| < draft-ietf-pkix-new-part1-11.txt | draft-ietf-pkix-new-part1-12.txt > | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries. | ||||
| PKIX Working Group R. Housley (RSA Laboratories) | RFC 3280 | |||
| Internet Draft W. Ford (VeriSign) | ||||
| W. Polk (NIST) | ||||
| D. Solo (Citigroup) | ||||
| expires in six months October 2001 | ||||
| Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure | ||||
| Certificate and CRL Profile | ||||
| <draft-ietf-pkix-new-part1-11.txt> | ||||
| Status of this Memo | ||||
| This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with | ||||
| all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working | ||||
| documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, | ||||
| and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute | ||||
| working documents as Internet-Drafts. | ||||
| Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months | ||||
| and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any | ||||
| time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference | ||||
| material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." | ||||
| The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at | ||||
| http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html | ||||
| The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at | ||||
| http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html | ||||
| To view the entire list of current Internet-Drafts, please check the | ||||
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| Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), ftp.nordu.net (Northern | ||||
| Europe), ftp.nis.garr.it (Southern Europe), munnari.oz.au (Pacific | ||||
| Rim), ftp.ietf.org (US East Coast), or ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast). | ||||
| Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001). All Rights Reserved. | ||||
| Abstract | ||||
| When complete, this specification will obsolete RFC 2459. | ||||
| Please send comments on this document to the ietf-pkix@imc.org mail | ||||
| list. | ||||
| This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 CRL for use | ||||
| in the Internet. An overview of the approach and model are provided | ||||
| as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in | ||||
| detail, with additional information regarding the format and | ||||
| semantics of Internet name forms (e.g., IP addresses). Standard | ||||
| certificate extensions are described and one new Internet-specific | ||||
| extension is defined. A required set of certificate extensions is | ||||
| specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described and a required | ||||
| extension set is defined as well. An algorithm for X.509 certificate | ||||
| path validation is described. Supplemental information is provided | ||||
| describing the format of public keys and digital signatures in X.509 | ||||
| certificates for common Internet public key encryption algorithms | ||||
| (i.e., RSA, DSA, and Diffie-Hellman). ASN.1 modules and examples are | ||||
| provided in the appendices. | ||||
| The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", | ||||
| "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this | ||||
| document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. | ||||
| Table of Contents | ||||
| 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 | ||||
| 2 Requirements and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 | ||||
| 2.1 Communication and Topology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 | ||||
| 2.2 Acceptability Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 | ||||
| 2.3 User Expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 | ||||
| 2.4 Administrator Expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 | ||||
| 3 Overview of Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 | ||||
| 3.1 X.509 Version 3 Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 | ||||
| 3.2 Certification Paths and Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 | ||||
| 3.3 Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 | ||||
| 3.4 Operational Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 | ||||
| 3.5 Management Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 | ||||
| 4 Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile . . . . . . . . . 15 | ||||
| 4.1 Basic Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 | ||||
| 4.1.1 Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 | ||||
| 4.1.1.1 tbsCertificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 | ||||
| 4.1.1.2 signatureAlgorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 | ||||
| 4.1.1.3 signatureValue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 | ||||
| 4.1.2 TBSCertificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 | ||||
| 4.1.2.1 Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 | ||||
| 4.1.2.2 Serial number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 | ||||
| 4.1.2.3 Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 | ||||
| 4.1.2.4 Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 | ||||
| 4.1.2.5 Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 | ||||
| 4.1.2.5.1 UTCTime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 | ||||
| 4.1.2.5.2 GeneralizedTime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 | ||||
| 4.1.2.6 Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 | ||||
| 4.1.2.7 Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 | ||||
| 4.1.2.8 Unique Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 | ||||
| 4.1.2.9 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 | ||||
| 4.2 Certificate Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 | ||||
| 4.2.1 Standard Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 | ||||
| 4.2.1.1 Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 | ||||
| 4.2.1.2 Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 | ||||
| 4.2.1.3 Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 | ||||
| 4.2.1.4 Private Key Usage Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 | ||||
| 4.2.1.5 Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 | ||||
| 4.2.1.6 Policy Mappings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 | ||||
| 4.2.1.7 Subject Alternative Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 | ||||
| 4.2.1.8 Issuer Alternative Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 | ||||
| 4.2.1.9 Subject Directory Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 | ||||
| 4.2.1.10 Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 | ||||
| 4.2.1.11 Name Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 | ||||
| 4.2.1.12 Policy Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 | ||||
| 4.2.1.13 Extended key usage field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 | ||||
| 4.2.1.14 CRL Distribution Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 | ||||
| 4.2.1.15 Inhibit Any-Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 | ||||
| 4.2.1.16 Freshest CRL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 | ||||
| 4.2.2 Internet Certificate Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 | ||||
| 4.2.2.1 Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 | ||||
| 4.2.2.2 Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 | ||||
| 5 CRL and CRL Extensions Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 | ||||
| 5.1 CRL Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 | ||||
| 5.1.1 CertificateList Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 | ||||
| 5.1.1.1 tbsCertList . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 | ||||
| 5.1.1.2 signatureAlgorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 | ||||
| 5.1.1.3 signatureValue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 | ||||
| 5.1.2 Certificate List "To Be Signed" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 | ||||
| 5.1.2.1 Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 | ||||
| 5.1.2.2 Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 | ||||
| 5.1.2.3 Issuer Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 | ||||
| 5.1.2.4 This Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 | ||||
| 5.1.2.5 Next Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 | ||||
| 5.1.2.6 Revoked Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 | ||||
| 5.1.2.7 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 | ||||
| 5.2 CRL Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 | ||||
| 5.2.1 Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 | ||||
| 5.2.2 Issuer Alternative Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 | ||||
| 5.2.3 CRL Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 | ||||
| 5.2.4 Delta CRL Indicator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 | ||||
| 5.2.5 Issuing Distribution Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 | ||||
| 5.2.6 Freshest CRL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 | ||||
| 5.3 CRL Entry Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 | ||||
| 5.3.1 Reason Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 | ||||
| 5.3.2 Hold Instruction Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 | ||||
| 5.3.3 Invalidity Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 | ||||
| 5.3.4 Certificate Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 | ||||
| 6 Certificate Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 | ||||
| 6.1 Basic Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 | ||||
| 6.1.1 Inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 | ||||
| 6.1.2 Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 | ||||
| 6.1.3 Basic Certificate Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 | ||||
| 6.1.4 Preparation for Certificate i+1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 | ||||
| 6.1.5 Wrap-up procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 | ||||
| 6.1.6 Outputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 | ||||
| 6.2 Extending Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 | ||||
| 6.3 CRL Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 | ||||
| 6.3.1 Revocation Inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 | ||||
| 6.3.2 Initialization and Revocation State Variables . . . . . . . . 81 | ||||
| 6.3.3 CRL Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 | ||||
| 7 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 | ||||
| 8 Intellectual Property Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 | ||||
| 9 Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 | ||||
| Appendix A. ASN.1 Structures and OIDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 | ||||
| A.1 Explicitly Tagged Module, 1988 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 | ||||
| A.2 Implicitly Tagged Module, 1988 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 | ||||
| Appendix B. ASN.1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 | ||||
| Appendix C. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 | ||||
| C.1 DSA Self-Signed Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 | ||||
| C.2 End Entity Certificate Using DSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 | ||||
| C.3 End Entity Certificate Using RSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 | ||||
| C.4 Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 | ||||
| Appendix D. Author Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 | ||||
| Appendix E. Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 | ||||
| 1 Introduction | ||||
| This specification is one part of a family of standards for the X.509 | ||||
| Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the Internet. This specification | ||||
| is a standalone document; implementations of this standard may | ||||
| proceed independent from the other parts. | ||||
| This specification profiles the format and semantics of certificates | ||||
| and certificate revocation lists for the Internet PKI. Procedures | ||||
| are described for processing of certification paths in the Internet | ||||
| environment. Encoding rules are provided for popular cryptographic | ||||
| algorithms. Finally, ASN.1 modules are provided in the appendices | ||||
| for all data structures defined or referenced. | ||||
| The specification describes the requirements which inspire the | ||||
| creation of this document and the assumptions which affect its scope | ||||
| in Section 2. Section 3 presents an architectural model and | ||||
| describes its relationship to previous IETF and ISO/IEC/ITU | ||||
| standards. In particular, this document's relationship with the IETF | ||||
| PEM specifications and the ISO/IEC/ITU X.509 documents are described. | ||||
| The specification profiles the X.509 version 3 certificate in Section | ||||
| 4, and the X.509 version 2 certificate revocation list (CRL) in | ||||
| Section 5. The profiles include the identification of ISO/IEC/ITU | ||||
| and ANSI extensions which may be useful in the Internet PKI. The | ||||
| profiles are presented in the 1988 Abstract Syntax Notation One | ||||
| (ASN.1) rather than the 1997 ASN.1 syntax used in the ISO/IEC/ITU | ||||
| standards. | ||||
| This specification also includes path validation procedures in | ||||
| Section 6. These procedures are based upon the ISO/IEC/ITU | ||||
| definition, but the presentation assumes one or more self-signed | ||||
| trusted CA certificates. Implementations are required to derive the | ||||
| same results but are not required to use the specified procedures. | ||||
| Procedures for identification and encoding of public key materials | ||||
| and digital signatures are defined in [PKIXALGS]. Implementations of | ||||
| this specification are not required to use any particular | ||||
| cryptographic algorithms. However, conforming implementations which | ||||
| use the algorithms identified in [PKIXALGS] MUST identify and encode | ||||
| the public key materials and digital signatures as described in that | ||||
| specification. | ||||
| Finally, three appendices are provided to aid implementers. Appendix | ||||
| A contains all ASN.1 structures defined or referenced within this | ||||
| specification. As above, the material is presented in the 1988 | ||||
| ASN.1. Appendix B contains notes on less familiar features of the | ||||
| ASN.1 notation used within this specification. Appendix C contains | ||||
| examples of a conforming certificate and a conforming CRL. | ||||
| 2 Requirements and Assumptions | ||||
| The goal of this specification is to develop a profile to facilitate | ||||
| the use of X.509 certificates within Internet applications for those | ||||
| communities wishing to make use of X.509 technology. Such | ||||
| applications may include WWW, electronic mail, user authentication, | ||||
| and IPsec. In order to relieve some of the obstacles to using X.509 | ||||
| certificates, this document defines a profile to promote the | ||||
| development of certificate management systems; development of | ||||
| application tools; and interoperability determined by policy. | ||||
| Some communities will need to supplement, or possibly replace, this | ||||
| profile in order to meet the requirements of specialized application | ||||
| domains or environments with additional authorization, assurance, or | ||||
| operational requirements. However, for basic applications, common | ||||
| representations of frequently used attributes are defined so that | ||||
| application developers can obtain necessary information without | ||||
| regard to the issuer of a particular certificate or certificate | ||||
| revocation list (CRL). | ||||
| A certificate user should review the certificate policy generated by | ||||
| the certification authority (CA) before relying on the authentication | ||||
| or non-repudiation services associated with the public key in a | ||||
| particular certificate. To this end, this standard does not | ||||
| prescribe legally binding rules or duties. | ||||
| As supplemental authorization and attribute management tools emerge, | ||||
| such as attribute certificates, it may be appropriate to limit the | ||||
| authenticated attributes that are included in a certificate. These | ||||
| other management tools may provide more appropriate methods of | ||||
| conveying many authenticated attributes. | ||||
| 2.1 Communication and Topology | ||||
| The users of certificates will operate in a wide range of | ||||
| environments with respect to their communication topology, especially | ||||
| users of secure electronic mail. This profile supports users without | ||||
| high bandwidth, real-time IP connectivity, or high connection | ||||
| availability. In addition, the profile allows for the presence of | ||||
| firewall or other filtered communication. | ||||
| This profile does not assume the deployment of an X.500 Directory | ||||
| system or a LDAP directory system. The profile does not prohibit the | ||||
| use of an X.500 Directory or a LDAP directory; however, any means of | ||||
| distributing certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs) may | ||||
| be used. | ||||
| 2.2 Acceptability Criteria | ||||
| The goal of the Internet Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is to meet | ||||
| the needs of deterministic, automated identification, authentication, | ||||
| access control, and authorization functions. Support for these | ||||
| services determines the attributes contained in the certificate as | ||||
| well as the ancillary control information in the certificate such as | ||||
| policy data and certification path constraints. | ||||
| 2.3 User Expectations | ||||
| Users of the Internet PKI are people and processes who use client | ||||
| software and are the subjects named in certificates. These uses | ||||
| include readers and writers of electronic mail, the clients for WWW | ||||
| browsers, WWW servers, and the key manager for IPsec within a router. | ||||
| This profile recognizes the limitations of the platforms these users | ||||
| employ and the limitations in sophistication and attentiveness of the | ||||
| users themselves. This manifests itself in minimal user | ||||
| configuration responsibility (e.g., trusted CA keys, rules), explicit | ||||
| platform usage constraints within the certificate, certification path | ||||
| constraints which shield the user from many malicious actions, and | ||||
| applications which sensibly automate validation functions. | ||||
| 2.4 Administrator Expectations | ||||
| As with user expectations, the Internet PKI profile is structured to | ||||
| support the individuals who generally operate CAs. Providing | ||||
| administrators with unbounded choices increases the chances that a | ||||
| subtle CA administrator mistake will result in broad compromise. | ||||
| Also, unbounded choices greatly complicate the software that process | ||||
| and validate the certificates created by the CA. | ||||
| 3 Overview of Approach | ||||
| Following is a simplified view of the architectural model assumed by | ||||
| the PKIX specifications. | ||||
| +---+ | ||||
| | C | +------------+ | ||||
| | e | <-------------------->| End entity | | ||||
| | r | Operational +------------+ | ||||
| | t | transactions ^ | ||||
| | i | and management | Management | ||||
| | f | transactions | transactions PKI | ||||
| | i | | users | ||||
| | c | v | ||||
| | a | ======================= +--+------------+ ============== | ||||
| | t | ^ ^ | ||||
| | e | | | PKI | ||||
| | | v | management | ||||
| | & | +------+ | entities | ||||
| | | <---------------------| RA |<----+ | | ||||
| | C | Publish certificate +------+ | | | ||||
| | R | | | | ||||
| | L | | | | ||||
| | | v v | ||||
| | R | +------------+ | ||||
| | e | <------------------------------| CA | | ||||
| | p | Publish certificate +------------+ | ||||
| | o | Publish CRL ^ ^ | ||||
| | s | | | Management | ||||
| | i | +------------+ | | transactions | ||||
| | t | <--------------| CRL Issuer |<----+ | | ||||
| | o | Publish CRL +------------+ v | ||||
| | r | +------+ | ||||
| | y | | CA | | ||||
| +---+ +------+ | ||||
| Figure 1 - PKI Entities | ||||
| The components in this model are: | ||||
| end entity: user of PKI certificates and/or end user system that | ||||
| is the subject of a certificate; | ||||
| CA: certification authority; | ||||
| RA: registration authority, i.e., an optional system to | ||||
| which a CA delegates certain management functions; | ||||
| CRL issuer: an optional system to which a CA delegates the | ||||
| publication of certificate revocation lists; | ||||
| repository: a system or collection of distributed systems that | ||||
| store certificates and CRLs and serves as a means of | ||||
| distributing these certificates and CRLs to end | ||||
| entities. | ||||
| Note that an Attribute Authority (AA) might also choose to delegate | ||||
| the publication of CRLs to a CRL issuer. | ||||
| 3.1 X.509 Version 3 Certificate | ||||
| Users of a public key require confidence that the associated private | ||||
| key is owned by the correct remote subject (person or system) with | ||||
| which an encryption or digital signature mechanism will be used. | ||||
| This confidence is obtained through the use of public key | ||||
| certificates, which are data structures that bind public key values | ||||
| to subjects. The binding is asserted by having a trusted CA | ||||
| digitally sign each certificate. The CA may base this assertion upon | ||||
| technical means (a.k.a., proof of possession through a challenge- | ||||
| response protocol), presentation of the private key, or on an | ||||
| assertion by the subject. A certificate has a limited valid lifetime | ||||
| which is indicated in its signed contents. Because a certificate's | ||||
| signature and timeliness can be independently checked by a | ||||
| certificate-using client, certificates can be distributed via | ||||
| untrusted communications and server systems, and can be cached in | ||||
| unsecured storage in certificate-using systems. | ||||
| ITU-T X.509 (formerly CCITT X.509) or ISO/IEC/ITU 9594-8, which was | ||||
| first published in 1988 as part of the X.500 Directory | ||||
| recommendations, defines a standard certificate format [X.509]. The | ||||
| certificate format in the 1988 standard is called the version 1 (v1) | ||||
| format. When X.500 was revised in 1993, two more fields were added, | ||||
| resulting in the version 2 (v2) format. | ||||
| The Internet Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) RFCs, published in 1993, | ||||
| include specifications for a public key infrastructure based on X.509 | ||||
| v1 certificates [RFC 1422]. The experience gained in attempts to | ||||
| deploy RFC 1422 made it clear that the v1 and v2 certificate formats | ||||
| are deficient in several respects. Most importantly, more fields | ||||
| were needed to carry information which PEM design and implementation | ||||
| experience has proven necessary. In response to these new | ||||
| requirements, ISO/IEC/ITU and ANSI X9 developed the X.509 version 3 | ||||
| (v3) certificate format. The v3 format extends the v2 format by | ||||
| adding provision for additional extension fields. Particular | ||||
| extension field types may be specified in standards or may be defined | ||||
| and registered by any organization or community. In June 1996, | ||||
| standardization of the basic v3 format was completed [X.509]. | ||||
| ISO/IEC/ITU and ANSI X9 have also developed standard extensions for | ||||
| use in the v3 extensions field [X.509][X9.55]. These extensions can | ||||
| convey such data as additional subject identification information, | ||||
| key attribute information, policy information, and certification path | ||||
| constraints. | ||||
| However, the ISO/IEC/ITU and ANSI X9 standard extensions are very | ||||
| broad in their applicability. In order to develop interoperable | ||||
| implementations of X.509 v3 systems for Internet use, it is necessary | ||||
| to specify a profile for use of the X.509 v3 extensions tailored for | ||||
| the Internet. It is one goal of this document to specify a profile | ||||
| for Internet WWW, electronic mail, and IPsec applications. | ||||
| Environments with additional requirements may build on this profile | ||||
| or may replace it. | ||||
| 3.2 Certification Paths and Trust | ||||
| A user of a security service requiring knowledge of a public key | ||||
| generally needs to obtain and validate a certificate containing the | ||||
| required public key. If the public-key user does not already hold an | ||||
| assured copy of the public key of the CA that signed the certificate, | ||||
| the CA's name, and related information (such as the validity period | ||||
| or name constraints), then it might need an additional certificate to | ||||
| obtain that public key. In general, a chain of multiple certificates | ||||
| may be needed, comprising a certificate of the public key owner (the | ||||
| end entity) signed by one CA, and zero or more additional | ||||
| certificates of CAs signed by other CAs. Such chains, called | ||||
| certification paths, are required because a public key user is only | ||||
| initialized with a limited number of assured CA public keys. | ||||
| There are different ways in which CAs might be configured in order | ||||
| for public key users to be able to find certification paths. For | ||||
| PEM, RFC 1422 defined a rigid hierarchical structure of CAs. There | ||||
| are three types of PEM certification authority: | ||||
| (a) Internet Policy Registration Authority (IPRA): This | ||||
| authority, operated under the auspices of the Internet Society, | ||||
| acts as the root of the PEM certification hierarchy at level 1. | ||||
| It issues certificates only for the next level of authorities, | ||||
| PCAs. All certification paths start with the IPRA. | ||||
| (b) Policy Certification Authorities (PCAs): PCAs are at level 2 | ||||
| of the hierarchy, each PCA being certified by the IPRA. A PCA | ||||
| shall establish and publish a statement of its policy with respect | ||||
| to certifying users or subordinate certification authorities. | ||||
| Distinct PCAs aim to satisfy different user needs. For example, | ||||
| one PCA (an organizational PCA) might support the general | ||||
| electronic mail needs of commercial organizations, and another PCA | ||||
| (a high-assurance PCA) might have a more stringent policy designed | ||||
| for satisfying legally binding digital signature requirements. | ||||
| (c) Certification Authorities (CAs): CAs are at level 3 of the | ||||
| hierarchy and can also be at lower levels. Those at level 3 are | ||||
| certified by PCAs. CAs represent, for example, particular | ||||
| organizations, particular organizational units (e.g., departments, | ||||
| groups, sections), or particular geographical areas. | ||||
| RFC 1422 furthermore has a name subordination rule which requires | ||||
| that a CA can only issue certificates for entities whose names are | ||||
| subordinate (in the X.500 naming tree) to the name of the CA itself. | ||||
| The trust associated with a PEM certification path is implied by the | ||||
| PCA name. The name subordination rule ensures that CAs below the PCA | ||||
| are sensibly constrained as to the set of subordinate entities they | ||||
| can certify (e.g., a CA for an organization can only certify entities | ||||
| in that organization's name tree). Certificate user systems are able | ||||
| to mechanically check that the name subordination rule has been | ||||
| followed. | ||||
| The RFC 1422 uses the X.509 v1 certificate formats. The limitations | ||||
| of X.509 v1 required imposition of several structural restrictions to | ||||
| clearly associate policy information or restrict the utility of | ||||
| certificates. These restrictions included: | ||||
| (a) a pure top-down hierarchy, with all certification paths | ||||
| starting from IPRA; | ||||
| (b) a naming subordination rule restricting the names of a CA's | ||||
| subjects; and | ||||
| (c) use of the PCA concept, which requires knowledge of | ||||
| individual PCAs to be built into certificate chain verification | ||||
| logic. Knowledge of individual PCAs was required to determine if | ||||
| a chain could be accepted. | ||||
| With X.509 v3, most of the requirements addressed by RFC 1422 can be | ||||
| addressed using certificate extensions, without a need to restrict | ||||
| the CA structures used. In particular, the certificate extensions | ||||
| relating to certificate policies obviate the need for PCAs and the | ||||
| constraint extensions obviate the need for the name subordination | ||||
| rule. As a result, this document supports a more flexible | ||||
| architecture, including: | ||||
| (a) Certification paths start with a public key of a CA in a | ||||
| user's own domain, or with the public key of the top of a | ||||
| hierarchy. Starting with the public key of a CA in a user's own | ||||
| domain has certain advantages. In some environments, the local | ||||
| domain is the most trusted. | ||||
| (b) Name constraints may be imposed through explicit inclusion of | ||||
| a name constraints extension in a certificate, but are not | ||||
| required. | ||||
| (c) Policy extensions and policy mappings replace the PCA | ||||
| concept, which permits a greater degree of automation. The | ||||
| application can determine if the certification path is acceptable | ||||
| based on the contents of the certificates instead of a priori | ||||
| knowledge of PCAs. This permits automation of certificate chain | ||||
| processing. | ||||
| 3.3 Revocation | ||||
| When a certificate is issued, it is expected to be in use for its | ||||
| entire validity period. However, various circumstances may cause a | ||||
| certificate to become invalid prior to the expiration of the validity | ||||
| period. Such circumstances include change of name, change of | ||||
| association between subject and CA (e.g., an employee terminates | ||||
| employment with an organization), and compromise or suspected | ||||
| compromise of the corresponding private key. Under such | ||||
| circumstances, the CA needs to revoke the certificate. | ||||
| X.509 defines one method of certificate revocation. This method | ||||
| involves each CA periodically issuing a signed data structure called | ||||
| a certificate revocation list (CRL). A CRL is a time stamped list | ||||
| identifying revoked certificates which is signed by a CA and made | ||||
| freely available in a public repository. Each revoked certificate is | ||||
| identified in a CRL by its certificate serial number. When a | ||||
| certificate-using system uses a certificate (e.g., for verifying a | ||||
| remote user's digital signature), that system not only checks the | ||||
| certificate signature and validity but also acquires a suitably- | ||||
| recent CRL and checks that the certificate serial number is not on | ||||
| that CRL. The meaning of "suitably-recent" may vary with local | ||||
| policy, but it usually means the most recently-issued CRL. A CA | ||||
| issues a new CRL on a regular periodic basis (e.g., hourly, daily, or | ||||
| weekly). An entry is added to the CRL as part of the next update | ||||
| following notification of revocation. An entry MUST NOT be removed | ||||
| from the CRL until it appears on one regularly scheduled CRL issued | ||||
| beyond the revoked certificate's validity period. | ||||
| An advantage of this revocation method is that CRLs may be | ||||
| distributed by exactly the same means as certificates themselves, | ||||
| namely, via untrusted servers and untrusted communications. | ||||
| One limitation of the CRL revocation method, using untrusted | ||||
| communications and servers, is that the time granularity of | ||||
| revocation is limited to the CRL issue period. For example, if a | ||||
| revocation is reported now, that revocation will not be reliably | ||||
| notified to certificate-using systems until all currently issued CRLs | ||||
| are updated -- this may be up to one hour, one day, or one week | ||||
| depending on the frequency that CRLs are issued. | ||||
| As with the X.509 v3 certificate format, in order to facilitate | ||||
| interoperable implementations from multiple vendors, the X.509 v2 CRL | ||||
| format needs to be profiled for Internet use. It is one goal of this | ||||
| document to specify that profile. However, this profile does not | ||||
| require CAs to issue CRLs. Message formats and protocols supporting | ||||
| on-line revocation notification are defined in other PKIX | ||||
| specifications. On-line methods of revocation notification may be | ||||
| applicable in some environments as an alternative to the X.509 CRL. | ||||
| On-line revocation checking may significantly reduce the latency | ||||
| between a revocation report and the distribution of the information | ||||
| to relying parties. Once the CA accepts the report as authentic and | ||||
| valid, any query to the on-line service will correctly reflect the | ||||
| certificate validation impacts of the revocation. However, these | ||||
| methods impose new security requirements: the certificate validator | ||||
| needs to trust the on-line validation service while the repository | ||||
| does not need to be trusted. | ||||
| 3.4 Operational Protocols | ||||
| Operational protocols are required to deliver certificates and CRLs | ||||
| (or status information) to certificate using client systems. | ||||
| Provision is needed for a variety of different means of certificate | ||||
| and CRL delivery, including distribution procedures based on LDAP, | ||||
| HTTP, FTP, and X.500. Operational protocols supporting these | ||||
| functions are defined in other PKIX specifications. These | ||||
| specifications may include definitions of message formats and | ||||
| procedures for supporting all of the above operational environments, | ||||
| including definitions of or references to appropriate MIME content | ||||
| types. | ||||
| 3.5 Management Protocols | ||||
| Management protocols are required to support on-line interactions | ||||
| between PKI user and management entities. For example, a management | ||||
| protocol might be used between a CA and a client system with which a | ||||
| key pair is associated, or between two CAs which cross-certify each | ||||
| other. The set of functions which potentially need to be supported | ||||
| by management protocols include: | ||||
| (a) registration: This is the process whereby a user first makes | ||||
| itself known to a CA (directly, or through an RA), prior to that | ||||
| CA issuing a certificate or certificates for that user. | ||||
| (b) initialization: Before a client system can operate securely | ||||
| it is necessary to install key materials which have the | ||||
| appropriate relationship with keys stored elsewhere in the | ||||
| infrastructure. For example, the client needs to be securely | ||||
| initialized with the public key and other assured information of | ||||
| the trusted CA(s), to be used in validating certificate paths. | ||||
| Furthermore, a client typically needs to be initialized with its | ||||
| own key pair(s). | ||||
| (c) certification: This is the process in which a CA issues a | ||||
| certificate for a user's public key, and returns that certificate | ||||
| to the user's client system and/or posts that certificate in a | ||||
| repository. | ||||
| (d) key pair recovery: As an option, user client key materials | ||||
| (e.g., a user's private key used for encryption purposes) may be | ||||
| backed up by a CA or a key backup system. If a user needs to | ||||
| recover these backed up key materials (e.g., as a result of a | ||||
| forgotten password or a lost key chain file), an on-line protocol | ||||
| exchange may be needed to support such recovery. | ||||
| (e) key pair update: All key pairs need to be updated regularly, | ||||
| i.e., replaced with a new key pair, and new certificates issued. | ||||
| (f) revocation request: An authorized person advises a CA of an | ||||
| abnormal situation requiring certificate revocation. | ||||
| (g) cross-certification: Two CAs exchange information used in | ||||
| establishing a cross-certificate. A cross-certificate is a | ||||
| certificate issued by one CA to another CA which contains a CA | ||||
| signature key used for issuing certificates. | ||||
| Note that on-line protocols are not the only way of implementing the | ||||
| above functions. For all functions there are off-line methods of | ||||
| achieving the same result, and this specification does not mandate | ||||
| use of on-line protocols. For example, when hardware tokens are | ||||
| used, many of the functions may be achieved as part of the physical | ||||
| token delivery. Furthermore, some of the above functions may be | ||||
| combined into one protocol exchange. In particular, two or more of | ||||
| the registration, initialization, and certification functions can be | ||||
| combined into one protocol exchange. | ||||
| The PKIX series of specifications defines a set of standard message | ||||
| formats supporting the above functions. The protocols for conveying | ||||
| these messages in different environments (e.g., e-mail, file | ||||
| transfer, and WWW) are described in those specifications. | ||||
| 4 Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile | ||||
| This section presents a profile for public key certificates that will | ||||
| foster interoperability and a reusable PKI. This section is based | ||||
| upon the X.509 v3 certificate format and the standard certificate | ||||
| extensions defined in [X.509]. The ISO/IEC/ITU documents use the | ||||
| 1997 version of ASN.1; while this document uses the 1988 ASN.1 | ||||
| syntax, the encoded certificate and standard extensions are | ||||
| equivalent. This section also defines private extensions required to | ||||
| support a PKI for the Internet community. | ||||
| Certificates may be used in a wide range of applications and | ||||
| environments covering a broad spectrum of interoperability goals and | ||||
| a broader spectrum of operational and assurance requirements. The | ||||
| goal of this document is to establish a common baseline for generic | ||||
| applications requiring broad interoperability and limited special | ||||
| purpose requirements. In particular, the emphasis will be on | ||||
| supporting the use of X.509 v3 certificates for informal Internet | ||||
| electronic mail, IPsec, and WWW applications. | ||||
| 4.1 Basic Certificate Fields | ||||
| The X.509 v3 certificate basic syntax is as follows. For signature | ||||
| calculation, the certificate is encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished | ||||
| encoding rules (DER) [X.208]. ASN.1 DER encoding is a tag, length, | ||||
| value encoding system for each element. | ||||
| Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| tbsCertificate TBSCertificate, | ||||
| signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, | ||||
| signatureValue BIT STRING } | ||||
| TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1, | ||||
| serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber, | ||||
| signature AlgorithmIdentifier, | ||||
| issuer Name, | ||||
| validity Validity, | ||||
| subject Name, | ||||
| subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo, | ||||
| issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, | ||||
| -- If present, version MUST be v2 or v3 | ||||
| subjectUniqueID [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, | ||||
| -- If present, version MUST be v2 or v3 | ||||
| extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL | ||||
| -- If present, version MUST be v3 | ||||
| } | ||||
| Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } | ||||
| CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER | ||||
| Validity ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| notBefore Time, | ||||
| notAfter Time } | ||||
| Time ::= CHOICE { | ||||
| utcTime UTCTime, | ||||
| generalTime GeneralizedTime } | ||||
| UniqueIdentifier ::= BIT STRING | ||||
| SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, | ||||
| subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } | ||||
| Extensions ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension | ||||
| Extension ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, | ||||
| critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, | ||||
| extnValue OCTET STRING } | ||||
| The following items describe the X.509 v3 certificate for use in the | ||||
| Internet. | ||||
| 4.1.1 Certificate Fields | ||||
| The Certificate is a SEQUENCE of three required fields. The fields | ||||
| are described in detail in the following subsections. | ||||
| 4.1.1.1 tbsCertificate | ||||
| The field contains the names of the subject and issuer, a public key | ||||
| associated with the subject, a validity period, and other associated | ||||
| information. The fields are described in detail in section 4.1.2; | ||||
| the tbsCertificate MAY also include extensions which are described in | ||||
| section 4.2. | ||||
| 4.1.1.2 signatureAlgorithm | ||||
| The signatureAlgorithm field contains the identifier for the | ||||
| cryptographic algorithm used by the CA to sign this certificate. | ||||
| [PKIXALGS] lists supported signature algorithms, but other signature | ||||
| algorithms MAY also be supported. | ||||
| An algorithm identifier is defined by the following ASN.1 structure: | ||||
| AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, | ||||
| parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL } | ||||
| The algorithm identifier is used to identify a cryptographic | ||||
| algorithm. The OBJECT IDENTIFIER component identifies the algorithm | ||||
| (such as DSA with SHA-1). The contents of the optional parameters | ||||
| field will vary according to the algorithm identified. [PKIXALGS] | ||||
| lists supported algorithms, but other algorithms MAY also be | ||||
| implemented. | ||||
| This field MUST contain the same algorithm identifier as the | ||||
| signature field in the sequence tbsCertificate (section 4.1.2.3). | ||||
| 4.1.1.3 signatureValue | ||||
| The signatureValue field contains a digital signature computed upon | ||||
| the ASN.1 DER encoded tbsCertificate. The ASN.1 DER encoded | ||||
| tbsCertificate is used as the input to the signature function. This | ||||
| signature value is then ASN.1 encoded as a BIT STRING and included in | ||||
| the signature field. The details of this process are specified for | ||||
| each of algorithms listed in [PKIXALGS]. | ||||
| By generating this signature, a CA certifies the validity of the | ||||
| information in the tbsCertificate field. In particular, the CA | ||||
| certifies the binding between the public key material and the subject | ||||
| of the certificate. | ||||
| 4.1.2 TBSCertificate | ||||
| The sequence TBSCertificate contains information associated with the | ||||
| subject of the certificate and the CA who issued it. Every | ||||
| TBSCertificate contains the names of the subject and issuer, a public | ||||
| key associated with the subject, a validity period, a version number, | ||||
| and a serial number; some MAY contain optional unique identifier | ||||
| fields. The remainder of this section describes the syntax and | ||||
| semantics of these fields. A TBSCertificate MAY also include | ||||
| extensions. Extensions for the Internet PKI are described in Section | ||||
| 4.2. | ||||
| 4.1.2.1 Version | ||||
| This field describes the version of the encoded certificate. When | ||||
| extensions are used, as expected in this profile, use X.509 version 3 | ||||
| (value is 2). If no extensions are present, but a UniqueIdentifier | ||||
| is present, use version 2 (value is 1). If only basic fields are | ||||
| present, use version 1 (the value is omitted from the certificate as | ||||
| the default value). | ||||
| Implementations SHOULD be prepared to accept any version certificate. | ||||
| At a minimum, conforming implementations MUST recognize version 3 | ||||
| certificates. | ||||
| Generation of version 2 certificates is not expected by | ||||
| implementations based on this profile. | ||||
| 4.1.2.2 Serial number | ||||
| The serial number MUST be a positive integer assigned by the CA to | ||||
| each certificate. It MUST be unique for each certificate issued by a | ||||
| given CA (i.e., the issuer name and serial number identify a unique | ||||
| certificate). CAs MUST force the serialNumber to be a non-negative | ||||
| integer. | ||||
| Given the uniqueness requirements above, serial numbers can be | ||||
| expected to contain long integers. Certificate users MUST be able to | ||||
| handle serialNumber values up to 20 octets. Conformant CAs MUST NOT | ||||
| use serialNumber values longer than 20 octets. | ||||
| Note: Non-conforming CAs MAY issue certificates with serial numbers | ||||
| that are negative, or zero. Certificate users SHOULD be prepared to | ||||
| handle such certificates. | ||||
| 4.1.2.3 Signature | ||||
| This field contains the algorithm identifier for the algorithm used | ||||
| by the CA to sign the certificate. | ||||
| This field MUST contain the same algorithm identifier as the | ||||
| signatureAlgorithm field in the sequence Certificate (section | ||||
| 4.1.1.2). The contents of the optional parameters field will vary | ||||
| according to the algorithm identified. [PKIXALGS] lists the | ||||
| supported signature algorithms. | ||||
| 4.1.2.4 Issuer | ||||
| The issuer field identifies the entity who has signed and issued the | ||||
| certificate. The issuer field MUST contain a non-empty distinguished | ||||
| name (DN). The issuer field is defined as the X.501 type Name | ||||
| [X.501]. Name is defined by the following ASN.1 structures: | ||||
| Name ::= CHOICE { | ||||
| RDNSequence } | ||||
| RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName | ||||
| RelativeDistinguishedName ::= | ||||
| SET OF AttributeTypeAndValue | ||||
| AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| type AttributeType, | ||||
| value AttributeValue } | ||||
| AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER | ||||
| AttributeValue ::= ANY DEFINED BY AttributeType | ||||
| DirectoryString ::= CHOICE { | ||||
| teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..MAX)), | ||||
| printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..MAX)), | ||||
| universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..MAX)), | ||||
| utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..MAX)), | ||||
| bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..MAX)) } | ||||
| The Name describes a hierarchical name composed of attributes, such | ||||
| as country name, and corresponding values, such as US. The type of | ||||
| the component AttributeValue is determined by the AttributeType; in | ||||
| general it will be a DirectoryString. | ||||
| The DirectoryString type is defined as a choice of PrintableString, | ||||
| TeletexString, BMPString, UTF8String, and UniversalString. The | ||||
| UTF8String encoding [RFC 2279] is the preferred encoding, and all | ||||
| certificates issued after December 31, 2003 MUST use the UTF8String | ||||
| encoding of DirectoryString (except as noted below). Until that | ||||
| date, conforming CAs MUST choose from the following options when | ||||
| creating a distinguished name, including their own: | ||||
| (a) if the character set is sufficient, the string MAY be | ||||
| represented as a PrintableString; | ||||
| (b) failing (a), if the BMPString character set is sufficient the | ||||
| string MAY be represented as a BMPString; and | ||||
| (c) failing (a) and (b), the string MUST be represented as a | ||||
| UTF8String. If (a) or (b) is satisfied, the CA MAY still choose | ||||
| to represent the string as a UTF8String. | ||||
| Exceptions to the December 31, 2003 UTF8 encoding requirements are as | ||||
| follows: | ||||
| (a) CAs MAY issue "name rollover" certificates to support an | ||||
| orderly migration to UTF8String encoding. Such certificates would | ||||
| include the CA's UTF8String encoded name as issuer and and the old | ||||
| name encoding as subject, or vice-versa. | ||||
| (b) As stated in section 4.1.2.6, the subject field MUST be | ||||
| populated with a non-empty distinguished name matching the | ||||
| contents of the issuer field in all certificates issued by the | ||||
| subject CA regardless of encoding. | ||||
| The TeletexString and UniversalString are included for backward | ||||
| compatibility, and SHOULD NOT be used for certificates for new | ||||
| subjects. However, these types MAY be used in certificates where the | ||||
| name was previously established. Certificate users SHOULD be | ||||
| prepared to receive certificates with these types. | ||||
| In addition, many legacy implementations support names encoded in the | ||||
| ISO 8859-1 character set (Latin1String) but tag them as | ||||
| TeletexString. The Latin1String includes characters used in Western | ||||
| European countries which are not part of the TeletexString charcter | ||||
| set. Implementations that process TeletexString SHOULD be prepared | ||||
| to handle the entire ISO 8859-1 character set.[ISO 8859-1] | ||||
| As noted above, distinguished names are composed of attributes. This | ||||
| specification does not restrict the set of attribute types that may | ||||
| appear in names. However, conforming implementations MUST be | ||||
| prepared to receive certificates with issuer names containing the set | ||||
| of attribute types defined below. This specification RECOMMENDS | ||||
| support for additional attribute types. | ||||
| Standard sets of attributes have been defined in the X.500 series of | ||||
| specifications.[X.520] Implementations of this specification MUST be | ||||
| prepared to receive the following standard attribute types in issuer | ||||
| and subject (section 4.1.2.6) names: | ||||
| * country, | ||||
| * organization, | ||||
| * organizational-unit, | ||||
| * distinguished name qualifier, | ||||
| * state or province name, | ||||
| * common name (e.g., "Susan Housley"), and | ||||
| * serial number. | ||||
| In addition, implementations of this specification SHOULD be prepared | ||||
| to receive the following standard attribute types in issuer and | ||||
| subject names: | ||||
| * locality, | ||||
| * title, | ||||
| * surname, | ||||
| * given name, | ||||
| * initials, | ||||
| * pseudonym, and | ||||
| * generation qualifier (e.g., "Jr.", "3rd", or "IV"). | ||||
| The syntax and associated object identifiers (OIDs) for these | ||||
| attribute types are provided in the ASN.1 modules in Appendix A. | ||||
| In addition, implementations of this specification MUST be prepared | ||||
| to receive the domainComponent attribute, as defined in [RFC 2247]. | ||||
| The Domain (Nameserver) System (DNS) provides a hierarchical resource | ||||
| labeling system. This attribute provides a convenient mechanism for | ||||
| organizations that wish to use DNs that parallel their DNS names. | ||||
| This is not a replacement for the dNSName component of the | ||||
| alternative name field. Implementations are not required to convert | ||||
| such names into DNS names. The syntax and associated OID for this | ||||
| attribute type is provided in the ASN.1 modules in Appendix A. | ||||
| Certificate users MUST be prepared to process the issuer | ||||
| distinguished name and subject distinguished name (section 4.1.2.6) | ||||
| fields to perform name chaining for certification path validation | ||||
| (section 6). Name chaining is performed by matching the issuer | ||||
| distinguished name in one certificate with the subject name in a CA | ||||
| certificate. | ||||
| This specification requires only a subset of the name comparison | ||||
| functionality specified in the X.500 series of specifications. The | ||||
| requirements for conforming implementations are as follows: | ||||
| (a) attribute values encoded in different types (e.g., | ||||
| PrintableString and BMPString) MAY be assumed to represent | ||||
| different strings; | ||||
| (b) attribute values in types other than PrintableString are case | ||||
| sensitive (this permits matching of attribute values as binary | ||||
| objects); | ||||
| (c) attribute values in PrintableString are not case sensitive | ||||
| (e.g., "Marianne Swanson" is the same as "MARIANNE SWANSON"); and | ||||
| (d) attribute values in PrintableString are compared after | ||||
| removing leading and trailing white space and converting internal | ||||
| substrings of one or more consecutive white space characters to a | ||||
| single space. | ||||
| These name comparison rules permit a certificate user to validate | ||||
| certificates issued using languages or encodings unfamiliar to the | ||||
| certificate user. | ||||
| In addition, implementations of this specification MAY use these | ||||
| comparison rules to process unfamiliar attribute types for name | ||||
| chaining. This allows implementations to process certificates with | ||||
| unfamiliar attributes in the issuer name. | ||||
| Note that the comparison rules defined in the X.500 series of | ||||
| specifications indicate that the character sets used to encode data | ||||
| in distinguished names are irrelevant. The characters themselves are | ||||
| compared without regard to encoding. Implementations of the profile | ||||
| are permitted to use the comparison algorithm defined in the X.500 | ||||
| series. Such an implementation will recognize a superset of name | ||||
| matches recognized by the algorithm specified above. | ||||
| 4.1.2.5 Validity | ||||
| The certificate validity period is the time interval during which the | ||||
| CA warrants that it will maintain information about the status of the | ||||
| certificate. The field is represented as a SEQUENCE of two dates: | ||||
| the date on which the certificate validity period begins (notBefore) | ||||
| and the date on which the certificate validity period ends | ||||
| (notAfter). Both notBefore and notAfter may be encoded as UTCTime or | ||||
| GeneralizedTime. | ||||
| CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate | ||||
| validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity | ||||
| dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime. | ||||
| The validity period for a certificate is the period of time from | ||||
| notBefore through notAfter, inclusive. | ||||
| 4.1.2.5.1 UTCTime | ||||
| The universal time type, UTCTime, is a standard ASN.1 type intended | ||||
| for representation of dates and time. UTCTime specifies the year | ||||
| through the two low order digits and time is specified to the | ||||
| precision of one minute or one second. UTCTime includes either Z | ||||
| (for Zulu, or Greenwich Mean Time) or a time differential. | ||||
| For the purposes of this profile, UTCTime values MUST be expressed | ||||
| Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu) and MUST include seconds (i.e., times are | ||||
| YYMMDDHHMMSSZ), even where the number of seconds is zero. Conforming | ||||
| systems MUST interpret the year field (YY) as follows: | ||||
| Where YY is greater than or equal to 50, the year SHALL be | ||||
| interpreted as 19YY; and | ||||
| Where YY is less than 50, the year SHALL be interpreted as 20YY. | ||||
| 4.1.2.5.2 GeneralizedTime | ||||
| The generalized time type, GeneralizedTime, is a standard ASN.1 type | ||||
| for variable precision representation of time. Optionally, the | ||||
| GeneralizedTime field can include a representation of the time | ||||
| differential between local and Greenwich Mean Time. | ||||
| For the purposes of this profile, GeneralizedTime values MUST be | ||||
| expressed Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu) and MUST include seconds (i.e., | ||||
| times are YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ), even where the number of seconds is zero. | ||||
| GeneralizedTime values MUST NOT include fractional seconds. | ||||
| 4.1.2.6 Subject | ||||
| The subject field identifies the entity associated with the public | ||||
| key stored in the subject public key field. The subject name MAY be | ||||
| carried in the subject field and/or the subjectAltName extension. If | ||||
| the subject is a CA (e.g., the basic constraints extension, as | ||||
| discussed in 4.2.1.10, is present and the value of cA is TRUE,) then | ||||
| the subject field MUST be populated with a non-empty distinguished | ||||
| name matching the contents of the issuer field (section 4.1.2.4) in | ||||
| all certificates issued by the subject CA. If subject naming | ||||
| information is present only in the subjectAltName extension (e.g., a | ||||
| key bound only to an email address or URI), then the subject name | ||||
| MUST be an empty sequence and the subjectAltName extension MUST be | ||||
| critical. | ||||
| Where it is non-empty, the subject field MUST contain an X.500 | ||||
| distinguished name (DN). The DN MUST be unique for each subject | ||||
| entity certified by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field. | ||||
| A CA MAY issue more than one certificate with the same DN to the same | ||||
| subject entity. | ||||
| The subject name field is defined as the X.501 type Name. | ||||
| Implementation requirements for this field are those defined for the | ||||
| issuer field (section 4.1.2.4). When encoding attribute values of | ||||
| type DirectoryString, the encoding rules for the issuer field MUST be | ||||
| implemented. Implementations of this specification MUST be prepared | ||||
| to receive subject names containing the attribute types required for | ||||
| the issuer field. Implementations of this specification SHOULD be | ||||
| prepared to receive subject names containing the recommended | ||||
| attribute types for the issuer field. The syntax and associated | ||||
| object identifiers (OIDs) for these attribute types are provided in | ||||
| the ASN.1 modules in Appendix A. Implementations of this | ||||
| specification MAY use these comparison rules to process unfamiliar | ||||
| attribute types (i.e., for name chaining). This allows | ||||
| implementations to process certificates with unfamiliar attributes in | ||||
| the subject name. | ||||
| In addition, legacy implementations exist where an RFC 822 name is | ||||
| embedded in the subject distinguished name as an EmailAddress | ||||
| attribute. The attribute value for EmailAddress is of type IA5String | ||||
| to permit inclusion of the character '@', which is not part of the | ||||
| PrintableString character set. EmailAddress attribute values are not | ||||
| case sensitive (e.g., "fanfeedback@redsox.com" is the same as | ||||
| "FANFEEDBACK@REDSOX.COM"). | ||||
| Conforming implementations generating new certificates with | ||||
| electronic mail addresses MUST use the rfc822Name in the subject | ||||
| alternative name field (section 4.2.1.7) to describe such identities. | ||||
| Simultaneous inclusion of the EmailAddress attribute in the subject | ||||
| distinguished name to support legacy implementations is deprecated | ||||
| but permitted. | ||||
| 4.1.2.7 Subject Public Key Info | ||||
| This field is used to carry the public key and identify the algorithm | ||||
| with which the key is used (e.g., RSA, DSA, or Diffie-Hellman). The | ||||
| algorithm is identified using the AlgorithmIdentifier structure | ||||
| specified in section 4.1.1.2. The object identifiers for the | ||||
| supported algorithms and the methods for encoding the public key | ||||
| materials (public key and parameters) are specified in [PKIXALGS]. | ||||
| 4.1.2.8 Unique Identifiers | ||||
| These fields MUST only appear if the version is 2 or 3 (section | ||||
| 4.1.2.1). These fields MUST NOT appear if the version is 1. The | ||||
| subject and issuer unique identifiers are present in the certificate | ||||
| to handle the possibility of reuse of subject and/or issuer names | ||||
| over time. This profile RECOMMENDS that names not be reused for | ||||
| different entities and that Internet certificates not make use of | ||||
| unique identifiers. CAs conforming to this profile SHOULD NOT | ||||
| generate certificates with unique identifiers. Applications | ||||
| conforming to this profile SHOULD be capable of parsing unique | ||||
| identifiers and making comparisons. | ||||
| 4.1.2.9 Extensions | ||||
| This field MUST only appear if the version is 3 (section 4.1.2.1). | ||||
| If present, this field is a SEQUENCE of one or more certificate | ||||
| extensions. The format and content of certificate extensions in the | ||||
| Internet PKI is defined in section 4.2. | ||||
| 4.2 Certificate Extensions | ||||
| The extensions defined for X.509 v3 certificates provide methods for | ||||
| associating additional attributes with users or public keys and for | ||||
| managing the certification hierarchy. The X.509 v3 certificate | ||||
| format also allows communities to define private extensions to carry | ||||
| information unique to those communities. Each extension in a | ||||
| certificate is designated as either critical or non-critical. A | ||||
| certificate using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters | ||||
| a critical extension it does not recognize; however, a non-critical | ||||
| extension MAY be ignored if it is not recognized. The following | ||||
| sections present recommended extensions used within Internet | ||||
| certificates and standard locations for information. Communities MAY | ||||
| elect to use additional extensions; however, caution SHOULD be | ||||
| exercised in adopting any critical extensions in certificates which | ||||
| might prevent use in a general context. | ||||
| Each extension includes an OID and an ASN.1 structure. When an | ||||
| extension appears in a certificate, the OID appears as the field | ||||
| extnID and the corresponding ASN.1 encoded structure is the value of | ||||
| the octet string extnValue. Only one instance of a particular | ||||
| extension MUST appear in a particular certificate. For example, a | ||||
| certificate may contain only one authority key identifier extension | ||||
| (section 4.2.1.1). An extension includes the boolean critical, with | ||||
| a default value of FALSE. The text for each extension specifies the | ||||
| acceptable values for the critical field. | ||||
| Conforming CAs MUST support key identifiers (sections 4.2.1.1 and | ||||
| 4.2.1.2), basic constraints (section 4.2.1.10), key usage (section | ||||
| 4.2.1.3), and certificate policies (section 4.2.1.5) extensions. If | ||||
| the CA issues certificates with an empty sequence for the subject | ||||
| field, the CA MUST support the subject alternative name extension | ||||
| (section 4.2.1.7). Support for the remaining extensions is OPTIONAL. | ||||
| Conforming CAs MAY support extensions that are not identified within | ||||
| this specification; certificate issuers are cautioned that marking | ||||
| such extensions as critical may inhibit interoperability. | ||||
| At a minimum, applications conforming to this profile MUST recognize | ||||
| the following extensions: key usage (section 4.2.1.3), certificate | ||||
| policies (section 4.2.1.5), the subject alternative name (section | ||||
| 4.2.1.7), basic constraints (section 4.2.1.10), name constraints | ||||
| (section 4.2.1.11), policy constraints (section 4.2.1.12), extended | ||||
| key usage (section 4.2.1.13), and inhibit any-policy (section | ||||
| 4.2.1.15). | ||||
| In addition, applications conforming to this profile SHOULD recognize | ||||
| the authority and subject key identifier (sections 4.2.1.1 and | ||||
| 4.2.1.2), and policy mapping (section 4.2.1.6) extensions. | ||||
| 4.2.1 Standard Extensions | ||||
| This section identifies standard certificate extensions defined in | ||||
| [X.509] for use in the Internet PKI. Each extension is associated | ||||
| with an OID defined in [X.509]. These OIDs are members of the id-ce | ||||
| arc, which is defined by the following: | ||||
| id-ce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 29} | ||||
| 4.2.1.1 Authority Key Identifier | ||||
| The authority key identifier extension provides a means of | ||||
| identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to | ||||
| sign a certificate. This extension is used where an issuer has | ||||
| multiple signing keys (either due to multiple concurrent key pairs or | ||||
| due to changeover). The identification MAY be based on either the | ||||
| key identifier (the subject key identifier in the issuer's | ||||
| certificate) or on the issuer name and serial number. | ||||
| The keyIdentifier field of the authorityKeyIdentifier extension MUST | ||||
| be included in all certificates generated by conforming CAs to | ||||
| facilitate chain building. There is one exception; where a CA | ||||
| distributes its public key in the form of a "self-signed" | ||||
| certificate, the authority key identifier MAY be omitted. The | ||||
| signature on a self-signed certificate is generated with the private | ||||
| key associated with the certificate's subject public key. (This | ||||
| proves that the issuer possesses both the public and private keys.) | ||||
| In this case, the subject and authority key identifiers would be | ||||
| identical, but only the subject key identifier is needed for | ||||
| certification path building. | ||||
| The value of the keyIdentifier field SHOULD be derived from the | ||||
| public key used to verify the certificate's signature or a method | ||||
| that generates unique values. Two common methods for generating key | ||||
| identifiers from the public key are described in (sec. 4.2.1.2). One | ||||
| common method for generating unique values is described in (sec. | ||||
| 4.2.1.2). Where a key identifier has not been previously | ||||
| established, this specification recommends use of one of these | ||||
| methods for generating keyIdentifiers. | ||||
| This profile recommends support for the key identifier method by all | ||||
| certificate users. | ||||
| This extension MUST NOT be marked critical. | ||||
| id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 35 } | ||||
| AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| keyIdentifier [0] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, | ||||
| authorityCertIssuer [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL, | ||||
| authorityCertSerialNumber [2] CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL } | ||||
| KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING | ||||
| 4.2.1.2 Subject Key Identifier | ||||
| The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying | ||||
| certificates that contain a particular public key. | ||||
| To facilitate chain building, this extension MUST appear in all | ||||
| conforming CA certificates, that is, all certificates including the | ||||
| basic constraints extension (section 4.2.1.10) where the value of cA | ||||
| is TRUE. The value of the subject key identifier MUST be the value | ||||
| placed in the key identifier field of the Authority Key Identifier | ||||
| extension (section 4.2.1.1) of certificates issued by the subject of | ||||
| this certificate. | ||||
| For CA certificates, subject key identifiers SHOULD be derived from | ||||
| the public key or a method that generates unique values. The key | ||||
| identifier is an explicit value placed in the certificate by the | ||||
| issuer, not a value generated by a certificate user. Two common | ||||
| methods for generating key identifiers from the public key are: | ||||
| (1) The keyIdentifier is composed of the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the | ||||
| value of the BIT STRING subjectPublicKey (excluding the tag, | ||||
| length, and number of unused bits). | ||||
| (2) The keyIdentifier is composed of a four bit type field with | ||||
| the value 0100 followed by the least significant 60 bits of the | ||||
| SHA-1 hash of the value of the BIT STRING subjectPublicKey | ||||
| (excluding the tag, length, and number of unused bit string bits). | ||||
| One common method for generating unique values is a monotonically | ||||
| increasing sequence of integers. | ||||
| For end entity certificates, the subject key identifier extension | ||||
| provides a means for identifying certificates containing the | ||||
| particular public key used in an application. Where an end entity | ||||
| has obtained multiple certificates, especially from multiple CAs, the | ||||
| subject key identifier provides a means to quickly identify the set | ||||
| of certificates containing a particular public key. To assist | ||||
| applications in identifying the appropriate end entity certificate, | ||||
| this extension SHOULD be included in all end entity certificates. | ||||
| For end entity certificates, subject key identifiers SHOULD be | ||||
| derived from the public key. Two common methods for generating key | ||||
| identifiers from the public key are identified above. | ||||
| Where a key identifier has not been previously established, this | ||||
| specification recommends use of one of these methods for generating | ||||
| keyIdentifiers. | ||||
| This extension MUST NOT be marked critical. | ||||
| id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 14 } | ||||
| SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= KeyIdentifier | ||||
| 4.2.1.3 Key Usage | ||||
| The key usage extension defines the purpose (e.g., encipherment, | ||||
| signature, certificate signing) of the key contained in the | ||||
| certificate. The usage restriction might be employed when a key that | ||||
| could be used for more than one operation is to be restricted. For | ||||
| example, when an RSA key should be used only to verify signatures on | ||||
| objects other than public key certificates and CRLs, the | ||||
| digitalSignature and/or nonRepudiation bits would be asserted. | ||||
| Likewise, when an RSA key should be used only for key management, the | ||||
| keyEncipherment bit would be asserted. | ||||
| This extension MUST appear in certificates that contain public keys | ||||
| that are used to validate digital signatures on other public key | ||||
| certificates or CRLs. When this extension appears, it SHOULD be | ||||
| marked critical. | ||||
| id-ce-keyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 15 } | ||||
| KeyUsage ::= BIT STRING { | ||||
| digitalSignature (0), | ||||
| nonRepudiation (1), | ||||
| keyEncipherment (2), | ||||
| dataEncipherment (3), | ||||
| keyAgreement (4), | ||||
| keyCertSign (5), | ||||
| cRLSign (6), | ||||
| encipherOnly (7), | ||||
| decipherOnly (8) } | ||||
| Bits in the KeyUsage type are used as follows: | ||||
| The digitalSignature bit is asserted when the subject public key | ||||
| is used with a digital signature mechanism to support security | ||||
| services other than non-repudiation (bit 1), certificate signing | ||||
| (bit 5), or CRL signing (bit 6). Digital signature mechanisms are | ||||
| often used for entity authentication and data origin | ||||
| authentication with integrity. | ||||
| The nonRepudiation bit is asserted when the subject public key is | ||||
| used to verify digital signatures used to provide a non- | ||||
| repudiation service which protects against the signing entity | ||||
| falsely denying some action, excluding certificate or CRL signing. | ||||
| In the case of later conflict, a reliable third party may | ||||
| determine the authenticity of the signed data. | ||||
| Further distinctions between the digitalSignature and | ||||
| nonRepudiation bits may be provided in specific certificate | ||||
| policies. | ||||
| The keyEncipherment bit is asserted when the subject public key is | ||||
| used for key transport. For example, when an RSA key is to be | ||||
| used for key management, then this bit is set. | ||||
| The dataEncipherment bit is asserted when the subject public key | ||||
| is used for enciphering user data, other than cryptographic keys. | ||||
| The keyAgreement bit is asserted when the subject public key is | ||||
| used for key agreement. For example, when a Diffie-Hellman key is | ||||
| to be used for key management, then this bit is set. | ||||
| The keyCertSign bit is asserted when the subject public key is | ||||
| used for verifying a signature on public key certificates. If the | ||||
| keyCertSign bit is asserted, then the cA bit in the basic | ||||
| constraints extension (section 4.2.1.10) MUST also be asserted. | ||||
| The cRLSign bit is asserted when the subject public key is used | ||||
| for verifying a signature on certificate revocation list (e.g., a | ||||
| CRL, delta CRL, or an ARL). This bit MUST be asserted in | ||||
| certificates that are used to verify signatures on CRLs. | ||||
| The meaning of the encipherOnly bit is undefined in the absence of | ||||
| the keyAgreement bit. When the encipherOnly bit is asserted and | ||||
| the keyAgreement bit is also set, the subject public key may be | ||||
| used only for enciphering data while performing key agreement. | ||||
| The meaning of the decipherOnly bit is undefined in the absence of | ||||
| the keyAgreement bit. When the decipherOnly bit is asserted and | ||||
| the keyAgreement bit is also set, the subject public key may be | ||||
| used only for deciphering data while performing key agreement. | ||||
| This profile does not restrict the combinations of bits that may be | ||||
| set in an instantiation of the keyUsage extension. However, | ||||
| appropriate values for keyUsage extensions for particular algorithms | ||||
| are specified in [PKIXALGS]. | ||||
| 4.2.1.4 Private Key Usage Period | ||||
| This profile RECOMMENDS against the use of this extension. CAs | ||||
| conforming to this profile MUST NOT generate certificates that | ||||
| include a critical private key usage period extension. | ||||
| The private key usage period extension allows the certificate issuer | ||||
| to specify a different validity period for the private key than the | ||||
| certificate. This extension is intended for use with digital | ||||
| signature keys. This extension consists of two optional components, | ||||
| notBefore and notAfter. The private key associated with the | ||||
| certificate SHOULD NOT be used to sign objects before or after the | ||||
| times specified by the two components, respectively. CAs conforming | ||||
| to this profile MUST NOT generate certificates with private key usage | ||||
| period extensions unless at least one of the two components is | ||||
| present. | ||||
| Where used, notBefore and notAfter are represented as GeneralizedTime | ||||
| and MUST be specified and interpreted as defined in section | ||||
| 4.1.2.5.2. | ||||
| id-ce-privateKeyUsagePeriod OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 16 } | ||||
| PrivateKeyUsagePeriod ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| notBefore [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, | ||||
| notAfter [1] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL } | ||||
| 4.2.1.5 Certificate Policies | ||||
| The certificate policies extension contains a sequence of one or more | ||||
| policy information terms, each of which consists of an object | ||||
| identifier (OID) and optional qualifiers. Optional qualifiers, which | ||||
| MAY be present, are not expected to change the definition of the | ||||
| policy. | ||||
| In an end entity certificate, these policy information terms indicate | ||||
| the policy under which the certificate has been issued and the | ||||
| purposes for which the certificate may be used. In a CA certificate, | ||||
| these policy information terms limit the set of policies for | ||||
| certification paths which include this certificate. When a CA does | ||||
| not wish to limit the set of policies for certification paths which | ||||
| include this certificate, they MAY assert the special policy | ||||
| anyPolicy, with a value of { 2 5 29 32 0 }. | ||||
| Applications with specific policy requirements are expected to have a | ||||
| list of those policies which they will accept and to compare the | ||||
| policy OIDs in the certificate to that list. If this extension is | ||||
| critical, the path validation software MUST be able to interpret this | ||||
| extension (including the optional qualifier), or MUST reject the | ||||
| certificate. | ||||
| To promote interoperability, this profile RECOMMENDS that policy | ||||
| information terms consist of only an OID. Where an OID alone is | ||||
| insufficient, this profile strongly recommends that use of qualifiers | ||||
| be limited to those identified in this section. When qualifiers are | ||||
| used with the special policy anyPolicy, they MUST be limited to the | ||||
| qualifiers identified in this section. | ||||
| This specification defines two policy qualifier types for use by | ||||
| certificate policy writers and certificate issuers. The qualifier | ||||
| types are the CPS Pointer and User Notice qualifiers. | ||||
| The CPS Pointer qualifier contains a pointer to a Certification | ||||
| Practice Statement (CPS) published by the CA. The pointer is in the | ||||
| form of a URI. Processing requirements for this qualifier are a | ||||
| local matter. No action is mandated by this specification regardless | ||||
| of the criticality value asserted for the extension. | ||||
| User notice is intended for display to a relying party when a | ||||
| certificate is used. The application software SHOULD display all | ||||
| user notices in all certificates of the certification path used, | ||||
| except that if a notice is duplicated only one copy need be | ||||
| displayed. To prevent such duplication, this qualifier SHOULD only | ||||
| be present in end entity certificates and CA certificates issued to | ||||
| other organizations. | ||||
| The user notice has two optional fields: the noticeRef field and the | ||||
| explicitText field. | ||||
| The noticeRef field, if used, names an organization and | ||||
| identifies, by number, a particular textual statement prepared by | ||||
| that organization. For example, it might identify the | ||||
| organization "CertsRUs" and notice number 1. In a typical | ||||
| implementation, the application software will have a notice file | ||||
| containing the current set of notices for CertsRUs; the | ||||
| application will extract the notice text from the file and display | ||||
| it. Messages MAY be multilingual, allowing the software to select | ||||
| the particular language message for its own environment. | ||||
| An explicitText field includes the textual statement directly in | ||||
| the certificate. The explicitText field is a string with a | ||||
| maximum size of 200 characters. | ||||
| If both the noticeRef and explicitText options are included in the | ||||
| one qualifier and if the application software can locate the notice | ||||
| text indicated by the noticeRef option then that text SHOULD be | ||||
| displayed; otherwise, the explicitText string SHOULD be displayed. | ||||
| id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 } | ||||
| anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-certificate-policies 0 } | ||||
| certificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation | ||||
| PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| policyIdentifier CertPolicyId, | ||||
| policyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF | ||||
| PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL } | ||||
| CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER | ||||
| PolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| policyQualifierId PolicyQualifierId, | ||||
| qualifier ANY DEFINED BY policyQualifierId } | ||||
| -- policyQualifierIds for Internet policy qualifiers | ||||
| id-qt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 2 } | ||||
| id-qt-cps OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 1 } | ||||
| id-qt-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 2 } | ||||
| PolicyQualifierId ::= | ||||
| OBJECT IDENTIFIER ( id-qt-cps | id-qt-unotice ) | ||||
| Qualifier ::= CHOICE { | ||||
| cPSuri CPSuri, | ||||
| userNotice UserNotice } | ||||
| CPSuri ::= IA5String | ||||
| UserNotice ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| noticeRef NoticeReference OPTIONAL, | ||||
| explicitText DisplayText OPTIONAL} | ||||
| NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| organization DisplayText, | ||||
| noticeNumbers SEQUENCE OF INTEGER } | ||||
| DisplayText ::= CHOICE { | ||||
| ia5String IA5String (SIZE (1..200)), | ||||
| visibleString VisibleString (SIZE (1..200)), | ||||
| bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..200)), | ||||
| utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..200)) } | ||||
| 4.2.1.6 Policy Mappings | ||||
| This extension is used in CA certificates. It lists one or more | ||||
| pairs of OIDs; each pair includes an issuerDomainPolicy and a | ||||
| subjectDomainPolicy. The pairing indicates the issuing CA considers | ||||
| its issuerDomainPolicy equivalent to the subject CA's | ||||
| subjectDomainPolicy. | ||||
| The issuing CA's users might accept an issuerDomainPolicy for certain | ||||
| applications. The policy mapping defines the list of policies | ||||
| associated with the subject CA that may be accepted as comparable to | ||||
| the issuerDomainPolicy. | ||||
| Each issuerDomainPolicy named in the policy mapping extension SHOULD | ||||
| also be asserted in a certificate policies extension in the same | ||||
| certificate. Policies SHOULD NOT be mapped either to or from the | ||||
| special value anyPolicy (section 4.2.1.5). | ||||
| This extension MAY be supported by CAs and/or applications, and it | ||||
| MUST be non-critical. | ||||
| id-ce-policyMappings OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 33 } | ||||
| PolicyMappings ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SEQUENCE { | ||||
| issuerDomainPolicy CertPolicyId, | ||||
| subjectDomainPolicy CertPolicyId } | ||||
| 4.2.1.7 Subject Alternative Name | ||||
| The subject alternative names extension allows additional identities | ||||
| to be bound to the subject of the certificate. Defined options | ||||
| include an Internet electronic mail address, a DNS name, an IP | ||||
| address, and a uniform resource identifier (URI). Other options | ||||
| exist, including completely local definitions. Multiple name forms, | ||||
| and multiple instances of each name form, MAY be included. Whenever | ||||
| such identities are to be bound into a certificate, the subject | ||||
| alternative name (or issuer alternative name) extension MUST be used; | ||||
| however, a DNS name MAY be represented in the subject field using the | ||||
| domainComponent attribute as described in section 4.1.2.4. | ||||
| Because the subject alternative name is considered to be definitively | ||||
| bound to the public key, all parts of the subject alternative name | ||||
| MUST be verified by the CA. | ||||
| Further, if the only subject identity included in the certificate is | ||||
| an alternative name form (e.g., an electronic mail address), then the | ||||
| subject distinguished name MUST be empty (an empty sequence), and the | ||||
| subjectAltName extension MUST be present. If the subject field | ||||
| contains an empty sequence, the subjectAltName extension MUST be | ||||
| marked critical. | ||||
| When the subjectAltName extension contains an Internet mail address, | ||||
| the address MUST be included as an rfc822Name. The format of an | ||||
| rfc822Name is an "addr-spec" as defined in RFC 822 [RFC 822]. An | ||||
| addr-spec has the form "local-part@domain". Note that an addr-spec | ||||
| has no phrase (such as a common name) before it, has no comment (text | ||||
| surrounded in parentheses) after it, and is not surrounded by "<" and | ||||
| ">". Note that while upper and lower case letters are allowed in an | ||||
| RFC 822 addr-spec, no significance is attached to the case. | ||||
| When the subjectAltName extension contains a iPAddress, the address | ||||
| MUST be stored in the octet string in "network byte order," as | ||||
| specified in RFC 791 [RFC 791]. The least significant bit (LSB) of | ||||
| each octet is the LSB of the corresponding byte in the network | ||||
| address. For IP Version 4, as specified in RFC 791, the octet string | ||||
| MUST contain exactly four octets. For IP Version 6, as specified in | ||||
| RFC 1883, the octet string MUST contain exactly sixteen octets [RFC | ||||
| 1883]. | ||||
| When the subjectAltName extension contains a domain name service | ||||
| label, the domain name MUST be stored in the dNSName (an IA5String). | ||||
| The name MUST be in the "preferred name syntax," as specified by RFC | ||||
| 1034 [RFC 1034]. Note that while upper and lower case letters are | ||||
| allowed in domain names, no signifigance is attached to the case. In | ||||
| addition, while the string " " is a legal domain name, subjectAltName | ||||
| extensions with a dNSName " " are not permitted. Finally, the use of | ||||
| the DNS representation for Internet mail addresses (wpolk.nist.gov | ||||
| instead of wpolk@nist.gov) MUST NOT be used; such identities are to | ||||
| be encoded as rfc822Name. | ||||
| Note: work is currently underway to specify domain names in | ||||
| international character sets. This names will likely not be | ||||
| accomodated by IA5String. Once this work is complete, this profile | ||||
| will be revisited and the appropriate functionality will be added. | ||||
| When the subjectAltName extension contains a URI, the name MUST be | ||||
| stored in the uniformResourceIdentifier (an IA5String). The name | ||||
| MUST NOT be a relative URL, and it MUST follow the URL syntax and | ||||
| encoding rules specified in [RFC 1738]. The name MUST include both a | ||||
| scheme (e.g., "http" or "ftp") and a scheme-specific-part. The | ||||
| scheme-specific-part MUST include a fully qualified domain name or IP | ||||
| address as the host. | ||||
| As specified in [RFC 1738], the scheme name is not case-sensitive | ||||
| (e.g., "http" is equivalent to "HTTP"). The host part is also not | ||||
| case-sensitive, but other components of the scheme-specific-part may | ||||
| be case-sensitive. When comparing URIs, conforming implementations | ||||
| MUST compare the scheme and host without regard to case, but assume | ||||
| the remainder of the scheme-specific-part is case sensitive. | ||||
| When the subjectAltName extension contains a DN in the directoryName, | ||||
| the DN MUST be unique for each subject entity certified by the one CA | ||||
| as defined by the issuer name field. A CA MAY issue more than one | ||||
| certificate with the same DN to the same subject entity. | ||||
| The subjectAltName MAY carry additional name types through the use of | ||||
| the otherName field. The format and semantics of the name are | ||||
| indicated through the OBJECT IDENTIFIER in the type-id field. The | ||||
| name itself is conveyed as value field in otherName. For example, | ||||
| Kerberos [RFC 1510] format names can be encoded into the otherName, | ||||
| using using a Kerberos 5 principal name OID and a SEQUENCE of the | ||||
| Realm and the PrincipalName. | ||||
| Subject alternative names MAY be constrained in the same manner as | ||||
| subject distinguished names using the name constraints extension as | ||||
| described in section 4.2.1.11. | ||||
| If the subjectAltName extension is present, the sequence MUST contain | ||||
| at least one entry. Unlike the subject field, conforming CAs MUST | ||||
| NOT issue certificates with subjectAltNames containing empty | ||||
| GeneralName fields. For example, an rfc822Name is represented as an | ||||
| IA5String. While an empty string is a valid IA5String, such an | ||||
| rfc822Name is not permitted by this profile. The behavior of clients | ||||
| that encounter such a certificate when processing a certificication | ||||
| path is not defined by this profile. | ||||
| Finally, the semantics of subject alternative names that include | ||||
| wildcard characters (e.g., as a placeholder for a set of names) are | ||||
| not addressed by this specification. Applications with specific | ||||
| requirements MAY use such names, but they MUST define the semantics. | ||||
| id-ce-subjectAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 17 } | ||||
| SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames | ||||
| GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName | ||||
| GeneralName ::= CHOICE { | ||||
| otherName [0] OtherName, | ||||
| rfc822Name [1] IA5String, | ||||
| dNSName [2] IA5String, | ||||
| x400Address [3] ORAddress, | ||||
| directoryName [4] Name, | ||||
| ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName, | ||||
| uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String, | ||||
| iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING, | ||||
| registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER} | ||||
| OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, | ||||
| value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } | ||||
| EDIPartyName ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| nameAssigner [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL, | ||||
| partyName [1] DirectoryString } | ||||
| 4.2.1.8 Issuer Alternative Names | ||||
| As with 4.2.1.7, this extension is used to associate Internet style | ||||
| identities with the certificate issuer. Issuer alternative names MUST | ||||
| be encoded as in 4.2.1.7. | ||||
| Where present, this extension SHOULD NOT be marked critical. | ||||
| id-ce-issuerAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 18 } | ||||
| IssuerAltName ::= GeneralNames | ||||
| 4.2.1.9 Subject Directory Attributes | ||||
| The subject directory attributes extension is used to convey | ||||
| identification attributes (e.g., nationality) of the subject. The | ||||
| extension is defined as a sequence of one or more attributes. This | ||||
| extension MUST be non-critical. | ||||
| id-ce-subjectDirectoryAttributes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 9 } | ||||
| SubjectDirectoryAttributes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute | ||||
| 4.2.1.10 Basic Constraints | ||||
| The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the | ||||
| certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification | ||||
| paths that include this certificate. | ||||
| The cA boolean indicates whether the certified public key belongs to | ||||
| a CA. If the cA boolean is not asserted, then the keyCertSign bit in | ||||
| the key usage extension MUST NOT be asserted. | ||||
| The pathLenConstraint field is meaningful only if the cA boolean is | ||||
| asserted and the key usage extension asserts the keyCertSign bit | ||||
| (section 4.2.1.3). In this case, it gives the maximum number of non- | ||||
| self-issued intermediate certificates that may follow this | ||||
| certificate in a valid certification path. A certificate is self- | ||||
| issued if the DNs that appear in the subject and issuer fields are | ||||
| identical and are not empty. (Note: The last certificate in the | ||||
| certification path is not an intermediate certificate, and is not | ||||
| included in this limit. Usually, the last certificate is an end | ||||
| entity certificate, but it can be a CA certificate.) A | ||||
| pathLenConstraint of zero indicates that only one more certificate | ||||
| may follow in a valid certification path. Where it appears, the | ||||
| pathLenConstraint field MUST be greater than or equal to zero. Where | ||||
| pathLenConstraint does not appear, no limit is imposed. | ||||
| This extension MUST appear as a critical extension in all CA | ||||
| certificates that contain public keys used to validate digital | ||||
| signatures on certificates. This extension MAY appear as a critical | ||||
| or non-critical extension in CA certificates that contain public keys | ||||
| used exclusively for purposes other than validating digital | ||||
| signatures on certificates. Such CA certificates include ones that | ||||
| contain public keys used exclusively for validating digital | ||||
| signatures on CRLs and ones that contain key management public keys | ||||
| used with certificate enrollment protocols. This extension MAY | ||||
| appear as a critical or non-critical extension in end entity | ||||
| certificates. | ||||
| CAs MUST NOT include the pathLenConstraint field unless the cA | ||||
| boolean is asserted and the key usage extension asserts the | ||||
| keyCertSign bit. | ||||
| id-ce-basicConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 19 } | ||||
| BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, | ||||
| pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL } | ||||
| 4.2.1.11 Name Constraints | ||||
| The name constraints extension, which MUST be used only in a CA | ||||
| certificate, indicates a name space within which all subject names in | ||||
| subsequent certificates in a certification path MUST be located. | ||||
| Restrictions apply to the subject distinguished name and apply to | ||||
| subject alternative names. Restrictions apply only when the | ||||
| specified name form is present. If no name of the type is in the | ||||
| certificate, the certificate is acceptable. | ||||
| Name constraints are not applied to certificates whose issuer and | ||||
| subject are identical (unless the certificate is the final | ||||
| certificate in the path). (This could prevent CAs that use name | ||||
| constraints from employing self-issued certificates to implement key | ||||
| rollover.) | ||||
| Restrictions are defined in terms of permitted or excluded name | ||||
| subtrees. Any name matching a restriction in the excludedSubtrees | ||||
| field is invalid regardless of information appearing in the | ||||
| permittedSubtrees. This extension MUST be critical. | ||||
| Within this profile, the minimum and maximum fields are not used with | ||||
| any name forms, thus minimum is always zero, and maximum is always | ||||
| absent. | ||||
| For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name. The | ||||
| constraint MAY specify a host or a domain. Examples would be | ||||
| "foo.bar.com"; and ".xyz.com". When the the constraint begins with | ||||
| a period, it MAY be expanded with one or more subdomains. That is, | ||||
| the constraint ".xyz.com" is satisfied by both abc.xyz.com and | ||||
| abc.def.xyz.com. However, the constraint ".xyz.com" is not satisfied | ||||
| by "xyz.com". When the constraint does not begin with a period, it | ||||
| specifies a host. | ||||
| A name constraint for Internet mail addresses MAY specify a | ||||
| particular mailbox, all addresses at a particular host, or all | ||||
| mailboxes in a domain. To indicate a particular mailbox, the | ||||
| constraint is the complete mail address. For example, "root@xyz.com" | ||||
| indicates the root mailbox on the host "xyz.com". To indicate all | ||||
| Internet mail addresses on a particular host, the constraint is | ||||
| specified as the host name. For example, the constraint "xyz.com" is | ||||
| satisfied by any mail address at the host "xyz.com". To specify any | ||||
| address within a domain, the constraint is specified with a leading | ||||
| period (as with URIs). For example, ".xyz.com" indicates all the | ||||
| Internet mail addresses in the domain "xyz.com", but not Internet | ||||
| mail addresses on the host "xyz.com". | ||||
| DNS name restrictions are expressed as foo.bar.com. Any DNS name that | ||||
| can be constructed by simply adding to the left hand side of the name | ||||
| satisfies the name constraint. For example, www.foo.bar.com would | ||||
| satisfy the constraint but foo1.bar.com would not. | ||||
| Legacy implementations exist where an RFC 822 name is embedded in the | ||||
| subject distinguished name in an attribute of type EmailAddress | ||||
| (section 4.1.2.6). When rfc822 names are constrained, but the | ||||
| certificate does not include a subject alternative name, the rfc822 | ||||
| name constraint MUST be applied to the attribute of type EmailAddress | ||||
| in the subject distinguished name. The ASN.1 syntax for EmailAddress | ||||
| and the corresponding OID are supplied in Appendix A. | ||||
| Restrictions of the form directoryName MUST be applied to the subject | ||||
| field in the certificate and to the subjectAltName extensions of type | ||||
| directoryName. Restrictions of the form x400Address MUST be applied | ||||
| to subjectAltName extensions of type x400Address. | ||||
| When applying restrictions of the form directoryName, an | ||||
| implementation MUST compare DN attributes. At a minimum, | ||||
| implementations MUST perform the DN comparison rules specified in | ||||
| Section 4.1.2.4. CAs issuing certificates with a restriction of the | ||||
| form directoryName SHOULD NOT rely on implementation of the full ISO | ||||
| DN name comparison algorithm. This implies name restrictions MUST be | ||||
| stated identically to the encoding used in the subject field or | ||||
| subjectAltName extension. | ||||
| The syntax of iPAddress MUST be as described in section 4.2.1.7 with | ||||
| the following additions specifically for Name Constraints. For IPv4 | ||||
| addresses, the ipAddress field of generalName MUST contain eight (8) | ||||
| octets, encoded in the style of RFC 1519 (CIDR) to represent an | ||||
| address range.[RFC 1519] For IPv6 addresses, the ipAddress field | ||||
| MUST contain 32 octets similarly encoded. For example, a name | ||||
| constraint for "class C" subnet 10.9.8.0 is represented as the octets | ||||
| 0A 09 08 00 FF FF FF 00, representing the CIDR notation | ||||
| 10.9.8.0/255.255.255.0. | ||||
| The syntax and semantics for name constraints for otherName, | ||||
| ediPartyName, and registeredID are not defined by this specification. | ||||
| id-ce-nameConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 30 } | ||||
| NameConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| permittedSubtrees [0] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL, | ||||
| excludedSubtrees [1] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL } | ||||
| GeneralSubtrees ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralSubtree | ||||
| GeneralSubtree ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| base GeneralName, | ||||
| minimum [0] BaseDistance DEFAULT 0, | ||||
| maximum [1] BaseDistance OPTIONAL } | ||||
| BaseDistance ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) | ||||
| 4.2.1.12 Policy Constraints | ||||
| The policy constraints extension can be used in certificates issued | ||||
| to CAs. The policy constraints extension constrains path validation | ||||
| in two ways. It can be used to prohibit policy mapping or require | ||||
| that each certificate in a path contain an acceptable policy | ||||
| identifier. | ||||
| If the inhibitPolicyMapping field is present, the value indicates the | ||||
| number of additional certificates that may appear in the path before | ||||
| policy mapping is no longer permitted. For example, a value of one | ||||
| indicates that policy mapping may be processed in certificates issued | ||||
| by the subject of this certificate, but not in additional | ||||
| certificates in the path. | ||||
| If the requireExplicitPolicy field is present, subsequent | ||||
| certificates MUST include an acceptable policy identifier. The value | ||||
| of requireExplicitPolicy indicates the number of additional | ||||
| certificates that may appear in the path before an explicit policy is | ||||
| required. An acceptable policy identifier is the identifier of a | ||||
| policy required by the user of the certification path or the | ||||
| identifier of a policy which has been declared equivalent through | ||||
| policy mapping. | ||||
| Conforming CAs MUST NOT issue certificates where policy constraints | ||||
| is a empty sequence. That is, at least one of the | ||||
| inhibitPolicyMapping field or the requireExplicitPolicy field MUST be | ||||
| present. The behavior of clients that encounter a empty policy | ||||
| constraints field is not addressed in this profile. | ||||
| This extension MAY be critical or non-critical. | ||||
| id-ce-policyConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 36 } | ||||
| PolicyConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| requireExplicitPolicy [0] SkipCerts OPTIONAL, | ||||
| inhibitPolicyMapping [1] SkipCerts OPTIONAL } | ||||
| SkipCerts ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) | ||||
| 4.2.1.13 Extended key usage field | ||||
| This field indicates one or more purposes for which the certified | ||||
| public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the basic | ||||
| purposes indicated in the key usage extension field. In general, | ||||
| this extension will appear only in end entity certificates. This | ||||
| field is defined as follows: | ||||
| id-ce-extKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 37 } | ||||
| ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId | ||||
| KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER | ||||
| Key purposes may be defined by any organization with a need. Object | ||||
| identifiers used to identify key purposes MUST be assigned in | ||||
| accordance with IANA or ITU-T Recommendation X.660. [X.660] | ||||
| This extension MAY, at the option of the certificate issuer, be | ||||
| either critical or non-critical. | ||||
| If the extension is flagged critical, then the certificate MUST only | ||||
| be used for one of the purposes indicated. If multiple purposes are | ||||
| indicated the application need not recognize all purposes indicated, | ||||
| as long as the intended purpose is present and recognized. | ||||
| If the extension is flagged non-critical, then it indicates the | ||||
| intended purpose or purposes of the key, and MAY be used in finding | ||||
| the correct key/certificate of an entity that has multiple | ||||
| keys/certificates. It is an advisory field and does not imply that | ||||
| usage of the key is restricted by the certification authority to the | ||||
| purpose indicated. Certificate using applications MAY nevertheless | ||||
| require that a particular purpose be indicated in order for the | ||||
| certificate to be acceptable to that application. | ||||
| If a certificate contains both a critical key usage field and a | ||||
| critical extended key usage field, then both fields MUST be processed | ||||
| independently and the certificate MUST only be used for a purpose | ||||
| consistent with both fields. If there is no purpose consistent with | ||||
| both fields, then the certificate MUST NOT be used for any purpose. | ||||
| The following key usage purposes are defined by this profile: | ||||
| id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 3 } | ||||
| id-kp-serverAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 1 } | ||||
| -- TLS WWW server authentication | ||||
| -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature, | ||||
| -- keyEncipherment or keyAgreement | ||||
| id-kp-clientAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 2 } | ||||
| -- TLS WWW client authentication | ||||
| -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature | ||||
| -- and/or keyAgreement | ||||
| id-kp-codeSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 3 } | ||||
| -- Signing of downloadable executable code | ||||
| -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature | ||||
| id-kp-emailProtection OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 4 } | ||||
| -- E-mail protection | ||||
| -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature, | ||||
| -- nonRepudiation, and/or (keyEncipherment or keyAgreement) | ||||
| id-kp-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 8 } | ||||
| -- Binding the hash of an object to a time | ||||
| -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature | ||||
| -- and/or nonRepudiation | ||||
| id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 } | ||||
| -- Signing OCSP responses | ||||
| -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature | ||||
| -- and/or nonRepudiation | ||||
| 4.2.1.14 CRL Distribution Points | ||||
| The CRL distribution points extension identifies how CRL information | ||||
| is obtained. The extension SHOULD be non-critical, but this profile | ||||
| RECOMMENDS support for this extension by CAs and applications. | ||||
| Further discussion of CRL management is contained in section 5. | ||||
| The cRLDistributionPoints extension is a SEQUENCE of | ||||
| DistributionPoint. A DistributionPoint consists of three fields, | ||||
| each of which is optional: distributionPoint, reasons, and cRLIssuer. | ||||
| While each of these fields is optional, a DistributionPoint MUST NOT | ||||
| consist of only the reasons field; either distributionPoint or | ||||
| cRLIssuer MUST be present. If the certificate issuer is not the CRL | ||||
| issuer, then the cRLIssuer field MUST be present and contain the Name | ||||
| of the CRL issuer. If the certificate issuer is also the CRL issuer, | ||||
| then the cRLIssuer field MUST be omitted and the distributionPoint | ||||
| field MUST be present. If the the distributionPoint field is | ||||
| omitted, cRLIssuer MUST be present and include a Name corresponding | ||||
| to an X.500 or LDAP directory entry where the CRL is located. | ||||
| When the distributionPoint field is present, it contains either a | ||||
| SEQUENCE of general names or a single value, nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. | ||||
| If the cRLDistributionPoints extension contains a general name of | ||||
| type URI, the following semantics MUST be assumed: the URI is a | ||||
| pointer to the current CRL for the associated reasons and will be | ||||
| issued by the associated cRLIssuer. The expected values for the URI | ||||
| are those defined in 4.2.1.7. Processing rules for other values are | ||||
| not defined by this specification. | ||||
| If the DistributionPointName contains multiple values, each name | ||||
| describes a different mechanism to obtain the same CRL. For example, | ||||
| the same CRL could be available for retrieval through both LDAP and | ||||
| HTTP. | ||||
| If the DistributionPointName contains the single value | ||||
| nameRelativeToCRLIssuer, the value provides a distinguished name | ||||
| fragment. The fragment is appended to the X.500 distinguished name | ||||
| of the CRL issuer to obtain the distribution point name. If the | ||||
| cRLIssuer field in the DistributionPoint is present, then the name | ||||
| fragment is appended to the distinguished name that it contains; | ||||
| otherwise, the name fragment is appended to the certificate issuer | ||||
| distinguished name. The DistributionPointName MUST NOT use the | ||||
| nameRealtiveToCRLIssuer alternative when cRLIssuer contains more than | ||||
| one distinguished name. | ||||
| If the DistributionPoint omits the reasons field, the CRL MUST | ||||
| include revocation information for all reasons. | ||||
| The cRLIssuer identifies the entity who signs and issues the CRL. If | ||||
| present, the cRLIssuer MUST contain at least one an X.500 | ||||
| distinguished name (DN), and MAY also contain other name forms. | ||||
| Since the cRLIssuer is compared to the CRL issuer name, the X.501 | ||||
| type Name MUST follow the encoding rules for the issuer name field in | ||||
| the certificate (section 4.1.2.4). | ||||
| id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 31 } | ||||
| CRLDistributionPoints ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF DistributionPoint | ||||
| DistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL, | ||||
| reasons [1] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL, | ||||
| cRLIssuer [2] GeneralNames OPTIONAL } | ||||
| DistributionPointName ::= CHOICE { | ||||
| fullName [0] GeneralNames, | ||||
| nameRelativeToCRLIssuer [1] RelativeDistinguishedName } | ||||
| ReasonFlags ::= BIT STRING { | ||||
| unused (0), | ||||
| keyCompromise (1), | ||||
| cACompromise (2), | ||||
| affiliationChanged (3), | ||||
| superseded (4), | ||||
| cessationOfOperation (5), | ||||
| certificateHold (6), | ||||
| privilegeWithdrawn (7), | ||||
| aACompromise (8) } | ||||
| 4.2.1.15 Inhibit Any-Policy | ||||
| The inhibit any-policy extension can be used in certificates issued | ||||
| to CAs. The inhibit any-policy indicates that the special any-policy | ||||
| OID, with the value { 2 5 29 32 0 }, is not considered an explicit | ||||
| match for other certificate policies. The value indicates the number | ||||
| of additional certificates that may appear in the path before any- | ||||
| policy is no longer permitted. For example, a value of one indicates | ||||
| that any-policy may be processed in certificates issued by the | ||||
| subject of this certificate, but not in additional certificates in | ||||
| the path. | ||||
| This extension MUST be critical. | ||||
| id-ce-inhibitAnyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 54 } | ||||
| InhibitAnyPolicy ::= SkipCerts | ||||
| SkipCerts ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) | ||||
| 4.2.1.16 Freshest CRL (a.k.a. Delta CRL Distribution Point) | ||||
| The freshest CRL extension identifies how delta CRL information is | ||||
| obtained. The extension MUST be non-critical. Further discussion of | ||||
| CRL management is contained in section 5. | ||||
| The same syntax is used for this extension and the | ||||
| cRLDistributionPoints extension, and is described in section | ||||
| 4.2.1.14. The same conventions apply to both extensions. | ||||
| id-ce-freshestCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 46 } | ||||
| FreshestCRL ::= CRLDistributionPoints | ||||
| 4.2.2 Private Internet Extensions | ||||
| This section defines two extensions for use in the Internet Public | ||||
| Key Infrastructure. These extensions may be used to direct | ||||
| applications to on-line information about the issuing CA or the | ||||
| subject. As the information may be available in multiple forms, each | ||||
| extension is a sequence of IA5String values, each of which represents | ||||
| a URI. The URI implicitly specifies the location and format of the | ||||
| information and the method for obtaining the information. | ||||
| An object identifier is defined for the private extension. The | ||||
| object identifier associated with the private extension is defined | ||||
| under the arc id-pe within the arc id-pkix. Any future extensions | ||||
| defined for the Internet PKI are also expected to be defined under | ||||
| the arc id-pe. | ||||
| id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= | ||||
| { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) | ||||
| security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) } | ||||
| id-pe OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 1 } | ||||
| 4.2.2.1 Authority Information Access | ||||
| The authority information access extension indicates how to access CA | ||||
| information and services for the issuer of the certificate in which | ||||
| the extension appears. Information and services may include on-line | ||||
| validation services and CA policy data. (The location of CRLs is not | ||||
| specified in this extension; that information is provided by the | ||||
| cRLDistributionPoints extension.) This extension may be included in | ||||
| subject or CA certificates, and it MUST be non-critical. | ||||
| id-pe-authorityInfoAccess OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 1 } | ||||
| AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax ::= | ||||
| SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AccessDescription | ||||
| AccessDescription ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| accessMethod OBJECT IDENTIFIER, | ||||
| accessLocation GeneralName } | ||||
| id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 } | ||||
| id-ad-caIssuers OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 2 } | ||||
| id-ad-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 1 } | ||||
| Each entry in the sequence AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax describes the | ||||
| format and location of additional information provided by the CA that | ||||
| issued the certificate in which this extension appears. The type and | ||||
| format of the information is specified by the accessMethod field; the | ||||
| accessLocation field specifies the location of the information. The | ||||
| retrieval mechanism may be implied by the accessMethod or specified | ||||
| by accessLocation. | ||||
| This profile defines two accessMethod OIDs: id-ad-caIssuers and id- | ||||
| ad-ocsp. | ||||
| The id-ad-caIssuers OID is used when the additional information lists | ||||
| CAs that have issued certificates superior to the CA that issued the | ||||
| certificate containing this extension. The referenced CA Issuers | ||||
| description is intended to aid certificate users in the selection of | ||||
| a certification path that terminates at a point trusted by the | ||||
| certificate user. | ||||
| When id-ad-caIssuers appears as accessMethod, the accessLocation | ||||
| field describes the referenced description server and the access | ||||
| protocol to obtain the referenced description. The accessLocation | ||||
| field is defined as a GeneralName, which can take several forms. | ||||
| Where the information is available via http, ftp, or ldap, | ||||
| accessLocation MUST be a uniformResourceIdentifier. Where the | ||||
| information is available via the Directory Access Protocol (DAP), | ||||
| accessLocation MUST be a directoryName. The entry for that | ||||
| directoryName contains CA certificates in the crossCertificatePair | ||||
| attribute. When the information is available via electronic mail, | ||||
| accessLocation MUST be an rfc822Name. The semantics of other id-ad- | ||||
| caIssuers accessLocation name forms are not defined. | ||||
| The id-ad-ocsp OID is used when revocation information for the | ||||
| certificate containing this extension is available using the Online | ||||
| Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [RFC 2560]. | ||||
| When id-ad-ocsp appears as accessMethod, the accessLocation field is | ||||
| the location of the OCSP responder, using the conventions defined in | ||||
| [RFC 2560]. Additional access descriptors may be defined in other | ||||
| PKIX specifications. | ||||
| 4.2.2.2 Subject Information Access | ||||
| The subject information access extension indicates how to access | ||||
| information and services for the subject of the certificate in which | ||||
| the extension appears. When the subject is a CA, information and | ||||
| services may include certificate validation services and CA policy | ||||
| data. When the subject is an end entity, the information describes | ||||
| the type of services offered and how to access them. In this case, | ||||
| the contents of this extension are defined in the protocol | ||||
| specifications for the suported services. This extension may be | ||||
| included in subject or CA certificates, and it MUST be non-critical. | ||||
| id-pe-subjectInfoAccess OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 11 } | ||||
| SubjectInfoAccessSyntax ::= | ||||
| SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AccessDescription | ||||
| AccessDescription ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| accessMethod OBJECT IDENTIFIER, | ||||
| accessLocation GeneralName } | ||||
| Each entry in the sequence SubjectInfoAccessSyntax describes the | ||||
| format and location of additional information provided by the subject | ||||
| of the certificate in which this extension appears. The type and | ||||
| format of the information is specified by the accessMethod field; the | ||||
| accessLocation field specifies the location of the information. The | ||||
| retrieval mechanism may be implied by the accessMethod or specified | ||||
| by accessLocation. | ||||
| This profile defines one access method to be used when the subject is | ||||
| a CA, and one access method to be used when the subject is an end | ||||
| entity. Additional access methods may be defined in the future in | ||||
| the protocol specifications for other services. | ||||
| The id-ad-caRepository OID is used when the subject is a CA, and | ||||
| publishes its certificates and CRLs (if issued) in a repository. The | ||||
| accessLocation field is defined as a GeneralName, which can take | ||||
| several forms. Where the information is available via http, ftp, or | ||||
| ldap, accessLocation MUST be a uniformResourceIdentifier. Where the | ||||
| information is available via the directory access protocol (dap), | ||||
| accessLocation MUST be a directoryName. When the information is | ||||
| available via electronic mail, accessLocation MUST be an rfc822Name. | ||||
| The semantics of other name forms of of accessLocation (when | ||||
| accessMethod is id-ad-caRepository) are not defined by this | ||||
| specification. | ||||
| The id-ad-timeStamping OID is used when the subject offers | ||||
| timestamping services using the Time Stamp Protocol defined in | ||||
| [PKIXTSA]. Where the timestamping services are available via http or | ||||
| ftp, accessLocation MUST be a uniformResourceIdentifier. Where the | ||||
| timestamping services are available via electronic mail, | ||||
| accessLocation MUST be an rfc822Name. Where timestamping services | ||||
| are available using TCP/IP, the dNSName or ipAddress name forms may | ||||
| be used. The semantics of other name forms of accessLocation (when | ||||
| accessMethod is id-ad-timeStamping) are not defined by this | ||||
| specification. | ||||
| Additional access descriptors may be defined in other PKIX | ||||
| specifications. | ||||
| id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 } | ||||
| id-ad-caRepository OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 5 } | ||||
| id-ad-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 3 } | ||||
| 5 CRL and CRL Extensions Profile | ||||
| As discussed above, one goal of this X.509 v2 CRL profile is to | ||||
| foster the creation of an interoperable and reusable Internet PKI. | ||||
| To achieve this goal, guidelines for the use of extensions are | ||||
| specified, and some assumptions are made about the nature of | ||||
| information included in the CRL. | ||||
| CRLs may be used in a wide range of applications and environments | ||||
| covering a broad spectrum of interoperability goals and an even | ||||
| broader spectrum of operational and assurance requirements. This | ||||
| profile establishes a common baseline for generic applications | ||||
| requiring broad interoperability. The profile defines a set of | ||||
| information that can be expected in every CRL. Also, the profile | ||||
| defines common locations within the CRL for frequently used | ||||
| attributes as well as common representations for these attributes. | ||||
| CRL issuers issue CRLs. In general, the CRL issuer is the CA. CAs | ||||
| publish CRLs to provide status information about the certificates | ||||
| they issued. However, a CA may delegate this responsibility to | ||||
| another trusted authority. Whenever the CRL issuer is not the CA | ||||
| that issued the certificates, the CRL is referred to as an indirect | ||||
| CRL. | ||||
| Each CRL has a particular scope. The CRL scope is the set of | ||||
| certificates that could appear on a given CRL. For example, the | ||||
| scope could be "all certificates issued by CA X", "all CA | ||||
| certificates issued by CA X", "all certificates issued by CA X that | ||||
| have been revoked for reasons of key compromise and CA compromise", | ||||
| or could be a set of certificates based on arbitrary local | ||||
| information, such as "all certificates issued to the NIST employees | ||||
| located in Boulder". | ||||
| A complete CRL lists all unexpired certificates, within its scope, | ||||
| that have been revoked for one of the revocation reasons covered by | ||||
| the CRL scope. The CRL issuer MAY also generate delta CRLs. A delta | ||||
| CRL only lists those certificates, within its scope, whose revocation | ||||
| status has changed since the issuance of a referenced complete CRL. | ||||
| The referenced complete CRL is referred to as a base CRL. The scope | ||||
| of a delta CRL MUST be the same as the base CRL that it references. | ||||
| This profile does not define any private Internet CRL extensions or | ||||
| CRL entry extensions. | ||||
| Environments with additional or special purpose requirements may | ||||
| build on this profile or may replace it. | ||||
| Conforming CAs are not required to issue CRLs if other revocation or | ||||
| certificate status mechanisms are provided. Conforming CAs that | ||||
| issue CRLs MUST issue version 2 CRLs, include the date by which the | ||||
| next CRL will be issued in the nextUpdate field (section 5.1.2.5), | ||||
| include the CRL number extension (section 5.2.3), and include the | ||||
| authority key identifier extension (section 5.2.1). Conforming | ||||
| applications that support CRLs are required to process both version 1 | ||||
| and version 2 complete CRLs that provide revocation information for | ||||
| all certificates issued by one CA. Conforming applications are not | ||||
| required to support processing of delta CRLs, indirect CRLs, or CRLs | ||||
| with a scope other than all certificates issued by the CA. | ||||
| 5.1 CRL Fields | ||||
| The X.509 v2 CRL syntax is as follows. For signature calculation, | ||||
| the data that is to be signed is ASN.1 DER encoded. ASN.1 DER | ||||
| encoding is a tag, length, value encoding system for each element. | ||||
| CertificateList ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| tbsCertList TBSCertList, | ||||
| signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, | ||||
| signatureValue BIT STRING } | ||||
| TBSCertList ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| version Version OPTIONAL, | ||||
| -- if present, MUST be v2 | ||||
| signature AlgorithmIdentifier, | ||||
| issuer Name, | ||||
| thisUpdate Time, | ||||
| nextUpdate Time OPTIONAL, | ||||
| revokedCertificates SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { | ||||
| userCertificate CertificateSerialNumber, | ||||
| revocationDate Time, | ||||
| crlEntryExtensions Extensions OPTIONAL | ||||
| -- if present, MUST be v2 | ||||
| } OPTIONAL, | ||||
| crlExtensions [0] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL | ||||
| -- if present, MUST be v2 | ||||
| } | ||||
| -- Version, Time, CertificateSerialNumber, and Extensions | ||||
| -- are all defined in the ASN.1 in section 4.1 | ||||
| -- AlgorithmIdentifier is defined in section 4.1.1.2 | ||||
| The following items describe the use of the X.509 v2 CRL in the | ||||
| Internet PKI. | ||||
| 5.1.1 CertificateList Fields | ||||
| The CertificateList is a SEQUENCE of three required fields. The | ||||
| fields are described in detail in the following subsections. | ||||
| 5.1.1.1 tbsCertList | ||||
| The first field in the sequence is the tbsCertList. This field is | ||||
| itself a sequence containing the name of the issuer, issue date, | ||||
| issue date of the next list, the optional list of revoked | ||||
| certificates, and optional CRL extensions. When there are no revoked | ||||
| certificates, the revoked certificates list is absent. When one or | ||||
| more certificates are revoked, each entry on the revoked certificate | ||||
| list is defined by a sequence of user certificate serial number, | ||||
| revocation date, and optional CRL entry extensions. | ||||
| 5.1.1.2 signatureAlgorithm | ||||
| The signatureAlgorithm field contains the algorithm identifier for | ||||
| the algorithm used by the CRL issuer to sign the CertificateList. | ||||
| The field is of type AlgorithmIdentifier, which is defined in section | ||||
| 4.1.1.2. [PKIXALGS] lists the supported algorithms for this | ||||
| specification. Conforming CAs MUST use the algorithm identifiers | ||||
| presented in [PKIXALGS] when signing with a supported signature | ||||
| algorithm. | ||||
| This field MUST contain the same algorithm identifier as the | ||||
| signature field in the sequence tbsCertList (section 5.1.2.2). | ||||
| 5.1.1.3 signatureValue | ||||
| The signatureValue field contains a digital signature computed upon | ||||
| the ASN.1 DER encoded tbsCertList. The ASN.1 DER encoded tbsCertList | ||||
| is used as the input to the signature function. This signature value | ||||
| is then ASN.1 encoded as a BIT STRING and included in the CRL's | ||||
| signatureValue field. The details of this process are specified for | ||||
| each of the supported algorithms in [PKIXALGS]. | ||||
| CAs that are also CRL issuers MAY use one private key to digitally | ||||
| sign certificates and CRLs, or MAY use separate private keys to | ||||
| digitally sign certificates and CRLs. When separate private keys are | ||||
| employed, each of the public keys associated with these private keys | ||||
| is placed in a separate certificate, one with the keyCertSign bit set | ||||
| in the key usage extension, and one with the cRLSign bit set in the | ||||
| key usage extension (section 4.2.1.3). When separate private keys | ||||
| are employed, certificates issued by the CA contain one authority key | ||||
| identifier, and the corresponding CRLs contain a different authority | ||||
| key identifier. The use of separate CA certificates for validation | ||||
| of certificate signatures and CRL signatures can offer improved | ||||
| security characteristics; however, it imposes a burden on | ||||
| applications, and it might limit interoperability. Many applications | ||||
| construct a certification path, and then validate the certification | ||||
| path (section 6). CRL checking in turn requires a separate | ||||
| certification path to be constructed and validated for the CA's CRL | ||||
| signature validation certificate. Applications that perform CRL | ||||
| checking MUST support certification path validation when certificates | ||||
| and CRLs are digitally signed with the same CA private key. These | ||||
| applications SHOULD support certification path validation when | ||||
| certificates and CRLs are digitally signed with different CA private | ||||
| keys. | ||||
| 5.1.2 Certificate List "To Be Signed" | ||||
| The certificate list to be signed, or TBSCertList, is a SEQUENCE of | ||||
| required and optional fields. The required fields identify the CRL | ||||
| issuer, the algorithm used to sign the CRL, the date and time the CRL | ||||
| was issued, and the date and time by which the CRL issuer will issue | ||||
| the next CRL. | ||||
| Optional fields include lists of revoked certificates and CRL | ||||
| extensions. The revoked certificate list is optional to support the | ||||
| case where a CA has not revoked any unexpired certificates that it | ||||
| has issued. The profile requires conforming CRL issuers to use the | ||||
| CRL Number CRL extension in all CRLs issued. | ||||
| 5.1.2.1 Version | ||||
| This optional field describes the version of the encoded CRL. When | ||||
| extensions are used, as required by this profile, this field MUST be | ||||
| present and MUST specify version 2 (the integer value is 1). | ||||
| 5.1.2.2 Signature | ||||
| This field contains the algorithm identifier for the algorithm used | ||||
| to sign the CRL. [PKIXALGS] lists OIDs for the most popular | ||||
| signature algorithms used in the Internet PKI. | ||||
| This field MUST contain the same algorithm identifier as the | ||||
| signatureAlgorithm field in the sequence CertificateList (section | ||||
| 5.1.1.2). | ||||
| 5.1.2.3 Issuer Name | ||||
| The issuer name identifies the entity who has signed and issued the | ||||
| CRL. The issuer identity is carried in the issuer name field. | ||||
| Alternative name forms may also appear in the issuerAltName extension | ||||
| (section 5.2.2). The issuer name field MUST contain an X.500 | ||||
| distinguished name (DN). The issuer name field is defined as the | ||||
| X.501 type Name, and MUST follow the encoding rules for the issuer | ||||
| name field in the certificate (section 4.1.2.4). | ||||
| 5.1.2.4 This Update | ||||
| This field indicates the issue date of this CRL. ThisUpdate may be | ||||
| encoded as UTCTime or GeneralizedTime. | ||||
| CRL issuers conforming to this profile MUST encode thisUpdate as | ||||
| UTCTime for dates through the year 2049. CRL issuers conforming to | ||||
| this profile MUST encode thisUpdate as GeneralizedTime for dates in | ||||
| the year 2050 or later. | ||||
| Where encoded as UTCTime, thisUpdate MUST be specified and | ||||
| interpreted as defined in section 4.1.2.5.1. Where encoded as | ||||
| GeneralizedTime, thisUpdate MUST be specified and interpreted as | ||||
| defined in section 4.1.2.5.2. | ||||
| 5.1.2.5 Next Update | ||||
| This field indicates the date by which the next CRL will be issued. | ||||
| The next CRL could be issued before the indicated date, but it will | ||||
| not be issued any later than the indicated date. CRL issuers SHOULD | ||||
| issue CRLs with a nextUpdate time equal to or later than all previous | ||||
| CRLs. nextUpdate may be encoded as UTCTime or GeneralizedTime. | ||||
| This profile requires inclusion of nextUpdate in all CRLs issued by | ||||
| conforming CRL issuers. Note that the ASN.1 syntax of TBSCertList | ||||
| describes this field as OPTIONAL, which is consistent with the ASN.1 | ||||
| structure defined in [X.509]. The behavior of clients processing CRLs | ||||
| which omit nextUpdate is not specified by this profile. | ||||
| CRL issuers conforming to this profile MUST encode nextUpdate as | ||||
| UTCTime for dates through the year 2049. CRL issuers conforming to | ||||
| this profile MUST encode nextUpdate as GeneralizedTime for dates in | ||||
| the year 2050 or later. | ||||
| Where encoded as UTCTime, nextUpdate MUST be specified and | ||||
| interpreted as defined in section 4.1.2.5.1. Where encoded as | ||||
| GeneralizedTime, nextUpdate MUST be specified and interpreted as | ||||
| defined in section 4.1.2.5.2. | ||||
| 5.1.2.6 Revoked Certificates | ||||
| When there are no revoked certificates, the revoked certificates list | ||||
| is absent. Otherwise, revoked certificates are listed by their | ||||
| serial numbers. Certificates revoked by the CA are uniquely | ||||
| identified by the certificate serial number. The date on which the | ||||
| revocation occurred is specified. The time for revocationDate MUST | ||||
| be expressed as described in section 5.1.2.4. Additional information | ||||
| may be supplied in CRL entry extensions; CRL entry extensions are | ||||
| discussed in section 5.3. | ||||
| 5.1.2.7 Extensions | ||||
| This field may only appear if the version is 2 (section 5.1.2.1). If | ||||
| present, this field is a SEQUENCE of one or more CRL extensions. CRL | ||||
| extensions are discussed in section 5.2. | ||||
| 5.2 CRL Extensions | ||||
| The extensions defined by ANSI X9 and ISO/IEC/ITU for X.509 v2 CRLs | ||||
| [X.509] [X9.55] provide methods for associating additional attributes | ||||
| with CRLs. The X.509 v2 CRL format also allows communities to define | ||||
| private extensions to carry information unique to those communities. | ||||
| Each extension in a CRL may be designated as critical or non- | ||||
| critical. A CRL validation MUST fail if it encounters a critical | ||||
| extension which it does not know how to process. However, an | ||||
| unrecognized non-critical extension may be ignored. The following | ||||
| subsections present those extensions used within Internet CRLs. | ||||
| Communities MAY elect to include extensions in CRLs which are not | ||||
| defined in this specification. However, caution SHOULD be exercised | ||||
| in adopting any critical extensions in CRLs which might be used in a | ||||
| general context. | ||||
| Conforming CRL issuers are required to include the authority key | ||||
| identifier (section 5.2.1) and the CRL number (section 5.2.3) | ||||
| extensions in all CRLs issued. | ||||
| 5.2.1 Authority Key Identifier | ||||
| The authority key identifier extension provides a means of | ||||
| identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to | ||||
| sign a CRL. The identification can be based on either the key | ||||
| identifier (the subject key identifier in the CRL signer's | ||||
| certificate) or on the issuer name and serial number. This extension | ||||
| is especially useful where an issuer has more than one signing key, | ||||
| either due to multiple concurrent key pairs or due to changeover. | ||||
| Conforming CRL issuers MUST use the key identifier method, and MUST | ||||
| include this extension in all CRLs issued. | ||||
| The syntax for this CRL extension is defined in section 4.2.1.1. | ||||
| 5.2.2 Issuer Alternative Name | ||||
| The issuer alternative names extension allows additional identities | ||||
| to be associated with the issuer of the CRL. Defined options include | ||||
| an rfc822 name (electronic mail address), a DNS name, an IP address, | ||||
| and a URI. Multiple instances of a name and multiple name forms may | ||||
| be included. Whenever such identities are used, the issuer | ||||
| alternative name extension MUST be used; however, a DNS name MAY be | ||||
| represented in the issuer field using the domainComponent attribute | ||||
| as described in section 4.1.2.4. | ||||
| The issuerAltName extension SHOULD NOT be marked critical. | ||||
| The OID and syntax for this CRL extension are defined in section | ||||
| 4.2.1.8. | ||||
| 5.2.3 CRL Number | ||||
| The CRL number is a non-critical CRL extension which conveys a | ||||
| monotonically increasing sequence number for a given CRL scope and | ||||
| CRL issuer. This extension allows users to easily determine when a | ||||
| particular CRL supersedes another CRL. CRL numbers also support the | ||||
| identification of complementary complete CRLs and delta CRLs. CRL | ||||
| issuers conforming to this profile MUST include this extension in all | ||||
| CRLs. | ||||
| If a CRL issuer generates delta CRLs in addition to complete CRLs for | ||||
| a given scope, the complete CRLs and delta CRLs MUST share one | ||||
| numbering sequence. If a delta CRL and a complete CRL that cover the | ||||
| same scope are issued at the same time, they MUST have the same CRL | ||||
| number and provide the same revocation information. That is, the | ||||
| combination of the delta CRL and an acceptable complete CRL MUST | ||||
| provide the same revocation information as the simultaneously issued | ||||
| complete CRL. | ||||
| If a CRL issuer generates two CRLs (two complete CRLs, two delta | ||||
| CRLs, or a complete CRL and a delta CRL) for the same scope at | ||||
| different times, the two CRLs MUST NOT have the same CRL number. | ||||
| That is, if the this update field (section 5.1.2.4) in the two CRLs | ||||
| are not identical, the CRL numbers MUST be different. | ||||
| id-ce-cRLNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 20 } | ||||
| CRLNumber ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) | ||||
| 5.2.4 Delta CRL Indicator | ||||
| The delta CRL indicator is a critical CRL extension that identifies a | ||||
| CRL as being a delta CRL. Delta CRLs contain updates to revocation | ||||
| information previously distributed, rather than all the information | ||||
| that would appear in a complete CRL. The use of delta CRLs can | ||||
| significantly reduce network load and processing time in some | ||||
| environments. Delta CRLs are generally smaller than the CRLs they | ||||
| update, so applications that obtain delta CRLs consume less network | ||||
| bandwidth than applications that obtain the corresponding complete | ||||
| CRLs. Applications which store revocation information in a format | ||||
| other than the CRL structure can add new revocation information to | ||||
| the local database without reprocessing information. | ||||
| The delta CRL indicator extension contains the single value of type | ||||
| BaseCRLNumber. The CRL number identifies the CRL, complete for a | ||||
| given scope, that was used as the starting point in the generation of | ||||
| this delta CRL. A conforming CRL issuer MUST publish the referenced | ||||
| base CRL as a complete CRL. The delta CRL contains all updates to | ||||
| the revocation status for that same scope. The combination of a | ||||
| delta CRL plus the referenced base CRL is equivalent to a complete | ||||
| CRL, for the applicable scope, at the time of publication of the | ||||
| delta CRL. | ||||
| When a conforming CRL issuer generates a delta CRL, the delta CRL | ||||
| MUST include a critical delta CRL indicator extension. | ||||
| When a delta CRL is issued, it MUST cover the same set of reasons and | ||||
| the same set of certificates that were covered by the base CRL it | ||||
| references. That is, the scope of the delta CRL MUST be the same as | ||||
| the scope of the complete CRL referenced as the base. The referenced | ||||
| base CRL and the delta CRL MUST omit the issuing distribution point | ||||
| extension or contain identical issuing distribution point extensions. | ||||
| Further, the CRL issuer MUST use the same private key to sign the | ||||
| delta CRL and any complete CRL that it can be used to update. | ||||
| An application that supports delta CRLs can construct a CRL that is | ||||
| complete for a given scope by combining a delta CRL for that scope | ||||
| with either an issued CRL that is complete for that scope or a | ||||
| locally constructed CRL that is complete for that scope. | ||||
| When a delta CRL is combined with a complete CRL or a locally | ||||
| constructed CRL, the resulting locally constructed CRL has the CRL | ||||
| number specified in the CRL number extension found in the delta CRL | ||||
| used in its construction. In addition, the resulting locally | ||||
| constructed CRL has the thisUpdate and nextUpdate times specified in | ||||
| the corresponding fields of the delta CRL used in its construction. | ||||
| In addition, the locally constructed CRL inherits the issuing | ||||
| distribution point from the delta CRL. | ||||
| A complete CRL and a delta CRL MAY be combined if the following four | ||||
| conditions are satisfied: | ||||
| (a) The complete CRL and delta CRL have the same issuer. | ||||
| (b) The complete CRL and delta CRL have the same scope. The two | ||||
| CRLs have the same scope if either of the following conditions are | ||||
| met: | ||||
| (1) The issuingDistributionPoint extension is omitted from | ||||
| both the complete CRL and the delta CRL. | ||||
| (2) The issuingDistributionPoint extension is present in both | ||||
| the complete CRL and the delta CRL, and the values for each of | ||||
| the fields in the extensions are the same in both CRLs. | ||||
| (c) The CRL number of the complete CRL is equal to or greater | ||||
| than the BaseCRLNumber specified in the delta CRL. That is, the | ||||
| complete CRL contains (at a minimum) all the revocation | ||||
| information held by the referenced base CRL. | ||||
| (d) The CRL number of the complete CRL is less than the CRL | ||||
| number of the delta CRL. That is, the delta CRL follows the | ||||
| complete CRL in the numbering sequence. | ||||
| CRL issuers MUST ensure that the combination of a delta CRL and any | ||||
| appropriate complete CRL accurately reflects the current revocation | ||||
| status. The CRL issuer MUST include an entry in the delta CRL for | ||||
| each certificate within the scope of the delta CRL whose status has | ||||
| changed since the generation of the referenced base CRL: | ||||
| (a) If the certificate is revoked for a reason included in the | ||||
| scope of the CRL, list the certificate as revoked. | ||||
| (b) If the certificate is valid and was listed on the referenced | ||||
| base CRL or any subsequent CRL with reason code certificateHold, | ||||
| and the reason code certificateHold is included in the scope of | ||||
| the CRL, list the certificate with the reason code removeFromCRL. | ||||
| (c) If the certificate is revoked for a reason outside the scope | ||||
| of the CRL, but the certificate was listed on the referenced base | ||||
| CRL or any subsequent CRL with a reason code included in the scope | ||||
| of this CRL, list the certificate as revoked but omit the reason | ||||
| code. | ||||
| (d) If the certificate is revoked for a reason outside the scope | ||||
| of the CRL and the certificate was neither listed on the | ||||
| referenced base CRL nor any subsequent CRL with a reason code | ||||
| included in the scope of this CRL, do not list the certificate on | ||||
| this CRL. | ||||
| The status of a certificate is considered to have changed if it is | ||||
| revoked, placed on hold, released from hold, or if its revocation | ||||
| reason changes. | ||||
| It is appropriate to list a certificate with reason code | ||||
| removeFromCRL on a delta CRL even if the certificate was not on hold | ||||
| in the referenced base CRL. If the certificate was placed on hold in | ||||
| any CRL issued after the base but before this delta CRL and then | ||||
| released from hold, it MUST be listed on the delta CRL with | ||||
| revocation reason removeFromCRL. | ||||
| A CRL issuer MAY optionally list a certificate on a delta CRL with | ||||
| reason code removeFromCRL if the notAfter time specified in the | ||||
| certificate precedes the thisUpdate time specified in the delta CRL | ||||
| and the certificate was listed on the referenced base CRL or in any | ||||
| CRL issued after the base but before this delta CRL. | ||||
| If a certificate revocation notice first appears on a delta CRL, then | ||||
| it is possible for the certificate validity period to expire before | ||||
| the next complete CRL for the same scope is issued. In this case, | ||||
| the revocation notice MUST be included in all subsequent delta CRLs | ||||
| until the revocation notice is included on at least one explicitly | ||||
| issued complete CRL for this scope. | ||||
| An application that supports delta CRLs MUST be able to construct a | ||||
| current complete CRL by combining a previously issued complete CRL | ||||
| and the most current delta CRL. An application that supports delta | ||||
| CRLs MAY also be able to construct a current complete CRL by | ||||
| combining a previously locally constructed complete CRL and the | ||||
| current delta CRL. A delta CRL is considered to be the current one | ||||
| if the current time is between the times contained in the thisUpdate | ||||
| and nextUpdate fields. Under some circumstances, the CRL issuer may | ||||
| publish one or more delta CRLs before indicated by the nextUpdate | ||||
| field. If more than one current delta CRL for a given scope is | ||||
| encountered, the application SHOULD consider the one with the latest | ||||
| value in thisUpdate to be the most current one. | ||||
| id-ce-deltaCRLIndicator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 27 } | ||||
| BaseCRLNumber ::= CRLNumber | ||||
| 5.2.5 Issuing Distribution Point | ||||
| The issuing distribution point is a critical CRL extension that | ||||
| identifies the CRL distribution point and scope for a particular CRL, | ||||
| and it indicates whether the CRL covers revocation for end entity | ||||
| certificates only, CA certificates only, attribute certificates | ||||
| only, or a limited set of reason codes. Although the extension is | ||||
| critical, conforming implementations are not required to support this | ||||
| extension. | ||||
| The CRL is signed using the CRL issuer's private key. CRL | ||||
| Distribution Points do not have their own key pairs. If the CRL is | ||||
| stored in the X.500 Directory, it is stored in the Directory entry | ||||
| corresponding to the CRL distribution point, which may be different | ||||
| than the Directory entry of the CRL issuer. | ||||
| The reason codes associated with a distribution point MUST be | ||||
| specified in onlySomeReasons. If onlySomeReasons does not appear, | ||||
| the distribution point MUST contain revocations for all reason codes. | ||||
| CAs may use CRL distribution points to partition the CRL on the basis | ||||
| of compromise and routine revocation. In this case, the revocations | ||||
| with reason code keyCompromise (1), cACompromise (2), and | ||||
| aACompromise (8) appear in one distribution point, and the | ||||
| revocations with other reason codes appear in another distribution | ||||
| point. | ||||
| If the distributionPoint field is present and contains a URI, the | ||||
| following semantics MUST be assumed: the object is a pointer to the | ||||
| most current CRL issued by this CRL issuer. The URI schemes ftp, | ||||
| http, mailto [RFC1738] and ldap [RFC1778] are defined for this | ||||
| purpose. The URI MUST be an absolute pathname, not a relative | ||||
| pathname, and MUST specify the host. | ||||
| If the distributionPoint field is absent, the CRL MUST contain | ||||
| entries for all revoked unexpired certificates issued by the CRL | ||||
| issuer, if any, within the scope of the CRL. | ||||
| The CRL issuer MUST assert the indirectCRL boolean, if the scope of | ||||
| the CRL includes certificates issued by authorities other than the | ||||
| CRL issuer. The authority responsible for each entry is indicated by | ||||
| the certificate issuer CRL entry extension (section 5.3.4). | ||||
| id-ce-issuingDistributionPoint OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 28 } | ||||
| issuingDistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL, | ||||
| onlyContainsUserCerts [1] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, | ||||
| onlyContainsCACerts [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, | ||||
| onlySomeReasons [3] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL, | ||||
| indirectCRL [4] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, | ||||
| onlyContainsAttributeCerts [5] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE } | ||||
| 5.2.6 Freshest CRL (a.k.a. Delta CRL Distribution Point) | ||||
| The freshest CRL extension identifies how delta CRL information for | ||||
| this complete CRL is obtained. The extension MUST be non-critical. | ||||
| This extension MUST NOT appear in delta CRLs. | ||||
| The same syntax is used for this extension as the | ||||
| cRLDistributionPoints certificate extension, and is described in | ||||
| section 4.2.1.14. However, only the distribution point field is | ||||
| meaningful in this context. The reasons and CRLIssuer fields MUST be | ||||
| omitted from this CRL extension. | ||||
| Each distribution point name provides the location at which a delta | ||||
| CRL for this complete CRL can be found. The scope of these delta | ||||
| CRLs MUST be the same as the scope of this complete CRL. The | ||||
| contents of this CRL extension are only used to locate delta CRLs; | ||||
| the contents are not used to validate the CRL or the referenced delta | ||||
| CRLs. The encoding conventions defined for distribution points in | ||||
| section 4.2.1.14 apply to this extension. | ||||
| id-ce-freshestCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 46 } | ||||
| FreshestCRL ::= CRLDistributionPoints | ||||
| 5.3 CRL Entry Extensions | ||||
| The CRL entry extensions already defined by ANSI X9 and ISO/IEC/ITU | ||||
| for X.509 v2 CRLs provide methods for associating additional | ||||
| attributes with CRL entries [X.509] [X9.55]. The X.509 v2 CRL format | ||||
| also allows communities to define private CRL entry extensions to | ||||
| carry information unique to those communities. Each extension in a | ||||
| CRL entry may be designated as critical or non-critical. A CRL | ||||
| validation MUST fail if it encounters a critical CRL entry extension | ||||
| which it does not know how to process. However, an unrecognized non- | ||||
| critical CRL entry extension may be ignored. The following | ||||
| subsections present recommended extensions used within Internet CRL | ||||
| entries and standard locations for information. Communities MAY | ||||
| elect to use additional CRL entry extensions; however, caution SHOULD | ||||
| be exercised in adopting any critical extensions in CRL entries which | ||||
| might be used in a general context. | ||||
| All CRL entry extensions used in this specification are non-critical. | ||||
| Support for these extensions is optional for conforming CRL issuers | ||||
| and applications. However, CRL issuers SHOULD include reason codes | ||||
| (section 5.3.1) and invalidity dates (section 5.3.3) whenever this | ||||
| information is available. | ||||
| 5.3.1 Reason Code | ||||
| The reasonCode is a non-critical CRL entry extension that identifies | ||||
| the reason for the certificate revocation. CRL issuers are strongly | ||||
| encouraged to include meaningful reason codes in CRL entries; | ||||
| however, the reason code CRL entry extension SHOULD be absent instead | ||||
| of using the unspecified (0) reasonCode value. | ||||
| id-ce-cRLReason OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 21 } | ||||
| -- reasonCode ::= { CRLReason } | ||||
| CRLReason ::= ENUMERATED { | ||||
| unspecified (0), | ||||
| keyCompromise (1), | ||||
| cACompromise (2), | ||||
| affiliationChanged (3), | ||||
| superseded (4), | ||||
| cessationOfOperation (5), | ||||
| certificateHold (6), | ||||
| removeFromCRL (8), | ||||
| privilegeWithdrawn (9), | ||||
| aACompromise (10) } | ||||
| 5.3.2 Hold Instruction Code | ||||
| The hold instruction code is a non-critical CRL entry extension that | ||||
| provides a registered instruction identifier which indicates the | ||||
| action to be taken after encountering a certificate that has been | ||||
| placed on hold. | ||||
| id-ce-holdInstructionCode OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 23 } | ||||
| holdInstructionCode ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER | ||||
| The following instruction codes have been defined. Conforming | ||||
| applications that process this extension MUST recognize the following | ||||
| instruction codes. | ||||
| holdInstruction OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= | ||||
| { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57(10040) 2 } | ||||
| id-holdinstruction-none OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {holdInstruction 1} | ||||
| id-holdinstruction-callissuer | ||||
| OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {holdInstruction 2} | ||||
| id-holdinstruction-reject OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {holdInstruction 3} | ||||
| Conforming applications which encounter an id-holdinstruction- | ||||
| callissuer MUST call the certificate issuer or reject the | ||||
| certificate. Conforming applications which encounter an id- | ||||
| holdinstruction-reject MUST reject the certificate. The hold | ||||
| instruction id-holdinstruction-none is semantically equivalent to the | ||||
| absence of a holdInstructionCode, and its use is strongly deprecated | ||||
| for the Internet PKI. | ||||
| 5.3.3 Invalidity Date | ||||
| The invalidity date is a non-critical CRL entry extension that | ||||
| provides the date on which it is known or suspected that the private | ||||
| key was compromised or that the certificate otherwise became invalid. | ||||
| This date may be earlier than the revocation date in the CRL entry, | ||||
| which is the date at which the CA processed the revocation. When a | ||||
| revocation is first posted by a CRL issuer in a CRL, the invalidity | ||||
| date may precede the date of issue of earlier CRLs, but the | ||||
| revocation date SHOULD NOT precede the date of issue of earlier CRLs. | ||||
| Whenever this information is available, CRL issuers are strongly | ||||
| encouraged to share it with CRL users. | ||||
| The GeneralizedTime values included in this field MUST be expressed | ||||
| in Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu), and MUST be specified and interpreted | ||||
| as defined in section 4.1.2.5.2. | ||||
| id-ce-invalidityDate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 24 } | ||||
| invalidityDate ::= GeneralizedTime | ||||
| 5.3.4 Certificate Issuer | ||||
| This CRL entry extension identifies the certificate issuer associated | ||||
| with an entry in an indirect CRL, that is, a CRL that has the | ||||
| indirectCRL indicator set in its issuing distribution point | ||||
| extension. If this extension is not present on the first entry in an | ||||
| indirect CRL, the certificate issuer defaults to the CRL issuer. On | ||||
| subsequent entries in an indirect CRL, if this extension is not | ||||
| present, the certificate issuer for the entry is the same as that for | ||||
| the preceding entry. This field is defined as follows: | ||||
| id-ce-certificateIssuer OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 29 } | ||||
| certificateIssuer ::= GeneralNames | ||||
| If used by conforming CRL issuers, this extension MUST always be | ||||
| critical. If an implementation ignored this extension it could not | ||||
| correctly attribute CRL entries to certificates. This specification | ||||
| RECOMMENDS that implementations recognize this extension. | ||||
| 6 Certification Path Validation | ||||
| Certification path validation procedures for the Internet PKI are | ||||
| based on the algorithm supplied in [X.509]. Certification path | ||||
| processing verifies the binding between the subject distinguished | ||||
| name and/or subject alternative name and subject public key. The | ||||
| binding is limited by constraints which are specified in the | ||||
| certificates which comprise the path and inputs which are specified | ||||
| by the relying party. The basic constraints and policy constraints | ||||
| extensions allow the certification path processing logic to automate | ||||
| the decision making process. | ||||
| This section describes an algorithm for validating certification | ||||
| paths. Conforming implementations of this specification are not | ||||
| required to implement this algorithm, but MUST provide functionality | ||||
| equivalent to the external behavior resulting from this procedure. | ||||
| Any algorithm may be used by a particular implementation so long as | ||||
| it derives the correct result. | ||||
| In section 6.1, the text describes basic path validation. Valid | ||||
| paths begin with certificates issued by a "most-trusted CA". The | ||||
| algorithm requires the public key of the CA, the CA's name, and any | ||||
| constraints upon the set of paths which may be validated using this | ||||
| key. | ||||
| The selection of a "most-trusted CA" is a matter of policy: it could | ||||
| be the top CA in a hierarchical PKI; the CA that issued the | ||||
| verifier's own certificate(s); or any other CA in a network PKI. The | ||||
| path validation procedure is the same regardless of the choice of | ||||
| "most-trusted CA." In addition, different applications may rely on | ||||
| different "most-trusted CA", or may accept paths that begin with any | ||||
| of a set of "most-trusted CAs." | ||||
| Section 6.2 describes methods for using the path validation algorithm | ||||
| in specific implementations. Two specific cases are discussed: the | ||||
| case where paths may begin with one of several trusted CAs; and where | ||||
| compatibility with the PEM architecture is required. | ||||
| Section 6.3 describes the steps necessary to determine if a | ||||
| certificate is revoked or on hold status when CRLs are the revocation | ||||
| mechanism used by the certificate issuer. | ||||
| 6.1 Basic Path Validation | ||||
| This text describes an algorithm for X.509 path processing. A | ||||
| conformant implementation MUST include an X.509 path processing | ||||
| procedure that is functionally equivalent to the external behavior of | ||||
| this algorithm. However, support for some of the certificate | ||||
| extensions processed in this algorithm are OPTIONAL for compliant | ||||
| implementations. Clients that do not support these extensions MAY | ||||
| omit the corresponding steps in the path validation algorithm. | ||||
| For example, clients are NOT REQUIRED to support the policy mapping | ||||
| extension. Clients that do not support this extension MAY omit the | ||||
| path validation steps where policy mappings are processed. Note that | ||||
| clients MUST reject the certificate if it contains an unsupported | ||||
| critical extension. | ||||
| The algorithm presented in this section validates the certificate | ||||
| with respect to the current date and time. A conformant | ||||
| implementation MAY also support validation with respect to some point | ||||
| in the past. Note that mechanisms are not available for validating a | ||||
| certificate with respect to a time outside the certificate validity | ||||
| period. | ||||
| The trust anchor is an input to the algorithm. There is no | ||||
| requirement that the same trust anchor be used to validate all | ||||
| certification paths. Different trust anchors MAY be used to validate | ||||
| different paths, as discussed further in Section 6.2. | ||||
| The primary goal of path validation is to verify the binding between | ||||
| a subject distinguished name or a subject alternative name and | ||||
| subject public key, as represented in the end entity certificate, | ||||
| based on the public key of the trust anchor. This requires obtaining | ||||
| a sequence of certificates that support that binding. The procedure | ||||
| performed to obtain this sequence of certificates is outside the | ||||
| scope of this specification. | ||||
| To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other | ||||
| things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n | ||||
| certificates) satisfies the following conditions: | ||||
| (a) for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is | ||||
| the issuer of certificate x+1; | ||||
| (b) certificate 1 is issued by the trust anchor; | ||||
| (c) certificate n is the certificate to be validated; and | ||||
| (d) for all x in {1, ..., n}, the certificate was valid at the | ||||
| time in question. | ||||
| When the trust anchor is provided in the form of a self-signed | ||||
| certificate, this self-signed certificate is not included as part of | ||||
| the prospective certification path. Information about trust anchors | ||||
| are provided as inputs to the certification path validation algorithm | ||||
| (section 6.1.1). | ||||
| A particular certification path may not, however, be appropriate for | ||||
| all applications. Therefore, an application MAY augment this | ||||
| algorithm to further limit the set of valid paths. The path | ||||
| validation process also determines the set of certificate policies | ||||
| that are valid for this path, based on the certificate policies | ||||
| extension, policy mapping extension, policy constraints extension, | ||||
| and inhibit any-policy extension. To achieve this, the path | ||||
| validation algorithm constructs a valid policy tree. If the set of | ||||
| certificate policies that are valid for this path is not empty, then | ||||
| the result will be a valid policy tree of depth n, otherwise the | ||||
| result will be a null valid policy tree. | ||||
| A certificate is self-issued if the DNs that appear in the subject | ||||
| and issuer fields are identical and are not empty. In general, the | ||||
| issuer and subject of the certificates that make up a path are | ||||
| different for each certificate. However, a CA may issue a | ||||
| certificate to itself to support key rollover or changes in | ||||
| certificate policies. These self-issued certificates are not counted | ||||
| when evaluating path length or name constraints. | ||||
| This section presents the algorithm in four basic steps: (1) | ||||
| initialization, (2) basic certificate processing, (3) preparation for | ||||
| the next certificate, and (4) wrap-up. Steps (1) and (4) are | ||||
| performed exactly once. Step (2) is performed for all certificates | ||||
| in the path. Step (3) is performed for all certificates in the path | ||||
| except the final certificate. Figure 2 provides a high-level | ||||
| flowchart of this algorithm. | ||||
| +-------+ | ||||
| | START | | ||||
| +-------+ | ||||
| | | ||||
| V | ||||
| +----------------+ | ||||
| | Initialization | | ||||
| +----------------+ | ||||
| | | ||||
| +<--------------------+ | ||||
| | | | ||||
| V | | ||||
| +----------------+ | | ||||
| | Process Cert | | | ||||
| +----------------+ | | ||||
| | | | ||||
| V | | ||||
| +================+ | | ||||
| | IF Last Cert | | | ||||
| | in Path | | | ||||
| +================+ | | ||||
| | | | | ||||
| THEN | | ELSE | | ||||
| V V | | ||||
| +----------------+ +----------------+ | | ||||
| | Wrap up | | Prepare for | | | ||||
| +----------------+ | Next Cert | | | ||||
| | +----------------+ | | ||||
| V | | | ||||
| +-------+ +--------------+ | ||||
| | STOP | | ||||
| +-------+ | ||||
| Figure 2. Certification Path Processing Flowchart | ||||
| 6.1.1 Inputs | ||||
| This algorithm assumes the following seven inputs are provided to the | ||||
| path processing logic: | ||||
| (a) a prospective certification path of length n. | ||||
| (b) the current date/time. | ||||
| (c) user-initial-policy-set: A set of certificate policy | ||||
| identifiers naming the policies that are acceptable to the | ||||
| certificate user. The user-initial-policy-set contains the special | ||||
| value any-policy if the user is not concerned about certificate | ||||
| policy. | ||||
| (d) trust anchor information, describing a CA that serves as a | ||||
| trust anchor for the certification path. The trust anchor | ||||
| information includes: | ||||
| (1) the trusted issuer name, | ||||
| (2) the trusted public key algorithm, | ||||
| (3) the trusted public key, and | ||||
| (4) optionally, the trusted public key parameters associated | ||||
| with the public key. | ||||
| The trust anchor information may be provided to the path | ||||
| processing procedure in the form of a self-signed certificate. | ||||
| The trusted anchor information is trusted because it was delivered | ||||
| to the path processing procedure by some trustworthy out-of-band | ||||
| procedure. If the trusted public key algorithm requires | ||||
| parameters, then the parameters are provided along with the | ||||
| trusted public key. | ||||
| (e) initial-policy-mapping-inhibit, which indicates if policy | ||||
| mapping is allowed in the certification path. | ||||
| (f) initial-explicit-policy, which indicates if the path must be | ||||
| valid for at least one of the certificate policies in the user- | ||||
| initial-policy-set. | ||||
| (g) initial-any-policy-inhibit, which indicates whether the | ||||
| anyPolicy OID should be processed if it is included in a | ||||
| certificate. | ||||
| 6.1.2 Initialization | ||||
| The initialization phase establishes eleven state variables based | ||||
| upon the seven inputs: | ||||
| (a) valid_policy_tree: A tree of certificate policies with their | ||||
| optional qualifiers; each of the leaves of the tree represents a | ||||
| valid policy at this stage in the certification path validation. | ||||
| If valid policies exist at this stage in the certification path | ||||
| validation, the depth of the tree is equal to the number of | ||||
| certificates in the chain that have been processed. If valid | ||||
| policies do not exist at this stage in the certification path | ||||
| validation, the tree is set to NULL. Once the tree is set to NULL, | ||||
| policy processing ceases. | ||||
| Each node in the valid_policy_tree includes four data objects: the | ||||
| valid policy, a set of associated policy qualifiers, a set of one | ||||
| or more expected policy values, and a criticality indicator. If | ||||
| the node is at depth x, the components of the node have the | ||||
| following semantics: | ||||
| (1) The valid_policy is a single policy OID representing a | ||||
| valid policy for the path of length x. | ||||
| (2) The qualifier_set is a set of policy qualifiers associated | ||||
| with the valid policy in certificate x. | ||||
| (3) The criticality_indicator indicates whether the | ||||
| certificate policy extension in certificate x was marked as | ||||
| critical. | ||||
| (4) The expected_policy_set contains one or more policy OIDs | ||||
| that would satisfy this policy in the certificate x+1. | ||||
| The initial value of the valid_policy_tree is a single node with | ||||
| valid_policy any-policy, an empty qualifier_set, an | ||||
| expected_policy_set with the single value any-policy, and a | ||||
| criticality_indicator of FALSE. This node is considered to be at | ||||
| depth zero. | ||||
| Figure 3 is a graphic representation of the initial state of the | ||||
| valid_policy_tree. Additional figures will use this format to | ||||
| describe changes in the valid_policy_tree during path processing. | ||||
| +----------------+ | ||||
| | any-policy | <---- valid_policy | ||||
| +----------------+ | ||||
| | {} | <---- qualifier_set | ||||
| +----------------+ | ||||
| | FALSE | <---- criticality_indicator | ||||
| +----------------+ | ||||
| | {any-policy} | <---- expected_policy_set | ||||
| +----------------+ | ||||
| Figure 3. Initial value of the valid_policy_tree state variable | ||||
| (b) permitted_subtrees: A set of root names for each name type | ||||
| (e.g., X.500 distinguished names, email addresses, or ip | ||||
| addresses) defining a set of subtrees within which all subject | ||||
| names in subsequent certificates in the certification path MUST | ||||
| fall. This variable includes a set for each name type: the | ||||
| initial value for the set for Distinguished Names is the set of | ||||
| all Distinguished names; the initial value for the set of RFC822 | ||||
| names is the set of all RFC822 names, etc. | ||||
| (c) excluded_subtrees: A set of root names for each name type | ||||
| (e.g., X.500 distinguished names, email addresses, or ip | ||||
| addresses) defining a set of subtrees within which no subject name | ||||
| in subsequent certificates in the certification path may fall. | ||||
| This variable includes a set for each name type, and the initial | ||||
| value for each set is empty. | ||||
| (d) explicit_policy: an integer which indicates if a non-NULL | ||||
| valid_policy_tree is required. The integer indicates the number of | ||||
| non-self-issued certificates to be processed before this | ||||
| requirement is imposed. Once set, this variable may be decreased, | ||||
| but may not be increased. That is, if a certificate in the path | ||||
| requires a non-NULL valid_policy_tree, a later certificate can not | ||||
| remove this requirement. If initial-explicit-policy is set, then | ||||
| the initial value is 0, otherwise the initial value is n+1. | ||||
| (e) inhibit_any-policy: an integer which indicates whether the | ||||
| any-policy policy identifier is considered a match. The integer | ||||
| indicates the number of non-self-issued certificates to be | ||||
| processed before the any-policy OID, if asserted in a certificate, | ||||
| is ignored. Once set, this variable may be decreased, but may not | ||||
| be increased. That is, if a certificate in the path inhibits | ||||
| processing of any-policy, a later certificate can not permit it. | ||||
| If initial-any-policy-inhibit is set, then the initial value is 0, | ||||
| otherwise the initial value is n+1. | ||||
| (f) policy_mapping: an integer which indicates if policy mapping | ||||
| is permitted. The integer indicates the number of non-self-issued | ||||
| certificates to be processed before policy mapping is inhibited. | ||||
| Once set, this variable may be decreased, but may not be | ||||
| increased. That is, if a certificate in the path specifies policy | ||||
| mapping is not permitted, it can not be overridden by a later | ||||
| certificate. If initial-policy-mapping-inhibit is set, then the | ||||
| initial value is 0, otherwise the initial value is n+1. | ||||
| (g) working_public_key_algorithm: the digital signature algorithm | ||||
| used to verify the signature of a certificate. The | ||||
| working_public_key_algorithm is initialized from the trusted | ||||
| public key algorithm provided in the trust anchor information. | ||||
| (h) working_public_key: the public key used to verify the | ||||
| signature of a certificate. The working_public_key is initialized | ||||
| from the trusted public key provided in the trust anchor | ||||
| information. | ||||
| (i) working_public_key_parameters: parameters associated with the | ||||
| current public key, that may be required to verify a signature | ||||
| (depending upon the algorithm). The working_public_key_parameters | ||||
| variable is initialized from the trusted public key parameters | ||||
| provided in the trust anchor information. | ||||
| (j) working_issuer_name: the issuer distinguished name expected | ||||
| in the next certificate in the chain. The working_issuer_name is | ||||
| initialized to the trusted issuer provided in the trust anchor | ||||
| information. | ||||
| (k) max_path_length: this integer is initialized to n, is | ||||
| decremented for each non-self-issued certificate in the path, and | ||||
| may be reduced to the value in the path length constraint field | ||||
| within the basic constraints extension of a CA certificate. | ||||
| Upon completion of the initialization steps, perform the basic | ||||
| certificate processing steps specified in 6.1.3. | ||||
| 6.1.3 Basic Certificate Processing | ||||
| The basic path processing actions to be performed for certificate i | ||||
| (for all i in [1..n]) are listed below. | ||||
| (a) Verify the basic certificate information. The certificate | ||||
| MUST satisfy each of the following: | ||||
| (1) The certificate was signed with the | ||||
| working_public_key_algorithm using the working_public_key and | ||||
| the working_public_key_parameters. | ||||
| (2) The certificate validity period includes the current time. | ||||
| (3) At the current time, the certificate is not revoked and is | ||||
| not on hold status. This may be determined by obtaining the | ||||
| appropriate CRL (section 6.3), status information, or by out- | ||||
| of-band mechanisms. | ||||
| (4) The certificate issuer name is the working_issuer_name. | ||||
| (b) If certificate i is self-issued and it is not the final | ||||
| certificate in the path, skip this step for certificate i. | ||||
| Otherwise, verify that the subject name is within one of the | ||||
| permitted_subtrees for X.500 distinguished names, and verify that | ||||
| each of the alternative names in the subjectAltName extension | ||||
| (critical or non-critical) is within one of the permitted_subtrees | ||||
| for that name type. | ||||
| (c) If certificate i is self-issued and it is not the final | ||||
| certificate in the path, skip this step for certificate i. | ||||
| Otherwise, verify that the subject name is not within one of the | ||||
| excluded_subtrees for X.500 distinguished names, and verify that | ||||
| each of the alternative names in the subjectAltName extension | ||||
| (critical or non-critical) is not within one of the | ||||
| excluded_subtrees for that name type. | ||||
| (d) If the certificate policies extension is present in the | ||||
| certificiate and the valid_policy_tree is not NULL, process the | ||||
| policy information by performing the following steps in order: | ||||
| (1) For each policy P not equal to any-policy in the | ||||
| certificate policies extension, let P-OID denote the OID in | ||||
| policy P and P-Q denote the qualifier set for policy P. | ||||
| Perform the following steps in order: | ||||
| (i) If the valid_policy_tree includes a node of depth i-1 | ||||
| where P-OID is in the expected_policy_set, create a child | ||||
| node as follows: set the valid_policy to OID-P; set the | ||||
| qualifier_set to P-Q, and set the expected_policy_set to {P- | ||||
| OID}. | ||||
| For example, consider a valid_policy_tree with a node of | ||||
| depth i-1 where the expected_policy_set is {Gold, White}. | ||||
| Assume the certificate policies Gold and Silver appear in | ||||
| the certificate policies extension of certificate i. The | ||||
| Gold policy is matched but the Silver policy is not. This | ||||
| rule will generate a child node of depth i for the Gold | ||||
| policy. The result is shown as Figure 4. | ||||
| |-----------------| | ||||
| | Red | | ||||
| |-----------------| | ||||
| | {} | | ||||
| |-----------------| node of depth i-1 | ||||
| | FALSE | | ||||
| |-----------------| | ||||
| | {Gold, White} | | ||||
| |-----------------| | ||||
| | | ||||
| | | ||||
| | | ||||
| V | ||||
| |-----------------| | ||||
| | Gold | | ||||
| |-----------------| | ||||
| | {} | | ||||
| |-----------------| node of depth i | ||||
| | uninitialized | | ||||
| |-----------------| | ||||
| | {Gold} | | ||||
| |-----------------| | ||||
| Figure 4. Processing an exact match | ||||
| (ii) If there was no match in step (i) and the | ||||
| valid_policy_tree includes a node of depth i-1 with the | ||||
| valid policy any-policy, generate a child node with the | ||||
| following values: set the valid_policy to P-OID; set the | ||||
| qualifier_set to P-Q, and set the expected_policy_set to {P- | ||||
| OID}. | ||||
| For example, consider a valid_policy_tree with a node of | ||||
| depth i-1 where the valid_policy is any-policy. Assume the | ||||
| certificate policies Gold and Silver appear in the | ||||
| certificate policies extension of certificate i. The Gold | ||||
| policy does not have a qualifier, but the Silver policy has | ||||
| the qualifier Q-Silver. If Gold and Silver were not matched | ||||
| in (i) above, this rule will generate two child nodes of | ||||
| depth i, one for each policy. The result is shown as Figure | ||||
| 5. | ||||
| |-----------------| | ||||
| | any-policy | | ||||
| |-----------------| | ||||
| | {} | | ||||
| |-----------------| node of depth i-1 | ||||
| | FALSE | | ||||
| |-----------------| | ||||
| | {any-policy} | | ||||
| |-----------------| | ||||
| / \ | ||||
| / \ | ||||
| / \ | ||||
| / \ | ||||
| |-----------------| |-----------------| | ||||
| | Gold | | Silver | | ||||
| |-----------------| |-----------------| | ||||
| | {} | | {Q-Silver} | | ||||
| |-----------------| nodes of |-----------------| | ||||
| | uninitialized | depth i | uninitialized | | ||||
| |-----------------| |-----------------| | ||||
| | {Gold} | | {Silver} | | ||||
| |-----------------| |-----------------| | ||||
| Figure 5. Processing unmatched policies when a leaf node | ||||
| specifies any-policy | ||||
| (2) If the certificate policies extension includes the policy | ||||
| anyPolicy with the qualifier set AP-Q and inhibit_any-policy is | ||||
| greater than 0, then: | ||||
| For each node in the valid_policy_tree of depth i-1, for each | ||||
| value in the expected_policy_set (including any-policy) that | ||||
| does not appear in a child node, create a child node with the | ||||
| following values: set the valid_policy to the value from the | ||||
| expected_policy_set in the parent node; set the qualifier_set | ||||
| to AP-Q, and set the expected_policy_set to the value in the | ||||
| valid_policy from this node. | ||||
| For example, consider a valid_policy_tree with a node of depth | ||||
| i-1 where the expected_policy_set = {Gold, Silver}. Assume | ||||
| any-policy appears in the certificate policies extension of | ||||
| certificate i, but Gold and Silver do not. This rule will | ||||
| generate two child nodes of depth i, one for each policy. The | ||||
| result is shown below as Figure 6. | ||||
| |-----------------| | ||||
| | Red | | ||||
| |-----------------| | ||||
| | {} | | ||||
| |-----------------| node of depth i-1 | ||||
| | FALSE | | ||||
| |-----------------| | ||||
| | {Gold, Silver} | | ||||
| |-----------------| | ||||
| / \ | ||||
| / \ | ||||
| / \ | ||||
| / \ | ||||
| |-----------------| |-----------------| | ||||
| | Gold | | Silver | | ||||
| |-----------------| |-----------------| | ||||
| | {} | | {} | | ||||
| |-----------------| nodes of |-----------------| | ||||
| | uninitialized | depth i | uninitialized | | ||||
| |-----------------| |-----------------| | ||||
| | {Gold} | | {Silver} | | ||||
| |-----------------| |-----------------| | ||||
| Figure 6. Processing unmatched policies when the certificate | ||||
| policies extension specifies any-policy | ||||
| (3) If there is a node in the valid_policy_tree of depth i-1 | ||||
| or less without any child nodes, delete that node. Repeat this | ||||
| step until there are no nodes of depth i-1 or less without | ||||
| children. | ||||
| For example, consider the valid_policy_tree shown in Figure 7 | ||||
| below. The two nodes at depth i-1 that are marked with an 'X' | ||||
| have no children, and are deleted. Applying this rule to the | ||||
| resulting tree will cause the node at depth i-2 that is marked | ||||
| with an 'Y' to be deleted. The following application of the | ||||
| rule does not cause any nodes to be deleted, and this step is | ||||
| complete. | ||||
| +-----------+ | ||||
| | | node of depth i-3 | ||||
| +-----------+ | ||||
| / | \ | ||||
| / | \ | ||||
| / | \ | ||||
| +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ | ||||
| | | | | | Y | nodes of | ||||
| +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ depth i-2 | ||||
| / \ | | | ||||
| / \ | | | ||||
| / \ | | | ||||
| +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ nodes of | ||||
| | | | X | | | | X | depth | ||||
| +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ i-1 | ||||
| | / | \ | ||||
| | / | \ | ||||
| | / | \ | ||||
| +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ nodes of | ||||
| | | | | | | | | depth | ||||
| +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ i | ||||
| Figure 7. Pruning the valid_policy_tree | ||||
| (4) If the certificate policies extension was marked as | ||||
| critical, set the criticality_indicator in all nodes of depth i | ||||
| to TRUE. If the certificate policies extension was not marked | ||||
| critical, set the criticality_indicator in all nodes of depth i | ||||
| to FALSE. | ||||
| (e) If the certificate policies extension is not present, set the | ||||
| valid_policy_tree to NULL. | ||||
| (f) Verify that either explicit_policy is greater than 0 or the | ||||
| valid_policy_tree is not equal to NULL; | ||||
| If any of steps (a), (b), (c), or (f) fails, the procedure | ||||
| terminates, returning a failure indication and an appropriate reason. | ||||
| If i is not equal to n, continue by performing the preparatory steps | ||||
| listed in 6.1.4. If i is equal to n, perform the wrap-up steps | ||||
| listed in 6.1.5. | ||||
| 6.1.4 Preparation for Certificate i+1 | ||||
| To prepare for processing of certificate i+1, perform the following | ||||
| steps for certificate i: | ||||
| (a) If a policy mapping extension is present, verify that the | ||||
| special value any-policy does not appear as an issuerDomainPolicy | ||||
| or a subjectDomainPolicy. | ||||
| (b) If a policy mapping extension is present, then for each | ||||
| issuerDomainPolicy ID-P in the policy mapping extension: | ||||
| (1) If the policy_mapping variable is greater than 0, for each | ||||
| node in the valid_policy_tree of depth i where ID-P is the | ||||
| valid_policy, set expected_policy_set to the set of | ||||
| subjectDomainPolicy values that are specified as equivalent to | ||||
| ID-P by the policy mapping extension. | ||||
| If no node of depth i in the valid_policy_tree has a | ||||
| valid_policy of ID-P but there is a node of depth i with a | ||||
| valid_policy of any-policy, then generate a child node of the | ||||
| node of depth i-1 that has a valid_policy of any-policy as | ||||
| follows: | ||||
| (i) set the valid_policy to ID-P; | ||||
| (ii) set the qualifier_set to the qualifier set of the | ||||
| policy any-policy in the certificate policies extension of | ||||
| certificate i; | ||||
| (iii) set the criticality_indicator to the criticality of | ||||
| the certificate policies extension of certificate i; | ||||
| (iv) and set the expected_policy_set to the set of | ||||
| subjectDomainPolicy values that are specified as equivalent | ||||
| to ID-P by the policy mappings extension. | ||||
| (2) If the policy_mapping variable is equal to 0: | ||||
| (i) delete each node of depth i in the valid_policy_tree | ||||
| where ID-P is the valid_policy. | ||||
| (ii) If there is a node in the valid_policy_tree of depth | ||||
| i-1 or less without any child nodes, delete that node. | ||||
| Repeat this step until there are no nodes of depth i-1 or | ||||
| less without children. | ||||
| (c) Assign the certificate subject name to working_issuer_name. | ||||
| (d) Assign the certificate subjectPublicKey to | ||||
| working_public_key. | ||||
| (e) If the subjectPublicKeyInfo field of the certificate contains | ||||
| an algorithm field with non-null parameters, assign the parameters | ||||
| to the working_public_key_parameters variable. | ||||
| If the subjectPublicKeyInfo field of the certificate contains an | ||||
| algorithm field with null parameters or parameters are omitted, | ||||
| compare the certificate subjectPublicKey algorithm to the | ||||
| working_public_key_algorithm. If the certificate subjectPublicKey | ||||
| algorithm and the working_public_key_algorithm are different, set | ||||
| the working_public_key_parameters to null. | ||||
| (f) Assign the certificate subjectPublicKey algorithm to the | ||||
| working_public_key_algorithm variable. | ||||
| (g) If a name constraints extension is included in the | ||||
| certificate, modify the permitted_subtrees and excluded_subtrees | ||||
| state variables as follows: | ||||
| (1) If permittedSubtrees is present in the certificate, set | ||||
| the permitted_subtrees state variable to the intersection of | ||||
| its previous value and the value indicated in the extension | ||||
| field. If permittedSubtrees does not include a particular name | ||||
| type, the permitted_subtrees state variable is unchanged for | ||||
| that name type. For example, the intersection of the name | ||||
| spaces nist.gov and csrc.nist.gov is csrc.nist.gov. And, the | ||||
| intersection of nist.gov and rsasecurity.com is the empty set. | ||||
| (2) If excludedSubtrees is present in the certificate, set the | ||||
| excluded_subtrees state variable to the union of its previous | ||||
| value and the value indicated in the extension field. If | ||||
| excludedSubtrees does not include a particular name type, the | ||||
| excluded_subtrees state variable is unchanged for that name | ||||
| type. For example, the union of the name spaces nist.gov and | ||||
| csrc.nist.gov is nist.gov. And, the union of nist.gov and | ||||
| rsasecurity.com is both name spaces. | ||||
| (h) If the issuer and subject names are not identical: | ||||
| (1) If explicit_policy is not 0, decrement explicit_policy by | ||||
| 1. | ||||
| (2) If policy_mapping is not 0, decrement policy_mapping by 1. | ||||
| (3) If inhibit_any-policy is not 0, decrement inhibit_any- | ||||
| policy by 1. | ||||
| (i) If a policy constraints extension is included in the | ||||
| certificate, modify the explicit_policy and policy_mapping state | ||||
| variables as follows: | ||||
| (1) If requireExplicitPolicy is present and is less than | ||||
| explicit_policy, set explicit_policy to the value of | ||||
| requireExplicitPolicy. | ||||
| (2) If inhibitPolicyMapping is present and is less than | ||||
| policy_mapping, set policy_mapping to the value of | ||||
| inhibitPolicyMapping. | ||||
| (j) If the inhibitAnyPolicy extension is included in the | ||||
| certificate and is less than inhibit_any-policy, set inhibit_any- | ||||
| policy to the value of inhibitAnyPolicy. | ||||
| (k) Verify that the certificate is a CA certificate (as specified | ||||
| in a basicConstraints extension or as verified out-of-band). | ||||
| (l) If the certificate was not self-issued, verify that | ||||
| max_path_length is greater than zero and decrement max_path_length | ||||
| by 1. | ||||
| (m) If pathLengthConstraint is present in the certificate and is | ||||
| less than max_path_length, set max_path_length to the value of | ||||
| pathLengthConstraint. | ||||
| (n) If a key usage extension is present, verify that the | ||||
| keyCertSign bit is set. | ||||
| (o) Recognize and process any other critical extension present in | ||||
| the certificate. Process any other recognized non-critical | ||||
| extension present in the certificate. | ||||
| If check (a), (k), (l), (n) or (o) fails, the procedure terminates, | ||||
| returning a failure indication and an appropriate reason. | ||||
| If (a), (k), (l), (n) and (o) have completed successfully, increment | ||||
| i and perform the basic certificate processing specified in 6.1.3. | ||||
| 6.1.5 Wrap-up procedure | ||||
| To complete the processing of the end entity certificate, perform the | ||||
| following steps for certificate n: | ||||
| (a) If certificate n was not self-issued and explicit_policy is | ||||
| not 0, decrement explicit_policy by 1. | ||||
| (b) If a policy constraints extension is included in the | ||||
| certificate and requireExplicitPolicy is present and has a value | ||||
| of 0, set the explicit_policy state variable to 0. | ||||
| (c) Assign the certificate subjectPublicKey to | ||||
| working_public_key. | ||||
| (d) If the subjectPublicKeyInfo field of the certificate contains | ||||
| an algorithm field with non-null parameters, assign the parameters | ||||
| to the working_public_key_parameters variable. | ||||
| If the subjectPublicKeyInfo field of the certificate contains an | ||||
| algorithm field with null parameters or parameters are omitted, | ||||
| compare the certificate subjectPublicKey algorithm to the | ||||
| working_public_key_algorithm. If the certificate subjectPublicKey | ||||
| algorithm and the working_public_key_algorithm are different, set | ||||
| the working_public_key_parameters to null. | ||||
| (e) Assign the certificate subjectPublicKey algorithm to the | ||||
| working_public_key_algorithm variable. | ||||
| (f) Recognize and process any other critical extension present in | ||||
| the certificate n. Process any other recognized non-critical | ||||
| extension present in certificate n. | ||||
| (g) Calculate the intersection of the valid_policy_tree and the | ||||
| user-initial-policy-set, as follows: | ||||
| (i) If the valid_policy_tree is NULL, the intersection is | ||||
| NULL. | ||||
| (ii) If the valid_policy_tree is not NULL and the user- | ||||
| initial-policy-set is any-policy, the intersection is the | ||||
| entire valid_policy_tree. | ||||
| (iii) If the valid_policy_tree is not NULL and the user- | ||||
| initial-policy-set is not any-policy, calculate the | ||||
| intersection of the valid_policy_tree and the user-initial- | ||||
| policy-set as follows: | ||||
| 1. Determine the set of policy nodes whose parent nodes | ||||
| have a valid_policy of any-policy. This is the | ||||
| valid_policy_node_set. | ||||
| 2. If the valid_policy of any node in the | ||||
| valid_policy_node_set is not in the user-initial-policy-set | ||||
| and is not any-policy, delete this node and all its | ||||
| children. | ||||
| 3. If there is a node in the valid_policy_tree of depth n-1 | ||||
| or less without any child nodes, delete that node. Repeat | ||||
| this step until there are no nodes of depth n-1 or less | ||||
| without children. | ||||
| If either (1) the value of explicit_policy variable is greater than | ||||
| zero, or (2) the valid_policy_tree is not NULL, then path processing | ||||
| has succeeded. | ||||
| 6.1.6 Outputs | ||||
| If path processing succeeds, the procedure terminates, returning a | ||||
| success indication together with final value of the | ||||
| valid_policy_tree, the working_public_key, the | ||||
| working_public_key_algorithm, and the working_public_key_parameters. | ||||
| 6.2 Using the Path Validation Algorithm | ||||
| The path validation algorithm describes the process of validating a | ||||
| single certification path. While each certification path begins with | ||||
| a specific trust anchor, there is no requirement that all | ||||
| certification paths validated by a particular system share a single | ||||
| trust anchor. An implementation that supports multiple trust anchors | ||||
| MAY augment the algorithm presented in section 6.1 to further limit | ||||
| the set of valid certification paths which begin with a particular | ||||
| trust anchor. For example, an implementation MAY modify the | ||||
| algorithm to apply name constraints to a specific trust anchor during | ||||
| the initialization phase, or the application MAY require the presence | ||||
| of a particular alternative name form in the end entity certificate, | ||||
| or the application MAY impose requirements on application-specific | ||||
| extensions. Thus, the path validation algorithm presented in section | ||||
| 6.1 defines the minimum conditions for a path to be considered valid. | ||||
| The selection of one or more trusted CAs is a local decision. A | ||||
| system may provide any one of its trusted CAs as the trust anchor for | ||||
| a particular path. The inputs to the path validation algorithm may | ||||
| be different for each path. The inputs used to process a path may | ||||
| reflect application-specific requirements or limitations in the trust | ||||
| accorded a particular trust anchor. For example, a trusted CA may | ||||
| only be trusted for a particular certificate policy. This | ||||
| restriction can be expressed through the inputs to the path | ||||
| validation procedure. | ||||
| It is also possible to specify an extended version of the above | ||||
| certification path processing procedure which results in default | ||||
| behavior identical to the rules of PEM [RFC 1422]. In this extended | ||||
| version, additional inputs to the procedure are a list of one or more | ||||
| Policy Certification Authority (PCA) names and an indicator of the | ||||
| position in the certification path where the PCA is expected. At the | ||||
| nominated PCA position, the CA name is compared against this list. | ||||
| If a recognized PCA name is found, then a constraint of | ||||
| SubordinateToCA is implicitly assumed for the remainder of the | ||||
| certification path and processing continues. If no valid PCA name is | ||||
| found, and if the certification path cannot be validated on the basis | ||||
| of identified policies, then the certification path is considered | ||||
| invalid. | ||||
| 6.3 CRL Validation | ||||
| This section describes the steps necessary to determine if a | ||||
| certificate is revoked or on hold status when CRLs are the revocation | ||||
| mechanism used by the certificate issuer. Conforming implementations | ||||
| that support CRLs are not required to implement this algorithm, but | ||||
| they MUST be functionally equivalent to the external behavior | ||||
| resulting from this procedure. Any algorithm may be used by a | ||||
| particular implementation so long as it derives the correct result. | ||||
| This algorithm assumes that all of the needed CRLs are available in a | ||||
| local cache. Further, if the next update time of a CRL has passed, | ||||
| the algorithm assumes a mechanism to fetch a current CRL and place it | ||||
| in the local CRL cache. | ||||
| This algorithm defines a set of inputs, a set of state variables, and | ||||
| processing steps that are performed for each certificate in the path. | ||||
| The algorithm output is the revocation status of the certificate. | ||||
| 6.3.1 Revocation Inputs | ||||
| To support revocation processing, the algorithm requires two inputs: | ||||
| (a) certificate: The algorithm requires the certificate serial | ||||
| number and issuer name to determine whether a certificate is on a | ||||
| particular CRL. The basicConstraints extension is used to | ||||
| determine whether the supplied certificate is associated with a CA | ||||
| or an end entity. If present, the algorithm uses the | ||||
| cRLDistributionsPoint and freshestCRL extensions to determine | ||||
| revocation status. | ||||
| (b) use-deltas: This boolean input determines whether delta CRLs | ||||
| are applied to CRLs. | ||||
| Note that implementations supporting legacy PKIs, such as RFC 1422 | ||||
| and X.509 version 1, will need an additional input indicating | ||||
| whether the supplied certificate is associated with a CA or an end | ||||
| entity. | ||||
| 6.3.2 Initialization and Revocation State Variables | ||||
| To support CRL processing, the algorithm requires the following state | ||||
| variables: | ||||
| (a) reasons_mask: This variable contains the set of revocation | ||||
| reasons supported by the CRLs and delta CRLs processed so far. | ||||
| The legal members of the set are the possible revocation reason | ||||
| values: unspecified, keyCompromise, caCompromise, | ||||
| affiliationChanged, superseded, cessationOfOperation, | ||||
| certificateHold, privilegeWithdrawn, and aACompromise. The | ||||
| special value all-reasons is used to denote the set of all legal | ||||
| members. This variable is initialized to the empty set. | ||||
| (b) cert_status: This variable contains the status of the | ||||
| certificate. This variable may be assigned one of the following | ||||
| values: unspecified, keyCompromise, caCompromise, | ||||
| affiliationChanged, superseded, cessationOfOperation, | ||||
| certificateHold, removeFromCRL, privilegeWithdrawn, aACompromise, | ||||
| the special value UNREVOKED, or the special value UNDETERMINED. | ||||
| This variable is initialized to the special value UNREVOKED. | ||||
| (c) interim_reasons_mask: This contains the set of revocation | ||||
| reasons supported by the CRL or delta CRL currently being | ||||
| processed. | ||||
| Note: In some environments, it is not necessary to check all reason | ||||
| codes. For example, some environments are only concerned with | ||||
| caCompromise and keyCompromise for CA certificates. This algorithm | ||||
| checks all reason codes. Additional processing and state variables | ||||
| may be necessary to limit the checking to a subset of the reason | ||||
| codes. | ||||
| 6.3.3 CRL Processing | ||||
| This algorithm begins by assuming the certificate is not revoked. | ||||
| The algorithm checks one or more CRLs until either the certificate | ||||
| status is determined to be revoked or sufficient CRLs have been | ||||
| checked to cover all reason codes. | ||||
| For each distribution point (DP) in the certificate CRL distribution | ||||
| points extension, for each corresponding CRL in the local CRL cache, | ||||
| while ((reasons_mask is not all-reasons) and | ||||
| (cert_status is UNREVOKED)) perform the following: | ||||
| (a) Update the local CRL cache by obtaining a complete CRL, a | ||||
| delta CRL, or both, as required: | ||||
| (1) If the current time is after the value of the CRL next | ||||
| update field, then do one of the following: | ||||
| (i) If use-deltas is set and either the certificate or the | ||||
| CRL contains the freshest CRL extension, obtain a delta CRL | ||||
| with the a next update value that is after the current time | ||||
| and can be used to update the locally cached CRL as | ||||
| specified in section 5.2.4. | ||||
| (ii) Update the local CRL cache with a current complete | ||||
| CRL, verify that the current time is before the next update | ||||
| value in the new CRL, and continue processing with the new | ||||
| CRL. If use-deltas is set, then obtain the current delta | ||||
| CRL that can be used to update the new locally cached | ||||
| complete CRL as specified in section 5.2.4. | ||||
| (2) If the current time is before the value of the next update | ||||
| field and use-deltas is set, then obtain the current delta CRL | ||||
| that can be used to update the locally cached complete CRL as | ||||
| specified in section 5.2.4. | ||||
| (b) Verify the issuer and scope of the complete CRL as follows: | ||||
| (1) If the DP includes cRLIssuer, then verify that the issuer | ||||
| field in the complete CRL matches cRLIssuer in the DP and that | ||||
| the complete CRL contains an issuing distribution point | ||||
| extension with the indrectCRL boolean asserted. Otherwise, | ||||
| verify that the CRL issuer matches the certificate issuer. | ||||
| (2) If the complete CRL includes an issuing distribution point | ||||
| (IDP) CRL extension check the following: | ||||
| (i) If the distribution point name is present in the IDP | ||||
| CRL extension and the distribution field is present in the | ||||
| DP, then verify that one of the names in the IDP matches one | ||||
| of the names in the DP. If the distribution point name is | ||||
| present in the IDP CRL extension and the distribution field | ||||
| is omitted from the DP, then verify that one of the names in | ||||
| the IDP matches one of the names in the cRLIssuer field of | ||||
| the DP. | ||||
| (ii) If the onlyContainsUserCerts boolean is asserted in | ||||
| the IDP CRL extension, verify that the certificate does not | ||||
| include the basic constraints extension with the cA boolean | ||||
| asserted. | ||||
| (iii) If the onlyContainsCACerts boolean is asserted in the | ||||
| IDP CRL extension, verify that the certificate includes the | ||||
| basic constraints extension with the cA boolean asserted. | ||||
| (iv) Verify that the onlyContainsAttributeCerts boolean is | ||||
| not asserted. | ||||
| (c) If use-deltas is set, verify the issuer and scope of the | ||||
| delta CRL as follows: | ||||
| (1) Verify that the delta CRL issuer matches complete CRL | ||||
| issuer. | ||||
| (2) If the complete CRL includes an issuing distribution point | ||||
| (IDP) CRL extension, verify that the delta CRL contains a | ||||
| matching IDP CRL extension. If the complete CRL omits an IDP | ||||
| CRL extension, verify that the delta CRL also omits an IDP CRL | ||||
| extension. | ||||
| (3) Verify that the delta CRL authority key identifier | ||||
| extension matches complete CRL authority key identifier | ||||
| extension. | ||||
| (d) Compute the interim_reasons_mask for this CRL as follows: | ||||
| (1) If the issuing distribution point (IDP) CRL extension is | ||||
| present and includes onlySomeReasons and the DP includes | ||||
| reasons, then set interim_reasons_mask to the intersection of | ||||
| reasons in the DP and onlySomeReasons in IDP CRL extension. | ||||
| (2) If the IDP CRL extension includes onlySomeReasons but the | ||||
| DP omits reasons, then set interim_reasons_mask to the value of | ||||
| onlySomeReasons in IDP CRL extension. | ||||
| (3) If the IDP CRL extension is not present or omits | ||||
| onlySomeReasons but the DP includes reasons, then set | ||||
| interim_reasons_mask to the value of DP reasons. | ||||
| (4) If the IDP CRL extension is not present or omits | ||||
| onlySomeReasons and the DP omits reasons, then set | ||||
| interim_reasons_mask to the special value all-reasons. | ||||
| (e) Verify that interim_reasons_mask includes one or more reasons | ||||
| that is not included in the reasons_mask. | ||||
| (f) Obtain and validate the certification path for the complete | ||||
| CRL issuer. | ||||
| (g) Validate the signature on the complete CRL using the public | ||||
| key validated in step (f). | ||||
| (h) If use-deltas is set, then validate the signature on the | ||||
| delta CRL using the public key validated in step (f). | ||||
| (i) If use-deltas is set, then search for the certificate on the | ||||
| delta CRL. If an entry is found that matches the certificate | ||||
| issuer and serial number as described in section 5.3.4, then set | ||||
| the cert_status variable to the indicated reason as follows: | ||||
| (1) If the reason code CRL entry extension is present, set the | ||||
| cert_status variable to the value of the reason code CRL entry | ||||
| extension. | ||||
| (2) If the reason code CRL entry extension is not present, set | ||||
| the cert_status variable to the value unspecified. | ||||
| (j) If (cert_status is UNREVOKED), then search for the | ||||
| certificate on the complete CRL. If an entry is found that | ||||
| matches the certificate issuer and serial number as described in | ||||
| section 5.3.4, then set the cert_status variable to the indicated | ||||
| reason as described in step (i). | ||||
| (k) If (cert_status is removeFromCRL), then set cert_status to | ||||
| UNREVOKED. | ||||
| If ((reasons_mask is all-reasons) OR (cert_status is not UNREVOKED)), | ||||
| then the revocation status has been determined, so return | ||||
| cert_status. | ||||
| If the revocation status has not been determined, repeat the process | ||||
| above with any available CRLs not specified in a distribution point | ||||
| but issued by the certificate issuer. For the processing of such a | ||||
| CRL, assume a DP with both the reasons and the cRLIssuer fields | ||||
| omitted and a distribution point name of the certificate issuer. | ||||
| That is, the sequence of names in fullName is generated from the | ||||
| certificate issuer field as well as the certificate issuerAltName | ||||
| extension. If the revocation status remains undetermined, then | ||||
| return the cert_status UNDETERMINED. | ||||
| 7 References | ||||
| [ISO 10646] ISO/IEC 10646-1:1993. International Standard -- | ||||
| Information technology -- Universal Multiple-Octet Coded | ||||
| Character Set (UCS) -- Part 1: Architecture and Basic | ||||
| Multilingual Plane. | ||||
| [RFC 791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", RFC 791, | ||||
| September 1981. | ||||
| [RFC 822] Crocker, D., "Standard for the format of ARPA Internet | ||||
| text messages", RFC 822, August 1982. | ||||
| [RFC 1034] Mockapetris, P.V., "Domain names - concepts and | ||||
| facilities", RFC 1034, November 1987. | ||||
| [RFC 1422] Kent, S., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic | ||||
| Mail: Part II: Certificate-Based Key Management," | ||||
| RFC 1422, February 1993. | ||||
| [RFC 1423] Balenson, D., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet | ||||
| Electronic Mail: Part III: Algorithms, Modes, and | ||||
| Identifiers," RFC 1423, February 1993. | ||||
| [RFC 1510] Kohl, J., and C. Neuman, "The Kerberos Network | ||||
| Authentication Service (V5)," RFC 1510, September 1993. | ||||
| [RFC 1519] Fuller, V., T. Li, J. Yu, and K. Varadhan, "Classless | ||||
| Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR): An Address Assignment and | ||||
| Aggregation Strategy", RFC 1519, September 1993. | ||||
| [RFC 1738] Berners-Lee, T., L. Masinter, and M. McCahill, | ||||
| "Uniform Resource Locators (URL)", RFC 1738, | ||||
| December 1994. | ||||
| [RFC 1778] Howes, T., S. Kille, W. Yeong, and C. Robbins, "The | ||||
| String Representation of Standard Attribute Syntaxes," | ||||
| RFC 1778, March 1995. | ||||
| [RFC 1883] Deering, S., and R. Hinden. "Internet Protocol, | ||||
| Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", RFC 1883, December | ||||
| 1995. | ||||
| [RFC 2044] F. Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of | ||||
| Unicode and ISO 10646", RFC 2044, October 1996. | ||||
| [RFC 2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate | ||||
| Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997. | ||||
| [RFC 2247] Kille, S., M. Wahl, A. Grimstad, R. Huber, and | ||||
| S. Sataluri, "Using Domains in LDAP/X.500 | ||||
| Distinguished Names", RFC 2247, January 1998. | ||||
| [RFC 2252] Wahl, M., A. Coulbeck, T. Howes, and S. Kille, | ||||
| "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (v3): | ||||
| Attribute Syntax Definitions", RFC 2252, | ||||
| December 1997. | ||||
| [RFC 2277] Alvestrand, H., "IETF Policy on Character Sets and | ||||
| Languages", January 1998. | ||||
| [RFC 2279] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of | ||||
| ISO 10646", RFC 2279, January 1998. | ||||
| [RFC 2459] Housley, R., W. Ford, W. Polk, and D. Solo, "Internet | ||||
| X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certificate and CRL | ||||
| Profile", RFC 2459, January 1999. | ||||
| [RFC 2560] Myers, M., R. Ankney, A. Malpani, S. Galperin, and | ||||
| C. Adams, "Online Certificate Status Protocal - OCSP", | ||||
| June 1999. | ||||
| [SDN.701] SDN.701, "Message Security Protocol 4.0", Revision A, | ||||
| 1997-02-06. | ||||
| [X.208] CCITT Recommendation X.208: Specification of Abstract | ||||
| Syntax Notation One (ASN.1), 1988. | ||||
| [X.501] ITU-T Recommendation X.501: Information | ||||
| Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The | ||||
| Directory: Models, 1993. | ||||
| [X.509] ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (1997 E): Information | ||||
| Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The | ||||
| Directory: Authentication Framework, June 1997. | ||||
| [X.520] ITU-T Recommendation X.520: Information | ||||
| Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The | ||||
| Directory: Selected Attribute Types, 1993. | ||||
| [X.660] ITU-T Recommendation X.660 Information | ||||
| Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - | ||||
| Procedures for the operation of OSI | ||||
| Registration Authorities: General procedures, 1992. | ||||
| [X9.55] ANSI X9.55-1995, Public Key Cryptography For The | ||||
| Financial Services Industry: Extensions To Public | ||||
| Key Certificates And Certificate Revocation Lists, | ||||
| 8 December, 1995. | ||||
| [PKIXALGS] Bassham, L., R. Housley, and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 | ||||
| Public Key Infrastructure Representation of Public Keys | ||||
| and Digital Signatures," | ||||
| draft-ietf-pkix-ipki-pkalgs-02.txt, March 2001. | ||||
| [PKIXTSA] Cain, P., D. Pinkas, and R. Zuccherato, "Internet | ||||
| X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time Stamp Protocol," | ||||
| draft-ietf-pkix-time-stamp-13.txt, January 2001. | ||||
| 8 Intellectual Property Rights | ||||
| The IETF has been notified of intellectual property rights claimed in | ||||
| regard to some or all of the specification contained in this | ||||
| document. For more information consult the online list of claimed | ||||
| rights (see http://www.ietf.org/ipr.html). | ||||
| The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any | ||||
| intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to | ||||
| pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in | ||||
| this document or the extent to which any license under such rights | ||||
| might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it | ||||
| has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the | ||||
| IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and | ||||
| standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of | ||||
| claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of | ||||
| licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to | ||||
| obtain a general license or permission for the use of such | ||||
| proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can | ||||
| be obtained from the IETF Secretariat. | ||||
| 9 Security Considerations | ||||
| The majority of this specification is devoted to the format and | ||||
| content of certificates and CRLs. Since certificates and CRLs are | ||||
| digitally signed, no additional integrity service is necessary. | ||||
| Neither certificates nor CRLs need be kept secret, and unrestricted | ||||
| and anonymous access to certificates and CRLs has no security | ||||
| implications. | ||||
| However, security factors outside the scope of this specification | ||||
| will affect the assurance provided to certificate users. This | ||||
| section highlights critical issues to be considered by implementers, | ||||
| administrators, and users. | ||||
| The procedures performed by CAs and RAs to validate the binding of | ||||
| the subject's identity to their public key greatly affect the | ||||
| assurance that ought to be placed in the certificate. Relying | ||||
| parties might wish to review the CA's certificate practice statement. | ||||
| This is particularly important when issuing certificates to other | ||||
| CAs. | ||||
| The use of a single key pair for both signature and other purposes is | ||||
| strongly discouraged. Use of separate key pairs for signature and | ||||
| key management provides several benefits to the users. The | ||||
| ramifications associated with loss or disclosure of a signature key | ||||
| are different from loss or disclosure of a key management key. Using | ||||
| separate key pairs permits a balanced and flexible response. | ||||
| Similarly, different validity periods or key lengths for each key | ||||
| pair may be appropriate in some application environments. | ||||
| Unfortunately, some legacy applications (e.g., SSL) use a single key | ||||
| pair for signature and key management. | ||||
| The protection afforded private keys is a critical security factor. | ||||
| On a small scale, failure of users to protect their private keys will | ||||
| permit an attacker to masquerade as them, or decrypt their personal | ||||
| information. On a larger scale, compromise of a CA's private signing | ||||
| key may have a catastrophic effect. If an attacker obtains the | ||||
| private key unnoticed, the attacker may issue bogus certificates and | ||||
| CRLs. Existence of bogus certificates and CRLs will undermine | ||||
| confidence in the system. If such a compromise is detected, all | ||||
| certificates issued to the compromised CA MUST be revoked, preventing | ||||
| services between its users and users of other CAs. Rebuilding after | ||||
| such a compromise will be problematic, so CAs are advised to | ||||
| implement a combination of strong technical measures (e.g., tamper- | ||||
| resistant cryptographic modules) and appropriate management | ||||
| procedures (e.g., separation of duties) to avoid such an incident. | ||||
| Loss of a CA's private signing key may also be problematic. The CA | ||||
| would not be able to produce CRLs or perform normal key rollover. | ||||
| CAs SHOULD maintain secure backup for signing keys. The security of | ||||
| the key backup procedures is a critical factor in avoiding key | ||||
| compromise. | ||||
| The availability and freshness of revocation information affects the | ||||
| degree of assurance that ought to be placed in a certificate. While | ||||
| certificates expire naturally, events may occur during its natural | ||||
| lifetime which negate the binding between the subject and public key. | ||||
| If revocation information is untimely or unavailable, the assurance | ||||
| associated with the binding is clearly reduced. Relying parties | ||||
| might not be able to process every critical extension that can appear | ||||
| in a CRL. CAs SHOULD take extra care when making revocation | ||||
| information available only through CRLs that contain critical | ||||
| extensions, particularly if support for those extensions is not | ||||
| mandated by this profile. For example, if revocation information is | ||||
| supplied using a combination of delta CRLs and full CRLs, and the | ||||
| delta CRLs are issued more frequently than the full CRLs, then | ||||
| relying parties that cannot handle the critical extensions related to | ||||
| delta CRL processing will not be able to obtain the most recent | ||||
| revocation information. Alternatively, if a full CRL is issued | ||||
| whenever a delta CRL is issued, then timely revocation information | ||||
| will be available to all relying parties. Similarly, implementations | ||||
| of the certification path validation mechanism described in section 6 | ||||
| that omit revocation checking provide less assurance than those that | ||||
| support it. | ||||
| The path validation algorithm depends on the certain knowledge of the | ||||
| public keys (and other information) about one or more trusted CAs. | ||||
| The decision to trust a CA is an important decision as it ultimately | ||||
| determines the trust afforded a certificate. The authenticated | ||||
| distribution of trusted CA public keys (usually in the form of a | ||||
| "self-signed" certificate) is a security critical out-of-band process | ||||
| that is beyond the scope of this specification. | ||||
| In addition, where a key compromise or CA failure occurs for a | ||||
| trusted CA, the user will need to modify the information provided to | ||||
| the path validation routine. Selection of too many trusted CAs makes | ||||
| the trusted CA information difficult to maintain. On the other hand, | ||||
| selection of only one trusted CA could limit users to a closed | ||||
| community of users. | ||||
| The quality of implementations that process certificates also affects | ||||
| the degree of assurance provided. The path validation algorithm | ||||
| described in section 6 relies upon the integrity of the trusted CA | ||||
| information, and especially the integrity of the public keys | ||||
| associated with the trusted CAs. By substituting public keys for | ||||
| which an attacker has the private key, an attacker could trick the | ||||
| user into accepting false certificates. | ||||
| The binding between a key and certificate subject cannot be stronger | ||||
| than the cryptographic module implementation and algorithms used to | ||||
| generate the signature. Short key lengths or weak hash algorithms | ||||
| will limit the utility of a certificate. CAs are encouraged to note | ||||
| advances in cryptology so they can employ strong cryptographic | ||||
| techniques. In addition, CAs SHOULD decline to issue certificates to | ||||
| CAs or end entities that generate weak signatures. | ||||
| Inconsistent application of name comparison rules can result in | ||||
| acceptance of invalid X.509 certification paths, or rejection of | ||||
| valid ones. The X.500 series of specifications defines rules for | ||||
| comparing distinguished names that require comparison of strings | ||||
| without regard to case, character set, multi-character white space | ||||
| substring, or leading and trailing white space. This specification | ||||
| relaxes these requirements, requiring support for binary comparison | ||||
| at a minimum. | ||||
| CAs MUST encode the distinguished name in the subject field of a CA | ||||
| certificate identically to the distinguished name in the issuer field | ||||
| in certificates issued by that CA. If CAs use different encodings, | ||||
| implementations might fail to recognize name chains for paths that | ||||
| include this certificate. As a consequence, valid paths could be | ||||
| rejected. | ||||
| In addition, name constraints for distinguished names MUST be stated | ||||
| identically to the encoding used in the subject field or | ||||
| subjectAltName extension. If not, then name constraints stated as | ||||
| excludedSubTrees will not match and invalid paths will be accepted | ||||
| and name constraints expressed as permittedSubtrees will not match | ||||
| and valid paths will be rejected. To avoid acceptance of invalid | ||||
| paths, CAs SHOULD state name constraints for distinguished names as | ||||
| permittedSubtrees wherever possible. | ||||
| Appendix A. Psuedo-ASN.1 Structures and OIDs | ||||
| This section describes data objects used by conforming PKI components | ||||
| in an "ASN.1-like" syntax. This syntax is a hybrid of the 1988 and | ||||
| 1993 ASN.1 syntaxes. The 1988 ASN.1 syntax is augmented with 1993 | ||||
| UNIVERSAL Types UniversalString, BMPString and UTF8String. | ||||
| The ASN.1 syntax does not permit the inclusion of type statements in | ||||
| the ASN.1 module, and the 1993 ASN.1 standard does not permit use of | ||||
| the new UNIVERSAL types in modules using the 1988 syntax. As a | ||||
| result, this module does not conform to either version of the ASN.1 | ||||
| standard. | ||||
| This appendix may be converted into 1988 ASN.1 by replacing the | ||||
| defintions for the UNIVERSAL Types with the 1988 catch-all "ANY". | ||||
| A.1 Explicitly Tagged Module, 1988 Syntax | ||||
| PKIX1Explicit88 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) | ||||
| security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(18) } | ||||
| DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= | ||||
| BEGIN | ||||
| UniversalString ::= [UNIVERSAL 28] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING | ||||
| -- UniversalString is defined in ASN.1:1993 | ||||
| BMPString ::= [UNIVERSAL 30] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING | ||||
| -- BMPString is the subtype of UniversalString and models | ||||
| -- the Basic Multilingual Plane of ISO/IEC/ITU 10646-1 | ||||
| UTF8String ::= [UNIVERSAL 12] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING | ||||
| -- The content of this type conforms to RFC 2279. | ||||
| id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= | ||||
| { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) | ||||
| security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) } | ||||
| id-pe OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 1 } | ||||
| -- arc for private certificate extensions | ||||
| id-qt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 2 } | ||||
| -- arc for policy qualifier types | ||||
| id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 3 } | ||||
| -- arc for extended key purpose OIDS | ||||
| id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 } | ||||
| -- arc for access descriptors | ||||
| id-qt-cps OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 1 } | ||||
| -- OID for CPS qualifier | ||||
| id-qt-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 2 } | ||||
| -- OID for user notice qualifier | ||||
| id-ad-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 1 } | ||||
| id-ad-caIssuers OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 2 } | ||||
| id-ad-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 3 } | ||||
| id-ad-caRepository OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 5 } | ||||
| Attribute ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| type AttributeType, | ||||
| values SET OF AttributeValue } | ||||
| -- at least one value is required | ||||
| AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER | ||||
| AttributeValue ::= ANY | ||||
| AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| type AttributeType, | ||||
| value AttributeValue } | ||||
| id-at OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 4 } | ||||
| id-at-name AttributeType ::= { id-at 41 } | ||||
| id-at-surname AttributeType ::= { id-at 4 } | ||||
| id-at-givenName AttributeType ::= { id-at 42 } | ||||
| id-at-initials AttributeType ::= { id-at 43 } | ||||
| id-at-generationQualifier AttributeType ::= { id-at 44 } | ||||
| X520name ::= CHOICE { | ||||
| teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-name)), | ||||
| printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-name)), | ||||
| universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-name)), | ||||
| utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-name)), | ||||
| bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..ub-name)) } | ||||
| id-at-commonName AttributeType ::= { id-at 3 } | ||||
| X520CommonName ::= CHOICE { | ||||
| teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), | ||||
| printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), | ||||
| universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), | ||||
| utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), | ||||
| bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)) } | ||||
| id-at-localityName AttributeType ::= { id-at 7 } | ||||
| X520LocalityName ::= CHOICE { | ||||
| teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-locality-name)), | ||||
| printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-locality-name)), | ||||
| universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-locality-name)), | ||||
| utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-locality-name)), | ||||
| bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..ub-locality-name)) } | ||||
| id-at-stateOrProvinceName AttributeType ::= { id-at 8 } | ||||
| X520StateOrProvinceName ::= CHOICE { | ||||
| teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-state-name)), | ||||
| printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-state-name)), | ||||
| universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-state-name)), | ||||
| utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-state-name)), | ||||
| bmpString BMPString (SIZE(1..ub-state-name)) } | ||||
| id-at-organizationName AttributeType ::= { id-at 10 } | ||||
| X520OrganizationName ::= CHOICE { | ||||
| teletexString TeletexString | ||||
| (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name)), | ||||
| printableString PrintableString | ||||
| (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name)), | ||||
| universalString UniversalString | ||||
| (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name)), | ||||
| utf8String UTF8String | ||||
| (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name)), | ||||
| bmpString BMPString | ||||
| (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name)) } | ||||
| id-at-organizationalUnitName AttributeType ::= { id-at 11 } | ||||
| X520OrganizationalUnitName ::= CHOICE { | ||||
| teletexString TeletexString | ||||
| (SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name)), | ||||
| printableString PrintableString | ||||
| (SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name)), | ||||
| universalString UniversalString | ||||
| (SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name)), | ||||
| utf8String UTF8String | ||||
| (SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name)), | ||||
| bmpString BMPString | ||||
| (SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name)) } | ||||
| id-at-title AttributeType ::= { id-at 12 } | ||||
| X520Title ::= CHOICE { | ||||
| teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-title)), | ||||
| printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-title)), | ||||
| universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-title)), | ||||
| utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-title)), | ||||
| bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..ub-title)) } | ||||
| id-at-dnQualifier AttributeType ::= { id-at 46 } | ||||
| X520dnQualifier ::= PrintableString | ||||
| id-at-countryName AttributeType ::= { id-at 6 } | ||||
| X520countryName ::= PrintableString (SIZE (2)) | ||||
| id-at-serialNumber AttributeType ::= { id-at 5 } | ||||
| X520SerialNumber ::= PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-serial-number)) | ||||
| id-at-pseudonym AttributeType ::= { id-at 65 } | ||||
| X520Pseudonym ::= CHOICE { | ||||
| teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-pseudonym)), | ||||
| printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-pseudonym)), | ||||
| universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-pseudonym)), | ||||
| utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-pseudonym)), | ||||
| bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..ub-pseudonym)) } | ||||
| id-domainComponent AttributeType ::= | ||||
| { 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 25 } | ||||
| DomainComponent ::= IA5String | ||||
| pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= | ||||
| { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9 } | ||||
| id-emailAddress AttributeType ::= { pkcs-9 1 } | ||||
| EmailAddress ::= IA5String (SIZE (1..ub-emailaddress-length)) | ||||
| Name ::= CHOICE { -- only one possibility for now -- | ||||
| rdnSequence RDNSequence } | ||||
| RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName | ||||
| DistinguishedName ::= RDNSequence | ||||
| RelativeDistinguishedName ::= | ||||
| SET SIZE (1 .. MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue | ||||
| DirectoryString ::= CHOICE { | ||||
| teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..MAX)), | ||||
| printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..MAX)), | ||||
| universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..MAX)), | ||||
| utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..MAX)), | ||||
| bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..MAX)) } | ||||
| Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| tbsCertificate TBSCertificate, | ||||
| signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, | ||||
| signature BIT STRING } | ||||
| TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| version [0] Version DEFAULT v1, | ||||
| serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber, | ||||
| signature AlgorithmIdentifier, | ||||
| issuer Name, | ||||
| validity Validity, | ||||
| subject Name, | ||||
| subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo, | ||||
| issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, | ||||
| -- If present, version MUST be v2 or v3 | ||||
| subjectUniqueID [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, | ||||
| -- If present, version MUST be v2 or v3 | ||||
| extensions [3] Extensions OPTIONAL | ||||
| -- If present, version MUST be v3 -- } | ||||
| Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } | ||||
| CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER | ||||
| Validity ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| notBefore Time, | ||||
| notAfter Time } | ||||
| Time ::= CHOICE { | ||||
| utcTime UTCTime, | ||||
| generalTime GeneralizedTime } | ||||
| UniqueIdentifier ::= BIT STRING | ||||
| SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, | ||||
| subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } | ||||
| Extensions ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension | ||||
| Extension ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, | ||||
| critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, | ||||
| extnValue OCTET STRING } | ||||
| CertificateList ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| tbsCertList TBSCertList, | ||||
| signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, | ||||
| signature BIT STRING } | ||||
| TBSCertList ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| version Version OPTIONAL, | ||||
| -- if present, MUST be v2 | ||||
| signature AlgorithmIdentifier, | ||||
| issuer Name, | ||||
| thisUpdate Time, | ||||
| nextUpdate Time OPTIONAL, | ||||
| revokedCertificates SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { | ||||
| userCertificate CertificateSerialNumber, | ||||
| revocationDate Time, | ||||
| crlEntryExtensions Extensions OPTIONAL | ||||
| -- if present, MUST be v2 | ||||
| } OPTIONAL, | ||||
| crlExtensions [0] Extensions OPTIONAL | ||||
| -- if present, MUST be v2 -- } | ||||
| AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, | ||||
| parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL } | ||||
| -- contains a value of the type | ||||
| -- registered for use with the | ||||
| -- algorithm object identifier value | ||||
| ORAddress ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| built-in-standard-attributes BuiltInStandardAttributes, | ||||
| built-in-domain-defined-attributes | ||||
| BuiltInDomainDefinedAttributes OPTIONAL, | ||||
| -- see also teletex-domain-defined-attributes | ||||
| extension-attributes ExtensionAttributes OPTIONAL } | ||||
| BuiltInStandardAttributes ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| country-name CountryName OPTIONAL, | ||||
| administration-domain-name AdministrationDomainName OPTIONAL, | ||||
| network-address [0] NetworkAddress OPTIONAL, | ||||
| -- see also extended-network-address | ||||
| terminal-identifier [1] TerminalIdentifier OPTIONAL, | ||||
| private-domain-name [2] PrivateDomainName OPTIONAL, | ||||
| organization-name [3] OrganizationName OPTIONAL, | ||||
| -- see also teletex-organization-name | ||||
| numeric-user-identifier [4] NumericUserIdentifier OPTIONAL, | ||||
| personal-name [5] PersonalName OPTIONAL, | ||||
| -- see also teletex-personal-name | ||||
| organizational-unit-names [6] OrganizationalUnitNames OPTIONAL | ||||
| -- see also teletex-organizational-unit-names -- } | ||||
| CountryName ::= [APPLICATION 1] CHOICE { | ||||
| x121-dcc-code NumericString | ||||
| (SIZE (ub-country-name-numeric-length)), | ||||
| iso-3166-alpha2-code PrintableString | ||||
| (SIZE (ub-country-name-alpha-length)) } | ||||
| AdministrationDomainName ::= [APPLICATION 2] CHOICE { | ||||
| numeric NumericString (SIZE (0..ub-domain-name-length)), | ||||
| printable PrintableString (SIZE (0..ub-domain-name-length)) } | ||||
| NetworkAddress ::= X121Address -- see also extended-network-address | ||||
| X121Address ::= NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-x121-address-length)) | ||||
| TerminalIdentifier ::= PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-terminal-id-length)) | ||||
| PrivateDomainName ::= CHOICE { | ||||
| numeric NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-name-length)), | ||||
| printable PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-name-length)) } | ||||
| OrganizationName ::= PrintableString | ||||
| (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name-length)) | ||||
| -- see also teletex-organization-name | ||||
| NumericUserIdentifier ::= NumericString | ||||
| (SIZE (1..ub-numeric-user-id-length)) | ||||
| PersonalName ::= SET { | ||||
| surname [0] PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-surname-length)), | ||||
| given-name [1] PrintableString | ||||
| (SIZE (1..ub-given-name-length)) OPTIONAL, | ||||
| initials [2] PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-initials-length)) OPTIONAL, | ||||
| generation-qualifier [3] PrintableString | ||||
| (SIZE (1..ub-generation-qualifier-length)) OPTIONAL } | ||||
| -- see also teletex-personal-name | ||||
| OrganizationalUnitNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..ub-organizational-units) | ||||
| OF OrganizationalUnitName | ||||
| -- see also teletex-organizational-unit-names | ||||
| OrganizationalUnitName ::= PrintableString (SIZE | ||||
| (1..ub-organizational-unit-name-length)) | ||||
| BuiltInDomainDefinedAttributes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE | ||||
| (1..ub-domain-defined-attributes) OF | ||||
| BuiltInDomainDefinedAttribute | ||||
| BuiltInDomainDefinedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| type PrintableString (SIZE | ||||
| (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-type-length)), | ||||
| value PrintableString (SIZE | ||||
| (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-value-length)) } | ||||
| ExtensionAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..ub-extension-attributes) OF | ||||
| ExtensionAttribute | ||||
| ExtensionAttribute ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| extension-attribute-type [0] INTEGER (0..ub-extension-attributes), | ||||
| extension-attribute-value [1] | ||||
| ANY DEFINED BY extension-attribute-type } | ||||
| common-name INTEGER ::= 1 | ||||
| CommonName ::= PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name-length)) | ||||
| teletex-common-name INTEGER ::= 2 | ||||
| TeletexCommonName ::= TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name-length)) | ||||
| teletex-organization-name INTEGER ::= 3 | ||||
| TeletexOrganizationName ::= | ||||
| TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name-length)) | ||||
| teletex-personal-name INTEGER ::= 4 | ||||
| TeletexPersonalName ::= SET { | ||||
| surname [0] TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-surname-length)), | ||||
| given-name [1] TeletexString | ||||
| (SIZE (1..ub-given-name-length)) OPTIONAL, | ||||
| initials [2] TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-initials-length)) OPTIONAL, | ||||
| generation-qualifier [3] TeletexString (SIZE | ||||
| (1..ub-generation-qualifier-length)) OPTIONAL } | ||||
| teletex-organizational-unit-names INTEGER ::= 5 | ||||
| TeletexOrganizationalUnitNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE | ||||
| (1..ub-organizational-units) OF TeletexOrganizationalUnitName | ||||
| TeletexOrganizationalUnitName ::= TeletexString | ||||
| (SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name-length)) | ||||
| pds-name INTEGER ::= 7 | ||||
| PDSName ::= PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-pds-name-length)) | ||||
| physical-delivery-country-name INTEGER ::= 8 | ||||
| PhysicalDeliveryCountryName ::= CHOICE { | ||||
| x121-dcc-code NumericString (SIZE (ub-country-name-numeric-length)), | ||||
| iso-3166-alpha2-code PrintableString | ||||
| (SIZE (ub-country-name-alpha-length)) } | ||||
| postal-code INTEGER ::= 9 | ||||
| PostalCode ::= CHOICE { | ||||
| numeric-code NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-postal-code-length)), | ||||
| printable-code PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-postal-code-length)) } | ||||
| physical-delivery-office-name INTEGER ::= 10 | ||||
| PhysicalDeliveryOfficeName ::= PDSParameter | ||||
| physical-delivery-office-number INTEGER ::= 11 | ||||
| PhysicalDeliveryOfficeNumber ::= PDSParameter | ||||
| extension-OR-address-components INTEGER ::= 12 | ||||
| ExtensionORAddressComponents ::= PDSParameter | ||||
| physical-delivery-personal-name INTEGER ::= 13 | ||||
| PhysicalDeliveryPersonalName ::= PDSParameter | ||||
| physical-delivery-organization-name INTEGER ::= 14 | ||||
| PhysicalDeliveryOrganizationName ::= PDSParameter | ||||
| extension-physical-delivery-address-components INTEGER ::= 15 | ||||
| ExtensionPhysicalDeliveryAddressComponents ::= PDSParameter | ||||
| unformatted-postal-address INTEGER ::= 16 | ||||
| UnformattedPostalAddress ::= SET { | ||||
| printable-address SEQUENCE SIZE (1..ub-pds-physical-address-lines) OF | ||||
| PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-pds-parameter-length)) OPTIONAL, | ||||
| teletex-string TeletexString | ||||
| (SIZE (1..ub-unformatted-address-length)) OPTIONAL } | ||||
| street-address INTEGER ::= 17 | ||||
| StreetAddress ::= PDSParameter | ||||
| post-office-box-address INTEGER ::= 18 | ||||
| PostOfficeBoxAddress ::= PDSParameter | ||||
| poste-restante-address INTEGER ::= 19 | ||||
| PosteRestanteAddress ::= PDSParameter | ||||
| unique-postal-name INTEGER ::= 20 | ||||
| UniquePostalName ::= PDSParameter | ||||
| local-postal-attributes INTEGER ::= 21 | ||||
| LocalPostalAttributes ::= PDSParameter | ||||
| PDSParameter ::= SET { | ||||
| printable-string PrintableString | ||||
| (SIZE(1..ub-pds-parameter-length)) OPTIONAL, | ||||
| teletex-string TeletexString | ||||
| (SIZE(1..ub-pds-parameter-length)) OPTIONAL } | ||||
| extended-network-address INTEGER ::= 22 | ||||
| ExtendedNetworkAddress ::= CHOICE { | ||||
| e163-4-address SEQUENCE { | ||||
| number [0] NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-e163-4-number-length)), | ||||
| sub-address [1] NumericString | ||||
| (SIZE (1..ub-e163-4-sub-address-length)) OPTIONAL }, | ||||
| psap-address [0] PresentationAddress } | ||||
| PresentationAddress ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| pSelector [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, | ||||
| sSelector [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, | ||||
| tSelector [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, | ||||
| nAddresses [3] EXPLICIT SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF OCTET STRING } | ||||
| terminal-type INTEGER ::= 23 | ||||
| TerminalType ::= INTEGER { | ||||
| telex (3), | ||||
| teletex (4), | ||||
| g3-facsimile (5), | ||||
| g4-facsimile (6), | ||||
| ia5-terminal (7), | ||||
| videotex (8) } (0..ub-integer-options) | ||||
| teletex-domain-defined-attributes INTEGER ::= 6 | ||||
| TeletexDomainDefinedAttributes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE | ||||
| (1..ub-domain-defined-attributes) OF TeletexDomainDefinedAttribute | ||||
| TeletexDomainDefinedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| type TeletexString | ||||
| (SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-type-length)), | ||||
| value TeletexString | ||||
| (SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-value-length)) } | ||||
| ub-name INTEGER ::= 32768 | ||||
| ub-common-name INTEGER ::= 64 | ||||
| ub-locality-name INTEGER ::= 128 | ||||
| ub-state-name INTEGER ::= 128 | ||||
| ub-organization-name INTEGER ::= 64 | ||||
| ub-organizational-unit-name INTEGER ::= 64 | ||||
| ub-title INTEGER ::= 64 | ||||
| ub-serial-number INTEGER ::= 64 | ||||
| ub-match INTEGER ::= 128 | ||||
| ub-emailaddress-length INTEGER ::= 128 | ||||
| ub-common-name-length INTEGER ::= 64 | ||||
| ub-country-name-alpha-length INTEGER ::= 2 | ||||
| ub-country-name-numeric-length INTEGER ::= 3 | ||||
| ub-domain-defined-attributes INTEGER ::= 4 | ||||
| ub-domain-defined-attribute-type-length INTEGER ::= 8 | ||||
| ub-domain-defined-attribute-value-length INTEGER ::= 128 | ||||
| ub-domain-name-length INTEGER ::= 16 | ||||
| ub-extension-attributes INTEGER ::= 256 | ||||
| ub-e163-4-number-length INTEGER ::= 15 | ||||
| ub-e163-4-sub-address-length INTEGER ::= 40 | ||||
| ub-generation-qualifier-length INTEGER ::= 3 | ||||
| ub-given-name-length INTEGER ::= 16 | ||||
| ub-initials-length INTEGER ::= 5 | ||||
| ub-integer-options INTEGER ::= 256 | ||||
| ub-numeric-user-id-length INTEGER ::= 32 | ||||
| ub-organization-name-length INTEGER ::= 64 | ||||
| ub-organizational-unit-name-length INTEGER ::= 32 | ||||
| ub-organizational-units INTEGER ::= 4 | ||||
| ub-pds-name-length INTEGER ::= 16 | ||||
| ub-pds-parameter-length INTEGER ::= 30 | ||||
| ub-pds-physical-address-lines INTEGER ::= 6 | ||||
| ub-postal-code-length INTEGER ::= 16 | ||||
| ub-pseudonym INTEGER ::= 128 | ||||
| ub-surname-length INTEGER ::= 40 | ||||
| ub-terminal-id-length INTEGER ::= 24 | ||||
| ub-unformatted-address-length INTEGER ::= 180 | ||||
| ub-x121-address-length INTEGER ::= 16 | ||||
| END | ||||
| A.2 Implicitly Tagged Module, 1988 Syntax | ||||
| PKIX1Implicit88 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) | ||||
| security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit(19) } | ||||
| DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= | ||||
| BEGIN | ||||
| IMPORTS | ||||
| id-pe, id-kp, id-qt-unotice, id-qt-cps, | ||||
| -- delete following line if "new" types are supported -- | ||||
| BMPString, UTF8String, -- end "new" types -- | ||||
| ORAddress, Name, RelativeDistinguishedName, | ||||
| CertificateSerialNumber, Attribute, DirectoryString | ||||
| FROM PKIX1Explicit88 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) | ||||
| dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) | ||||
| id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(18) }; | ||||
| id-ce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 29} | ||||
| id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 35 } | ||||
| AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| keyIdentifier [0] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, | ||||
| authorityCertIssuer [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL, | ||||
| authorityCertSerialNumber [2] CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL } | ||||
| -- authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerialNumber MUST both | ||||
| -- be present or both be absent | ||||
| KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING | ||||
| id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 14 } | ||||
| SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= KeyIdentifier | ||||
| id-ce-keyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 15 } | ||||
| KeyUsage ::= BIT STRING { | ||||
| digitalSignature (0), | ||||
| nonRepudiation (1), | ||||
| keyEncipherment (2), | ||||
| dataEncipherment (3), | ||||
| keyAgreement (4), | ||||
| keyCertSign (5), | ||||
| cRLSign (6), | ||||
| encipherOnly (7), | ||||
| decipherOnly (8) } | ||||
| id-ce-privateKeyUsagePeriod OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 16 } | ||||
| PrivateKeyUsagePeriod ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| notBefore [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, | ||||
| notAfter [1] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL } | ||||
| -- either notBefore or notAfter MUST be present | ||||
| id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 } | ||||
| anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-certificatePolicies 0 } | ||||
| CertificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation | ||||
| PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| policyIdentifier CertPolicyId, | ||||
| policyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF | ||||
| PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL } | ||||
| CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER | ||||
| PolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| policyQualifierId PolicyQualifierId, | ||||
| qualifier ANY DEFINED BY policyQualifierId } | ||||
| PolicyQualifierId ::= | ||||
| OBJECT IDENTIFIER ( id-qt-cps | id-qt-unotice ) | ||||
| CPSuri ::= IA5String | ||||
| UserNotice ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| noticeRef NoticeReference OPTIONAL, | ||||
| explicitText DisplayText OPTIONAL} | ||||
| NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| organization DisplayText, | ||||
| noticeNumbers SEQUENCE OF INTEGER } | ||||
| DisplayText ::= CHOICE { | ||||
| ia5String IA5String (SIZE (1..200)), | ||||
| visibleString VisibleString (SIZE (1..200)), | ||||
| bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..200)), | ||||
| utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..200)) } | ||||
| id-ce-policyMappings OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 33 } | ||||
| PolicyMappings ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SEQUENCE { | ||||
| issuerDomainPolicy CertPolicyId, | ||||
| subjectDomainPolicy CertPolicyId } | ||||
| id-ce-subjectAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 17 } | ||||
| SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames | ||||
| GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName | ||||
| GeneralName ::= CHOICE { | ||||
| otherName [0] AnotherName, | ||||
| rfc822Name [1] IA5String, | ||||
| dNSName [2] IA5String, | ||||
| x400Address [3] ORAddress, | ||||
| directoryName [4] Name, | ||||
| ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName, | ||||
| uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String, | ||||
| iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING, | ||||
| registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER } | ||||
| AnotherName ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, | ||||
| value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } | ||||
| EDIPartyName ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| nameAssigner [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL, | ||||
| partyName [1] DirectoryString } | ||||
| id-ce-issuerAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 18 } | ||||
| IssuerAltName ::= GeneralNames | ||||
| id-ce-subjectDirectoryAttributes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 9 } | ||||
| SubjectDirectoryAttributes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute | ||||
| id-ce-basicConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 19 } | ||||
| BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, | ||||
| pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL } | ||||
| id-ce-nameConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 30 } | ||||
| NameConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| permittedSubtrees [0] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL, | ||||
| excludedSubtrees [1] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL } | ||||
| GeneralSubtrees ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralSubtree | ||||
| GeneralSubtree ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| base GeneralName, | ||||
| minimum [0] BaseDistance DEFAULT 0, | ||||
| maximum [1] BaseDistance OPTIONAL } | ||||
| BaseDistance ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) | ||||
| id-ce-policyConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 36 } | ||||
| PolicyConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| requireExplicitPolicy [0] SkipCerts OPTIONAL, | ||||
| inhibitPolicyMapping [1] SkipCerts OPTIONAL } | ||||
| SkipCerts ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) | ||||
| id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 31} | ||||
| CRLDistributionPoints ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF DistributionPoint | ||||
| DistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL, | ||||
| reasons [1] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL, | ||||
| cRLIssuer [2] GeneralNames OPTIONAL } | ||||
| DistributionPointName ::= CHOICE { | ||||
| fullName [0] GeneralNames, | ||||
| nameRelativeToCRLIssuer [1] RelativeDistinguishedName } | ||||
| ReasonFlags ::= BIT STRING { | ||||
| unused (0), | ||||
| keyCompromise (1), | ||||
| cACompromise (2), | ||||
| affiliationChanged (3), | ||||
| superseded (4), | ||||
| cessationOfOperation (5), | ||||
| certificateHold (6), | ||||
| privilegeWithdrawn (7), | ||||
| aACompromise (8) } | ||||
| id-ce-extKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 37} | ||||
| ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId | ||||
| KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER | ||||
| id-kp-serverAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 1 } | ||||
| id-kp-clientAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 2 } | ||||
| id-kp-codeSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 3 } | ||||
| id-kp-emailProtection OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 4 } | ||||
| id-kp-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 8 } | ||||
| id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 } | ||||
| id-ce-inhibitAnyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 54 } | ||||
| InhibitAnyPolicy ::= SkipCerts | ||||
| id-ce-freshestCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 46 } | ||||
| FreshestCRL ::= CRLDistributionPoints | ||||
| id-pe-authorityInfoAccess OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 1 } | ||||
| AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax ::= | ||||
| SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AccessDescription | ||||
| AccessDescription ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| accessMethod OBJECT IDENTIFIER, | ||||
| accessLocation GeneralName } | ||||
| id-ce-cRLNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 20 } | ||||
| CRLNumber ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) | ||||
| id-ce-issuingDistributionPoint OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 28 } | ||||
| IssuingDistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE { | ||||
| distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL, | ||||
| onlyContainsUserCerts [1] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, | ||||
| onlyContainsCACerts [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, | ||||
| onlySomeReasons [3] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL, | ||||
| indirectCRL [4] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, | ||||
| onlyContainsAttributeCerts [5] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE } | ||||
| id-ce-deltaCRLIndicator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 27 } | ||||
| BaseCRLNumber ::= CRLNumber | ||||
| id-ce-cRLReasons OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 21 } | ||||
| CRLReason ::= ENUMERATED { | ||||
| unspecified (0), | ||||
| keyCompromise (1), | ||||
| cACompromise (2), | ||||
| affiliationChanged (3), | ||||
| superseded (4), | ||||
| cessationOfOperation (5), | ||||
| certificateHold (6), | ||||
| removeFromCRL (8), | ||||
| privilegeWithdrawn (9), | ||||
| aACompromise (10) } | ||||
| id-ce-certificateIssuer OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 29 } | ||||
| CertificateIssuer ::= GeneralNames | ||||
| id-ce-holdInstructionCode OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 23 } | ||||
| HoldInstructionCode ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER | ||||
| holdInstruction OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= | ||||
| {joint-iso-itu-t(2) member-body(2) us(840) x9cm(10040) 2} | ||||
| id-holdinstruction-none OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= | ||||
| {holdInstruction 1} -- deprecated | ||||
| id-holdinstruction-callissuer OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= | ||||
| {holdInstruction 2} | ||||
| id-holdinstruction-reject OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= | ||||
| {holdInstruction 3} | ||||
| id-ce-invalidityDate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 24 } | ||||
| InvalidityDate ::= GeneralizedTime | ||||
| END | ||||
| Appendix B. ASN.1 Notes | ||||
| CAs MUST force the serialNumber to be a non-negative integer, that | ||||
| is, the sign bit in the DER encoding of the INTEGER value MUST be | ||||
| zero - this can be done by adding a leading (leftmost) `00'H octet if | ||||
| necessary. This removes a potential ambiguity in mapping between a | ||||
| string of octets and an integer value. | ||||
| As noted in section 4.1.2.2, serial numbers can be expected to | ||||
| contain long integers. Certificate users MUST be able to handle | ||||
| serialNumber values up to 20 octets in length. Conformant CAs MUST | ||||
| NOT use serialNumber values longer than 20 octets. | ||||
| The construct "SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF" appears in several ASN.1 | ||||
| constructs. A valid ASN.1 sequence will have zero or more entries. | ||||
| The SIZE (1..MAX) construct constrains the sequence to have at least | ||||
| one entry. MAX indicates the upper bound is unspecified. | ||||
| Implementations are free to choose an upper bound that suits their | ||||
| environment. | ||||
| The construct "positiveInt ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)" defines positiveInt | ||||
| as a subtype of INTEGER containing integers greater than or equal to | ||||
| zero. The upper bound is unspecified. Implementations are free to | ||||
| select an upper bound that suits their environment. | ||||
| The character string type PrintableString supports a very basic Latin | ||||
| character set: the lower case letters 'a' through 'z', upper case | ||||
| letters 'A' through 'Z', the digits '0' through '9', eleven special | ||||
| characters ' = ( ) + , - . / : ? and space. | ||||
| Implementers should note that the at sign ('@') and underscore ('_') | ||||
| characters are not supported by the ASN.1 type PrintableString. | ||||
| These characters often appear in internet addresses. Such addresses | ||||
| MUST be encoded using an ASN.1 type that supports them. They are | ||||
| usually encoded as IA5String in either the emailAddress attribute | ||||
| within a distinguished name or the rfc822Name field of GeneralName. | ||||
| Conforming implementations MUST NOT encode strings which include | ||||
| either the at sign or underscore character as PrintableString. | ||||
| The character string type TeletexString is a superset of | ||||
| PrintableString. TeletexString supports a fairly standard (ASCII- | ||||
| like) Latin character set, Latin characters with non-spacing accents | ||||
| and Japanese characters. | ||||
| Named bit lists are BIT STRINGs where the values have been assigned | ||||
| names. This specification makes use of named bit lists in the | ||||
| definitions for the key usage extension and CRL reasons field in the | ||||
| CRL distribution points and freshest CRL certificate extensions, and | ||||
| the issuing distribution point CRL extension. When DER encoding a | ||||
| named bit list, trailing zeroes MUST be omitted. That is, the | ||||
| encoded value ends with the last named bit that is set to one. | ||||
| The character string type UniversalString supports any of the | ||||
| characters allowed by ISO 10646-1 [ISO 10646]. ISO 10646-1 is the | ||||
| Universal multiple-octet coded Character Set (UCS). ISO 10646-1 | ||||
| specifies the architecture and the "basic multilingual plane" - a | ||||
| large standard character set which includes all major world character | ||||
| standards. | ||||
| The character string type UTF8String was introduced in the 1997 | ||||
| version of ASN.1, and UTF8String was added to the list of choices for | ||||
| DirectoryString in the 2001 version of X.520 [X.520]. UTF8String is | ||||
| a universal type and has been assigned tag number 12. The content of | ||||
| UTF8String was defined by RFC 2044 [RFC 2044] and updated in RFC 2279 | ||||
| [RFC 2279]. | ||||
| In anticipation of these changes, and in conformance with IETF Best | ||||
| Practices codified in RFC 2277 [RFC 2277], IETF Policy on Character | ||||
| Sets and Languages, this document includes UTF8String as a choice in | ||||
| DirectoryString and the CPS qualifier extensions. | ||||
| Implementers should note that the DER encoding of the SET OF values | ||||
| requires ordering of the encodings of the values. In particular, | ||||
| this issue arises with respect to distinguished names. | ||||
| Implementers should note that the DER encoding of SET or SEQUENCE | ||||
| components whose value is the DEFAULT omit the component from the | ||||
| encoded certificate or CRL. For example, a BasicConstraints | ||||
| extension whose cA value is FALSE would omit the cA boolean from the | ||||
| encoded certificate. | ||||
| Object Identifiers (OIDs) are used throughout this specification to | ||||
| identify certificate policies, public key and signature algorithms, | ||||
| certificate extensions, etc. There is no maximum size for OIDs. | ||||
| This specification mandates support for OIDs which have arc elements | ||||
| with values that are less than 2^28, that is, they MUST be between 0 | ||||
| and 268,435,455, inclusive. This allows each arc element to be | ||||
| represented within a single 32 bit word. Implementations MUST also | ||||
| support OIDs where the length of the dotted decimal (see [RFC 2252], | ||||
| section 4.1) string representation can be up to 100 bytes | ||||
| (inclusive). Implementations MUST be able to handle OIDs with up to | ||||
| 20 elements (inclusive). CAs SHOULD NOT issue certificates which | ||||
| contain OIDs that exceed these requirements. | ||||
| Implementors are warned that the X.500 standards community has | ||||
| developed a series of extensibility rules. These rules determine | ||||
| when an ASN.1 definition can be changed without assigning a new | ||||
| object identifier (OID). For example, at least two extension | ||||
| definitions included in RFC 2459 [RFC 2459], the predecessor to this | ||||
| profile document, have different ASN.1 definitions in this | ||||
| specification, but the same OID is used. If unknown elements appear | ||||
| within an extension, and the extension is not marked critical, those | ||||
| unknown elements ought to be ignored, as follows: | ||||
| (a) ignore all unknown bit name assignments within a bit string; | ||||
| (b) ignore all unknown named numbers in an ENUMERATED type or | ||||
| INTEGER type that is being used in the enumerated style, provided | ||||
| the number occurs as an optional element of a SET or SEQUENCE; and | ||||
| (c) ignore all unknown elements in SETs, at the end of SEQUENCEs, | ||||
| or in CHOICEs where the CHOICE is itself an optional element of a | ||||
| SET or SEQUENCE. | ||||
| If an extension containing unexpected values is marked critical, the | ||||
| implementation MUST reject the certificate or CRL containing the | ||||
| unrecognized extension. | ||||
| Appendix C. Examples | ||||
| This section contains four examples: three certificates and a CRL. | ||||
| The first two certificates and the CRL comprise a minimal | ||||
| certification path. | ||||
| Section C.1 contains an annotated hex dump of a "self-signed" | ||||
| certificate issued by a CA whose distinguished name is | ||||
| cn=us,o=gov,ou=nist. The certificate contains a DSA public key with | ||||
| parameters, and is signed by the corresponding DSA private key. | ||||
| Section C.2 contains an annotated hex dump of an end entity | ||||
| certificate. The end entity certificate contains a DSA public key, | ||||
| and is signed by the private key corresponding to the "self-signed" | ||||
| certificate in section C.1. | ||||
| Section C.3 contains a dump of an end entity certificate which | ||||
| contains an RSA public key and is signed with RSA and MD5. This | ||||
| certificate is not part of the minimal certification path. | ||||
| Section C.4 contains an annotated hex dump of a CRL. The CRL is | ||||
| issued by the CA whose distinguished name is cn=us,o=gov,ou=nist and | ||||
| the list of revoked certificates includes the end entity certificate | ||||
| presented in C.2. | ||||
| The certificates were processed using Peter Gutman's dumpasn1 utility | ||||
| to generate the output. The source for the dumpasn1 utility is | ||||
| available at <http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/dumpasn1.c>. The | ||||
| binaries for the certificates and CRLs are available at | ||||
| <http://csrc.nist.gov/pki/pkixtools>. | ||||
| C.1 Certificate | ||||
| This section contains an annotated hex dump of a 699 byte version 3 | ||||
| certificate. The certificate contains the following information: | ||||
| (a) the serial number is 23 (17 hex); | ||||
| (b) the certificate is signed with DSA and the SHA-1 hash algorithm; | ||||
| (c) the issuer's distinguished name is OU=NIST; O=gov; C=US | ||||
| (d) and the subject's distinguished name is OU=NIST; O=gov; C=US | ||||
| (e) the certificate was issued on June 30, 1997 and will expire on | ||||
| December 31, 1997; | ||||
| (f) the certificate contains a 1024 bit DSA public key with | ||||
| parameters; | ||||
| (g) the certificate contains a subject key identifier extension | ||||
| generated using method (1) of section 4.2.1.2; and | ||||
| (h) the certificate is a CA certificate (as indicated through the | ||||
| basic constraints extension.) | ||||
| 0 30 699: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 4 30 635: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 8 A0 3: [0] { | ||||
| 10 02 1: INTEGER 2 | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 13 02 1: INTEGER 17 | ||||
| 16 30 9: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 18 06 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER dsaWithSha1 (1 2 840 10040 4 3) | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 27 30 42: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 29 31 11: SET { | ||||
| 31 30 9: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 33 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6) | ||||
| 38 13 2: PrintableString 'US' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 42 31 12: SET { | ||||
| 44 30 10: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 46 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10) | ||||
| 51 13 3: PrintableString 'gov' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 56 31 13: SET { | ||||
| 58 30 11: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 60 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER | ||||
| : organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11) | ||||
| 65 13 4: PrintableString 'NIST' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 71 30 30: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 73 17 13: UTCTime '970630000000Z' | ||||
| 88 17 13: UTCTime '971231000000Z' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 103 30 42: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 105 31 11: SET { | ||||
| 107 30 9: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 109 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6) | ||||
| 114 13 2: PrintableString 'US' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 118 31 12: SET { | ||||
| 120 30 10: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 122 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10) | ||||
| 127 13 3: PrintableString 'gov' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 132 31 13: SET { | ||||
| 134 30 11: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 136 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER | ||||
| : organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11) | ||||
| 141 13 4: PrintableString 'NIST' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 147 30 440: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 151 30 300: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 155 06 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER dsa (1 2 840 10040 4 1) | ||||
| 164 30 287: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 168 02 129: INTEGER | ||||
| : 00 B6 8B 0F 94 2B 9A CE A5 25 C6 F2 ED FC | ||||
| : FB 95 32 AC 01 12 33 B9 E0 1C AD 90 9B BC | ||||
| : 48 54 9E F3 94 77 3C 2C 71 35 55 E6 FE 4F | ||||
| : 22 CB D5 D8 3E 89 93 33 4D FC BD 4F 41 64 | ||||
| : 3E A2 98 70 EC 31 B4 50 DE EB F1 98 28 0A | ||||
| : C9 3E 44 B3 FD 22 97 96 83 D0 18 A3 E3 BD | ||||
| : 35 5B FF EE A3 21 72 6A 7B 96 DA B9 3F 1E | ||||
| : 5A 90 AF 24 D6 20 F0 0D 21 A7 D4 02 B9 1A | ||||
| : FC AC 21 FB 9E 94 9E 4B 42 45 9E 6A B2 48 | ||||
| : 63 FE 43 | ||||
| 300 02 21: INTEGER | ||||
| : 00 B2 0D B0 B1 01 DF 0C 66 24 FC 13 92 BA | ||||
| : 55 F7 7D 57 74 81 E5 | ||||
| 323 02 129: INTEGER | ||||
| : 00 9A BF 46 B1 F5 3F 44 3D C9 A5 65 FB 91 | ||||
| : C0 8E 47 F1 0A C3 01 47 C2 44 42 36 A9 92 | ||||
| : 81 DE 57 C5 E0 68 86 58 00 7B 1F F9 9B 77 | ||||
| : A1 C5 10 A5 80 91 78 51 51 3C F6 FC FC CC | ||||
| : 46 C6 81 78 92 84 3D F4 93 3D 0C 38 7E 1A | ||||
| : 5B 99 4E AB 14 64 F6 0C 21 22 4E 28 08 9C | ||||
| : 92 B9 66 9F 40 E8 95 F6 D5 31 2A EF 39 A2 | ||||
| : 62 C7 B2 6D 9E 58 C4 3A A8 11 81 84 6D AF | ||||
| : F8 B4 19 B4 C2 11 AE D0 22 3B AA 20 7F EE | ||||
| : 1E 57 18 | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 455 03 133: BIT STRING 0 unused bits, encapsulates { | ||||
| 459 02 129: INTEGER | ||||
| : 00 B5 9E 1F 49 04 47 D1 DB F5 3A DD CA 04 | ||||
| : 75 E8 DD 75 F6 9B 8A B1 97 D6 59 69 82 D3 | ||||
| : 03 4D FD 3B 36 5F 4A F2 D1 4E C1 07 F5 D1 | ||||
| : 2A D3 78 77 63 56 EA 96 61 4D 42 0B 7A 1D | ||||
| : FB AB 91 A4 CE DE EF 77 C8 E5 EF 20 AE A6 | ||||
| : 28 48 AF BE 69 C3 6A A5 30 F2 C2 B9 D9 82 | ||||
| : 2B 7D D9 C4 84 1F DE 0D E8 54 D7 1B 99 2E | ||||
| : B3 D0 88 F6 D6 63 9B A7 E2 0E 82 D4 3B 8A | ||||
| : 68 1B 06 56 31 59 0B 49 EB 99 A5 D5 81 41 | ||||
| : 7B C9 55 | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 591 A3 50: [3] { | ||||
| 593 30 48: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 595 30 29: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 597 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER | ||||
| : subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14) | ||||
| 602 04 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { | ||||
| 604 04 20: OCTET STRING | ||||
| : 86 CA A5 22 81 62 EF AD 0A 89 BC AD 72 41 | ||||
| : 2C 29 49 F4 86 56 | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 626 30 15: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 628 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19) | ||||
| 633 01 1: BOOLEAN TRUE | ||||
| 636 04 5: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { | ||||
| 638 30 3: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 640 01 1: BOOLEAN TRUE | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 643 30 9: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 645 06 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER dsaWithSha1 (1 2 840 10040 4 3) | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 654 03 47: BIT STRING 0 unused bits, encapsulates { | ||||
| 657 30 44: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 659 02 20: INTEGER | ||||
| : 43 1B CF 29 25 45 C0 4E 52 E7 7D D6 FC B1 | ||||
| : 66 4C 83 CF 2D 77 | ||||
| 681 02 20: INTEGER | ||||
| : 0B 5B 9A 24 11 98 E8 F3 86 90 04 F6 08 A9 | ||||
| : E1 8D A5 CC 3A D4 | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| C.2 Certificate | ||||
| This section contains an annotated hex dump of a 730 byte version 3 | ||||
| certificate. The certificate contains the following information: | ||||
| (a the serial number is 18 (12 hex); | ||||
| (b) the certificate is signed with DSA and the SHA-1 hash algorithm; | ||||
| (c) the issuer's distinguished name is OU=nist; O=gov; C=US | ||||
| (d) and the subject's distinguished name is CN=Tim Polk; OU=nist; | ||||
| O=gov; C=US | ||||
| (e) the certificate was valid from July 30, 1997 through December 1, | ||||
| 1997; | ||||
| (f) the certificate contains a 1024 bit DSA public key; | ||||
| (g) the certificate is an end entity certificate, as the basic | ||||
| constraints extension is not present; | ||||
| (h) the certificate contains an authority key identifier extension | ||||
| matching the subject key identifier of the certificate in Appendix | ||||
| C.1; and | ||||
| (i) the certificate includes one alternative name - an RFC 822 | ||||
| address of "wpolk@nist.gov". | ||||
| 0 30 730: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 4 30 665: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 8 A0 3: [0] { | ||||
| 10 02 1: INTEGER 2 | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 13 02 1: INTEGER 18 | ||||
| 16 30 9: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 18 06 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER dsaWithSha1 (1 2 840 10040 4 3) | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 27 30 42: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 29 31 11: SET { | ||||
| 31 30 9: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 33 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6) | ||||
| 38 13 2: PrintableString 'US' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 42 31 12: SET { | ||||
| 44 30 10: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 46 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10) | ||||
| 51 13 3: PrintableString 'gov' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 56 31 13: SET { | ||||
| 58 30 11: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 60 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER | ||||
| : organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11) | ||||
| 65 13 4: PrintableString 'NIST' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 71 30 30: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 73 17 13: UTCTime '970730000000Z' | ||||
| 88 17 13: UTCTime '971201000000Z' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 103 30 61: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 105 31 11: SET { | ||||
| 107 30 9: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 109 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6) | ||||
| 114 13 2: PrintableString 'US' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 118 31 12: SET { | ||||
| 120 30 10: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 122 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10) | ||||
| 127 13 3: PrintableString 'gov' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 132 31 13: SET { | ||||
| 134 30 11: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 136 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER | ||||
| : organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11) | ||||
| 141 13 4: PrintableString 'NIST' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 147 31 17: SET { | ||||
| 149 30 15: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 151 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3) | ||||
| 156 13 8: PrintableString 'Tim Polk' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 166 30 439: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 170 30 300: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 174 06 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER dsa (1 2 840 10040 4 1) | ||||
| 183 30 287: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 187 02 129: INTEGER | ||||
| : 00 B6 8B 0F 94 2B 9A CE A5 25 C6 F2 ED FC | ||||
| : FB 95 32 AC 01 12 33 B9 E0 1C AD 90 9B BC | ||||
| : 48 54 9E F3 94 77 3C 2C 71 35 55 E6 FE 4F | ||||
| : 22 CB D5 D8 3E 89 93 33 4D FC BD 4F 41 64 | ||||
| : 3E A2 98 70 EC 31 B4 50 DE EB F1 98 28 0A | ||||
| : C9 3E 44 B3 FD 22 97 96 83 D0 18 A3 E3 BD | ||||
| : 35 5B FF EE A3 21 72 6A 7B 96 DA B9 3F 1E | ||||
| : 5A 90 AF 24 D6 20 F0 0D 21 A7 D4 02 B9 1A | ||||
| : FC AC 21 FB 9E 94 9E 4B 42 45 9E 6A B2 48 | ||||
| : 63 FE 43 | ||||
| 319 02 21: INTEGER | ||||
| : 00 B2 0D B0 B1 01 DF 0C 66 24 FC 13 92 BA | ||||
| : 55 F7 7D 57 74 81 E5 | ||||
| 342 02 129: INTEGER | ||||
| : 00 9A BF 46 B1 F5 3F 44 3D C9 A5 65 FB 91 | ||||
| : C0 8E 47 F1 0A C3 01 47 C2 44 42 36 A9 92 | ||||
| : 81 DE 57 C5 E0 68 86 58 00 7B 1F F9 9B 77 | ||||
| : A1 C5 10 A5 80 91 78 51 51 3C F6 FC FC CC | ||||
| : 46 C6 81 78 92 84 3D F4 93 3D 0C 38 7E 1A | ||||
| : 5B 99 4E AB 14 64 F6 0C 21 22 4E 28 08 9C | ||||
| : 92 B9 66 9F 40 E8 95 F6 D5 31 2A EF 39 A2 | ||||
| : 62 C7 B2 6D 9E 58 C4 3A A8 11 81 84 6D AF | ||||
| : F8 B4 19 B4 C2 11 AE D0 22 3B AA 20 7F EE | ||||
| : 1E 57 18 | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 474 03 132: BIT STRING 0 unused bits, encapsulates { | ||||
| 478 02 128: INTEGER | ||||
| : 30 B6 75 F7 7C 20 31 AE 38 BB 7E 0D 2B AB | ||||
| : A0 9C 4B DF 20 D5 24 13 3C CD 98 E5 5F 6C | ||||
| : B7 C1 BA 4A BA A9 95 80 53 F0 0D 72 DC 33 | ||||
| : 37 F4 01 0B F5 04 1F 9D 2E 1F 62 D8 84 3A | ||||
| : 9B 25 09 5A 2D C8 46 8E 2B D4 F5 0D 3B C7 | ||||
| : 2D C6 6C B9 98 C1 25 3A 44 4E 8E CA 95 61 | ||||
| : 35 7C CE 15 31 5C 23 13 1E A2 05 D1 7A 24 | ||||
| : 1C CB D3 72 09 90 FF 9B 9D 28 C0 A1 0A EC | ||||
| : 46 9F 0D B8 D0 DC D0 18 A6 2B 5E F9 8F B5 | ||||
| : 95 BE | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 609 A3 62: [3] { | ||||
| 611 30 60: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 613 30 25: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 615 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectAltName (2 5 29 17) | ||||
| 620 04 18: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { | ||||
| 622 30 16: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 624 81 14: [1] 'wpolk@nist.gov' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 640 30 31: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 642 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER | ||||
| : authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35) | ||||
| 647 04 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { | ||||
| 649 30 22: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 651 80 20: [0] | ||||
| : 86 CA A5 22 81 62 EF AD 0A 89 BC AD 72 | ||||
| : 41 2C 29 49 F4 86 56 | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 673 30 9: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 675 06 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER dsaWithSha1 (1 2 840 10040 4 3) | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 684 03 48: BIT STRING 0 unused bits, encapsulates { | ||||
| 687 30 45: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 689 02 20: INTEGER | ||||
| : 36 97 CB E3 B4 2C E1 BB 61 A9 D3 CC 24 CC | ||||
| : 22 92 9F F4 F5 87 | ||||
| 711 02 21: INTEGER | ||||
| : 00 AB C9 79 AF D2 16 1C A9 E3 68 A9 14 10 | ||||
| : B4 A0 2E FF 22 5A 73 | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| C.3 End Entity Certificate Using RSA | ||||
| This section contains an annotated hex dump of a 654 byte version 3 | ||||
| certificate. The certificate contains the following information: | ||||
| (a) the serial number is 256; | ||||
| (b) the certificate is signed with RSA and the SHA-1 hash algorithm; | ||||
| (c) the issuer's distinguished name is OU=NIST; O=gov; C=US | ||||
| (d) and the subject's distinguished name is CN=Tim Polk; OU=NIST; | ||||
| O=gov; C=US | ||||
| (e) the certificate was issued on May 21, 1996 at 09:58:26 and | ||||
| expired on May 21, 1997 at 09:58:26; | ||||
| (f) the certificate contains a 1024 bit RSA public key; | ||||
| (g) the certificate is an end entity certificate (not a CA | ||||
| certificate); | ||||
| (h) the certificate includes an alternative subject name of | ||||
| "<http://www.itl.nist.gov/div893/staff/polk/index.html>" and an | ||||
| alternative issuer name of "<http://www.nist.gov/>" - both are URLs; | ||||
| (i) the certificate include an authority key identifier extension | ||||
| and a certificate policies extension psecifying the policy OID | ||||
| 2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.48.9; and | ||||
| (j) the certificate includes a critical key usage extension | ||||
| specifying that the public key is intended for verification of | ||||
| digital signatures. | ||||
| 0 30 654: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 4 30 503: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 8 A0 3: [0] { | ||||
| 10 02 1: INTEGER 2 | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 13 02 2: INTEGER 256 | ||||
| 17 30 13: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 19 06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER | ||||
| : sha1withRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 5) | ||||
| 30 05 0: NULL | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 32 30 42: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 34 31 11: SET { | ||||
| 36 30 9: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 38 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6) | ||||
| 43 13 2: PrintableString 'US' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 47 31 12: SET { | ||||
| 49 30 10: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 51 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10) | ||||
| 56 13 3: PrintableString 'gov' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 61 31 13: SET { | ||||
| 63 30 11: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 65 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER | ||||
| : organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11) | ||||
| 70 13 4: PrintableString 'NIST' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 76 30 30: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 78 17 13: UTCTime '960521095826Z' | ||||
| 93 17 13: UTCTime '970521095826Z' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 108 30 61: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 110 31 11: SET { | ||||
| 112 30 9: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 114 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6) | ||||
| 119 13 2: PrintableString 'US' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 123 31 12: SET { | ||||
| 125 30 10: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 127 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10) | ||||
| 132 13 3: PrintableString 'gov' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 137 31 13: SET { | ||||
| 139 30 11: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 141 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER | ||||
| : organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11) | ||||
| 146 13 4: PrintableString 'NIST' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 152 31 17: SET { | ||||
| 154 30 15: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 156 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3) | ||||
| 161 13 8: PrintableString 'Tim Polk' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 171 30 159: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 174 30 13: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 176 06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER | ||||
| : rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1) | ||||
| 187 05 0: NULL | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 189 03 141: BIT STRING 0 unused bits, encapsulates { | ||||
| 193 30 137: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 196 02 129: INTEGER | ||||
| : 00 E1 6A E4 03 30 97 02 3C F4 10 F3 B5 1E | ||||
| : 4D 7F 14 7B F6 F5 D0 78 E9 A4 8A F0 A3 75 | ||||
| : EC ED B6 56 96 7F 88 99 85 9A F2 3E 68 77 | ||||
| : 87 EB 9E D1 9F C0 B4 17 DC AB 89 23 A4 1D | ||||
| : 7E 16 23 4C 4F A8 4D F5 31 B8 7C AA E3 1A | ||||
| : 49 09 F4 4B 26 DB 27 67 30 82 12 01 4A E9 | ||||
| : 1A B6 C1 0C 53 8B 6C FC 2F 7A 43 EC 33 36 | ||||
| : 7E 32 B2 7B D5 AA CF 01 14 C6 12 EC 13 F2 | ||||
| : 2D 14 7A 8B 21 58 14 13 4C 46 A3 9A F2 16 | ||||
| : 95 FF 23 | ||||
| 328 02 3: INTEGER 65537 | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 333 A3 175: [3] { | ||||
| 336 30 172: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 339 30 63: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 341 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectAltName (2 5 29 17) | ||||
| 346 04 56: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { | ||||
| 348 30 54: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 350 86 52: [6] | ||||
| : 'http://www.itl.nist.gov/div893/staff/' | ||||
| : 'polk/index.html' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 404 30 31: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 406 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER issuerAltName (2 5 29 18) | ||||
| 411 04 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { | ||||
| 413 30 22: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 415 86 20: [6] 'http://www.nist.gov/' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 437 30 31: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 439 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER | ||||
| : authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35) | ||||
| 444 04 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { | ||||
| 446 30 22: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 448 80 20: [0] | ||||
| : 08 68 AF 85 33 C8 39 4A 7A F8 82 93 8E | ||||
| : 70 6A 4A 20 84 2C 32 | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 470 30 23: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 472 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER | ||||
| : certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32) | ||||
| 477 04 16: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { | ||||
| 479 30 14: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 481 30 12: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 483 06 10: OBJECT IDENTIFIER | ||||
| : '2 16 840 1 101 3 2 1 48 9' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 495 30 14: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 497 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15) | ||||
| 502 01 1: BOOLEAN TRUE | ||||
| 505 04 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { | ||||
| 507 03 2: BIT STRING 7 unused bits | ||||
| : '1'B (bit 0) | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 511 30 13: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 513 06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER | ||||
| : sha1withRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 5) | ||||
| 524 05 0: NULL | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 526 03 129: BIT STRING 0 unused bits | ||||
| : 1E 07 77 6E 66 B5 B6 B8 57 F0 03 DC 6F 77 | ||||
| : 6D AF 55 1D 74 E5 CE 36 81 FC 4B C5 F4 47 | ||||
| : 82 C4 0A 25 AA 8D D6 7D 3A 89 AB 44 34 39 | ||||
| : F6 BD 61 1A 78 85 7A B8 1E 92 A2 22 2F CE | ||||
| : 07 1A 08 8E F1 46 03 59 36 4A CB 60 E6 03 | ||||
| : 40 01 5B 2A 44 D6 E4 7F EB 43 5E 74 0A E6 | ||||
| : E4 F9 3E E1 44 BE 1F E7 5F 5B 2C 41 8D 08 | ||||
| : BD 26 FE 6A A6 C3 2F B2 3B 41 12 6B C1 06 | ||||
| : 8A B8 4C 91 59 EB 2F 38 20 2A 67 74 20 0B | ||||
| : 77 F3 | ||||
| : } | ||||
| C.4 Certificate Revocation List | Title: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure | |||
| Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) | ||||
| Profile | ||||
| Author(s): R. Housley, W. Polk, W. Ford, D. Solo | ||||
| Status: Standards Track | ||||
| Date: April 2002 | ||||
| Mailbox: rhousley@rsasecurity.com, wford@verisign.com, | ||||
| wpolk@nist.gov, dsolo@alum.mit.edu | ||||
| Pages: 129 | ||||
| Characters: 295556 | ||||
| Updates/Obsoletes/SeeAlso: None | ||||
| This section contains an annotated hex dump of a version 2 CRL with | I-D Tag: draft-ietf-pkix-new-part1-12.txt | |||
| one extension (cRLNumber). The CRL was issued by OU=NIST; O=gov; C=US | ||||
| on August 7, 1997; the next scheduled issuance was September 7, 1997. | ||||
| The CRL includes one revoked certificates: serial number 18 (12 hex), | ||||
| which was revoked on July 31, 1997 due to keyCompromise. The CRL | ||||
| itself is number 18, and it was signed with DSA and SHA-1. | ||||
| 0 30 203: SEQUENCE { | URL: ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc3280.txt | |||
| 3 30 140: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 6 02 1: INTEGER 1 | ||||
| 9 30 9: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 11 06 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER dsaWithSha1 (1 2 840 10040 4 3) | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 20 30 42: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 22 31 11: SET { | ||||
| 24 30 9: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 26 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6) | ||||
| 31 13 2: PrintableString 'US' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 35 31 12: SET { | ||||
| 37 30 10: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 39 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10) | ||||
| 44 13 3: PrintableString 'gov' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 49 31 13: SET { | ||||
| 51 30 11: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 53 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER | ||||
| : organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11) | ||||
| 58 13 4: PrintableString 'NIST' | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 64 17 13: UTCTime '970807000000Z' | ||||
| 79 17 13: UTCTime '970907000000Z' | ||||
| 94 30 34: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 96 30 32: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 98 02 1: INTEGER 18 | ||||
| 101 17 13: UTCTime '970731000000Z' | ||||
| 116 30 12: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 118 30 10: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 120 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLReason (2 5 29 21) | ||||
| 125 04 3: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { | ||||
| 127 0A 1: ENUMERATED 1 | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 130 A0 14: [0] { | ||||
| 132 30 12: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 134 30 10: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 136 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLNumber (2 5 29 20) | ||||
| 141 04 3: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { | ||||
| 143 02 1: INTEGER 12 | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 146 30 9: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 148 06 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER dsaWithSha1 (1 2 840 10040 4 3) | ||||
| : } | ||||
| 157 03 47: BIT STRING 0 unused bits, encapsulates { | ||||
| 160 30 44: SEQUENCE { | ||||
| 162 02 20: INTEGER | ||||
| : 22 4E 9F 43 BA 95 06 34 F2 BB 5E 65 DB A6 | ||||
| : 80 05 C0 3A 29 47 | ||||
| 184 02 20: INTEGER | ||||
| : 59 1A 57 C9 82 D7 02 21 14 C3 D4 0B 32 1B | ||||
| : 96 16 B1 1F 46 5A | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| : } | ||||
| Appendix D. Author Addresses: | This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 Certificate | |||
| Revocation List (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this | ||||
| approach and model are provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 | ||||
| certificate format is described in detail, with additional information | ||||
| regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard | ||||
| certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific | ||||
| extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is | ||||
| specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail, and | ||||
| required extensions are defined. An algorithm for X.509 certification | ||||
| path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are | ||||
| provided in the appendices. | ||||
| Russell Housley | This document is a product of the Internet X.509 Public Key | |||
| RSA Laboratories | Infrastructure (PKIX) Working Group of the IETF. | |||
| 918 Spring Knoll Drive | ||||
| Herndon, VA 20170 | ||||
| USA | ||||
| rhousley@rsasecurity.com | ||||
| Warwick Ford | This is now a Proposed Standard Protocol. | |||
| VeriSign, Inc. | ||||
| One Alewife Center | ||||
| Cambridge, MA 02140 | ||||
| USA | ||||
| wford@verisign.com | ||||
| Tim Polk | This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for | |||
| NIST | the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions | |||
| Building 820, Room 426 | for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the | |||
| Gaithersburg, MD 20899 | "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the | |||
| USA | standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution | |||
| wpolk@nist.gov | of this memo is unlimited. | |||
| David Solo | This announcement is sent to the IETF list and the RFC-DIST list. | |||
| Citigroup | Requests to be added to or deleted from the IETF distribution list | |||
| 909 Third Ave, 16th Floor | should be sent to IETF-REQUEST@IETF.ORG. Requests to be | |||
| New York, NY 10043 | added to or deleted from the RFC-DIST distribution list should | |||
| USA | be sent to RFC-DIST-REQUEST@RFC-EDITOR.ORG. | |||
| dsolo@alum.mit.edu | ||||
| Appendix E. Full Copyright Statement | Details on obtaining RFCs via FTP or EMAIL may be obtained by sending | |||
| an EMAIL message to rfc-info@RFC-EDITOR.ORG with the message body | ||||
| help: ways_to_get_rfcs. For example: | ||||
| Copyright (C) The Internet Society (date). All Rights Reserved. | To: rfc-info@RFC-EDITOR.ORG | |||
| Subject: getting rfcs | ||||
| This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to | help: ways_to_get_rfcs | |||
| others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it | ||||
| or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published | ||||
| and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any | ||||
| kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are | ||||
| included on all such copies and derivative works. In addition, the | ||||
| ASN.1 modules presented in Appendix A may be used in whole or in part | ||||
| without inclusion of the copyright notice. However, this document | ||||
| itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the | ||||
| copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other | ||||
| Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of | ||||
| developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for | ||||
| copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process shall be | ||||
| followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than | ||||
| English. | ||||
| The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be | Requests for special distribution should be addressed to either the | |||
| revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. This | author of the RFC in question, or to RFC-Manager@RFC-EDITOR.ORG. Unless | |||
| document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS | specifically noted otherwise on the RFC itself, all RFCs are for | |||
| IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK | unlimited distribution.echo | |||
| FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT | Submissions for Requests for Comments should be sent to | |||
| LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL | RFC-EDITOR@RFC-EDITOR.ORG. Please consult RFC 2223, Instructions to RFC | |||
| NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY | Authors, for further information. | |||
| OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. | ||||
| End of changes. 14 change blocks. | ||||
| 5810 lines changed or deleted | 46 lines changed or added | |||
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