MUST recognize
the following extensions: key usage (see sec. 4.2.1.3), certificate the following extensions: key usage (section 4.2.1.3), certificate
policies (see sec. 4.2.1.5), the subject alternative name (see sec. policies (section 4.2.1.5), the subject alternative name (section
4.2.1.7), basic constraints (see sec. 4.2.1.10), name constraints 4.2.1.7), basic constraints (section 4.2.1.10), name constraints
(see sec. 4.2.1.11), policy constraints (see sec. 4.2.1.12), extended (section 4.2.1.11), policy constraints (section 4.2.1.12), extended
key usage (see sec. 4.2.1.13), and inhibit any-policy (see sec. key usage (section 4.2.1.13), and inhibit any-policy (section
4.2.1.15). 4.2.1.15).
In addition, this profile RECOMMENDS application support for the In addition, applications conforming to this profile SHOULD recognize
authority and subject key identifier (see sec. 4.2.1.1 and 4.2.1.2), the authority and subject key identifier (sections 4.2.1.1 and
and policy mapping (see sec. 4.2.1.6) extensions. 4.2.1.2), and policy mapping (section 4.2.1.6) extensions.
4.2.1 Standard Extensions 4.2.1 Standard Extensions
This section identifies standard certificate extensions defined in This section identifies standard certificate extensions defined in
[X.509] for use in the Internet PKI. Each extension is associated [X.509] for use in the Internet PKI. Each extension is associated
with an OID defined in [X.509]. These OIDs are members of the id-ce with an OID defined in [X.509]. These OIDs are members of the id-ce
arc, which is defined by the following: arc, which is defined by the following:
id-ce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 29} id-ce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 29}
4.2.1.1 Authority Key Identifier 4.2.1.1 Authority Key Identifier
The authority key identifier extension provides a means of The authority key identifier extension provides a means of
identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to
sign a certificate. This extension is used where an issuer has sign a certificate. This extension is used where an issuer has
multiple signing keys (either due to multiple concurrent key pairs or multiple signing keys (either due to multiple concurrent key pairs or
due to changeover). The identification may be based on either the due to changeover). The identification MAY be based on either the
key identifier (the subject key identifier in the issuer's key identifier (the subject key identifier in the issuer's
certificate) or on the issuer name and serial number. certificate) or on the issuer name and serial number.
The keyIdentifier field of the authorityKeyIdentifier extension MUST The keyIdentifier field of the authorityKeyIdentifier extension MUST
be included in all certificates generated by conforming CAs to be included in all certificates generated by conforming CAs to
facilitate chain building. There is one exception; where a CA facilitate chain building. There is one exception; where a CA
distributes its public key in the form of a "self-signed" distributes its public key in the form of a "self-signed"
certificate, the authority key identifier may be omitted. In this certificate, the authority key identifier MAY be omitted. In this
case, the subject and authority key identifiers would be identical. case, the subject and authority key identifiers would be identical.
The value of the keyIdentifier field SHOULD be derived from the The value of the keyIdentifier field SHOULD be derived from the
public key used to verify the certificate's signature or a method public key used to verify the certificate's signature or a method
that generates unique values. Two common methods for generating key that generates unique values. Two common methods for generating key
identifiers from the public key are described in (sec. 4.2.1.2). One identifiers from the public key are described in (sec. 4.2.1.2). One
common method for generating unique values is described in (sec. common method for generating unique values is described in (sec.
4.2.1.2). Where a key identifier has not been previously 4.2.1.2). Where a key identifier has not been previously
established, this specification recommends use of one of these established, this specification recommends use of one of these
methods for generating keyIdentifiers. methods for generating keyIdentifiers.
skipping to change at page 27, line 50 skipping to change at page 27, line 50
authorityCertIssuer [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL, authorityCertIssuer [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
authorityCertSerialNumber [2] CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL } authorityCertSerialNumber [2] CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL }
KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING
4.2.1.2 Subject Key Identifier 4.2.1.2 Subject Key Identifier
The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying
certificates that contain a particular public key. certificates that contain a particular public key.
To facilitate chain building, this extension MUST appear in all con- To facilitate chain building, this extension MUST appear in all
forming CA certificates, that is, all certificates including the conforming CA certificates, that is, all certificates including the
basic constraints extension (see sec. 4.2.1.10) where the value of cA basic constraints extension (section 4.2.1.10) where the value of cA
is TRUE. The value of the subject key identifier MUST be the value is TRUE. The value of the subject key identifier MUST be the value
placed in the key identifier field of the Authority Key Identifier placed in the key identifier field of the Authority Key Identifier
extension (see sec. 4.2.1.1) of certificates issued by the subject of extension (section 4.2.1.1) of certificates issued by the subject of
this certificate. this certificate.
For CA certificates, subject key identifiers SHOULD be derived from For CA certificates, subject key identifiers SHOULD be derived from
the public key or a method that generates unique values. The key the public key or a method that generates unique values. The key
identifier is an explicit value placed in the certificate by the identifier is an explicit value placed in the certificate by the
issuer, not a value generated by a certificate user. Two common issuer, not a value generated by a certificate user. Two common
methods for generating key identifiers from the public key are: methods for generating key identifiers from the public key are:
(1) The keyIdentifier is composed of the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the (1) The keyIdentifier is composed of the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the
value of the BIT STRING subjectPublicKey (excluding the tag, value of the BIT STRING subjectPublicKey (excluding the tag,
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(2) The keyIdentifier is composed of a four bit type field with (2) The keyIdentifier is composed of a four bit type field with
the value 0100 followed by the least significant 60 bits of the the value 0100 followed by the least significant 60 bits of the
SHA-1 hash of the value of the BIT STRING subjectPublicKey. SHA-1 hash of the value of the BIT STRING subjectPublicKey.
One common method for generating unique values is a monotonically One common method for generating unique values is a monotonically
increasing sequence of integers. increasing sequence of integers.
For end entity certificates, the subject key identifier extension For end entity certificates, the subject key identifier extension
provides a means for identifying certificates containing the provides a means for identifying certificates containing the
particular public key used in an application. Where an end entity has particular public key used in an application. Where an end entity
obtained multiple certificates, especially from multiple CAs, the has obtained multiple certificates, especially from multiple CAs, the
subject key identifier provides a means to quickly identify the set subject key identifier provides a means to quickly identify the set
of certificates containing a particular public key. To assist of certificates containing a particular public key. To assist
applications in identifying the appropriate end entity certificate, applications in identifying the appropriate end entity certificate,
this extension SHOULD be included in all end entity certificates. this extension SHOULD be included in all end entity certificates.
For end entity certificates, subject key identifiers SHOULD be For end entity certificates, subject key identifiers SHOULD be
derived from the public key. Two common methods for generating key derived from the public key. Two common methods for generating key
identifiers from the public key are identifed above. identifiers from the public key are identified above.
Where a key identifier has not been previously established, this Where a key identifier has not been previously established, this
specification recommends use of one of these methods for generating specification recommends use of one of these methods for generating
keyIdentifiers. keyIdentifiers.
This extension MUST NOT be marked critical. This extension MUST NOT be marked critical.
id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 14 } id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 14 }
SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= KeyIdentifier SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= KeyIdentifier
4.2.1.3 Key Usage 4.2.1.3 Key Usage
The key usage extension defines the purpose (e.g., encipherment, The key usage extension defines the purpose (e.g., encipherment,
signature, certificate signing) of the key contained in the signature, certificate signing) of the key contained in the
certificate. The usage restriction might be employed when a key that certificate. The usage restriction might be employed when a key that
could be used for more than one operation is to be restricted. For could be used for more than one operation is to be restricted. For
example, when an RSA key should be used only for signing, the example, when an RSA key should be used only to verify signatures on
objects other than public key certificates and CRLs, the
digitalSignature and/or nonRepudiation bits would be asserted. digitalSignature and/or nonRepudiation bits would be asserted.
Likewise, when an RSA key should be used only for key management, the Likewise, when an RSA key should be used only for key management, the
keyEncipherment bit would be asserted. When used, this extension keyEncipherment bit would be asserted.
SHOULD be marked critical.
This extension MUST appear in certificates that contain public keys
that are used to validate digital signatures on other public key
certificates or CRLs. When this extension appears, it SHOULD be
marked critical.
id-ce-keyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 15 } id-ce-keyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 15 }
KeyUsage ::= BIT STRING { KeyUsage ::= BIT STRING {
digitalSignature (0), digitalSignature (0),
nonRepudiation (1), nonRepudiation (1),
keyEncipherment (2), keyEncipherment (2),
dataEncipherment (3), dataEncipherment (3),
keyAgreement (4), keyAgreement (4),
keyCertSign (5), keyCertSign (5),
cRLSign (6), cRLSign (6),
encipherOnly (7), encipherOnly (7),
decipherOnly (8) } decipherOnly (8) }
Bits in the KeyUsage type are used as follows: Bits in the KeyUsage type are used as follows:
The digitalSignature bit is asserted when the subject public key The digitalSignature bit is asserted when the subject public key
is used with a digital signature mechanism to support security is used with a digital signature mechanism to support security
services other than non-repudiation (bit 1), certificate signing services other than non-repudiation (bit 1), certificate signing
(bit 5), or revocation information signing (bit 6). Digital (bit 5), or CRL signing (bit 6). Digital signature mechanisms are
signature mechanisms are often used for entity authentication and often used for entity authentication and data origin
data origin authentication with integrity. authentication with integrity.
The nonRepudiation bit is asserted when the subject public key is The nonRepudiation bit is asserted when the subject public key is
used to verify digital signatures used to provide a non- used to verify digital signatures used to provide a non-
repudiation service which protects against the signing entity repudiation service which protects against the signing entity
falsely denying some action, excluding certificate or CRL signing. falsely denying some action, excluding certificate or CRL signing.
In the case of later conflict, a reliable third party may In the case of later conflict, a reliable third party may
determine the authenticity of the signed data. determine the authenticity of the signed data.
Further distinctions between the digitalSignature and Further distinctions between the digitalSignature and
nonRepudiation bits may be provided in specific certificate nonRepudiation bits may be provided in specific certificate
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used for key management, then this bit is set. used for key management, then this bit is set.
The dataEncipherment bit is asserted when the subject public key The dataEncipherment bit is asserted when the subject public key
is used for enciphering user data, other than cryptographic keys. is used for enciphering user data, other than cryptographic keys.
The keyAgreement bit is asserted when the subject public key is The keyAgreement bit is asserted when the subject public key is
used for key agreement. For example, when a Diffie-Hellman key is used for key agreement. For example, when a Diffie-Hellman key is
to be used for key management, then this bit is set. to be used for key management, then this bit is set.
The keyCertSign bit is asserted when the subject public key is The keyCertSign bit is asserted when the subject public key is
used for verifying a signature on certificates. This bit may only used for verifying a signature on public key certificates. If the
be asserted in CA certificates. If the keyCertSign bit is keyCertSign bit is asserted, then the cA bit in the basic
asserted, then the cA bit in the basic constraints extension (see constraints extension (section 4.2.1.10) MUST also be asserted.
4.2.1.10) MUST also be asserted. If neither the cRLSign bit nor
the keyCertSign bit are asserted, then the cA bit in the basic
constraints extension MUST NOT be asserted.
The cRLSign bit is asserted when the subject public key is used The cRLSign bit is asserted when the subject public key is used
for verifying a signature on revocation information (e.g., a CRL). for verifying a signature on certificate revocation list (e.g., a
This bit may only be asserted in CA certificates. If the cRLSign CRL, delta CRL, or an ARL). This bit MUST be asserted in
bit is asserted, then the cA bit in the basic constraints certificates that are used to verify signatures on CRLs.
extension (see 4.2.1.10) MUST also be asserted. If neither the
cRLSign bit nor the keyCertSign bit are asserted, then the cA bit
in the basic constraints extension MUST NOT be asserted.
The meaning of the encipherOnly bit is undefined in the absence of The meaning of the encipherOnly bit is undefined in the absence of
the keyAgreement bit. When the encipherOnly bit is asserted and the keyAgreement bit. When the encipherOnly bit is asserted and
the keyAgreement bit is also set, the subject public key may be the keyAgreement bit is also set, the subject public key may be
used only for enciphering data while performing key agreement. used only for enciphering data while performing key agreement.
The meaning of the decipherOnly bit is undefined in the absence of The meaning of the decipherOnly bit is undefined in the absence of
the keyAgreement bit. When the decipherOnly bit is asserted and the keyAgreement bit. When the decipherOnly bit is asserted and
the keyAgreement bit is also set, the subject public key may be the keyAgreement bit is also set, the subject public key may be
used only for deciphering data while performing key agreement. used only for deciphering data while performing key agreement.
This profile does not restrict the combinations of bits that may be This profile does not restrict the combinations of bits that may be
set in An instantiation of the keyUsage extension. However, set in an instantiation of the keyUsage extension. However,
appropriate values for keyUsage extensions for particular algorithms appropriate values for keyUsage extensions for particular algorithms
are specified in [PKIX ALGS]. are specified in [PKIXALGS].
4.2.1.4 Private Key Usage Period 4.2.1.4 Private Key Usage Period
This profile RECOMMENDS against the use of this extension. CAs This profile RECOMMENDS against the use of this extension. CAs
conforming to this profile MUST NOT generate certificates with conforming to this profile MUST NOT generate certificates with
critical private key usage period extensions. critical private key usage period extensions.
The private key usage period extension allows the certificate issuer The private key usage period extension allows the certificate issuer
to specify a different validity period for the private key than the to specify a different validity period for the private key than the
certificate. This extension is intended for use with digital certificate. This extension is intended for use with digital
signature keys. This extension consists of two optional components, signature keys. This extension consists of two optional components,
notBefore and notAfter. The private key associated with the notBefore and notAfter. The private key associated with the
certificate should not be used to sign objects before or after the certificate SHOULD NOT be used to sign objects before or after the
times specified by the two components, respectively. CAs conforming times specified by the two components, respectively. CAs conforming
to this profile MUST NOT generate certificates with private key usage to this profile MUST NOT generate certificates with private key usage
period extensions unless at least one of the two components is period extensions unless at least one of the two components is
present. present.
Where used, notBefore and notAfter are represented as GeneralizedTime Where used, notBefore and notAfter are represented as GeneralizedTime
and MUST be specified and interpreted as defined in section and MUST be specified and interpreted as defined in section
4.1.2.5.2. 4.1.2.5.2.
id-ce-privateKeyUsagePeriod OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 16 } id-ce-privateKeyUsagePeriod OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 16 }
PrivateKeyUsagePeriod ::= SEQUENCE { PrivateKeyUsagePeriod ::= SEQUENCE {
notBefore [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, notBefore [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
notAfter [1] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL } notAfter [1] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }
4.2.1.5 Certificate Policies 4.2.1.5 Certificate Policies
The certificate policies extension contains a sequence of one or more The certificate policies extension contains a sequence of one or more
policy information terms, each of which consists of an object policy information terms, each of which consists of an object
identifier (OID) and optional qualifiers. Optional qualifiers, which identifier (OID) and optional qualifiers. Optional qualifiers, which
may be present, are not expected to change the definition of the MAY be present, are not expected to change the definition of the
policy. policy.
In an end-entity certificate, these policy information terms indicate In an end entity certificate, these policy information terms indicate
the policy under which the certificate has been issued and the the policy under which the certificate has been issued and the
purposes for which the certificate may be used. In a CA certificate, purposes for which the certificate may be used. In a CA certificate,
these policy information terms limit the set of policies for these policy information terms limit the set of policies for
certification paths which include this certificate. When a CA does certification paths which include this certificate. When a CA does
not wish to limit the set of policies for certification paths which not wish to limit the set of policies for certification paths which
include this certificate, they may assert the special policy include this certificate, they MAY assert the special policy
anyPolicy, with a value of {2 5 29 32 0}. anyPolicy, with a value of { 2 5 29 32 0 }.
Applications with specific policy requirements are expected to have a Applications with specific policy requirements are expected to have a
list of those policies which they will accept and to compare the list of those policies which they will accept and to compare the
policy OIDs in the certificate to that list. If this extension is policy OIDs in the certificate to that list. If this extension is
critical, the path validation software MUST be able to interpret this critical, the path validation software MUST be able to interpret this
extension (including the optional qualifier), or MUST reject the extension (including the optional qualifier), or MUST reject the
certificate. certificate.
To promote interoperability, this profile RECOMMENDS that policy To promote interoperability, this profile RECOMMENDS that policy
information terms consist of only an OID. Where an OID alone is information terms consist of only an OID. Where an OID alone is
insufficient, this profile strongly recommends that use of qualifiers insufficient, this profile strongly recommends that use of qualifiers
be limited to those identified in this section. When qualifiers are be limited to those identified in this section. When qualifiers are
used with the special policy anyPolicy, they MUST be limited to the used with the special policy anyPolicy, they MUST be limited to the
qualifers identified in this section. qualifiers identified in this section.
This specification defines two policy qualifier types for use by This specification defines two policy qualifier types for use by
certificate policy writers and certificate issuers. The qualifier certificate policy writers and certificate issuers. The qualifier
types are the CPS Pointer and User Notice qualifiers. types are the CPS Pointer and User Notice qualifiers.
The CPS Pointer qualifier contains a pointer to a Certification The CPS Pointer qualifier contains a pointer to a Certification
Practice Statement (CPS) published by the CA. The pointer is in the Practice Statement (CPS) published by the CA. The pointer is in the
form of a URI. Processing requirements for this qualifier are a form of a URI. Processing requirements for this qualifier are a
local matter. No action is mandated by this specification regardless local matter. No action is mandated by this specification regardless
of the criticality value asserted for the extension. of the criticality value asserted for the extension.
User notice is intended for display to a relying party when a User notice is intended for display to a relying party when a
certificate is used. The application software SHOULD display all certificate is used. The application software SHOULD display all
user notices in all certificates of the certification path used, user notices in all certificates of the certification path used,
except that if a notice is duplicated only one copy need be except that if a notice is duplicated only one copy need be
displayed. To prevent such duplication, this qualifier SHOULD only displayed. To prevent such duplication, this qualifier SHOULD only
be present in end-entity certificates and CA certificates issued to be present in end entity certificates and CA certificates issued to
other organizations. other organizations.
The user notice has two optional fields: the noticeRef field and the The user notice has two optional fields: the noticeRef field and the
explicitText field. explicitText field.
The noticeRef field, if used, names an organization and The noticeRef field, if used, names an organization and
identifies, by number, a particular textual statement prepared by identifies, by number, a particular textual statement prepared by
that organization. For example, it might identify the that organization. For example, it might identify the
organization "CertsRUs" and notice number 1. In a typical organization "CertsRUs" and notice number 1. In a typical
implementation, the application software will have a notice file implementation, the application software will have a notice file
containing the current set of notices for CertsRUs; the containing the current set of notices for CertsRUs; the
application will extract the notice text from the file and display application will extract the notice text from the file and display
it. Messages may be multilingual, allowing the software to select it. Messages MAY be multilingual, allowing the software to select
the particular language message for its own environment. the particular language message for its own environment.
An explicitText field includes the textual statement directly in An explicitText field includes the textual statement directly in
the certificate. The explicitText field is a string with a the certificate. The explicitText field is a string with a
maximum size of 200 characters. maximum size of 200 characters.
If both the noticeRef and explicitText options are included in the If both the noticeRef and explicitText options are included in the
one qualifier and if the application software can locate the notice one qualifier and if the application software can locate the notice
text indicated by the noticeRef option then that text should be text indicated by the noticeRef option then that text SHOULD be
displayed; otherwise, the explicitText string should be displayed. displayed; otherwise, the explicitText string SHOULD be displayed.
id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 } id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 }
anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce-certificate-policies 0} anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-certificate-policies 0 }
certificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation certificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation
PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE { PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
policyIdentifier CertPolicyId, policyIdentifier CertPolicyId,
policyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF policyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL } PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL }
CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
PolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE { PolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
policyQualifierId PolicyQualifierId, policyQualifierId PolicyQualifierId,
qualifier ANY DEFINED BY policyQualifierId } qualifier ANY DEFINED BY policyQualifierId }
skipping to change at page 34, line 5 skipping to change at page 33, line 50
utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..200)) } utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..200)) }
4.2.1.6 Policy Mappings 4.2.1.6 Policy Mappings
This extension is used in CA certificates. It lists one or more This extension is used in CA certificates. It lists one or more
pairs of OIDs; each pair includes an issuerDomainPolicy and a pairs of OIDs; each pair includes an issuerDomainPolicy and a
subjectDomainPolicy. The pairing indicates the issuing CA considers subjectDomainPolicy. The pairing indicates the issuing CA considers
its issuerDomainPolicy equivalent to the subject CA's its issuerDomainPolicy equivalent to the subject CA's
subjectDomainPolicy. subjectDomainPolicy.
The issuing CA's users may accept an issuerDomainPolicy for certain The issuing CA's users MAY accept an issuerDomainPolicy for certain
applications. The policy mapping tells the issuing CA's users which applications. The policy mapping tells the issuing CA's users which
policies associated with the subject CA are comparable to the policy policies associated with the subject CA are comparable to the policy
they accept. they accept.
Each issuerDomainPolicy named in the the policy mapping extension Each issuerDomainPolicy named in the policy mapping extension SHOULD
should also be asserted in a certificate policies extension in the also be asserted in a certificate policies extension in the same
same certificate. Policies should not be mapped either to or from certificate. Policies SHOULD NOT be mapped either to or from the
the special value anyPolicy. (See 4.2.1.5 certificate policies). special value anyPolicy (section 4.2.1.5).
This extension may be supported by CAs and/or applications, and it This extension MAY be supported by CAs and/or applications, and it
MUST be non-critical. MUST be non-critical.
id-ce-policyMappings OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 33 } id-ce-policyMappings OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 33 }
PolicyMappings ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SEQUENCE { PolicyMappings ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SEQUENCE {
issuerDomainPolicy CertPolicyId, issuerDomainPolicy CertPolicyId,
subjectDomainPolicy CertPolicyId } subjectDomainPolicy CertPolicyId }
4.2.1.7 Subject Alternative Name 4.2.1.7 Subject Alternative Name
The subject alternative names extension allows additional identities The subject alternative names extension allows additional identities
to be bound to the subject of the certificate. Defined options to be bound to the subject of the certificate. Defined options
include an Internet electronic mail address, a DNS name, an IP include an Internet electronic mail address, a DNS name, an IP
address, and a uniform resource identifier (URI). Other options address, and a uniform resource identifier (URI). Other options
exist, including completely local definitions. Multiple name forms, exist, including completely local definitions. Multiple name forms,
and multiple instances of each name form, may be included. Whenever and multiple instances of each name form, MAY be included. Whenever
such identities are to be bound into a certificate, the subject such identities are to be bound into a certificate, the subject
alternative name (or issuer alternative name) extension MUST be used. alternative name (or issuer alternative name) extension MUST be used.
Because the subject alternative name is considered to be definitively Because the subject alternative name is considered to be definitively
bound to the public key, all parts of the subject alternative name bound to the public key, all parts of the subject alternative name
MUST be verified by the CA. MUST be verified by the CA.
Further, if the only subject identity included in the certificate is Further, if the only subject identity included in the certificate is
an alternative name form (e.g., an electronic mail address), then the an alternative name form (e.g., an electronic mail address), then the
subject distinguished name MUST be empty (an empty sequence), and the subject distinguished name MUST be empty (an empty sequence), and the
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the DNS representation for Internet mail addresses (wpolk.nist.gov the DNS representation for Internet mail addresses (wpolk.nist.gov
instead of wpolk@nist.gov) MUST NOT be used; such identities are to instead of wpolk@nist.gov) MUST NOT be used; such identities are to
be encoded as rfc822Name. be encoded as rfc822Name.
Note: work is currently underway to specify domain names in Note: work is currently underway to specify domain names in
international character sets. This names will likely not be international character sets. This names will likely not be
accomodated by IA5String. Once this work is complete, this profile accomodated by IA5String. Once this work is complete, this profile
will be revisited and the appropriate functionality will be added. will be revisited and the appropriate functionality will be added.
When the subjectAltName extension contains a URI, the name MUST be When the subjectAltName extension contains a URI, the name MUST be
stored in the uniformResourceIdentifier (an IA5String). The name MUST stored in the uniformResourceIdentifier (an IA5String). The name
be a non-relative URL, and MUST follow the URL syntax and encoding MUST NOT be a relative URL, and it MUST follow the URL syntax and
rules specified in [RFC 1738]. The name must include both a scheme encoding rules specified in [RFC 1738]. The name MUST include both a
(e.g., "http" or "ftp") and a scheme-specific-part. The scheme- scheme (e.g., "http" or "ftp") and a scheme-specific-part. The
specific-part must include a fully qualified domain name or IP scheme-specific-part MUST include a fully qualified domain name or IP
address as the host. address as the host.
As specified in [RFC 1738], the scheme name is not case-sensitive As specified in [RFC 1738], the scheme name is not case-sensitive
(e.g., "http" is equivalent to "HTTP"). The host part is also not (e.g., "http" is equivalent to "HTTP"). The host part is also not
case-sensitive, but other components of the scheme-specific-part may case-sensitive, but other components of the scheme-specific-part may
be case-sensitive. When comparing URIs, conforming implementations be case-sensitive. When comparing URIs, conforming implementations
MUST compare the scheme and host without regard to case, but assume MUST compare the scheme and host without regard to case, but assume
the remainder of the scheme-specific-part is case sensitive. the remainder of the scheme-specific-part is case sensitive.
When the subjectAltName extension contains a DN in the directoryName, When the subjectAltName extension contains a DN in the directoryName,
the DN MUST be unique for each subject entity certified by the one CA the DN MUST be unique for each subject entity certified by the one CA
as defined by the issuer name field. A CA may issue more than one as defined by the issuer name field. A CA MAY issue more than one
certificate with the same DN to the same subject entity. certificate with the same DN to the same subject entity.
The subjectAltName may carry additional name types through the use of The subjectAltName MAY carry additional name types through the use of
the otherName field. The format and semantics of the name are the otherName field. The format and semantics of the name are
indicated through the OBJECT IDENTIFIER in the type-id field. The indicated through the OBJECT IDENTIFIER in the type-id field. The
name itself is conveyed as value field in otherName. For example, name itself is conveyed as value field in otherName. For example,
Kerberos [RFC 1510] format names can be encoded into the otherName, Kerberos [RFC 1510] format names can be encoded into the otherName,
using the krb5PrincipalName OID and the KerberosName syntax as using the krb5PrincipalName OID and the KerberosName syntax as
defined in [PKINIT]. defined in [PKINIT].
Subject alternative names may be constrained in the same manner as Subject alternative names MAY be constrained in the same manner as
subject distinguished names using the name constraints extension as subject distinguished names using the name constraints extension as
described in section 4.2.1.11. described in section 4.2.1.11.
If the subjectAltName extension is present, the sequence MUST contain If the subjectAltName extension is present, the sequence MUST contain
at least one entry. Unlike the subject field, conforming CAs MUST at least one entry. Unlike the subject field, conforming CAs MUST
NOT issue certificates with subjectAltNames containing empty NOT issue certificates with subjectAltNames containing empty
GeneralName fields. For example, an rfc822Name is represented as an GeneralName fields. For example, an rfc822Name is represented as an
IA5String. While an empty string is a valid IA5String, such an IA5String. While an empty string is a valid IA5String, such an
rfc822Name is not permitted by this profile. The behavior of clients rfc822Name is not permitted by this profile. The behavior of clients
that encounter such a certificate when processing a certificication that encounter such a certificate when processing a certificication
path is not defined by this profile. path is not defined by this profile.
Finally, the semantics of subject alternative names that include Finally, the semantics of subject alternative names that include
wildcard characters (e.g., as a placeholder for a set of names) are wildcard characters (e.g., as a placeholder for a set of names) are
not addressed by this specification. Applications with specific not addressed by this specification. Applications with specific
requirements may use such names but MUST define the semantics. requirements MAY use such names, but they MUST define the semantics.
id-ce-subjectAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 17 } id-ce-subjectAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 17 }
SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames
GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName
GeneralName ::= CHOICE { GeneralName ::= CHOICE {
otherName [0] OtherName, otherName [0] OtherName,
rfc822Name [1] IA5String, rfc822Name [1] IA5String,
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extension is defined as a sequence of one or more attributes. This extension is defined as a sequence of one or more attributes. This
extension MUST be non-critical. extension MUST be non-critical.
id-ce-subjectDirectoryAttributes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 9 } id-ce-subjectDirectoryAttributes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 9 }
SubjectDirectoryAttributes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute SubjectDirectoryAttributes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
4.2.1.10 Basic Constraints 4.2.1.10 Basic Constraints
The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the
certificate is a CA and how deep a certification path may exist certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification
through that CA. paths that include this certificate.
The cA bit indicates if the certified public key may be used to The cA bit indicates whether the certified public key belongs to a
verify signatures on other certificates. If the cA bit is asserted, CA. If the cA bit is not asserted, then the keyCertSign bit in the
then either the keyCertSign bit or the cRLSign bit in the key usage key usage extension MUST NOT be asserted.
extension (see 4.2.1.3) MUST also be asserted. If the cA bit is not
asserted, then both the keyCertSign bit and the cRLSign in the key
usage extension MUST NOT be asserted.
The pathLenConstraint field is meaningful only if cA is set to TRUE. The pathLenConstraint field is meaningful only if the cA bit is
In this case, it gives the maximum number of CA certificates that may asserted and the key usage extension asserts the keyCertSign bit
follow this certificate in a certification path. (Note: The last (section 4.2.1.3). In this case, it gives the maximum number of non-
certificate in the certification path is not included in this limit. self-issued intermediate certificates that may follow this
Usually, the last certificate is an end-entity certificate, but it certificate in a valid certification path. A certificate is self-
can be a CA certificate.) A pathLenConstraint of zero indicates that issued if the DNs that appear in the subject and issuer fields are
only one more certificate may follow in the certification path. identical and are not empty. (Note: The last certificate in the
Where it appears, the pathLenConstraint field MUST be greater than or certification path is not an intermediate certificate, and is not
equal to zero. Where pathLenConstraint does not appear, there is no included in this limit. Usually, the last certificate is an end
limit to the allowed length of the certification path. entity certificate, but it can be a CA certificate.) A
pathLenConstraint of zero indicates that only one more certificate
may follow in a valid certification path. Where it appears, the
pathLenConstraint field MUST be greater than or equal to zero. Where
pathLenConstraint does not appear, no limit is imposed.
This extension MUST appear as a critical extension in all CA This extension MUST appear as a critical extension in all CA
certificates. This extension MAY appear as a critical or non- certificates that contain public keys used to validate digital
critical extension in end entity certificates. signatures on certificates. This extension MAY appear as a critical
or non-critical extension in CA certificates that contain public keys
used exclusively for purposes other than validating digital
signatures on certificates. Such CA certificates include ones that
contain public keys used exclusively for validating digital
signatures on CRLs and ones that contain key management public keys
used with certificate enrollment protocols. This extension MAY
appear as a critical or non-critical extension in end entity
certificates.
CAs MUST NOT include the pathLenConstraint field unless the cA bit is
asserted and the key usage extension asserts the keyCertSign bit.
id-ce-basicConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 19 } id-ce-basicConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 19 }
BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL } pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL }
4.2.1.11 Name Constraints 4.2.1.11 Name Constraints
The name constraints extension, which MUST be used only in a CA The name constraints extension, which MUST be used only in a CA
certificate, indicates a name space within which all subject names in certificate, indicates a name space within which all subject names in
subsequent certificates in a certification path MUST be located. subsequent certificates in a certification path MUST be located.
Restrictions apply to the subject distinguished name and apply to Restrictions apply to the subject distinguished name and apply to
subject alternative names. Restrictions apply only when the subject alternative names. Restrictions apply only when the
specified name form is present. If no name of the type is in the specified name form is present. If no name of the type is in the
certificate, the certificate is acceptable. certificate, the certificate is acceptable.
Name constraints are not applied to certificates whose issuer and Name constraints are not applied to certificates whose issuer and
subject are identical. (This could prevent CAs that use name subject are identical (unless the certificate is the final
certificate in the path). (This could prevent CAs that use name
constraints from issuing self-signed certificates to implement key constraints from issuing self-signed certificates to implement key
rollover.) rollover.)
Restrictions are defined in terms of permitted or excluded name Restrictions are defined in terms of permitted or excluded name
subtrees. Any name matching a restriction in the excludedSubtrees subtrees. Any name matching a restriction in the excludedSubtrees
field is invalid regardless of information appearing in the field is invalid regardless of information appearing in the
permittedSubtrees. This extension MUST be critical. permittedSubtrees. This extension MUST be critical.
Within this profile, the minimum and maximum fields are not used with Within this profile, the minimum and maximum fields are not used with
any name forms, thus minimum is always zero, and maximum is always any name forms, thus minimum is always zero, and maximum is always
absent. absent.
For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name. The For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name. The
constraint may specify a host or a domain. Examples would be constraint MAY specify a host or a domain. Examples would be
"foo.bar.com"; and ".xyz.com". When the the constraint begins with "foo.bar.com"; and ".xyz.com". When the the constraint begins with
a period, it may be expanded with one or more subdomains. That is, a period, it MAY be expanded with one or more subdomains. That is,
the constraint ".xyz.com" is satisfied by both abc.xyz.com and the constraint ".xyz.com" is satisfied by both abc.xyz.com and
abc.def.xyz.com. However, the constraint ".xyz.com" is not satisfied abc.def.xyz.com. However, the constraint ".xyz.com" is not satisfied
by "xyz.com". When the constraint does not begin with a period, it by "xyz.com". When the constraint does not begin with a period, it
specifies a host. specifies a host.
A name constraint for Internet mail addresses may specify a A name constraint for Internet mail addresses MAY specify a
particular mailbox, all addresses at a particular host, or all particular mailbox, all addresses at a particular host, or all
mailboxes in a domain. To indicate a particular mailbox, the mailboxes in a domain. To indicate a particular mailbox, the
constraint is the complete mail address. For example, "root@xyz.com" constraint is the complete mail address. For example, "root@xyz.com"
indicates the root mailbox on the host "xyz.com". To indicate all indicates the root mailbox on the host "xyz.com". To indicate all
Internet mail addresses on a particular host, the constraint is Internet mail addresses on a particular host, the constraint is
specified as the host name. For example, the constraint "xyz.com" is specified as the host name. For example, the constraint "xyz.com" is
satisfied by any mail address at the host "xyz.com". To specify any satisfied by any mail address at the host "xyz.com". To specify any
address within a domain, the constraint is specified with a leading address within a domain, the constraint is specified with a leading
period (as with URIs). For example, ".xyz.com" indicates all the period (as with URIs). For example, ".xyz.com" indicates all the
Internet mail addresses in the domain "xyz.com", but not Internet Internet mail addresses in the domain "xyz.com", but not Internet
mail addresses on the host "xyz.com". mail addresses on the host "xyz.com".
DNS name restrictions are expressed as foo.bar.com. Any DNS name that DNS name restrictions are expressed as foo.bar.com. Any DNS name that
can be constructed by simply adding to the left hand side of the name can be constructed by simply adding to the left hand side of the name
satisfies the name constraint. For example, www.foo.bar.com would satisfies the name constraint. For example, www.foo.bar.com would
satisfy the constraint but foo1.bar.com would not. satisfy the constraint but foo1.bar.com would not.
Legacy implementations exist where an RFC 822 name is embedded in the Legacy implementations exist where an RFC 822 name is embedded in the
subject distinguished name in an attribute of type EmailAddress (see subject distinguished name in an attribute of type EmailAddress
sec. 4.1.2.6). When rfc822 names are constrained, but the certificate (section 4.1.2.6). When rfc822 names are constrained, but the
does not include a subject alternative name, the rfc822 name certificate does not include a subject alternative name, the rfc822
constraint MUST be applied to the attribute of type EmailAddress in name constraint MUST be applied to the attribute of type EmailAddress
the subject distinguished name. The ASN.1 syntax for EmailAddress in the subject distinguished name. The ASN.1 syntax for EmailAddress
and the corresponding OID are supplied in Appendix A and B. and the corresponding OID are supplied in Appendix A.
Restrictions of the form directoryName MUST be applied to the subject Restrictions of the form directoryName MUST be applied to the subject
field in the certificate and to the subjectAltName extensions of type field in the certificate and to the subjectAltName extensions of type
directoryName. Restrictions of the form x400Address MUST be applied directoryName. Restrictions of the form x400Address MUST be applied
to subjectAltName extensions of type x400Address. to subjectAltName extensions of type x400Address.
When applying restrictions of the form directoryName, an When applying restrictions of the form directoryName, an
implementation MUST compare DN attributes. At a minimum, implementation MUST compare DN attributes. At a minimum,
implementations MUST perform the DN comparison rules specified in implementations MUST perform the DN comparison rules specified in
Section 4.1.2.4. CAs issuing certificates with a restriction of the Section 4.1.2.4. CAs issuing certificates with a restriction of the
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policy required by the user of the certification path or the policy required by the user of the certification path or the
identifier of a policy which has been declared equivalent through identifier of a policy which has been declared equivalent through
policy mapping. policy mapping.
Conforming CAs MUST NOT issue certificates where policy constraints Conforming CAs MUST NOT issue certificates where policy constraints
is a null sequence. That is, at least one of the inhibitPolicyMapping is a null sequence. That is, at least one of the inhibitPolicyMapping
field or the requireExplicitPolicy field MUST be present. The field or the requireExplicitPolicy field MUST be present. The
behavior of clients that encounter a null policy constraints field is behavior of clients that encounter a null policy constraints field is
not addressed in this profile. not addressed in this profile.
This extension may be critical or non-critical. This extension MAY be critical or non-critical.
id-ce-policyConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 36 } id-ce-policyConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 36 }
PolicyConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { PolicyConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
requireExplicitPolicy [0] SkipCerts OPTIONAL, requireExplicitPolicy [0] SkipCerts OPTIONAL,
inhibitPolicyMapping [1] SkipCerts OPTIONAL } inhibitPolicyMapping [1] SkipCerts OPTIONAL }
SkipCerts ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) SkipCerts ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)
4.2.1.13 Extended key usage field 4.2.1.13 Extended key usage field
This field indicates one or more purposes for which the certified This field indicates one or more purposes for which the certified
public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the basic public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the basic
purposes indicated in the key usage extension field. In general, purposes indicated in the key usage extension field. In general,
this extension will appear only in end entity certificates. This this extension will appear only in end entity certificates. This
field is defined as follows: field is defined as follows:
id-ce-extKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 37} id-ce-extKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 37 }
ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId
KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
Key purposes may be defined by any organization with a need. Object Key purposes may be defined by any organization with a need. Object
identifiers used to identify key purposes MUST be assigned in identifiers used to identify key purposes MUST be assigned in
accordance with IANA or ITU-T Rec. X.660 | ISO/IEC/ITU 9834-1. accordance with IANA or ITU-T Recommendation X.660 | ISO/IEC/ITU
9834-1.
This extension may, at the option of the certificate issuer, be This extension MAY, at the option of the certificate issuer, be
either critical or non-critical. either critical or non-critical.
If the extension is flagged critical, then the certificate MUST only If the extension is flagged critical, then the certificate MUST only
be used for one of the purposes indicated. If multiple purposes are be used for one of the purposes indicated. If multiple purposes are
indicated the application need not recognize all purposes indicated, indicated the application need not recognize all purposes indicated,
as long as the intended purpose is present and recognized. as long as the intended purpose is present and recognized.
If the extension is flagged non-critical, then it indicates the If the extension is flagged non-critical, then it indicates the
intended purpose or purposes of the key, and may be used in finding intended purpose or purposes of the key, and MAY be used in finding
the correct key/certificate of an entity that has multiple the correct key/certificate of an entity that has multiple
keys/certificates. It is an advisory field and does not imply that keys/certificates. It is an advisory field and does not imply that
usage of the key is restricted by the certification authority to the usage of the key is restricted by the certification authority to the
purpose indicated. Certificate using applications may nevertheless purpose indicated. Certificate using applications MAY nevertheless
require that a particular purpose be indicated in order for the require that a particular purpose be indicated in order for the
certificate to be acceptable to that application. certificate to be acceptable to that application.
If a certificate contains both a critical key usage field and a If a certificate contains both a critical key usage field and a
critical extended key usage field, then both fields MUST be processed critical extended key usage field, then both fields MUST be processed
independently and the certificate MUST only be used for a purpose independently and the certificate MUST only be used for a purpose
consistent with both fields. If there is no purpose consistent with consistent with both fields. If there is no purpose consistent with
both fields, then the certificate MUST NOT be used for any purpose. both fields, then the certificate MUST NOT be used for any purpose.
The following key usage purposes are defined by this profile: The following key usage purposes are defined by this profile:
id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 3 } id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 3 }
id-kp-serverAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-kp 1} id-kp-serverAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 1 }
-- TLS Web server authentication -- TLS WWW server authentication
-- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature, -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature,
-- keyEncipherment or keyAgreement -- keyEncipherment or keyAgreement
--
id-kp-clientAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-kp 2} id-kp-clientAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 2 }
-- TLS Web client authentication -- TLS WWW client authentication
-- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature and/or -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature
-- keyAgreement -- and/or keyAgreement
--
id-kp-codeSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-kp 3} id-kp-codeSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 3 }
-- Signing of downloadable executable code -- Signing of downloadable executable code
-- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature
--
id-kp-emailProtection OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-kp 4} id-kp-emailProtection OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 4 }
-- E-mail protection -- E-mail protection
-- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature, -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature,
-- nonRepudiation, and/or (keyEncipherment -- nonRepudiation, and/or (keyEncipherment or keyAgreement)
-- or keyAgreement)
-- id-kp-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 8 }
id-kp-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 8 } -- Binding the hash of an object to a time
-- Binding the hash of an object to a time from an agreed-upon time -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature
-- source. Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature, -- and/or nonRepudiation
-- nonRepudiation
id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 }
-- Signing OCSP responses
-- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature
-- and/or nonRepudiation
4.2.1.14 CRL Distribution Points 4.2.1.14 CRL Distribution Points
The CRL distribution points extension identifies how CRL information The CRL distribution points extension identifies how CRL information
is obtained. The extension SHOULD be non-critical, but this profile is obtained. The extension SHOULD be non-critical, but this profile
RECOMMENDS support for this extension by CAs and applications. RECOMMENDS support for this extension by CAs and applications.
Further discussion of CRL management is contained in section 5. Further discussion of CRL management is contained in section 5.
The cRLDistributionPoints extension is a SEQUENCE of The cRLDistributionPoints extension is a SEQUENCE of
DistributionPoint. A DistributionPoint consists of three fields, DistributionPoint. A DistributionPoint consists of three fields,
each of which is optional: the name of the DistributionPoint, each of which is optional: distributionPoint, reasons, and cRLIssuer.
ReasonsFlags, and the cRLIssuer. While each component is optional, a While each of these fields is optional, a DistributionPoint MUST NOT
DistributionPoint MUST NOT consist of only the ReasonsFlags field. consist of only the reasons field; either distributionPoint or
If the distributionPoint omits cRLIssuer, the CRL MUST be issued by cRLIssuer MUST be present. If the certificate issuer is not the CRL
the CA that issued the certificate. If the distributionPointName is issuer, then the cRLIssuer field MUST be present and contain the Name
absent, cRLIssuer MUST be present and include a Name corresponding to of the CRL issuer. If the certificate issuer is also the CRL issuer,
an X.500 or LDAP directory entry where the CRL is located. then the cRLIssuer field MUST be omitted and the distributionPoint
field MUST be present. If the the distributionPoint field is
omitted, cRLIssuer MUST be present and include a Name corresponding
to an X.500 or LDAP directory entry where the CRL is located.
If the cRLDistributionPoints extension contains a When the distributionPoint field is present, it contains either a
DistributionPointName of type URI, the following semantics MUST be SEQUENCE of general names or a single value, nameRelativeToCRLIssuer.
assumed: the URI is a pointer to the current CRL for the associated If the cRLDistributionPoints extension contains a general name of
reasons and will be issued by the associated cRLIssuer. The expected type URI, the following semantics MUST be assumed: the URI is a
values for the URI are those defined in 4.2.1.7. Processing rules for pointer to the current CRL for the associated reasons and will be
other values are not defined by this specification. If the issued by the associated cRLIssuer. The expected values for the URI
distributionPoint omits reasons, the CRL MUST include revocations for are those defined in 4.2.1.7. Processing rules for other values are
all reasons. not defined by this specification.
If the DistributionPointName contains multiple values, each name
describes a different mechanism to obtain the same CRL. For example,
the same CRL could be available for retrieval through both LDAP and
HTTP.
If the DistributionPointName contains the single value
nameRelativeToCRLIssuer, the value provides a distinguished name
fragment. The fragment is appended to the X.500 distinguished name
of the CRL issuer to obtain the distribution point name. If the
cRLIssuer field in the DistributionPoint is present, then the name
fragment is appended to the distinguished name that it contains;
otherwise, the name fragment is appended to the certificate issuer
distinguished name. The DistributionPointName MUST NOT use the
nameRealtiveToCRLIssuer alternative when cRLIssuer contains more than
one distinguished name.
If the DistributionPoint omits the reasons field, the CRL MUST
include revocation information for all reasons.
The cRLIssuer identifies the entity who signs and issues the CRL. If
present, the cRLIssuer MUST contain at least one an X.500
distinguished name (DN), and MAY also contain other name forms.
Since the cRLIssuer is compared to the CRL issuer name, the X.501
type Name MUST follow the encoding rules for the issuer name field in
the certificate (section 4.1.2.4).
id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 31 } id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 31 }
CRLDistributionPoints ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF DistributionPoint CRLDistributionPoints ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF DistributionPoint
DistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE { DistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE {
distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL, distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL,
reasons [1] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL, reasons [1] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL,
cRLIssuer [2] GeneralNames OPTIONAL } cRLIssuer [2] GeneralNames OPTIONAL }
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fullName [0] GeneralNames, fullName [0] GeneralNames,
nameRelativeToCRLIssuer [1] RelativeDistinguishedName } nameRelativeToCRLIssuer [1] RelativeDistinguishedName }
ReasonFlags ::= BIT STRING { ReasonFlags ::= BIT STRING {
unused (0), unused (0),
keyCompromise (1), keyCompromise (1),
cACompromise (2), cACompromise (2),
affiliationChanged (3), affiliationChanged (3),
superseded (4), superseded (4),
cessationOfOperation (5), cessationOfOperation (5),
certificateHold (6) } certificateHold (6),
privilegeWithdrawn (7),
aACompromise (8) }
4.2.1.15 Inhibit Any-Policy 4.2.1.15 Inhibit Any-Policy
The inhibit any-policy extension can be used in certificates issued The inhibit any-policy extension can be used in certificates issued
to CAs. The inhibit any-policy indicates that the special any-policy to CAs. The inhibit any-policy indicates that the special any-policy
OID, with the value {2 5 29 32 0}, is not considered an explicit OID, with the value { 2 5 29 32 0 }, is not considered an explicit
match for other certificate policies. The value indicates the number match for other certificate policies. The value indicates the number
of additional certificates that may appear in the path before any- of additional certificates that may appear in the path before any-
policy is no longer permitted. For example, a value of one indicates policy is no longer permitted. For example, a value of one indicates
that any-policy may be processed in certificates issued by the that any-policy may be processed in certificates issued by the
subject of this certificate, but not in additional certificates in subject of this certificate, but not in additional certificates in
the path. the path.
This extension MUST be critical. This extension MUST be critical.
id-ce-inhibitAnyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 54 } id-ce-inhibitAnyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 54 }
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policy is no longer permitted. For example, a value of one indicates policy is no longer permitted. For example, a value of one indicates
that any-policy may be processed in certificates issued by the that any-policy may be processed in certificates issued by the
subject of this certificate, but not in additional certificates in subject of this certificate, but not in additional certificates in
the path. the path.
This extension MUST be critical. This extension MUST be critical.
id-ce-inhibitAnyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 54 } id-ce-inhibitAnyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 54 }
InhibitAnyPolicy ::= SkipCerts InhibitAnyPolicy ::= SkipCerts
SkipCerts ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) SkipCerts ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)
4.2.1.16 Freshest CRL (a.k.a. Delta CRL Distribution Point) 4.2.1.16 Freshest CRL (a.k.a. Delta CRL Distribution Point)
The freshest CRL extension identifies how delta-CRL information is The freshest CRL extension identifies how delta CRL information is
obtained. The extension MUST be non-critical. Further discussion of obtained. The extension MUST be non-critical. Further discussion of
CRL management is contained in section 5. CRL management is contained in section 5.
The same syntax is used for this extension and the The same syntax is used for this extension and the
cRLDistributionPoints extension, and is described in section cRLDistributionPoints extension, and is described in section
4.2.1.14. The same conventions apply to both extensions. 4.2.1.14. The same conventions apply to both extensions.
id-ce-freshestCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 46 } id-ce-freshestCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 46 }
FreshestCRL ::= CRLDistributionPoints FreshestCRL ::= CRLDistributionPoints
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accessMethod is id-ad-caIssuers) are not defined by this accessMethod is id-ad-caIssuers) are not defined by this
specification. specification.
[RFC 2560] defines the access descriptor for the Online Certificate [RFC 2560] defines the access descriptor for the Online Certificate
Status Protocol. When this access descriptor appears in the Status Protocol. When this access descriptor appears in the
authority information access extension, this indicates the issuer authority information access extension, this indicates the issuer
provides revocation information for this certificate through the provides revocation information for this certificate through the
named OCSP service. Additional access descriptors may be defined in named OCSP service. Additional access descriptors may be defined in
other PKIX specifications. other PKIX specifications.
4.2.2.2 Subject Information Access 4.2.2.2 Subject Information Access
The subject information access extension indicates how to access The subject information access extension indicates how to access
information and services for the subject of the certificate in which information and services for the subject of the certificate in which
the extension appears. When the subject is a CA, information and the extension appears. When the subject is a CA, information and
services may include certificate validation services and CA policy services may include certificate validation services and CA policy
data. When the subject is an end entity, the information describes data. When the subject is an end entity, the information describes
the type of services offered and how to access them. In this case, the type of services offered and how to access them. In this case,
the contents of this extension are defined in the protocol the contents of this extension are defined in the protocol
specifications for the suported services. This extension may be specifications for the suported services. This extension may be
included in subject or CA certificates, and it MUST be non-critical. included in subject or CA certificates, and it MUST be non-critical.
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several forms. Where the information is available via http, ftp, or several forms. Where the information is available via http, ftp, or
ldap, accessLocation MUST be a uniformResourceIdentifier. Where the ldap, accessLocation MUST be a uniformResourceIdentifier. Where the
information is available via the directory access protocol (dap), information is available via the directory access protocol (dap),
accessLocation MUST be a directoryName. When the information is accessLocation MUST be a directoryName. When the information is
available via electronic mail, accessLocation MUST be an rfc822Name. available via electronic mail, accessLocation MUST be an rfc822Name.
The semantics of other name forms of of accessLocation (when The semantics of other name forms of of accessLocation (when
accessMethod is id-ad-caRepository) are not defined by this accessMethod is id-ad-caRepository) are not defined by this
specification. specification.
The id-ad-timeStamping OID is used when the subject offers The id-ad-timeStamping OID is used when the subject offers
timestamping services using the Time Stamp Protocol defined in [PKIX timestamping services using the Time Stamp Protocol defined in
TSA]. Where the timestamping services are available via http or ftp,
accessLocation MUST be a uniformResourceIdentifier. Where the [PKIXTSA]. Where the timestamping services are available via http or
ftp, accessLocation MUST be a uniformResourceIdentifier. Where the
timestamping services are available via electronic mail, timestamping services are available via electronic mail,
accessLocation MUST be an rfc822Name. Where timestamping services accessLocation MUST be an rfc822Name. Where timestamping services
are available using TCP/IP, the dNSName and ipAddress name forms may are available using TCP/IP, the dNSName and ipAddress name forms may
be used. The semantics of other name forms of accessLocation (when be used. The semantics of other name forms of accessLocation (when
accessMethod is id-ad-timeStamping) are not defined by this accessMethod is id-ad-timeStamping) are not defined by this
specification. specification.
Additional access descriptors may be defined in other PKIX Additional access descriptors may be defined in other PKIX
specifications. specifications.
id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 } id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 }
id-ad-caRepository OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 5 } id-ad-caRepository OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 5 }
id-ad-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 3 } id-ad-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 3 }
5 CRL and CRL Extensions Profile 5 CRL and CRL Extensions Profile
As described above, one goal of this X.509 v2 CRL profile is to As discussed above, one goal of this X.509 v2 CRL profile is to
foster the creation of an interoperable and reusable Internet PKI. foster the creation of an interoperable and reusable Internet PKI.
To achieve this goal, guidelines for the use of extensions are To achieve this goal, guidelines for the use of extensions are
specified, and some assumptions are made about the nature of specified, and some assumptions are made about the nature of
information included in the CRL. information included in the CRL.
CRLs may be used in a wide range of applications and environments CRLs may be used in a wide range of applications and environments
covering a broad spectrum of interoperability goals and an even covering a broad spectrum of interoperability goals and an even
broader spectrum of operational and assurance requirements. This broader spectrum of operational and assurance requirements. This
profile establishes a common baseline for generic applications profile establishes a common baseline for generic applications
requiring broad interoperability. The profile defines a baseline set requiring broad interoperability. The profile defines a set of
of information that can be expected in every CRL. Also, the profile information that can be expected in every CRL. Also, the profile
defines common locations within the CRL for frequently used defines common locations within the CRL for frequently used
attributes as well as common representations for these attributes. attributes as well as common representations for these attributes.
CRL issuers issue CRLs. In general, the CRL issuer is the CA. CAs
publish CRLs to provide status information about the certificates
they issued. However, a CA may delegate this responsibility to
another trusted authority. Whenever the CRL issuer is not the CA
that issued the certificates, the CRL is referred to as an indirect
CRL.
Each CRL has a particular scope. The CRL scope is the set of
certificates that could appear on a given CRL. For example, the
scope could be "all certificates issued by CA X", "all CA
certificates issued by CA X", "all certificates issued by CA X that
have been revoked for reasons of key compromise and CA compromise",
or could be a set of certificates based on arbitrary local
information, such as "all certificates issued to the NIST employees
located in Boulder".
A complete CRL lists all unexpired certificates, within its scope,
that have been revoked for one of the revocation reasons covered by
the CRL scope. The CRL issuer MAY also generate delta CRLs. A delta
CRL only lists those certificates, within its scope, whose revocation
status has changed since the issuance of a referenced complete CRL.
The referenced complete CRL is referred to as a base CRL. The scope
of a delta CRL MUST be the same as the base CRL that it references.
This profile does not define any private Internet CRL extensions or This profile does not define any private Internet CRL extensions or
CRL entry extensions. CRL entry extensions.
Environments with additional or special purpose requirements may Environments with additional or special purpose requirements may
build on this profile or may replace it. build on this profile or may replace it.
Conforming CAs are not required to issue CRLs if other revocation or Conforming CAs are not required to issue CRLs if other revocation or
certificate status mechanisms are provided. Conforming CAs that certificate status mechanisms are provided. Conforming CAs that
issue CRLs MUST issue version 2 CRLs, and CAs MUST include the date issue CRLs MUST issue version 2 CRLs, include the date by which the
by which the next CRL will be issued in the nextUpdate field (see next CRL will be issued in the nextUpdate field (section 5.1.2.5),
sec. 5.1.2.5), the CRL number extension (see sec. 5.2.3) and the include the CRL number extension (section 5.2.3), and include the
authority key identifier extension (see sec. 5.2.1). Conforming authority key identifier extension (section 5.2.1). Conforming
applications are required to process version 1 and 2 CRLs. applications that support CRLs are required to process both version 1
and 2 CRLs that are complete for a given scope. Conforming
applications are not required to support processing of delta CRLs or
indirect CRLs.
5.1 CRL Fields 5.1 CRL Fields
The X.509 v2 CRL syntax is as follows. For signature calculation, The X.509 v2 CRL syntax is as follows. For signature calculation,
the data that is to be signed is ASN.1 DER encoded. ASN.1 DER the data that is to be signed is ASN.1 DER encoded. ASN.1 DER
encoding is a tag, length, value encoding system for each element. encoding is a tag, length, value encoding system for each element.
CertificateList ::= SEQUENCE { CertificateList ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsCertList TBSCertList, tbsCertList TBSCertList,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
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issue date of the next list, the optional list of revoked issue date of the next list, the optional list of revoked
certificates, and optional CRL extensions. When there are no revoked certificates, and optional CRL extensions. When there are no revoked
certificates, the revoked certificates list is absent. When one or certificates, the revoked certificates list is absent. When one or
more certificates are revoked, each entry on the revoked certificate more certificates are revoked, each entry on the revoked certificate
list is defined by a sequence of user certificate serial number, list is defined by a sequence of user certificate serial number,
revocation date, and optional CRL entry extensions. revocation date, and optional CRL entry extensions.
5.1.1.2 signatureAlgorithm 5.1.1.2 signatureAlgorithm
The signatureAlgorithm field contains the algorithm identifier for The signatureAlgorithm field contains the algorithm identifier for
the algorithm used by the CA to sign the CertificateList. The field the algorithm used by the CRL issuer to sign the CertificateList.
is of type AlgorithmIdentifier, which is defined in section 4.1.1.2. The field is of type AlgorithmIdentifier, which is defined in section
[PKIX ALGS] lists the supported algorithms for this specification. 4.1.1.2. [PKIXALGS] lists the supported algorithms for this
Conforming CAs MUST use the algorithm identifiers presented in [PKIX specification. Conforming CAs MUST use the algorithm identifiers
ALGS] when signing with a supported signature algorithm. presented in [PKIXALGS] when signing with a supported signature
algorithm.
This field MUST contain the same algorithm identifier as the This field MUST contain the same algorithm identifier as the
signature field in the sequence tbsCertList (see sec. 5.1.2.2). signature field in the sequence tbsCertList (section 5.1.2.2).
5.1.1.3 signatureValue 5.1.1.3 signatureValue
The signatureValue field contains a digital signature computed upon The signatureValue field contains a digital signature computed upon
the ASN.1 DER encoded tbsCertList. The ASN.1 DER encoded tbsCertList the ASN.1 DER encoded tbsCertList. The ASN.1 DER encoded tbsCertList
is used as the input to the signature function. This signature value is used as the input to the signature function. This signature value
is then ASN.1 encoded as a BIT STRING and included in the CRL's is then ASN.1 encoded as a BIT STRING and included in the CRL's
signatureValue field. The details of this process are specified for signatureValue field. The details of this process are specified for
each of the supported algorithms in [PKIX ALGS]. each of the supported algorithms in [PKIXALGS].
CAs MAY use one private key to digitally sign certificates and CRLs, CAs that are also CRL issuers MAY use one private key to digitally
or CAs MAY use separate private keys to digitally sign certificates sign certificates and CRLs, or MAY use separate private keys to
and CRLs. When separate private keys are employed, each of the digitally sign certificates and CRLs. When separate private keys are
public keys associated with these private keys is placed in a employed, each of the public keys associated with these private keys
separate certificate, one with the keyCertSign bit set in the key is placed in a separate certificate, one with the keyCertSign bit set
usage extension, and one with the cRLSign bit set in the key usage in the key usage extension, and one with the cRLSign bit set in the
extension (see sec. 4.2.1.3). When separate private keys are key usage extension (section 4.2.1.3). When separate private keys
employed, certificates issued by the CA contain one authority key are employed, certificates issued by the CA contain one authority key
identifier, and the corresponding CRLs contain a different authority identifier, and the corresponding CRLs contain a different authority
key identifier. The use of separate CA certificates for validation key identifier. The use of separate CA certificates for validation
of certificate signatures and CRL signatures can offer improved of certificate signatures and CRL signatures can offer improved
security characteristics; however, it imposes a burden on security characteristics; however, it imposes a burden on
applications, and it might limit interoperability. Many applications applications, and it might limit interoperability. Many applications
construct a certification path, and then validate the certification construct a certification path, and then validate the certification
path (see sec. 6). CRL checking in turn requires a separate path (section 6). CRL checking in turn requires a separate
certification path to be constructed and validated for the CA's CRL certification path to be constructed and validated for the CA's CRL
signature validation certificate. Applications that perform CRL signature validation certificate. Applications that perform CRL
checking MUST support certification path validation when certificates checking MUST support certification path validation when certificates
and CRLs are digitally signed with the same CA private key. These and CRLs are digitally signed with the same CA private key. These
applications SHOULD support certification path validation when applications SHOULD support certification path validation when
certificates and CRLs are digitally signed with different CA private certificates and CRLs are digitally signed with different CA private
keys. keys.
5.1.2 Certificate List "To Be Signed" 5.1.2 Certificate List "To Be Signed"
The certificate list to be signed, or TBSCertList, is a SEQUENCE of The certificate list to be signed, or TBSCertList, is a SEQUENCE of
required and optional fields. The required fields identify the CRL required and optional fields. The required fields identify the CRL
issuer, the algorithm used to sign the CRL, the date and time the CRL issuer, the algorithm used to sign the CRL, the date and time the CRL
was issued, and the date and time by which the CA will issue the next was issued, and the date and time by which the CRL issuer will issue
CRL. the next CRL.
Optional fields include lists of revoked certificates and CRL Optional fields include lists of revoked certificates and CRL
extensions. The revoked certificate list is optional to support the extensions. The revoked certificate list is optional to support the
case where a CA has not revoked any unexpired certificates that it case where a CA has not revoked any unexpired certificates that it
has issued. The profile requires conforming CAs to use the CRL has issued. The profile requires conforming CRL issuers to use the
extension cRLNumber in all CRLs issued. CRL Number CRL extension in all CRLs issued.
5.1.2.1 Version 5.1.2.1 Version
This optional field describes the version of the encoded CRL. When This optional field describes the version of the encoded CRL. When
extensions are used, as required by this profile, this field MUST be extensions are used, as required by this profile, this field MUST be
present and MUST specify version 2 (the integer value is 1). present and MUST specify version 2 (the integer value is 1).
5.1.2.2 Signature 5.1.2.2 Signature
This field contains the algorithm identifier for the algorithm used This field contains the algorithm identifier for the algorithm used
to sign the CRL. [PKIX ALGS] lists OIDs for the most popular to sign the CRL. [PKIXALGS] lists OIDs for the most popular
signature algorithms used in the Internet PKI. signature algorithms used in the Internet PKI.
This field MUST contain the same algorithm identifier as the This field MUST contain the same algorithm identifier as the
signatureAlgorithm field in the sequence CertificateList (see section signatureAlgorithm field in the sequence CertificateList (section
5.1.1.2). 5.1.1.2).
5.1.2.3 Issuer Name 5.1.2.3 Issuer Name
The issuer name identifies the entity who has signed and issued the The issuer name identifies the entity who has signed and issued the
CRL. The issuer identity is carried in the issuer name field. CRL. The issuer identity is carried in the issuer name field.
Alternative name forms may also appear in the issuerAltName extension Alternative name forms may also appear in the issuerAltName extension
(see sec. 5.2.2). The issuer name field MUST contain an X.500 (section 5.2.2). The issuer name field MUST contain an X.500
distinguished name (DN). The issuer name field is defined as the distinguished name (DN). The issuer name field is defined as the
X.501 type Name, and MUST follow the encoding rules for the issuer X.501 type Name, and MUST follow the encoding rules for the issuer
name field in the certificate (see sec. 4.1.2.4). name field in the certificate (section 4.1.2.4).
5.1.2.4 This Update 5.1.2.4 This Update
This field indicates the issue date of this CRL. ThisUpdate may be This field indicates the issue date of this CRL. ThisUpdate may be
encoded as UTCTime or GeneralizedTime. encoded as UTCTime or GeneralizedTime.
CAs conforming to this profile that issue CRLs MUST encode thisUpdate CRL issuers conforming to this profile MUST encode thisUpdate as
as UTCTime for dates through the year 2049. CAs conforming to this UTCTime for dates through the year 2049. CRL issuers conforming to
profile that issue CRLs MUST encode thisUpdate as GeneralizedTime for this profile MUST encode thisUpdate as GeneralizedTime for dates in
dates in the year 2050 or later. the year 2050 or later.
Where encoded as UTCTime, thisUpdate MUST be specified and Where encoded as UTCTime, thisUpdate MUST be specified and
interpreted as defined in section 4.1.2.5.1. Where encoded as interpreted as defined in section 4.1.2.5.1. Where encoded as
GeneralizedTime, thisUpdate MUST be specified and interpreted as GeneralizedTime, thisUpdate MUST be specified and interpreted as
defined in section 4.1.2.5.2. defined in section 4.1.2.5.2.
5.1.2.5 Next Update 5.1.2.5 Next Update
This field indicates the date by which the next CRL will be issued. This field indicates the date by which the next CRL will be issued.
The next CRL could be issued before the indicated date, but it will The next CRL could be issued before the indicated date, but it will
not be issued any later than the indicated date. CAs SHOULD issue not be issued any later than the indicated date. CRL issuers SHOULD
CRLs with a nextUpdate time equal to or later than all previous CRLs. issue CRLs with a nextUpdate time equal to or later than all previous
nextUpdate may be encoded as UTCTime or GeneralizedTime. CRLs. nextUpdate may be encoded as UTCTime or GeneralizedTime.
This profile requires inclusion of nextUpdate in all CRLs issued by This profile requires inclusion of nextUpdate in all CRLs issued by
conforming CAs. Note that the ASN.1 syntax of TBSCertList describes conforming CRL issuers. Note that the ASN.1 syntax of TBSCertList
this field as OPTIONAL, which is consistent with the ASN.1 structure describes this field as OPTIONAL, which is consistent with the ASN.1
defined in [X.509]. The behavior of clients processing CRLs which structure defined in [X.509]. The behavior of clients processing CRLs
omit nextUpdate is not specified by this profile. which omit nextUpdate is not specified by this profile.
CAs conforming to this profile that issue CRLs MUST encode nextUpdate CRL issuers conforming to this profile MUST encode nextUpdate as
as UTCTime for dates through the year 2049. CAs conforming to this UTCTime for dates through the year 2049. CRL issuers conforming to
profile that issue CRLs MUST encode nextUpdate as GeneralizedTime for this profile MUST encode nextUpdate as GeneralizedTime for dates in
dates in the year 2050 or later. the year 2050 or later.
Where encoded as UTCTime, nextUpdate MUST be specified and Where encoded as UTCTime, nextUpdate MUST be specified and
interpreted as defined in section 4.1.2.5.1. Where encoded as interpreted as defined in section 4.1.2.5.1. Where encoded as
GeneralizedTime, nextUpdate MUST be specified and interpreted as GeneralizedTime, nextUpdate MUST be specified and interpreted as
defined in section 4.1.2.5.2. defined in section 4.1.2.5.2.
5.1.2.6 Revoked Certificates 5.1.2.6 Revoked Certificates
When there are no revoked certificates, the revoked certificates list When there are no revoked certificates, the revoked certificates list
is absent. Otherwise, revoked certificates are listed by their is absent. Otherwise, revoked certificates are listed by their
serial numbers. Certificates revoked by the CA are uniquely serial numbers. Certificates revoked by the CA are uniquely
identified by the certificate serial number. The date on which the identified by the certificate serial number. The date on which the
revocation occurred is specified. The time for revocationDate MUST revocation occurred is specified. The time for revocationDate MUST
be expressed as described in section 5.1.2.4. Additional information be expressed as described in section 5.1.2.4. Additional information
may be supplied in CRL entry extensions; CRL entry extensions are may be supplied in CRL entry extensions; CRL entry extensions are
discussed in section 5.3. discussed in section 5.3.
5.1.2.7 Extensions 5.1.2.7 Extensions
This field may only appear if the version is 2 (see sec. 5.1.2.1). This field may only appear if the version is 2 (section 5.1.2.1). If
If present, this field is a SEQUENCE of one or more CRL extensions. present, this field is a SEQUENCE of one or more CRL extensions. CRL
CRL extensions are discussed in section 5.2. extensions are discussed in section 5.2.
5.2 CRL Extensions 5.2 CRL Extensions
The extensions defined by ANSI X9 and ISO/IEC/ITU for X.509 v2 CRLs The extensions defined by ANSI X9 and ISO/IEC/ITU for X.509 v2 CRLs
[X.509] [X9.55] provide methods for associating additional attributes [X.509] [X9.55] provide methods for associating additional attributes
with CRLs. The X.509 v2 CRL format also allows communities to define with CRLs. The X.509 v2 CRL format also allows communities to define
private extensions to carry information unique to those communities. private extensions to carry information unique to those communities.
Each extension in a CRL may be designated as critical or non- Each extension in a CRL may be designated as critical or non-
critical. A CRL validation MUST fail if it encounters a critical critical. A CRL validation MUST fail if it encounters a critical
extension which it does not know how to process. However, an extension which it does not know how to process. However, an
unrecognized non-critical extension may be ignored. The following unrecognized non-critical extension may be ignored. The following
subsections present those extensions used within Internet CRLs. subsections present those extensions used within Internet CRLs.
Communities may elect to include extensions in CRLs which are not Communities MAY elect to include extensions in CRLs which are not
defined in this specification. However, caution should be exercised defined in this specification. However, caution SHOULD be exercised
in adopting any critical extensions in CRLs which might be used in a in adopting any critical extensions in CRLs which might be used in a
general context. general context.
Conforming CAs that issue CRLs are required to include the authority Conforming CRL issuers are required to include the authority key
key identifier (see sec. 5.2.1) and the CRL number (see sec. 5.2.3) identifier (section 5.2.1) and the CRL number (section 5.2.3)
extensions in all CRLs issued. extensions in all CRLs issued.
5.2.1 Authority Key Identifier 5.2.1 Authority Key Identifier
The authority key identifier extension provides a means of The authority key identifier extension provides a means of
identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to
sign a CRL. The identification can be based on either the key sign a CRL. The identification can be based on either the key
identifier (the subject key identifier in the CRL signer's identifier (the subject key identifier in the CRL signer's
certificate) or on the issuer name and serial number. This extension certificate) or on the issuer name and serial number. This extension
is especially useful where an issuer has more than one signing key, is especially useful where an issuer has more than one signing key,
either due to multiple concurrent key pairs or due to changeover. either due to multiple concurrent key pairs or due to changeover.
Conforming CAs MUST use the key identifier method, and MUST include Conforming CRL issuers MUST use the key identifier method, and MUST
this extension in all CRLs issued. include this extension in all CRLs issued.
The syntax for this CRL extension is defined in section 4.2.1.1. The syntax for this CRL extension is defined in section 4.2.1.1.
5.2.2 Issuer Alternative Name 5.2.2 Issuer Alternative Name
The issuer alternative names extension allows additional identities The issuer alternative names extension allows additional identities
to be associated with the issuer of the CRL. Defined options include to be associated with the issuer of the CRL. Defined options include
an rfc822 name (electronic mail address), a DNS name, an IP address, an rfc822 name (electronic mail address), a DNS name, an IP address,
and a URI. Multiple instances of a name and multiple name forms may and a URI. Multiple instances of a name and multiple name forms may
be included. Whenever such identities are used, the issuer be included. Whenever such identities are used, the issuer
alternative name extension MUST be used. alternative name extension MUST be used.
The issuerAltName extension SHOULD NOT be marked critical. The issuerAltName extension SHOULD NOT be marked critical.
The OID and syntax for this CRL extension are defined in section The OID and syntax for this CRL extension are defined in section
4.2.1.8. 4.2.1.8.
5.2.3 CRL Number 5.2.3 CRL Number
The CRL number is a non-critical CRL extension which conveys a The CRL number is a non-critical CRL extension which conveys a
monotonically increasing sequence number for each CRL issued by a CA. monotonically increasing sequence number for a given CRL scope and
This extension allows users to easily determine when a particular CRL CRL issuer. This extension allows users to easily determine when a
supersedes another CRL. CAs conforming to this profile MUST include particular CRL supersedes another CRL. CRL numbers also support the
this extension in all CRLs. identification of complementary complete CRLs and delta CRLs. CRL
issuers conforming to this profile MUST include this extension in all
CRLs.
If a CRL issuer generates delta CRLs in addition to complete CRLs for
a given scope, the complete CRLs and delta CRLs MUST share one
numbering sequence. If a delta CRL and a complete CRL that cover the
same scope are issued at the same time, they MUST have the same CRL
number and provide the same revocation information. That is, the
combination of the delta CRL and an acceptable complete CRL MUST
provide the same revocation information as the simultaneously issued
complete CRL.
If a CRL issuer generates two CRLs (two complete CRLs, two delta
CRLs, or a complete CRL and a delta CRL) for the same scope at
different times, the two CRLs MUST NOT have the same CRL number.
That is, if the this update field (section 5.1.2.4) in the two CRLs
are not identical, the CRL numbers MUST be different.
id-ce-cRLNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 20 } id-ce-cRLNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 20 }
cRLNumber ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) CRLNumber ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)
5.2.4 Delta CRL Indicator 5.2.4 Delta CRL Indicator
The delta CRL indicator is a critical CRL extension that identifies a The delta CRL indicator is a critical CRL extension that identifies a
CRL as being a delta CRL. Delta CRLs contain updates to revocation CRL as being a delta CRL. Delta CRLs contain updates to revocation
information previously distributed, rather than all the information information previously distributed, rather than all the information
that would appear in a complete CRL. The use of delta CRLs can that would appear in a complete CRL. The use of delta CRLs can
significantly reduce network load and processing time in some significantly reduce network load and processing time in some
environments. Delta CRLs are generally smaller than the CRLs they environments. Delta CRLs are generally smaller than the CRLs they
update, so applications that obtain delta CRLs consume less network update, so applications that obtain delta CRLs consume less network
bandwidth than applications that obtain the corresponding complete bandwidth than applications that obtain the corresponding complete
CRLs. Applications which store revocation information in a format CRLs. Applications which store revocation information in a format
other than the CRL structure can add new revocation information to other than the CRL structure can add new revocation information to
the local database without reprocessing information. the local database without reprocessing information.
The delta CRL indicator extension contains a single value of type The delta CRL indicator extension contains the single value of type
BaseCRLNumber. This value identifies the CRL number of the base CRL BaseCRLNumber. This value identifies the CRL number of the complete
that was used as the foundation in the generation of this delta CRL. CRL that was used as the foundation in the generation of this delta
The referenced base CRL is a CRL that was explicitly issued as a CRL CRL. The referenced base CRL is a CRL that was explicitly issued as
that is complete for a given scope (e.g., a set of revocation reasons a CRL that is complete for a given scope. The CRL containing the
or a particular distribution point.) The CRL containing the delta CRL delta CRL indicator extension contains all updates to the revocation
indicator extension contains all updates to the certificate status for that same scope. The combination of a CRL containing the
revocation status for that same scope. The combination of a CRL delta CRL indicator extension plus the CRL referenced in the
containing the delta CRL indicator extension plus the CRL referenced BaseCRLNumber component of this extension is equivalent to a complete
in the BaseCRLNumber component of this extension is equivalent to a CRL, for the applicable scope, at the time of publication of the
full CRL, for the applicable scope, at the time of publication of the
delta CRL. delta CRL.
When a conforming CA issues a delta CRL, the CA MUST also issue a CRL When a conforming CRL issuer generates a delta CRL, the delta CRL
that is complete for the given scope. Both the delta CRL and the MUST include a critical delta CRL indicator extension.
complete CRL MUST include the CRL number extension (see sec. 5.2.3).
The CRL number extension in the delta CRL and the complete CRL MUST
contain the same value. When a delta CRL is issued, it MUST cover
the same set of reasons and same set of certificates that were
covered by the base CRL it references.
An application can construct a CRL that is complete for a given When a delta CRL is issued, it MUST cover the same set of reasons and
scope, at the current time, in either of the following ways: the same set of certificates that were covered by the base CRL it
references. That is, the scope of the delta CRL MUST be the same as
the scope of the complete CRL referenced as the base. The referenced
base CRL and the delta CRL MUST omit the issuing distribution point
extension or contain identical issuing distribution point extensions.
Further, the CRL issuer MUST use the same private key to sign the
delta CRL and any complete CRL that it can be used to update.
(a) by retrieving the current delta CRL for that scope, and An application that supports delta CRLs can construct a CRL that is
combining it with an issued CRL that is complete for that scope complete for a given scope by combining a delta CRL for that scope
and that has a cRLNumber greater than or equal to the cRLNumber of with either an issued CRL that is complete for that scope or a
the base CRL referenced in the delta CRL; or locally constructed CRL that is complete for that scope.
(b) by retrieving the current delta CRL for that scope and When a delta CRL is combined with a complete CRL or a locally
combining it with a locally constructed CRL whose cRLNumber is constructed CRL, the resulting locally constructed CRL has the CRL
greater than or equal to the cRLNumber of the base CRL referenced number specified in the CRL number extension found in the delta CRL
in the current delta CRL. used in its construction. In addition, the resulting locally
constructed CRL has the thisUpdate and nextUpdate times specified in
the corresponding fields of the delta CRL used in its construction.
In addition, the locally constructed CRL inherits the issuing
distribution point from the delta CRL.
The constructed CRL has the CRL number specified in the CRL number A complete CRL and a delta CRL MAY be combined if the following four
extension found in the delta CRL used in its construction. conditions are satisfied:
CAs must ensure that application of a delta CRL to the referenced (a) The complete CRL and delta CRL have the same issuer.
base revocation information accurately reflects the current status of
revocation. If a CA supports the certificateHold revocation reason
the following rules must be applied when generating delta CRLs:
(a) If a certificate was listed as revoked with revocation reason (b) The complete CRL and delta CRL have the same scope. The two
certificateHold on a CRL (either a delta CRL or a CRL that is CRLs have the same scope if either of the following conditions are
complete for a given scope), whose cRLNumber is n, and the hold is met:
subsequently released, the certificate must be included in all
delta CRLs issued after the hold is released where the cRLNumber
of the referenced base CRL is less than or equal to n. The
certificate must be listed with revocation reason removeFromCRL
unless the certificate is subsequently revoked again for one of
the revocation reasons covered by the delta CRL, in which case the
certificate must be listed with the revocation reason appropriate
for the subsequent revocation.
(b) If the certificate was not removed from hold, but was (1) The issuingDistributionPoint extension is omitted from
permanently revoked, then it must be listed on all subsequent both the complete CRL and the delta CRL.
delta CRLs where the cRLNumber of the referenced base CRL is less
than the cRLNumber of the CRL (either a delta CRL or a CRL that is (2) The issuingDistributionPoint extension is present in both
complete for the given scope) on which the permanent revocation the complete CRL and the delta CRL, and the values for each of
notice first appeared. the fields in the extensions are the same in both CRLs.
(c) The CRL number of the complete CRL is greater than or equal
to the BaseCRLNumber specified in the delta CRL. That is, the
complete CRL contains (at a minimum) all the revocation
information held by the referenced base CRL.
(d) The CRL number of the complete CRL is less than the CRL
number of the delta CRL. That is, the delta CRL follows the
complete CRL in the numbering sequence.
CRL issuers MUST ensure that the combination of a delta CRL and any
appropriate complete CRL accurately reflects the current revocation
status. The CRL issuer MUST include an entry in the delta CRL for
each certificate within the scope of the delta CRL whose status has
changed since the generation of the referenced base CRL:
(a) If the certificate is revoked for a reason included in the
scope of the CRL, list the certificate as revoked.
(b) If not (a), list the certificate with the reason code
removeFromCRL.
The status of a certificate is considered to have changed if it is
revoked, placed on hold, released from hold, or if its revocation
reason changes.
It is appropriate to list a certificate with reason code
removeFromCRL on a delta CRL even if the certificate was not on hold
in the referenced base CRL. If the certificate was placed on hold in
any CRL issued after the base but before this delta CRL and then
released from hold, it MUST be listed on the delta CRL with
revocation reason removeFromCRL.
A CRL issuer MAY optionally list a certificate on a delta CRL with
reason code removeFromCRL if the notAfter time specified in the
certificate precedes the thisUpdate time specified in the delta CRL
and the certificate was listed on the referenced base CRL or in any
CRL issued after the base but before this delta CRL.
If a certificate revocation notice first appears on a delta CRL, then
it is possible for the certificate validity period to expire before
the next complete CRL for the same scope is issued. In this case,
the revocation notice MUST be included in all subsequent delta CRLs
until the revocation notice is included on at least one explicitly
issued complete CRL for this scope.
Applications that support delta CRLs are not required to support
local construction of CRLs. Since the delta CRLs are required to
reference a base CRL that was explicitly issued as a complete CRL,
the information required to process delta CRLs is always available in
a complete CRL.
id-ce-deltaCRLIndicator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 27 } id-ce-deltaCRLIndicator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 27 }
BaseCRLNumber ::= CRLNumber BaseCRLNumber ::= CRLNumber
5.2.5 Issuing Distribution Point 5.2.5 Issuing Distribution Point
The issuing distribution point is a critical CRL extension that The issuing distribution point is a critical CRL extension that
identifies the CRL distribution point for a particular CRL, and it identifies the CRL distribution point and scope for a particular CRL,
indicates whether the CRL covers revocation for end entity and it indicates whether the CRL covers revocation for end entity
certificates only, CA certificates only, or a limited set of reason certificates only, CA certificates only, attribute certificates
codes. Although the extension is critical, conforming only, or a limited set of reason codes. Although the extension is
implementations are not required to support this extension. critical, conforming implementations are not required to support this
extension.
The CRL is signed using the CA's private key. CRL Distribution The CRL is signed using the CRL issuer's private key. CRL
Points do not have their own key pairs. If the CRL is stored in the Distribution Points do not have their own key pairs. If the CRL is
X.500 Directory, it is stored in the Directory entry corresponding to stored in the X.500 Directory, it is stored in the Directory entry
the CRL distribution point, which may be different than the Directory corresponding to the CRL distribution point, which may be different
entry of the CA. than the Directory entry of the CRL issuer.
The reason codes associated with a distribution point MUST be The reason codes associated with a distribution point MUST be
specified in onlySomeReasons. If onlySomeReasons does not appear, specified in onlySomeReasons. If onlySomeReasons does not appear,
the distribution point shall contain revocations for all reason the distribution point MUST contain revocations for all reason codes.
codes. CAs MAY use CRL distribution points to partition the CRL on CAs may use CRL distribution points to partition the CRL on the basis
the basis of compromise and routine revocation. In this case, the of compromise and routine revocation. In this case, the revocations
revocations with reason code keyCompromise (1) and cACompromise (2) with reason code keyCompromise (1), cACompromise (2), and
appear in one distribution point, and the revocations with other aACompromise (8) appear in one distribution point, and the
reason codes appear in another distribution point. revocations with other reason codes appear in another distribution
point.
Where the issuingDistributionPoint extension contains a URL, the If the distributionPoint field is present and contains a URI, the
following semantics MUST be assumed: the object is a pointer to the following semantics MUST be assumed: the object is a pointer to the
most current CRL issued by this CA. The URI schemes ftp, http, most current CRL issued by this CRL issuer. The URI schemes ftp,
mailto [RFC1738] and ldap [RFC1778] are defined for this purpose. http, mailto [RFC1738] and ldap [RFC1778] are defined for this
The URI MUST be an absolute, not relative, pathname and MUST specify purpose. The URI MUST be an absolute pathname, not a relative
the host. pathname, and MUST specify the host.
If the distributionPoint field is absent, the CRL MUST contain
entries for all revoked unexpired certificates issued by the CRL
issuer, if any, within the scope of the CRL.
The CRL issuer MUST assert the indirectCRL boolean, if the scope of
the CRL includes certificates issued by authorities other than the
CRL issuer. The authority responsible for each entry is indicated by
the certificate issuer CRL entry extension (section 5.3.4).
id-ce-issuingDistributionPoint OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 28 } id-ce-issuingDistributionPoint OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 28 }
issuingDistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE { issuingDistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE {
distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL, distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL,
onlyContainsUserCerts [1] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, onlyContainsUserCerts [1] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
onlyContainsCACerts [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, onlyContainsCACerts [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
onlySomeReasons [3] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL, onlySomeReasons [3] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL,
indirectCRL [4] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE } indirectCRL [4] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
onlyContainsAttributeCerts [5] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE }
5.2.6 Freshest CRL (a.k.a. Delta CRL Distribution Point) 5.2.6 Freshest CRL (a.k.a. Delta CRL Distribution Point)
The freshest CRL extension identifies how delta-CRL information for The freshest CRL extension identifies how delta CRL information for
this CRL is obtained. The extension MUST be non-critical. this complete CRL is obtained. The extension MUST be non-critical.
This extension MUST NOT appear in delta CRLs.
The same syntax is used for this extension as the The same syntax is used for this extension as the
cRLDistributionPoints certificate extension, and is described in cRLDistributionPoints certificate extension, and is described in
section 4.2.1.14. The same conventions apply to both extensions. section 4.2.1.14. The same conventions apply to both extensions.
id-ce-freshestCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 46 } id-ce-freshestCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 46 }
FreshestCRL ::= CRLDistributionPoints FreshestCRL ::= CRLDistributionPoints
5.3 CRL Entry Extensions 5.3 CRL Entry Extensions
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The CRL entry extensions already defined by ANSI X9 and ISO/IEC/ITU The CRL entry extensions already defined by ANSI X9 and ISO/IEC/ITU
for X.509 v2 CRLs provide methods for associating additional for X.509 v2 CRLs provide methods for associating additional
attributes with CRL entries [X.509] [X9.55]. The X.509 v2 CRL format attributes with CRL entries [X.509] [X9.55]. The X.509 v2 CRL format
also allows communities to define private CRL entry extensions to also allows communities to define private CRL entry extensions to
carry information unique to those communities. Each extension in a carry information unique to those communities. Each extension in a
CRL entry may be designated as critical or non-critical. A CRL CRL entry may be designated as critical or non-critical. A CRL
validation MUST fail if it encounters a critical CRL entry extension validation MUST fail if it encounters a critical CRL entry extension
which it does not know how to process. However, an unrecognized non- which it does not know how to process. However, an unrecognized non-
critical CRL entry extension may be ignored. The following critical CRL entry extension may be ignored. The following
subsections present recommended extensions used within Internet CRL subsections present recommended extensions used within Internet CRL
entries and standard locations for information. Communities may entries and standard locations for information. Communities MAY
elect to use additional CRL entry extensions; however, caution should elect to use additional CRL entry extensions; however, caution SHOULD
be exercised in adopting any critical extensions in CRL entries which be exercised in adopting any critical extensions in CRL entries which
might be used in a general context. might be used in a general context.
All CRL entry extensions used in this specification are non-critical. All CRL entry extensions used in this specification are non-critical.
Support for these extensions is optional for conforming CAs and Support for these extensions is optional for conforming CRL issuers
applications. However, CAs that issue CRLs SHOULD include reason and applications. However, CRL issuers SHOULD include reason codes
codes (see sec. 5.3.1) and invalidity dates (see sec. 5.3.3) whenever (section 5.3.1) and invalidity dates (section 5.3.3) whenever this
this information is available. information is available.
5.3.1 Reason Code 5.3.1 Reason Code
The reasonCode is a non-critical CRL entry extension that identifies The reasonCode is a non-critical CRL entry extension that identifies
the reason for the certificate revocation. CAs are strongly the reason for the certificate revocation. CRL issuers are strongly
encouraged to include meaningful reason codes in CRL entries; encouraged to include meaningful reason codes in CRL entries;
however, the reason code CRL entry extension SHOULD be absent instead however, the reason code CRL entry extension SHOULD be absent instead
of using the unspecified (0) reasonCode value. of using the unspecified (0) reasonCode value.
id-ce-cRLReason OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 21 } id-ce-cRLReason OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 21 }
-- reasonCode ::= { CRLReason } -- reasonCode ::= { CRLReason }
CRLReason ::= ENUMERATED { CRLReason ::= ENUMERATED {
unspecified (0), unspecified (0),
keyCompromise (1), keyCompromise (1),
cACompromise (2), cACompromise (2),
affiliationChanged (3), affiliationChanged (3),
superseded (4), superseded (4),
cessationOfOperation (5), cessationOfOperation (5),
certificateHold (6), certificateHold (6),
removeFromCRL (8) } removeFromCRL (8),
privilegeWithdrawn (9),
aACompromise (10) }
5.3.2 Hold Instruction Code 5.3.2 Hold Instruction Code
The hold instruction code is a non-critical CRL entry extension that The hold instruction code is a non-critical CRL entry extension that
provides a registered instruction identifier which indicates the provides a registered instruction identifier which indicates the
action to be taken after encountering a certificate that has been action to be taken after encountering a certificate that has been
placed on hold. placed on hold.
id-ce-holdInstructionCode OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 23 } id-ce-holdInstructionCode OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 23 }
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instruction id-holdinstruction-none is semantically equivalent to the instruction id-holdinstruction-none is semantically equivalent to the
absence of a holdInstructionCode, and its use is strongly deprecated absence of a holdInstructionCode, and its use is strongly deprecated
for the Internet PKI. for the Internet PKI.
5.3.3 Invalidity Date 5.3.3 Invalidity Date
The invalidity date is a non-critical CRL entry extension that The invalidity date is a non-critical CRL entry extension that
provides the date on which it is known or suspected that the private provides the date on which it is known or suspected that the private
key was compromised or that the certificate otherwise became invalid. key was compromised or that the certificate otherwise became invalid.
This date may be earlier than the revocation date in the CRL entry, This date may be earlier than the revocation date in the CRL entry,
which is the date at which the CA processed the revocation. When a which is the date at which the CA processed the revocation. When a
revocation is first posted by a CA in a CRL, the invalidity date may revocation is first posted by a CRL issuer in a CRL, the invalidity
precede the date of issue of earlier CRLs, but the revocation date date may precede the date of issue of earlier CRLs, but the
SHOULD NOT precede the date of issue of earlier CRLs. Whenever this revocation date SHOULD NOT precede the date of issue of earlier CRLs.
information is available, CAs are strongly encouraged to share it Whenever this information is available, CRL issuers are strongly
with CRL users. encouraged to share it with CRL users.
The GeneralizedTime values included in this field MUST be expressed The GeneralizedTime values included in this field MUST be expressed
in Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu), and MUST be specified and interpreted in Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu), and MUST be specified and interpreted
as defined in section 4.1.2.5.2. as defined in section 4.1.2.5.2.
id-ce-invalidityDate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 24 } id-ce-invalidityDate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 24 }
invalidityDate ::= GeneralizedTime invalidityDate ::= GeneralizedTime
5.3.4 Certificate Issuer 5.3.4 Certificate Issuer
This CRL entry extension identifies the certificate issuer associated This CRL entry extension identifies the certificate issuer associated
with an entry in an indirect CRL, i.e. a CRL that has the indirectCRL with an entry in an indirect CRL, i.e. a CRL that has the indirectCRL
indicator set in its issuing distribution point extension. If this indicator set in its issuing distribution point extension. If this
extension is not present on the first entry in an indirect CRL, the extension is not present on the first entry in an indirect CRL, the
certificate issuer defaults to the CRL issuer. On subsequent entries certificate issuer defaults to the CRL issuer. On subsequent entries
in an indirect CRL, if this extension is not present, the certificate in an indirect CRL, if this extension is not present, the certificate
issuer for the entry is the same as that for the preceding entry. issuer for the entry is the same as that for the preceding entry.
This field is defined as follows: This field is defined as follows:
id-ce-certificateIssuer OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 29 } id-ce-certificateIssuer OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 29 }
certificateIssuer ::= GeneralNames certificateIssuer ::= GeneralNames
If used by conforming CAs that issue CRLs, this extension MUST always If used by conforming CRL issuers, this extension MUST always be
be critical. If an implementation ignored this extension it could critical. If an implementation ignored this extension it could not
not correctly attribute CRL entries to certificates. This correctly attribute CRL entries to certificates. This specification
specification RECOMMENDS that implementations recognize this RECOMMENDS that implementations recognize this extension.
extension.
6 Certification Path Validation 6 Certification Path Validation
Certification path validation procedures for the Internet PKI are Certification path validation procedures for the Internet PKI are
based on the algorithm supplied in [X.509]. Certification path based on the algorithm supplied in [X.509]. Certification path
processing verifies the binding between the subject distinguished processing verifies the binding between the subject distinguished
name and/or subject alternative name and subject public key. The name and/or subject alternative name and subject public key. The
binding is limited by constraints which are specified in the binding is limited by constraints which are specified in the
certificates which comprise the path and inputs which are specified certificates which comprise the path and inputs which are specified
by the relying party. The basic constraints and policy constraints by the relying party. The basic constraints and policy constraints
extensions allow the certification path processing logic to automate extensions allow the certification path processing logic to automate
the decision making process. the decision making process.
This section describes an algorithm for validating certification This section describes an algorithm for validating certification
paths. Conforming implementations of this specification are not paths. Conforming implementations of this specification are not
required to implement this algorithm, but MUST provide functionality required to implement this algorithm, but MUST provide functionality
equivalent to the external behavior resulting from this procedure. equivalent to the external behavior resulting from this procedure.
Any algorithm may be used by a particular implementation so long as Any algorithm may be used by a particular implementation so long as
it derives the correct result. it derives the correct result.
skipping to change at page 59, line 23 skipping to change at page 62, line 31
Section 6.2 describes methods for using the path validation algorithm Section 6.2 describes methods for using the path validation algorithm
in specific implementations. Two specific cases are discussed: the in specific implementations. Two specific cases are discussed: the
case where paths may begin with one of several trusted CAs; and where case where paths may begin with one of several trusted CAs; and where
compatibility with the PEM architecture is required. compatibility with the PEM architecture is required.
Section 6.3 describes the steps necessary to determine if a Section 6.3 describes the steps necessary to determine if a
certificate is revoked or on hold status when CRLs are the revocation certificate is revoked or on hold status when CRLs are the revocation
mechanism used by the certificate issuer. mechanism used by the certificate issuer.
6.1 Basic Path Validation 6.1 Basic Path Validation
This text describes an algorithm for X.509 path processing. A This text describes an algorithm for X.509 path processing. A
conformant implementation MUST include an X.509 path processing conformant implementation MUST include an X.509 path processing
procedure that is functionally equivalent to the external behavior of procedure that is functionally equivalent to the external behavior of
this algorithm. However, some of the certificate fields processed in this algorithm. However, support for some of the certificate
this algorithm are optional for compliant implementations. Clients extensions processed in this algorithm are OPTIONAL for compliant
that do not support these fields may omit the corresponding steps in implementations. Clients that do not support these extensions MAY
the path validation algorithm. omit the corresponding steps in the path validation algorithm.
For example, clients are not required to support the policy mapping For example, clients are NOT REQUIRED to support the policy mapping
extension. Clients that do not support this extension may omit the extension. Clients that do not support this extension MAY omit the
path validation steps where policy mappings are processed. Note that path validation steps where policy mappings are processed. Note that
clients MUST reject the certificate if it contains critical clients MUST reject the certificate if it contains an unsupported
extensions that are not supported. critical extension.
This text describes the trust anchor as an input to the algorithm. The trust anchor is an input to the algorithm. There is no
There is no requirement that the same trust anchor be used to requirement that the same trust anchor be used to validate all
validate all certification paths. Different trust anchors may be certification paths. Different trust anchors MAY be used to validate
used to validate different paths, as discussed further in Section different paths, as discussed further in Section 6.2.
6.2.
The primary goal of path validation is to verify the binding between The primary goal of path validation is to verify the binding between
a subject distinguished name or subject alternative name and subject a subject distinguished name or subject alternative name and subject
public key, as represented in the end entity certificate, based on public key, as represented in the end entity certificate, based on
the public key of the trust anchor. This requires obtaining a the public key of the trust anchor. This requires obtaining a
sequence of certificates that support that binding. The procedure sequence of certificates that support that binding. The procedure
performed to obtain this sequence of certificates is outside the performed to obtain this sequence of certificates is outside the
scope of this section. scope of this specification.
To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other
things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n
certificates) satisfies the following conditions: certificates) satisfies the following conditions:
(a) for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is (a) for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is
the issuer of certificate x+1; the issuer of certificate x+1;
(b) certificate 1 is issued by the trust anchor; (b) certificate 1 is issued by the trust anchor;
(c) certificate n is the end entity certificate; and (c) certificate n is the end entity certificate; and
(d) for all x in {1, ..., n}, the certificate was valid at the (d) for all x in {1, ..., n}, the certificate was valid at the
time in question. time in question.
A particular certification path may not, however, be appropriate for A particular certification path may not, however, be appropriate for
all applications. The path validation process also determines the all applications. Therefore, an application MAY augment this
set of certificate policies that are valid for this path, based on algorithm to further limit the set of valid paths. The path
the certificate policies extension, policy mapping extension, policy validation process also determines the set of certificate policies
constraints extension, and inhibit any-policy extension. To achieve that are valid for this path, based on the certificate policies
this, the path validation algorithm constructs a valid policy tree. extension, policy mapping extension, policy constraints extension,
If the set of certificate policies that are valid for this path is and inhibit any-policy extension. To achieve this, the path
not empty, then the result will be a valid policy tree of depth n, validation algorithm constructs a valid policy tree. If the set of
otherwise the result will be a NULL valid policy tree. certificate policies that are valid for this path is not empty, then
the result will be a valid policy tree of depth n, otherwise the
result will be a null valid policy tree.
A certificate is termed self-issued if the DNs that appear in the A certificate is self-issued if the DNs that appear in the subject
subject and issuer fields are identical and are not empty. In and issuer fields are identical and are not empty. In general, the
general, the issuer and subject of the certificates that make up a issuer and subject of the certificates that make up a path are
path are different for each certificate. However, a CA may issue a different for each certificate. However, a CA may issue a
certificate to itself to support key rollover or changes in certificate to itself to support key rollover or changes in
certificate policies. These self-issued certificates are not counted certificate policies. These self-issued certificates are not counted
when evaluating path length or name constraints. when evaluating path length or name constraints.
This section presents the algorithm in four basic steps: (1) This section presents the algorithm in four basic steps: (1)
initialization, (2) basic certificate processing, (3) preparation for initialization, (2) basic certificate processing, (3) preparation for
the next certificate, and (4) wrap-up. Steps (1) and (4) are the next certificate, and (4) wrap-up. Steps (1) and (4) are
performed exactly once. Step (2) is performed for all certificates performed exactly once. Step (2) is performed for all certificates
in the path. Step (3) is performed for all certificates in the path in the path. Step (3) is performed for all certificates in the path
except the final certificate. Figure 2 provides a high-level except the final certificate. Figure 2 provides a high-level
flowchart of this algorithm. flowchart of this algorithm.
+-------+ +-------+
| START | | START |
+-------+ +-------+
| |
V V
+----------------+ +----------------+
| Initialization | | Initialization |
+----------------+ +----------------+
| |
+<--------------------+ +<--------------------+
| | | |
V | V |
+----------------+ | +----------------+ |
| Process Cert | | | Process Cert | |
+----------------+ | +----------------+ |
| | | |
V | V |
+================+ | +================+ |
| IF Last Cert | | | IF Last Cert | |
| in Path | | | in Path | |
+================+ | +================+ |
| | | | | |
THEN | | ELSE | THEN | | ELSE |
V V | V V |
+----------------+ +----------------+ | +----------------+ +----------------+ |
| Wrap up | | Prepare for | | | Wrap up | | Prepare for | |
+----------------+ | Next Cert | | +----------------+ | Next Cert | |
| +----------------+ | | +----------------+ |
V | | V | |
+-------+ +--------------+ +-------+ +--------------+
| STOP | | STOP |
+-------+ +-------+
Figure 2. Path Processing Flowchart Figure 2. Certification Path Processing Flowchart
6.1.1 Inputs 6.1.1 Inputs
This algorithm assumes the following seven inputs are provided to the This algorithm assumes the following seven inputs are provided to the
path processing logic: path processing logic:
(a) a prospective certification path of length n; (a) a prospective certification path of length n;
(b) the time, T, for which the validity of the path should be (b) the time, T, for which the validity of the path should be
determined. This may be the current date/time, or some point in determined. This may be the current date/time, or some point in
the past. the past.
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(e) initial-policy-mapping-inhibit, which indicates if policy (e) initial-policy-mapping-inhibit, which indicates if policy
mapping is allowed in the certification path. mapping is allowed in the certification path.
(f) initial-explicit-policy, which indicates if the path must be (f) initial-explicit-policy, which indicates if the path must be
valid for at least one of the certificate policies in the user- valid for at least one of the certificate policies in the user-
initial-policy-set. initial-policy-set.
(g) initial-any-policy-inhibit, which indicates whether the any- (g) initial-any-policy-inhibit, which indicates whether the any-
policy OID should be processed if it is included in a certificate. policy OID should be processed if it is included in a certificate.
6.1.2 Initialization 6.1.2 Initialization
The initialization phase establishes eleven state variables based The initialization phase establishes eleven state variables based
upon the seven inputs: upon the seven inputs:
(a) valid_policy_tree: A tree of certificate policies with their (a) valid_policy_tree: A tree of certificate policies with their
optional qualifiers; each of the leaves of the tree represents a optional qualifiers; each of the leaves of the tree represents a
valid policy at this stage in the certification path validation. valid policy at this stage in the certification path validation.
If valid policies exist at this stage in the certification path If valid policies exist at this stage in the certification path
validation, the depth of the tree is equal to the number of validation, the depth of the tree is equal to the number of
certificates in the chain that have been processed. If valid certificates in the chain that have been processed. If valid
skipping to change at page 63, line 44 skipping to change at page 66, line 48
+----------------+ +----------------+
| any-policy | <---- valid_policy | any-policy | <---- valid_policy
+----------------+ +----------------+
| {} | <---- qualifier_set | {} | <---- qualifier_set
+----------------+ +----------------+
| FALSE | <---- criticality_indicator | FALSE | <---- criticality_indicator
+----------------+ +----------------+
| {any-policy} | <---- expected_policy_set | {any-policy} | <---- expected_policy_set
+----------------+ +----------------+
Figure 3. Initial value of the valid_policy_tree state variable Figure 3. Initial value of the valid_policy_tree state variable
(b) permitted_subtrees: A set of root names for each name type (b) permitted_subtrees: A set of root names for each name type
(e.g., X.500 distinguished names, email addresses, or ip (e.g., X.500 distinguished names, email addresses, or ip
addresses) defining a set of subtrees within which all subject addresses) defining a set of subtrees within which all subject
names in subsequent certificates in the certification path MUST names in subsequent certificates in the certification path MUST
fall. This variable includes a set for each name type: the fall. This variable includes a set for each name type: the
initial value for the set for Distinguished Names is the set of initial value for the set for Distinguished Names is the set of
all Distinguished names; the initial value for the set of RFC822 all Distinguished names; the initial value for the set of RFC822
names is the set of all RFC822 names, etc. names is the set of all RFC822 names, etc.
skipping to change at page 65, line 23 skipping to change at page 68, line 26
initialized to the trusted issuer provided in the trust anchor initialized to the trusted issuer provided in the trust anchor
information. information.
(k) max_path_length: this integer is initialized to n, and is (k) max_path_length: this integer is initialized to n, and is
reset by the path length constraint field within the basic reset by the path length constraint field within the basic
constraints extension of a CA certificate. constraints extension of a CA certificate.
Upon completion of the initialization steps, perform the basic Upon completion of the initialization steps, perform the basic
certificate processing steps specified in 6.1.3. certificate processing steps specified in 6.1.3.
6.1.3 Basic Certificate Processing 6.1.3 Basic Certificate Processing
The basic path processing actions to be performed for certificate i The basic path processing actions to be performed for certificate i
are listed below. are listed below.
(a) Verify the basic certificate information. The certificate (a) Verify the basic certificate information. The certificate
must satisfy each of the following: MUST satisfy each of the following:
(1) The certificate was signed with the (1) The certificate was signed with the
working_public_key_algorithm using the working_public_key and working_public_key_algorithm using the working_public_key and
the working_public_key_parameters. the working_public_key_parameters.
(2) The certificate validity period includes time T. (2) The certificate validity period includes time T.
(3) At time T, the certificate is not revoked and is not on (3) At time T, the certificate is not revoked and is not on
hold status. This may be determined by obtaining the hold status. This may be determined by obtaining the
appropriate CRL (see section 6.3), status information, or by appropriate CRL (section 6.3), status information, or by out-
out-of-band mechanisms. of-band mechanisms.
(4) The certificate issuer name is the working_issuer_name. (4) The certificate issuer name is the working_issuer_name.
(b) If certificate i is not self-issued, verify that the subject (b) If certificate i is self-issued and it is not the final
name is within one of the permitted_subtrees for X.500 certificate in the path, skip this step for certificate i.
distinguished names, and verify that each of the alternative names Otherwise, verify that the subject name is within one of the
in the subjectAltName extension (critical or non-critical) is permitted_subtrees for X.500 distinguished names, and verify that
within one of the permitted_subtrees for that name type. each of the alternative names in the subjectAltName extension
(critical or non-critical) is within one of the permitted_subtrees
for that name type.
(c) If certificate i is not self-issued, verify that the subject (c) If certificate i is self-issued and it is not the final
name is not within one of the excluded_subtrees for X.500 certificate in the path, skip this step for certificate i.
distinguished names, and verify that each of the alternative names Otherwise, verify that the subject name is not within one of the
in the subjectAltName extension (critical or non-critical) is not excluded_subtrees for X.500 distinguished names, and verify that
within one of the excluded_subtrees for that name type. each of the alternative names in the subjectAltName extension
(critical or non-critical) is not within one of the
excluded_subtrees for that name type.
(d) If the certificate policies extension is present in the (d) If the certificate policies extension is present in the
certificiate and the valid_policy_tree is not NULL, process the certificiate and the valid_policy_tree is not NULL, process the
policy information by performing the following steps in order: policy information by performing the following steps in order:
(1) For each policy P not equal to any-policy in the (1) For each policy P not equal to any-policy in the
certificate policies extension, let P-OID denote the OID in certificate policies extension, let P-OID denote the OID in
policy P and P-Q denote the qualifier set for policy P. policy P and P-Q denote the qualifier set for policy P.
Perform the following steps in order: Perform the following steps in order:
(i) If the valid_policy_tree includes a node of depth i-1 (i) If the valid_policy_tree includes a node of depth i-1
where P-OID is in the expected_policy_set, create a child where P-OID is in the expected_policy_set, create a child
node as follows: set the valid_policy to OID- P; set the node as follows: set the valid_policy to OID-P; set the
qualifier_set to P-Q, and set the expected_policy_set to {P- qualifier_set to P-Q, and set the expected_policy_set to {P-
OID}. OID}.
For example, consider a valid_policy_tree with a node of For example, consider a valid_policy_tree with a node of
depth i-1 where the expected_policy_set is {Gold, White}. depth i-1 where the expected_policy_set is {Gold, White}.
Assume the certificate policies Gold and Silver appear in Assume the certificate policies Gold and Silver appear in
the certificate policies extension of certificate i. The the certificate policies extension of certificate i. The
Gold policy is matched but the Silver policy is not. This Gold policy is matched but the Silver policy is not. This
rule will generate a child node of depth i for the Gold rule will generate a child node of depth i for the Gold
policy. The result is shown as Figure 4. policy. The result is shown as Figure 4.
skipping to change at page 67, line 28 skipping to change at page 70, line 28
|-----------------| |-----------------|
| Gold | | Gold |
|-----------------| |-----------------|
| {} | | {} |
|-----------------| node of depth i |-----------------| node of depth i
| uninitialized | | uninitialized |
|-----------------| |-----------------|
| {Gold} | | {Gold} |
|-----------------| |-----------------|
Figure 4. Processing an exact match Figure 4. Processing an exact match
(ii) If there was no match in step (i) and the (ii) If there was no match in step (i) and the
valid_policy_tree includes a node of depth i-1 with the valid_policy_tree includes a node of depth i-1 with the
valid policy any-policy, generate a child node with the valid policy any-policy, generate a child node with the
following values: set the valid_policy to P-OID; set the following values: set the valid_policy to P-OID; set the
qualifier_set to P-Q, and set the expected_policy_set to {P- qualifier_set to P-Q, and set the expected_policy_set to {P-
OID}. OID}.
For example, consider a valid_policy_tree with a node of For example, consider a valid_policy_tree with a node of
depth i-1 where the valid_policy is any-policy. Assume the depth i-1 where the valid_policy is any-policy. Assume the
skipping to change at page 68, line 28 skipping to change at page 71, line 28
|-----------------| |-----------------| |-----------------| |-----------------|
| Gold | | Silver | | Gold | | Silver |
|-----------------| |-----------------| |-----------------| |-----------------|
| {} | | {Q-Silver} | | {} | | {Q-Silver} |
|-----------------| nodes of |-----------------| |-----------------| nodes of |-----------------|
| uninitialized | depth i | uninitialized | | uninitialized | depth i | uninitialized |
|-----------------| |-----------------| |-----------------| |-----------------|
| {Gold} | | {Silver} | | {Gold} | | {Silver} |
|-----------------| |-----------------| |-----------------| |-----------------|
Figure 5. Processing unmatched policies when a leaf node Figure 5. Processing unmatched policies when a leaf node
specifies any-policy specifies any-policy
(2) If the certificate policies extension includes the policy (2) If the certificate policies extension includes the policy
any-policy with the qualifier set AP-Q and inhibit_any-policy any-policy with the qualifier set AP-Q and inhibit_any-policy
is greater than 0, then: is greater than 0, then:
For each node in the valid_policy_tree of depth i-1, for each For each node in the valid_policy_tree of depth i-1, for each
value in the expected_policy_set (including any-policy) that value in the expected_policy_set (including any-policy) that
does not appear in a child node, create a child node with the does not appear in a child node, create a child node with the
following values: set the valid_policy to the value from the following values: set the valid_policy to the value from the
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|-----------------| |-----------------| |-----------------| |-----------------|
| Gold | | Silver | | Gold | | Silver |
|-----------------| |-----------------| |-----------------| |-----------------|
| {} | | {} | | {} | | {} |
|-----------------| nodes of |-----------------| |-----------------| nodes of |-----------------|
| uninitialized | depth i | uninitialized | | uninitialized | depth i | uninitialized |
|-----------------| |-----------------| |-----------------| |-----------------|
| {Gold} | | {Silver} | | {Gold} | | {Silver} |
|-----------------| |-----------------| |-----------------| |-----------------|
Figure 6. Processing unmatched policies when the certificate Figure 6. Processing unmatched policies when the certificate
policies extension specifies any-policy policies extension specifies any-policy
(3) If there is a node in the valid_policy_tree of depth i-1 or (3) If there is a node in the valid_policy_tree of depth i-1 or
less without any child nodes, delete that node. Repeat this less without any child nodes, delete that node. Repeat this
step until there are no nodes of depth i-1 or less without step until there are no nodes of depth i-1 or less without
children. children.
For example, consider the valid_policy_tree shown in Figure 7 For example, consider the valid_policy_tree shown in Figure 7
below. The two nodes at depth i-1 that are marked with an 'X' below. The two nodes at depth i-1 that are marked with an 'X'
have no children, and are deleted. Applying this rule to the have no children, and are deleted. Applying this rule to the
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6.1.6 Outputs 6.1.6 Outputs
If path processing succeeds, the procedure terminates, returning a If path processing succeeds, the procedure terminates, returning a
success indication together with final value of the success indication together with final value of the
valid_policy_tree, the working_public_key, the valid_policy_tree, the working_public_key, the
working_public_key_algorithm, and the working_public_key_parameters. working_public_key_algorithm, and the working_public_key_parameters.
6.2 Using the Path Validation Algorithm 6.2 Using the Path Validation Algorithm
The path validation algorithm describes the process of validating a The path validation algorithm describes the process of validating a
single certification path. While each path begins with a specific single certification path. While each certification path begins with
trust anchor, there is no requirement that all paths validated by a a specific trust anchor, there is no requirement that all
particular system share a single trust anchor. An implementation certification paths validated by a particular system share a single
that supports multiple trust anchors may augment the algorithm trust anchor. An implementation that supports multiple trust anchors
prresented in section 6.1 to further limit the set of valid paths MAY augment the algorithm presented in section 6.1 to further limit
which begin with a particular trust anchor. For example, an the set of valid certification paths which begin with a particular
implementation may specify name constraints that apply to a specific trust anchor. For example, an implementation MAY modify the
trust anchor. algorithm to apply name constraints to a specific trust anchor during
the initialization phase, or the application MAY require the presence
of a particular alternative name form in the end entity certificate,
or the application MAY impose requirements on application-specific
extensions. Thus, the path validation algorithm presented in section
6.1 defines the minimum conditions for a path to be considered valid.
The selection of one or more trusted CAs is a local decision. A The selection of one or more trusted CAs is a local decision. A
system may provide any one of its trusted CAs as the trust anchor for system may provide any one of its trusted CAs as the trust anchor for
a particular path. The inputs to the path validation algorithm may a particular path. The inputs to the path validation algorithm may
be different for each path. The inputs used to process a path may be different for each path. The inputs used to process a path may
reflect application-specific requirements or limitations in the trust reflect application-specific requirements or limitations in the trust
accorded a particular trust anchor. For example, a trusted CA may accorded a particular trust anchor. For example, a trusted CA may
only be trusted for a particular certificate policy. This only be trusted for a particular certificate policy. This
restriction can be expressed through the inputs to the path restriction can be expressed through the inputs to the path
validation procedure. validation procedure.
skipping to change at page 75, line 44 skipping to change at page 79, line 5
Policy Certification Authorities (PCAs) names and an indicator of the Policy Certification Authorities (PCAs) names and an indicator of the
position in the certification path where the PCA is expected. At the position in the certification path where the PCA is expected. At the
nominated PCA position, the CA name is compared against this list. nominated PCA position, the CA name is compared against this list.
If a recognized PCA name is found, then a constraint of If a recognized PCA name is found, then a constraint of
SubordinateToCA is implicitly assumed for the remainder of the SubordinateToCA is implicitly assumed for the remainder of the
certification path and processing continues. If no valid PCA name is certification path and processing continues. If no valid PCA name is
found, and if the certification path cannot be validated on the basis found, and if the certification path cannot be validated on the basis
of identified policies, then the certification path is considered of identified policies, then the certification path is considered
invalid. invalid.
6.3 CRL Validation 6.3 CRL Validation
This section describes the steps necessary to determine if a This section describes the steps necessary to determine if a
certificate is revoked or on hold status when CRLs are the revocation certificate is revoked or on hold status when CRLs are the revocation
mechanism used by the certificate issuer. Conforming implementations mechanism used by the certificate issuer. Conforming implementations
of this specification are not required to implement this algorithm, that support CRLs are not required to implement this algorithm, but
but MUST be functionally equivalent to the external behavior they MUST be functionally equivalent to the external behavior
resulting from this procedure. Any algorithm may be used by a resulting from this procedure. Any algorithm may be used by a
particular implementation so long as it derives the correct result. particular implementation so long as it derives the correct result.
This algorithm assumes that all of the needed CRLs are available in a
local cache. Further, if the next update time of a CRL has passed,
the algorithm assumes a mechanism to fetch a current CRL and place it
in the local CRL cache.
This algorithm defines a set of inputs, a set of state variables, and This algorithm defines a set of inputs, a set of state variables, and
processing steps that are performed for each certificate in the path. processing steps that are performed for each certificate in the path.
The algorithm output is the revocation status of the certificate.
6.3.1 Revocation Inputs 6.3.1 Revocation Inputs
To support revocation processing, the algorithm requires two inputs: To support revocation processing, the algorithm requires two inputs:
(a) certificate: the algorithm requires the certificate serial (a) certificate: The algorithm requires the certificate serial
number and issuer name to determine if a certificate is on a number and issuer name to determine whether a certificate is on a
particular CRL. The basicConstraints extension is used to particular CRL. The basicConstraints extension is used to
determine whether the supplied certificate is associated with a CA determine whether the supplied certificate is associated with a CA
or an end-entity. If present, the algorithm may use the or an end entity. If present, the algorithm uses the
cRLDistributionsPoint and freshestCRL extensions to determine cRLDistributionsPoint and freshestCRL extensions to determine
revocation status. revocation status.
(b) use-deltas: This boolean input determines if the delta needs (b) use-deltas: This boolean input determines whether delta CRLs
to be checked if the CRL is still valid. are applied to CRLs.
Note that implementations supporting legacy PKIs, such as RFC 1422 Note that implementations supporting legacy PKIs, such as RFC 1422
and X.509 version 1, will need an additional input indicating and X.509 version 1, will need an additional input indicating
whether the supplied certificate is associated with a CA or an whether the supplied certificate is associated with a CA or an end
end-entity. entity.
6.3.2 Initialization and Revocation State Variables 6.3.2 Initialization and Revocation State Variables
To support CRL processing, the algorithm requires the following state To support CRL processing, the algorithm requires the following state
variables: variables:
(a) reasons_mask: This variable contains the set of revocation (a) reasons_mask: This variable contains the set of revocation
reasons supported by the CRLs and delta CRLs processed so far. reasons supported by the CRLs and delta CRLs processed so far.
The legal members of the set are the possible values for The legal members of the set are the possible revocation reason
reasonflags: unspecified; keyCompromise; caCompromise; values: unspecified, keyCompromise, caCompromise,
affiliationChanged; superseded; cessationOfOperation; and affiliationChanged, superseded, cessationOfOperation,
certificateHold. The special value all-reasons is used to denote certificateHold, privilegeWithdrawn, and aACompromise. The
the set of all legal members. This variable is initialized to the special value all-reasons is used to denote the set of all legal
empty set. members. This variable is initialized to the empty set.
(b) cert_status: This variable contains the status of the (b) cert_status: This variable contains the status of the
certificate. Legal values are unspecified; keyCompromise; certificate. This variable may be assigned one of the following
caCompromise; affiliationChanged; superseded; values: unspecified, keyCompromise, caCompromise,
cessationOfOperation; and certificateHold, the special value affiliationChanged, superseded, cessationOfOperation,
UNREVOKED, or the special value UNDETERMINED. This variable is certificateHold, removeFromCRL, privilegeWithdrawn, aACompromise,
initialized to the special value UNREVOKED. the special value UNREVOKED, or the special value UNDETERMINED.
This variable is initialized to the special value UNREVOKED.
(c) interim_reasons_mask: This contains the set of revocation (c) interim_reasons_mask: This contains the set of revocation
reasons supported by the CRL or delta CRL currently being reasons supported by the CRL or delta CRL currently being
processed. processed.
Note: In some environments, it is not necessary to check all reason Note: In some environments, it is not necessary to check all reason
codes. For example, some envornments only are concerned with codes. For example, some environments are only concerned with
caCompromise and keyCompromise for CA certificates. This algorithnm caCompromise and keyCompromise for CA certificates. This algorithm
checks all reason codes. Additional processing and state variables checks all reason codes. Additional processing and state variables
may be necessary to limit the checking to a subset of the reason may be necessary to limit the checking to a subset of the reason
codes. codes.
6.3.3 CRL Processing 6.3.3 CRL Processing
This algorithm begins by assuming the certificate is not revoked. This algorithm begins by assuming the certificate is not revoked.
The algorithm checks one or more CRLs until either the certificate The algorithm checks one or more CRLs until either the certificate
status is determined to be revoked or sufficent CRLs have been status is determined to be revoked or sufficient CRLs have been
checked to cover all reason codes. checked to cover all reason codes.
For each distribution point (DP) in the crl distribution points For each distribution point (DP) in the certificate CRL distribution
extension while ((reasons_mask is not all-reasons) and (cert_status points extension, for each corresponding CRL in the local CRL cache,
is UNREVOKED)) while ((reasons_mask is not all-reasons) and
(cert_status is UNREVOKED)) perform the following:
(1) locate the corresponding CRL in CRL cache, and perform the (a) Update the local CRL cache by obtaining a complete CRL, a
following verifications: delta CRL, or both, as required:
(a) compute the interim_reasons_mask for this CRL as follows: (1) If the current time is after the value of the CRL next
update field, then do one of the following:
1. if the CRL includes reasons and the DP includes reasons, (i) If use-deltas is set and either the certificate or the
then set interim_reasons_mask to the intersection of of CRL contains the freshest CRL extension, obtain a delta CRL
reasons in the DP and reasons in CRL reasons extension. with the a next update value that is after the current time
and can be used to update the locally cached CRL as
specified in section 5.2.4.
2. if the CRL includes reasons but the DP omits reasons, (ii) Update the local CRL cache with a current complete
then set interim_reasons_mask to the value of CRL reasons. CRL, verify that the current time is before the next update
value in the new CRL, and continue processing with the new
CRL. If use-deltas is set, then obtain the current delta
CRL that can be used to update the new locally cached
complete CRL as specified in section 5.2.4.
3. if the CRL omits reasons but the DP includes reasons, (2) If the current time is before the value of the next update
then set interim_reasons_mask to the value of DP reasons. field and use-deltas is set, then obtain the current delta CRL
that can be used to update the locally cached complete CRL as
specified in section 5.2.4.
4. if the CRL omits reasons and the DP omits reasons, then (b) Verify the issuer and scope of the complete CRL as follows:
set interim_reasons_mask to the special value all-reasons.
Verify that interim_reasons_mask includes one or more reasons (1) If the DP includes cRLIssuer, then verify that the issuer
that is not included in the reasons_mask. field in the complete CRL matches cRLIssuer in the DP and that
the complete CRL contains an issuing distribution point
extension with the indrectCRL boolean asserted. Otherwise,
verify that the CRL issuer matches the certificate issuer.
(b) Verify the issuer of the CRL as follows: (2) If the complete CRL includes an issuing distribution point
(IDP) CRL extension check the following:
if the DP includes cRLIssuer, then verify that the CRL (i) If the distribution point name is present in the IDP
issuer matches cRLIssuer else verify that the CRL issuer CRL extension, then verify that it matches one of the names
matches the certificate issuer. in the DP.
(c) obtain and validate the certification path for the CRL (ii) If the onlyContainsUserCerts boolean is asserted in
issuer. the IDP CRL extension, verify that the certificate does not
include the basic constraints extension with the cA boolean
asserted.
(d) validate the signature on the CRL. (iii) If the onlyContainsCACerts boolean is asserted in the
IDP CRL extension, verify that the certificate includes the
basic constraints extension with the cA boolean asserted.
(2) If each of the verifications (a) through (d) succeeds, then (iv) Verify that the onlyContainsAttributeCerts boolean is
perform the following steps: not asserted.
(a) If the value of next update field is before the current- (c) If use-deltas is set, verify the issuer and scope of the
time, otain an appropriate delta CRL or discard the CRL. delta CRL as follows:
(b) If the user wants freshest available info AND the freshest (1) Verify that the delta CRL issuer matches complete CRL
CRL extension is present, check for a corresponding delta for issuer.
this base.
(c) If a delta was obtained in (a) or (b), verify that the (2) If the complete CRL includes an issuing distribution point
delta CRL addresses the same set of certificates and the same (IDP) CRL extension, verify that the delta CRL contains a
set of reasons as the CRL. matching IDP CRL extension. If the complete CRL omits an IDP
CRL extension, verify that the delta CRL also omits an IDP CRL
extension.
(d) Perform the checks in step 1 (b) and (c): (3) Verify that the delta CRL authority key identifier
extension matches complete CRL authority key identifier
extension.
1. obtain and validate the certification path for the delta (d) Compute the interim_reasons_mask for this CRL as follows:
issuer
2. validate the signature on the delta CRL (1) If the issuing distribution point (IDP) CRL extension is
present and includes onlySomeReasons and the DP includes
reasons, then set interim_reasons_mask to the intersection of
reasons in the DP and onlySomeReasons in IDP CRL extension.
(e) If a delta CRL was obtained in (a) or (b), and the (2) If the IDP CRL extension includes onlySomeReasons but the
verifications (c) and (d) suceeded, combine the base and DP omits reasons, then set interim_reasons_mask to the value of
delta to form a complete CRL. onlySomeReasons in IDP CRL extension.
(3) If steps and (1) and (2) succeed, then set reasons_mask to the (3) If the IDP CRL extension omits onlySomeReasons but the DP
union of reasons_mask and interim_reasons_mask includes reasons, then set interim_reasons_mask to the value of
DP reasons.
(4) Search for the certificate on the CRL (4) If the IDP CRL extension omits onlySomeReasons and the DP
omits reasons, then set interim_reasons_mask to the special
value all-reasons.
(a) search for the serial number on the CRL (e) Verify that interim_reasons_mask includes one or more reasons
that is not included in the reasons_mask.
(b) if (a) succeeds, verify that (1) the CRL entry extension (f) Obtain and validate the certification path for the complete
Certificate issuer is not present or (2) the issuer identified CRL issuer.
in the CRL entry extension Certificate issuer is the issuer of
the certificate.
(c) if (a) and (b) succeeded, set the cert_status variable as (g) Validate the signature on the complete CRL using the public
appropriate: key validated in step (f).
1. if the reasons extension is present, set the cert_status (h) If use-deltas is set, then validate the signature on the
variable to the value of the reasons extension delta CRL using the public key validated in step (f).
2. if the reasons extension is not present, set the (i) If use-deltas is set, then search for the certificate on the
cert_status variable to the special value not-specified. delta CRL. If an entry is found that matches the certificate
issuer and serial number as described in section 5.3.4, then set
the cert_status variable to the indicated reason as follows:
if ((reasons_mask is all-reasons) OR (if cert_status is not (1) If the reason code CRL entry extension is present, set the
UNREVOKED) return cert_status cert_status variable to the value of the reason code CRL entry
extension.
If all CRLs named in the crl distribution points extension have (2) If the reason code CRL entry extension is not present, set
been exhausted, and the reasons_mask is not all-reasons and the the cert_status variable to the value unspecified.
cert_status is still UNREVOKED, the verifier must obtain
additional CRLs.
The verifier must repeat the process above with the additional (j) If (cert_status is UNREVOKED), then search for the
CRLs not specified in a distribution point. certificate on the complete CRL. If an entry is found that
matches the certificate issuer and serial number as described in
section 5.3.4, then set the cert_status variable to the indicated
reason as described in step (i).
If all CRLs are exhausted and the reasons_mask is not all-reasons (k) If (cert_status is removeFromCRL), then set cert_status to
return the cert_status UNDETERMINED. UNREVOKED.
7 References If ((reasons_mask is all-reasons) OR (cert_status is not UNREVOKED)),
then the revocation status has been determined, so return
cert_status.
If the revocation status has not been determined, repeat the process
above with any available CRLs not specified in a distribution point
but issued by the certificate issuer. If the revocation status
remains undetermined, then return the cert_status UNDETERMINED.
7 References
[RFC 791] J. Postel, "Internet Protocol", September 1981. [RFC 791] J. Postel, "Internet Protocol", September 1981.
[RFC 822] D. Crocker, "Standard for the format of ARPA Internet text [RFC 822] D. Crocker, "Standard for the format of ARPA Internet text
messages", August 1982. messages", August 1982.
[RFC 1034] P.V. Mockapetris, "Domain names - concepts and [RFC 1034] P.V. Mockapetris, "Domain names - concepts and
facilities", November 1987. facilities", November 1987.
[RFC 1422] Kent, S., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic [RFC 1422] Kent, S., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic
Mail: Part II: Certificate-Based Key Management," RFC Mail: Part II: Certificate-Based Key Management," RFC
1422, BBN Communications, February 1993. 1422, BBN Communications, February 1993.
[RFC 1423] Balenson, D., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic [RFC 1423] Balenson, D., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic
Mail: Part III: Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers," Mail: Part III: Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers,"
RFC 1423, Trusted Information Systems, February 1993. RFC 1423, Trusted Information Systems, February 1993.
[RFC 1510] Kohl, J., and C. Neuman, "The Kerberos Network [RFC 1510] Kohl, J., and C. Neuman, "The Kerberos Network
Authentication Service (V5)," RFC 1510, September 1993. Authentication Service (V5)," RFC 1510, September 1993.
[RFC 1519] V. Fuller, T. Li, J. Yu, and K. Varadhan. "Classless [RFC 1519] V. Fuller, T. Li, J. Yu, and K. Varadhan. "Classless
Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR): an Address Assignment and Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR): an Address Assignment and
Aggregation Strategy", September 1993. Aggregation Strategy", September 1993.
[RFC 1738] Berners-Lee, T., Masinter L., and M. McCahill. [RFC 1738] Berners-Lee, T., Masinter L., and M. McCahill.
"Uniform Resource Locators (URL)", RFC 1738, December 1994. "Uniform Resource Locators (URL)", RFC 1738, December 1994.
[RFC 1778] Howes, T., Kille S., Yeong, W. and C. Robbins. "The [RFC 1778] Howes, T., Kille S., Yeong, W. and C. Robbins. "The
String Representation of Standard Attribute Syntaxes," String Representation of Standard Attribute Syntaxes,"
RFC 1778, March 1995. RFC 1778, March 1995.
[RFC 1883] S. Deering and R. Hinden. "Internet Protocol, Version 6 [RFC 1883] S. Deering and R. Hinden. "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", December 1995. (IPv6) Specification", December 1995.
[RFC 2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC 2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", March 1997. Requirement Levels", March 1997.
[RFC 2247] Kille, S., Wahl, M., Grimstad, A., Huber, R. and S. [RFC 2247] Kille, S., Wahl, M., Grimstad, A., Huber, R. and S.
Sataluri. "Using Domains in LDAP/X.500 Distinguished Names", Sataluri. "Using Domains in LDAP/X.500 Distinguished Names",
RFC 2247, January 1998. RFC 2247, January 1998.
[RFC 2277] H. Alvestrand, "IETF Policy on Character Sets and [RFC 2277] H. Alvestrand, "IETF Policy on Character Sets and
Languages", January 1998. Languages", January 1998.
[RFC 2279] F. Yergeau, "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646", [RFC 2279] F. Yergeau, "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646",
January 1998. January 1998.
[RFC 2560] Myers, M., Ankney R., Malpani A., Galperin S., and [RFC 2560] Myers, M., Ankney R., Malpani A., Galperin S., and
C. Adams, "Online Certificate Status Protocal - OCSP", C. Adams, "Online Certificate Status Protocal - OCSP",
June 1999. June 1999.
[SDN.701] SDN.701, "Message Security Protocol 4.0", Revision A [SDN.701] SDN.701, "Message Security Protocol 4.0", Revision A
1997-02-06. 1997-02-06.
[X.208] CCITT Recommendation X.208: Specification of Abstract [X.208] CCITT Recommendation X.208: Specification of Abstract
Syntax Notation One (ASN.1), 1988. Syntax Notation One (ASN.1), 1988.
[X.501] ITU-T Recommendation X.501: Information [X.501] ITU-T Recommendation X.501: Information
Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The
Directory: Models, 1993. Directory: Models, 1993.
[X.509] ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (1997 E): Information [X.509] ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (1997 E): Information
Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The
Directory: Authentication Framework, June 1997. Directory: Authentication Framework, June 1997.
[X.520] ITU-T Recommendation X.520: Information [X.520] ITU-T Recommendation X.520: Information
Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The
Directory: Selected Attribute Types, 1993. Directory: Selected Attribute Types, 1993.
[X9.55] ANSI X9.55-1995, Public Key Cryptography For The Financial [X9.55] ANSI X9.55-1995, Public Key Cryptography For The Financial
Services Industry: Extensions To Public Key Certificates Services Industry: Extensions To Public Key Certificates
And Certificate Revocation Lists, 8 December, 1995. And Certificate Revocation Lists, 8 December, 1995.
[PKINIT] Tung, B., Neuman C., Hur M., Medvinsky A., Medvinsky S., [PKINIT] Tung, B., Neuman C., Hur M., Medvinsky A., Medvinsky S.,
Wray J., and J. Trostle, "Public Key Cryptography for Wray J., and J. Trostle, "Public Key Cryptography for
Initial Authentciaion in Kerberos," Initial Authentciaion in Kerberos,"
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-11.txt, March 15, 2000. draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-11.txt, March 15, 2000.
[PKIX ALGS] Bassham, L., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 [PKIXALGS] Bassham, L., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure Representation of Public Keys Public Key Infrastructure Representation of Public Keys
and Digital Signatures," and Digital Signatures,"
draft-ietf-pkix-ipki-pkalgs-00.txt, July 14, 2000. draft-ietf-pkix-ipki-pkalgs-00.txt, July 14, 2000.
[PKIX TSA] Cain, P., Pinkas, D., and R. Zuccherato, "Internet X.509 [PKIXTSA] Cain, P., Pinkas, D., and R. Zuccherato, "Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure Time Stamp Protocol," Public Key Infrastructure Time Stamp Protocol,"
draft-ietf-pkix-time-stamp-12.txt, November, 2000. draft-ietf-pkix-time-stamp-12.txt, November, 2000.
8 Intellectual Property Rights 8 Intellectual Property Rights
The IETF has been notified of intellectual property rights claimed in The IETF has been notified of intellectual property rights claimed in
regard to some or all of the specification contained in this regard to some or all of the specification contained in this
document. For more information consult the online list of claimed document. For more information consult the online list of claimed
rights. rights (see http://www.ietf.org/ipr.html).
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the
IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of
claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of
licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to
obtain a general license or permission for the use of such obtain a general license or permission for the use of such
proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can
be obtained from the IETF Secretariat. be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
9 Security Considerations 9 Security Considerations
The majority of this specification is devoted to the format and The majority of this specification is devoted to the format and
content of certificates and CRLs. Since certificates and CRLs are content of certificates and CRLs. Since certificates and CRLs are
digitally signed, no additional integrity service is necessary. digitally signed, no additional integrity service is necessary.
Neither certificates nor CRLs need be kept secret, and unrestricted Neither certificates nor CRLs need be kept secret, and unrestricted
and anonymous access to certificates and CRLs has no security and anonymous access to certificates and CRLs has no security
implications. implications.
However, security factors outside the scope of this specification However, security factors outside the scope of this specification
will affect the assurance provided to certificate users. This will affect the assurance provided to certificate users. This
section highlights critical issues that should be considered by section highlights critical issues to be considered by implementers,
implementors, administrators, and users. administrators, and users.
The procedures performed by CAs and RAs to validate the binding of The procedures performed by CAs and RAs to validate the binding of
the subject's identity of their public key greatly affect the the subject's identity of their public key greatly affect the
assurance that should be placed in the certificate. Relying parties assurance that ought to be placed in the certificate. Relying
may wish to review the CA's certificate practice statement. This may parties might wish to review the CA's certificate practice statement.
be particularly important when issuing certificates to other CAs. This is particularly important when issuing certificates to other
CAs.
The use of a single key pair for both signature and other purposes is The use of a single key pair for both signature and other purposes is
strongly discouraged. Use of separate key pairs for signature and key strongly discouraged. Use of separate key pairs for signature and
management provides several benefits to the users. The ramifications key management provides several benefits to the users. The
associated with loss or disclosure of a signature key are different ramifications associated with loss or disclosure of a signature key
from loss or disclosure of a key management key. Using separate key are different from loss or disclosure of a key management key. Using
pairs permits a balanced and flexible response. Similarly, different separate key pairs permits a balanced and flexible response.
validity periods or key lengths for each key pair may be appropriate Similarly, different validity periods or key lengths for each key
in some application environments. Unfortunately, some legacy pair may be appropriate in some application environments.
applications (e.g., SSL) use a single key pair for signature and key Unfortunately, some legacy applications (e.g., SSL) use a single key
management. pair for signature and key management.
The protection afforded private keys is a critical factor in The protection afforded private keys is a critical security factor.
maintaining security. On a small scale, failure of users to protect On a small scale, failure of users to protect their private keys will
their private keys will permit an attacker to masquerade as them, or permit an attacker to masquerade as them, or decrypt their personal
decrypt their personal information. On a larger scale, compromise of information. On a larger scale, compromise of a CA's private signing
a CA's private signing key may have a catastrophic effect. If an key may have a catastrophic effect. If an attacker obtains the
attacker obtains the private key unnoticed, the attacker may issue private key unnoticed, the attacker may issue bogus certificates and
bogus certificates and CRLs. Existence of bogus certificates and CRLs. Existence of bogus certificates and CRLs will undermine
CRLs will undermine confidence in the system. If the compromise is confidence in the system. If such a compromise is detected, all
detected, all certificates issued to the CA MUST be revoked, certificates issued to the compromised CA MUST be revoked, preventing
preventing services between its users and users of other CAs. services between its users and users of other CAs. Rebuilding after
Rebuilding after such a compromise will be problematic, so CAs are such a compromise will be problematic, so CAs are advised to
advised to implement a combination of strong technical measures implement a combination of strong technical measures (e.g., tamper-
(e.g., tamper-resistant cryptographic modules) and appropriate resistant cryptographic modules) and appropriate management
management procedures (e.g., separation of duties) to avoid such an procedures (e.g., separation of duties) to avoid such an incident.
incident.
Loss of a CA's private signing key may also be problematic. The CA Loss of a CA's private signing key may also be problematic. The CA
would not be able to produce CRLs or perform normal key rollover. would not be able to produce CRLs or perform normal key rollover.
CAs are advised to maintain secure backup for signing keys. The CAs SHOULD maintain secure backup for signing keys. The security of
security of the key backup procedures is a critical factor in the key backup procedures is a critical factor in avoiding key
avoiding key compromise. compromise.
The availability and freshness of revocation information will affect The availability and freshness of revocation information affects the
the degree of assurance that should be placed in a certificate. degree of assurance that ought to be placed in a certificate. While
While certificates expire naturally, events may occur during its certificates expire naturally, events may occur during its natural
natural lifetime which negate the binding between the subject and lifetime which negate the binding between the subject and public key.
public key. If revocation information is untimely or unavailable, If revocation information is untimely or unavailable, the assurance
the assurance associated with the binding is clearly reduced. associated with the binding is clearly reduced. Relying parties
Similarly, implementations of the Path Validation mechanism described might not be able to process every critical extension that can appear
in section 6 that omit revocation checking provide less assurance in a CRL. CAs SHOULD take extra care when making revocation
than those that support it. information available only through CRLs that contain critical
extensions, particularly if support for those extensions is not
mandated by this profile. For example, if revocation information is
supplied using a combination of delta CRLs and full CRLs, and the
delta CRLs are issued more frequently than the full CRLs, then
relying parties that cannot handle the critical extensions related to
delta CRL processing will not be able to obtain the most recent
revocation information. Alternatively, if a full CRL is issued
whenever a delta CRL is issued, then timely revocation information
will be available to all relying parties. Similarly, implementations
of the certification path validation mechanism described in section 6
that omit revocation checking provide less assurance than those that
support it.
The path validation algorithm depends on the certain knowledge of the The path validation algorithm depends on the certain knowledge of the
public keys (and other information) about one or more trusted CAs. public keys (and other information) about one or more trusted CAs.
The decision to trust a CA is an important decision as it ultimately The decision to trust a CA is an important decision as it ultimately
determines the trust afforded a certificate. The authenticated determines the trust afforded a certificate. The authenticated
distribution of trusted CA public keys (usually in the form of a distribution of trusted CA public keys (usually in the form of a
"self-signed" certificate) is a security critical out of band process "self-signed" certificate) is a security critical out of band process
that is beyond the scope of this specification. that is beyond the scope of this specification.
In addition, where a key compromise or CA failure occurs for a In addition, where a key compromise or CA failure occurs for a
trusted CA, the user will need to modify the information provided to trusted CA, the user will need to modify the information provided to
the path validation routine. Selection of too many trusted CAs will the path validation routine. Selection of too many trusted CAs makes
make the trusted CA information difficult to maintain. On the other the trusted CA information difficult to maintain. On the other hand,
hand, selection of only one trusted CA may limit users to a closed selection of only one trusted CA could limit users to a closed
community of users until a global PKI emerges. community of users.
The quality of implementations that process certificates may also The quality of implementations that process certificates also affects
affect the degree of assurance provided. The path validation the degree of assurance provided. The path validation algorithm
algorithm described in section 6 relies upon the integrity of the described in section 6 relies upon the integrity of the trusted CA
trusted CA information, and especially the integrity of the public information, and especially the integrity of the public keys
keys associated with the trusted CAs. By substituting public keys associated with the trusted CAs. By substituting public keys for
for which an attacker has the private key, an attacker could trick which an attacker has the private key, an attacker could trick the
the user into accepting false certificates. user into accepting false certificates.
The binding between a key and certificate subject cannot be stronger The binding between a key and certificate subject cannot be stronger
than the cryptographic module implementation and algorithms used to than the cryptographic module implementation and algorithms used to
generate the signature. Short key lengths or weak hash algorithms generate the signature. Short key lengths or weak hash algorithms
will limit the utility of a certificate. CAs are encouraged to note will limit the utility of a certificate. CAs are encouraged to note
advances in cryptology so they can employ strong cryptographic advances in cryptology so they can employ strong cryptographic
techniques. In addition, CAs should decline to issue certificates to techniques. In addition, CAs SHOULD decline to issue certificates to
CAs or end entities that generate weak signatures. CAs or end entities that generate weak signatures.
Inconsistent application of name comparison rules may result in Inconsistent application of name comparison rules can result in
acceptance of invalid X.509 certification paths, or rejection of acceptance of invalid X.509 certification paths, or rejection of
valid ones. The X.500 series of specifications defines rules for valid ones. The X.500 series of specifications defines rules for
comparing distinguished names require comparison of strings without comparing distinguished names that require comparison of strings
regard to case, character set, multi-character white space substring, without regard to case, character set, multi-character white space
or leading and trailing white space. This specification relaxes substring, or leading and trailing white space. This specification
these requirements, requiring support for binary comparison at a relaxes these requirements, requiring support for binary comparison
minimum. at a minimum.
CAs MUST encode the distinguished name in the subject field of a CA CAs MUST encode the distinguished name in the subject field of a CA
certificate identically to the distinguished name in the issuer field certificate identically to the distinguished name in the issuer field
in certificates issued by the latter CA. If CAs use different in certificates issued by the latter CA. If CAs use different
encodings, implementations of this specification may fail to encodings, implementations might fail to recognize name chains for
recognize name chains for paths that include this certificate. As a paths that include this certificate. As a consequence, valid paths
consequence, valid paths could be rejected. could be rejected.
In addition, name constraints for distinguished names MUST be stated In addition, name constraints for distinguished names MUST be stated
identically to the encoding used in the subject field or identically to the encoding used in the subject field or
subjectAltName extension. If not, (1) name constraints stated as subjectAltName extension. If not, then name constraints stated as
excludedSubTrees will not match and invalid paths will be accepted excludedSubTrees will not match and invalid paths will be accepted
and (2) name constraints expressed as permittedSubtrees will not and name constraints expressed as permittedSubtrees will not match
match and valid paths will be rejected. To avoid acceptance of and valid paths will be rejected. To avoid acceptance of invalid
invalid paths, CAs should state name constraints for distinguished paths, CAs SHOULD state name constraints for distinguished names as
names as permittedSubtrees where ever possible. permittedSubtrees wherever possible.
Appendix A. Psuedo-ASN.1 Structures and OIDs Appendix A. Psuedo-ASN.1 Structures and OIDs
This section describes data objects used by conforming PKI components This section describes data objects used by conforming PKI components
in an "ASN.1-like" syntax. This syntax is a hybrid of the 1988 and in an "ASN.1-like" syntax. This syntax is a hybrid of the 1988 and
1993 ASN.1 syntaxes. The 1988 ASN.1 syntax is augmented with 1993 1993 ASN.1 syntaxes. The 1988 ASN.1 syntax is augmented with 1993
UNIVERSAL Types UniversalString, BMPString and UTF8String. UNIVERSAL Types UniversalString, BMPString and UTF8String.
The ASN.1 syntax does not permit the inclusion of type statements in The ASN.1 syntax does not permit the inclusion of type statements in
the ASN.1 module, and the 1993 ASN.1 standard does not permit use of the ASN.1 module, and the 1993 ASN.1 standard does not permit use of
the new UNIVERSAL types in modules using the 1988 syntax. As a the new UNIVERSAL types in modules using the 1988 syntax. As a
result, this module does not conform to either version of the ASN.1 result, this module does not conform to either version of the ASN.1
standard. standard.
This appendix may be converted into 1988 ASN.1 by replacing the This appendix may be converted into 1988 ASN.1 by replacing the
defintions for the UNIVERSAL Types with the 1988 catch-all "ANY". defintions for the UNIVERSAL Types with the 1988 catch-all "ANY".
A.1 Explicitly Tagged Module, 1988 Syntax A.1 Explicitly Tagged Module, 1988 Syntax
PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) PKIX1Explicit88 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(18)} security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(18) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL -- -- EXPORTS ALL --
-- IMPORTS NONE -- -- IMPORTS NONE --
-- UNIVERSAL Types defined in 1993 and 1998 ASN.1
-- and required by this specification
UniversalString ::= [UNIVERSAL 28] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING UniversalString ::= [UNIVERSAL 28] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING
-- UniversalString is defined in ASN.1:1993 -- UniversalString is defined in ASN.1:1993
BMPString ::= [UNIVERSAL 30] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING BMPString ::= [UNIVERSAL 30] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING
-- BMPString is the subtype of UniversalString and models -- BMPString is the subtype of UniversalString and models
-- the Basic Multilingual Plane of ISO/IEC/ITU 10646-1 -- the Basic Multilingual Plane of ISO/IEC/ITU 10646-1
UTF8String ::= [UNIVERSAL 12] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING UTF8String ::= [UNIVERSAL 12] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING
-- The content of this type conforms to RFC 2279. -- The content of this type conforms to RFC 2279.
-- PKIX specific OIDs -- PKIX specific OIDs
id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) }
-- PKIX arcs -- PKIX arcs
id-pe OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 1 } id-pe OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 1 }
-- arc for private certificate extensions -- arc for private certificate extensions
id-qt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 2 } id-qt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 2 }
-- arc for policy qualifier types -- arc for policy qualifier types
id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 3 } id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 3 }
-- arc for extended key purpose OIDS -- arc for extended key purpose OIDS
id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 } id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 }
-- arc for access descriptors -- arc for access descriptors
-- policyQualifierIds for Internet policy qualifiers -- policyQualifierIds for Internet policy qualifiers
id-qt-cps OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 1 } id-qt-cps OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 1 }
-- OID for CPS qualifier -- OID for CPS qualifier
id-qt-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 2 } id-qt-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 2 }
-- OID for user notice qualifier -- OID for user notice qualifier
-- access descriptor definitions -- access descriptor definitions
id-ad-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 1 } id-ad-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 1 }
id-ad-caIssuers OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 2 } id-ad-caIssuers OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 2 }
id-ad-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 3 } id-ad-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 3 }
id-ad-caRepository OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 5 } id-ad-caRepository OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 5 }
-- attribute data types
Attribute ::= SEQUENCE { Attribute ::= SEQUENCE {
type AttributeType, type AttributeType,
values SET OF AttributeValue values SET OF AttributeValue }
-- at least one value is required -- } -- at least one value is required
AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
AttributeValue ::= ANY AttributeValue ::= ANY
AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
type AttributeType, type AttributeType,
value AttributeValue } value AttributeValue }
-- suggested naming attributes: Definition of the following -- suggested naming attributes: Definition of the following
-- information object set may be augmented to meet local
-- requirements. Note that deleting members of the set may
-- prevent interoperability with conforming implementations.
-- presented in pairs: the AttributeType followed by the
-- type definition for the corresponding AttributeValue
--Arc for standard naming attributes --Arc for standard naming attributes
id-at OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 4} id-at OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 4 }
-- Naming attributes of type X520name -- Naming attributes of type X520name
id-at-name AttributeType ::= {id-at 41} id-at-name AttributeType ::= { id-at 41 }
id-at-surname AttributeType ::= {id-at 4} id-at-surname AttributeType ::= { id-at 4 }
id-at-givenName AttributeType ::= {id-at 42} id-at-givenName AttributeType ::= { id-at 42 }
id-at-initials AttributeType ::= {id-at 43} id-at-initials AttributeType ::= { id-at 43 }
id-at-generationQualifier AttributeType ::= {id-at 44} id-at-generationQualifier AttributeType ::= { id-at 44 }
X520name ::= CHOICE { X520name ::= CHOICE {
teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-name)), teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-name)),
printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-name)), printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-name)),
universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-name)), universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-name)),
utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-name)), utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-name)),
bmpString BMPString (SIZE(1..ub-name)) } bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..ub-name)) }
-- Naming attributes of type X520CommonName -- Naming attributes of type X520CommonName
id-at-commonName AttributeType ::= {id-at 3} id-at-commonName AttributeType ::= { id-at 3 }
X520CommonName ::= CHOICE { X520CommonName ::= CHOICE {
teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)),
printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)),
universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)),
utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)),
bmpString BMPString (SIZE(1..ub-common-name)) } bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)) }
-- Naming attributes of type X520LocalityName -- Naming attributes of type X520LocalityName
id-at-localityName AttributeType ::= {id-at 7} id-at-localityName AttributeType ::= { id-at 7 }
X520LocalityName ::= CHOICE { X520LocalityName ::= CHOICE {
teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-locality-name)), teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-locality-name)),
printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-locality-name)), printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-locality-name)),
universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-locality-name)), universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-locality-name)),
utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-locality-name)), utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-locality-name)),
bmpString BMPString (SIZE(1..ub-locality-name)) } bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..ub-locality-name)) }
-- Naming attributes of type X520StateOrProvinceName -- Naming attributes of type X520StateOrProvinceName
id-at-stateOrProvinceName AttributeType ::= {id-at 8} id-at-stateOrProvinceName AttributeType ::= { id-at 8 }
X520StateOrProvinceName ::= CHOICE { X520StateOrProvinceName ::= CHOICE {
teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-state-name)), teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-state-name)),
printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-state-name)), printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-state-name)),
universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-state-name)), universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-state-name)),
utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-state-name)), utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-state-name)),
bmpString BMPString (SIZE(1..ub-state-name)) } bmpString BMPString (SIZE(1..ub-state-name)) }
-- Naming attributes of type X520OrganizationName -- Naming attributes of type X520OrganizationName
id-at-organizationName AttributeType ::= {id-at 10} id-at-organizationName AttributeType ::= { id-at 10 }
X520OrganizationName ::= CHOICE { X520OrganizationName ::= CHOICE {
teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name)), teletexString TeletexString
printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name)), (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name)),
universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name)), printableString PrintableString
utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name)), (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name)),
bmpString BMPString (SIZE(1..ub-organization-name)) } universalString UniversalString
(SIZE (1..ub-organization-name)),
utf8String UTF8String
(SIZE (1..ub-organization-name)),
bmpString BMPString
(SIZE (1..ub-organization-name)) }
-- Naming attributes of type X520OrganizationalUnitName -- Naming attributes of type X520OrganizationalUnitName
id-at-organizationalUnitName AttributeType ::= {id-at 11} id-at-organizationalUnitName AttributeType ::= { id-at 11 }
X520OrganizationalUnitName ::= CHOICE { X520OrganizationalUnitName ::= CHOICE {
teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name)), teletexString TeletexString
printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name)),
(SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name)), printableString PrintableString
universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name)),
(SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name)), universalString UniversalString
utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name)), (SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name)),
bmpString BMPString (SIZE(1..ub-organizational-unit-name)) } utf8String UTF8String
(SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name)),
bmpString BMPString
(SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name)) }
-- Naming attributes of type X520Title -- Naming attributes of type X520Title
id-at-title AttributeType ::= {id-at 12} id-at-title AttributeType ::= { id-at 12 }
X520Title ::= CHOICE { X520Title ::= CHOICE {
teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-title)), teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-title)),
printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-title)), printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-title)),
universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-title)), universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-title)),
utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-title)), utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-title)),
bmpString BMPString (SIZE(1..ub-title)) } bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..ub-title)) }
-- Naming attributes of type X520dnQualifier -- Naming attributes of type X520dnQualifier
id-at-dnQualifier AttributeType ::= { id-at 46 }
id-at-dnQualifier AttributeType ::= {id-at 46} X520dnQualifier ::= PrintableString
X520dnQualifier ::= PrintableString -- Naming attributes of type X520countryName (digraph from IS 3166)
id-at-countryName AttributeType ::= { id-at 6 }
id-at-countryName AttributeType ::= {id-at 6} X520countryName ::= PrintableString (SIZE (2))
X520countryName ::= PrintableString (SIZE (2)) -- IS 3166 codes
-- Naming attributes of type X520SerialNumber -- Naming attributes of type X520SerialNumber
id-at-serialNumber AttributeType ::= { id-at 5 } id-at-serialNumber AttributeType ::= { id-at 5 }
X520SerialNumber ::= PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-serial-number)) X520SerialNumber ::= PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-serial-number))
-- Naming attributes of type DomainComponent (from RFC 2247) -- Naming attributes of type DomainComponent (from RFC 2247)
id-domainComponent OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-domainComponent AttributeType ::=
{ 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 25 } { 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 25 }
DomainComponent ::= IA5String DomainComponent ::= IA5String
-- Legacy attributes -- Legacy attributes
pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9 } { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9 }
id-emailAddress AttributeType ::= { pkcs-9 1 } id-emailAddress AttributeType ::= { pkcs-9 1 }
EmailAddress ::= IA5String (SIZE (1..ub-emailaddress-length)) EmailAddress ::= IA5String (SIZE (1..ub-emailaddress-length))
-- naming data types -- -- naming data types --
Name ::= CHOICE { -- only one possibility for now -- Name ::= CHOICE { -- only one possibility for now --
rdnSequence RDNSequence } rdnSequence RDNSequence }
RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName
DistinguishedName ::= RDNSequence DistinguishedName ::= RDNSequence
RelativeDistinguishedName ::= RelativeDistinguishedName ::=
SET SIZE (1 .. MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue SET SIZE (1 .. MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue
-- Directory string type -- -- Directory string type --
DirectoryString ::= CHOICE { DirectoryString ::= CHOICE {
teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..MAX)), teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..MAX)),
printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..MAX)), printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..MAX)),
universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..MAX)), universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..MAX)),
utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..MAX)), utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..MAX)),
bmpString BMPString (SIZE(1..MAX)) } bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..MAX)) }
-- certificate and CRL specific structures begin here -- certificate and CRL specific structures begin here
Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsCertificate TBSCertificate, tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signature BIT STRING } signature BIT STRING }
TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] Version DEFAULT v1, version [0] Version DEFAULT v1,
skipping to change at page 90, line 29 skipping to change at page 94, line 37
-- If present, version MUST be v2 or v3 -- If present, version MUST be v2 or v3
extensions [3] Extensions OPTIONAL extensions [3] Extensions OPTIONAL
-- If present, version MUST be v3 -- } -- If present, version MUST be v3 -- }
Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) }
CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER
Validity ::= SEQUENCE { Validity ::= SEQUENCE {
notBefore Time, notBefore Time,
notAfter Time } notAfter Time }
Time ::= CHOICE { Time ::= CHOICE {
utcTime UTCTime, utcTime UTCTime,
generalTime GeneralizedTime } generalTime GeneralizedTime }
UniqueIdentifier ::= BIT STRING UniqueIdentifier ::= BIT STRING
SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } subjectPublicKey BIT STRING }
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-- Version, Time, CertificateSerialNumber, and Extensions were -- Version, Time, CertificateSerialNumber, and Extensions were
-- defined earlier for use in the certificate structure -- defined earlier for use in the certificate structure
AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL } parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL }
-- contains a value of the type -- contains a value of the type
-- registered for use with the -- registered for use with the
-- algorithm object identifier value -- algorithm object identifier value
-- X.400 address syntax starts here
ORAddress ::= SEQUENCE { ORAddress ::= SEQUENCE {
built-in-standard-attributes BuiltInStandardAttributes, built-in-standard-attributes BuiltInStandardAttributes,
built-in-domain-defined-attributes built-in-domain-defined-attributes
BuiltInDomainDefinedAttributes OPTIONAL, BuiltInDomainDefinedAttributes OPTIONAL,
-- see also teletex-domain-defined-attributes -- see also teletex-domain-defined-attributes
extension-attributes ExtensionAttributes OPTIONAL } extension-attributes ExtensionAttributes OPTIONAL }
-- [[[*** What is this comment about? OR-Name is not defined ***]]]
-- The OR-address is semantically absent from the OR-name if the
-- built-in-standard-attribute sequence is empty and the
-- built-in-domain-defined-attributes and extension-attributes are
-- both omitted.
-- Built-in Standard Attributes
BuiltInStandardAttributes ::= SEQUENCE { BuiltInStandardAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
country-name CountryName OPTIONAL, country-name CountryName OPTIONAL,
administration-domain-name AdministrationDomainName OPTIONAL, administration-domain-name AdministrationDomainName OPTIONAL,
network-address [0] NetworkAddress OPTIONAL, network-address [0] NetworkAddress OPTIONAL,
-- see also extended-network-address -- see also extended-network-address
terminal-identifier [1] TerminalIdentifier OPTIONAL, terminal-identifier [1] TerminalIdentifier OPTIONAL,
private-domain-name [2] PrivateDomainName OPTIONAL, private-domain-name [2] PrivateDomainName OPTIONAL,
organization-name [3] OrganizationName OPTIONAL, organization-name [3] OrganizationName OPTIONAL,
-- see also teletex-organization-name -- see also teletex-organization-name
numeric-user-identifier [4] NumericUserIdentifier OPTIONAL, numeric-user-identifier [4] NumericUserIdentifier OPTIONAL,
personal-name [5] PersonalName OPTIONAL, personal-name [5] PersonalName OPTIONAL,
-- see also teletex-personal-name -- see also teletex-personal-name
organizational-unit-names [6] OrganizationalUnitNames OPTIONAL organizational-unit-names [6] OrganizationalUnitNames OPTIONAL
-- see also teletex-organizational-unit-names -- } -- see also teletex-organizational-unit-names -- }
CountryName ::= [APPLICATION 1] CHOICE { CountryName ::= [APPLICATION 1] CHOICE {
x121-dcc-code NumericString x121-dcc-code NumericString
(SIZE (ub-country-name-numeric-length)), (SIZE (ub-country-name-numeric-length)),
iso-3166-alpha2-code PrintableString iso-3166-alpha2-code PrintableString
(SIZE (ub-country-name-alpha-length)) } (SIZE (ub-country-name-alpha-length)) }
AdministrationDomainName ::= [APPLICATION 2] CHOICE { AdministrationDomainName ::= [APPLICATION 2] CHOICE {
numeric NumericString (SIZE (0..ub-domain-name-length)), numeric NumericString (SIZE (0..ub-domain-name-length)),
printable PrintableString (SIZE (0..ub-domain-name-length)) } printable PrintableString (SIZE (0..ub-domain-name-length)) }
NetworkAddress ::= X121Address -- see also extended-network-address NetworkAddress ::= X121Address -- see also extended-network-address
X121Address ::= NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-x121-address-length)) X121Address ::= NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-x121-address-length))
TerminalIdentifier ::= PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-terminal-id-length)) TerminalIdentifier ::= PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-terminal-id-length))
PrivateDomainName ::= CHOICE { PrivateDomainName ::= CHOICE {
numeric NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-name-length)), numeric NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-name-length)),
printable PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-name-length)) } printable PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-name-length)) }
OrganizationName ::= PrintableString OrganizationName ::= PrintableString
(SIZE (1..ub-organization-name-length)) (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name-length))
-- see also teletex-organization-name
NumericUserIdentifier ::= NumericString NumericUserIdentifier ::= NumericString
(SIZE (1..ub-numeric-user-id-length)) (SIZE (1..ub-numeric-user-id-length))
PersonalName ::= SET { PersonalName ::= SET {
surname [0] PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-surname-length)), surname [0] PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-surname-length)),
given-name [1] PrintableString given-name [1] PrintableString
(SIZE (1..ub-given-name-length)) OPTIONAL, (SIZE (1..ub-given-name-length)) OPTIONAL,
initials [2] PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-initials-length)) OPTIONAL, initials [2] PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-initials-length)) OPTIONAL,
generation-qualifier [3] PrintableString generation-qualifier [3] PrintableString
(SIZE (1..ub-generation-qualifier-length)) OPTIONAL } (SIZE (1..ub-generation-qualifier-length)) OPTIONAL }
-- see also teletex-personal-name
OrganizationalUnitNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..ub-organizational-units) OrganizationalUnitNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..ub-organizational-units)
OF OrganizationalUnitName OF OrganizationalUnitName
-- see also teletex-organizational-unit-names
OrganizationalUnitName ::= PrintableString (SIZE OrganizationalUnitName ::= PrintableString (SIZE
(1..ub-organizational-unit-name-length)) (1..ub-organizational-unit-name-length))
-- Built-in Domain-defined Attributes
BuiltInDomainDefinedAttributes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE BuiltInDomainDefinedAttributes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE
(1..ub-domain-defined-attributes) OF (1..ub-domain-defined-attributes) OF
BuiltInDomainDefinedAttribute BuiltInDomainDefinedAttribute
BuiltInDomainDefinedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE { BuiltInDomainDefinedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
type PrintableString (SIZE type PrintableString (SIZE
(1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-type-length)), (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-type-length)),
value PrintableString (SIZE value PrintableString (SIZE
(1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-value-length))} (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-value-length)) }
-- Extension Attributes
ExtensionAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..ub-extension-attributes) OF ExtensionAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..ub-extension-attributes) OF
ExtensionAttribute ExtensionAttribute
ExtensionAttribute ::= SEQUENCE { ExtensionAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
extension-attribute-type [0] INTEGER (0..ub-extension-attributes), extension-attribute-type [0] INTEGER (0..ub-extension-attributes),
extension-attribute-value [1] extension-attribute-value [1]
ANY DEFINED BY extension-attribute-type } ANY DEFINED BY extension-attribute-type }
-- Extension types and attribute values -- Extension types and attribute values
common-name INTEGER ::= 1 common-name INTEGER ::= 1
CommonName ::= PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name-length)) CommonName ::= PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name-length))
teletex-common-name INTEGER ::= 2 teletex-common-name INTEGER ::= 2
TeletexCommonName ::= TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name-length)) TeletexCommonName ::= TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name-length))
teletex-organization-name INTEGER ::= 3 teletex-organization-name INTEGER ::= 3
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common-name INTEGER ::= 1 common-name INTEGER ::= 1
CommonName ::= PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name-length)) CommonName ::= PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name-length))
teletex-common-name INTEGER ::= 2 teletex-common-name INTEGER ::= 2
TeletexCommonName ::= TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name-length)) TeletexCommonName ::= TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name-length))
teletex-organization-name INTEGER ::= 3 teletex-organization-name INTEGER ::= 3
TeletexOrganizationName ::= TeletexOrganizationName ::=
TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name-length)) TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name-length))
teletex-personal-name INTEGER ::= 4 teletex-personal-name INTEGER ::= 4
TeletexPersonalName ::= SET { TeletexPersonalName ::= SET {
surname [0] TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-surname-length)), surname [0] TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-surname-length)),
given-name [1] TeletexString given-name [1] TeletexString
(SIZE (1..ub-given-name-length)) OPTIONAL, (SIZE (1..ub-given-name-length)) OPTIONAL,
initials [2] TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-initials-length)) OPTIONAL, initials [2] TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-initials-length)) OPTIONAL,
generation-qualifier [3] TeletexString (SIZE generation-qualifier [3] TeletexString (SIZE
(1..ub-generation-qualifier-length)) OPTIONAL } (1..ub-generation-qualifier-length)) OPTIONAL }
teletex-organizational-unit-names INTEGER ::= 5 teletex-organizational-unit-names INTEGER ::= 5
TeletexOrganizationalUnitNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE TeletexOrganizationalUnitNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE
(1..ub-organizational-units) OF TeletexOrganizationalUnitName (1..ub-organizational-units) OF TeletexOrganizationalUnitName
TeletexOrganizationalUnitName ::= TeletexString TeletexOrganizationalUnitName ::= TeletexString
(SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name-length)) (SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name-length))
pds-name INTEGER ::= 7 pds-name INTEGER ::= 7
PDSName ::= PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-pds-name-length)) PDSName ::= PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-pds-name-length))
physical-delivery-country-name INTEGER ::= 8 physical-delivery-country-name INTEGER ::= 8
PhysicalDeliveryCountryName ::= CHOICE { PhysicalDeliveryCountryName ::= CHOICE {
x121-dcc-code NumericString (SIZE (ub-country-name-numeric-length)), x121-dcc-code NumericString (SIZE (ub-country-name-numeric-length)),
iso-3166-alpha2-code PrintableString iso-3166-alpha2-code PrintableString
(SIZE (ub-country-name-alpha-length)) } (SIZE (ub-country-name-alpha-length)) }
postal-code INTEGER ::= 9 postal-code INTEGER ::= 9
PostalCode ::= CHOICE { PostalCode ::= CHOICE {
numeric-code NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-postal-code-length)), numeric-code NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-postal-code-length)),
printable-code PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-postal-code-length)) } printable-code PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-postal-code-length)) }
physical-delivery-office-name INTEGER ::= 10 physical-delivery-office-name INTEGER ::= 10
PhysicalDeliveryOfficeName ::= PDSParameter PhysicalDeliveryOfficeName ::= PDSParameter
skipping to change at page 94, line 45 skipping to change at page 99, line 4
physical-delivery-office-name INTEGER ::= 10 physical-delivery-office-name INTEGER ::= 10
PhysicalDeliveryOfficeName ::= PDSParameter PhysicalDeliveryOfficeName ::= PDSParameter
physical-delivery-office-number INTEGER ::= 11 physical-delivery-office-number INTEGER ::= 11
PhysicalDeliveryOfficeNumber ::= PDSParameter PhysicalDeliveryOfficeNumber ::= PDSParameter
extension-OR-address-components INTEGER ::= 12 extension-OR-address-components INTEGER ::= 12
ExtensionORAddressComponents ::= PDSParameter ExtensionORAddressComponents ::= PDSParameter
physical-delivery-personal-name INTEGER ::= 13 physical-delivery-personal-name INTEGER ::= 13
PhysicalDeliveryPersonalName ::= PDSParameter PhysicalDeliveryPersonalName ::= PDSParameter
physical-delivery-organization-name INTEGER ::= 14 physical-delivery-organization-name INTEGER ::= 14
PhysicalDeliveryOrganizationName ::= PDSParameter PhysicalDeliveryOrganizationName ::= PDSParameter
extension-physical-delivery-address-components INTEGER ::= 15 extension-physical-delivery-address-components INTEGER ::= 15
ExtensionPhysicalDeliveryAddressComponents ::= PDSParameter ExtensionPhysicalDeliveryAddressComponents ::= PDSParameter
unformatted-postal-address INTEGER ::= 16 unformatted-postal-address INTEGER ::= 16
UnformattedPostalAddress ::= SET { UnformattedPostalAddress ::= SET {
printable-address SEQUENCE SIZE (1..ub-pds-physical-address-lines) OF printable-address SEQUENCE SIZE (1..ub-pds-physical-address-lines) OF
PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-pds-parameter-length)) OPTIONAL, PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-pds-parameter-length)) OPTIONAL,
teletex-string TeletexString teletex-string TeletexString
(SIZE (1..ub-unformatted-address-length)) OPTIONAL } (SIZE (1..ub-unformatted-address-length)) OPTIONAL }
street-address INTEGER ::= 17 street-address INTEGER ::= 17
StreetAddress ::= PDSParameter StreetAddress ::= PDSParameter
post-office-box-address INTEGER ::= 18 post-office-box-address INTEGER ::= 18
PostOfficeBoxAddress ::= PDSParameter PostOfficeBoxAddress ::= PDSParameter
skipping to change at page 95, line 50 skipping to change at page 100, line 9
PDSParameter ::= SET { PDSParameter ::= SET {
printable-string PrintableString printable-string PrintableString
(SIZE(1..ub-pds-parameter-length)) OPTIONAL, (SIZE(1..ub-pds-parameter-length)) OPTIONAL,
teletex-string TeletexString teletex-string TeletexString
(SIZE(1..ub-pds-parameter-length)) OPTIONAL } (SIZE(1..ub-pds-parameter-length)) OPTIONAL }
extended-network-address INTEGER ::= 22 extended-network-address INTEGER ::= 22
ExtendedNetworkAddress ::= CHOICE { ExtendedNetworkAddress ::= CHOICE {
e163-4-address SEQUENCE { e163-4-address SEQUENCE {
number [0] NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-e163-4-number-length)), number [0] NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-e163-4-number-length)),
sub-address [1] NumericString sub-address [1] NumericString
(SIZE (1..ub-e163-4-sub-address-length)) OPTIONAL }, (SIZE (1..ub-e163-4-sub-address-length)) OPTIONAL },
psap-address [0] PresentationAddress } psap-address [0] PresentationAddress }
PresentationAddress ::= SEQUENCE { PresentationAddress ::= SEQUENCE {
pSelector [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, pSelector [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
sSelector [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, sSelector [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
tSelector [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, tSelector [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
nAddresses [3] EXPLICIT SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF OCTET STRING } nAddresses [3] EXPLICIT SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF OCTET STRING }
terminal-type INTEGER ::= 23 terminal-type INTEGER ::= 23
TerminalType ::= INTEGER { TerminalType ::= INTEGER {
telex (3), telex (3),
teletex (4), teletex (4),
g3-facsimile (5), g3-facsimile (5),
g4-facsimile (6), g4-facsimile (6),
ia5-terminal (7), ia5-terminal (7),
videotex (8) } (0..ub-integer-options) videotex (8) } (0..ub-integer-options)
-- Extension Domain-defined Attributes
teletex-domain-defined-attributes INTEGER ::= 6 teletex-domain-defined-attributes INTEGER ::= 6
TeletexDomainDefinedAttributes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE TeletexDomainDefinedAttributes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE
(1..ub-domain-defined-attributes) OF TeletexDomainDefinedAttribute (1..ub-domain-defined-attributes) OF TeletexDomainDefinedAttribute
TeletexDomainDefinedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE { TeletexDomainDefinedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
type TeletexString type TeletexString
(SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-type-length)), (SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-type-length)),
value TeletexString value TeletexString
(SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-value-length)) } (SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-value-length)) }
-- specifications of Upper Bounds MUST be regarded as mandatory -- specifications of Upper Bounds MUST be regarded as mandatory
-- from Annex B of ITU-T X.411 Reference Definition of MTS Parameter -- from Annex B of ITU-T X.411 Reference Definition of MTS Parameter
-- Upper Bounds -- Upper Bounds
-- Upper Bounds
ub-name INTEGER ::= 32768 ub-name INTEGER ::= 32768
ub-common-name INTEGER ::= 64 ub-common-name INTEGER ::= 64
ub-locality-name INTEGER ::= 128 ub-locality-name INTEGER ::= 128
ub-state-name INTEGER ::= 128 ub-state-name INTEGER ::= 128
ub-organization-name INTEGER ::= 64 ub-organization-name INTEGER ::= 64
ub-organizational-unit-name INTEGER ::= 64 ub-organizational-unit-name INTEGER ::= 64
ub-title INTEGER ::= 64 ub-title INTEGER ::= 64
ub-serial-number INTEGER ::= 64 ub-serial-number INTEGER ::= 64
ub-match INTEGER ::= 128 ub-match INTEGER ::= 128
ub-emailaddress-length INTEGER ::= 128 ub-emailaddress-length INTEGER ::= 128
skipping to change at page 98, line 6 skipping to change at page 102, line 6
-- measured in characters. Excepting PrintableString or IA5String, a -- measured in characters. Excepting PrintableString or IA5String, a
-- significantly greater number of octets will be required to hold -- significantly greater number of octets will be required to hold
-- such a value. As a minimum, 16 octets, or twice the specified upper -- such a value. As a minimum, 16 octets, or twice the specified upper
-- bound, whichever is the larger, should be allowed for TeletexString. -- bound, whichever is the larger, should be allowed for TeletexString.
-- For UTF8String or UniversalString at least four times the upper -- For UTF8String or UniversalString at least four times the upper
-- bound should be allowed. -- bound should be allowed.
END END
A.2 Implicitly Tagged Module, 1988 Syntax A.2 Implicitly Tagged Module, 1988 Syntax
PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) PKIX1Implicit88 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit(19)} security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit(19) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL -- -- EXPORTS ALL --
IMPORTS IMPORTS
id-pe, id-kp, id-qt-unotice, id-qt-cps, id-ad, id-pe, id-kp, id-qt-unotice, id-qt-cps,
-- delete following line if "new" types are supported -- -- delete following line if "new" types are supported --
BMPString, UTF8String, -- end "new" types -- BMPString, UTF8String, -- end "new" types --
ORAddress, Name, RelativeDistinguishedName, ORAddress, Name, RelativeDistinguishedName,
CertificateSerialNumber, Attribute, DirectoryString CertificateSerialNumber, Attribute, DirectoryString
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) FROM PKIX1Explicit88 { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(18)}; id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(18) };
-- ISO arc for standard certificate and CRL extensions -- ISO arc for standard certificate and CRL extensions
id-ce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 29} id-ce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 29}
-- authority key identifier OID and syntax -- authority key identifier OID and syntax
id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 35 } id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 35 }
AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
skipping to change at page 99, line 28 skipping to change at page 103, line 28
PrivateKeyUsagePeriod ::= SEQUENCE { PrivateKeyUsagePeriod ::= SEQUENCE {
notBefore [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, notBefore [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
notAfter [1] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL } notAfter [1] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }
-- either notBefore or notAfter MUST be present -- either notBefore or notAfter MUST be present
-- certificate policies extension OID and syntax -- certificate policies extension OID and syntax
id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 } id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 }
anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce-certificatePolicies 0} anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-certificatePolicies 0 }
CertificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation CertificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation
PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE { PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
policyIdentifier CertPolicyId, policyIdentifier CertPolicyId,
policyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF policyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL } PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL }
CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
skipping to change at page 102, line 29 skipping to change at page 106, line 29
fullName [0] GeneralNames, fullName [0] GeneralNames,
nameRelativeToCRLIssuer [1] RelativeDistinguishedName } nameRelativeToCRLIssuer [1] RelativeDistinguishedName }
ReasonFlags ::= BIT STRING { ReasonFlags ::= BIT STRING {
unused (0), unused (0),
keyCompromise (1), keyCompromise (1),
cACompromise (2), cACompromise (2),
affiliationChanged (3), affiliationChanged (3),
superseded (4), superseded (4),
cessationOfOperation (5), cessationOfOperation (5),
certificateHold (6) } certificateHold (6),
privilegeWithdrawn (7),
aACompromise (8) }
-- extended key usage extension OID and syntax -- extended key usage extension OID and syntax
id-ce-extKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 37} id-ce-extKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 37}
ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId
KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- extended key purpose OIDs -- extended key purpose OIDs
id-kp-serverAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 1 } id-kp-serverAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 1 }
id-kp-clientAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 2 } id-kp-clientAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 2 }
id-kp-codeSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 3 } id-kp-codeSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 3 }
id-kp-emailProtection OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 4 } id-kp-emailProtection OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 4 }
id-kp-ipsecEndSystem OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 5 } id-kp-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 8 }
id-kp-ipsecTunnel OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 6 } id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 }
id-kp-ipsecUser OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 7 }
id-kp-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 8 }
-- inhibit any policy OID and syntax -- inhibit any policy OID and syntax
id-ce-inhibitAnyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 54 } id-ce-inhibitAnyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 54 }
InhibitAnyPolicy ::= SkipCerts InhibitAnyPolicy ::= SkipCerts
-- freshest (delta)CRL extension OID and syntax
id-ce-freshestCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 46 } id-ce-freshestCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 46 }
FreshestCRL ::= CRLDistributionPoints FreshestCRL ::= CRLDistributionPoints
-- authority info access -- authority info access
id-pe-authorityInfoAccess OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 1 } id-pe-authorityInfoAccess OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 1 }
AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax ::= AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax ::=
skipping to change at page 103, line 34 skipping to change at page 107, line 34
id-ce-cRLNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 20 } id-ce-cRLNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 20 }
CRLNumber ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) CRLNumber ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)
-- issuing distribution point extension OID and syntax -- issuing distribution point extension OID and syntax
id-ce-issuingDistributionPoint OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 28 } id-ce-issuingDistributionPoint OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 28 }
IssuingDistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE { IssuingDistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE {
distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL, distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL,
onlyContainsUserCerts [1] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, onlyContainsUserCerts [1] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
onlyContainsCACerts [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, onlyContainsCACerts [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
onlySomeReasons [3] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL, onlySomeReasons [3] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL,
indirectCRL [4] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE } indirectCRL [4] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
onlyContainsAttributeCerts [5] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE }
id-ce-deltaCRLIndicator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 27 } id-ce-deltaCRLIndicator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 27 }
BaseCRLNumber ::= CRLNumber BaseCRLNumber ::= CRLNumber
-- CRL reasons extension OID and syntax -- CRL reasons extension OID and syntax
id-ce-cRLReasons OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 21 } id-ce-cRLReasons OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 21 }
CRLReason ::= ENUMERATED { CRLReason ::= ENUMERATED {
unspecified (0), unspecified (0),
keyCompromise (1), keyCompromise (1),
cACompromise (2), cACompromise (2),
affiliationChanged (3), affiliationChanged (3),
superseded (4), superseded (4),
cessationOfOperation (5), cessationOfOperation (5),
certificateHold (6), certificateHold (6),
removeFromCRL (8) } removeFromCRL (8),
privilegeWithdrawn (9),
aACompromise (10) }
-- certificate issuer CRL entry extension OID and syntax -- certificate issuer CRL entry extension OID and syntax
id-ce-certificateIssuer OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 29 } id-ce-certificateIssuer OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 29 }
CertificateIssuer ::= GeneralNames CertificateIssuer ::= GeneralNames
-- hold instruction extension OID and syntax -- hold instruction extension OID and syntax
id-ce-holdInstructionCode OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 23 } id-ce-holdInstructionCode OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 23 }
skipping to change at page 105, line 4 skipping to change at page 109, line 4
id-holdinstruction-reject OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-holdinstruction-reject OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{holdInstruction 3} {holdInstruction 3}
-- invalidity date CRL entry extension OID and syntax -- invalidity date CRL entry extension OID and syntax
id-ce-invalidityDate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 24 } id-ce-invalidityDate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 24 }
InvalidityDate ::= GeneralizedTime InvalidityDate ::= GeneralizedTime
END END
Appendix B. ASN.1 Notes Appendix B. ASN.1 Notes
CAs MUST force the serialNumber to be a non-negative integer, that CAs MUST force the serialNumber to be a non-negative integer, that
is, the sign bit in the DER encoding of the INTEGER value MUST be is, the sign bit in the DER encoding of the INTEGER value MUST be
zero - this can be done by adding a leading (leftmost) `00'H octet if zero - this can be done by adding a leading (leftmost) `00'H octet if
necessary. This removes a potential ambiguity in mapping between a necessary. This removes a potential ambiguity in mapping between a
string of octets and an integer value. string of octets and an integer value.
As noted in section 4.1.2.2, serial numbers can be expected to As noted in section 4.1.2.2, serial numbers can be expected to
contain long integers. Certificate users MUST be able to handle contain long integers. Certificate users MUST be able to handle
serialNumber values up to 20 octets in length. Conformant CAs MUST serialNumber values up to 20 octets in length. Conformant CAs MUST
NOT use serialNumber values longer than 20 octets. NOT use serialNumber values longer than 20 octets.
The construct "SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF" appears in several ASN.1 The construct "SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF" appears in several ASN.1
constructs. A valid ASN.1 sequence will have zero or more entries. constructs. A valid ASN.1 sequence will have zero or more entries.
The SIZE (1..MAX) construct constrains the sequence to have at least The SIZE (1..MAX) construct constrains the sequence to have at least
one entry. MAX indicates the upper bound is unspecified. one entry. MAX indicates the upper bound is unspecified.
Implementations are free to choose an upper bound that suits their Implementations are free to choose an upper bound that suits their
environment. environment.
The construct "positiveInt ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)" defines positiveInt The construct "positiveInt ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)" defines positiveInt
as a subtype of INTEGER containing integers greater than or equal to as a subtype of INTEGER containing integers greater than or equal to
zero. The upper bound is unspecified. Implementations are free to zero. The upper bound is unspecified. Implementations are free to
select an upper bound that suits their environment. select an upper bound that suits their environment.
The character string type PrintableString supports a very basic Latin The character string type PrintableString supports a very basic Latin
character set: the lower case letters 'a' through 'z', upper case character set: the lower case letters 'a' through 'z', upper case
letters 'A' through 'Z', the digits '0' through '9', eleven special letters 'A' through 'Z', the digits '0' through '9', eleven special
characters ' = ( ) + , - . / : ? and space. characters ' = ( ) + , - . / : ? and space.
The character string type TeletexString is a superset of The character string type TeletexString is a superset of
PrintableString. TeletexString supports a fairly standard (ascii- PrintableString. TeletexString supports a fairly standard (ascii-
like) Latin character set, Latin characters with non-spacing accents like) Latin character set, Latin characters with non-spacing accents
and Japanese characters. and Japanese characters.
The character string type UniversalString supports any of the The character string type UniversalString supports any of the
characters allowed by ISO 10646-1. ISO 10646 is the Universal characters allowed by ISO 10646-1. ISO 10646 is the Universal
multiple-octet coded Character Set (UCS). ISO 10646-1 specifes the multiple-octet coded Character Set (UCS). ISO 10646-1 specifies the
architecture and the "basic multilingual plane" - a large standard architecture and the "basic multilingual plane" - a large standard
character set which includes all major world character standards. character set which includes all major world character standards.
The character string type UTF8String was introduced in the 1997 The character string type UTF8String was introduced in the 1997
version of ASN.1, and UTF8String was added to the list of choices for version of ASN.1, and UTF8String was added to the list of choices for
DirectoryString in the 2001 version of X.520. UTF8String is a DirectoryString in the 2001 version of X.520. UTF8String is a
universal type and has been assigned tag number 12. The content of universal type and has been assigned tag number 12. The content of
UTF8String was defined by RFC 2044 and updated in RFC 2279, "UTF-8, a UTF8String was defined by RFC 2044 and updated in RFC 2279, "UTF-8, a
transformation format of ISO 10646." transformation format of ISO 10646."
In anticipation of these changes, and in conformance with IETF Best In anticipation of these changes, and in conformance with IETF Best
Practices codified in RFC 2277, IETF Policy on Character Sets and Practices codified in RFC 2277, IETF Policy on Character Sets and
Languages, this document includes UTF8String as a choice in Languages, this document includes UTF8String as a choice in
DirectoryString and the CPS qualifier extensions. DirectoryString and the CPS qualifier extensions.
Implementers should note that the DER encoding of the SET OF values Implementers should note that the DER encoding of the SET OF values
requires ordering of the encodings of the values. In particular, this requires ordering of the encodings of the values. In particular,
issue arises with respect to distinguished names. this issue arises with respect to distinguished names.
Object Identifiers (OIDs) are used throught this specification to Object Identifiers (OIDs) are used throughout this specification to
identify certificate policies, public key and signature algorithms, identify certificate policies, public key and signature algorithms,
certificate extensions, etc. There is no maximum size for OIDs. certificate extensions, etc. There is no maximum size for OIDs.
This specification mandates support for OIDs which have arc elements This specification mandates support for OIDs which have arc elements
with values that are less than 2^28, i.e. they MUST be between 0 and with values that are less than 2^28, that is, they MUST be between 0
268,435,455 inclusive. This allows each arc element to be represented and 268,435,455, inclusive. This allows each arc element to be
within a single 32 bit word. Implementations MUST also support OIDs represented within a single 32 bit word. Implementations MUST also
where the length of the dotted decimal (see [LDAP], section 4.1.2) support OIDs where the length of the dotted decimal (see [LDAP],
string representation can be up to 100 bytes (inclusive). section 4.1.2) string representation can be up to 100 bytes
Implementations MUST be able to handle OIDs with up to 20 elements (inclusive). Implementations MUST be able to handle OIDs with up to
(inclusive). CAs SHOULD NOT issue certificates which contain OIDs 20 elements (inclusive). CAs SHOULD NOT issue certificates which
that breach these requirements. contain OIDs that exceed these requirements.
Appendix C. Examples Implementors are warned that the X.500 standards community has
developed a series of extensibility rules. These rules determine
when an ASN.1 definition can be changed without assigning a new
object identifier (OID). For example, at least two extension
definitions included in RFC 2459 have different ASN.1 definitions in
this specification, but the same OID is used. If unknown elements
appear within an extension, and the extension is not marked critical,
those unknown elements ought to be ignored, as follows:
(a) ignore all unknown bit name assignments within a bit string;
(b) ignore all unknown named numbers in an ENUMERATED type or
INTEGER type that is being used in the enumerated style, provided
the number occurs as an optional element of a SET or SEQUENCE; and
(c) ignore all unknown elements in SETs, at the end of SEQUENCEs,
or in CHOICEs where the CHOICE is itself an optional element of a
SET or SEQUENCE.
If an extension containing unexpected values is marked critical, the
implementation MUST reject the certificate or CRL containing the
unrecognized extension.
Appendix C. Examples
This section contains four examples: three certificates and a CRL. This section contains four examples: three certificates and a CRL.
The first two certificates and the CRL comprise a minimal The first two certificates and the CRL comprise a minimal
certification path. certification path.
Section C.1 contains an annotated hex dump of a "self-signed" Section C.1 contains an annotated hex dump of a "self-signed"
certificate issued by a CA whose distinguished name is certificate issued by a CA whose distinguished name is
cn=us,o=gov,ou=nist. The certificate contains a DSA public key with cn=us,o=gov,ou=nist. The certificate contains a DSA public key with
parameters, and is signed by the corresponding DSA private key. parameters, and is signed by the corresponding DSA private key.
Section C.2 contains an annotated hex dump of an end-entity Section C.2 contains an annotated hex dump of an end entity
certificate. The end entity certificate contains a DSA public key, certificate. The end entity certificate contains a DSA public key,
and is signed by the private key corresponding to the "self-signed" and is signed by the private key corresponding to the "self-signed"
certificate in section C.1. certificate in section C.1.
Section C.3 contains a dump of an end entity certificate which Section C.3 contains a dump of an end entity certificate which
contains an RSA public key and is signed with RSA and MD5. This contains an RSA public key and is signed with RSA and MD5. This
certificate is not part of the minimal certification path. certificate is not part of the minimal certification path.
Section C.4 contains an annotated hex dump of a CRL. The CRL is Section C.4 contains an annotated hex dump of a CRL. The CRL is
issued by the CA whose distinguished name is cn=us,o=gov,ou=nist and issued by the CA whose distinguished name is cn=us,o=gov,ou=nist and
the list of revoked certificates includes the end entity certificate the list of revoked certificates includes the end entity certificate
presented in C.2. presented in C.2.
The certificates were processed using Peter Gutman's dumpasn1 utility The certificates were processed using Peter Gutman's dumpasn1 utility
to generate the output. The source for the dumpasn1 utility is to generate the output. The source for the dumpasn1 utility is
available at <http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/dumpasn1.c>. The available at <http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/dumpasn1.c>. The
binaries for the certificates and CRLs are available at binaries for the certificates and CRLs are available at
<http://csrc.nist.gov/pki/pkixtools>. <http://csrc.nist.gov/pki/pkixtools>.
C.1 Certificate C.1 Certificate
This section contains an annotated hex dump of a 699 byte version 3 This section contains an annotated hex dump of a 699 byte version 3
certificate. The certificate contains the following information: certificate. The certificate contains the following information:
(a) the serial number is 23 (17 hex); (a) the serial number is 23 (17 hex);
(b) the certificate is signed with DSA and the SHA-1 hash algorithm; (b) the certificate is signed with DSA and the SHA-1 hash algorithm;
(c) the issuer's distinguished name is OU=NIST; O=gov; C=US (c) the issuer's distinguished name is OU=NIST; O=gov; C=US
(d) and the subject's distinguished name is OU=NIST; O=gov; C=US (d) and the subject's distinguished name is OU=NIST; O=gov; C=US
(e) the certificate was issued on June 30, 1997 and will expire on (e) the certificate was issued on June 30, 1997 and will expire on
December 31, 1997; December 31, 1997;
(f) the certificate contains a 1024 bit DSA public key with (f) the certificate contains a 1024 bit DSA public key with
skipping to change at page 110, line 5 skipping to change at page 114, line 27
: } : }
645 30 9: SEQUENCE { 645 30 9: SEQUENCE {
647 06 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER dsaWithSha1 (1 2 840 10040 4 3) 647 06 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER dsaWithSha1 (1 2 840 10040 4 3)
: } : }
656 03 47: BIT STRING 0 unused bits 656 03 47: BIT STRING 0 unused bits
: 30 2C 02 14 6A F9 3F 72 30 7F 45 DC E5 50 C1 5E : 30 2C 02 14 6A F9 3F 72 30 7F 45 DC E5 50 C1 5E
: 94 A0 6D C7 92 4C E5 E1 02 14 6F 61 B8 65 F7 AA : 94 A0 6D C7 92 4C E5 E1 02 14 6F 61 B8 65 F7 AA
: DF 46 1B F7 39 0D 0D 88 9E FE B6 83 F7 1A : DF 46 1B F7 39 0D 0D 88 9E FE B6 83 F7 1A
: } : }
C.2 Certificate C.2 Certificate
This section contains an annotated hex dump of a 730 byte version 3 This section contains an annotated hex dump of a 730 byte version 3
certificate. The certificate contains the following information: certificate. The certificate contains the following information:
(a) the serial number is 18 (12 hex); (a) the serial number is 18 (12 hex);
(b) the certificate is signed with DSA and the SHA-1 hash algorithm; (b) the certificate is signed with DSA and the SHA-1 hash algorithm;
(c) the issuer's distinguished name is OU=nist; O=gov; C=US (c) the issuer's distinguished name is OU=nist; O=gov; C=US
(d) and the subject's distinguished name is CN=Tim Polk; OU=nist; (d) and the subject's distinguished name is CN=Tim Polk; OU=nist;
O=gov; C=US O=gov; C=US
(e) the certificate was valid from July 30, 1997 through December 1, (e) the certificate was valid from July 30, 1997 through December 1,
1997; 1997;
skipping to change at page 113, line 7 skipping to change at page 117, line 30
: } : }
677 30 9: SEQUENCE { 677 30 9: SEQUENCE {
679 06 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER dsaWithSha1 (1 2 840 10040 4 3) 679 06 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER dsaWithSha1 (1 2 840 10040 4 3)
: } : }
688 03 48: BIT STRING 0 unused bits 688 03 48: BIT STRING 0 unused bits
: 30 2D 02 14 37 FC 44 BF 7F 8D 18 1F 40 04 2F CF : 30 2D 02 14 37 FC 44 BF 7F 8D 18 1F 40 04 2F CF
: EA CC 22 B2 16 01 FF 13 02 15 00 97 D0 24 96 0F : EA CC 22 B2 16 01 FF 13 02 15 00 97 D0 24 96 0F
: 64 8A C3 8D 41 B2 0E B9 26 D5 31 D1 A0 F1 BC : 64 8A C3 8D 41 B2 0E B9 26 D5 31 D1 A0 F1 BC
: } : }
C.3 End-Entity Certificate Using RSA C.3 End Entity Certificate Using RSA
This section contains an annotated hex dump of a 675 byte version 3 This section contains an annotated hex dump of a 675 byte version 3
certificate. The certificate contains the following information: certificate. The certificate contains the following information:
(a) the serial number is 256; (a) the serial number is 256;
(b) the certificate is signed with RSA and the MD2 hash algorithm; (b) the certificate is signed with RSA and the MD2 hash algorithm;
(c) the issuer's distinguished name is OU=Dept. Arquitectura de (c) the issuer's distinguished name is OU=Dept. Arquitectura de
Computadors; O=Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya; C=ES Computadors; O=Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya; C=ES
(d) and the subject's distinguished name is CN=Francisco Jordan; (d) and the subject's distinguished name is CN=Francisco Jordan;
OU=Dept. Arquitectura de Computadors; O=Universitat Politecnica de OU=Dept. Arquitectura de Computadors; O=Universitat Politecnica de
Catalunya; C=ES Catalunya; C=ES
skipping to change at page 116, line 21 skipping to change at page 120, line 44
: C1 25 6F AB 72 C0 5D DA E4 2F D5 E1 B0 25 D8 B4 : C1 25 6F AB 72 C0 5D DA E4 2F D5 E1 B0 25 D8 B4
: F1 82 95 D6 0D A5 4E 4F A1 23 E1 13 A4 9C 3D C5 : F1 82 95 D6 0D A5 4E 4F A1 23 E1 13 A4 9C 3D C5
: 7F FD 05 EC 75 06 30 66 97 75 A6 5D 8F 97 BA B4 : 7F FD 05 EC 75 06 30 66 97 75 A6 5D 8F 97 BA B4
: EC A9 43 19 8D B7 54 FD E9 AD 43 B8 3C 8B D3 9E : EC A9 43 19 8D B7 54 FD E9 AD 43 B8 3C 8B D3 9E
: C7 C7 27 E3 1A AD D3 79 AC 65 5A 52 78 C4 D0 43 : C7 C7 27 E3 1A AD D3 79 AC 65 5A 52 78 C4 D0 43
: 81 50 F7 8A BA E2 30 1A 6D D0 78 A0 4E AE 2E 79 : 81 50 F7 8A BA E2 30 1A 6D D0 78 A0 4E AE 2E 79
: 37 0C 93 05 5C D1 9C 1B B2 62 73 D1 EA 50 B7 84 : 37 0C 93 05 5C D1 9C 1B B2 62 73 D1 EA 50 B7 84
: 29 92 74 34 CF BA AA 2C 4D 43 59 EF 98 0C 41 6C : 29 92 74 34 CF BA AA 2C 4D 43 59 EF 98 0C 41 6C
: } : }
C.4 Certificate Revocation List C.4 Certificate Revocation List
This section contains an annotated hex dump of a version 2 CRL with This section contains an annotated hex dump of a version 2 CRL with
one extension (cRLNumber). The CRL was issued by OU=nist;O=gov;C=us one extension (cRLNumber). The CRL was issued by OU=nist;O=gov;C=us
on July 7, 1996; the next scheduled issuance was August 7, 1996. The on July 7, 1996; the next scheduled issuance was August 7, 1996. The
CRL includes one revoked certificates: serial number 18 (12 hex). CRL includes one revoked certificates: serial number 18 (12 hex).
The CRL itself is number 18, and it was signed with DSA and SHA-1. The CRL itself is number 18, and it was signed with DSA and SHA-1.
0 30 203: SEQUENCE { 0 30 203: SEQUENCE {
3 30 140: SEQUENCE { 3 30 140: SEQUENCE {
6 02 1: INTEGER 1 6 02 1: INTEGER 1
skipping to change at page 118, line 5 skipping to change at page 123, line 5
: } : }
146 30 9: SEQUENCE { 146 30 9: SEQUENCE {
148 06 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER dsaWithSha1 (1 2 840 10040 4 3) 148 06 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER dsaWithSha1 (1 2 840 10040 4 3)
: } : }
157 03 47: BIT STRING 0 unused bits 157 03 47: BIT STRING 0 unused bits
: 30 2C 02 14 79 1F F6 93 0B 84 06 D6 A0 7C 8D 68 : 30 2C 02 14 79 1F F6 93 0B 84 06 D6 A0 7C 8D 68
: A7 52 2E 5F 3F 89 9B 4B 02 14 66 D4 B5 2A 68 36 : A7 52 2E 5F 3F 89 9B 4B 02 14 66 D4 B5 2A 68 36
: 9B 72 88 58 E3 89 19 AD 81 89 2E 96 BB CC : 9B 72 88 58 E3 89 19 AD 81 89 2E 96 BB CC
: } : }
Appendix D. Author Addresses: Appendix D. Author Addresses:
Russell Housley Russell Housley
RSA Laboratories RSA Laboratories
918 Spring Knoll Drive 918 Spring Knoll Drive
Herndon, VA 20170 Herndon, VA 20170
USA USA
rhousley@rsasecurity.com rhousley@rsasecurity.com
Warwick Ford Warwick Ford
VeriSign, Inc. VeriSign, Inc.
skipping to change at page 118, line 45 skipping to change at page 123, line 45
Appendix E. Full Copyright Statement Appendix E. Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (date). All Rights Reserved. Copyright (C) The Internet Society (date). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works. In addition, the included on all such copies and derivative works. In addition, the
ASN.1 modules presented in Appendices A and B may be used in whole or ASN.1 modules presented in Appendix A may be used in whole or in part
in part without inclusion of the copyright notice. However, this without inclusion of the copyright notice. However, this document
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process shall be copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process shall be
followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
English. English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. This revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. This
document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS
IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK
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