| < draft-ietf-raw-ldacs-09.txt | draft-ietf-raw-ldacs-10.txt > | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RAW N. Maeurer, Ed. | RAW N. Maeurer, Ed. | |||
| Internet-Draft T. Graeupl, Ed. | Internet-Draft T. Graeupl, Ed. | |||
| Intended status: Informational German Aerospace Center (DLR) | Intended status: Informational German Aerospace Center (DLR) | |||
| Expires: 25 April 2022 C. Schmitt, Ed. | Expires: 22 September 2022 C. Schmitt, Ed. | |||
| Research Institute CODE, UniBwM | Research Institute CODE, UniBwM | |||
| 22 October 2021 | 21 March 2022 | |||
| L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) | L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) | |||
| draft-ietf-raw-ldacs-09 | draft-ietf-raw-ldacs-10 | |||
| Abstract | Abstract | |||
| This document gives an overview of the architecture of the L-band | This document gives an overview of the architecture of the L-band | |||
| Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS), which provides a | Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS), which provides a | |||
| secure, scalable and spectrum efficient terrestrial data link for | secure, scalable and spectrum efficient terrestrial data link for | |||
| civil aviation. LDACS is a scheduled, reliable multi-application | civil aviation. LDACS is a scheduled, reliable multi-application | |||
| cellular broadband system with support for IPv6. LDACS provides a | cellular broadband system with support for IPv6. LDACS provides a | |||
| data link for IPv6 network-based aircraft guidance. High reliability | data link for IPv6 network-based aircraft guidance. High reliability | |||
| and availability for IP connectivity over LDACS, as well as security, | and availability for IP connectivity over LDACS, as well as security, | |||
| skipping to change at page 1, line 39 ¶ | skipping to change at page 1, line 39 ¶ | |||
| Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering | Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering | |||
| Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute | Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute | |||
| working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- | working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- | |||
| Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. | Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. | |||
| Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months | Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months | |||
| and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any | and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any | |||
| time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference | time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference | |||
| material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." | material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." | |||
| This Internet-Draft will expire on 25 April 2022. | This Internet-Draft will expire on 22 September 2022. | |||
| Copyright Notice | Copyright Notice | |||
| Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the | Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the | |||
| document authors. All rights reserved. | document authors. All rights reserved. | |||
| This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal | This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal | |||
| Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ | Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ | |||
| license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. | license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. | |||
| Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights | Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights | |||
| and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components | and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components | |||
| extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text | extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as | |||
| as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are | described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are | |||
| provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. | provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. | |||
| Table of Contents | Table of Contents | |||
| 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 | 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 | |||
| 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 | 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 | |||
| 3. Motivation and Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 | 3. Motivation and Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 | |||
| 3.1. Voice Communications Today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 | 3.1. Voice Communications Today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 | |||
| 3.2. Data Communications Today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 | 3.2. Data Communications Today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 | |||
| 4. Provenance and Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 | 4. Provenance and Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 | |||
| 5. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 | 5. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 | |||
| 5.1. Advances Beyond the State-of-the-Art . . . . . . . . . . 9 | 5.1. Advances Beyond the State-of-the-Art . . . . . . . . . . 9 | |||
| 5.1.1. Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 | 5.1.1. Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 | |||
| 5.1.2. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 | 5.1.2. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 | |||
| 5.1.3. High Data Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 | 5.1.3. High Data Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 | |||
| 5.2. Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 | 5.2. Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 | |||
| 5.2.1. Air/Ground Multilink . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 | 5.2.1. Air/Ground Multilink . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 | |||
| 5.2.2. Air/Air Extension for LDACS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 | 5.2.2. Air/Air Extension for LDACS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 | |||
| 5.2.3. Flight Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 | 5.2.3. Flight Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 | |||
| 5.2.4. Business Communications of Airlines . . . . . . . . . 12 | 5.2.4. Business Communications of Airlines . . . . . . . . . 12 | |||
| 5.2.5. LDACS-based Navigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 | 5.2.5. LDACS-based Navigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 | |||
| 6. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 | 6. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 | |||
| 7. Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 | 7. Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 | |||
| 7.1. LDACS Sub-Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 | 7.1. LDACS Sub-Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 | |||
| 7.2. Topology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 | 7.2. Topology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 | |||
| 7.3. LDACS Protocol Stack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 | 7.3. LDACS Protocol Stack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 | |||
| 7.3.1. LDACS Physical Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 | 7.3.1. LDACS Physical Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 | |||
| 7.3.2. LDACS Data Link Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 | 7.3.2. LDACS Data Link Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 | |||
| 7.3.3. LDACS Sub-Network Layer and Protocol Services . . . . 19 | 7.3.3. LDACS Sub-Network Layer and Protocol Services . . . . 19 | |||
| 7.4. LDACS Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 | 7.4. LDACS Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 | |||
| 8. Reliability and Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 | 8. Reliability and Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 | |||
| 8.1. Below Layer 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 | 8.1. Below Layer 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 | |||
| 8.2. Layer 1 and 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 | 8.2. Layer 1 and 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 | |||
| 8.3. Beyond Layer 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 | 8.3. Beyond Layer 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 | |||
| 9. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 | 9. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 | |||
| 9.1. Security in Wireless Digital Aeronautical | 9.1. Security in Wireless Digital Aeronautical | |||
| Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 | Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 | |||
| 9.2. LDACS Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 | 9.2. LDACS Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 | |||
| 9.3. LDACS Security Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 | 9.3. LDACS Security Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 | |||
| 9.4. LDACS Security Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 | 9.4. LDACS Security Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 | |||
| 9.5. LDACS Security Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 | 9.5. LDACS Security Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 | |||
| 9.5.1. Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 | 9.5.1. Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 | |||
| 9.5.2. Entity Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 | 9.5.2. Entity Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 | |||
| 9.5.3. Entity Authentication and Key Establishment . . . . . 27 | 9.5.3. Entity Authentication and Key Establishment . . . . . 27 | |||
| 9.5.4. Message-in-transit Confidentiality, Integrity and | 9.5.4. Message-in-transit Confidentiality, Integrity and | |||
| Authenticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 | Authenticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 | |||
| 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 | 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 | |||
| 11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 | 11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 | |||
| 12. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 | 12. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 | |||
| 13. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 | 13. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 | |||
| Appendix A. Selected Information from DO-350A . . . . . . . . . 35 | Appendix A. Selected Information from DO-350A . . . . . . . . . 34 | |||
| Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 | Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 | |||
| 1. Introduction | 1. Introduction | |||
| One of the main pillars of the modern Air Traffic Management (ATM) | One of the main pillars of the modern Air Traffic Management (ATM) | |||
| system is the existence of a communications infrastructure that | system is the existence of a communications infrastructure that | |||
| enables efficient aircraft control and safe aircraft separation in | enables efficient aircraft control and safe aircraft separation in | |||
| all phases of flight. Current systems are technically mature but | all phases of flight. Current systems are technically mature but | |||
| suffering from the Very High Frequency (VHF) band's increasing | suffering from the Very High Frequency (VHF) band's increasing | |||
| saturation in high- density areas and the limitations posed by | saturation in high- density areas and the limitations posed by | |||
| analogue radio communications. Therefore, aviation globally, and the | analogue radio communications. Therefore, aviation globally, and the | |||
| skipping to change at page 4, line 43 ¶ | skipping to change at page 4, line 43 ¶ | |||
| In the context of safety-related communications, LDACS will play a | In the context of safety-related communications, LDACS will play a | |||
| major role in future ATM. ATN/IPS datalinks will provide diversified | major role in future ATM. ATN/IPS datalinks will provide diversified | |||
| terrestrial and space-based connectivity in a multi-link concept, | terrestrial and space-based connectivity in a multi-link concept, | |||
| called the Future Communications Infrastructure (FCI) [VIR2021]. | called the Future Communications Infrastructure (FCI) [VIR2021]. | |||
| From a technical point of view the FCI will realize airborne multi- | From a technical point of view the FCI will realize airborne multi- | |||
| homed IPv6 networks connected to a global ground network via at least | homed IPv6 networks connected to a global ground network via at least | |||
| two independent communication technologies. This is considered in | two independent communication technologies. This is considered in | |||
| more detail in related IETF work in progress [I-D.haindl-lisp-gb-atn] | more detail in related IETF work in progress [I-D.haindl-lisp-gb-atn] | |||
| [I-D.ietf-rtgwg-atn-bgp]. | [I-D.ietf-rtgwg-atn-bgp]. | |||
| In the context of WG-RAW, developing options, such as intelligent | In the context of the Reliable and Available Wireless (RAW) working | |||
| switching between datalinks, for reliably delivering content from and | group, developing options, such as intelligent switching between | |||
| to endpoints, is foreseen. As LDACS is part of such a concept, the | datalinks, for reliably delivering content from and to endpoints, is | |||
| work of RAW is immediately applicable. In general, with the | foreseen. As LDACS is part of such a concept, the work of RAW is | |||
| aeronautical communications system transitioning to ATN/IPS, and data | immediately applicable. In general, with the aeronautical | |||
| being transported via IPv6, closer cooperation and collaboration | communications system transitioning to ATN/IPS, and data being | |||
| between the aeronautical and IETF community is desirable. | transported via IPv6, closer cooperation and collaboration between | |||
| the aeronautical and IETF community is desirable. | ||||
| LDACS standardization within the framework of ICAO started in | LDACS standardization within the framework of ICAO started in | |||
| December 2016. The ICAO standardization group has produced an | December 2016. The ICAO standardization group has produced an | |||
| initial Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS) document | initial Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS) document | |||
| [ICA2018]. It defines the general characteristics of LDACS. The | [ICA2018]. It defines the general characteristics of LDACS. The | |||
| ICAO standardization group plans to produce an ICAO technical manual | ICAO standardization group plans to produce an ICAO technical manual | |||
| - the ICAO equivalent to a technical standard - within the next | - the ICAO equivalent to a technical standard - within the next | |||
| years. Generally, the group is open to input from all sources and | years. Generally, the group is open to input from all sources and | |||
| encourages cooperation between the aeronautical and the IETF | encourages cooperation between the aeronautical and the IETF | |||
| community. | community. | |||
| skipping to change at page 7, line 23 ¶ | skipping to change at page 7, line 23 ¶ | |||
| [RAW-TECHNOS]. | [RAW-TECHNOS]. | |||
| 3.1. Voice Communications Today | 3.1. Voice Communications Today | |||
| Voice links are used for Air/Ground (A/G) and Air/Air (A/A) | Voice links are used for Air/Ground (A/G) and Air/Air (A/A) | |||
| communications. The communications equipment is either ground-based | communications. The communications equipment is either ground-based | |||
| working in the High Frequency (HF) or VHF frequency band or | working in the High Frequency (HF) or VHF frequency band or | |||
| satellite-based. All VHF and HF voice communications are operated | satellite-based. All VHF and HF voice communications are operated | |||
| via open broadcast channels without authentication, encryption or | via open broadcast channels without authentication, encryption or | |||
| other protective measures. The use of well-proven communications | other protective measures. The use of well-proven communications | |||
| procedures via broadcast channels can help to enhance the safety of | procedures via broadcast channels, such as phraseology or read-backs, | |||
| communications. The main voice communications media is still the | requiring well-trained personnel, help to enhance the safety of | |||
| analogue VHF Double Side-Band Amplitude Modulation (DSB-AM) | communications, but does not replace necessary cryptographical | |||
| security mechanisms. The main voice communications media is still | ||||
| the analogue VHF Double Side-Band Amplitude Modulation (DSB-AM) | ||||
| communications technique, supplemented by HF single side-band | communications technique, supplemented by HF single side-band | |||
| amplitude modulation and satellite communications for remote and | amplitude modulation and satellite communications for remote and | |||
| oceanic regions. DSB-AM has been in use since 1948, works reliably | oceanic regions. DSB-AM has been in use since 1948, works reliably | |||
| and safely, and uses low-cost communication equipment. These are the | and safely, and uses low-cost communication equipment. These are the | |||
| main reasons why VHF DSB-AM communications are still in use, and it | main reasons why VHF DSB-AM communications are still in use, and it | |||
| is likely that this technology will remain in service for many more | is likely that this technology will remain in service for many more | |||
| years. This however, results in current operational limitations and | years. This however, results in current operational limitations and | |||
| impediments in deploying new ATM applications, such as flight-centric | impediments in deploying new ATM applications, such as flight-centric | |||
| operation with point-to-point communications between pilots and air | operation with point-to-point communications between pilots and air | |||
| traffic control officers. [BOE2019] | traffic control officers. [BOE2019] | |||
| skipping to change at page 7, line 48 ¶ | skipping to change at page 8, line 4 ¶ | |||
| Like for voice, data communications into the cockpit, are currently | Like for voice, data communications into the cockpit, are currently | |||
| provided by ground-based equipment operating either on HF or VHF | provided by ground-based equipment operating either on HF or VHF | |||
| radio bands or by legacy satellite systems. All these communication | radio bands or by legacy satellite systems. All these communication | |||
| systems are using narrowband radio channels with a data throughput | systems are using narrowband radio channels with a data throughput | |||
| capacity in the order of kilobits per second. While the aircraft is | capacity in the order of kilobits per second. While the aircraft is | |||
| on ground, some additional communications systems are available, like | on ground, some additional communications systems are available, like | |||
| the Aeronautical Mobile Airport Communications System (AeroMACS) or | the Aeronautical Mobile Airport Communications System (AeroMACS) or | |||
| public cellular networks, operating in the Airport (APT) domain and | public cellular networks, operating in the Airport (APT) domain and | |||
| able to deliver broadband communications capability. [BOE2019] | able to deliver broadband communications capability. [BOE2019] | |||
| For regulatory reasons, the data communications networks, used for | ||||
| The data communications networks, used for the transmission of data | the transmission of data relating to the safety and regularity of | |||
| relating to the safety and regularity of flight, must be strictly | flight, must be strictly isolated from those providing entertainment | |||
| isolated from those providing entertainment services to passengers. | services to passengers. This leads to a situation that the flight | |||
| crews are supported by narrowband services during flight while | ||||
| This leads to a situation that the flight crews are supported by | passengers have access to inflight broadband services. The current | |||
| narrowband services during flight while passengers have access to | HF and VHF data links cannot provide broadband services now or in the | |||
| inflight broadband services. The current HF and VHF data links | future, due to the lack of available spectrum. This technical | |||
| cannot provide broadband services now or in the future, due to the | shortcoming is becoming a limitation to enhanced ATM operations, such | |||
| lack of available spectrum. This technical shortcoming is becoming a | as trajectory-based operations and 4D trajectory negotiations. | |||
| limitation to enhanced ATM operations, such as trajectory-based | [BOE2019] | |||
| operations and 4D trajectory negotiations. [BOE2019] | ||||
| Satellite-based communications are currently under investigation and | Satellite-based communications are currently under investigation and | |||
| enhanced capabilities are under development which will be able to | enhanced capabilities are under development which will be able to | |||
| provide inflight broadband services and communications supporting the | provide inflight broadband services and communications supporting the | |||
| safety and regularity of flight. In parallel the ground-based | safety and regularity of flight. In parallel the ground-based | |||
| broadband data link technology LDACS is being standardized by ICAO | broadband data link technology LDACS is being standardized by ICAO | |||
| and has recently shown its maturity during flight tests [MAE20211] | and has recently shown its maturity during flight tests [MAE20211] | |||
| [BEL2021]. The LDACS technology is scalable, secure and spectrum | [BEL2021]. The LDACS technology is scalable, secure and spectrum | |||
| efficient and provides significant advantages to the users and | efficient and provides significant advantages to the users and | |||
| service providers. It is expected that both - satellite systems and | service providers. It is expected that both - satellite systems and | |||
| skipping to change at page 8, line 34 ¶ | skipping to change at page 8, line 37 ¶ | |||
| Plan (GNAP). [BOE2019] | Plan (GNAP). [BOE2019] | |||
| 4. Provenance and Documents | 4. Provenance and Documents | |||
| The development of LDACS has already made substantial progress in the | The development of LDACS has already made substantial progress in the | |||
| Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) framework and is currently | Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) framework and is currently | |||
| being continued in the follow-up program SESAR2020 [RIH2018]. A key | being continued in the follow-up program SESAR2020 [RIH2018]. A key | |||
| objective of these activities is to develop, implement and validate a | objective of these activities is to develop, implement and validate a | |||
| modern aeronautical data link able to evolve with aviation needs over | modern aeronautical data link able to evolve with aviation needs over | |||
| long-term. To this end, an LDACS specification has been produced | long-term. To this end, an LDACS specification has been produced | |||
| [GRA2019] and is continuously updated; transmitter demonstrators were | [GRA2020] and is continuously updated; transmitter demonstrators were | |||
| developed to test the spectrum compatibility of LDACS with legacy | developed to test the spectrum compatibility of LDACS with legacy | |||
| systems operating in the L-band [SAJ2014]; and the overall system | systems operating in the L-band [SAJ2014]; and the overall system | |||
| performance was analyzed by computer simulations, indicating that | performance was analyzed by computer simulations, indicating that | |||
| LDACS can fulfil the identified requirements [GRA2011]. | LDACS can fulfil the identified requirements [GRA2011]. | |||
| Up to now LDACS standardization has been focused on the development | Up to now LDACS standardization has been focused on the development | |||
| of the physical layer and the data link layer. Only recently have | of the physical layer and the data link layer. Only recently have | |||
| higher layers have come into the focus of the LDACS development | higher layers have come into the focus of the LDACS development | |||
| activities. There is currently no "IPv6 over LDACS" specification | activities. There is currently no "IPv6 over LDACS" specification | |||
| publicly available; however, SESAR2020 has started the testing of | publicly available; however, SESAR2020 has started the testing of | |||
| skipping to change at page 10, line 13 ¶ | skipping to change at page 10, line 24 ¶ | |||
| robustness measures [MAE20182] [MAE2021]. | robustness measures [MAE20182] [MAE2021]. | |||
| 5.1.3. High Data Rates | 5.1.3. High Data Rates | |||
| The user data rate of LDACS is 315 kbit/s to 1428 kbit/s on the | The user data rate of LDACS is 315 kbit/s to 1428 kbit/s on the | |||
| Forward Link (FL) for the Ground-to-Air (G2A) connection, and 294 | Forward Link (FL) for the Ground-to-Air (G2A) connection, and 294 | |||
| kbit/s to 1390 kbit/s on the Reverse Link (RL) for the Air-to-Ground | kbit/s to 1390 kbit/s on the Reverse Link (RL) for the Air-to-Ground | |||
| (A2G) connection, depending on coding and modulation. This is up to | (A2G) connection, depending on coding and modulation. This is up to | |||
| two orders of magnitude greater than current terrestrial digital | two orders of magnitude greater than current terrestrial digital | |||
| aeronautical communications systems, such as the VHF Data Link mode 2 | aeronautical communications systems, such as the VHF Data Link mode 2 | |||
| (VDLm2), provide [ICAO2019] [GRA2019]. | (VDLm2), provide [ICAO2019] [GRA2020]. | |||
| 5.2. Application | 5.2. Application | |||
| LDACS will be used by several aeronautical applications ranging from | LDACS will be used by several aeronautical applications ranging from | |||
| enhanced communications protocol stacks (multi-homed mobile IPv6 | enhanced communications protocol stacks (multi-homed mobile IPv6 | |||
| networks in the aircraft and potentially ad-hoc networks between | networks in the aircraft and potentially ad-hoc networks between | |||
| aircraft) to broadcast communication applications (sending Ground | aircraft) to broadcast communication applications (sending Ground | |||
| Based Augmentation System (GBAS) correction data) and integration | Based Augmentation System (GBAS) correction data) and integration | |||
| with other service domains (using the communications signal for | with other service domains (using the communications signal for | |||
| navigation) [MAE20211]. | navigation) [MAE20211]. | |||
| skipping to change at page 12, line 17 ¶ | skipping to change at page 12, line 28 ¶ | |||
| 5.2.4. Business Communications of Airlines | 5.2.4. Business Communications of Airlines | |||
| In addition to air traffic services, AOC services are transmitted | In addition to air traffic services, AOC services are transmitted | |||
| over LDACS. AOC is a generic term referring to the business | over LDACS. AOC is a generic term referring to the business | |||
| communication of airlines, between the airlines and service partners | communication of airlines, between the airlines and service partners | |||
| on the ground and their own aircraft in the air. Regulatory-wise, | on the ground and their own aircraft in the air. Regulatory-wise, | |||
| this is considered related to safety and regularity of flight and may | this is considered related to safety and regularity of flight and may | |||
| therefore be transmitted over LDACS. AOC communication is considered | therefore be transmitted over LDACS. AOC communication is considered | |||
| the main business case for LDACS communications service providers | the main business case for LDACS communications service providers | |||
| since modern aircraft generate significant amounts of data (i.e., | since modern aircraft generate significant amounts of data (e.g., | |||
| engine maintenance data). | engine maintenance data). | |||
| 5.2.5. LDACS-based Navigation | 5.2.5. LDACS-based Navigation | |||
| Beyond communications, radio signals can always also be used for | Beyond communications, radio signals can always also be used for | |||
| navigation. This fact is used for the LDACS navigation concept. | navigation. This fact is used for the LDACS navigation concept. | |||
| For future aeronautical navigation, ICAO recommends the further | For future aeronautical navigation, ICAO recommends the further | |||
| development of GNSS based technologies as primary means for | development of GNSS based technologies as primary means for | |||
| navigation. Due to the large separation between navigational | navigation. Due to the large separation between navigational | |||
| skipping to change at page 13, line 39 ¶ | skipping to change at page 13, line 47 ¶ | |||
| applies to the ground network. The avionics networks on the aircraft | applies to the ground network. The avionics networks on the aircraft | |||
| will likely be heavily modified versions of Ethernet or proprietary. | will likely be heavily modified versions of Ethernet or proprietary. | |||
| AOC applications currently mostly use the same stack (although some | AOC applications currently mostly use the same stack (although some | |||
| applications, like the graphical weather service may use the | applications, like the graphical weather service may use the | |||
| commercial passenger network). This creates capacity problems | commercial passenger network). This creates capacity problems | |||
| (resulting in excessive amounts of timeouts) since the underlying | (resulting in excessive amounts of timeouts) since the underlying | |||
| terrestrial data links do not provide sufficient bandwidth (i.e., | terrestrial data links do not provide sufficient bandwidth (i.e., | |||
| with VDLm2 currently in the order of 10 kbit/s). The use of non- | with VDLm2 currently in the order of 10 kbit/s). The use of non- | |||
| aviation specific data links is considered a security problem. | aviation specific data links is considered a security problem. | |||
| Ideally the aeronautical IP internetwork and the Internet should be | Ideally the aeronautical IP internetwork, hence the ATN over which | |||
| completely separated. | only communications related to safety and regularity of flight is | |||
| handled, and the Internet should be completely separated at Layer 3. | ||||
| The objective of LDACS is to provide a next generation terrestrial | The objective of LDACS is to provide a next generation terrestrial | |||
| data link designed to support IP addressing and provide much higher | data link designed to support IP addressing and provide much higher | |||
| bandwidth to avoid the currently experienced operational problems. | bandwidth to avoid the currently experienced operational problems. | |||
| The requirement for LDACS is therefore to provide a terrestrial high- | The requirement for LDACS is therefore to provide a terrestrial high- | |||
| throughput data link for IP internetworking in the aircraft. | throughput data link for IP internetworking in the aircraft. | |||
| In order to fulfil the above requirement LDACS needs to be | In order to fulfil the above requirement LDACS needs to be | |||
| interoperable with IP (and IP-based services like Voice-over-IP) at | interoperable with IP (and IP-based services like Voice-over-IP) at | |||
| skipping to change at page 14, line 38 ¶ | skipping to change at page 14, line 45 ¶ | |||
| LDACS will become one of several wireless access networks connecting | LDACS will become one of several wireless access networks connecting | |||
| aircraft to the ATN implemented by the FCI. | aircraft to the ATN implemented by the FCI. | |||
| The current LDACS design is focused on the specification of layer one | The current LDACS design is focused on the specification of layer one | |||
| and two. However, for the purpose of this work, only layer two | and two. However, for the purpose of this work, only layer two | |||
| details are discussed here. | details are discussed here. | |||
| Achieving the stringent continuity, availability, and integrity | Achieving the stringent continuity, availability, and integrity | |||
| requirements defined in [DO350A] will require the specification of | requirements defined in [DO350A] will require the specification of | |||
| layer 3 and above mechanisms (e.g. reliable crossover at the IP | layer 3 and above mechanisms (e.g. reliable crossover at the IP | |||
| layer). Fault management mechanisms are similarly undefined. Input | layer). Fault management mechanisms are similarly undefined. | |||
| from the working group will be appreciated here. | ||||
| 7.1. LDACS Sub-Network | 7.1. LDACS Sub-Network | |||
| An LDACS sub-network contains an Access Router (AR) and several GS, | An LDACS sub-network contains an Access Router (AR) and several GS, | |||
| each of them providing one LDACS radio cell. | each of them providing one LDACS radio cell. | |||
| User plane interconnection to the ATN is facilitated by the AR | User plane interconnection to the ATN is facilitated by the AR | |||
| peering with an A/G Router connected to the ATN. | peering with an A/G Router connected to the ATN. | |||
| The internal control plane of an LDACS sub-network interconnects the | The internal control plane of an LDACS sub-network interconnects the | |||
| skipping to change at page 18, line 37 ¶ | skipping to change at page 19, line 16 ¶ | |||
| 5. User data itself is communicated in the Data Channel (DCH) on the | 5. User data itself is communicated in the Data Channel (DCH) on the | |||
| FL and RL. | FL and RL. | |||
| Access to the FL and RL data channel is granted by the scheduling | Access to the FL and RL data channel is granted by the scheduling | |||
| mechanism implemented in the LME discussed below. | mechanism implemented in the LME discussed below. | |||
| 7.3.2.3. Voice Interface (VI) Services | 7.3.2.3. Voice Interface (VI) Services | |||
| The VI provides support for virtual voice circuits. Voice circuits | The VI provides support for virtual voice circuits. Voice circuits | |||
| may either be set-up permanently by the GS (e.g., to emulate voice | may either be set-up permanently by the GS (e.g., to emulate voice | |||
| party line) or may be created on demand. The creation and selection | party line) or may be created on demand. | |||
| of voice circuits is performed. | ||||
| 7.3.2.4. LDACS Management Entity (LME) Services | 7.3.2.4. LDACS Management Entity (LME) Services | |||
| The mobility management service in the LME provides support for | The mobility management service in the LME provides support for | |||
| registration and de-registration (cell entry and cell exit), scanning | registration and de-registration (cell entry and cell exit), scanning | |||
| RF channels of neighboring cells and handover between cells. In | RF channels of neighboring cells and handover between cells. In | |||
| addition, it manages the addressing of aircraft within cells. | addition, it manages the addressing of aircraft within cells. | |||
| The resource management service provides link maintenance (power, | The resource management service provides link maintenance (power, | |||
| frequency and time adjustments), support for adaptive coding and | frequency and time adjustments), support for adaptive coding and | |||
| skipping to change at page 20, line 36 ¶ | skipping to change at page 21, line 14 ¶ | |||
| LDACS medium access layer on top of the physical layer uses a static | LDACS medium access layer on top of the physical layer uses a static | |||
| frame structure to support deterministic timer management. As shown | frame structure to support deterministic timer management. As shown | |||
| in Figure 3 and Figure 4, LDACS framing structure is based on Super- | in Figure 3 and Figure 4, LDACS framing structure is based on Super- | |||
| Frames (SF) of 240ms duration corresponding to 2000 OFDM symbols. FL | Frames (SF) of 240ms duration corresponding to 2000 OFDM symbols. FL | |||
| and RL boundaries are aligned in time (from the GS perspective) | and RL boundaries are aligned in time (from the GS perspective) | |||
| allowing for deterministic slots for control and data channels. This | allowing for deterministic slots for control and data channels. This | |||
| initial AS time synchronization and time synchronization maintenance | initial AS time synchronization and time synchronization maintenance | |||
| is based on observing the synchronization symbol pairs that | is based on observing the synchronization symbol pairs that | |||
| repetitively occur within the FL stream, being sent by the | repetitively occur within the FL stream, being sent by the | |||
| controlling GS [GRA2019]. | controlling GS [GRA2020]. | |||
| ^ | ^ | |||
| | +------+------------+------------+------------+------------+ | | +------+------------+------------+------------+------------+ | |||
| | FL | BCCH | MF | MF | MF | MF | | | FL | BCCH | MF | MF | MF | MF | | |||
| F +------+------------+------------+------------+------------+ | F +------+------------+------------+------------+------------+ | |||
| r <---------------- Super-Frame (SF) - 240ms ----------------> | r <---------------- Super-Frame (SF) - 240ms ----------------> | |||
| e | e | |||
| q +------+------------+------------+------------+------------+ | q +------+------------+------------+------------+------------+ | |||
| u RL | RACH | MF | MF | MF | MF | | u RL | RACH | MF | MF | MF | MF | | |||
| e +------+------------+------------+------------+------------+ | e +------+------------+------------+------------+------------+ | |||
| skipping to change at page 22, line 44 ¶ | skipping to change at page 23, line 6 ¶ | |||
| The protocol used to communicate faults is not defined in the LDACS | The protocol used to communicate faults is not defined in the LDACS | |||
| specification. It is assumed that vendors would use industry | specification. It is assumed that vendors would use industry | |||
| standard protocols like the Simple Network Management Protocol or the | standard protocols like the Simple Network Management Protocol or the | |||
| Network Configuration Protocol, where security permits. | Network Configuration Protocol, where security permits. | |||
| The LDACS data link layer protocol, running on top of the medium | The LDACS data link layer protocol, running on top of the medium | |||
| access sub-layer, uses ARQ to provide reliable data transmission on | access sub-layer, uses ARQ to provide reliable data transmission on | |||
| the data channel. | the data channel. | |||
| It employs selective repeat ARQ with transparent fragmentation and | It employs selective repeat ARQ with transparent fragmentation and | |||
| reassembly to the resource allocation size to achieve low latency and | reassembly to the resource allocation size to minimize latency and | |||
| a low overhead without losing reliability. It ensures correct order | overhead without losing reliability. It ensures correct order of | |||
| of packet delivery without duplicates. In case of transmission | packet delivery without duplicates. In case of transmission errors, | |||
| errors, it identifies lost fragments with deterministic timers synced | it identifies lost fragments with deterministic timers synced to the | |||
| to the medium access frame structure and initiates retransmission. | medium access frame structure and initiates retransmission. | |||
| 8.3. Beyond Layer 2 | 8.3. Beyond Layer 2 | |||
| LDACS availability can be increased by appropriately deploying LDACS | LDACS availability can be increased by appropriately deploying LDACS | |||
| infrastructure: This means proliferating the number of terrestrial | infrastructure: This means proliferating the number of terrestrial | |||
| ground stations. However, the scarcity of aeronautical spectrum for | ground stations. However, the scarcity of aeronautical spectrum for | |||
| data link communication (in the case of LDACS: tens of MHz in the | data link communication (in the case of LDACS: tens of MHz in the | |||
| L-band) and the long range (in the case of LDACS: up to 200 nautical | L-band) and the long range (in the case of LDACS: up to 200 nautical | |||
| miles) make this quite hard. The deployment of a larger number of | miles) make this quite hard. While the deployment of a larger number | |||
| small cells is certainly possible, suffers, however, also from the | of small cells is one possible solution, this also suffers from the | |||
| scarcity of spectrum. An additional constraint to consider, is that | spectrum scarcity. An additional constraint to consider, is that | |||
| Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) is the primary user of the | Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) is the primary user of the | |||
| aeronautical L-band. That is, any LDACS deployment has to take DME | aeronautical L-band. That is, any LDACS deployment has to take DME | |||
| frequency planning into account. | frequency planning into account. | |||
| The aeronautical community has therefore decided not to rely on a | The aeronautical community has therefore decided not to rely on a | |||
| single communication system or frequency band. It is envisioned to | single communication system or frequency band. It is envisioned to | |||
| have multiple independent data link technologies in the aircraft | have multiple independent data link technologies in the aircraft | |||
| (e.g., terrestrial and satellite communications) in addition to | (e.g., terrestrial and satellite communications) in addition to | |||
| legacy VHF voice. | legacy VHF voice. | |||
| However, as of now, no reliability and availability mechanisms that | However, as of now, no reliability and availability mechanisms that | |||
| could utilize the multi-link architecture, have been specified on | could utilize the multi-link architecture, have been specified on | |||
| Layer 3 and above. Even if LDACS has been designed for reliability, | Layer 3 and above. Even if LDACS has been designed for reliability, | |||
| the wireless medium presents significant challenges to achieve | the wireless medium presents significant challenges to achieve | |||
| deterministic properties such as low packet error rate, bounded | deterministic properties such as low packet error rate, bounded | |||
| consecutive losses, and bounded latency. Support for high | consecutive losses, and bounded latency. Support for high | |||
| reliability and availability for IP connectivity over LDACS is | reliability and availability for IP connectivity over LDACS is | |||
| therefore, highly desirable, needs, however, to be adapted to the | certainly highly desirable but needs to be adapted to the specific | |||
| specific use case. | use case. | |||
| 9. Security | 9. Security | |||
| ICAO Doc 9896 foresees transport layer security [ICAO2015] for all | ICAO Doc 9896 foresees transport layer security [ICAO2015] for all | |||
| aeronautical data as described in ARINC P858 [ARI2021], most likely | aeronautical data as described in ARINC P858 [ARI2021], most likely | |||
| realized via Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [RFC6012] | realized via Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [RFC6012] | |||
| [RFC6347]. | [RFC6347]. | |||
| LDACS also needs to comply with in-depth security requirements, | LDACS also needs to comply with in-depth security requirements, | |||
| stated in P858, for the radio access technologies transporting ATN/ | stated in P858, for the radio access technologies transporting ATN/ | |||
| skipping to change at page 24, line 40 ¶ | skipping to change at page 24, line 40 ¶ | |||
| Most CNS technology developed in ICAO relies on open standards, thus | Most CNS technology developed in ICAO relies on open standards, thus | |||
| syntax and semantics of wireless digital aeronautical communications | syntax and semantics of wireless digital aeronautical communications | |||
| should be expected to be common knowledge for attackers. With | should be expected to be common knowledge for attackers. With | |||
| increased digitization and automation of civil aviation, the human as | increased digitization and automation of civil aviation, the human as | |||
| control instance, is being taken gradually out of the loop. | control instance, is being taken gradually out of the loop. | |||
| Autonomous transport drones or single piloted aircraft demonstrate | Autonomous transport drones or single piloted aircraft demonstrate | |||
| this trend. However, without profound cybersecurity measures such as | this trend. However, without profound cybersecurity measures such as | |||
| authenticity and integrity checks of messages in-transit on the | authenticity and integrity checks of messages in-transit on the | |||
| wireless link or mutual entity authentication, this lack of a control | wireless link or mutual entity authentication, this lack of a control | |||
| instance can prove disastrous. Thus, future digital communications | instance can prove disastrous. Thus, future digital communications | |||
| waveforms will need additional embedded security features to fulfill | will need additional embedded security features to fulfill modern | |||
| modern information security requirements like authentication and | information security requirements like authentication and integrity. | |||
| integrity. These security features require sufficient bandwidth | These security features require sufficient bandwidth which is beyond | |||
| which is beyond the capabilities of currently deployed VHF narrowband | the capabilities of currently deployed VHF narrowband communications | |||
| communications systems. For voice and data communications, | systems. For voice and data communications, sufficient data | |||
| sufficient data throughput capability is needed to support the | throughput capability is needed to support the security functions | |||
| security functions while not degrading performance. LDACS is a data | while not degrading performance. LDACS is a data link technology | |||
| link technology with sufficient bandwidth to incorporate security | with sufficient bandwidth to incorporate security without losing too | |||
| without losing too much user data throughput. | much user data throughput. | |||
| 9.2. LDACS Requirements | 9.2. LDACS Requirements | |||
| Overall, there are several business goals for cybersecurity to | Overall, there are several business goals for cybersecurity to | |||
| protect, within the FCI in civil aviation: | protect, within the FCI in civil aviation: | |||
| 1. Safety: The system must sufficiently mitigate attacks, which | 1. Safety: The system must sufficiently mitigate attacks, which | |||
| contribute to safety hazards. | contribute to safety hazards. | |||
| 2. Flight regularity: The system must sufficiently mitigate attacks, | 2. Flight regularity: The system must sufficiently mitigate attacks, | |||
| which contribute to delays, diversions, or cancellations of | which contribute to delays, diversions, or cancellations of | |||
| skipping to change at page 26, line 36 ¶ | skipping to change at page 26, line 36 ¶ | |||
| found in [ICA2018] and [MAE20182] and respective updates in | found in [ICA2018] and [MAE20182] and respective updates in | |||
| [MAE20191], [MAE20192], [MAE2020], and most recently [MAE2021]. | [MAE20191], [MAE20192], [MAE2020], and most recently [MAE2021]. | |||
| 9.5.1. Entities | 9.5.1. Entities | |||
| A simplified LDACS architectural model requires the following | A simplified LDACS architectural model requires the following | |||
| entities: Network operators such as the Societe Internationale de | entities: Network operators such as the Societe Internationale de | |||
| Telecommunications Aeronautiques (SITA) [SIT2020] and ARINC [ARI2020] | Telecommunications Aeronautiques (SITA) [SIT2020] and ARINC [ARI2020] | |||
| are providing access to the ground IPS network via an A/G LDACS | are providing access to the ground IPS network via an A/G LDACS | |||
| router. This router is attached to a closed off LDACS access | router. This router is attached to a closed off LDACS access | |||
| network, which connects via further (access routers to the different | network, which connects via further access routers to the different | |||
| LDACS cell ranges, each controlled by a GS (serving one LDACS cell), | LDACS cell ranges, each controlled by a GS (serving one LDACS cell), | |||
| with several interconnected GS spanning a local LDACS access network. | with several interconnected GS spanning a local LDACS access network. | |||
| Via the A/G wireless LDACS data link AS the aircraft is connected to | Via the A/G wireless LDACS data link AS the aircraft is connected to | |||
| the ground network and via the aircraft's VI and aircraft's network | the ground network and via the aircraft's VI and aircraft's network | |||
| interface, aircraft's data can be sent via the AS back to the GS, | interface, aircraft's data can be sent via the AS back to the GS, | |||
| then to the LDACS local access network, access routers, LDACS access | then to the LDACS local access network, access routers, LDACS access | |||
| network, A/G LDACS router and finally to the ground IPS network | network, A/G LDACS router and finally to the ground IPS network | |||
| [ICAO2015]. | [ICAO2015]. | |||
| 9.5.2. Entity Identification | 9.5.2. Entity Identification | |||
| skipping to change at page 27, line 40 ¶ | skipping to change at page 27, line 40 ¶ | |||
| certificate's content. First, all ground infrastructures must | certificate's content. First, all ground infrastructures must | |||
| mutually authenticate to each other, negotiate and derive keys and, | mutually authenticate to each other, negotiate and derive keys and, | |||
| thus, secure all ground connections. How this process is handled in | thus, secure all ground connections. How this process is handled in | |||
| detail is still an ongoing discussion. However, established methods | detail is still an ongoing discussion. However, established methods | |||
| to secure user plane by IPSec [RFC4301] and IKEv2 [RFC7296] or the | to secure user plane by IPSec [RFC4301] and IKEv2 [RFC7296] or the | |||
| application layer via TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] are conceivable. The LDACS | application layer via TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] are conceivable. The LDACS | |||
| PKI with their chain-of-trust approach, digital certificates and | PKI with their chain-of-trust approach, digital certificates and | |||
| public entity keys lay the groundwork for this step. In a second | public entity keys lay the groundwork for this step. In a second | |||
| step, the AS with the LDACS radio aboard, approaches an LDACS cell | step, the AS with the LDACS radio aboard, approaches an LDACS cell | |||
| and performs a cell-attachment procedure with the corresponding GS. | and performs a cell-attachment procedure with the corresponding GS. | |||
| This procedure consists of (1) the basic cell entry [GRA2019] and (2) | This procedure consists of (1) the basic cell entry [GRA2020] and (2) | |||
| a Mutual Authentication and Key Establishment (MAKE) procedure | a Mutual Authentication and Key Establishment (MAKE) procedure | |||
| [MAE2021]. | [MAE2021]. | |||
| Note, that LDACS will foresee multiple security levels. To address | Note, that LDACS will foresee multiple security levels. To address | |||
| the issue of the long service life of LDACS (i.e., possibly >30 | the issue of the long service life of LDACS (i.e., possibly >30 | |||
| years) and the security of current pre-quantum cryptography, these | years) and the security of current pre-quantum cryptography, these | |||
| security levels include pre- and post-quantum cryptographic | security levels include pre- and post-quantum cryptographic | |||
| solutions. Limiting security data on the LDACS datalink as much as | solutions. Limiting security data on the LDACS datalink as much as | |||
| possible, to reserve as much space for actual user data transmission, | possible, to reserve as much space for actual user data transmission, | |||
| is key in the LDACS security architecture, this is also reflected in | is key in the LDACS security architecture, this is also reflected in | |||
| skipping to change at page 28, line 17 ¶ | skipping to change at page 28, line 17 ¶ | |||
| 9.5.4. Message-in-transit Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity | 9.5.4. Message-in-transit Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity | |||
| The key material from the previous step can then be used to protect | The key material from the previous step can then be used to protect | |||
| LDACS Layer 2 communications via applying encryption and integrity | LDACS Layer 2 communications via applying encryption and integrity | |||
| protection measures on the SNP layer of the LDACS protocol stack. As | protection measures on the SNP layer of the LDACS protocol stack. As | |||
| LDACS transports AOC and ATS data, the integrity of that data is most | LDACS transports AOC and ATS data, the integrity of that data is most | |||
| important, while confidentiality only needs to be applied to AOC data | important, while confidentiality only needs to be applied to AOC data | |||
| to protect business interests [ICA2018]. This possibility of | to protect business interests [ICA2018]. This possibility of | |||
| providing low layered confidentiality and integrity protection | providing low layered confidentiality and integrity protection | |||
| ensures a secure delivery of user data over the air gap. | ensures a secure delivery of user data over the wireless link. | |||
| Furthermore, it ensures integrity protection of LDACS control data. | Furthermore, it ensures integrity protection of LDACS control data. | |||
| 10. IANA Considerations | 10. IANA Considerations | |||
| This memo includes no request to IANA. | This memo includes no request to IANA. | |||
| 11. Acknowledgements | 11. Acknowledgements | |||
| Thanks to all contributors to the development of LDACS and ICAO PT-T. | Thanks to all contributors to the development of LDACS and ICAO PT-T. | |||
| skipping to change at page 28, line 46 ¶ | skipping to change at page 28, line 46 ¶ | |||
| industry and potential economic spillovers. | industry and potential economic spillovers. | |||
| Thanks to the Aeronautical Communications group at the Institute of | Thanks to the Aeronautical Communications group at the Institute of | |||
| Communications and Navigation of the German Aerospace Center (DLR). | Communications and Navigation of the German Aerospace Center (DLR). | |||
| With that, the authors would like to explicitly thank Miguel Angel | With that, the authors would like to explicitly thank Miguel Angel | |||
| Bellido-Manganell and Lukas Marcel Schalk for their thorough | Bellido-Manganell and Lukas Marcel Schalk for their thorough | |||
| feedback. | feedback. | |||
| 12. Normative References | 12. Normative References | |||
| [GRA2019] Graeupl, T., Rihacek, C., and B. Haindl, "LDACS A/G | ||||
| Specification", SESAR2020 PJ14-02-01 D3.3.030 , 2019. | ||||
| [ICAO2015] International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), "Manual | ||||
| on the Aeronautical Telecommunication Network (ATN) using | ||||
| Internet Protocol Suite (IPS) Standards and Protocols, Doc | ||||
| 9896", January 2015, | ||||
| <https://standards.globalspec.com/std/10026940/icao-9896>. | ||||
| [RTCA2019] Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA), | ||||
| "Internet Protocol Suite Profiles, DO-379", September | ||||
| 2019, <https://www.rtca.org/products/do-379/>. | ||||
| [EURO2019] European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment | ||||
| (EUROCAE), "Technical Standard of Aviation Profiles for | ||||
| ATN/IPS, ED-262", September 2019, | ||||
| <https://eshop.eurocae.net/eurocae-documents-and-reports/ | ||||
| ed-262/>. | ||||
| [ARI2021] ARINC, "Internet Protocol Suite (IPS) For Aeronautical | ||||
| Safety Services Part 1- Airborne IP System Technical | ||||
| Requirements, ARINC SPECIFICATION 858 P1", June 2021, | ||||
| <https://standards.globalspec.com/std/14391274/858p1>. | ||||
| 13. Informative References | 13. Informative References | |||
| [RFC3610] Whiting, D., Housley, R., and N. Ferguson, "Counter with | ||||
| CBC-MAC (CCM)", RFC 3610, DOI 10.17487/RFC3610, September | ||||
| 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3610>. | ||||
| [RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing | [RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing | |||
| Architecture", RFC 4291, DOI 10.17487/RFC4291, February | Architecture", RFC 4291, DOI 10.17487/RFC4291, February | |||
| 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4291>. | 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4291>. | |||
| [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the | [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the | |||
| Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301, | Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301, | |||
| December 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>. | December 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>. | |||
| [RFC4493] Song, JH., Poovendran, R., Lee, J., and T. Iwata, "The | ||||
| AES-CMAC Algorithm", RFC 4493, DOI 10.17487/RFC4493, June | ||||
| 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4493>. | ||||
| [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., | ||||
| Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key | ||||
| Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List | ||||
| (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, | ||||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>. | ||||
| [RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand | ||||
| Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869, | ||||
| DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010, | ||||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>. | ||||
| [RFC6012] Salowey, J., Petch, T., Gerhards, R., and H. Feng, | [RFC6012] Salowey, J., Petch, T., Gerhards, R., and H. Feng, | |||
| "Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Transport | "Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Transport | |||
| Mapping for Syslog", RFC 6012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6012, | Mapping for Syslog", RFC 6012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6012, | |||
| October 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6012>. | October 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6012>. | |||
| [RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer | [RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer | |||
| Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347, | Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347, | |||
| January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>. | January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>. | |||
| [RFC7136] Carpenter, B. and S. Jiang, "Significance of IPv6 | [RFC7136] Carpenter, B. and S. Jiang, "Significance of IPv6 | |||
| Interface Identifiers", RFC 7136, DOI 10.17487/RFC7136, | Interface Identifiers", RFC 7136, DOI 10.17487/RFC7136, | |||
| February 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7136>. | February 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7136>. | |||
| [RFC7236] Reschke, J., "Initial Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) | ||||
| Authentication Scheme Registrations", RFC 7236, | ||||
| DOI 10.17487/RFC7236, June 2014, | ||||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7236>. | ||||
| [RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T. | [RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T. | |||
| Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 | Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 | |||
| (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October | (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October | |||
| 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>. | 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>. | |||
| [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol | [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol | |||
| Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, | Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>. | |||
| [GRA2020] Graeupl, T., Rihacek, C., and B. Haindl, "LDACS A/G | ||||
| Specification", SESAR2020 PJ14-02-01 D3.3.030 , 2020, | ||||
| <https://www.ldacs.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/SESAR202 | ||||
| 0_PJ14-W2-60_D3_1_210_Initial_LDACS_AG_Specification_00_01 | ||||
| _00-1_0_updated.pdf>. | ||||
| [ARI2021] ARINC, "Internet Protocol Suite (IPS) For Aeronautical | ||||
| Safety Services Part 1- Airborne IP System Technical | ||||
| Requirements, ARINC SPECIFICATION 858 P1", June 2021, | ||||
| <https://standards.globalspec.com/std/14391274/858p1>. | ||||
| [EURO2019] European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment | ||||
| (EUROCAE), "Technical Standard of Aviation Profiles for | ||||
| ATN/IPS, ED-262", September 2019, | ||||
| <https://eshop.eurocae.net/eurocae-documents-and-reports/ | ||||
| ed-262/>. | ||||
| [ICAO2015] International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), "Manual | ||||
| on the Aeronautical Telecommunication Network (ATN) using | ||||
| Internet Protocol Suite (IPS) Standards and Protocols, Doc | ||||
| 9896", January 2015, | ||||
| <https://standards.globalspec.com/std/10026940/icao-9896>. | ||||
| [RTCA2019] Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA), | ||||
| "Internet Protocol Suite Profiles, DO-379", September | ||||
| 2019, <https://www.rtca.org/products/do-379/>. | ||||
| [SCH2016] Schneckenburger, N., Jost, T., Shutin, D., Walter, M., | [SCH2016] Schneckenburger, N., Jost, T., Shutin, D., Walter, M., | |||
| Thiasiriphet, T., Schnell, M., and U.C. Fiebig, | Thiasiriphet, T., Schnell, M., and U.C. Fiebig, | |||
| "Measurement of the L-band Air-to-Ground Channel for | "Measurement of the L-band Air-to-Ground Channel for | |||
| Positioning Applications", IEEE Transactions on Aerospace | Positioning Applications", IEEE Transactions on Aerospace | |||
| and Electronic Systems, 52(5), pp.2281-229 , 2016. | and Electronic Systems, 52(5), pp.2281-229 , 2016. | |||
| [MAE20191] Maeurer, N., Graeupl, T., and C. Schmitt, "Evaluation of | [MAE20191] Maeurer, N., Graeupl, T., and C. Schmitt, "Evaluation of | |||
| the LDACS Cybersecurity Implementation", IEEE 38th Digital | the LDACS Cybersecurity Implementation", IEEE 38th Digital | |||
| Avionics Systems Conference (DACS), pp. 1-10, San Diego, | Avionics Systems Conference (DACS), pp. 1-10, San Diego, | |||
| CA, USA , 2019. | CA, USA , 2019. | |||
| [MAE20192] Maeurer, N. and C. Schmitt, "Towards Successful | [MAE20192] Maeurer, N. and C. Schmitt, "Towards Successful | |||
| Realization of the LDACS Cybersecurity Architecture: An | Realization of the LDACS Cybersecurity Architecture: An | |||
| Updated Datalink Security Threat- and Risk Analysis", IEEE | Updated Datalink Security Threat- and Risk Analysis", IEEE | |||
| Integrated Communications, Navigation and Surveillance | Integrated Communications, Navigation and Surveillance | |||
| Conference (ICNS), pp. 1-13, Herndon, VA, USA , 2019. | Conference (ICNS), pp. 1-13, Herndon, VA, USA , 2019. | |||
| [FAN2019] Pierattelli, S., Fantappie, P., Tamalet, S., van den | ||||
| Einden, B., Rihacek, C., and T. Graeupl, "LDACS Deployment | ||||
| Options and Recommendations", SESAR2020 PJ14-02-01 | ||||
| D3.4.020 , 2019. | ||||
| [MAE20182] Maeurer, N. and A. Bilzhause, "A Cybersecurity | [MAE20182] Maeurer, N. and A. Bilzhause, "A Cybersecurity | |||
| Architecture for the L-band Digital Aeronautical | Architecture for the L-band Digital Aeronautical | |||
| Communications System (LDACS)", IEEE 37th Digital Avionics | Communications System (LDACS)", IEEE 37th Digital Avionics | |||
| Systems Conference (DASC), pp. 1-10, London, UK , 2017. | Systems Conference (DASC), pp. 1-10, London, UK , 2017. | |||
| [GRA2011] Graeupl, T. and M. Ehammer, "L-DACS1 Data Link Layer | [GRA2011] Graeupl, T. and M. Ehammer, "L-DACS1 Data Link Layer | |||
| Evolution of ATN/IPS", 30th IEEE/AIAA Digital Avionics | Evolution of ATN/IPS", 30th IEEE/AIAA Digital Avionics | |||
| Systems Conference (DASC), pp. 1-28, Seattle, WA, USA , | Systems Conference (DASC), pp. 1-28, Seattle, WA, USA , | |||
| 2011. | 2011. | |||
| skipping to change at page 32, line 5 ¶ | skipping to change at page 31, line 23 ¶ | |||
| Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) Activities in | Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) Activities in | |||
| SESAR2020", Integrated Communications Navigation and | SESAR2020", Integrated Communications Navigation and | |||
| Surveillance Conference (ICNS), pp. 1-8, Herndon, VA, | Surveillance Conference (ICNS), pp. 1-8, Herndon, VA, | |||
| USA , 2018. | USA , 2018. | |||
| [BEL2019] Bellido-Manganell, M. A. and M. Schnell, "Towards Modern | [BEL2019] Bellido-Manganell, M. A. and M. Schnell, "Towards Modern | |||
| Air-to-Air Communications: the LDACS A2A Mode", IEEE/AIAA | Air-to-Air Communications: the LDACS A2A Mode", IEEE/AIAA | |||
| 38th Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC), pp. 1-10, | 38th Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC), pp. 1-10, | |||
| San Diego, CA, USA , 2019. | San Diego, CA, USA , 2019. | |||
| [TS33.401] Zhang, D., "3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE); | ||||
| Security architecture", T33.401, 3GPP , 2012. | ||||
| [CRO2016] Crowe, B., "Proposed AeroMACS PKI Specification is a Model | [CRO2016] Crowe, B., "Proposed AeroMACS PKI Specification is a Model | |||
| for Global and National Aeronautical PKI Deployments", | for Global and National Aeronautical PKI Deployments", | |||
| WiMAX Forum at 16th Integrated Communications, Navigation | WiMAX Forum at 16th Integrated Communications, Navigation | |||
| and Surveillance Conference (ICNS), pp. 1-19, New York, | and Surveillance Conference (ICNS), pp. 1-19, New York, | |||
| NY, USA , 2016. | NY, USA , 2016. | |||
| [MAE2020] Maeurer, N., Graeupl, T., and C. Schmitt, "Comparing | [MAE2020] Maeurer, N., Graeupl, T., and C. Schmitt, "Comparing | |||
| Different Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Flavors for LDACS", | Different Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Flavors for LDACS", | |||
| IEEE/AIAA 39th Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC), | IEEE/AIAA 39th Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC), | |||
| pp. 1-10, San Antonio, TX, USA , 2020. | pp. 1-10, San Antonio, TX, USA , 2020. | |||
| skipping to change at page 33, line 25 ¶ | skipping to change at page 32, line 38 ¶ | |||
| [KAMA2010] Kamali, B., "An Overview of VHF Civil Radio Network and | [KAMA2010] Kamali, B., "An Overview of VHF Civil Radio Network and | |||
| the Resolution of Spectrum Depletion", Integrated | the Resolution of Spectrum Depletion", Integrated | |||
| Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance Conference, | Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance Conference, | |||
| pp. F4-1-F4-8 , May 2010. | pp. F4-1-F4-8 , May 2010. | |||
| [SON2021] Soni, D., Basu, K., Nabeel, M., Aaraj, N., Manzano, M., | [SON2021] Soni, D., Basu, K., Nabeel, M., Aaraj, N., Manzano, M., | |||
| and R. Karri, "FALCON", Hardware Architectures for Post- | and R. Karri, "FALCON", Hardware Architectures for Post- | |||
| Quantum Digital Signature Schemes, pp. 31-41 , November | Quantum Digital Signature Schemes, pp. 31-41 , November | |||
| 2021. | 2021. | |||
| [KOB1987] Koblitz, N. and M. Hellman, "Elliptic Curve | ||||
| Cryptosystems", Mathematics of Computation, | ||||
| 48(177):203-209. , January 1987. | ||||
| [SIK2021] SIKE, "SIKE – Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation", | [SIK2021] SIKE, "SIKE – Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation", | |||
| October 2021, <https://sike.org/>. | October 2021, <https://sike.org/>. | |||
| [ROY2020] Roy, S.S.. and A. Basso, "High-Speed Instruction-Set | [ROY2020] Roy, S.S.. and A. Basso, "High-Speed Instruction-Set | |||
| Coprocessor For Lattice-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanism: | Coprocessor For Lattice-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanism: | |||
| Saber In Hardware", IACR Transactions on Cryptographic | Saber In Hardware", IACR Transactions on Cryptographic | |||
| Hardware and Embedded Systems, 443-466. , August 2020. | Hardware and Embedded Systems, 443-466. , August 2020. | |||
| [RAW-TECHNOS] | [RAW-TECHNOS] | |||
| Thubert, P., Cavalcanti, D., Vilajosana, X., Schmitt, C., | Thubert, P., Cavalcanti, D., Vilajosana, X., Schmitt, C., | |||
| and J. Farkas, "Reliable and Available Wireless | and J. Farkas, "Reliable and Available Wireless | |||
| Technologies", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- | Technologies", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- | |||
| ietf-raw-technologies-04, 3 August 2021, | ietf-raw-technologies-05, 2 February 2022, | |||
| <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-raw- | <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-raw- | |||
| technologies-04>. | technologies-05>. | |||
| [RAW-USE-CASES] | [RAW-USE-CASES] | |||
| Papadopoulos, G. Z., Thubert, P., Theoleyre, F., and C. J. | Bernardos, C. J., Papadopoulos, G. Z., Thubert, P., and F. | |||
| Bernardos, "RAW use cases", Work in Progress, Internet- | Theoleyre, "RAW use-cases", Work in Progress, Internet- | |||
| Draft, draft-ietf-raw-use-cases-03, 20 October 2021, | Draft, draft-ietf-raw-use-cases-05, 23 February 2022, | |||
| <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-raw-use- | <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-raw-use- | |||
| cases-03>. | cases-05>. | |||
| [I-D.haindl-lisp-gb-atn] | [I-D.haindl-lisp-gb-atn] | |||
| Haindl, B., Lindner, M., Rahman, R., Comeras, M. P., | Haindl, B., Lindner, M., Rahman, R., Comeras, M. P., | |||
| Moreno, V., Maino, F., and B. Venkatachalapathy, "Ground- | Moreno, V., Maino, F., and B. Venkatachalapathy, "Ground- | |||
| Based LISP for the Aeronautical Telecommunications | Based LISP for the Aeronautical Telecommunications | |||
| Network", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-haindl- | Network", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-haindl- | |||
| lisp-gb-atn-06, 6 March 2021, | lisp-gb-atn-06, 6 March 2021, | |||
| <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-haindl-lisp- | <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-haindl-lisp- | |||
| gb-atn-06>. | gb-atn-06>. | |||
| [I-D.ietf-rtgwg-atn-bgp] | [I-D.ietf-rtgwg-atn-bgp] | |||
| Templin, F. L., Saccone, G., Dawra, G., Lindem, A., and V. | Templin, F. L., Saccone, G., Dawra, G., Lindem, A., and V. | |||
| Moreno, "A Simple BGP-based Mobile Routing System for the | Moreno, "A Simple BGP-based Mobile Routing System for the | |||
| Aeronautical Telecommunications Network", Work in | Aeronautical Telecommunications Network", Work in | |||
| Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rtgwg-atn-bgp-11, 6 | Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rtgwg-atn-bgp-14, 14 | |||
| July 2021, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft- | February 2022, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/ | |||
| ietf-rtgwg-atn-bgp-11>. | draft-ietf-rtgwg-atn-bgp-14>. | |||
| [ICAO2018] International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), | [ICAO2018] International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), | |||
| "Handbook on Radio Frequency Spectrum Requirements for | "Handbook on Radio Frequency Spectrum Requirements for | |||
| Civil Aviation, Doc 9718, Volume 1, ICAO Spectrum | Civil Aviation, Doc 9718, Volume 1, ICAO Spectrum | |||
| Strategy, Policy Statements and Related Information", July | Strategy, Policy Statements and Related Information", July | |||
| 2018, <https://www.icao.int/safety/FSMP/Documents/Doc9718/ | 2018, <https://www.icao.int/safety/FSMP/Documents/Doc9718/ | |||
| Doc9718_Vol_I_2nd_ed_(2018)corr1.pdf>. | Doc9718_Vol_I_2nd_ed_(2018)corr1.pdf>. | |||
| [EURO2021] European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment | ||||
| (EUROCAE), "Radio Frequency Function 2020 report", March | ||||
| 2021, <https://www.eurocontrol.int/>. | ||||
| [ARI2019] ARINC, "AOC Air-Ground Data And Message Exchange Format, | [ARI2019] ARINC, "AOC Air-Ground Data And Message Exchange Format, | |||
| ARINC 633", January 2019, | ARINC 633", January 2019, | |||
| <https://standards.globalspec.com/std/13152055/ | <https://standards.globalspec.com/std/13152055/ | |||
| ARINC%20633>. | ARINC%20633>. | |||
| [VIR2021] Virdia, A., Stea, G., and G. Dini, "SAPIENT: Enabling | [VIR2021] Virdia, A., Stea, G., and G. Dini, "SAPIENT: Enabling | |||
| Real-Time Monitoring and Control in the Future | Real-Time Monitoring and Control in the Future | |||
| Communication Infrastructure of Air Traffic Management", | Communication Infrastructure of Air Traffic Management", | |||
| IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, | IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, | |||
| 22(8):4864-4875 , August 2021. | 22(8):4864-4875 , August 2021. | |||
| skipping to change at page 36, line 20 ¶ | skipping to change at page 35, line 20 ¶ | |||
| +------------------------+-------------+-------------+ | +------------------------+-------------+-------------+ | |||
| | Continuity | 0.999 | 0.95 | | | Continuity | 0.999 | 0.95 | | |||
| +------------------------+-------------+-------------+ | +------------------------+-------------+-------------+ | |||
| | Availability | 0.989 | 0.989 | | | Availability | 0.989 | 0.989 | | |||
| +------------------------+-------------+-------------+ | +------------------------+-------------+-------------+ | |||
| | Integrity | 1E-5 per FH | 1E-5 per FH | | | Integrity | 1E-5 per FH | 1E-5 per FH | | |||
| +------------------------+-------------+-------------+ | +------------------------+-------------+-------------+ | |||
| Table 1: CPDLC Requirements for RCP 130 | Table 1: CPDLC Requirements for RCP 130 | |||
| +==============+==========+==============+=========+=========+ | +========================+=========+=========+=========+=========+ | |||
| | | RCP 240 | RCP 240 | RCP 400 | RCP 400 | | | | RCP 240 | RCP 240 | RCP 400 | RCP 400 | | |||
| +==============+==========+==============+=========+=========+ | +========================+=========+=========+=========+=========+ | |||
| | Parameter | ET | TT95% | ET | TT95% | | | Parameter | ET | TT95% | ET | TT95% | | |||
| +--------------+----------+--------------+---------+---------+ | +------------------------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ | |||
| | Transaction | 240 | 210 | 400 | 350 | | | Transaction Time (sec) | 240 | 210 | 400 | 350 | | |||
| | Time (sec) | | | | | | +------------------------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ | |||
| +--------------+----------+--------------+---------+---------+ | | Continuity | 0.999 | 0.95 | 0.999 | 0.95 | | |||
| | Continuity | 0.999 | 0.95 | 0.999 | 0.95 | | +------------------------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ | |||
| +--------------+----------+--------------+---------+---------+ | | Availability | 0.989 | 0.989 | 0.989 | 0.989 | | |||
| | Availability | 0.989 | 0.989 | 0.989 | 0.989 | | +------------------------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ | |||
| | | (safety) | (efficiency) | | | | | Integrity | 1E-5 | 1E-5 | 1E-5 | 1E-5 | | |||
| +--------------+----------+--------------+---------+---------+ | | | per FH | per FH | per FH | per FH | | |||
| | Integrity | 1E-5 per | 1E-5 per FH | 1E-5 | 1E-5 | | +------------------------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ | |||
| | | FH | | per FH | per FH | | ||||
| +--------------+----------+--------------+---------+---------+ | ||||
| Table 2: CPDLC Requirements for RCP 240/400 | Table 2: CPDLC Requirements for RCP 240/400 | |||
| RCP Monitoring and Alerting Criteria in case of CPDLC: | RCP Monitoring and Alerting Criteria in case of CPDLC: | |||
| - MA-1: The system shall be capable of detecting failures and | - MA-1: The system shall be capable of detecting failures and | |||
| configuration changes that would cause the communication service | configuration changes that would cause the communication service | |||
| no longer meet the RCP specification for the intended use. | no longer meet the RCP specification for the intended use. | |||
| - MA-2: When the communication service can no longer meet the RCP | - MA-2: When the communication service can no longer meet the RCP | |||
| specification for the intended function, the flight crew and/or | specification for the intended function, the flight crew and/or | |||
| the controller shall take appropriate action. | the controller shall take appropriate action. | |||
| +==============+=====+=====+==========+==============+======+=======+ | +==============+========+========+========+========+========+=======+ | |||
| | | RSP | RSP | RSP 180 | RSP 180 | RSP |RSP 400| | | | RSP | RSP | RSP | RSP | RSP | RSP | | |||
| | | 160 | 160 | | | 400 | | | | | 160 | 160 | 180 | 180 | 400 | 400 | | |||
| +==============+=====+=====+==========+==============+======+=======+ | +==============+========+========+========+========+========+=======+ | |||
| | Parameter | OT |DT95%| OT | DT95% | OT | DT95% | | | Parameter | OT | DT95% | OT | DT95% | OT | DT95% | | |||
| +--------------+-----+-----+----------+--------------+------+-------+ | +--------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+-------+ | |||
| | Transaction | 160 | 90 | 180 | 90 | 400 | 300 | | | Transaction | 160 | 90 | 180 | 90 | 400 | 300 | | |||
| | Time (sec) | | | | | | | | | Time (sec) | | | | | | | | |||
| +--------------+-----+-----+----------+--------------+------+-------+ | +--------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+-------+ | |||
| | Continuity |0.999| 0.95| 0.999 | 0.95 |0.999 | 0.95 | | | Continuity | 0.999 | 0.95 | 0.999 | 0.95 | 0.999 | 0.95 | | |||
| +--------------+-----+-----+----------+--------------+------+-------+ | +--------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+-------+ | |||
| | Availability |0.989|0.989| 0.989 | 0.989 |0.989 | 0.989 | | | Availability | 0.989 | 0.989 | 0.989 | 0.989 | 0.989 | 0.989 | | |||
| | | | | (safety) | (efficiency) | | | | +--------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+-------+ | |||
| +--------------+-----+-----+----------+--------------+------+-------+ | | Integrity | 1E-5 | 1E-5 | 1E-5 | 1E-5 | 1E-5 | 1E-5 | | |||
| | Integrity | 1E-5| 1E-5| 1E-5 per | 1E-5 per FH | 1E-5 | 1E-5 | | | | per FH | per FH | per FH | per FH | per | per | | |||
| | | per | per | FH | |per FH| per FH| | | | | | | | FH | FH | | |||
| | | FH | FH | | | | | | +--------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+-------+ | |||
| +--------------+-----+-----+----------+--------------+------+-------+ | ||||
| Table 3: ADS-C Requirements | Table 3: ADS-C Requirements | |||
| RCP Monitoring and Alerting Criteria: | RCP Monitoring and Alerting Criteria: | |||
| - MA-1: The system shall be capable of detecting failures and | - MA-1: The system shall be capable of detecting failures and | |||
| configuration changes that would cause the ADS-C service no longer | configuration changes that would cause the ADS-C service no longer | |||
| meet the RSP specification for the intended function. | meet the RSP specification for the intended function. | |||
| - MA-2: When the ADS-C service can no longer meet the RSP | - MA-2: When the ADS-C service can no longer meet the RSP | |||
| specification for the intended function, the flight crew and/or | specification for the intended function, the flight crew and/or | |||
| End of changes. 46 change blocks. | ||||
| 181 lines changed or deleted | 142 lines changed or added | |||
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