< draft-ietf-raw-ldacs-05.txt		draft-ietf-raw-ldacs-06.txt >
	RAW N. Maeurer, Ed.		RAW N. Maeurer, Ed.
	Internet-Draft T. Graeupl, Ed.		Internet-Draft T. Graeupl, Ed.
	Intended status: Informational German Aerospace Center (DLR)		Intended status: Informational German Aerospace Center (DLR)
	Expires: 5 May 2021 C. Schmitt, Ed.		Expires: 29 July 2021 C. Schmitt, Ed.
	Research Institute CODE, UniBwM		Research Institute CODE, UniBwM
	1 November 2020		25 January 2021
	L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS)		L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS)
	draft-ietf-raw-ldacs-05		draft-ietf-raw-ldacs-06
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document provides an overview of the architecture of the L-band		This document provides an overview of the architecture of the L-band
	Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS), which provides a		Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS), which provides a
	secure, scalable and spectrum efficient terrestrial data link for		secure, scalable and spectrum efficient terrestrial data link for
	civil aviation. LDACS is a scheduled, reliable multi-application		civil aviation. LDACS is a scheduled, reliable multi-application
	cellular broadband system with support for IPv6. LDACS SHALL provide		cellular broadband system with support for IPv6. LDACS SHALL provide
	a data link for IP network-based aircraft guidance. High reliability		a data link for IP network-based aircraft guidance. High reliability
	and availability for IP connectivity over LDACS are therefore		and availability for IP connectivity over LDACS are therefore
	skipping to change at page 1, line 39 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 39 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on 5 May 2021.		This Internet-Draft will expire on 29 July 2021.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
	license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.		license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
	Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights		Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
	and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components		and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
	extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text		extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
	as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are		as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
	provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.		provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
	skipping to change at page 2, line 51 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 51 ¶
	9.2. DLS Entity Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21		9.2. DLS Entity Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
	9.3. VI Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22		9.3. VI Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
	9.4. LME Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22		9.4. LME Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
	9.5. SNP Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22		9.5. SNP Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
	10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22		10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
	10.1. Reasons for Wireless Digital Aeronautical		10.1. Reasons for Wireless Digital Aeronautical
	Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22		Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
	10.2. Requirements for LDACS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23		10.2. Requirements for LDACS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
	10.3. Security Objectives for LDACS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24		10.3. Security Objectives for LDACS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
	10.4. Security Functions for LDACS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24		10.4. Security Functions for LDACS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
	10.5. Security Architectural Details for LDACS . . . . . . . . 24		10.5. Resulting Security Architectural Details . . . . . . . . 24
	10.5.1. Entities in LDACS Security Model . . . . . . . . . . 25		10.5.1. Entities in LDACS Security Model . . . . . . . . . . 25
	10.5.2. Matter of LDACS Entity Identification . . . . . . . 25		10.5.2. Matter of LDACS Entity Identification . . . . . . . 25
	10.5.3. Matter of LDACS Entity Authentication and Key		10.5.3. Matter of LDACS Entity Authentication and Key
	Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25		Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
	10.5.4. Matter of LDACS Message-in-transit Confidentiality,		10.5.4. Matter of LDACS Message-in-transit Confidentiality,
	Integrity and Authenticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26		Integrity and Authenticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
	10.6. Security Architecture for LDACS . . . . . . . . . . . . 26		10.6. Security Modules for LDACS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
	11. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27		11. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
	12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27		12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
	13. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27		13. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
	14. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27		14. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
	15. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27		15. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
	Appendix A. Selected Information from DO-350A . . . . . . . . . 30		Appendix A. Selected Information from DO-350A . . . . . . . . . 30
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	skipping to change at page 24, line 46 ¶		skipping to change at page 24, line 46 ¶
	These objectives were used to derive several security functions for		These objectives were used to derive several security functions for
	LDACS REQUIRED to be integrated in the LDACS cybersecurity		LDACS REQUIRED to be integrated in the LDACS cybersecurity
	architecture: (1) Identification, (2) Authentication, (3)		architecture: (1) Identification, (2) Authentication, (3)
	Authorization, (4) Confidentiality, (5) System Integrity, (6) Data		Authorization, (4) Confidentiality, (5) System Integrity, (6) Data
	Integrity, (7) Robustness, (8) Reliability, (9) Availability, and		Integrity, (7) Robustness, (8) Reliability, (9) Availability, and
	(10) Key and Trust Management. Several works investigated possible		(10) Key and Trust Management. Several works investigated possible
	measures to implement these security functions [BIL2017], [MAE20181],		measures to implement these security functions [BIL2017], [MAE20181],
	[MAE20191]. Having identified security requirements, objectives and		[MAE20191]. Having identified security requirements, objectives and
	functions it MUST be ensured that they are applicable.		functions it MUST be ensured that they are applicable.
	10.5. Security Architectural Details for LDACS		10.5. Resulting Security Architectural Details
	The requirements lead to a LDACS security model including different		The requirements lead to a LDACS security model including different
	entities for identification, authentication and authorization		entities for identification, authentication and authorization
	purposes ensuring integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of data		purposes ensuring integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of data
	in-transit especially.		in-transit especially.
	10.5.1. Entities in LDACS Security Model		10.5.1. Entities in LDACS Security Model
	A simplified LDACS architectural modelrequires the following		A simplified LDACS architectural modelrequires the following
	entities: Network operators such as the Societe Internationale de		entities: Network operators such as the Societe Internationale de
	skipping to change at page 26, line 34 ¶		skipping to change at page 26, line 34 ¶
	The subsequent key material from the previous step can then be used		The subsequent key material from the previous step can then be used
	to protect LDACS Layer 2 communications via applying encryption and		to protect LDACS Layer 2 communications via applying encryption and
	integrity protection measures on the SNP layer of the LDACS protocol		integrity protection measures on the SNP layer of the LDACS protocol
	stack. As LDACS transports AOC and ATS data, the integrity of that		stack. As LDACS transports AOC and ATS data, the integrity of that
	data is most important, while confidentiality only needs to be		data is most important, while confidentiality only needs to be
	applied to AOC data to protect business interests [ICA2018]. This		applied to AOC data to protect business interests [ICA2018]. This
	possibility of providing low layered confidentiality and integrity		possibility of providing low layered confidentiality and integrity
	protection ensures a secure delivery of user data over the air gap.		protection ensures a secure delivery of user data over the air gap.
	Furthermore it ensures integrity protection of LDACS control data.		Furthermore it ensures integrity protection of LDACS control data.
	10.6. Security Architecture for LDACS		10.6. Security Modules for LDACS
	A draft of the cybersecurity architecture of LDACS can be found in		A draft of the cybersecurity architecture of LDACS can be found in
	[ICA2018] and [MAE20182] and respective updates in [MAE20191],		[ICA2018] and [MAE20182] and respective updates in [MAE20191],
	[MAE20192], and [MAE2020]. It proposes the use of an own LDACS PKI,		[MAE20192], and [MAE2020]. It proposes the use of an own LDACS PKI,
	identity management based on aircraft identities and network operator		identity management based on aircraft identities and network operator
	identities (e.g., SITA and ARINC), public key certificates		identities (e.g., SITA and ARINC), public key certificates
	incorporated in the PKI based chain-of-trust and stored in the		incorporated in the PKI based chain-of-trust and stored in the
	entities allowing for mutual authentication and key exchange		entities allowing for mutual authentication and key exchange
	procedures, key derivation mechanisms for perfect forward secrecy and		procedures, key derivation mechanisms for perfect forward secrecy and
	user/control plane message-in-transit integrity and confidentiality		user/control plane message-in-transit integrity and confidentiality
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