< draft-ietf-precis-saslprepbis-06.txt		draft-ietf-precis-saslprepbis-07.txt >
	PRECIS P. Saint-Andre		PRECIS P. Saint-Andre
	Internet-Draft Cisco Systems, Inc.		Internet-Draft &yet
	Obsoletes: 4013 (if approved) A. Melnikov		Obsoletes: 4013 (if approved) A. Melnikov
	Intended status: Standards Track Isode Ltd		Intended status: Standards Track Isode Ltd
	Expires: June 6, 2014 December 3, 2013		Expires: September 25, 2014 March 24, 2014
	Preparation and Comparison of Internationalized Strings Representing		Preparation and Comparison of Internationalized Strings Representing
	Usernames and Passwords		Usernames and Passwords
	draft-ietf-precis-saslprepbis-06		draft-ietf-precis-saslprepbis-07
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document describes methods for handling Unicode strings		This document describes methods for handling Unicode strings
	representing usernames and passwords. This document obsoletes RFC		representing usernames and passwords. This document obsoletes RFC
	4013.		4013.
	Status of this Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on June 6, 2014.		This Internet-Draft will expire on September 25, 2014.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
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	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	2. What the Username and Password Profiles Provide . . . . . . . 3		2. What the Username and Password Profiles Provide . . . . . . . 3
	3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	4. Usernames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		4. Usernames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	4.1. Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		4.1. Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	4.2. Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		4.2. Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4.2.1. Case Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		4.2.1. Case Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	4.3. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		4.3. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	5. Passwords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		5. Passwords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	5.1. Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		5.1. Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	5.2. Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		5.2. Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	5.3. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		5.3. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	6. Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		6. Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	6.1. Usernames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		6.1. Usernames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	6.2. Passwords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		6.2. Passwords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	7.1. UsernameIdentifierClass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		7.1. UsernameIdentifierClass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	7.2. PasswordFreeformClass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		7.2. PasswordFreeformClass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	8.1. Password/Passphrase Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		8.1. Password/Passphrase Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	8.2. Identifier Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		8.2. Identifier Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	8.3. Reuse of PRECIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		8.3. Reuse of PRECIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	8.4. Reuse of Unicode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		8.4. Reuse of Unicode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	Appendix A. Differences from RFC 4013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		Appendix A. Differences from RFC 4013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	Appendix B. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		Appendix B. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	Usernames and passwords are widely used for authentication and		Usernames and passwords are widely used for authentication and
	authorization on the Internet, either directly when provided in		authorization on the Internet, either directly when provided in
	plaintext (as in the SASL PLAIN mechanism [RFC4616] or the HTTP Basic		plaintext (as in the SASL PLAIN mechanism [RFC4616] or the HTTP Basic
	scheme [RFC2617]) or indirectly when provided as the input to a		scheme [RFC2617]) or indirectly when provided as the input to a
	cryptographic algorithm such as a hash function (as in the SASL SCRAM		cryptographic algorithm such as a hash function (as in the SASL SCRAM
	mechanism [RFC5802] or the HTTP Digest scheme [RFC2617]). To		mechanism [RFC5802] or the HTTP Digest scheme [RFC2617]). To
	increase the likelihood that the input and comparison of usernames		increase the likelihood that the input and comparison of usernames
	skipping to change at page 5, line 39 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 36 ¶
	; point that conforms to RFC 5890		; point that conforms to RFC 5890
	;		;
	All code points and blocks not explicitly allowed in the PRECIS		All code points and blocks not explicitly allowed in the PRECIS
	IdentifierClass are disallowed; this includes private use characters,		IdentifierClass are disallowed; this includes private use characters,
	surrogate code points, and the other code points and blocks that were		surrogate code points, and the other code points and blocks that were
	defined as "Prohibited Output" in [RFC4013]. In addition, common		defined as "Prohibited Output" in [RFC4013]. In addition, common
	constructions such as "user@example.com" are allowed as usernames		constructions such as "user@example.com" are allowed as usernames
	under this specification, as they were under [RFC4013].		under this specification, as they were under [RFC4013].
			Implementation Note: The username construct defined in this
			document does not necessarily match what all deployed applications
			might refer to as a "username" or "userid", but instead provides a
			relatively safe subset of Unicode characters that can be used in
			existing SASL mechanisms and SASL-using application protocols, and
			even in most application protocols that do not currently use SASL.
	4.2. Preparation		4.2. Preparation
	Each userpart of a username MUST conform to the		Each userpart of a username MUST conform to the
	"UsernameIdentifierClass" profile of the PRECIS IdentifierClass,		"UsernameIdentifierClass" profile of the PRECIS IdentifierClass,
	which is defined as follows:		which is defined as follows:
	1. The base string class is the "IdentifierClass" specified in		1. The base string class is the "IdentifierClass" specified in
	[I-D.ietf-precis-framework].		[I-D.ietf-precis-framework].
	2. Fullwidth and halfwidth characters MUST be mapped to their		2. Fullwidth and halfwidth characters MUST be mapped to their
	decomposition equivalents.		decomposition mappings.
	3. So-called additional mappings MAY be applied, such as those
	defined in [I-D.ietf-precis-mappings].
	4. Uppercase and titlecase characters might be mapped to their		3. So-called additional mappings MAY be applied, such as mapping of
			delimiters (e.g., characters such as '@', ':', '/', '+', and '-')
			and special handling of certain characters or classes of
			characters (e.g., mapping of non-ASCII spaces to ASCII space or
			mapping of control characters to nothing); the PRECIS mappings
			document [I-D.ietf-precis-mappings] describes such mappings in
			more detail.
			4. Depending on the SASL mechanism, SASL-using application protocol,
			or non-SASL-using application protocol in question, uppercase and
			titlecase characters might or might not be mapped to their
	lowercase equivalents (see Section 4.2.1 below).		lowercase equivalents (see Section 4.2.1 below).
	5. Unicode Normalization Form C (NFC) MUST be applied to all		5. Unicode Normalization Form C (NFC) MUST be applied to all
	characters.		characters.
	With regard to directionality, the "Bidi Rule" provided in [RFC5893]		With regard to directionality, the "Bidi Rule" provided in [RFC5893]
	applies.		applies.
	A username MUST NOT be zero bytes in length. This rule is to be		A username MUST NOT be zero bytes in length. This rule is to be
	enforced after any normalization and mapping of code points.		enforced after any normalization and mapping of code points.
	In protocols that provide usernames as input to a cryptographic		In protocols that provide usernames as input to a cryptographic
	skipping to change at page 6, line 41 ¶		skipping to change at page 7, line 6 ¶
	In particular:		In particular:
	o SASL mechanisms that directly re-use this profile MUST specify		o SASL mechanisms that directly re-use this profile MUST specify
	whether and when case mapping is to be applied to authentication		whether and when case mapping is to be applied to authentication
	identifiers. SASL mechanisms SHOULD delay any case mapping to the		identifiers. SASL mechanisms SHOULD delay any case mapping to the
	last possible moment, such as when doing a lookup by username,		last possible moment, such as when doing a lookup by username,
	username comparisons, or generating a cryptographic salt from a		username comparisons, or generating a cryptographic salt from a
	username (if the last possible moment happens on the server, then		username (if the last possible moment happens on the server, then
	decisions about case mapping can be a matter of deployment		decisions about case mapping can be a matter of deployment
	policy). In keeping with RFC4422, SASL mechanisms are not to		policy). In keeping with [RFC4422], SASL mechanisms are not to
	apply this or any other profile to authorization identifiers.		apply this or any other profile to authorization identifiers.
	o Application protocols that use SASL (such as IMAP [RFC3501] and		o Application protocols that use SASL (such as IMAP [RFC3501] and
	XMPP [RFC6120]) and that directly re-use this profile MUST specify		XMPP [RFC6120]) and that directly re-use this profile MUST specify
	whether case mapping is to be applied to authorization		whether case mapping is to be applied to authorization
	identifiers. Such "SASL application protocols" SHOULD delay any		identifiers. Such "SASL application protocols" SHOULD delay any
	case mapping of authorization identifiers to the last possible		case mapping of authorization identifiers to the last possible
	moment, which happens to necessarily be on the server side (this		moment, which happens to necessarily be on the server side (this
	enables decisions about case mapping to be a matter of deployment		enables decisions about case mapping to be a matter of deployment
	policy). In keeping with RFC4422, SASL application protocols are		policy). In keeping with [RFC4422], SASL application protocols
	not to apply this or any other profile to authentication		are not to apply this or any other profile to authentication
	identifiers.		identifiers.
	o Application protocols that do not use SASL (such as HTTP		o Application protocols that do not use SASL (such as HTTP
	authentication with the Basic and Digest schemes [RFC2617]) MUST		authentication with the Basic and Digest schemes [RFC2617]) MUST
	specify whether and when case mapping is to be applied to		specify whether and when case mapping is to be applied to
	authentication identifiers and authorization identifiers. Such		authentication identifiers and authorization identifiers. Such
	"non-SASL application protocols" SHOULD delay any case mapping to		"non-SASL application protocols" SHOULD delay any case mapping to
	the last possible moment, such as when doing a lookup by username,		the last possible moment, such as when doing a lookup by username,
	username comparisons, or generating a cryptographic salt from a		username comparisons, or generating a cryptographic salt from a
	username (if the last possible moment happens on the server, then		username (if the last possible moment happens on the server, then
	skipping to change at page 10, line 15 ¶		skipping to change at page 10, line 14 ¶
	surrogate code points, and the other code points and blocks defined		surrogate code points, and the other code points and blocks defined
	as "Prohibited Output" in Section 2.3 of RFC 4013.		as "Prohibited Output" in Section 2.3 of RFC 4013.
	5.2. Preparation		5.2. Preparation
	A password MUST conform to the "PasswordFreeformClass" profile of the		A password MUST conform to the "PasswordFreeformClass" profile of the
	PRECIS FreeformClass, which is defined as follows:		PRECIS FreeformClass, which is defined as follows:
	1. The base string class is the "FreeformClass" specified in		1. The base string class is the "FreeformClass" specified in
	[I-D.ietf-precis-framework].		[I-D.ietf-precis-framework].
	2. Fullwidth and halfwidth characters MUST NOT be mapped to their		2. Fullwidth and halfwidth characters MUST NOT be mapped to their
	decomposition equivalents.		decomposition mappings.
	3. Any instances of non-ASCII space MUST be mapped to ASCII space		3. Any instances of non-ASCII space MUST be mapped to ASCII space
	(U+0020).		(U+0020).
	4. So-called additional mappings MAY be applied, such as those
	defined in [I-D.ietf-precis-mappings].		4. Uppercase and titlecase characters MUST NOT be mapped to their
	5. Uppercase and titlecase characters MUST NOT be mapped to their
	lowercase equivalents.		lowercase equivalents.
	6. Unicode Normalization Form C (NFC) MUST be applied to all
			5. Unicode Normalization Form C (NFC) MUST be applied to all
	characters.		characters.
	With regard to directionality, the "Bidi Rule" (defined in [RFC5893])		With regard to directionality, the "Bidi Rule" (defined in [RFC5893])
	and similar rules are unnecessary and inapplicable to passwords,		and similar rules are unnecessary and inapplicable to passwords,
	since they can reduce the range of characters that are allowed in a		since they can reduce the range of characters that are allowed in a
	string and therefore reduce the amount of entropy that is possible in		string and therefore reduce the amount of entropy that is possible in
	a password. Furthermore, such rules are intended to minimize the		a password. Furthermore, such rules are intended to minimize the
	possibility that the same string will be displayed differently on a		possibility that the same string will be displayed differently on a
	system set for right-to-left display and a system set for left-to-		system set for right-to-left display and a system set for left-to-
	right display; however, passwords are typically not displayed at all		right display; however, passwords are typically not displayed at all
	skipping to change at page 12, line 20 ¶		skipping to change at page 12, line 16 ¶
	equivalents to those equivalents, whereas the PRECIS		equivalents to those equivalents, whereas the PRECIS
	IdentifierClass entirely disallows Unicode code points with		IdentifierClass entirely disallows Unicode code points with
	compatibility equivalents (i.e., during comparison NFKC is more		compatibility equivalents (i.e., during comparison NFKC is more
	"aggressive" about finding matches than is NFC). A few examples		"aggressive" about finding matches than is NFC). A few examples
	might suffice to indicate the nature of the problem: (1) U+017F		might suffice to indicate the nature of the problem: (1) U+017F
	LATIN SMALL LETTER LONG S is compatibility equivalent to U+0073		LATIN SMALL LETTER LONG S is compatibility equivalent to U+0073
	LATIN SMALL LETTER S (2) U+2163 ROMAN NUMERAL FOUR is		LATIN SMALL LETTER S (2) U+2163 ROMAN NUMERAL FOUR is
	compatibility equivalent to U+0049 LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I and		compatibility equivalent to U+0049 LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I and
	U+0056 LATIN CAPITAL LETTER V (3) U+FB01 LATIN SMALL LIGATURE FI		U+0056 LATIN CAPITAL LETTER V (3) U+FB01 LATIN SMALL LIGATURE FI
	is compatibility equivalent to U+0066 LATIN SMALL LETTER F and		is compatibility equivalent to U+0066 LATIN SMALL LETTER F and
	U+0069 LATIN SMALL LETTER I. Under SASLprep, the use of NFKC also		U+0069 LATIN SMALL LETTER I. Under SASLprep, the use of NFKC also
	handled the mapping of fullwidth and halfwidth code points to		handled the mapping of fullwidth and halfwidth code points to
	their decomposition equivalents (see [I-D.ietf-precis-mappings]).		their decomposition mappings. Although it is expected that code
	Although it is expected that code points with compatibility		points with compatibility equivalents are rare in existing
	equivalents are rare in existing usernames, for migration purposes		usernames, for migration purposes deployments might want to search
	deployments might want to search their database of usernames for		their database of usernames for Unicode code points with
	Unicode code points with compatibility equivalents and map those		compatibility equivalents and map those code points to their
	code points to their compatibility equivalents.		compatibility equivalents.
	o SASLprep mapped the "characters commonly mapped to nothing" from		o SASLprep mapped the "characters commonly mapped to nothing" from
	Appendix B.1 of [RFC3454]) to nothing, whereas the PRECIS		Appendix B.1 of [RFC3454]) to nothing, whereas the PRECIS
	IdentifierClass entirely disallows most of these characters, which		IdentifierClass entirely disallows most of these characters, which
	correspond to the code points from the "M" category defined under		correspond to the code points from the "M" category defined under
	Section 6.13 of [I-D.ietf-precis-framework] (with the exception of		Section 6.13 of [I-D.ietf-precis-framework] (with the exception of
	U+1806 MONGOLIAN TODO SOFT HYPHEN, which was "commonly mapped to		U+1806 MONGOLIAN TODO SOFT HYPHEN, which was "commonly mapped to
	nothing" in Unicode 3.2 but at the time of this writing does not		nothing" in Unicode 3.2 but at the time of this writing does not
	have a derived property of Default_Ignorable_Code_Point in Unicode		have a derived property of Default_Ignorable_Code_Point in Unicode
	6.2). For migration purposes, deployments might want to remove		6.2). For migration purposes, deployments might want to remove
	skipping to change at page 13, line 20 ¶		skipping to change at page 13, line 19 ¶
	Unicode Normalization Form C (NFC). Because NFKC is more		Unicode Normalization Form C (NFC). Because NFKC is more
	aggressive about finding matches than NFC, in practice this change		aggressive about finding matches than NFC, in practice this change
	is unlikely to cause significant problems and indeed has the		is unlikely to cause significant problems and indeed has the
	security benefit of probably resulting in fewer false positives		security benefit of probably resulting in fewer false positives
	when comparing passwords. A few examples might suffice to		when comparing passwords. A few examples might suffice to
	indicate the nature of the problem: (1) U+017F LATIN SMALL LETTER		indicate the nature of the problem: (1) U+017F LATIN SMALL LETTER
	LONG S is compatibility equivalent to U+0073 LATIN SMALL LETTER S		LONG S is compatibility equivalent to U+0073 LATIN SMALL LETTER S
	(2) U+2163 ROMAN NUMERAL FOUR is compatibility equivalent to		(2) U+2163 ROMAN NUMERAL FOUR is compatibility equivalent to
	U+0049 LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I and U+0056 LATIN CAPITAL LETTER V		U+0049 LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I and U+0056 LATIN CAPITAL LETTER V
	(3) U+FB01 LATIN SMALL LIGATURE FI is compatibility equivalent to		(3) U+FB01 LATIN SMALL LIGATURE FI is compatibility equivalent to
	U+0066 LATIN SMALL LETTER F and U+0069 LATIN SMALL LETTER I. Under		U+0066 LATIN SMALL LETTER F and U+0069 LATIN SMALL LETTER I.
	SASLprep, the use of NFKC also handled the mapping of fullwidth		Under SASLprep, the use of NFKC also handled the mapping of
	and halfwidth code points to their decomposition equivalents (see		fullwidth and halfwidth code points to their decomposition
	[I-D.ietf-precis-mappings]). Although it is expected that code		mappings. Although it is expected that code points with
	points with compatibility equivalents are rare in existing		compatibility equivalents are rare in existing passwords, some
	passwords, some passwords that matched when SASLprep was used		passwords that matched when SASLprep was used might no longer work
	might no longer work when the rules in this specification are		when the rules in this specification are applied.
	applied.
	o SASLprep mapped the "characters commonly mapped to nothing" from		o SASLprep mapped the "characters commonly mapped to nothing" from
	Appendix B.1 of [RFC3454]) to nothing, whereas the PRECIS		Appendix B.1 of [RFC3454]) to nothing, whereas the PRECIS
	FreeformClass entirely disallows such characters, which correspond		FreeformClass entirely disallows such characters, which correspond
	to the code points from the "M" category defined under Section		to the code points from the "M" category defined under
	6.13 of [I-D.ietf-precis-framework] (with the exception of U+1806		Section 6.13 of [I-D.ietf-precis-framework] (with the exception of
	MONGOLIAN TODO SOFT HYPHEN, which was commonly mapped to nothing		U+1806 MONGOLIAN TODO SOFT HYPHEN, which was commonly mapped to
	in Unicode 3.2 but at the time of this writing is allowed by		nothing in Unicode 3.2 but at the time of this writing is allowed
	Unicode 6.2). In practice, this change will probably have no		by Unicode 6.2). In practice, this change will probably have no
	effect on comparison, but user-oriented software might reject such		effect on comparison, but user-oriented software might reject such
	code points instead of ignoring them during password preparation.		code points instead of ignoring them during password preparation.
	7. IANA Considerations		7. IANA Considerations
	The IANA shall add the following entries to the PRECIS Profiles		The IANA shall add the following entries to the PRECIS Profiles
	Registry.		Registry.
	7.1. UsernameIdentifierClass		7.1. UsernameIdentifierClass
	Name: UsernameIdentifierClass.		Name: UsernameIdentifierClass.
	Applicability: Usernames in security and application protocols.		Applicability: Usernames in security and application protocols.
	Base Class: IdentifierClass.		Base Class: IdentifierClass.
	Replaces: The SASLprep profile of Stringprep.		Replaces: The SASLprep profile of Stringprep.
	Width Mapping: Map fullwidth and halfwidth characters to their		Width Mapping: Map fullwidth and halfwidth characters to their
	decomposition equivalents.		decomposition mappings.
	Additional Mappings: None required or recommended.		Additional Mappings: None required or recommended.
	Case Mapping: To be defined by security or application protocols		Case Mapping: To be defined by security or application protocols
	that use this profile.		that use this profile.
	Normalization: NFC.		Normalization: NFC.
	Directionality: The "Bidi Rule" defined in RFC 5893 applies.		Directionality: The "Bidi Rule" defined in RFC 5893 applies.
	Exclusions: None.		Exclusions: None.
	Enforcement: To be defined by security or application protocols that		Enforcement: To be defined by security or application protocols that
	use this profile.		use this profile.
	Specification: RFC XXXX. [Note to RFC Editor: please change XXXX to		Specification: RFC XXXX. [Note to RFC Editor: please change XXXX to
	the number issued for this specification.]		the number issued for this specification.]
	7.2. PasswordFreeformClass		7.2. PasswordFreeformClass
	Name: PasswordFreeformClass.		Name: PasswordFreeformClass.
	Applicability: Passwords in security and application protocols.		Applicability: Passwords in security and application protocols.
	Base Class: FreeformClass		Base Class: FreeformClass
	Replaces: The SASLprep profile of Stringprep.		Replaces: The SASLprep profile of Stringprep.
	Width Mapping: None.		Width Mapping: None.
	Additional Mappings: Map non-ASCII space characters to ASCII space.		Additional Mappings: Map non-ASCII space characters to ASCII space.
	Case Mapping: None.		Case Mapping: None.
	Normalization: NFC.		Normalization: NFC.
	Directionality: None.		Directionality: None.
	Exclusions: None.		Exclusions: None.
	Enforcement: To be defined by security or application protocols that		Enforcement: To be defined by security or application protocols that
	use this profile.		use this profile.
	Specification: RFC XXXX.		Specification: RFC XXXX.
	8. Security Considerations		8. Security Considerations
	8.1. Password/Passphrase Strength		8.1. Password/Passphrase Strength
	The ability to include a wide range of characters in passwords and		The ability to include a wide range of characters in passwords and
	passphrases can increase the potential for creating a strong password		passphrases can increase the potential for creating a strong password
	with high entropy. However, in practice, the ability to include such		with high entropy. However, in practice, the ability to include such
	characters ought to be weighed against the possible need to reproduce		characters ought to be weighed against the possible need to reproduce
	skipping to change at page 15, line 26 ¶		skipping to change at page 15, line 41 ¶
	The security considerations described in [UTS39] apply to the use of		The security considerations described in [UTS39] apply to the use of
	Unicode characters in usernames and passwords.		Unicode characters in usernames and passwords.
	9. References		9. References
	9.1. Normative References		9.1. Normative References
	[I-D.ietf-precis-framework]		[I-D.ietf-precis-framework]
	Saint-Andre, P. and M. Blanchet, "Precis Framework:		Saint-Andre, P. and M. Blanchet, "Precis Framework:
	Handling Internationalized Strings in Protocols",		Handling Internationalized Strings in Protocols", draft-
	draft-ietf-precis-framework-12 (work in progress),		ietf-precis-framework-15 (work in progress), March 2014.
	November 2013.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
	[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO		[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
	10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.		10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.
	[RFC5234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax		[RFC5234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
	Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.		Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.
	[UNICODE] The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard, Version		[UNICODE] The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard, Version
	6.1", 2012,		6.1", 2012,
	<http://www.unicode.org/versions/Unicode6.1.0/>.		<http://www.unicode.org/versions/Unicode6.1.0/>.
	9.2. Informative References		9.2. Informative References
	[I-D.ietf-precis-mappings]		[I-D.ietf-precis-mappings]
	Yoneya, Y. and T. NEMOTO, "Mapping characters for PRECIS		Yoneya, Y. and T. NEMOTO, "Mapping characters for PRECIS
	classes", draft-ietf-precis-mappings-05 (work in		classes", draft-ietf-precis-mappings-07 (work in
	progress), October 2013.		progress), February 2014.
	[RFC20] Cerf, V., "ASCII format for network interchange", RFC 20,		[RFC20] Cerf, V., "ASCII format for network interchange", RFC 20,
	October 1969.		October 1969.
	[RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,		[RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
	Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP		Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
	Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",		Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
	RFC 2617, June 1999.		RFC 2617, June 1999.
	[RFC3454] Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, "Preparation of		[RFC3454] Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, "Preparation of
	Internationalized Strings ("stringprep")", RFC 3454,		Internationalized Strings ("stringprep")", RFC 3454,
	December 2002.		December 2002.
	[RFC3501] Crispin, M., "INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - VERSION		[RFC3501] Crispin, M., "INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - VERSION
	4rev1", RFC 3501, March 2003.		4rev1", RFC 3501, March 2003.
	[RFC4013] Zeilenga, K., "SASLprep: Stringprep Profile for User Names		[RFC4013] Zeilenga, K., "SASLprep: Stringprep Profile for User Names
	and Passwords", RFC 4013, February 2005.		and Passwords", RFC 4013, February 2005.
	[RFC4422] Melnikov, A., Ed. and K. Zeilenga, Ed., "Simple		[RFC4422] Melnikov, A., Ed. and K. Zeilenga, Ed., "Simple
	Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422,		Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422, June
	June 2006.		2006.
	[RFC4616] Zeilenga, K., "The PLAIN Simple Authentication and		[RFC4616] Zeilenga, K., "The PLAIN Simple Authentication and
	Security Layer (SASL) Mechanism", RFC 4616, August 2006.		Security Layer (SASL) Mechanism", RFC 4616, August 2006.
	[RFC5802] Newman, C., Menon-Sen, A., Melnikov, A., and N. Williams,		[RFC5802] Newman, C., Menon-Sen, A., Melnikov, A., and N. Williams,
	"Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism		"Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism
	(SCRAM) SASL and GSS-API Mechanisms", RFC 5802, July 2010.		(SCRAM) SASL and GSS-API Mechanisms", RFC 5802, July 2010.
	[RFC5890] Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for		[RFC5890] Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for
	Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework",		Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework",
	skipping to change at page 17, line 31 ¶		skipping to change at page 17, line 45 ¶
	allowed (this "inclusion model" was originally used for		allowed (this "inclusion model" was originally used for
	internationalized domain names in [RFC5891]; see [RFC5894] for		internationalized domain names in [RFC5891]; see [RFC5894] for
	further discussion). It is important to keep this distinction in		further discussion). It is important to keep this distinction in
	mind when comparing the technology defined in this document to		mind when comparing the technology defined in this document to
	SASLprep [RFC4013].		SASLprep [RFC4013].
	The following substantive modifications were made from RFC 4013.		The following substantive modifications were made from RFC 4013.
	o A single SASLprep algorithm was replaced by two separate		o A single SASLprep algorithm was replaced by two separate
	algorithms: one for usernames and another for passwords.		algorithms: one for usernames and another for passwords.
	o The new preparation algorithms use PRECIS instead of a stringprep		o The new preparation algorithms use PRECIS instead of a stringprep
	profile. The new algorithms work independenctly of Unicode		profile. The new algorithms work independenctly of Unicode
	versions.		versions.
	o As recommended in the PRECIS framwork, changed the Unicode		o As recommended in the PRECIS framwork, changed the Unicode
	normalization form to NFC (from NFKC).		normalization form to NFC (from NFKC).
	o Some Unicode code points that were mapped to nothing in RFC 4013		o Some Unicode code points that were mapped to nothing in RFC 4013
	are simply disallowed by PRECIS.		are simply disallowed by PRECIS.
	Appendix B. Acknowledgements		Appendix B. Acknowledgements
	The following individuals provided helpful feedback on this document:		The following individuals provided helpful feedback on this document:
	Marc Blanchet, Alan DeKok, Joe Hildebrand, Jeffrey Hutzelman, Simon		Marc Blanchet, Alan DeKok, Joe Hildebrand, Jeffrey Hutzelman, Simon
	Josefsson, Jonathan Lennox, Matt Miller, Chris Newman, Yutaka OIWA,		Josefsson, Jonathan Lennox, Matt Miller, Chris Newman, Yutaka OIWA,
	Pete Resnick, Andrew Sullivan, and Nico Williams (Nico in particular		Pete Resnick, Andrew Sullivan, and Nico Williams (Nico in particular
	provided text that was used in Section 4.2.1). Thanks also to		provided text that was used in Section 4.2.1). Thanks also to
	Yoshiro YONEYA and Takahiro NEMOTO for implementation feedback.		Yoshiro YONEYA and Takahiro NEMOTO for implementation feedback.
	This document borrows some text from [RFC4013] and [RFC6120].		This document borrows some text from [RFC4013] and [RFC6120].
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Peter Saint-Andre		Peter Saint-Andre
	Cisco Systems, Inc.		&yet
	1899 Wynkoop Street, Suite 600		P.O. Box 787
	Denver, CO 80202		Parker, CO 80134
	USA		USA
	Phone: +1-303-308-3282		Email: ietf@stpeter.im
	Email: psaintan@cisco.com
	Alexey Melnikov		Alexey Melnikov
	Isode Ltd		Isode Ltd
	5 Castle Business Village		5 Castle Business Village
	36 Station Road		36 Station Road
	Hampton, Middlesex TW12 2BX		Hampton, Middlesex TW12 2BX
	UK		UK
	Email: Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com		Email: Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com
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